Policing the context:
Principles and guidance to inform international policing assistance

What Works Series

Stabilisation Unit

The Stabilisation Unit (SU) is a uniquely integrated civil-military operational unit funded from the Conflict Pool, designed to be agile, responsive and well-equipped to operate in high threat environments. It combines in-house staff expertise with the ability to draw on a larger pool of civilian expertise for specialised, longer term or larger scale taskings. It ensures lessons from practical experience are captured as best practice and used to improve future SU, Conflict Pool and wider delivery in support of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS).

International Policing is a critical component of the BSOS and the SU hosts serving police officers alongside other members of staff who have an expert knowledge of policing issues in Fragile & Conflict Affected States (FCAS). The police element within the SU mainstreams non-operational UK policing capability into wider HMG conflict and stabilisation programming by providing:

- The gateway to international policing for government, police and all domestic and international partners
- The communication hub for non-operational international policing activities
- Strategic advice on international policing issues
- Development of UK international policing capacity and capability
- Development of UK contributions to bilateral & multilateral assistance programmes
- Guidance in relation to overseas police deployments
- Sourcing of appropriately skilled and experienced officers from across the UK for deployments to countries to support specific stabilisation activity
- Management of the International Police Assistance Board (IPAB), a multi-agency coordinating body for international police activity
- Co-ordination of the IPAB referral process that considers proposed international activity by UK police officers

Stabilisation What Works papers

What Works (WWs) provide programmatic guidance to UK government officials, Deployable Civilian Experts and contractors engaged in stabilisation. They cover a range of issues including; Political engagement in stabilisation, Analysis, Planning, Monitoring &Evaluation, How to modify stabilisation operations to context, Stakeholder engagement, Strategic communications, Management and leadership of stabilisation platforms and Outsourcing. They are available online and from the Stabilisation Unit Lessons team (www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk)

The WWs are informed by the UK Concept of Stability and Stabilisation, the Principles of Stabilisation and the UK Approach to Stabilisation. They are also supported by a series of thematic papers called the Stabilisation Issues Notes.

Feedback and comments on this paper and the other outputs in the series can be sent to the SU Lessons Team can be sent so SULessons@stabilisationunit.gov.uk

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Glossary

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
BSOS	Building Stability Overseas Strategy
CBP	Community-based Policing
CONTEST	Strategy for Countering Terrorism
DCC	District Community Council
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FCAS	Fragile and conflict-affected states
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
G8	Group of Eight
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
MoU	Memorandum of understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSJA	Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidance
PNC	*Police Nationale Congolaise*
PSVI	Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative
SOCA	Serious and Organised Crime Agency
SSAPR	Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform programme (in DRC)
UKBA	UK Border Agency
VAWG	Violence against women and girls

Foreword by President of the Association of Chief Police Officers Sir Hugh Orde, Chief Executive of the College of Policing Alex Marshall, and ACPO lead for International Affairs Chief Constable Colette Paul.

In recent years the UK has played a leading role internationally in supporting effective and accountable police in countries at risk of or recovering from violent conflict. In some, for instance Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Kosovo, this support has been high profile and involved large numbers of serving and retired policemen and women. In others, whilst our contributions have not perhaps had the same public profile, they have nevertheless made significant and lasting contributions to helping countries get back on their feet following periods of war or instability.

The UK invests in supporting improvements to policing internationally for many important reasons. Not least an effective and accountable police service is critical to maintaining national security, safeguarding social and economic development and to helping countries affected by conflict to become more stable, and more peaceful. The UK National Security Strategy and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy are both clear in stating the UK commitment to tackling conflict and insecurity internationally and in the role that UK policing can play in support.

The UK approach to policing is well known and respected around the world. We know however from our own experience here in the UK that policing must be relevant and responsive to the local environment in which it takes place. Therefore, whilst we place great emphasis on the support that we can provide through our international policing efforts, we are also careful not to impose a particular model of policing on others. However, we do believe that effective policing should seek to promote and uphold core principles, not only because they are critical to the integrity of our own police, but also because we believe that they are at the heart of effective policing everywhere.

This document draws lessons on what it means to uphold and promote core policing principles in our overseas assistance, providing a crucial insight into both 'what works' and the many challenges that we must navigate to achieve success. It is based on the collective UK international policing experience over recent years including Afghanistan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and most recently in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Libya.

It should be essential reading for anybody designing, implementing or overseeing a policing programme. It does not claim to have all the answers, but in flagging key lessons and challenges it ensures that we continue to learn and to build on good practice.

This is the first iteration of a living document. As our experience grows we will update it so that we are always building on our most recent learning. Your experience in providing international policing assistance will be vital to this endeavour and as such we look forwards to further editions, including lessons from your current and future work.

As President of ACPO, Chief Executive of the National College of Policing and ACPO lead for International Affairs we encourage you to read this document and to incorporate the lessons it draws into your work. As an important contribution to our approach to international policing we hope that it will be both interesting and instructive.

Good luck!

Sir Hugh Orde OBE QPM
ACPO President

Alex Marshall
Chief Executive, College of Policing

Colette Paul
ACPO International Policing Lead

Introduction

The United Kingdom (UK) has significant experience of supporting policing assistance programmes in a wide range of contexts and is increasingly working in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) and stabilisation contexts where enhancing safety and security is a key priority. The SU has produced this paper to respond to a range of recent developments:

- **Increasing importance of UK supported security and justice programming, with policing a key area of intervention** – There has been a growing trend for policing programmes across Her Majesty's Government (HMG), demonstrated by the availability of Department for International Development (DFID), Conflict Pool and other funding, and with policing firmly identified as an priority in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and in the activities of specific departments including the Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Home Office. Support to enhance policing is also a common feature of HMG counter terrorism assistance in partner countries. The newly announced Conflict, Security and Stability Fund and associated regional and national strategies required by the UK's National Security Council is likely to further increase the profile and importance of UK supported policing programmes.

- **Role of UK police officers in international policing** – Many UK police officers play important roles on regionally and internationally-mandated police support missions in a variety of different contexts from situations of ongoing active violence to peacetime situations more akin to that of the UK. This experience needs to be captured, and applied, if their work is to be informed by wider learning.

- **Need for evidence of what works** – Whilst there have been reviews of UK-supported policing programmes in individual countries, there has been no broader attempt to distil lessons from these. In addition, work by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicates that across its 34 donor members "externally supported [security and justice] programmes generally feature low success rates".[1] At the same time, a significant body of empirical work exists within criminology literature, which has not been effectively applied to the development context. Some of this suggests ways in which policing assistance programmes can learn valuable lessons of 'what works' and, therefore, produce more effective programming.[2]

- **Benefit of a common approach** – Many HMG programmes use the language of 'community policing' or 'community-based policing' but these terms can mean different things to different audiences. The lack of a common understanding risks undermining key work to support the improvement of security and justice in priority countries for

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[1] OECD, p.3, 2012.
[2] It is recognised that the majority of criminology research is done in European or North American contexts and so not all findings will be relevant to FCAS. However, where approaches have been empirically shown not to work in developed countries, it is unlikely that they will work in resource-scarce fragile states.

HMG. Common understandings of key terms and approaches is of ever greater importance given the increased profile of policing assistance, and its place alongside other actions taken in support which require close coordination and collaboration between different actors often working within the same time and space.

- **Working in different environments requires a context-specific approach** - HMG is increasingly focusing on policing in conflict-affected environments and countries undergoing transitions. These contexts present new challenges, including endemic shortages of vital resources (e.g. human capacity and funding), lack of access to key actors, a multiplicity of security providers and interested international actors and high degrees of risk. There is an urgent need for up-to-date guidance to inform programmes in such challenging situations which this paper seeks to address.

Purpose

This paper aims to enhance the impact of UK support to policing assistance programmes. Different contexts demonstrate diverse demands, which require different solutions. This paper seeks to ensure that UK assistance to policing is always:

- Based on common principles and international standards.

- Responsive to the local context.

- Informed by, and informs, the UK's political strategies and priorities.

- Clear in its intended strategic impact and outcomes.

- Grounded in an empirical understanding of what works in order to generate value for money.

- Developed and managed effectively and efficiently.

Whilst it is intended that it will have wide utility, the primary audience for this paper is those responsible for commissioning, designing and overseeing the delivery of UK-supported international policing assistance programmes. It is hoped that it is particularly valuable for those working in FCAS and stabilisation contexts. It is intended as a living document that will be reviewed annually and updated as further lessons are learned. Feedback on the content and its utility is therefore actively sought (please see contact details on inside cover).

Development of this paper

This paper seeks to distil learning of 'what works' in policing assistance programmes into practical guidance. It results from a year-long period of consultation and review including:

- Reviewing existing UK and international guidance and literature on police development and security and justice reform.

- Reviewing lessons learned from a wide range of UK-supported policing development programmes over the last 10 years contexts (including Afghanistan, Bolivia, DRC, Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Sierra Leone and South Sudan).

- Reviewing evaluations of security and justice programmes supported by other donors and international organisations.

- Reviewing the findings from recent criminological research.

The lessons identified reinforce some key messages from previous guidance, whilst adding significant new learning based on the above recent work.

The paper has been drafted by the UK Government's Stabilisation Unit in its role as both a centre of excellence for security and justice work in conflict affected and fragile contexts and facilitator of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) International Policing support. ACPO, The College of Policing, DFID, MoD and the FCO have all been involved in its development.

Scope

This paper is focused primarily on assistance to enhance the effectiveness and accountability of state police services. However, it is important to recognise that the police are never the sole answer to problems of security and injustice. Partnerships are needed across the criminal justice chain with prosecution services, courts and prisons and indeed with military and other defence actors in particular contexts. And in many fragile states policing may be carried out by a wide range of actors (see definitions Box) and there will often be a range of state, non-state, and traditional justice providers. This paper highlights this complexity and identifies the broad range of actors who often need to be engaged to improve security and justice. Effective HMG assistance programmes normally include a specific focus on developing these linkages. Working with the police, however, does pose specific challenges and this paper seeks to both highlight and address them.

Structure

This paper is in three main sections:

- **Why does the UK provide policing assistance overseas?**
  This section provides an overview of the UK policy context and the contributions that policing assistance can make to a range of UK priorities.

- **What are the principles that underpin UK policing assistance overseas?**
  This section describes the core principles that UK assistance to policing is based upon, drawing on international standards.

- **How can policing assistance programmes apply these principles in different contexts?**
  This section is structured according to the programme cycle. Based on learning from past programmes, the section examines how these principles can inform the analysis,

design, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation of assistance programmes.

Annex A provides key questions to ask when designing and managing the implementation of assistance programmes. Annex B introduces some resources for further information, advice and practical support.

Police and Policing Definitions and Contexts

This paper makes a distinction between police, policing and policing actors. For clarity these are defined as follows:

Police: the civil institution of a state, responsible for the protection of life and property, prevention and detection of crime, and the preservation of law and order.

Policing: the activities carried out by policing actors in order to protect life and property, prevent and detect crime, and preserve and enforce law and order.

Policing actors: the range of organisations in fragile and conflict-affected states who carry out policing. This typically includes core state agencies such as the police, military and border guards; local providers who have constitutional and legal authority; and non-state actors who have no legal authority to carry out policing but do so nevertheless.

The role of the police can be defined as to: Protect life and property; preserve law and order; prevent crime and bring offenders to justice. However the prioritisation of policing objectives depends in large part on the security and conflict context. In countries affected by violent conflict, the focus is likely to be on protecting lives and maintaining law and order. In more peaceful contexts, there may be a greater focus on bringing offenders to justice.

