

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Annotated Bibliography on National Security Issues

A third of this volume is devoted to this annotated bibliography for two simple reasons: first, this book is intended to be a portal, encouraging further exploration; and second, the annotations allow the author to summarize these excellent works in a manner that cannot be done in the body of the book, while also making observations in the context of signal contributions from others, leaving the very substantive works of others in the forefront.

America in the Eyes of Others	226
Biology, Evolution & World Brain	228
Bureaucratic & Western Reasoning Pathologies.....	232
Citizenship, the Polity, and Power of the People.....	237
Conflict in Every Clime and Place	249
Corporate Corruption & Irresponsibility.....	267
Environment & Public Health.....	270
Foreign Affairs and International Security Policy	282
Intelligence (Fiction)	289
Intelligence & Information Studies (Non-Fiction)	290
Reference.....	318
Strategy.....	321
Trade-Offs (Instruments of National Power)	336
Treason & Traitors	348

The absence of a number of popular books, for instance, those on terrorism, stems from their being less important than those listed here when considered from a strategic perspective—while also being beyond the author's reach in terms of time available to read. Please note that individual authors as well as title elements are included in the Index to this book. The greatest deficiency of this bibliography is its lack of coverage of foreign language materials—the absence of a national strategy for acquiring, translating, and promulgating essential perspectives in foreign languages is *the* greatest threat to our security—Washington is literally operating on 2% of the relevant information. I believe that citizens working together can master the vast domains of open information, can develop common sense policy, and can instruct their elected officials such that we begin acting as the Smart Nation that we are capable of becoming....if you read, think, and vote.

America in the Eyes of Others

Barber, Benjamin R, *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* (Ballantine, 1996)

The heart of this book, in my opinion, is on page 210 where the author carefully distinguishes between the Jihad's opposition to McWorld consumerism and development patterns, as opposed to democracy or other political notions.

All groups have their extremists and lunatics, and all groups have their bureaucracies and overly-rigid institutionalizations of past preferences. The one needs to be stamped out, and the other radically reformed--no matter what beliefs you aspire to.

Where I see the vitality and promise of this generation is in the possible energizing of the publics of many nations, including the nations of Islam, and public engagement of the core question of our time: what changes must we make in our corporate and consumerist behavior in order to, at once, establish both a sustainable model for the quality of life and choice we aspire to, while simultaneously establishing new forms of regional political and cultural accommodations that respect very strongly held beliefs?

There are two books that bracket this one in interesting ways. The first, readily identified from top-notch reviews such as appear in the Los Angeles Times, is Chalmers Johnson book, *BLOWBACK: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*. The second, less readily perceived, is Howard Bloom's *GLOBAL BRAIN: The Evolution of Mass Mind from the Big Bang to the 21st Century*. Among the core ideas in Bloom's book are two: that we as a species, never mind our inter-tribal conflicts, are losing the survival war against ever-more powerful bacteria and the epidemics that carry them forward; and that language in combination with culture kills half our brain cells as our brains "conform" into the accepted social constructions of reality that our sponsoring society imposes on us.

In a nut-shell, then, we are engaged in three world wars right now: one between cultures that cannot talk to one another because the necessary portions of the brain have been literally killed in the course of intra-cultural development; one between the political and economic manifestation of our respective cultures, between a politics subservient to corporations on the one side and a politics terrified of the religious zealot individuals on the other side; and a third war, the most important, the war that has not really started yet, between individuals and corporations over campaign finance reform

and the consequent outcomes that can be managed with respect to political economy and political education.

Chomsky, Noam, Ramsey Clark, and Edward W. Said, *Acts of Aggression: Policing Rogue States* (Seven Stories Press, 1999)

This small 65-page paperback is part of The Open Media Pamphlet Series. In three separate articles by internationally-recognized humanists, it makes three important points:

- first, that U.S. policies toward "rogue states" comprised largely of embargoes that result in infant mortality, local epidemics, starvation, infertility, and so on, are a direct violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- second, that the U.S. appears to have been both an active practitioner of biochemical warfare resulting in the deaths and deformation of hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese civilians (Agent Orange) as well as a passive practitioner in biological warfare qua disease promulgation through embargo and non-intervention; and
- third, that the U.S. has consistently refused to abide by international arbitration and other means for settling disputes, but instead generally utilized force as its preferred vehicle for getting its own way, regardless of international agreements to which it has been a signatory.

Too few write credibly in this vein, and this pamphlet is therefore a helpful off-set to the more conventional wisdom that comes from the military-industrial complex and the politicians this complex supports.

McNamara, Robert S. and James G. Blight, *Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century* (Public Affairs, 2001).

Of all the books I have read or reviewed in the past two years, this is the only one that comes close to addressing the bitter truth about the fundamental disconnect between our perception of ourselves as "the beacon of truth", and the rest of the world's perception of us as "interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, and hypocritical." Those that would seek to understand just how long our Dark Ages will last would do well to start with this book while also buying a copy of the map of *World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2000* available from the PIOOM Project at Leiden University. Beyond that,

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

selected portions of the Shultz et al book on *Security Studies for the 21st Century*, where detailed comments are made about both knowledge gaps among our policymakers and non-traditional threats, are recommended.

There is no question but that the Attack on America of 11 September 2001 has awakened and even frightened the American public. It has elicited conventional assurances from other nation states. What most Americans do not understand, what this book makes brilliantly clear, is that two thirds of the rest of the world is glad it happened. I quote from page 52: "...at least two-thirds of the world's people--Chinese, Russians, Indians, Arabs, Muslims, and Africans--see the United States as the single greatest threat to their societies. They do not regard America as a military threat but as a menace to their integrity, autonomy, prosperity and freedom of action."

Whether one agrees with their depiction of two-thirds or not (or whether they see the Attack as a well-deserved bloody nose or an atrocity beyond the pale), the fact is that the authors paint--together with the PIOOM map--a compelling picture of billions—not millions but billions—of impoverished dispossessed people suffering from failed states, crime, slavery, starvation, water shortages—and an abundance of media as well as propaganda showing the US fat and happy and living the consumer society dream on the backs of these billions.

The deep insights that I find throughout this book—a partnership between McNamara with the global reality and power game insights and James Blight with the scholarly underpinnings—are extraordinarily applicable to the challenges that we face in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 Attack on America. In particular, their dissection of the United Nations—what works and what does not—and their recommendations for future initiatives that are multilateralist and focused on the prevention and amelioration of the root conditions that are spawning our terrorist challenges, are vital reading for policymakers, diplomats, warriors, and financial magnates. We should read this book before we throw money at the problem in counterproductive ways.

Biology, Evolution & World Brain

Bloom, Howard, *Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind from the Big Bang to the 21st Century* (John Wiley, 2000)

Very very few books actually need to be read word for word, beginning with the bibliography and ending with the footnotes. This is one of those books. While there are some giant leaps of faith and unexplained challenges to the author's central premises

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

(e.g. after an entire chapter on why Athenian diversity was superior to Spartan selection, the catastrophic loss of Athens to Sparta in 404 BC receives one sentence), this is a deep book whose detail requires careful absorption.

I like this book and recommend it to everyone concerned with day to day thinking and information operations. I like it because it off-sets the current fascination with the world-wide web and electronic connectivity, and provides a historical and biologically based foundation for thinking about what Kevin Kelly and Stuart Brand set forth in the 1970's through the 1990's: the rise of neo-biological civilization and the concepts of co-evolution.

There are a number of vital observations that are relevant to how we organize ourselves and how we treat diversity. Among these:

- 1) The five major elements of global inter-species and inter-group network intelligence are the conformity enforcers; the diversity generators; the inner-judges; resource shifters; and inter-group tournaments. You have to read the book to appreciate the breadth and value of how these work within all species from bacteria to homo sapiens.
- 2) Bacteria have extraordinary strategies for rapid-fire external information collection and exchange, quick-paced inventiveness, and global data sharing. Species higher up on the evolutionary scale do not always retain these capabilities--they internalize capabilities while losing organic connectivity to others.
- 3) Imitative learning, while beneficial in general, can be extremely hazardous to inventiveness and adaptation. This ties in with his wonderful discussion of reality as a shared hallucination--fully one half of a person's brain cells are killed off by culturally-driven framing.
- 4) Non-conformists--diversity generators--are absolutely vital to the survival of any species because they are "option generators"--but too often those in power (e.g. a corporate presidency that thinks it knows all it needs to know) will shut out and even ruin the very non-conformists it most needs to adapt to external challenges it does not understand.
- 5) Labor theories of productivity that exclude calculation of the time and energy spent on information exchange are out-moded and counter-productive. In this the author is greatly reinforced by Paul Strassmann's many books on Knowledge Capital (TM) and information productivity--we have the wrong metrics for evaluating individual information productivity, something Alan Greenspan saw early, but we also have the wrong metrics for evaluating *group* information productivity,

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

something most have not figured out yet: it is called the "virtual intelligence community" or the "world brain", and that is the next information revolution.

- 6) World War III is here now, and it is an inter-species group tournament in which we are losing because we are not collecting and exchanging vital information fast enough. The rampant continent-wide diseases (not just AIDS but the square of AIDS, malaria-anemia, tuberculosis, and hepatitis, best described by Robert D. Kaplan's works as well as Laurie Garrett) and the antibiotic-resistant (and freezer resistant) strains of toxic disease and disease carriers will kill most of us much sooner than a gun in the hands of a fellow man....unless we figure out that early warning, global coverage, and rapid response non-military surge intervention is vital to our survival.
- 7) Language as well as culture are killers of thought. The author is compelling and fascinating as he discusses this in detail, comparing different language-cultural "toolkits" for concepts like the environment, alternative food sources, discipline options, and so on.
- 8) The author, who clearly has suffered some himself from being excluded or not taken seriously, is careful to discuss both the positive and the negative aspects of the "conformity police"—the conclusion I draw from his overall discussion is that we are seriously at risk, as humans in general but as Anglo-Saxons in particular, because the conformity police control all the resources (including National Science Foundation grants) and the iconoclasts are being shunned and starved.
- 9) The chapters on the kidnapping of the mass mind and how reality is a shared group hallucination draw ably on earlier works such as *The Social Construction of Reality*. The author excels at discussing how a very small number of people--25,000 in the case of Hitler's takeover of Germany--can combine cultural conformity traits with a little terror and corruption to dominate much larger groups of otherwise intelligent beings.
- 10) Internal processing matters more than external collection. I found this fascinating. Kevin Kelly and Stuart Brand and others have led the way in earlier decades, but the author does a great job of pointing out how an effective learning machine has far more internal connections than external windows, and that in a "hive mind" what you do with what you know individually--in terms of sharing with others--is vastly more important than how much you as a single individual might know.

