

2014 GLOBAL FORECAST







U.S. Security Policy at a Crossroads

EDITORS
CRAIG COHEN | KATHLEEN HICKS
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CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES



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THE ENDURING STRENGTH OF AMERICA LIES IN A DYNAMIC CIVIC CULTURE, WITH INDIVIDUALS EMPOWERED TO THINK NEW IDEAS AND MOBILIZE ACTION.

THE DETERIORATION OF GOVERNMENT

Introduction | John J. Hamre

The political standoff in Washington resulting in the shutdown of government operations brings to mind a remarkable study that was done several years ago by the World Bank. The analysts tried to account for the wealth of a nation.

Was national wealth primarily produced by natural resources (such as energy resources, agricultural richness, and fishing stocks), man-made resources (such as factories, infrastructure, and housing stock) or intangible resources (such as quality of judicial courts, stability of currency, rule of law, quality of education systems, and consensus on national purposes)? Overwhelmingly (by a factor of 3 to 1), the primary sources of national wealth were these intangible resources.

Reflecting on this, it is ironic that all of the attributes of intangible wealth come down to the quality of government. Quality governance is the foundation of national wealth. A government that is fair, flexible, creative, efficient and free of corruption contributes to national wealth. (Look at examples like Finland, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and Norway.) Governance that is contentious, out-of-date, rule-bound, and inefficient destroys national wealth. (The list of examples is too long to include here.)

I fear we are witnessing a serious deterioration of government in the United States that will affect our long-term prosperity. Some members of Congress think any form of government is bad and want to shut it down or radically scale it back. Other members of Congress judge government effectiveness by increasing quantities of spending, irrespective of performance. Sadly, almost all members of Congress think that compromising will prejudice their tactical position for the next election. They may consider it tactics, but tragically this most recent standoff has strategic consequences—and all of them are bad.

I hear regularly from foreign friends, and most of them are senior government officials or private sector executives. In almost every instance they are good friends of America. I always hear the same refrain: "What are you guys doing to yourselves? What is wrong with America?"

My response is depressing. "America no longer has two political parties that seek broad support in American society. Our politics have evolved three minority parties that cannot attract broad national support." The Democratic Party moved more to the center during the last decade and won elections. But the last five years have seen the defeat of most "Blue Dog" Democrats. The party now is anchored on the progressive left base that was built in the 1930s to 1960s. Its agenda is appealing to 25 percent to 30 percent of American society.

The other two minority parties have emerged from the splintering of the Republican Party. Tea Party Republicans believe the traditional Republican Party has lost its way and has been corrupted by Washington folkways. In their view, only radical surgery can save the country. Deficits are the greatest threat facing the country, they argue, and nothing else much matters until we get control of that problem. Traditional Republicans are energized by Tea Party activism, but see the Tea Party agenda as a poison chalice with the public.

All three minority parties maneuver in endless tactical posturing. Since their bases demand loyalty to primary convictions, politicians don't feel they can compromise on fundamental issues. Rather, the debate devolves into empty posturing for public effect.

This situation is caused by two things. State party leaders have engineered safe electoral districts, so the only election that matters now for most members of Congress is a primary, not the general election. Primaries promote ideological purity, not governing pragmatism. The other problem is the way money has turbocharged Washington politics. Members of Congress spend all their time trying to raise money. Put these two factors together and

we get politicians that focus on the next election and embrace an agenda that is attractive to their district and their donors (increasingly out of their districts), but may be hugely unpopular to the nation.


People may feel it is a tactical situation, but it has strategic implications. The quality of American government is deteriorating significantly in this environment. I see it in every corner. Washington politics are threatening America's future.

These divisions at home have consequences internationally for the United States. After a dozen years of war, the 2008 financial crisis, budgetary contraction inside government, and growing political polarization, U.S. security policy stands at a crossroads as America finds itself lacking a durable political consensus on the nation's role in the world.

Objectively, the foundations of American power are strong. We have a creative entrepreneurial class, strong corporations, superb universities, rule of law, a reasonably efficient judicial system, and broad social consensus on American values. America should be able to sustain its global superpower status indefinitely through this century. All of this, however, is put at risk by the political gridlock that is undermining the foundations of American prosperity and freezing America's capacity to respond to breaking developments in the world.

In this issue of *Global Forecast*, CSIS scholars answer the questions that we believe will determine the future trajectory of American power in 2014 and beyond. It's no surprise that many of these questions concern our ability to adapt to changing realities in the Middle East and to sustain our commitments in Asia. But an equally important number concern getting our own house in order.

Ultimately, I am optimistic. America has endured episodes in the past of political gridlock and a collapse of consensus. The enduring strength of America lies in a dynamic civic culture, with individuals empowered to think new ideas and mobilize action. These essays offer our perspective on solutions for the future. We have the capacity to put our country on the right path again.



CAN WE REBUILD A NATIONAL SECURITY CONSENSUS?

Kathleen H. Hicks

American foreign policy is at a crossroads. The nation is fiscally challenged, politically polarized, frustrated by 10 years of conflict, and confronting relative decline—a daunting set of conditions in which to establish a foreign affairs agenda. Successfully navigating the shifting domestic and international landscape at this crossroads will be critical to securing U.S. interests. Reviving a consensus on how to do so is almost as important.

The prospect of U.S. military intervention in Syria has highlighted the fragility of our long-standing national security consensus. When our nation is deeply fragmented, we are prone to strategic drift, as happened during the Vietnam War. In contrast, a shared vision for U.S. national security across a core, bipartisan cross-section of the American public and their elected officials enables us to be agile and purposeful, as it did immediately after World War II. A U.S. foreign policy consensus is also important to the friends and allies it helps to assure and to those whom it helps to credibly deter.

Consensus, however, will not be easy.

CHALLENGES TO CONSENSUS

Strengthening the consensus on the U.S. role in the world requires the nation to address at least four interwoven challenges. First, most Americans are understandably concerned foremost with solving problems at home. Education, infrastructure, health care, and the economy are issues of primary importance to many American families. The past 10



years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the lack of an urgent, existential threat to the Unites States have compounded this desire to look inward. It is unsurprising that in a 2012 Pew Research poll, 83 percent of respondents agreed that we should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems at home, up from 73 percent in 2002.¹

Second, resources are scarce. The U.S. economy is still recovering and entitlement spending is consuming an increasing proportion of the federal budget. Fewer dollars are now available for defense, diplomacy, and developmentindeed, for any discretionary spending. The effects of these fiscal constraints go beyond the reduction in our ability to execute a given security strategy. They also increase the scrutiny over the strategic choices themselves. Should the United States try to improve its domestic infrastructure (currently graded a D+ by the American Society of Engineers), ensure its military can defeat any potential future adversary (a difficult and costly goal), and/or increase security at U.S. borders? How should we pay for what we want: raise

tax rates, cut entitlements, reduce military benefits? Winston Churchill best captured the sentiment for our times with his famous quip: "Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think."

A third challenge to consensus is a deepening division in American culture over the appropriate balance between privacy and security. On the left and right, the government is suffering from a trust deficit in its handling of information and technology. In the center, there is disgust over the very leaks that have fueled the distrust. Such divisions are longstanding in American history, but in the information and unmanned age, they are likely to multiply. Left unresolved, these threats to the public's trust in U.S. foreign and security policies will constrain the president and Congress by creating confusion over fundamental principles regarding the role and limits of government.

Finally, perhaps the greatest challenge to a shared vision of the U.S. role in the world

^{1.} Pew Research Center, "U.S. Foreign Policy: Key Data Points from Pew Research," July 19, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/u-s-foreign-policy-key-data-points/.

is the disintegration of bipartisanship. This disintegration reflects the factors cited above and many others beyond this author's scope. Bipartisanship has long been strongest in the national security arena. This owes in part to sustained levels of public support for an active U.S. role on the world stage, which paradoxically remains at levels on par with the public's desire to focus more at home.² Yet as the chasm between political parties widens on other issues, agreement on national security matters suffers in the wake.


BUILDING A SECURITY CONSENSUS

Though the above challenges to consensus are perhaps obvious, their resolution is not. The United States is at an important crossroads in its foreign policy. With two years until the next presidential election, 2014 is a propitious time to begin a public discussion on the key principles, interests, and approaches that should guide American security policy. Some of the key questions to address include:

- What are our nation's interests in the world, and what relative value do we assign to each of those interests?
- Does the United States need to be a leader in the world to secure those interests? What does it mean to lead in a period of austerity?
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- What domestic investments and choices are critical for making the United States stronger abroad?
- What costs and risks is the United States willing to bear in its rebalance to Asia? The fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates? Preventing Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons?
- Where can investments in development and diplomacy offset more costly investments in defense? Where can private industry assist and what efforts are inherently the federal government's to pursue?
- How can we be more effective in working with our allies and partners across the globe? What must the United States be prepared to do alone and what should others provide in support of common interests?
- What principles should guide leaders in balancing the need for improved security with the rights of American citizens?

These issues must be weighed and discussed by citizens across the nation. We will not achieve the needed foreign policy consensus through an insular debate inside of Washington, D.C. Although a public dialogue alone is unlikely to overcome the challenges to consensus, it is a necessary step in forging a coherent and convincing narrative for America's desired role in the world. Armed with a common understanding of our purpose and principles, the United States will be positioned to forge a national security approach that sustains the kind of active role in the world that most Americans seek.

^{2.} Ibid. In 2012, 83 percent of respondents agreed that it is best for the future of the United States for it to be active in world affairs.



THE SNOWDEN EFFECT: CAN WE UNDO THE DAMAGE TO AMERICAN POWER?

James A. Lewis

Political scientists and military strategists have tried to define a new grand strategy for America since the end of the Cold War. Despite repeated efforts, the results have not been compelling, perhaps because they start from the wrong premise about America's continued global role. The chaotic global politic situation we face now, with clashing values and interests, is not the same as a military threat to freedom from hostile totalitarian regimes against whom we could lead and defend. In the current situation, we are just another contender for power, one whose ideas, no matter how exceptional, are often greeted with suspicions that Edward Snowden's leaks have only reinforced.

The damage done by the leaks to intelligence collection will be short lived, but the damage to American influence could easily endure. The leaks have done more harm than we recognize. Snowden is the latest in a long line of American naïfs-gullible, self-righteous, with a dislike for America that blinds them to the world's larger dangers. Like the unfortunate Bradley Manning, Snowden was exploited by those whose intent is to damage American influence and power. We are used to applauding those who use the internet against authoritarian

regimes, but the tool has now been turned against democracies. Individuals who use the global internet for political effect are a new and potent force in international politics, and the internet lets them reach an expanded audience for a counter-narrative that casts Ameri-

can action in the harsh light of self-interest.

The United States is unique in defining its selfinterest as best served by promoting a stable international order based on the rule of law, open and equitable arrangements for trade, and a commitment to democratic government and human rights. Its record is not perfect, but is better than any other nation in pursuing such ideals. But most nations now believe that legitimacy in international affairs comes from the United Nations, not from an inherited exceptionalism. The reaction to the leaks shows that much of the world questions exceptionalism as a justification for our actions.

American exceptionalism is a historical artifact from a world that no longer exists. Seventy years ago, the United States led an alliance of democracies to defeat fascism. Twenty-five years ago, with the same Western alliance, it overcame a massive totalitarian regime. But most of the world's population was not alive for these events and they find them unpersuasive in explaining that we are not just another great power or hegemon

pursuing narrow self-interest. The invocation of the right of self-defense is unpersuasive because most nations believe self-defense is only justified when a nation's territorial integrity or political independence is threatened, and the United States faces no such threat. Elites in countries as disparate as Germany and Brazil question American conduct as contrary to the norms of state behavior. The disparity between America's historic message and its current actions, and the ambiguous nature of conflict today where

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This is not an argument about whether American actions since 2003 were necessary or correct. What counts for a new grand strategy

is how they are perceived by others and how this perception affects American power. When Brazil's president tells the UN General Assembly that Snowden's revelations "caused indignation and repudiation in public opinion around the world," and were "a breach of international law and an affront to the principles that must guide relations among [states]," she reflects a growing unwillingness to accept American leadership.

