Stephen Aftergood: Defense Warning Network

Ethics, Government, IO Impotency, Military
Steven Aftergood
Steven Aftergood

THE DEFENSE WARNING NETWORK

The structure and functions of the Defense Warning Network were outlined in a new directive issued yesterday by the Department of Defense.

The mission of the Defense Warning Network is to provide notice “of potential threats posed by adversaries, political and economic instability, failed or failing states, and any other emerging challenges that could affect the United States or its interests worldwide.”  See The Defense Warning Network, DoD Directive 3115.16, December 5, 2013.

Phi Beta Iota: This used to be what Charlie Allen, then National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/W) was responsible for, along with the Warning Committee.  Evidently DoD is not getting what it needs from the DNI or CIA. When combined with the increasingly desperate attempts to develop “Alternative 2” and “Alternative ISR” capabilities, one must conclude that DoD has correctly appraised both the national and its own defense C4I capabilities to be deadly dysfunctional.  We are right back at 1992 (Dwayne Andrews and Paul Strassman, among others), trillions of dollars later, with nothing to show for a quarter century of stove-piped idiocy — less the lost time, blood, treasure, and spirit.  Noteworthy is the following from the policy memorandum:

e. The DoD warning mission is to:

(1) Identify and warn appropriate leadership within the DoD of potential threats posed by adversaries, political and economic instability, failed or failing states, and any other emerging challenges that could affect the United States or its interests worldwide, to include:

(a) Warning of attack on the United States or its allies or conflict that could require
the employment of U.S. or allied forces and capabilities.

(b) Warning of state collapse or failure that could trigger employment of U.S. or
allied forces and capabilities.

(c) Warning of terrorist, political, economic, military, technological, energy, environmental, societal, or other developments that could influence the development and implementation of defense policy, operational and contingency plans, and force capabilities.

(2) Identify and convey threats, vulnerabilities, and address potential opportunities
associated with U.S. interests, objectives, assets, policies, plans, and ongoing  operations or activities.

(3) Inform debates among and decisions by intelligence and operational consumers
within DoD about potential implications, cascading effects, and unintended consequences that could affect or be affected by proposed U.S. policies, plans, actions, or responses to emerging foreign events and trends.

See Also:

2013 Intelligence Future
1976-2013: Intelligence Models 2.1
Decision Support Story Board
NATO OSE/M4IS2 2.0
Open Source Agency (OSA)