I am not as upbeat as other reviewers about how this book suggests endless possibilities for a return to the perfect earth and inter-galactic migration. If anything, I am fairly concerned that the bacteria will win this war and that it will be another human species,

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

billions of years from today, that may finally get it right. While we know everything we need to know to radically alter the manner in which we collect, process, and share information, our political conformity police and our economic robber barons are intent on keeping us stupid as a people in this generation. Nothing stands between us and Howard Bloom's vision for bio-diverse salvation but our own inherent timidity, rigidity, and inertness--we are chained by old ideas and loath to explore new ones. We prefer death by habit to life by choice. This is very scary stuff--this is a *great* book.

Harman, Willis, *GlobalMindChange: The Promise of the 21st Century* (Berrett-Koehler, 1998)

This is a wonderful indictment of the Western scientific tradition, less comprehensive than Voltaire's Bastards but more readable and more focused as a result. The author shows a clear connection between existing global problems (ethnic violence, water scarcity, pollution, poverty, criminalization of society) and the earlier Western decisions to adopt scientific objectivity (with all of its inherent bias and ignorance) as well as the primacy of economic institutions such as have given rise to the consumerist society, regardless of the external diseconomies, the concentrations of ill-gotten wealth, and the cost to the earth resource commons. The author is especially strong on the need to restore spirituality, consciousness, and values to the decision-making and information-sharing architecture of the world--only in this way could community be achieved across national and ethnic and class lines, and only in this way could environmental sustainability and justice (economic, social, and cultural) be made possible. This is not a "tree hugger" book as much as it is a "master's class" for those who would be master's of the universe. It is a very fine portal into the growing body of people who wish to be cultural creatives, and easily one of the guideposts toward the next major paradigm shift, away from scientific materialism and toward a new *communitas* in which people really matter.

Wells, H. G., *World Brain* (Ayer, 1999)

First published in 1938, a modern edition is vastly improved by the addition of a critical introduction by Alan Mayne. Very much focused on how a world-brain might alter national policy-making, how Public Opinion or an "Open Conspiracy" might restore common sense and popular control to arenas previously reserved for an elite.

The information functionality of the World Brain easily anticipated the world wide web as it might evolve over the next 20-30 years: comprehensive, up to date, distributed, classification scheme, dynamic, indexes, summaries and surveys, freely available and easily accessible. We have a long way to go, but the framework is there.

The communication functions of the world brain would include a highly effective information retrieval system, selective dissemination of information, efficient communication facilities, effective presentation, popular education, public and individual awareness for all issues, and facilitate social networking between organizations, groups, and individuals.

The world brain is the "virtual intelligence community" qua noosphere. This is one of the fundamental references for anyone thinking about the future of politics, economics, or social systems.

Bureaucratic & Western Reasoning Pathologies

Gordon, Andrew, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command* (Naval Institute Press, 2000)

I really like and recommend this book to anyone remotely connected to national security decision-making. There are four major points in this book that neither the publicity prose nor the earlier reviewers emphasize, and I focus on these because they are the heart of the book and the core of its value:

- 1) Peacetime breeds officers, systems, and doctrine that are unlikely to stand the empirical test of war. As the author notes, every incompetent in war has previously been promoted to his or her high rank in peacetime. Systems are adopted without serious battle testing or interoperability (and intelligence) supportability being assured, and doctrine takes a back seat to protocol and keeping up appearances.
- 2) Technologists are especially pernicious and dangerous to future warfighting capability when they are allowed to promulgate new technology under ideal peacetime conditions, and not forced to stand the test of battle-like degradation and the friction of real-world conditions.
- 3) Doctrine based on the lessons of history rather than the pomp of peacetime is the ultimate insurance policy.
- 4) Robust—even intrusive and pervasive--communications (signaling) in peacetime is almost certain to denigrate healthy doctrinal development, has multiple pernicious effects on the initiative and development of individual commanders, and can have

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

catastrophic consequences when it is severely degraded in wartime and the necessary doctrinal foundation and command initiative are lacking.

This is a very long book at 708 pages, and I would hasten to note that the book is worth purchasing even if only to read Chapter 25, pages 562-601, in which the author brilliantly sets forth 28 distinct "propositions". The balance of the book is extraordinary in its detail and a pleasure to scan over, but its primary role is to absolutely guarantee the credibility and industry of the author.

Each of the 28 propositions, one sentence in length with varying explanatory summaries, is compelling, relevant, and most critical to how we train both flag officers and field grade officers of all the services. Were the author so inclined, I would encourage him to develop the final chapter as a stand-alone primer for military leaders seeking to learn from history and avoid the dangerous juxtaposition of too much technology and too little thought. While the author draws his propositions from an excruciatingly detailed study of the Battle of Jutland and the British naval cultures in conflict before and after Jutland, this book is not, at root, about a specific battle, but rather about the constantly forgotten "first principles" of training, equipping, and organizing forces for combat. Hard to do in peacetime with the best of leaders, a tragedy in waiting with the more common peacetime penguins in charge. "Ratcatchers", the author's phrase for those who do well in war, are crushed by the peacetime protocols, and this is perhaps the greatest lesson of all: we must nurture our ratcatchers, even place them on independent duty to travel distant lands, but somehow, somehow,

keep them in play against the day when we need them.

Kuhn, Thomas, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (University of Chicago, 1996)

Two points are worthy of emphasis:

- 1) the paradigm shift is always forced and
- 2) until the paradigm shift occurs, always suddenly, the incumbents can comfortably explain everything with their existing paradigm.

There will be many from the current *laissez faire* academics without accountability environment who would be critical of this book, but the fact is that it's fundamentals are on target; as the sociology of knowledge has shown time and time again, "thinkers" are nepotistic, incestuous, and generally lazy, as well as mono-lingual and culturally-

constrained, and it takes a major shock-wave to push any given intellectual domain up to the next plateau.

Lessig, Lawrence, *the future of ideas: the fate of the commons in a connected world* (Random, 2001)

I struggled with this book, in part because I really dislike the manner in which the law has been complicated to the point of unreason—beyond the ken of normal people. Having concluded the book, however, I have to say this is really worth the effort. The author is laying bare the raw threats to the future of the electronic commons. He discusses in detail how very specific government policies to sell and control bandwidth, and very specific corporate legal claims being backed by ignorant lawyers within government, are essentially "fencing" the Internet commons and severely constraining both the rights of the people and the prospects for the future of ideas and innovation.

I am not a lawyer and I cannot speak to the points of law, but I am a voter and I can speak to that; what is happening to the Internet through legal machinations that are largely invisible to the people is a travesty, a crime, treason against the Nation, and grounds for a public uprising demanding the recall of any official that permits and perpetuates the theft of the commons by corporations and their lawyers.

In the aftermath of 9-11, when our secret national intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities failed us, there is a need for a restoration of the people's intelligence in the aggregate as our first line of defense against enemies both foreign and domestic. I regard this book as a very serious, thoughtful, and well-intentioned "public intelligence estimate" and warning, of the harm to our security and prosperity that will ensue from a legal system that is now "out of control" and not being audited by the common sense of the people.

I would go so far as to say (shudder), that along with Internet standards we now need a public advocacy group (our own lawyers), funded by the people, to fight these government and corporate lawyers at every turn.

Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, *Secrecy: The American Experience* (Yale, 1999)

Senator Moynihan applies his intellect and his strong academic and historical bent to examine the U.S. experience with secrecy, beginning with its early distrust of ethnic minorities. He applies his social science frames of reference to discuss secrecy as a form of regulation and secrecy as a form of ritual, both ultimately resulting in a

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

deepening of the inherent tendency of bureaucracy to create and keep secrets—secrecy as the cultural norm. His historical overview, current right up to 1998, is replete with documented examples of how secrecy may have facilitated selected national security decisions in the short-run, but in the long run these decisions were not only found to have been wrong for lack of accurate open information that was dismissed for being open, but also harmful to the democratic fabric, in that they tended to lead to conspiracy theories and other forms of public distancing from the federal government. He concludes: "The central fact is that we live today in an Information Age. Open sources give us the vast majority of what we need to know in order to make intelligent decisions. Decisions made by people at ease with disagreement and ambiguity and tentativeness. Decisions made by those who understand how to exploit the wealth and diversity of publicly available information, who no longer simply assume that clandestine collection—that is, 'stealing secrets'—equals greater intelligence. Analysis, far more than secrecy, is the key to security....Secrecy is for losers."

Postrel, Virginia, *The Future and Its Enemies: The Growing Conflict Over Creativity, Enterprise, and Progress* (Free Press, 1998)

This is a quick read, in part because it is a series of essays that are loosely connected. It is a reasoned attack on both government regulation and imposed technical standards. To the extent that it seems to deny the value of any standards, any oversight, any structure, it is unreasonable.

Indeed, while I whole-heartedly agreed that government regulation has gotten completely out of control, I am much more concerned about corporate corruption (Enron simply being the latest case), and so I would say this book is valuable and worth reading but it is missing the bridge chapter to "what next?"

However, I like the book and I recommend it. Its value was driven home to me by an unrelated anecdote, the tales from South Korea of my data recovery expert. Bottom line: they are so far ahead of the United States, with 92% wireless penetration in urban areas, and free-flowing video and television on every hand-held communications-computing device, in part because they have not screwed up the bandwidth allocations and reservations as badly as we have. I was especially inspired by the thought that we should no longer reserve entire swaths of bandwidth for the exclusive use of the military or other government functions—let them learn how to operate in the real world rather than their artificial construct of reserved preference.

The book is well footnoted but the index is marginal—largely an index of names rather than ideas.

Saul, John Ralston, *Voltaire's Bastards: the Dictatorship of Reason in the West* (Vintage, 1993)

There is much in this book, depending on one's particular interests, which can be skimmed or skipped. With patience, however, the book in its entirety is a rewarding experience for it calls into question much about how we organize ourselves politically, economically, and socially.

The bottom line, and very consistently with other great books such as *The Manufacture of Evil* on the low end and *Consilience* on the high end, is that Western thinking has been corrupted to the point that the West has become, as the inside flap says, "a vast, incomprehensible directionless machine, run by process-minded experts....whose cult of scientific management is bereft of both sense and morality."

As my own interests run toward public intelligence and public effectiveness in guiding the polity, I found his several chapters related to secrecy, immorality, and the "hijacking of capitalism" to be especially worthwhile.

He concludes that secrecy is pathological, undermining both public confidence and the public dialog. Intelligence in his view is about disseminated knowledge, not secrets.

Throughout the book the author discusses the contest between those who feel that the people cannot be trusted--the elites who strive to remain in power by making power appear an arcane skill with rites and formulas beyond the ken of the people--and those who feels that the people--and especially the larger consciousness of the people--are more in touch with nature and reality and the needs of the people than these elites.