Brazil takes a conservative approach to international relations that reflects narrowly defined interests. If Brazil itself is not directly threatened, it takes no action. The chief purpose of international relations is commercial benefit or, for larger powers, to assert regional dominance. These concepts could describe American foreign policy in the nineteenth century and probably still guide the foreign policy of many countries. But in Brazil and elsewhere, there is also a reactive element, stimulated by discomfort with the unipolar moment and the perceived excesses of the war on terror. Becoming the sole global power

produced antibodies to American authority and created a concern in many countries that no single state, no matter how pure its motives, should dominate world affairs.

This concern damages both the credibility and the legitimacy of America's leadership. The situation resembles the post-Vietnam era. Like then, there is an element of lost respect—the 10-year adventure in Iraq and Afghanistan did not enhance the credibility of American power or ideas. There is a strong reaction to abuses both perceived and real (often by those already disposed to be hostile). But after Vietnam, democratic nations still faced a common opponent, and needed American leadership for collective defense. This helped the United States regain leadership and influence. That is not the case today. Moreover, America's domestic political crisis can make our exceptionalism something to avoid rather than admire - government shutdowns and budget impasses do not inspire confidence abroad. The state of world affairs does not favor a return to global influence as easily as it did thirty years ago.

The unipolar moment is long gone but the contest for democracy that appeared to end with the Soviets' demise is not over. There are direct challenges to the principles and institutions created after 1945, from the crumpling of the World Trade Organization to the questioning of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this new struggle of ideas we face an agile and diffuse set of opponents. They believe or at least they use with great effect the argument that America is an empire and that the motive behind its global presence is to preserve control. This counternarrative to exceptionalism has won broad acceptance; the leaks reinforce it even though the ultimate effect of the leaks is to strengthen authoritarianism and injure human rights.

We are again in a contest of ideas and values. It is not a military contest. A new grand strategy cannot rely on military preeminence, since force and coercion are counterproductive when pursuing political goals that require winning agreement from nations with whom we are unlikely to ever find ourselves at war. Nor can defeating terrorism serve as an organizing principle. While only the United States has the means or the ideas to pursue a world ruled by law rather than force, being irreplaceable does not guarantee leadership, particularly when we face a skeptical global audience that includes powerful nations eager to challenge American ideas on how international relations should work and ready to assert regional authority against the global power.

One response to the leaks would be to wait, do nothing, and hope that the Snowden effect will simply go away. But inaction guarantees damage. An apology would be ludicrous, given the behavior of other countries. A recitation of slogans is inadequate. The best response to the leaks and those who trumpet them is that the justification for our actions is not exceptionalism (or hegemony) but the continued pursuit of peaceful international relations based on the beliefs that have shaped American policy since it became a global power. A world in which America is less capable or steps back will be neither pleasant nor safe (a point that escapes both European leftists and Congressional isolationists). The applause that greeted the leaks from a not overly astute audience obscures this danger. The Snowden effect is a warning of how our influence has been damaged—and provides an opportunity to rebuild it.

WHAT BATTLEFIELD LESSONS HAVE WE LEARNED FROM 12 YEARS OF WAR?

Maren Leed

Every conflict is a laboratory for the evolution of military operations. Peacetime militaries develop concepts and capabilities to accomplish tasks around a given vision. As soon as peace gives way to conflict, the gaps between concepts and reality become rapidly apparent. Successful organizations, leaders, and technologies adapt, facilitating the emergence of new ways of warfighting.

The last 12 years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq are no different. From the onset of the initial invasion of Afghanistan with special operations teams riding on horseback with the Northern Alliance to complex

coalition operations in Basra, U.S. forces have developed new equipment, procedures, doctrine and organizations while continuously engaged with disparate adversaries ranging from former state militaries and narco-traffickers to criminal networks and local insurgents. This has driven numerous areas of major change within the U.S. military, many of which have

already had tremendous effects and may be still further enhanced going forward.

Among the most fundamental of these changes is the unprecedented fusion of operational and intelligence information. Rapid advances in computing and telecommunications technologies enabled U.S. forces to gather intelligence data not just through new or expanded use of sensors on the battlefield (such as blimps and signals intelligence tools), but also through the conduct of routine operations (such as census operations collecting biometric information). Fed in near-real time into networks with unprecedented capacity to process and identify relationships, analysts were able to rapidly generate intelligence relevant not only to the highest levels of strategic command but also to local commanders who, in turn, pushed it down to the appropriate tactical actors. This intelligence was

then used to inform new operations, which generated additional intelligence. This adaptation resulted in an operational-intelligence cycle so rapid and effective that, for the first time in U.S. military history, operations were limited by available forces rather than intelligence to usefully guide them.

These processes were pioneered within the Special Operations community, and their full

exploitation led to a second major area of change: an enhanced interdependence between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their conventional counterparts. Whereas previously SOF and conventional forces had little interaction, eventually commanders recognized that their three areas of

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focus-high-end terrorist networks for SOF, local insurgents within large civilian populations for conventional forces, and building the capacity of indigenous forces for both SOF and conventional forces-were so intertwined that greater collaboration was an imperative. In some areas, SOF commanders were given responsibility for supporting conventional force units. Even more surprisingly, some conventional commanders assumed command over SOF detachments. This collaboration allowed for the more efficient use of scarce assets like helicopters and medical support, but also increased the sharing of intelligence and lessons learned in linked operational planning, and built relationships and understanding that was previously inconceivable.

A third major advance was in the use of unmanned systems. The most prominent example

is the vast expansion in reliance on aerial drones not only for surveillance but for lethal strikes. In addition, ground forces employed robots to search for improvised explosive devices, and pioneered the use of unmanned helicopters to deliver supplies to remote locations.

In these areas and others, the different military services combined expertise like never before. Naval electronic warfare specialists served on the ground supporting soldiers and Marines, while the Air Force took tools developed for ground operations to the skies. Headquarters became a mélange not only of the different branches but of multiple nations and defense and civilian institutions.

The scope and scale of these changes would not have been possible absent the crucible of necessity. It is important to note, however, that many of these adaptations occurred within the context of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. While counter-terror missions will persist using a much smaller subset of the force going forward, counter-insurgency is now an explicit area of decreased focus for U.S. defense policymakers. The question, therefore, is the degree to which these features constitute a "new American way of war" and whether they truly take hold as the missions that precipitated them fade.

For example, how could operational/intelligence fusion manifest itself in humanitarian assistance or partner capacity building missions? Are the tools, processes and organizations the same, and if not, will the lessons be forgotten or will new innovations be necessary? As SOF and conventional forces return to a more traditional division of labor, do they continue to exercise with each other and synchronize their activities to ensure relationships and procedures are maintained or expanded? Are unmanned systems integrated even more fully into future operations, or will they be employed in the same manner as they have been in the past?

Irrespective of how the above questions might be answered, progress raises another critical area of potential friction. If these revolutions are fully embraced, they may distance American warfare from that of our allies and friends to such an extent that our vision of a more distributed and collective set of like-minded actors is largely unachievable. Many of the areas of major change were underpinned by technologies, at least some of which the United States may be reluctant to share broadly. If the gap between U.S. capabilities and partner capabilities becomes too great, other countries may become increasingly dependent on the United States, a future directly at odds with our current fiscal path.

WHAT HAS SYRIA TAUGHT US ABOUT THE RIGHT TIME TO USE FORCE?

Clark A. Murdock

Following 12 years of conflict in the Middle East, the Syrian civil war has presented the United States with a hard test of its appetite for military intervention. The Obama administration has faced public reluctance, political division, and a deep fiscal crisis as it has weighed whether and how to use force in Syria.

The use of force has been considered for three objectives: (1) ousting the Assad regime and putting in a government based on the moderate opposition; (2) deterring the use of chemical weapons (CW) by the Assad regime; and (3) persuading Syria (and Russia) to make good on their commitment to eliminate the Syrian stockpile of chemical weapons. The right time to engage militarily varies with the objective, as this essay will explore. This essay concludes with some observations on what leaders need to do if they want to use force to achieve their ends.

REGIME CHANGE IN SYRIA

If there was a right time for a U.S.-led military intervention to force regime change, it was shortly after Assad rolled out his tanks against peaceful protesters in May 2011. Action akin to that taken by NATO forces in Libya (such as a takedown of air defenses, an imposition of a no-fly zone, and selected attacks against armor and artillery units) but on a larger scale (since Syria is a more formidable opponent) might have worked. More than two years later, however, regime removal in Libya had lost its cachet, in large part because there had been no plans for dealing with the consequences of removing Qaddafi. There was little political support, either domestically or internationally, for taking on regime change in Syria and little evidence that President Obama, despite his "Assad must go" rhetoric, wanted to pursue this objective.

As developments in Syria—the spreading sectarian and ethnic conflict and the movement of al Qaeda–linked groups into the country, to name two—greatly increased the significance of Syria to U.S. national interests,

the costs and risks of forcible regime change increased exponentially. Syrian security forces were reinforced by Hezbollah, Iran and Russia, and the reliably moderate opposition ceased to be a lead actor in the fight to remove Assad.

DETERRING SYRIAN USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

When deterrent threats fail, the right time to use force is right away. Forcefully carrying out retaliatory strikes is critical to restoring deterrence with the transgressor and maintaining credibility with others who are watching closely how well the United States backs up its red lines. In August 2012, President Obama said: "We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized." Obama repeated these red lines, and in April 2013 said that CW use would be a "game-changer" and "would change my calculus" on using force.

After the United Kingdom and France told the United Nations in mid-April 2013 that Syria had engaged in several small-scale CW attacks, it took Washington almost three months to confirm it with "high confidence." A third-tier White House official announced that in response to "credible evidence" of Syrian CW use, the United States would increase nonlethal assistance and would begin "direct support" to the opposition's military wing. U.S. deterrence failed when the Assad regime responded with a much larger CW attack that killed 1,400 people, including almost 400 children on August 21, 2013.

While focus has now turned to implementing the agreement for Syrian elimination of its chemical stockpile, it should not be overlooked that the right times to have responded to Syrian CW use were in late



spring and late summer of 2013. While Syria might not employ chemical weapons again, it won't be because the United States carried out its deterrent threats.

ELIMINATING SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The right time to use force in support of a chemical weapons elimination regime might be if the Syrian government fails to cooperate or cheats. In his September 10, 2013, address to the nation, President Obama explained how, "in part because of the credible threat of U.S. military action," the Russian and Syrian initiative

WHEN DETERRENT THREATS FAIL, THE RIGHT TIME TO USE FORCE IS RIGHT AWAY. made two days earlier had the "potential to remove the threat of chemical weapons without the use of force." As a consequence, President Obama asked "the leaders of Congress to postpone a vote to authorize the use of force while we pursue this diplomatic path" and "ordered the military to maintain their current posture to keep the pressure on Assad and to be in a position to respond if diplomacy fails."

The process of eliminating Syria's stockpile could take years and is unverifiable. It is an inconvenient but illustrative fact that chemical weapons were discovered in Libya after Qaddafi fell, even though he had supposedly given them up in December 2003. Identifying the right time to use military pressure to keep a messy diplomatic process on track is very difficult. Syria, much like Iraq between the two Gulf wars, will have many "cheat and retreat" opportunities, which will pose many "talk and retreat" challenges for the United States. Absent another incident of chemical weapons use or other atrocity by the Assad regime, it will be nearly impossible to garner sufficient domestic and international support for U.S. military action to coerce Syrian cooperation in the elimination process.

THE "RIGHT STUFF"?

Nations do not make decisions. It is the men and women occupying leadership positions who make decisions. As former secretary of defense Leon Panetta said in mid-September 2013, "When the president of the United States draws a red line, the credibility of this country is dependent on him backing up his word." Giving up red lines isn't the answer, because that's often the same as giving a green light for U.S. adversaries. So, how does a president establish credibility (or restore if it is lost) for his red lines?

- · Mean what you say and say what you mean.
- Prepare both to carry out your threats and to deal with the consequences.
- Since actions always speak louder than words, use force from time to time to demonstrate your resolve.

Using force is not for the faint-hearted, indecisive, or inconsistent. Knowing when is the right time to use force is important, but having the "right stuff" is critical. ▶

HOW CAN WE DEVELOP A SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE STRATEGY FOR DEFENSE?