Moving from stabilisation towards recovery affects the priorities for policing assistance and the range of actors involved. In highly unstable contexts, military actors are likely to perform policing roles, which may require different approaches from policing assistance programmes. A forthcoming Stabilisation Unit paper on 'Security Sector Stabilisation' will examine the challenges of policing and security provision and the range of actors involved in the context of high levels of violence in greater detail.

Why does the UK provide policing assistance overseas?

In an increasingly interconnected world, the UK's security, prosperity and freedom is linked to that of others. Conflict and instability, unaccountable and ineffective governments, terrorism, transnational and organised crime, human rights violations and poor socio-economic development in other countries all impact on the UK. Addressing these issues at source is both morally right and in Britain's national interest.[3]

Working with others on the invitation of 'host' countries to tackle these issues is political, touching as it often does, on issues of national sovereignty and identity. It requires an integrated approach using diplomatic, development, military and security tools.[4] At the centre of this effort is work to improve security and justice. Insecurity and injustice can fuel conflict, poor governance, terrorism, transnational and organised crime, human rights violations and restrict socio-economic development. And each of these problems in turn undermines security and justice. Reversing this negative spiral is a critical challenge that the UK government is committed to tackling.

Policing and its role in the wider justice system is a pivotal issue in this broad agenda. The police are often the face of the state to citizens and the institution that most affects their daily lives[5]. They are the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, being the agency of the state primarily responsible for upholding the rule of law and maintaining public order. Because the police often lie at the heart of, and typically enforce, the existing power relations in society they can have significant positive and negative effects.[6] Professional police services that have the trust and confidence of people and respond to the needs of all sections of society can provide a platform for security, prosperity and freedom[7]. Repressive police forces that fail to protect communities and are associated with corruption can trigger violence and fuel radicalisation[8].

The reality in most fragile states is that the police are just one of a number of actors who provide safety and security. Typically, these may include core state agencies such as the police, military and border guards; local providers who have constitutional and legal authority to provide safety and security, such as Chieftain Police (in Sierra Leone) and militia (in Ethiopia); traditional actors who mediate disputes and provide access to justice but which might sit outside formal state sanctioned provision; and non-state actors who have no legal authority to provide safety and security but do so nevertheless. In the context of endemic resource shortages in most fragile states, it is unlikely that the police themselves will able to provide safety and security for all citizens in the short or medium term. How this wide range of different policing actors operate therefore, and the extent to which they

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[3] HMG, p.4, 2011a.
[4] HMG, p.4, 2011a.
[5] HMG, P.21 2007.
[6] OECD, p.iii, 2011.
[7] HMG p.12 2011a.
[8] HMG p.12 2011a.

support and are reinforced by the wider justice system has a significant impact on stability, citizen safety and economic growth.

The cost of international inaction on policing is high[9]; conversely, the benefits of action can be significant. That is why work to support the development of effective policing actors that have the trust and confidence of citizens, and uphold the rule of law is a central focus of HMG work overseas. International policing assistance is directly relevant to five important UK priorities, as set out below. Responding to each of these priorities may lead to a different selection of activities in a policing assistance programme, but the principles underpinning them will be common to all.

Conflict prevention and post conflict recovery

Tackling the root causes of instability and resolving conflicts are recognised in the National Security Strategy as priority tasks to help ensure the UK's security.[10] Conflict and instability are also fundamental barriers to international development. Of the 34 countries furthest from reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 22 are in, or are emerging from, conflict.[11] Policing is a central issue for conflict prevention and is at the heart of HMG's upstream approach that is described in BSOS.[12] Supporting effective and accountable policing actors that protect citizens, guard against corruption and provide access to justice is one element that is critical to preventing conflict and building peace.[13]

Rapid crisis response, improving the UK's ability to take fast, appropriate and effective action to stop a crisis escalating or spreading, is at the heart of the downstream pillar of BSOS.[14] Indeed, effective action to support post-conflict reconstruction is vital to help ensure a sustainable peace - 40 per cent of armed conflicts recommence within a decade of hostilities ending.[15] Policing is fundamental to this. The provision of basic protection and rights to citizens is a clear demonstration of a peace dividend. Reforming abusive and unaccountable police actors is often central to preventing a slide back to violence. And ensuring civilian police are able to take on, and provide more effective policing responsibilities and services is critical to long-term recovery and peacebuilding.

Development

Poverty, inequality, and high unemployment exacerbate instability and violence.[16] Security and access to justice are essential for sustainable development in both fragile and more stable environments. Research in poor and marginalised communities has shown that residents cite insecurity and powerlessness as some of the biggest impediments to a better

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[9] OECD, p.3 2005.
[10] HMG, p.31, 2010.
[11] DFID, p.2, 2010.
[12] HMG, p.12, 2011a.
[13] World Bank, p.v, 2011.
[14] HMG, p.22, 2011a.
[15] DFID, p.10, 2010.
[16] HMG, p.13, 2011a.

life. Similarly insecurity and lack of access to resources can drive and facilitate crime. Improving policing is therefore vital to address some of the most immediate threats to poor people's lives.[17]

National security

Terrorism and organised crime are recognised in the National Security Strategy as two of the main threats to the UK's national security.[18] Success in countering both threats relies, in part, on effective policing as part of an integrated approach often involving a wide range of different actors. The UK's Strategy for Countering Terrorism (CONTEST)[19], and the Local to Global Strategy [20] for reducing the risk of organised crime, identifies the critical role of the police in pursuing terrorists and strengthening enforcement against organised criminals. These strategies also emphasise the important role that effective and accountable police services can play in helping prevent people being radicalised, turning to terrorism, and stemming opportunities for organised crime to take root. The National Security Strategy highlights that Britain will be safer if the values of human rights and the rule of law are upheld and respected in the world.[21] Helping partner countries develop their police services in this way as part of wider efforts is an effective means of reducing the threat to UK national security from terrorism and organised crime.

Rule of law

The rule of law is the underlying framework that underpins open and fair societies and economies, where citizens, businesses and civil society can prosper. The rule of law advances five main ends: public authority is bound by and accountable to clear and known laws; citizens are treated equally before the law; human rights are protected; citizens can access efficient and predictable dispute resolution mechanisms; and law and order are prevalent.[22] The rule of law is inherently political because it is not just about the law; it is about the 'rules', the institutions that determine who has access to power, rights and resources.[23] The police are therefore a key actor – they are necessary to protect and enforce the rule of law, although they can also undermine it. Understanding the political economy of policing and strengthening the capability and accountability of the police is vital.

Violence against women and girls

Violence against women and girls (VAWG) is the most widespread form of abuse worldwide, affecting one third of all women in their lifetime.[24] During conflict and humanitarian

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[17] DFID, p.75, 2009.
[18] HMG, p.25, 2010.
[19] HMG, 2011b.
[20] HMG, 2011c.
[21] HMG, p.4, 2010.
[22] DFID, p.2, 2013a.
[23] DFID, p.2, 2013a.
[24] DFID, 2011a.

emergencies, the incidence of physical and sexual violence can dramatically increase. VAWG can have a negative impact on opportunities for long term peace and stability, violates human rights, and reduces progress towards the MDGs.[25] Yet VAWG is not criminalised in many countries and is instead a matter for civil law. The impact of this is compounded by the fact that it is also an issue that the police often ignore, and that sometimes the police themselves perpetrate. Actively protecting the safety of women and girls is a key responsibility of the police and it is a UK priority to address this challenge, supporting the police's partnership with the many other stakeholders who are needed to work together to reduce violence against women. Improving security and access to justice for women and girls is a corporate goal for DFID and preventing sexual violence is now a G8 Commitment.[26] Further, preventing and reducing VAWG is not only a means of improving security and access to justice and providing relevant services for survivors, but also means ensuring national security sector and justice reform programmes are gender-sensitive.[27]

[25] DFID, 2013a.
[26] DFID 2011a; Hague, 2012.
[27] FCO, para 10, 2013.

What are the principles that underpin UK policing assistance overseas?

This section explains the principles that should underpin all UK policing assistance overseas. Its purpose is not to propose a blueprint for how policing should be delivered, but to set out a philosophy and core principles. This approach is grounded in international best practice and based on lessons from UK policing assistance programmes. These principles should be inherent in any UK funded programme, whether the local priority is counter terrorism, gang violence or crime prevention.

However, *how* these principles are applied will vary greatly in different contexts (as emphasised by the title of this paper). This is addressed in the next section. While the principles are inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing, in some contexts they may not all align with the immediate interests of partners. It may not be feasible to work on them all immediately in all contexts, but if so it is important that programmes have a plan as to how to build support for them. Progress towards these principles will undoubtedly move at different speeds in different environments: the key point is to not forget the importance of each of them to sustainable democratic policing over the medium-long term.

Accountability

A fundamental principle of policing is that the police should be accountable for their actions.[28] They should be accountable to citizens for how they police communities, to the courts for their actions (particularly the exercise of coercive powers that have potential for abuse), and to the government for their performance and the expenditure of limited public resources.

Improving the accountability of the police has been identified as critical to the success of police reforms. A police service that is seen to be accountable will earn a higher degree of public trust, confidence and cooperation and can therefore be more effective in the delivery of its duties.[29]

Accountability mechanisms should be both internal and external and should apply at all levels.[30] Each individual officer should recognise the importance of their role in securing the confidence of the public in the institution. The principle of accountability for policing actions should also apply to other state and non-state actors who may perform that role.

Empowerment

Empowerment and ownership of policing both by the public and the police themselves has been part of policing philosophies for many years. Robert Peel, the founder of the Metropolitan Police in London described the interrelationships between public and police in

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[28] HMG, p.42, 2007.
[29] SEESAC, p.20, 2006.
[30] OECD-DAC, p.163, 2007.

1829[31]; more recently, UNDP identified empowerment as critical to successful policing[32]. Empowerment and ownership in policing can be seen to have two important dimensions.[33] Firstly, it is a process whereby communities are given a voice in directing policing priorities towards improving the quality of life in their neighbourhoods. This involves policing actors and local authorities creating an environment in which citizens are empowered to help identify the problems that they should focus on, and to support their actions to address them. Empowerment is closely linked with 'accountability'. The mechanisms and forums that are used to engage and empower citizens, should also be used to help hold the police, and others who provide policing services, to account.

Secondly, within the police, empowerment also relates to a decentralised organisational structure and a philosophy, which ensures that decisions are taken at the most appropriate levels. This requires reinforcement through a management style that is supportive and encouraging of discretionary judgment: empowering police officers to tackle local issues, and offering support and guidance to officers exercising their initiative. Internal checks and balances are required to ensure that autonomy at the front line is not abused or facilitates a lack of performance.

Gender equality and ending violence against women

Women and girls are often marginalised and face specific threats to their safety and barriers to accessing justice. One of the primary responsibilities of a police service is to be responsive to the differing needs and perceptions of all members of the community. This involves giving women and girls a voice in setting policing priorities and monitoring implementation. It requires recognising gender-based violence and particularly violence against women as a priority crime. It involves tackling violence against women by the police and other security providers. And it also necessitates working within the police service to achieve gender equality across the service, including through the recruitment, retention and promotion of women police officers and the provision of a safe and respectful working environment for women and men[34]. There are a limited number of women involved in policing in FCAS and yet they can play a very positive role in security provision both for sensitive issues such as violence against women and girls and more generally. Women police officers, or even female citizens engaging with the police, face specific risks of violence in some countries. Working to mitigate these risks is critical to encouraging women's involvement.

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[31] "…to maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police. The police being only members of the public that are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence". SEESAC, p.3, 2007.