This is a difficult book to absorb and enjoy, but I recommend because it sets the broad outlines for the real power struggle in the 21st Century--not between terrorism and capitalism, but rather between the government-corporate elites with their own agenda, and the larger body of people now possibly ready to turn every organization into an employee-owned and managed activity.

Strahan, Jerry E., *Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Boats that Won World War II* (Louisiana State University Press, 1994)

I wish every doctoral dissertation were this useful. Under the guidance of Stephen E. Ambrose, well known for his books on the citizen-soldiers of World War II, the author has produced a very readable and moving book about one brilliant caustic citizen's forgotten contributions to World War II.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Two aspects of this book jump out at the reader: the first is that Americans are capable of anything when motivated. Andrew Jackson Higgins and his employees, most trained overnight for jobs they never thought to have, was able to create an assembly line producing one ship a day. He was able to design, build and test gun boats and landing craft on an overnight basis. He is remembered by Marines, and especially General Victor Krulak, for having given America the one missing ingredient necessary for successful amphibious landings—in this way, he may well have changed the course of the war and the history of our Nation.

The second aspect that jumps out at the reader is that of bureaucratic pettiness to the point of selfishly undermining the war effort within the Department of the Navy and the Bureau of Boats. In careful and measured detail, the author lays out the history of competition between trained naval architects with closed minds, and the relatively under-trained Higgins team with new ideas, and shows how the bureaucracy often conspired to block and demean Higgins at the expense of the Marines and the sailors on the front line. There is less of that sort of thing these days, but it is still with us, as we contemplate the need for a 450-ship Navy that is fully capable for Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

This book should be included on the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations lists of recommended professional readings, and it should be studied by anyone contemplating the hidden dangers of bureaucratic interests that often override the public interest and undermine our national security.

Citizenship, the Polity, and Power of the People

Aleinikoff, T. Alexander and Douglas Klusmeyer (eds.), *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001)

I have mixed feelings about this book. On the most positive side, it is the only, and therefore the best, treatment of the issues of citizenship that I could identify, and that is why I bought it. The range of authoritative essays that have been brought together is very worthy, and anyone contemplating this topic must take this work into account.

On the other hand, as I went through chapter after chapter, what I tended to see was an awful lot of academic whining about how the world is getting too complex and too multi-cultural to be able to pin someone down to just one citizenship, let them have many. Reality check needed here. Governments exist to preserve and protect very

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

specific moral, ideological, and cultural values, and governments are the means by which a Republic finances what are called external diseconomies--those things that are needed for the common good but not profitable for the private sector to do.

There are glimmers here and there of how one might better integrate new immigrants and otherwise promote good citizenship, but overall what this book is missing is a major commitment to thinking about how one draws the line between nationalized citizens truly loyal to their newly chosen nation-state, and those who choose to retain another primary citizenship and simply enjoy the bounty of the land they have chosen to VISIT....

Of all the contributions, the one that stood out for me was by Adrian Favell, on "Integration Policy and Integration Research in Europe: A Review and Critique." Despite the title, the heart of this chapter concerns the information "sources and methods" that underlie conclusions about citizenship and the policies on citizenship. There is a great deal of meat in this chapter, and it could useful guide the next book in what I hope will become a series.

I like this book. It forced me to think and it certainly opened my eyes to how we are letting a whole bunch of people debate the nature of citizenship without ever really being committed to the idea that an oath of loyalty is fundamental--as universal service should be fundamental, not to flesh out the military, but rather to provide a common foundation for knowing one another intimately, for respecting one another from that common ground. How one defines citizenship is fundamental to the future of every nation--this book both enlightens and frightens.

Carter, Barry C., *Infinite Wealth: A New World of Collaboration and Abundance in the Knowledge Era* (Butterworth Heineman, 1991)

First off, this book made the cut above another ten or so options on the fringes (the amazon reviews helped). It was a good choice. The author captures the essence of many other books as well as real-world experience with two fundamental points that every manager and every employee--including fast-food employees and others in "drone" jobs--needs to absorb:

- first, that the existing bureaucratization of the economy at every level is costing so much as to place those companies in jeopardy during the forthcoming economic shake-out, and
- second, that the sooner every individual begins the process of inventorying their personal capabilities and creating the networks for offering their personal services

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

and knowledge via the Internet to all comers, the sooner they will be able to share in the profits associated with their direct individual contributions to the new economy.

The Department of Defense acquisition and contracting examples are especially shocking because they show, so credibly and in detail, how we have institutionalized multi-billion dollar waste.

This is a special book. It is by a practical man who has drawn very personal and transformative lessons from the school of hard knocks, and whose recounting of those lessons have value for anyone who expects to work for a living today and in the future. This is not a "get rich quick" book as much as it is a "get rich together or get left behind" book.

Dalai Lama, *Ethics for the New Millenium* (Riverhead, 1999)

Every single person, and especially those with the power to harm others through their corporate or government roles, should read this book.

The Dalai Lama begins by recognizing that religion is no longer providing an ethical compass for the majority of us, and ends by recommending a world parliament of religions (just as some believe a world parliament of cultures is also needed to represents nations without states).

At it's most fundamental, this easy to read and very practical book is about obeying the Golden Rule--or a variation of the physician's rule, "first do no harm."

This is not a book for mantra lovers. At its most strategic level, the book focuses on the fact that the problems facing nation-states and entire societies cannot be solved in the absence of ethical restraint. Technology and law enforcement can address deviants in the minority, but not a majority that chooses deviance as a routine lifestyle.

This is the first book I have encountered in my religious reading that actively respects all other religions as well as personal ethical systems apart from religion. In essence, the Dalai Lama calls for each person to restore their spiritual base, either by honoring their chosen religion, or by adopting a personal ethical philosophy that is consistent with the generic teachings of various religions.

At a very personal level, as I read this book I saw clearly how my competitive and confrontational instincts, honed over a half century by a "dog eat dog" culture, have in fact hurt me and hurt others. I was reminded by this book that a Nobel Prize has been

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

awarded to those showing that trust lowers the costs of business transactions--Fukiyama managed to get an entire book out of that one word. Reflecting on this book, and its measured discussion of how each of us simply seeks happiness and avoidance of suffering, caused me to reflect on how often each of us reduces the happiness of others and impose suffering through rudeness, harm by omission (not sharing useful information) and in other more aggressive ways.

On a global scale, and very consistent with other social science works on the complexity and inter-connectedness of the world, the book clearly addresses the urgent need for major world powers to understand that our existing life style and its damage to world resources is both unaffordable and suicidal. This book on ethics applies to Nations and to organizations, not just to individuals. It is a very elegant "dummy's guide to survival in the 21st Century."

Gladwell, Malcolm, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* (Little, Brown & Company, 2000)

For those aspiring to revolutionary change in any aspect of life (e.g. the Cultural Creatives), this book is a subtle revolutionary manifesto--at a more mundane level it is a sales guide. I like this book because as we all deal with the information explosion, it provides some important clues regarding what messages will "get through", and what we need to do to increase the chances that our own important messages reach out to others.

This book is in some ways a modern version of Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. While more of a story than a thesis, there is a great deal here that tracks with some of the more advanced information theory dissertations, and the book could reasonably be subtitled "The Precipitants of Social Revolutions."

The most subtle message in this book is that substance is not vital--perception is. The contagiousness of the idea, the life-altering potential of the smallest ideas, and the fact that revolutionary change is always cataclysmic rather than evolutionary, will frustrate those who think that years of intellectual exploration will be rewarded with acceptance. However, despite the revolutionary nature of the final "tipping point", there is actually a clear path taking up to 25 years, from the Innovators to the Early Adopters, to the Early Majority, to the Late Majority. My sense is that America today, with its 50 million Cultural Creatives, is about to cross over from the Early Adopters to the Early Majority stage, and will do so during the forthcoming Congressional elections when we see a rise in Independents and more attention to energy and other alternative sustainable lifestyle issues--hence, this book is relevant to anyone who either wants to promote a shift in America or elsewhere away from consumerism (or who wants to go on selling

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

consumerism), or who wants to seriously revisit what many would call the failed strategies of the early environmentalist, human rights, and corporate accountability advocates.

The book ends on an irresistibly upbeat note--change is possible, people can radically transform their beliefs for the common good in the face of the right kind of impetus. Each of us has a role to play, whether as a Connector, a Maven, a Salesman, or a Buyer, and our role will not be defined in rational terms, but rather in social terms. In many ways, this book is about the restoration of community and the importance of relationships, and it is assuredly relevant to anyone who thinks about "the common good."

Stein, Herbert, *Governing the \$5 Trillion Economy* (Oxford, 1989)

This absolute gem from 1989 should be updated and republished. I have resurrected it in relation to my reading on federal budgeting and the dangers of the deficit spending now in vogue in Washington (2002).

This is the best book I have read on the strategic aspects of the federal budget--needed reforms, key issues in allocation policy, using the budget to stabilize the economy.

Where the book excels is in its analysis of how the federal budget should be used to steer private sector outlays—as Osborne and Gaebler suggested, we must steer rather than row—guide the private sector rather than use taxpayer dollars for direct products and services.

In his discussion of priorities, the author focuses heavily on the lack of investment in education and the resurrection of education both public and private. As we enter the 21st Century largely ignorant as a Nation (of external realities, not at individuals), I cannot help but think that the time has come for the public to take charge of "political economy," and begin actively setting forth its priorities. Just this week, in *The Washington Post* of 27 February 2002, David Ignatius suggests that Washington has turned its back on the Nation. It seems to me that's pretty dangerous, but if the Nation allows itself to be ignored by Washington, then we have the government—and the federal spending priorities—we deserve.

Halsted, Ted, and Michael Lind, *The Radical Center: The Future of American Politics* (Doubleday, 2001)

Those who have bought *The Cultural Creatives* by Paul Ray and Sherry Ruth Anderson, or *IMAGINE: What America Could be in the 21st Century*, will not only be thrilled by this book, they will understand that the "citizen-centered" system of governance is finally achievable and imminent--we should all try to buy, read, discuss and relate this book to the Congressional elections in 2002 and the Presidential election in 2004.

This book is *loaded* with common sense. It is absolutely not a political spin manual, a manifesto for revolution, or a ponderous think tank "blue sky" prescription for curing all the ills of the world. This book has three simple focal points and they are powerful:

- 1) More Americans identify themselves as Independents than as either Republicans or Democrats, and the way is open for a new "radical centrist" choice of leadership;
- 2) The original social contract that placed highly educated experts in charge of everything (government, corporations, even non-profits), taking care of the largely ignorant masses, is *history*. The people are smart, the people are connected, and the people want *choices* rather than ideologically-contrived menus.
- 3) Young adults are the key to the future and will decide the next few major elections, but only (a huge caveat) if leaders of vision and charisma can come forth with truthful options grounded in reality--the authors are carefully critical of political "triangulation" that seeks to manufacture false representations of common interest, only to betray those the moment after election.