David J. Berteau

For several years, the defense budget has been under siege from government-wide budget gridlock and a legislative stalemate. The Department of Defense (DoD) has dutifully built its budgets and submitted them to Congress, but final appropriations have often differed substantially, making it hard for DoD to implement its own plans. Government shutdowns add to the confusion, and the short-term stopgap legislation of continuing resolutions prevents DoD from implementing any long-term solutions to budget challenges. The lack of full-year appropriations, the additional complications of spending caps from the Budget Control Act of 2011, and the arbitrary budget cuts from the process of sequestration only compound the impact of this uncertainty.

The alternative to arbitrary budget cuts is to reduce defense spending in a strategic manner, but that can be a complicated and lengthy process. Challenges in strategic choices are exacerbated by DoD's own internal cost growth problems, whether they are in weapon systems, military pay and benefits, health care, or operation and maintenance accounts, as well as the impact of unplanned operations such as support of possible strikes on Syria. DoD has, however, made three institutional choices that, like self-inflicted wounds, needlessly compound the problem.

DEFENSE DEPENDS ON FISCALLY DISCIPLINED PROGRAMMING

First, for more than 50 years, DoD has operated under the gold standard for government budget processes, with the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Since it was put in place by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1961, the PPBS, as it is called, has been one of the strengths of DoD. It builds an annual budget for DoD, which the president submits to Congress along with the rest of the federal government, but it provides far more than a one-year spending plan. Through a five-year plan called the Future Years Defense Program, or FYDP, the PPBS provides a detailed roadmap for everything that matters for defense, from the size and composition of the forces to their pay and benefits,



from the support and operations of current weapon systems to the basic research for new technology, and from the balance of capabilities across the military services to the need for eliminating redundancies.

In addition to the FYDP providing a roadmap, it is the mechanism within DoD by which civilian leadership, including the White House, sets priorities and makes the resource tradeoffs needed to protect those priorities. Through long-term planning, it is possible for leaders, from the president down, to develop a set of strategies and priorities for national security and

defense, then to ensure that the ways and means to implement those strategies will be developed, available, and sustained.

Recent years have seen a decline in both the quality and the relevance of the FYDP and in the process of the PPBS itself. One reason for that decline is that DoD is currently planning for three budget levels: one that complies with the final Budget Control Act levels (roughly \$475 billion per year for the defense base budget), one that complies with the initial Budget Control Act reductions (10 percent higher than the final BCA caps—an approach shared by

DoD, the White House, and both houses of Congress), and one that splits the difference (5 percent higher than the final BCA caps). Another reason for that decline rests in the changes to the PPBS process.

DEFENSE HAS WEAKENED THE PPBS

In the mid-2000s, DoD tried to make changes to the PPBS. In addition to the phases of planning, programming, and budgeting, the defense secretary added a fourth phase, called execution. The idea was sound and worthy, to focus not only on plans to spend money but on tracking to see what DoD achieved as that money was spent. Even the name was changed from the PPBS to the PPBE system. From the start, though, it has proved difficult to track real results and tie them back to specific budget line items. In most ways, the system is still the PPBS, not the new PPBE.

A more challenging change was to combine two of the phases of the PPBS, with a combined program and budget review. For more than 40 years, the process had two sequential reviews, first of the full multiyear spending plan called the "program," then of the details for the budget year about to go to Congress. In the wake of September 11, 2001, these two reviews were combined. In practice, while it has saved calendar time, this change has meant that neither review gets the full attention it needs. The result has been a weaker process, with less precision and fidelity, undermining the ability of civilian leadership to set priorities, tradeoffs, and strategic directions. A weaker PPBS produces a weaker FYDP, which in turn provides less protection from the vagaries of the more chaotic congressional appropriations process described above. Further weakening of this process has come from the wide use of supplemental appropriations that exist outside of this entire process.

DEFENSE HAS BECOME ADDICTED TO SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

Within weeks of the terrorist attacks on September 11, Congress appropriated an additional \$20 billion for defense spending. As operations built up, first in Afghanistan and then Iraq, supplemental appropriation levels for DoD grew to almost 10 times that level, reaching \$189 billion in FY 2008, nearly 40 percent the size of that year's \$480 billion baseline defense budget. Even today, supplementals (now called Overseas Contingency Operations, or OCO, and totaling nearly \$90 billion per year) make up nearly 20 percent of total defense spending. Because the blueprint for this spending is not integrated with the FYDP, it is at best tied only loosely to long-term PPBS planning.

Such supplementals provide funds for critical operations in wartime, and they permit urgent and perhaps unforeseen needs to be met. Supplementals also, however, become a way to pay for needs that are not directly connected to the wars. In that way, they can circumvent the power of the FYDP and undermine the role of the PPBS to reflect the priorities, tradeoffs, and strategic directions of the president and his civilian leadership.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?


Each of these three factors has undermined DoD's own ability to handle the external pressures and uncertainty caused by the government's budget crisis, but there is hope, because each can be addressed by DoD, regardless of the overall budget siege. DoD can take a more strategic approach to bringing its resources in line with reality through the following institutional choices.

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First, DoD needs to wean itself from its addiction to supplemental appropriations through a clear delineation of spending in the current supplementals that should be in the base budget. No one knows precisely how much OCO spending should be in the base budget, but DoD needs to begin now to apply the necessary priority tradeoffs to ensure costs not directly related to the war fit into the base. These changes will take perhaps two years to implement, and will no doubt be challenging, given the severe DoD fiscal constraints, but it must be done to ensure future fiscal health and stability.

Second, DoD needs to look beyond the current struggles over implementing the Budget Control Act, with its caps and sequesters, and begin to plan seriously for spending levels that reflect the end of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Prudence and reality urge DoD to produce a FYDP that reflects the most likely spending level. The absence of any agreement in Congress means that this will probably be close to the Budget Control Act levels, including sequestration if needed, of approximately \$475 billion per year, with inflation added and with reasonable supplementals. No single military service has the incentive to offer a realistic long-term plan at lower levels unless all are required to do so, so the secretary of defense needs to issue a consistent and affordable set of priorities that are the same for all of DoD.

Third, it's too late to take these actions for this year or even the next. Instead, DoD needs to restore fiscally disciplined programming to the FYDP in time for the period of 2016 and beyond. That sounds a long way off, but the internal DoD guidance for the dollars and the strategy for the FY16-21 FYDP is due next spring. The planning and the priorities for that guidance will flow from the current Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR. The time is now for that QDR to reflect the priorities, tradeoffs, and strategic directions needed to produce an executable, affordable defense program for the next decade.



PART TV/C



The Changing Order in the Middle East

WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES EXPECT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST?

Anthony H. Cordesman

During the last year, the United States has lurched from crisis to crisis in the Middle East, including every state in North Africa. Sometimes the focus has been Egypt, sometimes Syria, and sometimes Iran. Iraq and Yemen have surfaced sporadically. Libya has become a garden of conspiracy theories blaming America for the country's ills, and as for Tunisia and Bahrain, it remains unclear what U.S. policy efforts are intended to accomplish.

It is time that the United States and the world realize that the "Arab Spring" will be at least a decade of crisis that affects Iran and Israel as much as the Arab states. It is all too clear that no state in the region is safe, with the possible exception of the wealthiest oil exporting states in the Gulf—each of which is vulnerable to instability from neighbors. It is equally clear that the broader regional instability will affect the other surrounding states like Turkey and those in the Horn of Africa, as well as all states dependent on the region's petroleum exports, trade, and transit routes.

The region's violence thus has consequences as far afield as the Philippines, Thailand, Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and the United States. Moreover, it has become equally clear that what Samuel Huntington once termed a "clash of civilizations" is something very different. The Middle East and North Africa are the epicenter of a struggle for the future of Islam and the control of largely Islamic states that spread from East Asia to Morocco.

The overwhelming number of victims, however, comes from conflict between Sunni extremists and the vast majority of more moderate Sunnis, Shi'ites and other sects of Islam. The extremists target Muslims and other faiths in



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Islamic countries or countries with large Islamic minorities ranging from India to Lebanon.

Terrorist casualties from al Qaeda and other foreign Islamist terrorist movements in both the United States and Europe have been minimal since the mid-2000s, and estimates by sources like the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and Combating Terrorism Center at West Point indicate that between 82 percent and 97 percent of the casualties of Islamic extremists have been Muslim. Almost all have been in primarily Islamic countries or countries with very large and long-standing Muslim minorities like India and Nigeria.

Far too often, the policy debate in the United States on the Middle East focuses on Washington trying to address each current political crisis in turn. Administration officials tried to deal with Egypt by focusing on the legal definition of "coup," and by hoping we could somehow negotiate a settlement between the army and Muslim Brotherhood. The administration dealt with Syria largely by trying to ignore the civil war and then switching to a focus on chemical weapons. In most other cases, the appearance is that Washington has tried to ignore the deeper internal dynamics in favor of hoping for the best.

It is time that we accept the sheer scale of the forces at work. The increasingly violent struggle for the future of Islam is the product of decades of failed secular politics and governance in state after state and is tied to mass demographic problems, weak or failed economic development, and deep sectarian, ethnic, and tribal fissures. Nor can we ignore decades of failed efforts to create viable political structures, effective and honest governance, as well as rule of law and internal security.

Calls for rapid democracy, rule of law, and human rights based on Western values ignore the lack of viable institutions to build upon. These calls ignore the reality that only violence or massive popular upheavals are likely to bring political change in this context. But popular upheavals cannot produce a stable resolution of the political forces they unleash because there are no quick answers and states have no viable political systems, structures of governance, or in many cases functioning economies that can meet popular expectations in less than a decade.

Americans should remember that their own revolution is a historical exception that left forces at play that led to the Civil War. The French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the overall history of Europe from 1848 to at least the end of World War II, and the rapid collapse of almost every postcolonial "democracy" into a coup or "one man, one vote, one time" rule provide ample warning that those who start revolutions almost never survive in power to finish them unless they too become autocrats; that revolutionary leaders rise out of political conspiracy and generally lack real experience in compromise and practical politics, and have little or no experience in governance.

Consider the forces that only time and repeated crises can tame: as nearly two decades of UN Arab Human Development Reports and U.S. State Department human rights reports have shown, there is little real rule of law in states where parallel legal systems legitimize star chamber security proceedings, and ordinary justice and policing are dysfunctional and corrupt. Constitutions are often

just scraps of paper or used selectively to reinforce state power. Human rights are caught up in ethnic, sectarian, political, and religious struggles and are often largely a matter of relative position and status. Corruption, crony capitalism, grimly inefficient state sectors, gross state overemployment, steadily worsening equity of income distribution, and poorly distributed oil income mean that these states sharply underinvest in education and medical systems, as well as housing, water, and infrastructure.

As the UN Arab Development Reports warned, these forces operate in largely desert states that have populations at least three times—often more than four times—what they were in 1950 and that will increase by roughly another 40 to 50 percent by 2050. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the total population of the Middle East and North Africa grew from 81.6 million in 1950 to 392.4 million in 2013—some 4.8 times—and will grow to 580.5 million in 2050—another 48 percent.

Two crisis cases illustrate the demographic pressures involved. In Egypt's case, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that its population grew from 22.2 million in 1950 to 85.3 million in 2013 and will grow to 137.8 million in 2050 in spite of hyperurbanization and a dropping rate of population growth. The other MENA states with the largest populations have similar demographics. In Syria's case, its population grew from 3.5 million in 1950 to 22.5 million in 2013 and will grow to 37.7 million in 2050, and Syria is typical in that at least a third of its current population is 14 years of age or younger.

The region's limited land, water, capital, and market structures have created a different and growing kind of crisis. They have made many states food-import-dependent at the same time people have been driven off the land. Hyper-urbanization, growing super slums, and nationwide poverty affect even oil states like Saudi Arabia.

The average per capita income tells a grim story, even if one ignores growing income inequalities that have badly shrunk or limited the incomes of the



middle class while making the rich far more wealthy. While the United States has a per capita income of \$50,700, which ranks 14th in the world, the CIA estimates Egypt has a per capita income of \$6,700, which ranks 143rd in the world. Syria had a per capita income of \$5,100 in 2011, which ranked 159th in the world.

In spite of the impression that all oil states are wealthy, the petroleum disease is all too real: Algeria has a per capita income of \$7,600 (137th in the world), Libya has a per capita income of \$12,300 (141st in the world), Iraq has a per capita income of \$7,200 (143rd in the world), Iran has a per capita income of \$13,300 (100th in the world), and even Saudi Arabia has a per capita income of \$31,800 (46th in the world).