[32] SEESSAC/UNDP, p.4, 2007.

[33] OECD-DAC, p.169, 2007.

[34] OECD-DAC, p.174, 2007.

Human rights

The police exist to support rights and freedoms, not to undermine them. In the performance of their duty, police officers (and all state and non-state policing actors) must respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all people. Ensuring that the police adhere to the law and international standards in key areas such as detention,[35] crime investigation[36] and the use of force[37] are important issues.

The actions of individual officers can have a significant impact on fundamental issues of trust and confidence in the police and the state. This is particularly true with regard to the right of the police to use force. The excessive and inappropriate use of force by the police, particularly in fragile contexts, can immediately undermine progress in all other areas of reform (see Box A)[38]. The protection of human rights is closely linked to accountability. Officers, police departments and all state and non-state policing actors should be made accountable for their actions.

Furthermore, it is essential that all UK-funded programmes consider carefully the risk that the assistance they provide will contribute to – or even be perceived to contribute to – human rights violations carried out by counterpart police services. The Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) guidance[39] is an important part of HMG's approach to managing this risk and should be adhered to in all cases.

Box A: Public trust in policing and the use of force and firearms

The use of force by police services should always be closely scrutinised, but in post-conflict countries this is often a particularly sensitive issue. According to the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, in carrying out their duties, police officers should as far as possible apply non-violent methods before resorting to any use of physical force. Use of force must be the minimum appropriate in the circumstances and reflect a graduated and flexible response to the situation. Police officers should use physical force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or have no realistic chance of achieving the intended result.

Experience in recent years in Afghanistan and Libya highlights a challenging dilemma. Citizens often mistrust the police because of their role before or during the conflict, with the misuse of physical force and firearms normally high on their list of complaints. But with widespread insecurity, citizens also want to be safe. How force is applied, up to and including the use of deadly force, and how those using it are held accountable for their action is critical to resolving this dilemma and improving trust in the police.

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[35] For example, preventing wrongful arrest, illegal detention and the mistreatment of prisoners.
[36] For example, ensuring proper gathering and protection of evidence, and legal interrogation methods.
[37] For example, preventing the misuse of handcuffs, restraint and lethal force.
[38] The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials is of particular importance in this regard. See UN, 1990.
[39] HMG, 2013.

Partnership

Partnerships are key to effective policing.[40] Most safety and security problems cannot be solved by the police acting alone. Evidence shows that multi-stakeholder partnerships are important for crime prevention. Partnerships with communities help identify local needs and policing priorities, and promote accountability, transparency and effectiveness. This is important across the criminal justice system including prosecution services, courts and prisons. Partnerships are important with local authorities, women's groups, education and social service agencies, neighbourhood associations, youth organisations, NGOs, all of whom play a role in helping to prevent crime. And in fragile states, the police and international actors providing support may need to establish partnerships and clearly coordinated assistance programmes with a range of other actors who provide security and justice, whether it be the military, intelligence, non-state armed groups, or traditional courts.

Problem Solving

Problem solving can be viewed strategically as being at the core of the policing mission[41]. It is also a valuable technique that can be used to address safety and security concerns at an operational or tactical level. By studying crime and disorder issues, usually in geographically defined areas, responses can be identified and implemented to address them, where possible by addressing both symptoms and their underlying causes. Crime and violence occurs at a point in time; in a specific location; for particular reasons; and, frequently, to identifiable individuals, groups, organisations or businesses who are often repeatedly victimised. Problem solving requires a structured approach, making use of consultation, partnerships and the analysis of information.

Service delivery

Service delivery is the key guiding concept of policing in democracies. It reflects the central commitment of the police to protect the safety and security of citizens and their livelihoods and property. An ethos of 'service' needs to inform the way that policing is practiced at all levels – from policy to implementation, and from strategic planning to how police conduct themselves on the streets. This attitude is central to the development of police services from a 'force' to a more responsive service approach. Key elements of service delivery include the visibility, accessibility and familiarity of policing actors to citizens.

The way the police, and all other policing actors, behave determines the level of public trust and confidence in them. Everyone engaged in policing must act with integrity towards

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[40] For instance, Chapter 7 of the Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (often referred to as the Patten Report) described effective policing as "…the police working in partnership with the community; the community thereby participating in its own policing; and the two working together…" Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, 1999.
41 See for instance Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle and Eck, 2008.

members of the public and their colleagues, avoiding all forms of behaviour that may reasonably be perceived to be abusive, corrupt or dishonest. Policing actors must also at all times, impartially uphold and obey the law, demonstrating a fair and unbiased approach. They should respect and support all members of society in the execution of their lawful duties, avoiding any perception of prejudice towards a particular community. This is especially crucial with regards to respecting the rights of women and girls and the differing perspectives and needs of women, men, boys and girls on safety and security.

How can policing assistance programmes apply these principles in different contexts?

This section looks at how the key principles of policing outlined above can be integrated into effective policing assistance programmes that are appropriate to the challenges of the local context. Pragmatism is important here as well as principles. Experience shows that the aim in fragile contexts should be to support 'best fit' solutions that will deliver improvements in safety and security. This section summarises many of the key lessons from HMG and other international policing assistance programmes around the world over the last 10 years. It is recognised that 'how' policing assistance is designed and delivered will differ across HMG departments and agencies. But the principles, and many of the lessons outlined here will be relevant across government. This section provides an account of 'what works' and is structured according to the programme cycle:

- **Setting objectives** – at the outset of the process of developing a policing assistance programme. This focuses on why HMG is considering undertaking policing work in a particular context, the desired outcomes, and the possible parameters for investigation.

- **Assessment (analysis)** - this examines the context in which a proposed policing assistance programme might take place. It focuses on the analysis which is necessary to determine the appropriate focus of a programme.

- **Design (planning)** – this identifies lessons learned from efforts to design police assistance programmes, with a particular focus on establishing programme objectives and intended results.

- **Implementation (delivery)** – this highlights learning from experiences of managing and delivering programmes in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.

- **Management** – this points out important lessons in terms of how a programme should be managed and overseen by HMG.

Annex A closely mirrors the structure of this section, and sets out some of the key questions to help frame work at each stage. Annex B sets out where to go for further information, advice and practical support.

Identifying issues to address

The core HMG objectives that tend to drive policing assistance programmes overseas were laid out above (see section 'Why does the UK provide policing assistance overseas?'). It will be necessary in any country context to identify the primary desired outcome(s). Establishing up front what the safety and security outcomes are that HMG is seeking to support provides an essential step in guiding what kind of actors and issues need to be focused on in the assessment phase. Identifying these outcomes requires consideration of the full range of HMG's interests and activities in a given context. It is important to identify areas where

different HMG interests converge or compete, and to consider the consequences and trade-offs of different approaches. For example, promoting the police as a more effective security actor in a highly insecure environment may lead the police towards a paramilitary style of operation which could undermine their longer-term role as a key part of the criminal justice system. Similarly, attention should be paid to how successful cooperation and transitions will be achieved between different security actors. For example, care should be taken to understand the potential issues, benefits and challenges posed by hand-overs between military and civilian actors, and of military and civilian actors working in the same space and time on highly related priorities.

Having a clear idea at the outset of what success will look like in a particular country means that the assessment and programme design processes can flow from this. There are many examples of programmes that say they are seeking one outcome, but are actually undertaking activities more likely to have different effects, for example:

- Many programmes in post-conflict environments say they are seeking to reduce crime and violence in that country by building the capacity of the police service as an institution from the top down, yet we have few examples of this kind of direct impact given the level of infrastructure and capacity deficits that exist. There are instances where such programmes have contributed to statebuilding goals by making the police a more visible and respected presence in certain parts of the country.

- A common approach to policing programmes is to strengthen external accountability and oversight structures, based on a desire to reduce police misconduct and corruption. However, there is very limited evidence that these structures have a direct impact on actual misconduct, although they can improve perceptions of the police and enhance public trust.,

Not thinking through these issues up front can lead to lazy assessments and planning that seek to impose 'tried and trusted' approaches that do not necessarily respond to the primary outcomes and whose rationale cannot be underpinned by robust evidence.

It can be useful at the outset to establish some criteria against which the findings of the assessment and design phases will be judged. These criteria can then be regularly applied throughout the different stages of the programme cycle to check whether initial choices are still valid. These criteria could be:[42]

i)   Is the initiative transformative? Does it have the possibility of changing the incentives and behaviour of people and organisations? As a result of that change, is it likely lead to better safety and security outcomes? Does the initiative address the underlying causes of conflict and instability?

ii)   Can the initiative be institutionalised? Does it have the possibility of being incorporated into structured and formalised bureaucratic practices?

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[42] Asia Foundation, p.4-5 2012.

iii)   Can the initiative be taken to scale? Within available and likely funding does the proposed initiative have the possibility of expanding beyond the specific project intervention site or agency?

iv)   Is transformative reform politically possible? Is there a national and international political coalition for change? If not, how is the programme building this political coalition and the political capital of stakeholders to influence the outcome of political events? Has the programme identified the right change agents? How is the programme changing the political calculus of decision-makers?

v)   Are reforms and any likely support programmes locally owned? This means more than just political commitment to programme goals on the part of national elites and leaders. To what extent are the aims of a programme more widely owned by the population? Are there tensions between government and other local ownership? To what extent is the programme consistent with existing cultural, political or social process or norms?

Assessment[43]

A detailed assessment is critical to:

- Verify whether the assumptions and issues identified at the outset are correct and the outcome is relevant and achievable in the context.

- Develop a realistic theory of change[44] that will guide the design of an assistance programme to best deliver the outcome in the context.

- Situate the planned support within the wider context.

Understanding the context is therefore the basis of good programming. Policing assistance programmes should consider the existing core pieces of analysis that inform HMG country strategies (e.g. conflict assessment, country context analysis). Building on these foundations, more specific analysis will normally be important in three key areas:

- Safety and security context

- Political economy context

- Institutional context

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[43] For further details on assessment and analysis in stabilisation and conflict contexts see What Works Analysis and Stabilisation Issues Note: Analysis, Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation.
[44] A theory of change explains why the proposed activities are expected to lead to the intended result. It highlights assumptions and risks, and proposes mitigating actions to address them.

Experience shows the benefit of working in this sequence: starting by looking at the issues on the ground; then considering how underlying political and economic forces shape this reality; and then assessing what is needed to help the police and other actors to address the challenges identified, given the political context.

Traditionally, many assistance programmes were solely based on an institutional assessment of the police itself. This often led to a programme primarily focused on institutional capacity-building with difficulties in then demonstrating how this improved the safety and security of citizens. Starting with an analysis of the safety and security context is more likely to lead to effective programming and results on the ground.

Safety and security context

Threats to citizen safety and security – A good starting point is to assess the main safety and security issues facing citizens. It is important to identify the specific needs, concerns and priorities of women, men, boys and girls from all sectors of the community, recognising that women and girls often face specific real and perceived safety and security threats related to their gender. Similarly, it is essential to examine the particular challenges faced by marginalised social and demographic groups (e.g. religious groups, ethnic groups, youth and the elderly). It is also necessary to look at where these problems occur – are they concentrated in specific geographical areas or spread across the country? The more perspectives that can be assessed and disaggregated the better, as it guards against the voices of the powerful dominating the analysis of the context.