The bottom line in this book is that the artificial trade-offs imposed on the people by menu- and elite-driven party politics are no longer acceptable nor enforceable, and the opportunity now presents itself for the voting public to remake the government from the outside in.

They focus on the core segments and core values that make America great: the market with its liberty; the state with its equality of opportunity; and the community (including religions) with its solidarity and nurturing of civic virtues.

Among the core negatives they identify where citizens could and should be free to choose rather than accept imposed combinations, are:

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

- 1) Elections tied to rigid political parties that have veto rights over candidates, and selections that allow minority winners where more than two candidates split the majority vote.
- 2) Pension and health care programs tied to organizations rather than individuals--trapping individuals and constraining innovation.
- 3) Educational systems tied to mass conformity rather than individual customization--with gross inequalities across counties and states because property taxes fund education, rather than a national normalized program with equal investments for every child.
- 4) Tax systems tied to loopholes, patronage, and earnings, rather than to consumption and savings (tax breaks for savings).
- 5) Immigration policies tied to old needs for low-skilled labor instead of new needs for high-skilled labor and the protection of the nation from dilution, disease, and excess demands on our tax-payer funded safety nets.

There are many other gems in this well-written and self-effacing book. The authors come across as very sensible, very devoted to America and its values, and very much ahead of the curve.

They conclude that major renovations of our society usually result from a combination of three factors: an external shock to the system; the emergence of new political alliances, and the availability of compelling new ideas for social reform.

They specifically note that an obstacle to innovation is the lack of a well-formed political worldview among both the new generation of young voters, and the new elites (most of whom have eschewed politics).

While they say that realignments are not expected in the next presidential or congressional cycle, but rather over the next ten to twenty five years, I believe they underestimate the power of the Internet and self-organizing groups such as represented by the Cultural Creatives.

I hope the authors consider launching a *Journal of Citizen Governance* and a web-site where citizens' can self-organize, because unlike the cultural creatives and the imaginative individuals who focus in niche areas, these two authors have finally "cracked the code" in a common sense manner that anyone can understand and anyone can act upon.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

This is a unique and seminal work that could influence the future of national, state, and local politics, and hence the future of the Nation. This is *very* well done.

Howe, Neil and William Strauss, *Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation* (Vintage Books, 2000)

I was very impressed by the author's earlier book, *Generations*, and when this one came along I grabbed it, for I have three children in the 1982-1998 birth date range that demarcates the Millennial Generation.

As we come away from the 11 September attack on America, the horrors of genocide from Kosovo to Burundi to East Timor, the stock market crash and the threat of recession, this book is nothing if not uplifting.

I strongly recommend this book for anyone who has children, deals with children or young employees, or who likes to speculate on where the future will take us.

According to the authors, and their earlier book provides a very fine and well-research foundation for their prognostications, the Millennial Generation is the next "great generation" and it will be fully capable of rising to the many challenges that face us all. Especially encouraging is their view that much of the malaise felt by our teenagers in the post Cold-War years is being rapidly eliminated--our young people appear, at least in the most developed portions of the world, to be moving decisively toward a kinder and gentler demeanor, including a restoration of family values.

The structure of the book is useful (see the table of contents) but there is one very serious deficiency for a book of this caliber: there is no index. When I went to see all the references to "culture wars", the one somber note in this otherwise very positive assessment of the future, the lack of an index prevented me from using the book as a reference work.

This gives rise to my one concern about this generation (I have three children in the Millennials), and that is their lack of international studies and comparative religion training. It is my impression that even the best of our schools are failing to teach foreign affairs and global conditions, and failing to show how what happens beyond our water's edge has a direct bearing on our future peace and prosperity--the author's would have done well to spend more time on the differences between our US-born millennials and foreign millennials (whom they characterize as several years behind but on the same track), and to address the gaps in our education of this otherwise stellar generation.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Every parent and teacher, and every politician who wants to be elected in the next 20 years, needs to read this book. If Hollywood and other purveyors of products to the 10-25 year old marketplace were to read this book, we might get to a kinder and gentler broadcast, print media, literature, and family entertainment culture even more quickly than the book predicts.

Lewis, Michael, *LOSERS: The Road to Everyplace but the White House* (Vintage, 1999)

The older version, *Trail Fever*, is available at stores that sell everything for a dollar or less, this book is a hard-copy bargain. Even for those who have read other campaign trail books, this book offers a combination of unvarnished sad truths (Presidential candidates speaking to empty rooms, waving to empty runways, all to create the "virtual reality" of having something to say and someone to listen to it) together with a sense of lost opportunities.

As campaign reform looms on the horizon, I found this book especially appealing for its detailed look at "the people's candidate," Morry Taylor, the "Grizz"--a person I never heard of during the actual campaign. The book really drives home how flawed our existing electoral system is today, as well as all the campaign contributions, "rented strangers," and other anomalies that make good Presidents an accident rather than a choice.

I read the book shortly after reading Ted Halstead and Michael Lind, *The Radical Center*, on citizen-centered politics of choice, and there could be no better book for appreciating just how radical Halstead and Michael are, than this book.

Ray, Paul H. and Sherry Ruth Anderson, *The Cultural Creatives: How 50 Million People Are Changing the World* (Harmony, 2000)

This book should be read together with *IMAGINE*, edited by Marianne Williamson. Taken together, the two books are inspirational while still being practical.

Cultural Creatives as a book, and some of the other reviews, tend to over-sell the success of the emergence of an alternative lifestyle to Traditionalists (stereotyped as somewhat red neckish and religious rightists) and Moderns (stereotyped as ravish the earth anything-goes corporate carpetbaggers). The reality is that there are as many "cultural creatives" as there are people with disabilities in the United States--50 million. Not one quarter of the population, as one reviewer claims.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Having said that, by way of somber stage-setting, I cannot say enough good things about this book. It should be required reading for every citizen, every student, and every public official. In a very real sense, this book strikes me as a truly seminal work that could help millions of individuals reframe their personal connection to one another, to their Republic, and to the earth.

This is neither a tree-hugger book nor a mantras R us book. This book provides a thoughtful review of how different movements--first the environmental movement, then the human rights movement, and finally the consciousness movement--have come together to define an alternative lifestyle and alternative paradigm for political and economic and social relationships in the larger context of a sustainable "whole" earth.

I found this book motivational and meaningful at both a personal level and a larger national level.

At the personal level, its detailed and well-organized description of fifteen very distinct aspects of a "cultural creative" lifestyle helped me understand--as it has helped many others--that there is actually a category of people who have come to grips with and found solutions that enrich their lives--and this explains my great disappointment that the book does not offer a "resources" section at the end. I would have been very glad to discover, for example, a "Cultural Creative" journal or magazine that combined a strong book review section, art and culture, a consumer reports section tailored to the higher standards of the "CCs", new innovations in home restoration and remodeling, vacation options known to be attractive to CCs, etcetera.

At the higher political level, I found the book constructive and just this side of a tipping point. An increasing number of people, all of them generally outside of Washington and not associated with Wall Street, clearly have some strong positive values and a real commitment to achieving reform through "many small actions".

What this group has lacked is a means of communicating and orchestrating itself on a scale sufficient to demand respect from politicians and corporation. The Internet now provides such a vehicle--and as the Internet explodes from 3.5M people worldwide to 3.5B people worldwide, in the next ten years, I am convinced that Cultural Creatives may finally come into their own as a new form of global political party. Cultural Creatives would sign the Kyoto Treaty (and know what it is); Cultural Creatives would demand a 100% increase--from a half-penny a dollar to a full penny a dollar--in America's foreign diplomatic and humanitarian assistance budget--and Cultural Creatives could conceivably give the Republican Party a real beating in the next Congressional elections if President Bush persists in breaking his campaign vow on reducing carbon emissions. A peaceful revolution in our national agenda may truly be a near-term reality.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

This is not a book where a summary can do it justice. It needs to be experienced at an individual level and ideally also at a community level, where it could be understood and accepted as a common point of reference for individual choosing to live "in relation" to one another and to the world, at a level much higher and more satisfying than our current arrangements. When this book makes it to the best-seller list, America will have matured and there will be hope for our children's future quality of life.

Williamson, Marianne (ed.), *IMAGINE: What America Could Be in the 21st Century* (Rodale, 2000)

I almost did not buy this book, and I say that because an awful lot of really smart folks might be inclined to turn away on the basis of the title and the possibility that this is a fairy tale wishful-thinking la la land kind of book. It is not. It is practical (and political), it is enriching, and it is over-all a very high quality endeavor that has been well executed.

Four "great truths" are articulated many times over across the various readings, and they merit listing here:

- 1) Campaign finance reform is the absolute non-negotiable first step that must precede every other reform. Until the people can reassert their great common sense for the common good, and restore the true democratic tradition, nothing else will happen.
- 2) Neighborhoods are the bedrock of both democracy and sustainable development, and we have spent fifty years building in the wrong direction. New legal and economic incentives must be found to redirect both urban and suburban real estate management back in the direction of self-contained neighborhoods.
- 3) Local production of everything, from electricity to food to major goods like automobiles) appears to be a pre-requisite for deconflicting high quality of life needs from limited resource availability. The book includes several very intelligent discussions of how this might come about.
- 4) Networking makes everything else possible, and by this the book means electronic networking. I was especially fascinated by some of the examples of near-real-time sharing that electronic networking makes possible--everything from a neighborhood car to scheduled hand-me-downs of winter coats from one family to another. We have not progressed one mile down the road of what the Internet

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

makes possible at a personal and neighborhood level, and I would recommend this book for that perspective alone.

The creative editorial role must be applauded. From the identification and recruitment of the contributors, to the selection of the photographs that each tell their own story, to the quality of the paper used to create the book, all testify to the competence and knowledge of the editor.

Lastly, it merits comment that the book serves as a very fine calling card from something called The Global Renaissance Alliance.

Wishard, William Van Dusen, *Between Two Ages: The 21st Century and Meaning* (Xlibris, 2000)

I've been in and out of this book over the past couple of months and I would sum up my reactions in three ways: 1) I will never be able to sum this book up or feel I have gotten all I could out of it—it would be on my list of books to take to a desert island and read over and over again; 2) it is, together with Will and Ariel Durant's *The Lessons of History*, a remarkable short-hand survey of the past two centuries; and 3) at the end it cuts to the chase and agrees with Zbigniew Brzezinski—the big global challenge today is about moral, ethical, cross-cultural, philosophical *grounding*.

I don't see the author's vision happening in any sort of structured officially-sanctioned way. And I don't see this book impacting on people the way *IMAGINE* or *Cultural Creatives* can impact—but if you have the time and the intellectual curiosity to go deep, this is a very engaging book that will take a long time to fully appreciate.

