Marcus Aurelius: Top Polygrapher Caught Selling Secrets to Singapore….Proxy for China?

Corruption, Government
Marcus Aurelius
Marcus Aurelius

A little irony here — one of USG’s premier spycatchers accused of committing espionage by flogging info about polygraph TTP and vulnerabilities.

Senior Official at Federal Polygraph School Accused of Espionage

Scott W. Carmichael, a recently retired counterintelligence investigator with the Defense Intelligence Agency, has accused Donald Krapohl, Special Assistant to the Chief, National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA) and longtime editor of the American Polygraph Association quarterly, Polygraph, of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. In an e-mail message to retired FBI polygraph examiner Robert Drdak dated 3 September 2014, a copy of which was received by, Carmichael alleges that Krapohl manipulated Drdak in an elaborate scheme to funnel classified information about polygraph countermeasures to the government of Singapore.

Carmichael theorizes that Krapohl encouraged Drdak to write a paper on polygraph countermeasures that was ultimately based on a classified study conducted in 1994 by Dr. Gordon H. Barland, then a researcher with the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (now the NCCA), and to sell that paper to the Lafayette Instrument Company, knowing that the information in the paper would make its way to the Singaporean government.

Carmichael concludes his e-mail by urging Drdak to “[call] the FBI before they begin to look at you as a suspect.”

Carmichael played a key role in the investigation of Cuban spy Ana Belen Montes (who incidentally beat the polygraph), about which he has authored a book, True Believer.

The full text of Carmichael’s e-mail to retired FBI polygraph examiner Robert Drdak (with one redaction) follows:


From: Scott W. Carmichael <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, Sep 3, 2014 at 9:22 AM
Subject: Your countermeasures document on Lafayette and Limestone
To: [email protected]


You’ve got a problem.  Recommend you read this more than once before taking action.

A little background on me:  My name is Scott W. Carmichael.  You and I have never met, and I doubt that you have ever even heard of me. For background, I served for a period of four years as an NCIS agent from 1984-1988, and then took a job in 1988 with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as a counterintelligence investigator based in Washington, D.C..  I retired just months ago, this past April, after serving for nearly 26 years with that agency.  I was DIA’s senior security and counterintelligence investigator at the time of my retirement.  Some people in the business know me because of my role in identifying former DIA analyst Ana B. Montes as an espionage suspect, and then persuading WFO to open the investigation which lead in time to her arrest as a Cuban spy back in CY2001.  I wrote a book about the case – you can find a reference to it on  You can find additional references on Amazon to other books that I’ve written, and you can find other references to me simply by Googling my name plus the keyword DIA on the internet.

I am generally aware of your professional background, including the role you played in clearing Richard Jewel of suspicion in the 1996 bombing in Olympic Park.  I took my son to watch the Dream Team play against Yugoslavia that night, by the way, and missed the bombing only because my son was too tired after the game to walk to the Park.

Your problem:  The document which you provided to Lafayette and Limestone was plagiarized.  That is correct.  Worse, the original was an official U.S. government document which summarized the findings of a study performed in CY2003 by Dan Weatherman and Paul Menges.  Their findings were tested/verified by Dr. Stuart M. Senter.  The study conducted by Dan and Paul drew on raw data collected by Dr. Gordon H. Barland and the classified report of his earlier study of mental countermeasures dated in 1994.  Dan, Paul and Dr. Senter performed their work as employees of DoDPI.  Your old colleague and former business partner Don Krapohl provided oversight for their work and edited the report submitted by Dan and Paul back in CY2003.  The entire effort was official, and it was based on a classified study.

Dan and Paul believed their findings constituted a new, reliable, and therefore extremely valuable diagnostic tool.  Dr. Senter tested the tool and determined that, sure enough, the specific diagnostic features identified by Dan and Paul through their study correlated with a high degree of probability to the employment of countermeasures.  As you may know, the U.S. government now requires all federal polygraph examiners to receive 40 hours of instruction on polygraph countermeasures to become certified as federal examiners; and, to receive 4 hours of polygraph countermeasures refresher training every year to maintain their certifications.  DoDPI/DCCA is so confident in the diagnostic tool developed by Dan and Paul, they decided to use the new tool as the very foundation for the 40-hour instruction and the annual 4-hour refresher training.

Again, Dr. Barland’s 1994 study, which formed the basis for Weatherman and Menges’s study, was classified.  By definition, then, and by DoD Instruction, Weatherman and Menges’s study and findings, were therefore also classified.

But DoDPI did something stupid.  They committed a security violation.  In fact, they did so repeatedly.  They found it inconvenient and unwieldy to carry classified briefing slides around with them as they traveled to various parts of the country to teach the diagnostic tool to examiners – and, when they found it necessary to brief uncleared personnel on the tool, rather than follow routine but bothersome administrative procedures which would have enabled them to do so, they elected to simply not stamp their briefing slides at all.  Instead, they stamped their materials as Unclassified/FOUO – while handling and treating their materials as though they were classified, in order to ensure their tool did not fall into foreign hands.  Why?  Because anyone who learns how the entire US government now detects the employment of countermeasures, will be able to device methods to defeat the US government examination process.

And then you sold it to Lafayette and Limestone.

Quite a shock, isn’t it.

Don Krapohl roped you in, Bob.  Used you.  You were a dupe.  Of that, I am fairly certain.  I was in the CI business for 30 years, Bob, and Ana B. Montes was not the only spy whom I personally identified, and not the only one I put in jail.  I achieved some small success in the business, and I got to be pretty good at connecting the dots.

