Search: negative reviews lessons not learned us navy status quo and culture

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Amazon Page

Complex searches do not work with Word Press but simple ones do.  Robert Steele has not reviewed this book but provides the link to an earlier guest review here an amplifying comment below the fold with many links. A search result that works: < Review Lessons Not Learned >

Review (Guest): Lessons Not Learned – The U.S. Navy’s Status Quo Culture

See Also:

Review: The Rules of the Game–Jutland and British Naval Command

Winslow Wheeler: US Navy Status Quo Culture — Lessons Not Learned, Substituting Pork and Lies for Effective Weapons Systems + US Flag Officer Lack of Integrity RECAP

Robert David Steele Vivas
Robert David Steele Vivas

ROBERT STEELE: All of the services have toxic leadership issues.  All of the services lie, cheat, and steal. All of the services lack ethics, fall short in leadership, and eschew ethical evidence-based decision-support. The US Navy has its own unique spin rooted in history, combining the blockheadness of the Battle of Jutland (do not question authority) with a Master after God complex that is dangerous now. When I briefed the 450 ship Navy concept in 1992, deeply rooted in a new expeditionary environment study the Navy had not bothered to read, the bloated Captains called for my firing. To question the centrality of the carrier group far from everywhere was heresy — today we also know that carriers are toast in the face of Chinese submarines with German diesel engines and Russian supersonic missiles. Today, although CNO has created a strategist track, this is receiving lip service, in part because none of the services are capable of holding three complicated thoughts in their heads at one time: Whole of Government; four levels of analysis where the threat and the force structure need changes at each level; and waging peaceful preventive measures instead of blindly embracing elective wars based on ideology and lies. Now there is some good news. There is a TINY possibility that the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (a Marine with above average integrity) and the new Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (an Air Force officer that understands why the Air Force has to be good at long-haul movement), might open the way for respecting the fundamentals. I never tire of quoting Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC):

I am constantly being asked for a bottom-line defense number. I don’t know of any logical way to arrive at such a figure without analyzing the threat; without determining what changes in our strategy should be made in light of the changes in the threat; and then determining what force structure and weapons programs we need to carry out this revised strategy.

It has been my honor to do more thinking along the lines we need — embracing holistic analytics, true cost economics, and open source everything engineering that optimizes by, with, and through possibilities — than anyone else in the US ranks. For this I have been marginalized. Just as my solution to the Somali pirate issue, devised for CENTCOM J2P in 2005 and refused by SOCOM and Irregular Navy for years because it was — in their almost identical words — “not an expensive enough problem,” so today we have Service Chiefs that continue to fight for budget share and protect waste because that is what they know how to do and no one is holding them accountable for being honest and effective. We should be eradicating the 45% to 75% documented waste (from acquisition to Afghanistan) and easily meeting the President’s objective of a 30% cut in the defense budget while also creating a 450 ship Navy, a long-haul Air Force, an air-mobile Army, and a Marine Corps that is once again focused on being a 911 force also capable of forced entry, carried by a Navy that is 33% littoral instead of 9% littoral. Here are two contrasting quotes that I find useful in evaluating where we are today:

The danger is, you’ll become like a moron. You’ll become incapable of learning from most people in the world, no matter how much experience they have in their particular areas that may be much greater than yours” [because of your blind faith in the value of your narrow and often incorrect secret information].  Daniel Ellsberg speaking to Henry Kissinger

When things are not going well, until you get the truth out on the table, no matter how ugly, you are not in a position to deal with it.  Bob Seelert, Chairman of Saatchi & Saatchi Worldwide (New York)

It will be interesting to see how General Vincent Stewart, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, deals with all of the enemies of a sound national defense at each of the four levels — enemies as much domestic as they are foreign.

See Especially:

2014 Robert Steele On Defense Intelligence – Seven Strikes

2001-04-01Threats, Strategy, and Force Structure: An Alternative Paradigm for National Security in the 21st Century” Chapter 9 in Steven Metz (ed.) Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm (Strategic Studies Institute,April 2001)

1999-04-01 Muddy Waters, Rusting Buckets: A Skeptical Assessment of U.S. Naval Effectiveness in the 21st Century.”

1990 Expeditionary Environment Analytic Model

See Also:

2014 Robert Steele Answers to Richard Olivier on 21st Leadership with Annotated Bibliography & Links

2012 Robert Steele: Reflections on the US Military — Redirection Essential — and a Prerequisite to Creating a 450-Ship Navy, a Long-Haul Air Force, and an Air-Liftable Army + Sanity RECAP

2011 Robert Steele: Citizen in Search of Integrity (Full Text Online for Google Translate)

1995 Robert Steele on Waging War and Peace in the 21st Century — French National Flag Conference on Information Strategy

1976-2013: Analytic, Methodological, & Technical Models 2.1

1957+ Story Board: Peace & Prosperity Through Ethical Evidence-Based Decision-Support — Analytic Sources, Models, Tools, & Tradecraft

Chuck Spinney: The Timeless Corrupt Defense Bow Wave — with Comment from Robert Steele on How to Cut Defense 30% AND Create a 450-Ship Navy, Long-Haul Air Force, and Air-Mobile Army

Journal: USN Refuses NGF for USMC–Gap Clearly Identified by Expeditionary Factors Study in 1989

Marcus Aurelius: Can the Army [CSA] Handle the Truth? Includes Copy of SSI Monograph “Closing the Candor Chasm”

Marcus Aurelius: LYING TO OURSELVES – DISHONESTY IN THE ARMY PROFESSION (Free Monograph) Plus RS on BD Opportunity

Neal Rauhauser: US Aircraft Carriers — Way Too Many, Irresponsibly Drawing Resources Away from a Long-Haul Air Force and an Air-Mobile Army

NIGHTWATCH: From 1979 to 2012 – No Improvement in DoD Response to Ambassadors and Embassies in Extremis + EE21 RECAP

Robert Steele: CNO Realizes We Need a 450 Ship Navy — 22 Years After I Was Almost Fired for Same Idea…

Search: Steele USMC C4I 1990’s

Vincent Stewart: D/DIA 1st USMC 1st Jamaican-American, Starts with Seven Strikes (& Nine Specific Senior Executive Enemies in Place) on Day One

Way of the Truth — Quotations

Winslow Wheeler: Purge the Generals to Fix the Army + Flag Corruption and Ineptitude RECAP