Conflict in Every Clime and Place

Arquilla, John and David F. Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (RAND, 2001)

Although their references lean toward "the usual suspects" among the beltway bubbas, and none of the authors demonstrate real access to the various hacker groups that I have gotten to know over the past decade, this is without question one of the best sets of articles, put together by two people I view as being the most capable in this area of inquiry, and therefore I recommend it very strongly as a starting point.

As with most publications by RAND it lacks an index, for which I deduct one star. The value of an index does not appear to be appreciated by those who publish these taxpayer-funded collections, and I continually lament the myopia that prevents the publishers from making such a useful collection even more valuable by taking the time to create an aggregate index.

I hope this is the last of the theoretical volumes. While it has some operationally-oriented contributions, one of the best being by Phil Williams on Transnational Criminal Networks, it is too theoretical overall, and much too US-centric. There are French, Nordic, and Singaporean, and Australian authorities, to mention just a few, that the editors must now make an effort to bring into a larger dialog. At the same time, it is now vital that we get on with much deeper study and discussion of the actual networks and specific practices--we must do much more in documenting the "order of battle" for netwar. One article, for example, lists a sample of Arabic web sites but goes no further--I would have liked to see some discussion of the 396 terrorist, insurgent, and opposition web sites, including the "Muslim Hackers" who asked for a clerical ruling on whether the Koran encouraged hacking as a means of war (it does, according to the same people that support bin Laden's views), and I would like to see much more integration with the investigative efforts of both law enforcement authorities and private sector security and fraud authorities. I am especially disappointed that all of these authorities appear to be largely oblivious to or at least not making substantive reference to the ten-year-long track record compiled by Winn Schwartau and his InfoWarCon speakers and web site, an event that is arguably the only serious international venue for addressing these issues in a serious manner, with a commensurately valuable web site.

There is one other major gap in this book's approach to networks and netwars. With the exception of Paul de Armond's article on netwar against the World Trade Organization,

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

there are no references to intelligence failures and intelligence requirements *vis a vis* this threat domain. I am reminded of Congressional testimony by General Alfred Grey, then Commandant of the Marine Corps. Explaining why his was the only service to have one general in charge of both communications and computers on the one hand, and intelligence on the other, he stated with force: "Communications and computing without intelligence is just noise; and intelligence without communications and computing is irrelevant." The editors and authors need to establish intelligence concepts and doctrine for this threat.

This book represents the very best that DoD money can fund in isolation, and therein lies the problem. What few taxpayer funds are spent by DoD in addressing such important matters and not being spent wisely because there is no serious commitment to creating a data warehouse of all studies related to networks and netwar; there is no commitment to accessing and understanding the considerable lessons learned outside the somewhat nepotistic DoD network of standard experts; and there seems to be no commitment to creating a center of excellence that can nurture *public* understanding and new *public* standards for protecting both our critical infrastructure and the vital data that circulates on that infrastructure.

The editors and the authors are of the very highest caliber. They are also operating in a vacuum. I for one would like to see them get serious funding, to include the establishment of a public international center of excellence on netwar, with branch offices in London and Singapore.

We are losing the Third World War, between governments and gangs, in part because the military-industrial-congressional complex continues to define security in terms of very expensive mobility and weapons systems--communications, computing, and intelligence are an afterthought, and the authors are quite correct in the aggregate when they suggest that we are our own worst enemy in failing to redirect substantial funds toward cyber-war and cyber-peace. The editors and authors could be very helpful if they address in their next volume, both an intelligence order of battle against which capabilities might be created; and specific proposals for establishing international, national, and state & local capabilities. What should they be, what will it cost, who should manage them? "It ain't real until it's the budget." The authors are gracious to a fault, but it is clear from their work in the aggregate that they share a concern with our lack of preparedness for a 9-11 level of effort against our financial, transportation, power, and communications networks. They merit the greatest of respect and a full hearing from the public.

Chomsky, Noam, 9-11 (Seven Stories, 2001)

Chomsky is somewhat predictable and irritating in his repetitive condemnation of all past and present U.S. interventions around the world, and he harps heavily on the U.S. being the only country in the world actually condemned for terrorism (against Nicaragua) by the World Court but one has to give him credit—his is one of the few credible voices seeking to enlighten the American people with respect to two major global realities: first, that America is violating others with impunity and regularity; and second, that we have no idea just how hated we are for these actions.

There were a couple of tid-bits in this book that made me especially glad to have obtained it for reading and retention. His evaluation of the Sudan situation, and his detailed review of the impact on Sudanese reliant on the low-cost medicines from the factory bombed into oblivion on the now-disputed suggestion of the CIA, provides a perspective that needs more respect.

His lengthy discussion of the contradictory record of the United States on human rights—in favor when it does not interfere with business, actively obstructionist when it takes place in Saudi Arabia or Indonesia where financial equities (generally mining and energy company equities) are great, is disturbingly sensible.

I will always read Chomsky, for he provides a leavening of forthright candor and intellectual honesty that is too often absent from mainstream discussions. Indeed, as I was reading the bit on Sudan, it occurred to me that we are long over-due for the next revolution in learned discourse—the digitization of all such books so that a reader can, to take Sudan as an example, see on their screen a "map" of Sudanese issues, and then select from across a range of competing viewpoints on any issue. One has to seek out Chomsky now—in the future it may be salutary to find him automatically served up as a side dish whenever the pundits wax too pontifical.

Clark, Wesley K., *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (Public Affairs, 2001)

Every citizen should read this book so they can instruct their elected representatives and vote for military reform. As things now stand, we will lose the war on terrorism over time because of the perennial flaws in our system that this book identifies.

1) Don't Bother Us Now. The U.S. political system is not structured to pay attention to "early warning". Kosovo (as well as Croatia and Serbia beforehand and later Macedonia) were well known looming problems, but in the aftermath of the Gulf War, both Congress and the Administration in power at the time said to the U.S. Intelligence

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Community, essentially: "don't bother us anymore with this, this is inconvenient warning, we'll get to it when it explodes." We allowed over a hundred thousand to be murdered in genocide, because our political system was "tired."

2) "Modern war" is an overwhelming combination of micro-management from across the varied nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; a reliance on very high-tech weapons with precision effect that are useless in the absence of precision intelligence (and the lawyers insist the intelligence be near-real-time, a virtual impossibility for years to come); and an obsession with avoiding casualties that hand-cuffs our friendly commanders and gives great encouragement to our enemies.

3) Services versus Commanders. The military services that under Title 10 are responsible for training, equipping, and organizing the forces--but not for fighting them, something the regional commanders-in-chief must do--have become--and I say this advisedly--the biggest impediment to the successful prosecution of operations. The detailed story of the Army staff resistance to the use of the Apache helicopters is the best case study I have ever seen of how senior staff generals with political access can prevent operational generals with field responsibilities from being fully effective. In combination with the insistence of the services that forces be held back for Korean and Persian Gulf threats that might not be realized, instead of supporting a real war that existed in Europe, simply stated, makes it clear that there is a "seam" between our force-creating generals and our force-fighting generals that has gotten *out of control*. The fog of war is thickest in Washington, and the greatest friction--the obstacles to success in war--are largely of our own making.

4) Lawyers, Fear, and Micro-Management. Just as we recently witnessed a lawyer overruling the general to avoid killing the commander of the Taliban, General Clark's war was dominated by lawyers, a fear of casualties, and micro-management, from Washington, of his use of every weapons system normally left to the discretion of the field commander. This has gotten completely out of hand. Within NATO it is compounded by multi-national forces whose commanders can refuse orders inconsistent with their own national view of things, but reading this book, one is left with the clear understanding that General Clark was fighting a three-front war at all times: with the real enemy, with the media, and with Washington--his NATO commanders were the least of his problems.

5) Technology Loses to Weather and Lacks Intelligence. Throughout the book there are statements that make it clear that the U.S. military is not yet an all-weather military, and has a very long way to go before it ever will be. Aligned with this incapacity is a high-technology culture that suffers from very weak maintenance and an almost complete lack of intelligence at the level of precision and with the timeliness that is needed for our very expensive weapons to be effective. Nothing has changed since

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

MajGen Bob Scales wrote his excellent *Firepower in Limited War*, pointing out that artillery still cannot be adequately supported by the intelligence capabilities we have now.

6) Strategic Mobility Shortfalls, Tactical Aviation Constraints. Although General Clark judges the air war to have been a success, and an essential factor in facilitating "coercive diplomacy", he also communicates two realities about U.S. military aviation: 1) we do not have the strategic aviation lift to get anywhere in less than 90-180 days, and his request for a 75 day mobilization was not possible as a result; and 2) our tactical aviation assets are so specialized, and require so much advance preparation in terms of munitions, route planning, and so on, that they cannot be readily redirected in less than a full day. A full day. This is simply outlandish.

7) We Don't Do Mountains. No statement in the book hurt me more than one by an Army general telling General Clark that his plans for the ground campaign could not be supported by the U.S. Army because "we don't do mountains" This, in combination with the loser's attitude (no casualties) and the general reluctance of the services to put their high-tech capabilities like the Apache at risk in a real war, sum up the decrepitude of the U.S. military leadership and the Revolution in Military Affairs-Andrew Gordon in *Rules of the Game* has it exactly right-the post Viet-Nam and post Cold War era has left us with a bunch of high-tech chickens in control of military resources, and we need to find ourselves some rat-catchers able to redirect our military toward a lust for man to man combat in every clime and place-and the low-tech sustainable tools to do the job.

8) General Clark's concluding words, on page 459: "In Kosovo my commanders and I found that we lacked the detailed prompt information to campaign effectively against the Serb ground forces. Most of the technologies we had been promoting since the Gulf War were still immature, unable to deal with the vagaries of weather, vegetation, and urban areas, or the limitations of bandwidth and airspace. The discrete service programs didn't always fit together technically. And (sic) the officers who operated the programs were not qualified to work across service lines and did not understand the full range of national capabilities. I worried about the nature of Joint skills even among senior officers." Are we ready? No.

Godson, Larry P., *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban* (Washington, 2001)

This is a very impressive book, perhaps one of the best all-around books on Afghanistan, yet when I finished it I had the strongest feeling that it had been a rather antiseptic review. Eurudite, one of the best outlines I have ever seen for examining a

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

truly chaotic situation, everything falling into place from chapter to chapter--yet at the end of it I simply did not have the guts of the matter in my hands.

I found the answer in other materials, including a special project to map all of the existing tribes, sub-tribes, and individual leaders where they could be identified. The project required monitoring of local radio stations in various languages, some of which did not have print media. At the end of it all what came across was massive--massive--chaos in a medieval environment where everyone, without exception, regards every foreign power--and especially the superpowers--as an intruder, and every other Afghan as someone to be killed, exploited, or followed, depending on the situation.