Provision of safety and security – Identifying which actors provide safety and security is critical. Particular attention should be paid to understanding how different sorts of actors might perform policing roles at different times and to the periods during which these different actors take over from each other. For instance, military actors might play peacekeeping roles in the immediate period following a ceasefire and indeed continue to be actively engaged in supporting aspects of policing even after the end of conflict. However at some point, their roles are likely to transform and the role of local law enforcement agencies will become paramount. In fragile states there are a wide range of security providers and it is important to analyse their mandates, motivations, capability, geographical reach, how they do or do not work together and the points at which the roles and responsibilities of different actors begin, end and intersect.

It is not always easy, possible or desirable, to draw a rigid distinction between state institutions, local providers who have constitutional and legal authority to provide policing services, and non-state actors involved in security and justice[45]. A strong lesson from the

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[45] For example in post-revolution Libya actors undertaking policing roles range from national police to affiliated militia groups who work with the police in their local area to neighbourhood watch and self-defence groups that provide security outside any agreement with the state and outside any legal framework: in their different ways, all claim legitimacy and authority to act.

past decade is that policing assistance programmes must work with local realities and understand all actors who have an influence over and authority to provide safety, security and justice. This is the difference between a programme focused on policing (the delivery of safety and security) and one focused on the police.

Popular actions and perceptions – Who do citizens go to for the provision of safety and security and what do they think about the policing services they receive? Examining the actions and views of women and girls, as distinct from those of men and boys, is crucial. It is also important to note the particular challenges faced by marginalised social and demographic groups. It is not uncommon to find that citizens trust non-state security providers more than the police.

Political economy context

Historical perspective – It is valuable to consider what are the historical legacies and underlying factors that shape how the police and other security providers behave, and how communities relate to these actors. Part of this historical context may be the history of British involvement in policing, from colonial times up to previous assistance programmes. It is important to be aware of any existing legacies when thinking about new programming. This can often provide valuable platforms that can be built upon.

Cultural and legal context – HMG policing assistance programmes are increasingly being developed in Francophone and Islamic countries. Understanding the implications of a different cultural and legal context – and how the role of the police varies from in a typical Commonwealth environment – is fundamental. It is important to consider what kind of influence the UK is likely to have in such contexts and what this implies for choices of partners and delivery methods.

Formal and informal processes – Decision-making processes are often not as they seem. It is important to consider the influence of certain interest groups, such as business elites, ethnic or religious factions.

Corruption – It is critical to assess to what extent corruption impacts on policing. Are there high level connections between policing actors, politicians and organised crime? Is corruption endemic and systematised within the police service or is primarily low level and petty? UK policing assistance to Jamaica changed focus significantly after a political economy analysis identified corruption as a major barrier to progress (see Box B on following page).

Conflict risks - Given the role of policing in state-society relations, and the multiple actors involved in policing in conflict-affected countries, there is significant potential for assistance programmes to inadvertently exacerbate tensions. An assessment should identify the root

causes of tensions and potential triggers, and analyse how assistance programmes can 'do no harm' and have a positive impact on peacebuilding.

Political will - A common problem of assistance programmes has been to assume that 'political will' exists for police and policing development and that it will remain constant. The extent of the commitment of political leaders, senior police officers, and other influential stakeholders to reform must be assessed regularly. Identifying potential constituencies of support for police and policing development, and highlighting which actors are likely to resist change (and why) is critical. For example, powerful elites may be more concerned with ensuring that the police is able to protect their interests than they are about the safety of citizens. A useful test is to ask what financial, physical and human resources are actors prepared to commit to support reforms. The best way of developing political will for change is by demonstrating its relevance to current political priorities and so an assessment should identify partner government policies or processes that could provide useful entry points or linkages with policing assistance programmes.

Box B: Developing a politically-aware police assistance programme in Jamaica

DFID supported police reform programmes in Jamaica throughout the 1990s and 2000s, whilst crime rates soared and confidence in the police plummeted. The programmes focused on institutional capacity-building in areas such as human resource management, crime scene investigation and divisional primacy. The delivery model was based on international consultants flying in to deliver short-term training inputs, which were often generic rather than context specific. Whilst logframes targets were often achieved, the desired outcome of reducing crime and violence was further away than ever. The underlying programme assumption that institutional capacity building would reduce crime and restore trust in the police did not hold.

DFID reviewed the programme using political economy analysis, which identified the link between the police, organised crime and politics as the major barrier to change. A new programme was developed which took a much more politically-aware approach and focused significantly on reducing corruption within the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). Diplomatic engagement between HMG and the Government of Jamaica led to an agreement that long term international police officers would be embedded into the command structure of the JCF, with line management responsibilities. The former Senior Director of Investigations in the Police Ombudsman's Office in Northern Ireland was appointed as Head of the JCF's Anti-Corruption Branch. Investigations over the next three years led to roughly 10% of officers being retired in the public interest, internally disciplined or, in some cases, convicted in court. This zero tolerance approach led to an increase in public confidence in the JCF. It also coincided with a significant reduction in crime and violence including a 40% reduction in the murder rate. Whilst many other factors also contributed to this, removing corrupt officers from the police played a significant role.

Institutional context

Given this wider operating environment, what about the police themselves? Assistance programmes should be based on realistic analysis of the constraints they face, and the drivers and obstacles to change within the police.

What works - The first step of an assessment of the institutional context is to understand 'what works,' what types of policing are effective, how, and why. It is crucial to identify existing good practices - by whichever agency, institution, system and/or group that is providing it – and determine whether those practices can be expanded, extended, and built upon.

Meaning of key terms – The police in many countries may say that they are practising 'community policing', but experience shows that often this term hides more than it reveals about what is going on. Probing the local meaning of key terms, and understanding the potential implications of this is important (see Box C below).

Box C: Community policing

Community policing is a commonly-used term but experience shows that it means different things in different contexts. This phrase has been used to refer to:

- A set of tactics, often involving some form of community-police dialogue but also including greater levels of patrolling and the establishment of community-police liaison officers, designed to strengthen partnerships between communities and police at local levels.

- An overarching policing philosophy (closely aligned with the principles set out in this paper) that recognises the police must win the trust and support of the public to effectively combat crime and that this implies root and branch reform.

- A way to strengthen the police's ability to reach into communities, by establishing volunteers at local levels that provide information to the police or act on their behalf, in some cases increasing state control and surveillance.

Experience from HMG programmes show that 'community policing' tactics alone are unlikely to have significant impact on police behaviour because they can easily become marginalised from the primary policing approach. The terms 'community-based policing' or 'policing with the community' are therefore often used in programmes to indicate that what is being developed is not 'policing *of* the community' or 'policing *by* the community'. Understanding local meanings of key terms, or helping develop a local consensus on a meaning, is important to ensure that assistance programmes do not start out with different actors having different expectations.

Resources and capacities - The resource deficits (financial, human and logistical) experienced by police services in FCAS are often chronic and long-term. Similarly, the existing capacities of police and potential police recruits, including in core areas such as literacy and numeracy are often very low. It is therefore often useful to assess whether the maximum benefit is being gained from available police resources and to be realistic in terms of what can be expected in the context of existing capacities. Frequent challenges can include the corrupt diversion of budgets, misuse of police vehicles, or poor deployment of personnel. One readily accessible way to determine police priorities is to examine police budgets. For instance, flat or declining allocations for internal affairs/professional standards units would raise questions about the commitment to the development of police accountability, regardless of the words spoken by political and/or police leadership.

Leadership capacity – It is essential to determine the scope and limits of leadership capacity at all levels of the organisation. This will determine the likelihood of potential changes being adopted, and implemented in a sustainable fashion.

Attitudes of police officers – Understanding what the police themselves think is illuminating. This should include understanding attitudes towards women, including women within the police. A move towards more service-oriented, community-based policing often requires a normative and cognitive change. Are officers ready for this? Are neighbourhoods and communities ready for this? It is extremely important to examine the attitudes and opinions of the rank and file police. Their judgments and perceptions may be different to those in positions of senior leadership, particularly with regard to issues of policing priorities and corruption. Without hearing the perspectives of the rank and file, it is difficult to accurately determine how widespread support is for police reform or development.

Who are the police? – Examining the make-up of the police is an important task. What is the ratio of men to women and how are different social groups represented? Often in post-conflict countries a large proportion of police officers may be former military or rebel fighters who have been integrated into the police with limited, if any, training, and they may remain in groups in certain parts of the country. Understanding this background, and what it might imply for the relationship of these officers with other local providers and citizens is critical.

Other policing actors - The institutional context is not limited to the police service, but includes all those other local providers and non-state actors who provide safety and security. Examining the mandate, size, capacity and motivations of these providers is a fundamental part of a policing assessment.

Corruption - Examining current and historical corruption trends in the police and other policing actors is critical. It is important to consider what the risk factors are which may make them vulnerable to corruption.

Other donor programmes –The UK is often one of a number of countries and international organisations who are providing support to enhance security and justice in partner countries. It is critical to understand where other donors are providing assistance to the police or justice sector. In line with the Paris Declaration, the UK is committed to harmonising its support with other donors to increase development effectiveness.

Bringing the analysis together

When put together, the above three areas of analysis should be able to verify initial assumptions and provide firm proposals on:

- What are the priority issues to address?

- What is already being addressed by others?

- How can the UK add value and best provide support to improve policing in the local context?

Design

Designing policing assistance programmes that reflect key principles, whilst drawing on rigorous analysis to ensure relevance to the local context is challenging. Learning from past programmes highlights the importance of two key lessons:

- Understanding what is realistic.
- Balancing long-term and short-term results.

Understanding what is realistic

One of the strongest findings to come from reviews of policing programmes around the world is that there needs to be much greater realism about the contexts in which assistance programmes are delivered, and what sort of impact they can have. There are a number of aspects to this:

Best fit solutions – The 2011 World Development Report emphasised the importance of not becoming stuck trying to implement 'perfect' reforms in fragile and conflict-affected states; instead assistance programmes should focus on pragmatic 'best fit' solutions[46]. This finding is relevant to policing programmes. Too often, programmes have invested large sums of money in 'best practice' systems which are not appropriate to the constraints and chronic resource deficits of the local context. Starting assessments and programme design from the perspective of addressing concrete safety problems, rather than rectifying capacity gaps in institutions, can help avoid this. Working backwards from the challenges that citizens face to then identifying the changes in systems and institutions that are needed to tackle these issues can help to build capacity whilst solving problems and improving service delivery.

Realism about the reach of the state – In almost all fragile states, the police are a minority security provider with limited capacity and geographic reach. If a programme has ambitions to have a tangible impact on the security of key populations, yet there is no plausible prospect of the police enforcing Rule of Law in the areas where they live in the medium term, then this will necessitate working with a range of different actors. Even in areas where the state does exercise effective control, the police may not be the predominant security provider given the endemic resource shortages which the police often face. In such instances, a policing assistance programme may need to work with a wide range of actors in order to enhance safety and security.

Key partnerships – Lessons from past programmes show that trying to improve the police in isolation does not work. But there is also a risk in being over-ambitious. There is no need for every programme to take a 'comprehensive' approach that addresses all parts of the security and justice sector at once. However, it is vital to understand how policing fits into

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[46] World Bank, p.146-147, 2011.

the bigger picture. The key is identifying which are the essential partnerships to address the specific safety and security problems the programme is targeting. Developing these linkages should be an integral part of assistance programmes. This is also where international coordination is critical as often other countries or international organisations may be supporting assistance programmes with other security and justice institutions that could be mutually reinforcing.

Timescales for sustainable change - Lasting institutional change takes time.[47] However, there is a tension though between normal short-term project cycles and long-term transformational objectives. Being pragmatic about what is achievable in a limited time period with limited resources is therefore critical. Where possible, long-term funding commitments can provide valuable predictability of support.