The wealthier and better educated in the Arab world also face major problems. Increasingly better educated women cannot find productive jobs. Male youth unemployment and underemployment among university graduates are well over 20 percent and sometimes 40 percent for at least two years after graduation. In 2010, the year before the Arab Spring, estimates put the number of directly unemployed young men in the MENA region at well over 25 million. Underemployment is a far more serious problem at every level of education. Token jobs for males disguise a massive lack of real productivity, as do grossly inflated service sectors, security forces, and civil services.

This mix of forces affects every country differently and to a different degree. Some countries have regimes that will find ways of dealing with these forces of change. Some will be able to evolve with only minimal changes to their power structure and government. Some will undergo change under new authoritarians, and all too many will have at least a half decade or more of repeated upheavals and changes in regime by coup, civil war, or massive popular unrest. Sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and regional violence, as well as wars or power struggles with neighboring states, will occur in the process, as will

radicalization of violent elements of their populations producing violent extremism, terrorism, and equally violent repression.

The United States cannot ignore these realities. Every year increases U.S. dependence on the global economy, as well as the dependence of U.S. employment and job creation on global trends. According to U.S. Department of Energy estimates made in 2013, the United States will not achieve energy independence through 2035. Large reserves of domestic shale gas will only re-

duce direct import dependence to 67 percent for a limited number of years.

The United States will remain dependent on imports from Asia and Europe (and U.S. exports to these countries), who in turn are dependent on Middle Eastern and North African oil and gas exports. Moreover, our domestic petroleum and nonpetroleum import prices will rise along with world prices during any regional energy crisis.

No friendly Arab state or Israel can be secure without U.S. military support and aid. Regional stability will not be possible without a strong U.S. military presence, a growing emphasis on partnerships in security and counterterrorism, and U.S. efforts to negotiate the way out of internal and international conflicts, as well as provide military help to deter, contain, and end them.

If the United States is to deal with these realities, we must begin to recognize that crisis diplomacy and the use of force can at best create temporary solutions to aid truly urgent U.S. national security interests. We must realize that the fight against terrorism and extremism cuts much deeper that dealing with today's symptoms like al

Qaeda and will continue, mutate, and surge again until the underlying causes are gradually removed.

We must realize that many core values in the Middle East and North Africa are tied to Islamic, Arab, and local standards—not ours. Calls for instant democracy are most likely to return to the same results of the postcolonial era of "one man, one vote, one time." Human rights are not universally observed or aspired to, and will evolve slowly and in

different ways. The United States cannot control or shape internal civil wars and revolution when they occur, only exert limited pressure and influence—supporting the best elements and putting pressure on the worst.

Truly effective economic reform will take years—and probably more than a decade—of outside influence, pressure, and carefully focused aid. Restructuring military and security forces will take similar years of patient U.S. military advisory efforts and support. Talk of international standards for the rule of law, constitutions, and policing will be no substitute for years of patient advisory efforts.

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The United States cannot accomplish any of this through rhetoric, region-wide efforts at public diplomacy, sanctions, cutting off aid, trying to manage the region from Washington, or treating different countries and mixes of problems as if they were all the same. No real progress can come from focusing on each crisis as if more were not to come, and solving the crisis could do more than temporarily treat the symptoms rather than the underlying cause.

The United States needs to address each country case individually, although it cannot ignore the full range of regional and outside forces at work. It needs to realize that effective influence is exerted on a country-by-country basis and largely by U.S. country teams. It is the slow, evolutionary impact of political, military, counterterrorism, economic, and human rights efforts by the country teams to exert patient and consistent pressure and aid on a target of opportunity that can have the best hope of achieving progress.

The United States cannot succeed by lurching form crisis to crisis any more than it can succeed by calling for the end of history or hoping for an idealized cloning of the American Revolution. It cannot succeed by backing an uncertain mix of exiles, or using force without regard to strategy. Force may be necessary, but force will only be meaningful if linked to efforts to have an impact on changes to politics and governance.

The United States must focus on strategic patience and continuing efforts over at least the coming decade. It must accept major reversals as inevitable, take casualties in the process, and try and try again. Like the Cold War, this will be an era of slow progress, progress though patient influence, and willingness to achieve change and progress with the aid of allies and international institutions. Patience and a willingness to accept complexity are not always American values. This time they had better be.





WHAT SHOULD THE MIDDLE EAST EXPECT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES?

Jon B. Alterman

Western influence in the Middle East has many drivers: the strong economies of Western states, strong trade with the region, and diplomatic clout around the world. Underlying all of those factors, however, is Western states' willingness to go to war to defend friends and interests in the Middle East. In many ways, the archetypal demonstration of this commitment was the 1991 Gulf War, in which more than a dozen Western armies, led by the United States, reversed Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and defended Saudi Arabia.

When Western leaders sought to go to war last August to punish Bashar al-Assad for chemical weapons use, the publics in three states—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—were so skeptical, they arrested their governments' desires to fight a limited war.

One could blame this refusal on these governments' poor political skills, Syria's lack of coveted natural resources, or simply fatigue after a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. If true, the publics' reluctance to endorse war in Syria doesn't tell us anything about the future of the Western role in the Middle East. Yet, looking more closely, it does appear that we have arrived at an inflection point, and that Western military commitment to the region—and therefore the relationships based on that commitment—are shifting in important ways.

There are at least five reasons that support the idea that a new and durable attitude is emerging. First, the results of previous interventions have been mixed at best. Western countries sought to further avowedly political goals through military means, and they came up short. The complexity of local politics and the high stakes felt by local actors mean it would take more resources to shape politics from afar than Western countries are willing to sustain.

Second, the energy trade is changing. The growth in North American production, the flattening of European demand, and the rise of Asia all suggest a different set of interests to defend. Notably, the growing trade ties of Asian consumers to the Middle East have not increased Asia's commitment to the region's security to match, or even really supplement, the efforts of Western states. Western publics are noticing.

Third, defense budgets in Western states are likely to remain constrained for decades, as demographic shifts and entitlements consume ever-larger amounts of na-

tional budgets. In this environment, publics are more likely to see overseas commitments as a luxury.

Fourth, the rising threat of non-state actors changes the security equation. Large Western armies not only do not deter these threats, but they sometimes encourage them. Further, Western governments differ markedly from Middle Eastern allies about how to confront these threats. with Western governments favoring

broad political inclusion, and Middle Eastern governments often opting for a blend of cooptation and coercion. Security, in this way, becomes an area of friction rather than the bedrock of cooperation.

Fifth, sustained Western engagement has engendered neither warmth nor gratitude from most Middle Eastern publics, and in some cases, it has aroused just the opposite. While mere popularity was never the goal of Western efforts, sustained hostility diminishes Western publics' willingness to keep investing in the region.

What these five points suggest is a more lasting Western effort to impose distance between the West and the Middle East. To be sure, Western governments will not cut off ties, and they will continue to sell weapons and train forces against security threats. Yet, it seems likely that Western states will focus on a narrower set of security threats going forward, focusing on trade through key waterways and with less attention to conditions within and between countries.

For the United States, a more distant set of relationships in the Middle East will make it harder to operate globally. In particular, a different relationship with Egypt will probably entail more difficulties moving between Europe and the Mediterranean on the one hand, and Asia and the Gulf on the other. Hedging against instability in Bahrain will likely involve a lighter U.S. military footprint in the broader Gulf region.

Accompanying a decline in military ties, U.S. trade with the region is likely to slump as well. Govern-

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ments have made strategic investments in U.S. goods and services in part to keep the focus and attention of the U.S. government. Should the focus wander, so too will the dollars.

Among some of Iran's neighbors, a diminished U.S. presence, combined with a more conciliatory Iranian leadership, may prompt a limited rapprochement across the Gulf. In

Israel, a more uncertain U.S. military commitment is likely to have an opposite effect, persuading Israelis that they are more isolated and therefore act more aggressively to deter their enemies.

Overall, however, the shift suggests a U.S. willingness to accept more volatility in the Middle East, out of a conviction that it will not add to greater volatility in the United States itself. Such an approach would represent a repudiation of the Bush administration's approach since September 11, 2001, which placed the Middle East at the fulcrum of U.S. security.

For the last several years, conservative Gulf states have noted the Obama administration's rebalancing toward Asia and complained of abandonment. For the United States and other Western powers, however, the changes described here have less to do with Asia than with the Middle East itself. The region is changing, and the U.S. relationship with it is changing, too.

IS RUSSIA BACK AS A POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Andrew C. Kuchins

The September Kerry-Lavrov agreement for Syria to give up its chemical weapons has lit up the Cold War Hotline with reams of calls that Russia now has more power and influence in the Middle East than at any time in the last 40 or 50 years and that this rise comes directly at the expense of the United States. Unquestionably, American power and prestige in the Middle East has taken a multitude of blows since the Iraq invasion of 2003 and the emergence of the Arab Spring nearly three years ago. But are other regional leaders clamoring for face-time with Vladimir Putin? No. Aside from its continuing tenuous ties with Tehran and Bashar Al-Assad, Russian ties with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and most of the Arab Gulf States have worsened since the onset of the Arab Spring in January 2011.

And the "New Cold War" that everyone loves to talk about? Get serious. Even with oil priced at over \$100 per barrel, Russia's economic growth has stagnated to less than 2 percent. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has already called for a "stringent" budget in 2014. Today the Russian GDP amounts to between 12 percent to 15 percent of U.S. GDP—hardly the foundation



to contest U.S. power and influence around the globe as the Soviet Union once did. And the plans for Russian military modernization are a far cry from the kind of global power projection that Soviet leaders spent billions on, ultimately contributing to the downfall of the Soviet economy and end to its existence. That is not a mistake Moscow will make again.

President Putin has grandiose ambitions for his Eurasian Union, but the grand prize, Ukraine, has already announced its preference for closer economic integration with the EU. Armenia agreed to sign on to Putin's plan under great pressure from Moscow in September, and there is discussion about Kyrgyzstan and possibly Tajikistan joining as well. This is hardly the making of a new global economic powerhouse. Meanwhile, China is going on a buying tear in Russia's "zone of privileged interests." While Putin was pulling off his diplomatic coup on Syria, Xi Jinping went on a spending spree in Central Asia in September, signing about \$100 billion worth of deals, much of it locking up oil and gas supplies and assets. A report in the Guardian indicated that a Chinese company is seeking to buy up to 5 percent of Ukrainian agricultural land. While Western media and politicians are huffing and puffing about Putin and Syria, China is raiding Russia's kitchen!

Speaking of Syria, the Russians got one big thing right that the Obama administration got wrong: the staying power of Assad. Obama administration officials' continuous cries that Assad must go prior to negotiations resulted in little progress considering that nobody, including the Obama administration, had the will or wherewithal to make him go. A lot of Americans inside and outside of the administration are more than just a little queasy about the chain of events that brought us to the point of de facto recognizing and dealing with the Assad government since only his people can implement the chemical weapons agreement. But the larger potential good is that this opens the door for possible negotiations on other aspects of the humanitarian disaster in and beyond Syria resulting from the civil war. And perhaps cooperation with Russia on Syria could lead to cooperation with Russia on other matters, such as Iran.

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Time will tell whether moderate overtures by Iran's newly elected President Rouhani will ultimately lead to resolution of the Iranian nuclear program dilemma, truly a first-order priority for the Obama administration. But if the negotiated settlement for Syria to give up its chemical weapons arsenal holds up, it could serve as a precedent for Washington and Moscow to work together on Iran. Obviously Moscow does not have anywhere near the leverage in Tehran that it currently has in Damascus, but defusing the U.S.-Russia standoff in Syria, if it holds, potentially creates a much more felicitous environment for Russian support on Iran.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, both the George W. Bush administration and the Obama administration have been reasonably satisfied with Russian cooperation on Iran's nuclear program. In 2006, President Putin made very constructive proposals for the verifiable disposition of Iranian nuclear materials used for peaceful purposes. During a trip to Tehran in 2006, his last such trip, Putin's proposals were rejected by the Iranian leadership, and the personal relationship between Putin and former Iranian president Ahmadinejad have been strained ever since. Putin undoubtedly would like to see the Iran problem solved and to be involved in its resolution. Much of Russian foreign policy in the last decade has focused on constraining U.S. power without offering constructive solutions of its own, but Syria may be a turning point. If so, there may be momentum and just enough trust between Moscow and Washington to effectively work together on the most urgent security challenge in the Middle East.