This is a very fine book, but when one examines the list of organizations (14) and key individuals (16), what comes across is antiseptic simplicity. This is not a criticism of the author, the research (virtually every English-language reference of note), or the conclusions--all fit well within a very thoughtful approach to describing this failed state called Afghanistan. What jumps out at me is the fact that we do not have the access to the same story as told in Russian, Chinese, Dari, Farsi, Pashto, Urdu, Hindi, and we have done nothing to actually get below the state level--what I call "two levels down"--to the sub-tribe level.

As the world gets more complex, as "wild cards" such as Omar bin Laden cause massive dislocations within major developed countries, not just in isolated failed states, it seems to me that we do not have the sources and tools in hand to get a truly comprehensive coherent view of any particular situation. I would go so far as to say that each book such as this can only be considered a calling card--an audition--and that a real understanding of the Afghan situation could only emerge from a multi-national effort that brings together such talented authors, across cultural and national lines, and gives them the kind of collection, processing, modeling, and operational intelligence support that are normally reserved for just a few great nations. In brief, what we understand about Afghanistan is now too important to be left to a single author or a single perspective--and certainly too important to be left to a single failed intelligence community that thinks only in English.

Heidenrich, John G., *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen* (Praeger, 2001)

The author of this book not only completed graduate work with a direct focus on genocide, but spent over a year supporting the Office of War Crimes at the Department of State, each day creating an open source intelligence report on genocide--at the time he was engaged in this activity, there were eighteen (18) such active genocidal movements going on around the world.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

This is a brilliant and compelling book that is also practical and essential for anyone who desires to understand the complete inadequacy of the diplomats, the policymakers, the media, and the intelligence communities. It is unnerving in its calm and reasoned detailing of how genocide can take place, its survey of the millions upon millions of post-WWII holocausts taking place today--as the media and policymakers ignore these realities.

Citizen-voters, in my view, will benefit considerably from this book because it will help them understand that there are three worlds out there, and we as a nation are not dealing well with two of the three--the most dangerous two. There is the world of well-fed diplomats and businessman, traveling and negotiating in their warm safe buffer zones. There is the real world as experienced by normal people, many of whom are oppressed and poor and feel helpless in the face of dictatorial regimes and local warlords who may do as they wish absent the rule of law. And then there is the world of genocide, an underworld of such horrific pervasive violence and inhuman brutality that one can only wonder if we are all guilty of mass insanity for turning our backs on this murder of millions.

The author is a world-class scholar and ardent champion for informing the public and achieving informed policy in this vital area, and I can only hope that serious people put some money behind his thinking.

Kaplan, Robert D., *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War* (Random House, 2000)

This is *not* a capstone work. It is a set of simple samples from the author's much deeper and more complex writing and reporting. If you have time for only one book by this author, this is the one.

He is strongest on historical continuity and ground truth reality. He is weakest on intelligence issues but asks the right question: how do we reduce risk around the world when traditional military forces are unsuited to the task?

Writing as he does for the prestigious and eclectic *The Atlantic Monthly*, where he is the primary (some would say the only) voice on foreign policy matters, one can only hope that he will focus in the coming year on the fundamentals of information sharing across national, cultural, and organizational boundaries--this book, and all the other books by this author, are highly recommended because they open a window on the real world that has not been opened by our very expensive government intelligence and diplomatic capabilities, and is not available from our inexpensive but all too mundane media. I

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

would go so far as to suggest that this kind of personal travel and reflection--that the author represents so ably--is precisely the kind of future alternative intelligence capability (in the open legal ethical sense) that we must have more of, and so the question we should all be asking when we finish this book by Robert D. Kaplan is: how do we clone this guy so we have 1000 more like him, and all their reporting is easily accessible to citizens?

Kaplan, Robert D., *Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus* (Random, 2000)

This will not be a long review. There is a similarity to Robert Kaplan's books, and my reviews of his other books will suffice for additional detail.

Having said that, I will also say that this book continues an excellent pattern of combining prior reading of history, a solid understanding of geography, and a gift for drawing out from an astonishing diversity of individuals, those little details that may bore in the aggregate but are priceless when endured and absorbed.

He seems to have missed the genocide against the Tatars, but perhaps that was hidden from him.

There is one huge gem, at least for me, in this book, and that is his assessment of the potential for a new schism between Western and Eastern Christianity, and how that must be avoided at all costs. This one sentence and the surrounding text is alone worth the price of the book.

Kaplan, Robert D., *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy* (Random House, 1996)

If you ever wondered why the U.S. Intelligence Community tries so desperately to keep its annual budget secret from Congress and the citizens, this book might provide a clue: one man, very well-grounded in historical and contextual reading, is capable of reporting extremely valuable insights that neither a \$30 billion a year spy world nor a \$3 billion a year diplomatic community seem capable of either comprehending or communicating to the public.

Robert D. Kaplan gets three big things right: he studies history before visiting; he is firmly grounded in a geographical or geophysical appreciation of every situation; and he travels on foot and at the lowest common level. The world he sees and reports on is

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

not the world that the pampered and sheltered diplomats, businessmen, and journalists see or understand.

Reading Kaplan is a treat for anyone who takes the rest of the world and America's naiveté with some seriousness. He is correct when he posits a new World War, "a protracted struggle between ourselves and the demons of crime, population pressure, environmental degradation, disease, and culture conflict."

He is at his best when mixing his historical reading with his personal intellect and observations, to arrive at conclusions that contradict conventional wisdom—for instance, his appreciation of Iran as a structured and stable society, and of Turkey as the next mega-power and the keeper of the Islamic flame. His extremely sharp observations about Saudi Arabia as the hidden enemy of the United States of America are very very provocative, especially when one realizes that we are providing them with an extremely generous military and economic program at U.S. taxpayer expense. Saudi funding of terrorism, including Bin Laden, is increasingly documented in the public domain, and U.S. taxpayers need to begin questioning U.S. policy in this specific area.

This personal travel narrative is invaluable as a means of contemplating the realities of nations that exist (e.g. the Kurds) alongside states that continue to persecute and deny these nations a right to live. Although another hundred pages follow, the real end of the book is on page 336 where he discusses a living map of the future world, one that is constantly changing and that reflects several realities—a reality of overlapping group identities such as those of language and economic class; a reality of legal boundaries and overlapping and sometimes conflicting cultural boundaries; a reality of power distributed and often shared openly between police, criminals, terrorists, white-collar thieves, and politicians; and a reality of population growth, disease, refugee migrations and genocide; as well as soil and water scarcity.

His bibliography is quite worthwhile, and helps make his personal reporting even more valuable. I have but one disappointment, and that is that this prolific author and policy commentator, a major force (indeed, the only continuous voice on foreign policy matters for *The Atlantic Monthly*), has failed to provide a concluding section that pulls it all together in an executive briefing suitable for policy consideration. There are many valuable lessons and observations in this book, I recommend it highly, but I fear that the policy-makers who most desperately need to be educated will never, ever actually read the book.

Klare, Michael T., *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (Metropolitan, 2001)

This is a very thoughtful and well-documented book that has been 20 years in the making—the author is on record as having discussed water wars in 1980, and should be credited with anticipating the relationship between natural resources, ethnic conflict, and great power discomfort well before the pack.

He covers oil in particular, energy, and in more general terms, water, minerals, and timber. His footnotes are quite satisfactory and strike a very fine balance--unusually good--between policy, military, and academic or industry sources. Sadly, I believe that this book, as with Laurie Garrett's book on the collapse of public health, will be ignored by the Administration, which appears to have decided that real war is only between states, that energy is something to be increased, not moderated in use, and that real men do not concern themselves with ethnic conflict, small wars, or the Third World.

As I reflect on this book, and its deep discussion of the details of existing and potential resources wars (it includes a very fine illustrative appendix of oil and natural gas conflicts, all current), I contemplate both my disappointment that the author and publisher did not choose to do more with geospatial visualization--a fold out map of the world with all the points plotted in color would have been an extraordinary value--and the immediate potential value of adding the knowledge represented by this book on resources and the Garrett book on public health threats—to the *World Conflict & Human Rights Map 2000* published by PIOOM at Leiden University in The Netherlands.

What I really like about this book is its relevance, its authority, its utility. What I find frustrating about this book is that it is, like all books, an isolated fragment of knowledge that cannot easily be integrated and visualized. How helpful it would be, if US voters could see a geographic depiction of the world showing all that the author of this excellent work is trying to communicate, and on the same geographic depiction, see the military dollars versus the economic assistance dollars that the U.S. is or is not investing. The results would be shocking and could lead to political action as the community level, for what is clear to me from this book is that there is a huge disconnect between the real threat, our national security policies, and how we actually spend our foreign affairs, defense, and trade dollars from the taxpayers' pockets.

A trillion dollar tax cut, or a trillion dollar investment in deterrence through investments in natural resource stabilization and extension? Which would be of more lasting value to the seventh generation of our children? The author does not comment--one is left to read between the lines.

Marshall, Monty, *Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999)

This book is deeply important to our future, for it is the first over-all comprehensive look at the global reality of failed states, spreading non-state violence, and the emergence of complex emergencies where 90% of the casualties are civilian.

Drawing on a wide-variety of databases and field studies around the globe, the author focuses the societal groups and their migration toward protracted violence in the context of failed states. He puts forward a theory on the diffusion of insecurity, how this leads to arrested development, and why, for very practical reasons, the more developed nations must devise new means of structured and focused intervention leading to the creation of peace.

The author does not advocate intervention willy-nilly—if anything, he joins Jessica Matthews, William Shawcross, and others in pointing out that incompetent interventions actually make matters worse—external actors and external resources have a way of prolonging internal conflicts rather than resolving them. Military forces, the ones most often used, are also the least effective—new combinations and new capabilities are needed.

He is especially effective at criticizing, in a very gracious but pointed manner, the institutionalist and realist schools that have never moved beyond sovereign states, political boundaries, conventional militaries, and a Euro-centric perspective.

He is much better than Fukiyama at dealing with reality, and the equal of Huntington in considering cultural clashes rooted in social identities and real-world resource difficulties.

I found two major observations in this work that merit broad repetition:

First, and the author gives due credit to the path-finding work of Ted Gurr and the Minorities at Risk project, there is an established pattern, world-wide, in which violent political action is always preceded by a period of nonviolent activity that was either ignored or repressed.

Second, once violence has been inculcated into a social group as the normative condition, there is a distinct loss of capacity to engage in meaningful exchanges, negotiation, etcetera. Outcomes become irrelevant, and as Ralph Peters has pointed out

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

so often, war and conflict become the *raison d'être* rather than any kind of rational means to a political end.

Throughout the book, and worthy of a focused chapter or future article, there are comments on data, information, and analysis that are extremely valuable when embraced and integrated. Apart from numerous observations on the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on sub-state violence when the state is the normal analytical unit and also the repressor of information; the author has insights into how models drive what data is visible, collected, or accepted; and how the social units in conflict themselves become filters, channels, or barriers to communication.