However, there is also evidence from UK support to Sierra Leone and Australian support to the Solomon Island that this can create long-term dependencies and even lead to partner governments reducing their own funding for security and justice institutions in the knowledge that donors will pick up the tab. The lesson identified is that international actors need to be clear if they are aiming for sustainable results or where they are willing to play a capacity substitution role, and make sure that the design of their assistance reflects this distinction.[48]

In an immediate post-conflict situation, it may be necessary for a stabilisation approach to support a higher level of external justice and security provision than would be sustainable over the longer term. However, this form of support should be provided in such a way as to avoid distorting local institutions and spending patterns, and should be drawn down as soon as feasible, bearing in mind the need to offset the risks of renewed conflict with the risks of long-term dependency. At the same time, longer term development efforts should focus on restoring law and justice services to pre-conflict levels and building them up in a sustainable way, paying particular attention to long-term recurrent costs and their affordability.[49]

Balancing long-term and short-term results

Experience shows the benefit of setting longer-term goals that will take several years to deliver but then to design short-term (1-2 years) measures and associated results that make a tangible step towards achieving these longer-term objectives. This is vital given the mismatch between the time needed for sustainable reform, donor programming cycles and political imperatives to achieve quick results.

Articulate long-term strategic objectives - Policing assistance programmes are often better at describing the activities they will undertake and their immediate effects (what DFID logframes refer to as the 'outputs') than they are about the longer-term changes this is intended to bring about. For example, programmes may list the number of officers that

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[47] "Sustainable, complete institutional reform takes 15-30 years." DFID, p6, 2012.
[48] AusAID, p.xi, 2012.
[49] AusAID, p.xii, 2012.

have been trained, or the number of police stations that have been built, but be less clear, or lack the evidence to demonstrate, what changes this has led to in terms of the quality of policing (the outcome) or how this in turn has improved the safety of citizens (the impact). Similarly, programmes often do not articulate clearly the 'theory of change' (or 'programme logic') underpinning the programme, i.e. why it is expected that undertaking the planned activities will lead to the intended result. Design processes need to carefully align short-term activities with overarching objectives (see Box D).

Box D: The contribution of improved policing to political transition in Libya

The police played an important role in maintaining Colonel Gaddafi in power for 42 years in Libya. The end of the war in 2011, which resulted in his death and the collapse of his regime, was followed by widespread insecurity and the administration of justice almost ground to a halt. The new Government was elected on a platform of 'One Police, One Army' and committed to the establishment of effective and inclusive police and other security and justice institutions. In these early days, the UK supported activities to reform and develop the police so that it was able to play a more effective role in improving public security and tackling crime.

In early 2013, the UK Prime Minister and National Security Council committed the UK to increasing its support for the Libyan government on security and justice issues. A new assistance programme has been designed specifically in response to a request by the Libyan government for help in protecting the political settlement process, and to support the provision of improved services for the public. There is a strong relationship between on-going insecurity, the lack of public trust in security and justice institutions, and the success of the political transition. The Theory of Change of the new Security, Justice and Defence programme states that through protecting the political process, and improving the quality of policing services, an inclusive political settlement will be encouraged, the legitimacy of state institutions will be enhanced, and economic activity and social interaction will be increased through improving citizen security. The three pillars of the programme focus on improving the capacity of police to protect those involved in the transition process; enhancing the institutional capacity of the police and Ministry of Interior to develop policy, strategies and plans; and increasing the capability of the police to provide more effective, responsive and accountable services for the public. As a consequence, UK policing assistance for Libya is explicitly linked to strategic goals and to the UK's political strategy.

Identify quick wins carefully – Identifying visible, straightforward interventions that address local needs and can be achieved quickly can serve a number of valuable purposes - building the confidence of partners, demonstrating a dividend to citizens, and generating momentum for longer-term implementation. But unless they are carefully selected then they can waste resources and cause frustrations. If quick wins are promised, they must actually be delivered *quickly*, or the credibility of the assistance programme can suffer as a result.

Plan coherently across Whitehall – Enhancing policing is central to a number of UK policy objectives and departments. Close coordination is needed to help ensure that interventions working to short time-frames, for example seeking to build niche capabilities to support counter terrorism or organised crime objectives, can also advance, and not hinder, a longer-term agenda. Posts in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Jamaica[50] and Pakistan have, at different times, all provided examples of where some progress has been made on joined-up work on security and justice.

Align interests and incentives - A synthesis of DFID evaluations conducted in fragile states found that, "Success often depends on the alignment of interests and incentives between DFID and its stakeholders."[51] One way this can be done is through agreeing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with partner governments at the outset of a programme (see Box E).

Box E: The benefit of MoUs with partner governments

The experience of DFID's security sector reform programme in DRC shows how MoUs can be used strategically to gauge partner government commitment. DFID was concerned about the programmatic and political risk of engaging on security and justice and wanted to set milestones and provide an opportunity to end support if progress was not being made. There were a number of lessons from this experience:

- Negotiating an MoU requires diplomatic skill and FCO engagement

- Milestones should be a combination of easy targets to boost trust and confidence, and challenging ones to test political will.

- Red lines can be drawn on key issues such as human rights violations.

- Establishing a joint HMG/partner government steering committee to review progress can create a space for political dialogue on sensitive issues.

- MoUs can help to increase local ownership of the political and police leadership and provide transparency by setting out partners' mutual and reciprocal responsibilities.

- MoUs are more powerful if they are jointly agreed with other donors.

Identify results that matter and evaluating progress – Given the long timeframes necessary for sustainable change, evidencing whether reform processes are moving in the right direction can be difficult. The challenge is to identify what type of indicators can show that

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[50] In 2006 the Jamaica Forward Strategy was agreed by a range of UK departments at post including DFID, FCO, MoD, SOCA and UKBA. This was also developed with the co-operation of the Home Office and Metropolitan Police. There was then a twice yearly meeting in London at Director level to report on progress and get direction. In 2010 the strategy was replaced with a more focused document which looked at crime, violence and political corruption which DFID, FCO and the agencies at post. UKBA, SOCA and MOD were then brought in on areas of their specific interest and expertise.

[51] DFID, p.21, 2012.

the foundations or building blocks for longer-term change are successfully being laid.[52] Examples of indicators in different contexts could include:[53]

- <u>Breakdown a process into different steps towards a certain objective</u> – e.g. signing by the government of a MoU for police reform programme (building block indicator of political will to implement reform); validated local information on crime is collected, analysed, and used to set local policing strategies (building block indicator of progress towards crime prevention).

- <u>Results in capacity building</u> – e.g. civil society organisations are publishing reports and conducting advocacy on policing issues (building block indicator of progress towards increased capacity of civil society to hold the government to account); police officers that have been trained in partnership-working and problem-solving are assigned to police stations in crime-affected areas (building block indicator of improved service delivery).

- <u>Results in relationship building</u> – e.g. regular inter-agency meetings of security and justice actors which had previously worked in siloes (building block indicator of progress towards an integrated multi-stakeholder approach); civil society organisations being invited by the government into discussions on policing issues (building block indicator of increased political space and accountability).

These examples of indicators all evidence some change in behaviour which increase the chance of a longer-term improvement in safety and security. This approach echoes that of Outcome Mapping which is a useful methodology to help develop and assess the results of policing programmes.[54]

Build flexibility into programme design – If assistance programmes are to be responsive to the local context, they must be flexible. It is often difficult at the outset of a programme to specify the exact results that are both feasible in the context and necessary for transformative change. The combination of long-term goals and short-term activities and results should enable an iterative process of implementation, review and adjustment. The value of such a step-by-step approach in complex and rapidly-changing environments is recognised by the UK military in campaign planning. The Joint Doctrine Note on Assessment

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[52] OECD INCAF calls these 'process' indicators but for HMG purposes, referring to this as a 'foundational' or 'building block' approach, emphasises that the real benefit is building a platform for longer-term transformative change (OECD, 2012).

[53] These examples use the INCAF typology of three aspects of process.

[54] This methodology was developed by the International Development Research Centre in response to the challenges of measuring the impact of development interventions, when this impact may often occur long after programmes have finished, in unanticipated forms and where attribution is difficult. Outcome Mapping focuses on one specific type of result: outcomes as behavioural change. Outcomes are defined as changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities, or actions of the people, groups, and organisations with whom a program works directly. These outcomes can be logically linked to a programme's activities. The focus is on looking at how activities contribute to behaviour change outcomes that in turn enhance the possibility of development impacts. By focusing on behaviour, programmes can better plan for and assess their contributions to development.

highlights how the continuous evaluation of progress should be integral to all operations and is a "strategic tool to regularly review and adjust plans…[a]ssessments enable commanders to test assumptions, judge progress, and learn and adapt." [55] Such a flexible approach towards a particular objective in fast-changing environments is also valuable for UK policing assistance programmes.

Develop a scaling-up strategy - Experience shows that decisions around pilot projects need to be very carefully thought through. If assumptions are being made about future scale up these need to be rigorously analysed. When programmes take a geographic focus and target support to enhance policing, significant gains can be made in local service delivery. In the absence of unlimited resources, programme designers often make understandable choices to focus interventions in specific locations in order to have a greater chance of evidencing impact. The challenge, however, is sustaining this over a long period, and developing a realistic plan for scaling this up. A communication strategy is vital to avoid raising unrealistic public expectations about the pace of change.

As an example, delays in Kenya in the approval of a national community-based policing policy have left implementation resting on the initiatives of individual police stations or externally-funded pilots. This indicates that assumptions previous assistance programmes made about the political will to implement community-based policing nationally may have been flawed. In South Sudan, the challenges of scale, capacity and credibility are greater, and a real challenge for the Safety and Access to Justice Programme has been to translate its high levels of ambition for police transformation beyond three core urban locations across the country. Without a broader collective effort, from other donors and from the Government of South Sudan, the vast majority of citizens will continue to receive no service from the police.

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[55] MoD, p.1, 2012

Box F: Findings from donor evaluations on balancing design approaches

‘Thematic Evaluation of EC support to Justice and Security System Reform’ (EC, 2011)

“Commission assistance was heavily focused on building institutional capacity within state security and justice bodies rather than on addressing the constraints to service delivery from the perspective of the intended beneficiaries. The overwhelming focus of assistance was on technical solutions to security and justice problems delivered through training, advice, provision of capital equipment, and infrastructure development. This assistance helped to build capacity within, and strengthen governance of, these sectors. But it often had limited impact in terms of improved service delivery. Insufficient emphasis was placed on involving end-beneficiaries in addressing the constraints to service delivery.”

‘Building on Local Strengths: evaluation of Australian Law and Justice Assistance’ (AusAid, 2012)

“This kind of support [capacity building] has produced patchy results—islands of capacity in discrete technical areas— without necessarily delivering overall improvement in the quality of justice received by citizens. The case studies suggest a number of reasons why this is the case. First, shortage of capacity is not always the binding constraint on institutional performance…Second, capacity-building programs are often overambitious in scope, attempting to address too many fundamental problems simultaneously. In low capacity environments, there may be limited ability to implement major reforms due to weaknesses in planning, budgeting and change management capacities. Finally, capacity-building approaches often work towards international best practice and imported institutional models, which are a poor fit in the local environment. As a result, when Australian law and justice programs focus solely on top-down organisational capacity building, they struggle to demonstrate real results for their intended beneficiaries.”

Implementation

This section is organised according to the principles of policing introduced above. Lessons from recent police assistance programmes are identified in each area to illustrate how principles can be successfully integrated into programme implementation.