CAN WE STOP VIOLENT EXTREMISM FROM GOING MAINSTREAM IN NORTH AFRICA?

Haim Malka

For most of the last decade, the fight against violent extremism in North Africa pitted the United States and its allies against bands of fighters holed up in the wilderness. While many Islamist groups shared the extremists' goal of creating an Islamic state, most focused on social and political action to pursue their goals. Al Qaeda's affiliates in North Africa took a different approach. They used violence to polarize societies and deepen the split between local populations on the one hand and the United States and allied governments on the other. Al Qaeda's strategy produced spectacles of violence, yet it remains a fringe phenomenon that fails to inspire a critical mass.

Revolutionary change sparked by the Arab uprisings in 2011 created unprecedented space for new kinds of activism. It also unleashed a wave of extremism that is increasingly mainstream. Adherents to this view combine al Qaeda's violent outlook and goal of establishing an Islamic empire with grassroots social and political activism. This combination resonates powerfully with many young people, especially those who are eager to influence their societies after decades of marginalization. By focusing on social and political activism rather than solely on terrorism and violence to achieve their aims, these new groups appeal to a much broader cross-section of society than al Qaeda's narrow focus ever could.



As this new extremism evolves, it threatens to undermine fragile governments and radicalize publics in societies already polarized by deep cultural, socioeconomic, and political cleavages. New groups such as Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia and Libya are not replacing al Qaeda affiliates, but they are evolving alongside them. Their followers have mobilized and used violence to enforce their puritanical social norms, destroy popular shrines they deem un-Islamic, and attack diplomatic facilities. A large mass of adherents that occasionally uses violence could ultimately be more destabilizing to states than a hardened group of fighters on society's margins. While the U.S. and regional governmental response to al Qaeda's narrow strategy focuses on counterterrorism, the antidote to this popular extremism will require navigating

a complex mix of local socioeconomic, religious, and political dynamics that are largely beyond the control of the United States.

The new generation of extremists has learned from al Qaeda's failures. They are also coming of age during a period of upheaval and political uncertainty. People are frustrated with the slow pace of change and the unmet expectations of new governments. In Tunisia and Libya in particular, extremists benefit from weak governments as they can organize and propagate their message with fewer constraints. Rather than existing on the margins of society and trying to lure away young men, the new extremists are a dynamic part of society with broader appeal. Activists are students, teachers, and shop keepers who believe in reshaping their society rather than destroying it.



To be sure, al Qaeda's old model still exists. The attack on a gas facility in Algeria in January 2013 and the takeover of Northern Mali in 2012 illustrates that al Qaeda's approach has also benefitted from the upheaval of the post-Arab uprising environment. Governments in Libya and Tunisia are weak; thousands of militants imprisoned by former regimes were released; and weapons from Qaddafi's arsenal are readily available across the region. Hundreds, if not thousands, of young men from North Africa are now fighting in Syria. The survivors will return home with combat skills, new networks, and a sense of empowerment. Policymakers need to formulate strategies for both the old and new extremists that take into account their differences, similarities, and how they overlap.


The answer to al Qaeda's strategy is relatively straightforward: locate and kill militant leaders and fighters to disrupt future attacks while addressing the underlying causes of extremism through economic and political development. Countering the new generation of extremism, however, is more complex, because the combination of grassroots activism and extremist ideology creates new ambiguities about the use of violence, making a counterterrorism-focused approach less effective and more likely to strengthen the appeal of extremism rather than diminish it.

EXTREMISTS HAVE NOT CAPTURED THE ARAB UPRISINGS, BUT THEY ARE **EXPLOITING THE NEW-FOUND** FREEDOMS WON THROUGH **POPULARLY-DRIVEN** POLITICAL CHANGE, AND THEY ARE CAPITALIZING ON WIDESPREAD FRUSTRATION.

The broader challenge will be delegitimizing the use of violence as a political tool and preventing mainstream extremists from crossing the line to embrace al Qaeda's wanton violence. Opening political space for Islamists has been one strategy, but it also risks legitimizing extremist voices. Professionalizing security forces and the justice sector in ways that minimize abuse against populations is crucial. De-radicalization programs which provide alternative religious interpretations and practices are also an important component of any strategy, though their short-term impact is likely to be limited.

While the United States can play a role in addressing this evolving challenge, ultimately governments in North Africa will need to take the lead. The United States can provide partner governments with additional support and training, but those efforts should be designed to ensure that they target extremist threats, not to suppress legitimate forms of political opposition. Strengthening multilateral cooperation in the region, especially among quarrelsome neighbors, is also important, because extremism threatens every country in the region.

Extremists have not captured the Arab uprisings, but they are exploiting the new-found freedoms won through popularly-driven political change, and they are capitalizing on widespread frustration. Growing numbers of young people across the region see violence as a legitimate political tool. Ultimately this mainstream extremism is less dramatic than al Qaeda's version, but over the next generation it will have a far greater impact in shaping the region.



PART THREE



Sustaining the Rebalance



SHOULD WE CHANGE OUR SECURITY APPROACH IN ASIA?

Two years after the Obama administration announced its "pivot" to Asia, Fellow Zack Cooper sat down with Michael J. Green, senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair, Christopher K. Johnson, Freeman Chair in China Studies, and Victor Cha, Korea Chair, to discuss whether the United States has the right security approach to the region.

ZACK COOPER: How would you evaluate the "rebalance" now that we're two years in?

MICHAEL GREEN: I would give the Pentagon good marks for engagement with Southeast Asia. Secretary Hagel has been there twice already and cooperation with the regional militaries in both bilateral and multilateral spheres is increasing rapidly. But Southeast Asia is the easier problem, since everybody wants more of us but nobody wants a heavy footprint. I do not think the administration is making comparable traction yet in Northeast Asia, which is a much harder problem.

CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON: I agree with Mike. The rebalance has reassured our allies and friends in the region. But China is strongly signaling its intent to ramp up its engagement with its neighbors, especially in the economic, trade, and military-to-military spheres. If one of the goals of the rebalance is to reassure China that our strategy is not aimed at containing them, while at the same time influencing their actions in such a way as to get them to comply with commonly accepted international rules and norms, I think the track record is much more mixed. I don't think the rebalance has had much impact in fundamentally reshaping China's broad strategy in the region.

GREEN: I'm not sure the "pivot" or "rebalance" was about Northeast Asia originally. In Southeast Asia, they want us over the horizon, but in Northeast Asia our Japanese and Korean allies want us to have the ability to fight and win. And both allies face increasingly complex threat environments, including North Korea's nuclear break-out and Chinese operational coercion in the East China Sea.

JOHNSON: In fact, the rebalance has so far failed to address China's success in fundamentally altering the status quo in both the East and South

China Seas. It is clear that it's going to take more than a few littoral combat ships in Singapore and some Marines in Darwin to meaningfully impact China's security calculus. Secretary Clinton's intervention at the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2010 put the Chinese on their back foot, but we must now follow through to sustain that pressure.

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VICTOR CHA: The rebalance deserves high marks for making a clear declaration that America's strategic priorities are shifting to Asia, but the key test for its success is follow-through. Aside from the implementation of some agreements on basing and trade from the previous administration, there have not

been new security initiatives to accompany the pivot. Many in the region are still wondering whether this declaration of a pivot might fall the way of past ones dating back centuries in which Washington declared a "new Pacific era," and then promptly forgot about it.

COOPER: Certainly the sequester environment makes it harder to convince allies and competitors of our enduring presence?

GREEN: Sequestration casts a large shadow. Our allies in Northeast Asia will notice if we go from 11 to 7 carriers over the next decade. Throw in the fact that we need to reassure Beijing that we don't really want a fight in the first place, and the puzzle is very complex. It is reassuring, though, to hear that U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine assets will be weighted to the Pacific. On the other hand, there is a narrative building in the region that President Obama is not keeping the same focus on Asia in his second term, an impression that could get worse now that the government shutdown forced him to cancel his participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit and East Asia Summit in early October.

CHA: Asian suspicions about the "un-pivot" were

confirmed by Obama's no-show for the dual Asian summits in October. It is harmful because it underscores an American pattern of inconsistency. In March 2010, the president canceled an Asia trip two days before his departure because of the healthcare reform bill. Three months later, he canceled another trip because of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. What the region sees is an America lacking the capacity to sustain regular engagement in the Asia-Pacific. It

is difficult for the United States to be perceived as a leader if we are not seen as dependable.

Important work could have been done on this most recent trip. Obama needed to sell a not-yet-completed trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership,

which could add over \$70 billion per annum to the U.S. economy by 2025. He needed to strategize with Beijing and Seoul on how to rein in North Korea. He needed to send deterrence messages to China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. He needed to calm the waters between his two key Asian allies, Japan and Korea. John Kerry admirably stood in for Obama on these and other tasks, but at these summits if you are out of sight, you are out of mind. This was wholly apparent in the leadership group photo for APEC, where the secretary was placed in the back row corner while Chinese leader Xi stood front and center next to the Indonesian host.

COOPER: Do the leadership changes in China, Japan and South Korea provide more of an opportunity to strike this balance between reassurance and deterrence?

CHA: People say leadership changes offer the opportunity to "reset" relations. But you only have to reset what is not working. And relations with these three countries have for the most part been working. The biggest challenge in the near-term is not forging bilateral alliance ties, but forging better Japan-ROK ties.

GREEN: I agree with Victor that maintaining constructive Japan-ROK relations is essential to U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. Japan's prime minister need not be an obstacle to this. Abe provides the potential for the quality the Japanese most desperately need in their leaders—longevity. We need a strong Japan, and Abe is already opening up new opportunities for closer defense cooperation with Washington through his plans to recognize Japan's right of collective self-defense under the UN Charter. But while initial U.S. apprehension about Abe's ideology has ebbed as his government has focused on pragmatic steps to grow the economy, Seoul seems to have hardened its views towards Japan. This will be a real dilemma for the United States going forward.

CHA: Abe is rebuilding the reservoir of trust in the U.S.-Japan alliance that had been depleted in recent years. In Korea's case, I think South Korea's president only reinforces her predecessor's commitment to the U.S. alliance. The question is what can Abe and Park do together? Relations with Xi remain more of a work-in-progress. The key metric of success will be cooperation on North Korea, intellectual property, and cyber.

JOHNSON: The jury is still out on exactly how China has changed its North Korea policy, but it is clear that there is a different approach under Xi that may be more in line with U.S. interests. There is also significant movement on the security dynamic between the United States and China. Xi has made clear to the PLA that mil-to-mil relations must improve. The two sides are creating more normalized defense ties by signing new agreements that emphasize working-level cooperation and interaction. All of this is good news, provided we remain clear-eyed in understanding that China's actions may have more to do with Xi's internal political calculations than with maintaining healthy Sino-U.S. relations

COOPER: You mentioned North Korea. This is obviously one of the continuing security challenges in Asia, along with the potential for conflict in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Do you see multilateral fora playing any role in managing crises going forward?

CHA: Not really based on the past record. In CSIS's recent survey of Asian elites, the overwhelming majority said they'd look to themselves or partners like the United States over established multilateral groups like APEC or ASEAN to solve real problems. To the extent that multilateral groups pool common crisis response resources like in the 2004 Tsunami, then these typically form around pre-existing bilateral relationships. The greatest role these groups play is in fostering transparency and establishing norms. I just don't see how you manage a crisis without a lead power moving the group forward.

GREEN: The most impressive multilateral forum in Asia right now is the youngest. That's the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus that brought Secretary Hagel out to the region recently. ARF is interesting because it imposes an influence cost on any big power that gets too pushy. The Six Party Talks on North Korea are looking pretty tattered, but do point to the eventual need for a Northeast Asian security forum of some kind. I think trilaterals like the U.S-Australia-Japan Trilateral Security Dialogue are an undervalued mechanism to build trust and patterns of cooperation that endure through times of crisis, but those are based on U.S. bilateral alliances, of course.

JOHNSON: I'm skeptical of using multilateral fora to shape sustainable solutions to crises. China can manipulate ASEAN when it really matters, and the member states collectively are struggling to dissuade China from pursuing bilateral negotiations with the other claimant countries in the South China Sea. Similarly, I don't see Tokyo being willing to accept a multilateral approach to resolving the East China Sea dispute. Still, there

are intriguing signs that Xi Jinping is allowing more internal debate on pursuing a binding Code of Conduct with ASEAN. If realized, this could mark a meaningful shift in China's approach to multilateral diplomacy.