The concluding recommendations for systemic policy call for a global arms moratorium; a migration from regional collective security arrangements to global normative security arrangements including an international stand-alone range of capabilities for monitoring, facilitating, and imposing non-violent conflict resolution; a general proscription of force by any nation or social group; regional associations or what he called a "complex federalism"; a decentralization of systemic authority, which really means a reduction of U.S. impositions in favor of localized influences with greater legitimacy; and a criminalization of individual acts of violence within war--the ending of war (or state sovereign direction) as an excuse for individual acts of violence and depravity.

If I had one criticism of the book--and in no way does this undermine the brilliance and utility of the work itself--it is that it does not include, either as a preface or as an appendix, a summary of the actual "state of the world" such as the author has helped create in the World Conflict and Human Rights Map project out of Leiden University (PIOOM). A description and enumeration of the 29 complex emergencies, 67 countries with hundreds of thousands of refugees, 59 countries with plagues and epidemics, 27 countries with massive famine--as well as the torture, child soldiers, and other distinct manifestations of the sub-state instability the author studies so well--would have helped the non-academic and policy readers to better grasp the urgent vitality of this seminal work.

The author and his insights deserve the very highest levels of attention, for all that he has done here is call into question the out-dated political science concepts and the policies--including the defense acquisition and force structure policies--of every so-called modern nation. The globe is burning, every President and Prime Minister is fiddling, and the author documents very clearly that this fire is headed straight for our homeland.

Ngemi , Yaa-Lengi M., *Genocide in the Congo, Zaire: In the Name of Bill Clinton, and of the Paris Club, and of the Mining Conglomerates, So It Is* (iUniverse.com, 2000)

This book is a perfect complement to the more scholarly and policy-oriented book by John Heidenrich on *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen* (reviewed in this section). I strongly recommend that both books be bought and read at the same time.

This book is a cry from the heart of a Congolese, it has explicit photographs, and you can get through it in half an hour--what you see and feel will be with you for the rest of your life.

It is a good thing when a book of this utility and importance can make its way from the lower depths of Africa and--with the help of amazon--into the mainstream world where anyone can learn of its availability. This is not a book that will be found in libraries or used in classrooms--it is a book that is at once so inexpensive and so horrifying, that any adult who in any way cares about the future of the international community, should buy it....at the same time that they get the Heidenrich book. Two men, world's apart, with one mind and the same broken heart.

Pelton, Robert Young, *The World's Most Dangerous Places* (Harper, 2000)

Robert Young Pelton is thoughtful and provocative. He has written an extraordinary book that ordinary people will take to be a sensationalist travel guide, while real experts scrutinize every page for the hard truths about the real world that neither the CIA nor the media report.

Unlike clandestine case officers and normal foreign service officers, all of them confined to capital cities and/or relying on third party reporting, Robert Young Pelton actually goes to the scene of the fighting, the scene of the butchery, the scene of the grand thefts, and unlike all these so-called authoritative sources, he actually has had eyeballs on the targets and boots in the mud.

I have learned two important lessons from this book, and from its author Robert Young Pelton:

First, trust no source that has not actually been there. He is not the first to point out that most journalists are "hotel warriors", but his veracity, courage, and insights provide

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

compelling evidence of what journalism could be if it were done properly. Government sources are even worse--it was not until I heard him speak candidly about certain situations that I realized that most of our Embassy reporting--both secret and open--is largely worthless because it is third hand, not direct.

Second, I have learned from this book and the author that sometimes the most important reason for visiting a war zone is to learn about what is NOT happening. His accounts of Chechnya, and his personal first-hand testimony that the Russians were terrorizing their Muslims in the *absence* of any uprising or provocation, are very disturbing. His books offers other accounts of internal terrorism that are being officially ignored by the U.S. Government, and I am most impressed by the value of his work as an alternative source of "national intelligence" and "ground truth".

There are a number of very important works now available to the public on the major threats to any country's national security, and most of them are as unconventional as this one--Laurie Garrett on public health, Marq de Villiers on Water, Joe Thornton on chlorine-based industry and the environment--and some, like Robert D. Kaplan's books on his personal travels, are moving and inspiring reflections on reality as few in the Western world could understand it--but Robert Young Pelton is in my own mind the most structured, the most competent, the most truthful, and hence the most valuable reporter of fact on the world's most dangerous places.

What most readers may not realize until they read this book is that one does not have to travel to these places to be threatened by them--what is happening there today, and what the U.S. government does or does not do about developments in these places, today, will haunt this generation and many generations to follow. I strongly recommend this book to anyone who cares to contemplate the real world right now.

Petterson, Donald, *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe* (Westview, 1999)

When compared to the other book on Sudan that I read at the same time, *White Nile, Black Blood: War, Leadership, and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala*, this book, while worth reviewing, is extremely disappointing. If this is the best our Department of State can do--if this bland account of endless repetitive meetings and meaningless demarches is the best that America can do in addressing the deep challenges of Sudan--then we need a whole new State Department.

It struck me immediately, as I worked through the book, that it is the diary of someone who means well, but lacks historical and cultural contextual knowledge. Not only are there no references to learned studies, but the short-sighted thesis of the author is

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

summed up on page 136: "The cumulative combination of factors putting Sudan in such a bad light (with the U.S. Government) began with the military takeover in July 1989." When one contrasts this statement--this shallow perception--with the rich 200-year survey provided by *White Nile, Black Blood*, one can only feel a deep sadness for the isolation of our foreign service from the larger reality of the real world.

Early on in the book the author-ambassador confesses to not knowing Arabic and to having had six months training in Arabic before reporting. This demonstrates two things clearly: first, that the Department of State is incompetent in Arabic affairs if it does not have legions of qualified officers fluent in Arabic from whom it can select an Ambassador and second, that obviously the language is not considered critical to the job if six months will suffice--just enough to get to the toilet, not enough to accept directions across town.

This book is a travel diary. I have annotated page 148 with the note: "substitutes travel for thinking." There is no analysis in this book, no grasp of history, no real grip on the regional realities (other than a passing reference to the fact that water is going to be a cause of war in the future--something well covered in Marq de Villiers *WATER: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource*. Neither de Villiers nor Michael Klare's *RESOURCE WARS: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* are cited by this book.)

At the very end there was a tiny glimmer of hope as the author began a chapter on working with the United Nations, and made it clear that the UN practice of allowing each of its agencies to appoint independent ambassadors to the same country, rather than subordinating all UN agencies to a single UN ambassador, was a big part of their problem. After three paragraphs, it became clear there was nothing else to be had from this chapter. I have the note "This is not a serious book."

At one point in the book the author observes that neither Congress nor the U.S. public would allow the Administration to be more pro-active in Sudan. It immediately occurred to me that if this is true, *ergo* Department of State has failed miserably, ignominiously, at informing the U.S. public of the true situation in Sudan, for any informed citizen would be sure to support extremely aggressive action against the (northern) Sudan despots and supporters of terrorism and genocide.

Shawcross, William, *Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict* (Simon & Schuster, 2000)

This book is serious, scholarly yet down to earth, compassionate, insightful, terribly relevant and most useful to any citizen, overseas practitioner, or policymaker. By the books own rendering, "good will without strength can make things worse." Most

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

compellingly, the author demonstrates both the nuances and the complexities of "peace operations", and the fact that they require at least as much forethought, commitment, and sustainment as combat operations. Food scarcity and dangerous public health are the root symptoms, not the core issues.

The most dangerous element is not the competing sides, but the criminal gangs that emerge to "stoke the fires of nationalism and ethnicity in order to create an environment of fear and vulnerability" (and great profit). At the same time, humanitarianism has become a big part of the problem—we have not yet learned how to distinguish between those conflicts where intervention is warranted (e.g. massive genocide campaigns) and those where internal conflicts need to be settled internally. In feeding the competing parties, we are both prolonging the conflict, and giving rise to criminal organizations that learn to leverage both the on-going conflict and the incoming relief supplies. Perhaps more troubling, there appears to be a clear double-standard—whether deliberate or circumstantial—between attempts to bring order to the white western or Arab fringe countries and what appears to be callous indifference to black African and distant Asian turmoil that includes hundreds of thousands victim to genocide and tens of thousands victim to living amputation, mutilation, and rape.

When all is said and done, and these are my conclusions from reading this excellent work,

- 1) there is no international intelligence system in place suitable to providing both the global coverage and public education needed to mobilize and sustain multi-national peacekeeping coalitions;
- 2) the United Nations is not structured, funded, nor capable of carrying out disciplined effective peacekeeping operations, and the contributing nations are unreliable in how and when they will provide incremental assistance;
- 3) we still have a long way to go in devising new concepts, doctrines, and technologies and programs for effectively integrating and applying preventive diplomacy, transformed defense, transnational law enforcement, and public services (water, food, health and education) in a manner that furthers regionally-based peace and prosperity instead of feeding the fires of local unrest.

Schwartau, Winn, *CYBERSHOCK: Surviving Hackers, Phreakers, Identity Thieves, Internet Terrorists and Weapons of Mass Disruption* (Thunder's Mouth Press, 2000)

There will be those quick to trash this book as sensationalist, and they are partly right. What most people, including the critics, do not realize is that Winn Schwartau went out on a limb in the late 1980's and early 1990's and is *the* primary reason Congress got concerned enough about these issues to demand a Critical Infrastructure Protection program funded at over \$1B--it was Winn, not others quick to claim the line, that testified to Congress about an "electronic Pearl Harbor" on 24 June 1991. This book is unabashedly populist and seeks to make this very complex threat entertaining and understandable, and for that reason alone it is worth the time to consider. There are many other serious books for engineers, this is the one for anyone at all from housewife to student to executive. Great airplane book, won't save the world, but will certainly increase your consciousness across the board.

Equally good are two earlier books by the same author, *Terminal Compromise* and *INFORMATION WARFARE: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway*. The first is a novel of how terrorists might attack America using only electronic means, while the second is the original book on information warfare that finally got Washington to treat this topic seriously.

Schwartau, Winn, *Pearl Harbor Dot Com* (Interpact, 2002)

This book is based on a *non-fiction* manuscript about U.S. vulnerabilities to electronic that was so hot that the author's lawyers insisted he turn it into a novel to avoid liability.

It is absolutely superb and written by one of the most authoritative persons around. Unlike most academic and industry security specialists, the author has from the very beginning understood, respected, and been in touch with the elite hackers who worked very hard in the 1980's to expose the outrageously vulnerable electronic systems used by our financial, transportation, power, and communications industries.

In my view, books like this as well as the non-fiction books such as *Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway* have been vital elements in educating consumers, stockholders, and voters. If you want to know just how vulnerable your bank account is, read this book.

I won't reveal the surprise ending, but will say that it is absolutely a shocker, and totally credible.