Accountability

Incentivising accountability - Programmes need to think about sequencing and ‘conditionality’ to ensure that the vital long-term work that accountability requires does not get brushed aside by a focus (on both sides) on delivering training and equipment. Accountability is a key objective of policing development but it has often received insufficient attention in assistance programmes. Oversight is required at different levels: locally, in the executive, externally and internally.

Local accountability - The traditional international approach to enhancing police accountability in FCAS relies on external institutions. The tacit assumption is that more and better enforcement of rules and regulations will strengthen the police's incentives to improve service provision. But in many fragile states, the institutions assigned to monitor the police are typically weak and malfunctioning, and may lack incentives to effectively perform their task.

Evidence from assistance programmes shows that strengthening the bottom-up demand for improved performance by beneficiaries often delivers more immediate results. In Malawi the establishment of community policing forums across the country provided the most effective means of accountability. DFID is currently supporting local accountability programmes for the delivery of social services such as healthcare in many countries. More could often be done to consider if and how these could be extended to cover policing and justice services.

Box G: Police-community dialogue in Helmand Province

Helmand Province in Afghanistan is affected by on-going conflict and violence. However even with these obvious and deep-rooted challenges, there have been important examples of police-community cooperation. These included regular precinct-level police meetings organised by the local police commander in parts of Lashkar Gah city at which community members raised local security and justice problems and the police reported on the action they had taken to deal with them. Similarly, District Community Councils (DCCs) in several districts included security and justice sub-committees that encouraged the regular and active participation of community members in identifying policing and other security problems, and then holding the DCC to account for addressing them. Both these examples demonstrated the possibility of putting into practice the principles of accountability, partnership, service delivery and empowerment in very challenging conditions and the positive response that they generated from community members.

However, the relationship of the executive to the police is often a sensitive and blurred one in FCAS[56]. In many countries, political interference in police matters is significant and may range from directing operations to changing the senior management team after each election. This undermines the independence and morale of the police and the possibility of establishing merit-based systems of promotion. However, this sensitivity and complexity should be a reason *for* supporting efforts to link executive and operational aspects of policing rather than to avoid it. One way of addressing this problem can be to support the establishment of an independent police service commission made up of eminent figures responsible for overseeing recruitment, promotion, discipline and other personnel issues. Another common response to the weakness (or, in some cases, complete absence) of the

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[56] OECD-DAC, p.172 2007

executive oversight body has been to focus solely on the police instead, in an effort to go "with the grain" of the local context. The risks of such a decision and the likely lack of oversight that it might encourage needs to be fully appreciated, as experience in many countries shows that this can seriously undermine the ability of the executive to hold the police to account in the medium-long term.[57]

Box H: Increasing police accountability after conflict

A simple but powerful first step in the immediate aftermath of conflict is to ensure that police officers in FCAS wear name badges or have very visible identification in public order situations. This was done in Bosnia Herzegovina and Sierra Leone by the UN to good effect. When an officer ceases to be anonymous to the local community, the level of accountability significantly increases. Citizens are then able to make specific complaints about the actions of individual police officers. The risk of being reported acts as a check on officers' actions and increases the pressure on them to follow through on commitments.

External accountability – To sustain long-term police reforms, national accountability bodies are required with the mandate and capacity to enforce professional standards. However, the evidence indicates that this cannot be done quickly and cannot be embedded unless the institution is already structurally robust, which is, typically, not the case in FCAS[58]. External accountability bodies are likely to develop quicker in countries which are less fragile such as Jamaica[59] and Kenya.[60] However, the high level of corruption and police killings in both countries highlight that new accountability structures have a long way to go to reverse previous impunity and a widespread culture of misconduct, and a range of approaches are required to have any chance of achieving impact. In both those countries, civil society organisations are playing an important role in driving further demand for improved accountability.

Internal accountability - It is crucially important that the police themselves develop internal accountability mechanisms. These can range from performance management regimes to Internal Affairs Departments that conduct investigations into allegations of misconduct. However, it is important to look for evidence that police services in FCAS are committed to implementing these managerial systems or have the resources to do so. Internal accountability mechanisms, however good, are often met with suspicion by the public as they are viewed as the police policing themselves. This shows the importance of embedding them as part of a wider accountability programme.

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[57] OECD-DAC, p.173, 2007.
[58] World Bank, p.149, 2011.
[59] Where an Independent Police Complaints Commission has recently been established.
[60] Where an Independent Police Oversight Authority is being developed.

> **Box I: Strengthening accountability: Lessons from DRC**
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> DFID's 'Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform' (SSAPR) programme seeks to strengthen both the *supply* of better policing – through a range of capacity building and training activities with the *Police Nationale Congolaise* (PNC) – and the *demand* for better and more accountable policing. This accountability work includes support to strengthen:
>
> - Internal discipline and accountability within the PNC.
>
> - External oversight by the Ministry of the Interior and parliamentary committees.
>
> - Social accountability by community groups and civil society organisations.
>
> 'Accountability' is not a familiar concept in DRC – indeed, even the word 'accountability' does not translate comfortably into French – and it has taken time for key stakeholders to really understand the concept and its implications for their work. Changes of key personnel, including ministers, have caused delays. And there have been mixed messages at times from other donor programmes.
>
> Despite these obstacles, after 3-4 years of engagement, some progress can be identified. The most significant change, even if it is hard to measure, is the degree to which communities in SSAPR-supported pilot areas are becoming more proactive on security matters: there is a sense that the process of engaging in public-police co-operation forums have given communities a greater sense of their own agency, that they are 'authors of their own lives'. At the national level, a number of laws have also been passed and some institutional changes have taken place. There is no doubt, however, that embedding sustainable institutions and a culture of accountability requires a long-term vision: the SSAPR is the first step in a process that may take well over a decade to really bear fruit.

Empowerment

Empowerment of communities - Experience from many countries shows that it is often difficult to sustain the engagement of citizens in policing. One reason for this is that engagement is often done in a very passive way by the police with the focus on improving community relations, rather than seeking actively to work with the public to address a specific issue that is of local concern. Another reason is that citizens are often afraid or unwilling to participate in something that appears to be led by the police.

There is an important potential role for NGOs and other civil society organisations in mobilising citizens and helping to facilitate a dialogue with the police. A recent review of the sustainability of DFID's policing assistance in Malawi concluded that one of the reasons the coverage of community policing forums dropped significantly after the programme ended was the lack of involvement of NGOs and other civil society organisations.[61]

Empowerment of police officers - This can be very challenging in traditionally hierarchical police services. Junior officers often have no experience of independent decision-making

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[61] Review conducted for this paper into policing assistance in Malawi by Biesheuvel and MacLean, 2012.

and can even be frightened to take the initiative as this would be negatively perceived by their bosses. External support has to be sensitive to societal and organisational norms and values. One approach is to work with senior officers to identify appropriate situations where decision making can be delegated, and then to provide assistance both to the front-line officers who are required to exercise this new authority, but also to the middle/upper ranks around how to respond. Another is to sensitise communities that junior police officers are mandated to speak for the organisation and the senior hierarchy which is often not immediately understood.

Police training - Class room training is often a default option when designing policing assistance programmes, especially where large numbers of officers need to be capacitated. However, empirical research shows that whilst this can increase 'knowledge', it rarely improves skills or changes behaviour, especially when it is a stand-alone activity. The publication and dissemination of manuals and guidelines also often has little benefit, if done in isolation.[62]

Individual mentoring has been shown to be the most effective training method, but this requires a structured approach with peer support, peer-to-peer discussions, and experienced mentors, it is also very resource intense. Practical hands-on training conducted outside the classroom, where officers are tested on their reactions and behaviours in situations, has also been shown to be effective. Finally, training combined with concrete support has also been shown to have benefits. For instance in Sudan, the DFID Safety and Justice Programme supports police officers undergoing leadership training to develop a practical safety project in their local area, to try and ensure that skills learned are put into practice.

Gender equality and ending violence against women

Integrating tackling gender-based violence in programmes – Violence against women and girls is probably the most common form of abuse in almost all countries, yet it has often not been a sufficient focus of policing assistance programmes. HMG's commitment to tackling VAWG and promoting gender equality requires the need to apply a gender lens to policing programmes right at the outset, rather than it often being an add on. This needs to be integrated throughout the analysis, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases. This is now beginning to happen, for example with forthcoming programmes in Ethiopia and South Sudan having a specific focus on improving the safety and justice of women and girls and promoting the recruitment and promotion of women within the police.

Senior investigating officers are on the PSVI Team of Experts roster and can provide advice, along with others PSVI experts, to existing country programmes on how gender equality and ending VAWG can be effectively integrated into their work on security and justice reform,

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[62] OECD-DAC, p.171, 2007.

for example in Libya. The forthcoming DFID Guidance Note on Addressing VAWG through Security and Justice Programming will provide practical guidance on how better to deal with VAWG.

Women and children's units - The most common approach (for example in DRC and Nepal) to addressing gender-based violence in policing programmes has been through the establishment of women and children units or family support units.[63] These specially trained and equipped units are normally staffed by mostly by women police officers and deployed to police stations/posts that are either physically separate from the local police building or, at a minimum, have their own entrance. Experience shows that these units often succeed in increasing the number of survivors reporting violent incidents, however, they have not proven effective in decreasing violence against women.[64] Evidence indicates that to be effective in increasing rates of convictions of perpetrators, prosecutors need to be integrated into the teams. Another lesson is that often the units get marginalised by national police services, with women officers only being deployed to work in these units, the equipment donated by donors often appropriated, minimal internal budget allocations, and the experience that women officers gain in these units not recognised in promotions. The challenge for assistance programmes is developing specialist capacity within a broader approach, which includes sensitisation amongst all police of gender equality issues including the positive role women can play in policing, to ensure that it is not ghettoised.[65]

Partnerships with medical and social services – Support to survivors of gender-based violence can be most effective when provided from medical facilities rather than police stations. The rapid provision of appropriate and sensitive medical and social services reduces the likelihood of secondary victimisation. The police ideally should have access to or an office within the health facility, but play a secondary role, with trained medical staff collecting whatever forensic evidence from the survivor that is available. Following reporting of incidents to the police, an effective referral system is then required to ensure that the survivor also gets appropriate medical and psychosocial support.

Promoting gender equality in the police - The police is an overwhelmingly male institution in most developing countries and many assistance programmes have failed adequately to address gender issues. Steps such as setting quotas for recruiting and retaining women, making working conditions more appropriate to the other roles that women play, and requiring a gender balance in training opportunities are important. In addition targeted work is also significant, for example training women investigators so that victims of gender-based violence are more likely to report crimes to the police. In Kenya, pressure by civil society organisations for new constitutional requirements on gender equality were reflected

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[63] DFID, p.12, 2013b.
[64] DFID, p.13, 2013b.
[65] DFID, p.14, 2013b.

in the November 2012 recruitment of 7,000 new officers, senior police appointments (including of the Deputy IG) and recruitment to the new Internal Affairs Unit.[66]

Human rights

Policy and guidance - Protecting the rights of the individual should be the 'thread' that runs through the change process. This principle should be embedded in existing and newly created operational policy and guidance, in particular around the use of force and the protection of civil liberties for victims and witnesses as well as in offender management procedures. This is particularly important for the UK when accepted attitudes and behaviours in a partner country (such as the age at which juveniles are considered to have 'come of age' and are held responsible as adults) are at odds with those in the UK.