Let me make an educated guess:  One day, out of the blue, Don either called you or approached you, and asked whether you were yet published.  He told you that getting published was a good idea, because it made you an ‘expert’.  And since you were retired, you could command more money for speeches and appearances as a ‘published’ expert.  So he then told you that he had something that he’d been working on in his spare time – some ideas that he’d been kicking around, and that he hadn’t gotten around to actually publishing them yet.  He offered them to you ‘to take a look’ at them.  So he provided a ‘draft’ paper and charts.  Then you probably talked about the concepts a bit, maybe posed a few questions, and then Don probably suggested that you write an introduction and maybe make some changes or whatever – and offered to ‘edit’ the final paper for you.  And then offered to ‘facilitate’ an introduction to both Lafayette and Limestone – since he already had a business relationship with both companies.  Am I far off the mark, Bob?  Don was just being a good friend and generous buddy.

Or am I wrong?

I’m right.

A little history for you:  Back in CY2008, Don Krapohl had just completed a tour as president of APA, and was then the editor-in-chief of APA’s magazine, Polygraph.  As editor, he had to drum up business for the magazine, by which I mean that he had to persuade others to write articles for the magazine. Among those he approached were Donnie Dutton and Jack Ogilvie, who at that time served as chief of Phoenix P.D.’s polygraph shop.  The pitch which Don used to persuade Donnie and Jack was the same as that described above:  Are you published, yet?  It would be good for you to be published….  An article appeared in the magazine by Donnie and Jack which purported to be a re-study of an earlier study of chair sensors used to detect countermeasures.  The earlier study was one conducted by a graduate student at Michigan State University (MSU) in CY2002 who provided both his raw data/charts as well as his ‘unpublished’ paper for use by Donnie and Jack.  The graduate student in question?  A Singaporean military intelligence officer who served as chief of the government of Singapore’s polygraph school – V. Cholan Kopparumsolan – who happened to be a countermeasures specialist.  Cholan was a member of APA.  An APA VP controlled a contract to provide polygraph training to Cholan’s school. I interviewed both Donnie and Jack.  Neither of them ‘wrote’ the article in question.  A ‘draft’ of the article was provided by Don Krapohl to them; they added comments; Don Krapohl ‘edited’ their comments and finalized the article. Question:  Who wrote the ‘draft’, and where did it come from?

Bob – you are a retired FBI Special Agent.  Re-read the above paragraph, then figure that one out, for yourself.

Jack Ogilvie retired shortly after the article was published in Polygraph magazine.  Krapohl, Donnie and..Cholan were invited to the annual AAPP convention to witness as Jack gave a presentation on his and Donnie’s ‘findings’ as published in the article.  Right in front of Cholan.  After the convention, Krapohl and Cholan went for a hike in the Grand Canyon. Thereafter, each year following the annual APA convention, Cholan led a Singaporean delegation to DoDPI/DCCA/NCCA…to request training, including training in countermeasures.  Naturally, the request for countermeasures training was refused.  Cholan and other foreign members of APA had very good reason to believe that NCCA did indeed possess something special in the way of countermeasures training.  Why?  Because every year during the annual APA convention, NCCA set aside a 4-hour block of time for federal/USG examiners to receive their annual 4-hour refresher training in countermeasures – and they penned it onto the calendar!  And every year, foreign members of APA asked the Americans what they knew about countermeasures that no one else in the world seemed to know.

Cholan, therefore, had good reason to believe that NCCA…and Krapohl…had access to something special with regard to countermeasures.  But that NCCA was not willing to simply hand it over.

Until you gave it to Lafayette and Limestone.

I suspect Cholan threatened to blow the whistle on Krapohl for plagiarizing his MSU ‘unpublished’ paper, and that Cholan demanded a quid pro quo – something of equal value in return.  Krapohl wasn’t about to simply hand over the paper written by Weatherman and Menges.  So he had you do it, for him.

The Singaporeans use Lafayette machines.  Once you sold your paper to Lafayette and Limestone, Krapohl simply told Cholan where to find it.

Dan Weatherman and Stu Senter reviewed your paper and compared it to their paper.  There is no doubt whatsoever.

Bob – I worked counterintelligence for 30 years.  I personally identified two suspects who were subsequently convicted under federal espionage statutes and imprisoned – that’s a good record.  And I neutralized quite a few others. I know espionage.  Anyone who should have known that that material would fall into the hands of a foreign government, to the benefit of a foreign government or to the detriment of ours, violated 18 USC 794.  The compromise of the Weatherman/Menges paper constitutes espionage.

And your name is all over that paper, and probably all over contracts with Lafayette and Limestone.

You have a problem.

Call Dan Weatherman.  Ask.  Then call your former colleagues at the FBI and offer to serve as a material witness.

Because frankly and candidly, my assessment is that you were a victim in this.  Just my assessment.

But DO NOT call Don Krapohl.  He does not know that I am even remotely aware of any of this.  If you call him – to alert him – then we’ll know that you and Don cooked this up together.

Call Dan Weatherman at [phone number redacted].  That is Dan’s home telephone number. Verify what I’ve told you.  Then get ahead of this by calling the FBI before they begin to look at you as a suspect.

Call the FBI.  Before I call the FBI.

And don’t you dare alert Don Krapohl.

Scott W. Carmichael