COOPER: So what more should Washington be doing to strengthen our security approach to Asia?

GREEN: Three things. First, we have to get out of the sequestration bind so that the Pentagon can actually match resources to strategy. Second, the Pentagon has to decide what they want our big alliances with Japan and Korea to look like. Abe is ready to do more, so now the burden falls on the administration. Meanwhile, President Park's government in Seoul is getting anxious about accepting wartime operational command in 2015 from the United States as planned, but the administration does not want to reopen the issue. We need to get off autopilot and pivot to Northeast Asian security too. And third, finish TPP and get it through Congress. America's role in Asia depends on the Navy, but rises and falls with trade.

CHA: I think the United States can be more present in the region with a special focus on alliances and partners. We should place a higher priority on U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral coordination and consolidation. U.S. leaders can reach a framework agreement on TPP. And finally, the United States can finish base consolidation agreements in Japan and Korea.

JOHNSON: I would just add two additional thoughts. First, we should be talking less and doing more. Much of the hard work needed to properly implement the rebalance will best be done quietly. Second, the United States needs to try to better define specific roles for individual countries based on their niche capabilities. Without U.S. leadership to design a suite of capabilities based on countries' individual strengths, it will be impossible to develop the holistic security net that the rebalance was intended to realize.

HOW IMPORTANT IS TPP TO OUR ASIA POLICY?

The 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), whose aim is to liberalize trade in the Asia-Pacific region, is a central plank of the Obama administration's "rebalance" to Asia. The negotiating partners include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam.

Senior Fellow Murray Hiebert sat down with Ernest Z. Bower, Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies, Matthew Goodman, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, and Scott Miller, William M. Scholl Chair in International Business, to discuss the prospects for and significance of TPP.

MURRAY HIEBERT: What's so significant about the TPP, and how will it change the dynamics in Asia?

MATTHEW GOODMAN: The TPP is far and away the most significant new element of a longstanding U.S. strategy of engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to the economic benefits of more open trade and investment and updated rules of the road, a successful TPP will more firmly anchor the United States in a region that is critical to our future security and prosperity. The TPP is already changing the conversation about regional integration in Asia, as even nonparticipants realize the importance of striving for higher standards in their trade and investment arrangements.

SCOTT MILLER: The TPP matters because of both its scope and content. The TPP includes three of the United States' top five trading partners, as well as several large, fast-growing Pacific economies which together account for 40 percent of global GDP. The regional architecture, which includes new disciplines on digital trade and other areas, better reflects the new reality of IT-enabled global value chains. Unlike the previous generation of bilateral free trade agreements, the TPP is likely to attract other economies to join, creating a durable, modern rule-set for Asia-Pacific commerce. East Asian economic integration has always been a safe bet. The TPP reinforces U.S. engagement with that integration process.

FOR THE UNITED STATES, THE TPP
REPRESENTS ITS PRIMARY TACTIC
IN IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY TO
PROMOTE REGIONAL PEACE AND
PROSPERITY THROUGH ECONOMIC
ENGAGEMENT, IN EFFECT REBALANCING
THE ASIA "PIVOT," WHICH WAS
INTERPRETED BY MANY IN THE REGION
TO BE DOMINATED INITIALLY BY
SECURITY CONCERNS.

ERNEST Z. BOWER: The TPP is significant because it is an Asia-driven conceptualization of the need for high-standard rules to promote economic integration, trade, and investment. It is important to remember that the United States joined a preexisting negotiation, so this is not a "U.S. initiative." If successful, a strong TPP agreement sets a credible standard for establishing trans-border rule of law for trade and investment in the world's largest and fastest growing regional economies.

For the United States, the TPP represents its primary tactic in implementing a strategy to promote regional peace and prosperity through economic engagement, in effect rebalancing the Asia



"pivot," which was interpreted by many in the region to be dominated initially by security concerns. U.S. membership in the TPP says that the United States recognizes that strong economic engagement is foundationally necessary for a sustainable and long-term security strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

HIEBERT: The administration hopes to complete the TPP by the end of 2013. Is that realistic considering that it includes such diverse players and the complexity of the issues it is seeking to address?

MILLER: The Obama administration is faced with effectively two different sets of negotiations. One is with the 11 TPP partner economies, each of which has different needs and constituencies. Reaching a satisfactory conclusion will be enormously complicated.

The second is with the U.S. Congress, with which the administration must come to terms on negotiating

priorities and procedures for implementing legislation. Candidly, the second negotiation is way behind schedule to safely assume a 2013 conclusion of the first. The last time an administration sought trade promotion authority, which gives the president the authority to negotiate trade agreements that Congress can approve or disapprove but not amend, the legislative process consumed over 10 months from bill introduction to presidential signing.

A 2013 completion of TPP presumes the administration would sign a trade agreement without congressional authority. This is not unprecedented—it happened with the U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement in 2000—but it's risky given the stakes of the TPP and the trade policy concerns of Congress that cross party lines.

BOWER: Completing the TPP negotiations by the end of 2013 is absolutely a reasonable objective, and it serves all parties well as a goal. Negotiations, almost by definition, can drag on without an end point supported by strong political will. In truth, the diversity of the negotiating parties is a challenge, but the issues have all been at least partially addressed in previous trade negotiations by nearly every country.

There are some newer issues such as labor and environment, but regional governments quietly welcome the exogenous push to drive much-needed reforms. This gives them political cover to make changes being asked for by an increasing large and vocal middle class in the region which could rise to 3.2 billion by 2030, up from an estimated 525 million to 670 million today.

GOODMAN: There's no question that the TPP negotiations are extremely complex and difficult, and success by the end of this year is by no means assured. But there does seem to be a strong sense of determination among the participating countries to get a deal done and not let the talks drag on as has happened in the multilateral Doha Round. Trade talks are always darkest before the dawn, as the most difficult political trade-offs come into focus, but if the political will is there, I believe a basic deal by the end of the year is possible.

HIEBERT: What are the implications for U.S. strategy in Asia if the 12 negotiating partners can't complete the TPP before the end of 2013?

BOWER: The most important implications for U.S. strategy from a delay in completing the TPP is that Asia will move forward with other integration thrusts that are well under way. Unfortunately, a weakness in U.S. strategy is that it has not sought a seat in these other regional integration vehicles such as the ASEAN+3, which tends to be a Sino-centric model, or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a trade arrangement including the 10 ASEAN members plus Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand.

The weakness of the U.S. strategy in Asia is that its economic thrust through the TPP is not consistent with, and in fact undercuts, its central geopolitical objective. TPP is not all-inclusive and thus is perceived by some to run counter to a free and open market approach with an even playing field. The U.S. objective ought to be to promote U.S. interests in the world's most important market and most significant security theater for the 21st century by strengthening the alliances and bilateral relationships necessary to create regional structures enabling all countries to define and then play by a common set of rules.

GOODMAN: If 2014 arrived without a basic TPP deal in place or the realistic prospect of achieving one in the near term, this would be very damaging to Washington's TPP-centered economic strategy in Asia. It would likely require a pause and consideration of other options. In the end, American economic and strategic interests in the region are too important not to keep trying, but U.S. prestige and influence in the region would be set back. This is why the administration seems to be redoubling its efforts to get a deal done this year.

MILLER: Viewed through the lens of U.S. domestic politics, it's unlikely that President Obama would force his own party to vote on a big trade agreement just before the 2014 mid-term congressional elections. What's more important than the date is the plan. That is, what's the administration's plan to secure trade promotion authority from Congress, which would allow it to resolve the thorny end-of-negotiation issues, conclude the TPP, and secure ratification? To my mind, a credible program is more important than a calendar-based goal.



HOW WILL THE SHIFTING ENERGY LANDSCAPE IN ASIA IMPACT GEOPOLITICS?

Sarah O. Ladislaw

Over the past decade the world has watched as energy demand growth has shifted away from traditional energy consumers in the developed world to the growing economies in developing regions.

No growth has been as dramatic as the demand surge experienced in Asia, where energy demand has grown by 75 percent. China alone is now the world's largest energy consumer, the second largest consumer of oil, the world's largest consumer and producer of coal—accounting for fully half of total global coal consumption, and soon to become the world's largest oil importer.

For the energy community, this is not news. Energy forecasters routinely identify China, India, and the rest of developing Asia as the largest growing source of energy demand in the next several decades, representing fully 60 percent of the world increase in energy use between now and 2040 (with China and India alone counting for half). Energy demand in developing economies surpassed energy demand in developed economies last decade. As of 2009, Chinese energy consumption outpaced U.S. energy consumption. Consequently, over the last decade or so energy watchers have ramped up their focus on this region with a great deal more attention paid to the energy policies, economic shifts and their drivers, market conditions, and even energyrelated geopolitical dynamics in and around Asia. Major questions remain unanswered, however, including how global markets, infrastructure, and institutions will accommodate a rising Asia alongside large traditional global consumers like the United States, Japan, and Europe.

This evolving shift toward Asia as the future energy demand center of the world has accelerated in unexpected and dramatic ways as a result of the economic downturn in developed countries and the recent revolution in unconventional oil and gas in the United States. Starting in the late 2000s, the United States began to experience rapid growth in the development of unconventional gas (shale gas). and later tight oil resources that, when coupled with a slowing of domestic energy demand, now position the United States to be a potential net exporter of natural gas and significantly reduce oil imports. Moreover, the slow pace of the post-Great Recession economic recovery has further strengthened the contrast between developing portions of the world with their stronger signs of economic recovery and the still struggling developed economies with stagnating or declining energy demand growth. If the current trends persist, the world will no longer be as evenly balanced by consumption centers and import destinations for

oil and natural gas. Cargoes bound for the United States and the commercial deals underlying those trade flows can now more fully shift eastward, absent other drivers or strategic considerations.

For many countries within Asia, the need to rely on so much of the rest of the world for vital energy supplies is seen as a large strategic vulnerability that must be managed. For regions outside Asia, the shift in economic dynamism towards the East is often cast as a rebalancing of geoeconomic leverage, especially with regard to China and perhaps one day for India. For energy market watchers and forecasters, Asia is now an even more important anchor to the global supply/demand balance and an influential force in global energy markets.

FOR REGIONS OUTSIDE ASIA, THE SHIFT IN ECONOMIC DYNAMISM TOWARDS THE EAST IS OFTEN CAST AS A REBALANCING OF GEOECONOMIC LEVERAGE.

From a U.S. security policy perspective, this has raised a number of core questions about the ongoing military commitment to protecting vital energy and other trade transit sea lanes, choke points, and major producer regions, most notably in the Middle East. In his recent speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Obama offered a clear articulation of the United States' ongoing commitment to protect those interests, saying: "We will ensure the free flow of energy from the region to the world. Although America is steadily reducing our own dependence on imported oil, the world still depends upon the region's energy supply, and a severe disruption could destabilize the entire global economy."

The question now is how to do this effectively in the face of an ever more turbulent security environment in the Middle East, as well as pressure to streamline our defense budgets and rebalance our security presence abroad. The answer thus far has been to find ways to bolster ties with allies in the region where possible, engage diplomatically with those outside the region who share our strategic interest, including those in Europe and Asia, and work toward a broader sharing of the responsibility to protect the free flow of energy with key regional powers in the region and beyond.

In some ways, however, the most important energy and security related question is about leverage versus stability in this new energy world. Before the accelerated energy pivot to Asia and onset of unconventional oil and gas production in the United States, major energy producers and consumers were fairly adept at understanding their relationships with each other. The pace of change in global markets has thrown that system off-kilter and with it comes the potential for further changes.

For the last several decades, the United States put a premium on stability in global markets. The United States took the lead in promoting the idea that energy security and economic gains could be achieved through integrated energy markets underpinned by open investment environments and efficient functioning of markets facilitated by relatively free trade in energy. Despite the administration's efforts to assure our lasting commitment to these basic precepts of our longstanding approach to international energy policy, it is clear that U.S. policymakers are also eager to more aggressively pursue what newfound geopolitical leverage might be afforded by this new energy reality. It is only fair to presume that other countries will do the same.


HOW SHOULD WE ADDRESS NUCLEAR RISKS IN ASIA?