Reflective of the community served – Police forces in fragile and conflict-affected states are often not representative of the communities they serve. Gender imbalances (as highlighted above) are a common problem but ethnic and religious representation are also very important issues in many countries. This situation often contributes to police violations of the human rights of other ethnic and religious groups, as well as perceptions of discrimination. Ensuring that assistance programmes promote a balanced representation reflecting the society being policed is vital in such contexts, with the introduction of effective measures to remove any barriers to playing a full part in the organisation.

Partnership

Strategic v tactical partnerships – A recent evaluation of AusAID's security and justice programmes in the South Pacific highlights the very limited effectiveness of efforts to support strategic sector-wide coordination committees in partner governments. It concludes that coordination has greater impact, and is more easily achieved, by bringing together security and justice organisations at the tactical level to address joint solutions to common problems.[67] This finding echoes the experience of DFID assistance to security and justice in Malawi. A National Council on Safety and Justice failed to achieve its potential and was wound up when DFID funding was cut. However structures such as Court User Committees, Community Policing Forums, the Body of Case Handling Institutions and the National Juvenile Justice Forum were more effective and sustainable in bringing together several stakeholders to achieve a common goal in a meaningful way for the first time.

Problem-solving

Integrating problem-solving into programmes – A problem-solving approach identifies specific issues or challenges with the delivery of security and justice in a particular context and applies a standard methodology to their resolution. It progresses from problem identification, through analysis, formulation of options, implementation of a chosen solution and measurement of results (see Box H below). For organisations without strong planning,

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[66] Review conducted for this paper into policing assistance in Kenya by Saferworld, 2013.
[67] AusAID 2012.

budgeting and management capacity, problem solving may be easier to implement than comprehensive reform or top-down capacity building. The approach encourages the police to work with the range of actors necessary to address the identified problem, whether national ministries, local government, social service providers, local or non-state policing actors, or civil society. Solutions will often involve more than one actor, and so this approach can be useful for improving co-ordination. For example, in some Latin American cities, problems of late night shootings around bars were significantly reduced by restricting alcohol sales and banning the carrying of guns in public.

Box J: Problem-solving process

1. *Identify* problems and prioritise them incorporating community input.

2. *Analyse* information about offenders, victims, and crime locations.

3. *Design* strategies that address priority problems by thinking beyond traditional police tactics and engaging other stakeholders.

4. *Implement* the strategies in partnership with other stakeholders.

5. *Evaluate* effectiveness to determine how well the plan has been carried out and if results were achieved.

Box K: The World Bank's approach to problem-solving

The World Bank's recent report 'New Directions in Justice Reform' (World Bank 2012) draws a lesson from its previous support that effective programmes apply "a problem-solving and empirically based approach to justice reform anchored in the needs of end users, one that focuses on actual realizations and accomplishments rather than the establishment of what are identified in advance as the 'right' institutions and rules." This requires:

- **Making data the foundation of programmes** - Ensuring that reform programmes collect information on the workings of the justice system, including the experiences of women and other marginalized groups. Strong diagnostics should inform the design of interventions and provide information on the political economy of reform and its risks, and the way potential reforms might translate into progress towards justice.

- **Identifying key problems rather than pursue some ideal justice system model** - "Rather than beginning with the question of how to modernize the court system, such efforts should begin by asking where failings of the justice system are a constraint to equitable development."

Service delivery

Trust and confidence in the police – Evidence from criminological research shows that how the police treat citizens is closely linked to levels of legitimacy. Victim satisfaction with police performance is significantly more related to the level of respect and concern shown

by officers, than to the outcome of the police investigation. Positive interactions by citizens with the police are causally related to increasing satisfaction and trust, and higher satisfaction in turn is causally related to improved public cooperation. Working to improve how the police interact with the public is often a neglected part of programming and has been shown to be effective[68].

Multi-layered approach – Improving service delivery requires working at different levels; a solely localised focus is normally insufficient to secure sustainable change. For example, national work to support policy development, create the strategic framework and advocate for budgetary allocations is often required. At the local level, experience shows that local authorities or municipalities are vital partners and that broad partnerships with a range of actors are necessary to enhance community safety.

Codes of ethics or standards: Codes set down the standards and behaviours expected from a police officer when carrying out their duty. They provide a guide to how they should conduct themselves as well as what the community can expect from each individual. Codes are intended to help a police officer to make the necessary judgement calls on a daily basis when providing an effective police service. Experience shows however that the promulgation of such codes and/or standards often have little effect in the short to medium term and require changes in wider attitudes and behaviours for them to have impact.[69]

Box L: Model police stations

A common method used in assistance programmes (e.g. DRC, Malawi, South Sudan, Nigeria) to try and improve the service delivery of a partner country's police is to support the development of model police stations. Police stations are often unwelcoming environments for citizens and the idea is to establish stations which are accessible and provide a high quality of service. This is normally intended to benefit in addressing crime as well as building public trust.

Experience shows that this approach can bring benefits in improved service delivery in that location. But a lesson learned is that it is important that the primary focus is on the delivery of services rather than the physical building of a new station. If new model police stations are built then this can be an expensive intervention and so should not be based on an expectation that partner countries will be able to scale up through replicating these in other areas. Further, if model stations are places for modelling good policing practice then it is valuable if the police has a policy of seconding staff from other locations to the station so that 'on the job' training can have wider benefit.

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[68] Review conducted for this paper into policing assistance in Sierra Leone by Scheye, 2013.
[69] Review conducted for this paper into policing assistance in Sierra Leone by Scheye, 2013.

Nevertheless, the strengthening of codes and standards is important for longer-term police capacity building. Evidence does suggest though that close supervision of patrol officers by their middle and senior officers is capable of reducing police misconduct and malfeasance. The difficulty in FCAS, however, is that this close supervision needs to be based upon established processes and procedures, managerial systems that may not be realistic to implement in the short-to medium term.[70]

Management

The often significant political, programme and financial risks associated with international policing assistance ensure that the quality of programme management is an essential element of success or failure. Much has been written both on generic programme management in development and conflict-affected contexts, and on management issues which are of particular concern to international policing assistance programmes. This section sets out some of the most critical elements of effective management of policing assistance and wider security and justice work, which have been identified on the basis of many years of experience.

As general principles of good programming, they are also relevant to other stages of the programme cycle, and therefore, to other parts of this guidance note. Together, they aim to provide the reader with an introduction to some of the most important issues that the management of policing assistance programmes must tackle. They are divided into three categories:

- Political engagement

- Developing local ownership and leadership

- Working iteratively and flexibly

Political engagement

Maintaining UK support for policing assistance programmes - Given the highly political nature of policing, it is vital that HMG remains closely engaged in implementation, even if delivery is being outsourced.A lesson from many policing assistance programmes is that they require the active oversight and engagement of DFID, FCO and other departments and agencies to maximise their effectiveness. It is important that there is a strong and continual relationship between officials at Post and those delivering policing assistance. HMG must provide political leadership and oversight. Without this, programmes risk strategic drift, becoming too technically-focused, risk-averse or moving into politically-sensitive areas without HMG oversight and back-up.[71]

Ensuring political oversight and management of externally contracted programmes -

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[70] SEESAC, p.15-20 2006.
[71] Reviews conducted for this paper by the authors of UK supported international police assistance programmes in Afghanistan, Kenya, Libya, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Nigeria.

The challenges of ensuring that the political aspects of a programme are understood and managed effectively, and that political reputation is safeguarded, is of particular importance in the context of HMG decisions to outsource policing assistance programmes. While the implementation can be outsourced, the risk cannot, particularly in terms of political and reputational risk. Partner country actors may well not understand the distinctions and relationships between HMG core staff and contractors; even when they do, they most likely do not particularly care. Donors are perceived by stakeholders in the partner country to be responsible for the programmes they support, regardless of who is implementing them. [72]

A study conducted by the Stabilisation Unit in 2012[73] found that commercial companies can be reluctant to take on difficult issues which bring them into conflict with host governments. Similarly, it found that a corollary to outsourcing programme design and delivery was that the experience and skill base within Embassies can be eroded: some contractors reported that they felt they had been left to manage the political aspects of the programme in the absence of regular strategic Embassy engagement. Conversely, some felt that although they had in practice taken responsibility for managing the political elements of the programme, they were not given either the information or access required to help them to make the best contribution to the UK's wider political strategy. In 2011, around three quarters of DFID's spending on security and justice programmes was delivered through outsourcing to companies, consultants and NGOs.[74] This highlights the importance of getting the management of outsourced services right: it is vital that contractors delivering assistance must also 'work politically' – they cannot take a technical approach and 'leave the politics to HMG' as assistance programmes themselves are inherently political.

Developing local ownership and leadership[75]

Local ownership and leadership of policing reform and community safety processes is fundamental to their success. Experience shows that even when key national actors formally indicate support, it may in fact only be partial or based on different expectations of what will follow. There is therefore a need to distinguish formal approval from true ownership of, and intention to, implement an assistance programme. A critical task for programme managers and HMG staff is to work with local partners to develop local ownership and leadership throughout assistance programmes.

Building coalitions of support – Programmes should avoid an over-reliance on a very limited number of individuals as 'champions of change'. If work depends on key senior individuals then progress can halt when they move on. Building a broad coalition of support including political leaders, senior police officers and mid-ranking officers who might be tomorrow's

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[72] Reviews conducted for this paper by the authors of UK supported international police assistance programmes in Afghanistan, Kenya, Libya, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Nigeria.
[73] Hendrickson and Hiscock, 2012.
[74] Correspondence with DFID CHASE.
[75] Local ownership has different elements including the support and leadership of government partners, senior police officers, civil society organisations and the public.

leaders is important. Engaging business and religious leaders, NGOs and community leaders is essential to public support. An early priority for programmes is to identify whose support is necessary for programme objectives to be achieved, and to develop an appropriate stakeholder engagement strategy.

Understanding resistance to change - It is common to experience strong resistance to police development. This resistance can originate from a multiplicity of directions – from within elements of the elite, governing bodies, corrupt elements inside the police, criminal organisations, affected neighbourhoods and communities. Those who resist police development are not 'spoilers' but are rationally defending their interests, or those of their organisations, as they perceive them. Resistance to development may be heightened if a policing assistance programme is perceived to be driven by external interests. One of the lessons from UN support to policing in East Timor is that the perception that community policing was an internationally-driven concept has hampered progress. It is as necessary to understand the motivations of those who resist development as it is to build coalitions of support.[76]

Developing local models for policing – Adapting international best practice and experience to the context in which it is being applied is important. Supporting the development of local policing models that take into account the specific political, security, economic, cultural and other characteristics can be useful in this regard. For instance, in South Sudan, DFID has funded local research to assess existing understanding and practices of community policing, and provide recommendations to the South Sudan Police Service to inform their development of a Policy on Community Policing.[77] And in Bolivia, the UK assistance programme brought in experts from a number of Latin American countries that had undergone successful police reform to inform Bolivian stakeholders to develop the model that best worked for Bolivia.[78]

Ensuring national not just government ownership – It is important to remember that local ownership extends beyond government ownership and that partner government priorities may not equate to the needs of citizens. Governments can change quickly in fragile states and ensuring broad-based political support is vital to prevent sudden halts to progress. In DRC, a number of mechanisms were established to encourage wider ownership of a programme which was initially quite top-down in its development. These included 'forums de quartier' which bring together the provincial government, local authorities and civil society representatives; community score card meetings where similar actors have come together to discuss their views on police performance; and work supporting civil society interaction with provincial assemblies. The 2012 annual programme review found considerable anecdotal evidence that these efforts had had a positive impact on relations

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[76] Review conducted for this paper into police assistance in East Timor by Scheye, 2013.
[77] Review conducted for this paper into police assistance in South Sudan by Carver, 2013.
[78] Review conducted for this paper into police assistance in Bolivia by Weiss, 2013.

between the police and communities and on broadening the base of support for the wider police assistance programme.[79]

Developing operational ownership of reforms: Reforms often focus on laws, policy and doctrine without enough emphasis on (and financial and technical support for) how these translate into real changes at operational level. The strategic level needs to be able to be translated, to a district or station level to ensure delivery with clear tactical plans. In Sierra Leone, the weak understanding and awareness of national reforms at the local level was based on a theory of change which presumed that strong SLP leadership would trickle-down to the rank and file and instil their adherence to police development. A 2012 review for HMG reflected that this has not happened, and that among the reasons is that the 'rank and file' have not perceived the potential benefits of the development and have therefore not participated fully in the reform programme.[80]

Avoiding substituting international experts instead of building local capacity: If international actors have too much control over the design of structures, systems, processes and policies, they may look better on paper, but they are unlikely to be properly owned, and thus potentially will never be fully implemented or lead to sustainable change. In the case of UK support to the development of the police in Sierra Leone, a recent study suggested that HMG advice and funding for police development in the years following the initial military intervention and stabilisation activities up to 2004 supported the expansion of an unsustainable police service, in terms of overall numbers, budgets, and expectations.[81] Getting the balance right between providing advice and experience on the one hand, and directing thinking and decision making on the other is a constant challenge. This is particularly difficult when there is a strong imperative to improve policing and the wider security context quickly, and where local capacity or decision making is weak or contested.