Sharon Squassoni

While North Korea would appear to be the most prominent nuclear risk in Asia, the United States faces a more complex web of nuclear challenges as it works to build secure and sustainable relationships in that region. More than ever, a strong U.S. role in nuclear energy and nonproliferation in that region will be crucial for reducing emerging nuclear risks.

Without a doubt, nuclear energy will grow fastest in Asia, given the ambitious construction plans of China and South Korea, and the tremendous energy needs of other emerging economies and exploding populations. This contrasts with Europe and the Americas, which are likely to see little growth or perhaps even decline in nuclear energy. Unlike in the 1970s when U.S. nuclear exports dominated the global market, the nuclear power plants that will be constructed in Asia are much more likely to be "homegrown"-that is, built by Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear vendors. In all three cases, there is a tremendous learning curve in nuclear governance, for domestic and export programs.

In China, the rapid pace of nuclear power plant construction (16 operating and 29 under construction) is placing strains on a relatively small regulatory system, prompting outside concerns that China needs more resources (financial and human) for nuclear regulation. After the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan, China halted construction for a year although targets for growth have not changed. Japan, which is experiencing a complete nuclear power shutdown, is still adjusting to its new, more independent nuclear regulatory agency created after Fukushima, but the future of nuclear energy in Japan is uncertain. Until a significant number of reactors restart, observers will question the need to maintain Japan's nuclear fuel cycle capabilities (uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing). Indeed, resuming reprocessing could leave Japan with huge stockpiles of separated plutonium with nowhere to go, posing significant security risks. South Korea will be closely watching what happens in Japan, especially since it is petitioning the United



States for approval to enrich and reprocess U.S. material under the bilateral agreement for nuclear cooperation. At the same time, the South Korean nuclear industry is also adjusting to a new regulatory system and indictments over significant safety lapses.

Even as they struggle to implement best practices at home, nuclear vendors in all three countries have ambitious plans to export their technology, particularly to Southeast Asian countries that have little or no experience with nuclear energy-Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines. This combination of new exporters and inexperienced recipients suggests a potentially significant increase in the risks of new nuclear energy.

China, South Korea and Japan need to be part of a broader, global discussion on how to make nuclear energy sustainable in the long run. That discussion needs to involve all stakeholders (civil society, industry, governments, and international organizations) and has to address whether we need better, mandatory standards for safety and security. The United States should be a key voice in that discussion, as well as continue government cooperation and commercial relationships it has developed over decades with Japan and South Korea. The United States also needs to support more dialogue in Asia about regional approaches to such things as energy and nuclear energy research and development, fuel assurances, and nuclear waste disposal.

The growth in nuclear energy in Asia comes at the same time as growth in nuclear weapons in Asia. China is the only one of the five "legitimate" nuclear weapon states (under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) that is increasing its arsenal with new warheads, missiles, and submarines. (China's estimated arsenal of 250 nuclear warheads, of which about 140 are designed for delivery on landbased missiles—mostly mobile, solid-fuelled--and the rest for delivery with aircraft, is still far smaller than those of the United States and Russia, but roughly equal with those of the United Kingdom and France.³) While the other nuclear weapon states adhere to an informal, decades-long moratorium on production of fissile material for weapons, China does not and could add to its reported 20 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and about 2 tons of separated plutonium. The Obama administration has approached China to discuss strategic stability, but reaching the long-term objective of greater restraint within the Chinese nuclear program, and, ultimately, participation in multinational strategic arms reduction talks, is still far off.

North Korea is the other obvious nuclear weapons threat in Asia. With a small (8–12) nuclear weapons stockpile and fledgling fissile material production capability, North Korea currently shows no signs of restraint. Pyongyang recently restarted its 5MWe plutonium production reactor that had been mothballed under the 1994 Agreed Framework, and likely continues its work on uranium enrichment. At the moment, there is little promise of engaging in disarmament talks with the United States, China, Russia, Japan or South Korea. Perhaps even more worrisome, the regime is building at least one nuclear power reactor for electricity, entirely outside the international safety, security and nonproliferation regime.


No other countries in the region have active nuclear weapons program, although at least two have had programs in the past. Some observers worry about latent nuclear weapons proliferation in Japan's fuel cycle capabilities and worry that U.S. assurances about extended nuclear deterrence are not as credible as they might be. Unlike Europe, the absence of alliance structures in Asia makes it

difficult to strike the same kinds of security bargains and assurances that allowed nuclear energy to prosper in Europe without significant proliferation risks. Finding the right balance between promoting nuclear energy and discouraging expansion of existing or new nuclear weapons stockpiles could be trickier in Asia.

Ideally, a U.S. strategy for enhancing nuclear energy while dissuading nuclear weapons proliferation in Asia would include a blueprint for nuclear governance in the region. Such a blueprint would have to address fissile material production, stockpiles, and nuclear waste management, including regional solutions. Overall, a tiered approach to reach out to all levels of stakeholders-civil society, industry, governments and international organizations—is essential. Finally, such a strategy would need to incorporate the highest standards in nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation, and require significant transparency and cooperation among regional partners. This would be far-reaching for Asia, where territorial and historical disputes still make front-page news, limiting the public's appetite for cooperation. However, there may still be a window for encouraging cooperation in the aftermath of Fukushima. The United States should leverage its strengths in nuclear governance to minimize nuclear risks and ensure the safe, secure and sustainable development of peaceful nuclear energy abroad.

IDEALLY, A U.S. STRATEGY FOR
ENHANCING NUCLEAR ENERGY WHILE
DISSUADING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION IN ASIA WOULD
INCLUDE A BLUEPRINT FOR NUCLEAR
GOVERNANCE IN THE REGION.

^{3.} Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories: 1945–2013," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 69, no. 5 (September/October 2013).



ARE THERE OPPORTUNITIES TO BOLSTER REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION?

The United States is a global power with security interests and commitments in every region of the world. The current defense strategy of the United States calls for increased engagement and investment in the Asia-Pacific region, while maintaining peace and security in cooperation with its allies and partners in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Senior Fellow Samuel Brannen sat down with Europe Director Heather A. Conley, Africa Director Jennifer G. Cooke, Americas Director Carl Meacham, Pacific Forum President Ralph A. Cossa, and Burke Chair Senior Fellow Aram Nerguizian to discuss whether the United States is well positioned to meet this objective in five critical regions.

SAM BRANNEN: Does the United States' current architecture of alliances and partnerships meet emerging security needs in your region of study?

RALPH A. COSSA (ASIA PACIFIC): Yes. The alliances have long been the foundation upon which U.S. security strategy and commitment are based in the Asia-Pacific, and building new partnerships to augment—not replace—them has been the focus of every U.S. administration since the end of the Cold War. The catch phrase changes with each administration but the focus remains. The goal is to reassure allies and friends, and you can never have too much reassurance.

HEATHER CONLEY (EUROPE): Yes and no. NATO has successfully met transatlantic security challenges when tested. Yet, as NATO's operational role in Afghanistan comes to an



end, important questions are being raised about the Alliance's future relevance and how its 28 members will meet security challenges in coming decades. While instability in North Africa and the Middle East as well as a revanchist Russia pose immediate external challenges to European security, Europe's prolonged economic crisis has fueled nationalistic and xenophobic sentiment that has created internal challenges to Europe's political willingness and ability to address these emerging threats.

ARAM NERGUIZIAN (MIDDLE EAST): Decades of bilateral and multilateral effort have led to U.S. successes in shaping relationships with the Gulf Cooperation Council states. However, should the United States scale back regional commitment levels, doubts remain as to whether the Gulf states can adapt to

future threats from Iran or find ways to integrate Iraq into the regional security architecture. In the Levant, strong bilateral ties with Israel, Egypt and Jordan have been the bedrock of U.S. efforts since the Camp David Accords. However, that structure is struggling to adapt to regional instability, intrastate violence in Syria and Egypt, subnational security actors including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria, and the need to end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

CARL MEACHAM (AMERICAS): The existing approach supports U.S. defenses against terrorism, but has yet to fully address the challenges posed by transnational crime and narcotics trafficking. The United States currently relies on collaboration with Mexico, Colombia and Central American militaries

to stem the traffic of drugs. U.S. Southern Command has focused its training efforts on Central American militaries and maintained a base in Soto Cano, Honduras. Canada remains a close NATO ally with strong bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism.

JENNIFER COOKE (AFRICA): Not yet. Africa's conflict zones are covered by a patchwork of stabilization missions from the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations, often overlapping in the same country. These interventions can stanch the bleeding, but they can be slow to deploy, are ill-equipped to effectively neutralize security threats, and remain overwhelmingly reliant on external support. The African Union's proposed regional stand-by forces are not yet operational, and African national and regional security forces lack the basic capacities to prevent and serve as first responders to a proliferating array of transnational threats that are growing in sophistication and impinge more and more on U.S. as well as African interests.

BRANNEN: What are recent examples of successful U.S.-led security cooperation in each region?

COOKE: The support the United States has provided to the French and the multinational stabilization force in Mali has been effective. French forces deployed in significant numbers as part of Operation Serval in Mali in 2013, and the United States provided critical strategic airlift into Mali and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that allowed France and its allies to strike swiftly and with deadly effect throughout the battle space. The United States also provided vital life support to some 6,000 African soldiers that moved in behind the French to hold ground.

MEACHAM: Plan Colombia is probably the most successful recent example of U.S. security cooperation in the Americas. Through Plan Colombia, the United States has learned lessons that can be applied to the newest security initiative in the region: the Mérida Initiative. Through Mérida, Mexico and the United States have partnered to combat transnational crime and narcotics trafficking since 2007.

NERGUIZIAN: Examples of successful U.S.-led security cooperation in the Levant include coproduction and training partnerships with Egypt and Jordan, U.S.-Israeli codevelopment of multitier missile defense and U.S.-led exercises such as Bright Star and Eager Lion. Key successes to date in the Gulf include joint U.S.-GCC military exercises such as Eagle Resolve and making the GCC states partners in the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar. The United States has also been key to developing regional counterterrorism capabilities, ground-based air defenses, missile defense and counteracting shortcomings in regional integration on command and control.

COSSA: The Bush administration's global Proliferation Security Initiative and Six-Party Talks—currently in limbo—have both been endorsed by the Obama administration and provide examples of productive multilateral security cooperation. The United States has played a leading role, sometimes directly and sometimes behind the scenes, in moving the ASEAN Regional Forum in the direction of deeper security cooperation on nontraditional security issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The ASEAN Defense Ministers recently accepted Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel's invitation to meet in Honolulu in 2014 to discuss broader defense cooperation—the first meeting ever outside Southeast Asia for the organization.

CONLEY: NATO is the ultimate, 64-year-old example of American-led success in security cooperation. It maintained stability during the Cold War, stopped conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo, responded to the September 11, 2001, attacks by operationally engaging in Afghanistan for the past twelve years, and implemented an air campaign to protect the Libyan people.

BRANNEN: How would you recommend that the United States improve security cooperation? What are the greatest opportunities?

COSSA: First, we need to get our own house in order. We cannot provide an American model for others when our political process comes across to the rest of the world as dysfunctional. Asians believe the

"pivot" is real but question if it is sustainable, given U.S. budget problems. We also need to better articulate our overall Asia strategy and how basing issues in Korea, Japan, and elsewhere, and our engagement policy toward China, all fit into this broader strategic vision.

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CONLEY: The United States and Europe must fundamentally rethink their future security relationship, a task that was not fully completed at the end of the Cold War, and then dramatically redirected following the September 11 attacks. Traditionally, American security leadership in Europe has been an "either-or" proposition: either the Americans lead it or they leave it to the Europeans to sort the problem out. A third way must be found that retains American investment in Europe's security (but at reduced financial cost) and convinces Europe to invest more in its own defense. This new compact should refocus on NATO's core task—twenty-first-century collective defense while ensuring at least limited European power projection capabilities and a more meaningful and operational relationship with non-European partners.

MEACHAM: The primary security threat in the region is narcotics production and trafficking and organized crime. North American countries are similarly affected by transnational crime through Central America and the Caribbean. These transit points are the pathway for 95 percent of South American cocaine destined for the United States. The United States, Canada, and Mexico therefore need to build on previous agreements such as Plan Colombia and apply those lessons to the Mérida Initiative to collaboratively strengthen security throughout the Americas.

NERGUIZIAN: In the Levant, the United States must show pragmatism and strategic patience with partners that are struggling to find internal stability, contain the destabilizing effects of the Syria crisis and work to address the Arab-Israeli conflict as a source of discord. Despite real setbacks in terms of politics and governance, the United States should resist pressures to disengage with the Egyptian military. The United States should also be ready to take a long-term view on aiding Jordanian and Lebanese security forces deal with the destabilizing effects of the Syrian civil war. In the Gulf, the United States will be challenged by growing GCC suspicion of U.S. efforts to deal with Iran, the possible effects of the "pivot to Asia" and the future of U.S. military resourcing challenges. The United States must help these regional partners to build their capacity to work together in pursuit of common security interests despite their growing concerns about U.S. commitments to them.

COOKE: There is no substitute for the long, hard slog of building the capacity, competence, and professionalism of African military, police, and intelligence forces and strengthening the civilian institutions that govern them. The rationale for the U.S. Africa Command—to bring more focused, consistent, and nuanced engagement to that end—remains fundamentally valid. The Command can accomplish this even while keeping a light footprint and investing strategically. Failure to build those basic capabilities will likely mean more costly interventions well into the future. The United States should continue to work with France and other European partners in building those capacities and in coordinating and sharing the burden of more direct interventions, when national interests warrant.



WHAT CAN CIVILIAN POWER ACCOMPLISH IN FOREIGN CRISES?

Smart Power-the balance between hard power and soft power-depends on the United States having civilian tools at its disposal. Robert D. Lamb, director of the Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation, sat down for a conversation with Global Health Policy Center Director J. Stephen Morrison, Project on Prosperity and Development Director Daniel F. Runde, and Global Food Security Project Director Johanna Nesseth Tuttle on whether U.S. civilian assistance abroad can reduce the need for military power.

ROBERT D. LAMB: The debates this summer around how the United States should respond to the crisis in Syria revolved around whether to use military force, but I think much of the substance of the debate was really about how to avoid using military force. Although having the threat of force in the background can be useful to coerce a diplomatic solution, the preferred response to foreign policy crises is obviously to use whatever civilian tools are at our disposal, and to consider using military tools only when those fail.

Certainly if a conflict emerges out of some set of grievances-lack of jobs, marginalization, mistreatment-it's easy in retrospect to argue that if only those grievances had been redressed earlier a military response would never have been needed. But it seems to me that it's significantly harder to say in advance which grievances should be redressed, or to say in retrospect that a conflict did not emerge because they were redressed successfully. I think it's pretty hard to draw a straight line from the supposed root causes of conflict to conflict prevention. Can any of you think of examples where it was clear that conflict was prevented?

J. STEPHEN MORRISON: You're right; you can never prove a counterfactual. More often, you face cases where it's ambiguous whether addressing a problem through civilian tools lowered the need to rely upon U.S. military action. For example, in the late 1990s, internal wars proliferated in central and eastern Africa, and at the same time UN peacekeeping declined precipitously. How did Africa restabilize in the naught decade? The UN Security Council renewed commitments to blue helmet UN peacekeeping.

In parallel, in the period 1999–2002, extremely high rates of HIV/AIDS in eastern and southern Africa were viewed as a grave transnational security threat, capable of undermining societies, economies, and militaries and leaving behind "ungoverned" spaces where violent extremists could flourish. That threat was a key impetus to the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) launched in 2003, the single largest infectious disease initiative in history, which over a decade has spent over \$50 billion and put more than 6 million people on life-sustaining treatment.

Today you see substantial gains in controlling the AIDS pandemic—we are near a tipping point. We also see substantial progress in deploying UN peacekeepers and a decline in the number of hot internal civil wars. Certainly PEPFAR saved millions of lives from HIV/AIDS. But did it also save lives from a reduced risk of conflict? An argument can be made that it helped, but it's difficult to draw a direct line.

JOHANNA NESSETH TUTTLE: You see this in agriculture, too. Afghanistan was a very significant example of a country mired in conflict and

poverty, with a stunted economy based on rain-fed agriculture. Efforts to reduce threats to the United States from Afghanistan quickly turned to a strategy to increase incomes by improving agricultural methods and farm productivity. But this happened at a time when U.S. support for international food and agriculture was at its lowest in decades, and the knowledge and technical skill to support poor farmers had declined. A lot of people noted that the Defense Department had more people with farm backgrounds than USAID had. There was also a lot of in-fighting among agencies, in particular USDA, USAID and DoD. I think the inefficiencies and miscommunication resulted in wasted funds and ultimately a limited impact.

Most people think we're never doing something like Afghanistan again, but we've also seen a lot of examples where food shortages or spikes in food prices have led to pretty significant civil unrest. Weak states are particularly vulnerable to this. But there are usually other factors at play as well, such as jobs. If you don't have a job, it's hard to buy food, and if you don't have any job prospects, you're probably pretty frustrated. It's a volatile mix.

LAMB: That seems to be another area where it's hard to draw a straight line: from lack of jobs to conflict. But it's something that comes up in almost any society when you ask locals to explain the root causes: if only the young people had jobs they wouldn't fight. I'm skeptical of the link, because the evidence is hard to read. But it makes sense intuitively.

DANIEL F. RUNDE: It definitely makes sense. I think one of the takeaways from Afghanistan and Iraq—and this is shared by many in the military—is that employing as many people as possible in the private sector is a strategic goal of the United States. The U.S. military has tried to do this through a variety of ad hoc approaches, but no one is going to become a four-star general through this. This has to go back to civilian agencies.

Take the example of Colombia. A significant part of the turnaround there can be linked to U.S. military assistance and advisors, along with a series of civilian assistance programs, such as supporting the demobilization of former combatants and offering a judicial process as a pathway back into society. Many historians and economists equate success in places like South Korea with those societies' making difficult decisions, along with targeted assistance and advice from the United States.

Yet the instruments we have only work when we have a willing counterpart or partner, because ultimately we are only a supporting actor in someone else's drama. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show that we are still not lined up strategically enough among our military and civilian organizations. This alignment is understandably difficult to achieve but nevertheless critical.

LAMB: I think that's an important point. The heart of counterinsurgency doctrine was that reducing corruption and helping the government deliver essential services would improve its legitimacy and thereby attract popular support toward the government and away from the insurgents. But if the political elites aren't interested in becoming legitimate or don't think they need to be in order to defeat insurgents, what can civilian aid programs do? They aren't going to change the politics of the conflict. You have to change relationships and incentives. That's politics and diplomacy, not aid.

RUNDE: The United States has at its disposal a host of soft-power approaches, some of which we have not been utilizing to their full strategic potential. At a time when more robust and costlier options are off the table, it is increasingly important to maintain American global leadership by means of active engagement abroad through soft power instruments. We need only look at our successes in countries such as Colombia and South Korea, not to mention our mixed experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, to know what works well.

NESSETH: I agree. The United States can learn from its experience and expenditures over the past decade, or it can move forward and push aside the knowledge we've gained.

LAMB: That's where I think we're weakest. While we're pretty good at collecting lessons, we're not very good at institutionalizing them.

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What I've heard here is that, while you can't draw a straight line from prevention to peace, logic and experience suggest opportunities do exist to use civilian power better than we do. Our military is strong and capable but it's a blunt instrument. There's a lot of talent in our civilian agencies. But we need to learn how to use them better. We have to get smarter at how we mix complicated politics and diplomacy with technical and institutional assistance. If we succeed, it can reduce our reliance on military power to achieve important foreign policy objectives. The pressures on the Defense Department to do less may offer new opportunities to highlight what civilian prevention efforts can accomplish, and to provide new impetus to institutionalizing the approaches that work.



CAN WE ADAPT TO THE CHANGING NATURE OF POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

Juan Zarate

In an increasingly interconnected world—where trade, financing, travel, and communications are fundamentally intertwined—the role of non-state, networked actors and systems—from corporations to influential Twitterati—often hold the keys to power and influence globally. The lament of the loss of American power and influence and inability to conduct "streetcraft" in addition to "statecraft," especially in the wake of the Arab revolutions, reflects a belief system dependent primarily on the projection of power through classic state power.

Power and influence now often lie outside the classic state-structures and Westphalian models that have defined the post WWII era. The state remains relevant, but more than ever before the global power landscape is shared with other actors and networks. It's not enough to say that power has shifted—we need to recognize that state-based power may no longer be central to exerting influence in this new environment. White House talking points, U.S. aid programs, and the might of the U.S. military may not be enough in this new world.

As in the international financial system, this new global landscape offers not just transnational threats to be countered but advantages and potential new allies

as well. The national security focus since 9/11 has largely centered on the threats brought to us by globalization and the shifting nature of power. The shock of 9/11 was not just the horrors of a devastating attack against civilians on American soil but that it was perpetrated by a small network of dedicated individuals who reject modernity but leveraged key elements of globalization to strike the sole remaining superpower from the hinterlands of Afghanistan.

We have spent much of the last decade concerned with nefarious actors and networks—from al Qaida to Russian organized crime—that have drawn strength from globalization and increased access to information and new technologies. But we have consistently failed to look at the other side of the ledger—for allies and the networks of actors and institutions whose interests align with ours.

Just as David Headley, the American recruited by Lashkar et Tayyiba, was able to use Google Maps to help plot the Mumbai attacks in 2008, Oscar Morales, an unemployed Colombian engineer, used

Facebook in 2007, to mobilize 11 million people around the world to march against the FARC and give voice to the anti-kidnapping movement. In a society in which information moves at the speed of Twitter, individuals like Julian Assange can disseminate state secrets wantonly, straining diplomatic relations and putting lives at risk. Yet, the very interconnectedness upon which he preyed also empowers companies like Amazon, MasterCard and PayPal to shut down his funding sources, in ways that are swifter and perhaps more effective than government-led legal action.

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Similarly, while the United States government has worried about groups of Somali-American youth in Minneapolis, Seattle, and Columbus traveling to Somalia to train and fight (often engaging in suicide attacks) with the al Qaeda affiliate, al-Shabaab, it has done far less to support the Somali American business elite, like the prime minister of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), that has returned to Somalia to establish a new government and a semblance of stability. While terrorist groups have forged dangerous alliances and networks through shared training camps, the more than tens of thousands of international military and police personnel that train in the United States annuallyoften studying at America's universities-remain an untapped resource for formal and informal global security coordination and cooperation. And while we kill al Qaida leaders in Pakistan's western frontier and strain to maintain diplomatic relations with Islamabad, we spend comparably little time

> supporting the investments of Pakistani-American business men and women doing business in and along those borders.

> In the 21st century, the nation that galvanizes the majority of these new global voices will enjoy more power and exert

more influence than has ever before been possible. More than any other state and culture, America enjoys a comparative advantage in leveraging the diffusion of powers and influence in ways that are commensurate with our enduring strategic security and prosperity. This opportunity stems from the active employment of our unrivaled strategic suasion. Strategic suasion is the directed use of American power and influence to align influential state and non-state actors and networks with American interests.

The empowerment of private sector and non-state actors does not threaten our interests. Indeed, as the rising power centers, credible voices and key shapers of environments, these actors are our natural allies in the 21st century. Our interaction with them, however can no longer be passive or ad hoc. We need to develop new structures and doctrines that enable our government and these actors to work in concert and in parallel to realize and achieve common goals and interests.

Though classic state power still matters, a new national security model must take into account centrally the idea of strategic suasion and the role of non-state networked actors to influence for good and in parallel with classic state power. National security policy should be geared toward aligning those nonstate interests to align with American interests and values. The goal of our national security should not be just the defense and promotion of our interests, but the creation of conditions globally commensurate with American interests and values. Freedom of expression, the press, flow of information, accountability of governments, respect for human rights, protection of minorities, empowerment of women, free trade and systems built to empower entrepreneurs and individual expression, and the building of transparent civil institutions are all values and goals that the United States and American society should be promoting. These goals are neither solely the province of the U.S. government nor achievable only by the elements of the government. This is fundamental to understanding and shaping power relationshipsand our national security—in the 21st century.

This article is a modified excerpt from the author's new book, Treasury's War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (PublicAffairs, 2013). The author would like to thank Muhammad Kirdar, former CSIS research assistant for his collaboration and assistance on this article.

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ABOUT CSIS

For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed solutions to the world's greatest policy challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars are developing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world.

CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center's 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.

Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world's preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center's president and chief executive officer in April 2000.



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