Working iteratively and flexibly

In addition to ensuring that initial planning and programme design includes flexibility as a key principle, the highly political nature of police reform and the rapidly-changing contexts of fragile states also require flexible management approaches. Developing assistance programmes iteratively provides important opportunities to build the ownership of local partners by engaging them in reviews of progress.

Monitoring the delivery of work and implications for achieving results - The current focus on 'results' in development and security and justice work, and the pressure to prove that money is well spent, is driving thinking about what a 'good' result is for a police assistance programme, particularly in a fragile setting. A challenge in this regard is that given the nature of the programmes (political, long-term, requiring flexibility it can be hard to identify at the outset what the overall impact of a given intervention will be. This does not however

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[79] Review conducted for this paper into police assistance in DRC by Hiscock, 2012.
[80] Review conducted for this paper into policing assistance in Sierra Leone by Scheye, 2013.
[81] Review conducted for this paper into policing assistance in Sierra Leone by Scheye, 2013.

suggest that monitoring is 'too difficult' and can therefore be left out of programme planning and implementation. It requires that significant effort should be invested in monitoring progress towards outcome-level results as well as on the delivery of stated outputs. For example, the 2012 annual review of the DRC policing assistance programme questioned whether DFID log-frames and results management, based on a linear understanding of how change happens, demanding measurable 3-5 year results and yearly improvements (milestones) towards these results, are really appropriate. However, whilst there is a growing acknowledgement of the challenges of applying generic management tools to security and justice work, particularly in fragile environments, the overarching need for financial accountability lends itself to rigid work plans and more conservative programming. Paying close attention to programme performance and the extent to which expected results are likely to be met is an important part of programme management. Monitoring progress and consulting on resulting changes to anticipated results can help manage changes in expectations and in the delivery of specific elements of the programme.[82]

Use regular reviews to adjust to context - Adapting policing assistance programmes to changed environments and reallocating resources requires a flexible approach that maximises the opportunities of annual reviews to review the theory of change and logframe and revise them to the new reality. The DFID How To Note on Results in FCAS recognises that: "The 'theory of change' will itself change and need adapting over time in response to new circumstances, analysis and understanding; we are unlikely to know with complete confidence at the outset how cause and effect will work, and how the politics will play out, in a particular context."[83] Reviews can be flexibly used to go beyond examining the delivery of outputs to test whether assumptions still stand, and if outcomes are still appropriate as well.

Use data to inform decision-making - Enhanced monitoring frameworks will be important to generate the data to enable a judgement to be reached about the direction of travel and whether existing approaches are having the desired results. The Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme was established by the Provincial Reconstruction Team in 2010. It aimed through regular perception surveys to track changes in public attitudes and opinions and was used regularly in work to support to the police and other security providers in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Similarly, in South Sudan, Kosovo and Libya amongst others, perception surveys and regular literature reviews are used to inform decision making on programme design and review and on subsequent resource allocation. A range of tools from real time monitoring to longer-term independent research and analysis can be valuable. The important thing is ensuring a link to decision-making.

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[82] Review conducted for this paper into policing assistance in DRC by Hiscock,2012.
[83] DFID, p.6, 2012.

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Annex A - Key questions and guidance for designing and implementing policing assistance programmes in conflict affected and fragile contexts

This annex sets out some of the key questions for those involved in designing or implementing police assistance programmes. They have been drawn from the programmes reviewed in the What Works document and are based on established good practice. Remember though that all contexts are different: Care should be taken to ensure that these questions are further developed and elaborated to cover the conditions and requirements of your programme.

The questions below are organised broadly in the sequence in which you will need to address them.

Context:

What is the operating environment in which your police assistance programme will take place?

What is the political, economic, social and security environment in which your programme will take place?

The UK has developed a range of different tools and guidance which will be useful in this regard. These include the cross-Whitehall Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability (JACS) and the DFID Country Governance Assessment (CGA).

The sorts of questions that you will want to consider will include:

Political

- How is the political system structured?

- To what extent is the police politically directed?

- How is policy regarding policing set and overseen by political actors?

- Are the police perceived by the public primarily to protect the government or to uphold the law and protect the public?

- How are senior police positions recruited and to whom are post holders responsible?

- How does the police relate to the military and how are their roles understood?

- How do local police commanders relate to local politicians, such as governors or mayors?

- What are other bilateral and multilateral actors planning/doing? What are their motivations and to what extent are your ideas consistent with a collective approach?

Economic

- How is the local economy structured?

- What impact does this have on the police in terms of their pay?

- Is corruption a problem, including in the police? Do the police take payments from the public to supplement their incomes? To what extent are these seen as legitimate by the public and by senior police managers?

- Do the police operate more in specific geographic areas or with specific income groups?

- Do people who can afford to employ private security providers?

Social

- What does the public understand by the term security? What role do they expect the State to play in providing it, and where do they see the police fitting in?

- Are there particular groups who are greatest at risk from crime or insecurity?

- Are these groups located in particular parts of the country or parts of specific towns or cities?

- Do they have political representation – or political power?

- How are disputes within or between families or neighbours dealt with? Do the police or other formal security providers have a role?

- What are public attitudes towards crime and punishment?

- What sorts of insecurities do people fear? How does this differ for different genders or age groups?

Security

- What are the major causes of insecurity? Are they purely physical? To what extent are people also fearful for their economic or livelihood security for instance?

- If crime is significant, to what extent are the police perceived to respond to, or indeed perpetrate it?

- If insecurity is linked to political violence, how do the police respond?

- What is the structure of security provision? In addition to the police, which other agencies or actors are involved? What is the extent of private security provision within a state regulated system? To what extent do the military perform public security tasks?

- To what extent are 'non-state' security providers active? To what extent are they linked to state providers? How are they perceived by the public?

- Do the police have a philosophy or model of policing that they are committed to, and do they implement it in practice?

- To what extent are the principles which underpin UK policing experience understood or applied by the police?

Justice

- Are there particular and significant grievances or injustices affecting people (for instance such as political crimes committed during previous government regimes, or land rights issues)?

- How does policing fit into the wider criminal justice system? What role do the police have in prosecutions, investigations and evidence collection, providing security to the judicial process?

- What is the formal relationship between the police and prosecutors? In practice how does it work?

- Where do people go to seek justice or redress? To what extent are informal or traditional systems used?

- If the function of the police was improved, would it directly improve the administration of justice or justice outcomes? If not, what else within the wider criminal justice system is preventing this from happening?

Results:

What do you want your police assistance programme to achieve?

Ultimately the success or otherwise of a policing assistance programme should be judged by two things (a) the extent to which it changes the policies, knowledge, attitudes and practice of police authorities and agencies; and (b) the extent to which these changes contribute to higher goals such as improving security and administration of justice, or reducing the fragility of the state. Being very clear at the outset as to what changes you want to bring about through your policing programme, and the contribution that these changes will make to addressing high level problems is critical. Once you have developed this initial 'theory of change' you will need to think about what indicators you will use to judge whether you have been successful both during the implementation of the programme and as it ends.

The sorts of questions that you may want to consider in identifying the results you want to achieve include:

- What is the problem that you are seeking to tackle through your policing assistance programme?

- What overall impact do you want your police assistance programme to make as a contribution to addressing this problem?

- Specifically, what are the high-level changes that you want to see in the police as a consequence of your assistance programme? How can you explain the connection between the changes in the police and the impact on the overall problem that you want to achieve?

- How will you incorporate monitoring and evaluation into your programme from the beginning? What indicators will you use to judge success? How will you respond to changes in the political or security environment?

- What is your approach to the programme? Will it feature technical advice, mentoring, training, piloting or equipping? How will these components come together to make a contribution to overall impact?

- What are the links between your proposed programme and other security and justice projects and programmes, led by the UK and others?

- What are the funding sources for the programme and if your programme is multi-year, how will you ensure that your funding is allocated on a multi-year basis?

Design and delivery:

What are the key factors to consider when designing and delivering a programme?

Once you have (a) identified the overall impact that you want your programme to contribute towards (b) defined the specific changes in the police that you want to achieve (c) established the indicators by which you will track and evaluate success and (d) decided on your overall approach, you are ready to design and then mange the delivery of your programme.

Programme design and management is a well-established discipline with many good quality resources from which you can draw. The following questions are indicative of those that you can ask to help ensure that your programme is designed and delivered effectively.

Programme design and management

- Inputs and activities: Working backwards from the changes or results that you have previously identified, what sorts of activities are most appropriate for making the contribution that you seek? In identifying these activities have the following criteria in mind: efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, flexibility.

- To what extent do these activities both promote and honour the principles of UK policing assistance?

- Which activities most closely relate to the overall approach that you have selected for your programme?

- Monitoring and evaluation frameworks. In addition to your indicators for overall success, what will you do to ensure that your programme can be monitored and evaluated successfully?

- Accountability. How will the programme and those responsible for delivery be held to account for its performance? How can local accountability be ensured?

- Ownership. Is your programme owned locally? By whom? How can local stakeholders be involved in consultations around programme design and then in overseeing its implementation?

- Responsiveness. How responsive is your programme to changes in the political, conflict or security context?

- Partnerships and coordination. Is your programme a bilateral programme or is it appropriate to work with others. In addition to potential partners, how will you ensure that the programme is coordinated with others involved in similar areas or with those working with the same counterparts?

- Delivery options. Who will deliver this programme on your behalf? Should it be delivered 'in house' or by others, including partner governments, commercial contractors, NGOs, international/multilateral agencies? What are the pros and cons of the different options? Think about political and reputational risk, costs, potential scale, expertise and the time it would take to get operational.

- Risk management. What are the risks for your programme – political, reputational, financial, physical and programmatic? How will you mitigate these risks?

- Buy-in and sign-off. Who needs to 'sign off' on your programme? What do they need to be persuaded of your case?

- Management arrangements. How will the programme be managed? Will it be managed from the Embassy/High Commission or through a delivery agent? What will relationship be between those responsible for strategic management and direction and operational delivery?

- Ongoing management responsibilities. How will the programme be directed as it is implemented? How will it remain flexible and able to respond to changes in the political or security environment?