Spaulding, Jay and Stephanie Beswick (eds.), *White Nile, Black Blood: War, Leadership, and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala* (Red Sea, 1999)

I read this book at the same time that I read the quasi-official story on Sudan (Donald Petterson's *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe*, reviewed in this section) and I have to say, not only is this collection of edited articles--and the editorial summary--quite pleasing in its professional grasp of history, its depth, its coverage of the core issues in a comprehensive and actionable way--but it also causes me grave anguish when I compare it to what can only be described as a self-centered mediocre State Department memoir.

This is good solid stuff. It is especially helpful in setting aside the superficial views that ethnic conflict or European-drawn borders are the root of Sudan's internal conflict issues, and it cuts to chase: "it's about wealth, simpleton!".

The history of Sudan is well-drawn out, with the bottom line being that the southerners and their especially rich territory have been constantly besieged and ravished by the northern elite. The only time of peace in the 200-year-war has been when the British imposed that peace, and there is a suggestive air about that finding.

The varied discussions of genocide and "cultural cleansing", including the forced rape of the women in the groups being eradicated, and the use of famine to kill two million, are dismaying in the extreme.

"Ecology and economics provide controlling metaphors." This is an excellent summary of the book.

Also helpful is the book's coverage of the relations between Egypt and Sudan (both historical and current), the explicit (northern) Sudanese sponsorship of terrorism and hosting of many Islamic and other terrorist groups within its territory, and the general references to the varying influences of the Turks, the British, and the missionaries.

This is a serious book, by serious people, and it does the Sudan issues full justice. One puts the book down feeling somewhat aghast at the ignorance of the U.S. government, the incapacity of the United Nations, and the blatant malevolence of the northern Sudanese predators. This book is strongly recommended for any person who wonders about their government's competence and compassion. Sudan is a cancer, not just within Africa, but within the larger world, and the continued acceptance of the genocide and slavery and related plagues that characterize this place call into question the legitimacy, the ethics, the accountability, of all Western governments.

Corporate Corruption & Irresponsibility

Czech, Brian, *Shoveling Fuel for a Runaway Train: Errant Economists, Shameful Spenders, and a Plan to Stop Them All* (University of California, 2000)

There are some very harsh truths in this book, in which a very thoughtful Conservation Biologist takes on the very hard challenge of defining a political and economic model that is survivable.

From his early doctrine of "competitive exclusion" (one species can benefit only at the expense of others) to his methodical and progressive dismantling of economic growth as an unquestioned political goal, of the prevailing economic theories as being totally insane (efficiency does not prevent the depletion of natural capital from a limited earth), to his sensible and moral and provocative outlining of the ecological economics (or the economics of environmental survival), this is a book that teaches and this is a man I would trust to counsel a future President....

This book will appeal to anyone who considers himself or herself a Cultural Creative, and I hope it appeals to the "silent majority" that could yet make a difference in "political economy." Whether we save the Earth for future generations boils down to this: are the citizens of the various nations, the employees of the various corporations, prepared to think for themselves? Are they prepared to join the global grid of free thinkers and cyber-advocates that are finding that the Internet is the lever that will move the world and empower the people once again? The author argues, in a compelling, academically sound and morally encouraging way, that America above all nations finds itself in a new civil war, a war between the "liquidating class" and the "steady state" class.

Besides citizens, this book will provoke and enlighten venture fund managers, political action campaign managers, and leaders of any organization. Others have certainly been down this road, the Club of Rome being especially noteworthy as an early attempt to establish trade-off values, but I believe this gentle, capable professional (with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Division of Refugees) has written a timely book that is in its own way the "Silent Spring" of this generation. Perhaps more to the point, he makes it clear that all environmental issues, all economic issues, are inherently political, and we the voters have a choice in every election: between the candidate indebted to corporate carpetbaggers, and the candidate beholden to the people.

Eichenwald, Kurt, *The Informant: A True Story* (Broadway, 2000)

The level of detail in this book is extraordinary, as is the meticulous documentation of sources. Even the index is surprising in both its presence and its quality.

A few little gems jump out at me from all the detail:

- 1) Corporate corruption appears to not only be routine, but massive among more industries and companies than we might believe.
- 2) The government does actually try to regulate and prosecute, but this is both very expensive, and appears to result in the public *not* becoming conscious of the mis-deeds--no massive boycott, for example, seems to result.
- 3) The executives that conspire to cheat the public are remarkably ignorant. I was stunned to read how one of the principals in this story fell victim to what I thought was a really well-known Nigerian scam for defrauding numerous Americans of tens of thousands of dollars each, claiming that it will "release" millions in hijacked funds from the national bank.
- 4) The government often mistreats its own people. I was especially troubled, having seen employee abuse at other national agencies, when the book related how a senior FBI agent was not allowed to transfer--and save his mental health--because of his boss's selfish interests.
- 5) Lastly, I was left with the impression that there is an elaborate dance that goes on between the very expensive top law firms that protect corporate criminals, and the government. While the government seems to have worked hard on this one, the general impression that is left is that the normal drill when the public has been defrauded of hundreds of millions of dollars, is for the culprits to plead "no contest" and agree not to do it again--in return for token fines and guaranteed immunity.

At the end of the book I was left feeling dismayed at the depth and breadth of corporate corruption, at the general inadequacy of government in keeping the private sector economy honest, and at the lack of alternative public advocacy devices for truly focusing public spotlights such that fair pricing and fair practices are widely understood and enforced by customers, not just under-funded over-worked oversight bodies.

Although the book is very very long at 629 pages, I would have liked to see an author's epilogue titled "What Is To Be Done?" The author of this book can rightly claim to be among a select few intimately familiar with this problem in a manner no book by itself

could communicate, and so a public policy analysis, some sort of prescription, would have been a valuable postscript to this excellent, really superior, investigative report.

Mitchell, Lawrence E., *Corporate Irresponsibility: America's Newest Export* (Yale, 2001)

I just realized this is the third book by a lawyer I have absorbed in this month's reading, and that is somehow a scary thought. If lawyers are starting to write popular reformist tracts against unfettered capitalism and the export of the flawed U.S. approach to capitalism, something very interesting must be happening in the dark recesses of our national mind.

This is not an easy book to read but on balance it is a very important book and one that would appear to be essential to any discussion of how we might reform the relationship between the federal government with its 1950's concepts and regulations, corporations with their secularist and short-term profit and liquidation notions, and the people who ultimately are both the foundation and the beneficiaries (or losers) within the political economy of the nation and the world.

The author lays out, from a business law perspective, all the legal and financial reasons why our corporate practices today sacrifice the long-term perspective and the creation of aggregate value, in favor of short-term profit-taking. He makes a number of suggestions for improvement.

Toward the end of the book, citing Lipsett but adding his own observations, he digs deep and summarizes our corporate culture as one that threatens traditional forms of community and morality (Lipsett), while increasingly dominating—undermining—foreign governments and cultures. Elsewhere in the book the stunning failure of our form of capitalism in selected countries is explored.

Although there are adequate notes, there is no bibliography and the index is extraordinarily mediocre—not containing, for example, the references in the book to oversight, political, or regulation. One star is deducted for this failure by the publisher to treat the book's content seriously.

Soros, George, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered* (Public Affairs, 1998)

I think George Soros and Robert Kaplan, as well as others that are starting to realize that the opposite of virtue is not vice but rather virtue carried to an extreme (Jim Fox said it first, at least in this era), are on to something.

Although economists of great traditional standing (Robert Samuelson comes to mind) have been very quick to denigrate, even trash, the ideas of George Soros, my personal reaction, and my own reading of 225 or so books that I have reviewed for Amazon, suggests that he is right on target. Unfettered capitalism and corporate consumerism is killing us, and is part of the problem between Western secularism and Islamic fundamentalism--we don't have a model for sustainable faith-based prosperity they can buy into (I am mindful of Bernard Lewis's *What Went Wrong* thesis).

Most recently, in *The Washington Post* of 24 February 2002, George Soros is quoted as saying, "We can't be successful in fighting terrorism unless we fight that other axis of evil--poverty, disease and ignorance." Right on. Both *The Future of Life* and *The Future of Ideas* (see my reviews of those titles), and many other books now coming together in a critical mass, support basic propositions about the failure of politics, the erosion of moral contexts, and the dangers of capitalism upon public health, the environment, and the social fabric.

I would normally have rated this book with 4 stars for its lack of reference to others, but in light of the importance of the argument that George Soros makes, and the value of his own unique experiences bridging the worlds of poverty and wealth, American and Eastern European challenges and biases, I have to give this a 5--and wait to see our academic economists do better.

Environment & Public Health

Cook, Robin, *TOXIN* (Penguin, 1999)

If you're the type of person that does not have the time to read Laurie Garrett's *BETRAYAL OF TRUST: The Collapse of Global Public Health* (Hyperion, 2000), at 754 pages a real challenge, then this book, and the other books in the series, are a very worthwhile means of exploring real truths in an engrossing manner. The fact of the matter is that we are creating an increasingly dangerous environment for ourselves, with cross-contamination, increasingly resistant strains of difficult to diagnose diseases,

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

and so on. The naive will lambaste the book for scare-mongering, and they will be wrong--if this book gets you through an airline flight, or an afternoon, and causes you to think just a tiny bit about the reality that we can no longer trust our government to protect the food supply and preparation process, and to think just a tiny bit about how you might protect your children from inadequate "due diligence" by the food service industry, then you will be richly rewarded. The author himself recommends the non-fiction book by Nicols Fox, *SPOILED: What is Happening to Our Food Supply and Why We Are Increasingly at Risk* (Basic Books, 1997 or Penguin, 1998). The bottom line is that this novel is for serious people, and chillingly worthwhile for those who like to learn while being entertained.

De Villiers, Marq, *WATER: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource* (Houghton Mifflin, 2000)

I rank this book as being among the top ten I have read in the decade, for the combined reason that its topic concerns our survival, and its author has done a superior job of integrating both scholarly research (with full credit to those upon whose work he builds) and what must be a unique background of actually having traveled to the specific desolate areas that comprise the heart of this book—from the Aral Sea

"the exposed seabed, now over 28,000 square kilometers, became a stew of salt, pesticide residues, and toxic chemicals; the strong winds in the region pick up more than 40 million tons of these poisonous sediments each year, and the contaminated dust storms that follow have caused the incidence of respiratory illnesses and cancers to explode."

to the heart of China

"According to China's own figures, between 1983 and 1990 the number of cities short of water tripled to three hundred, almost half the cities in the country; those whose problem was described as 'serious' rose from forty to one hundred."

The author provides a thoughtful and well-structured look at every corner of the world, with special emphasis on the Middle East, the Tigris-Euphrates System, the Nile, the Americas, and China; and at the main human factors destroying our global water system:

- pollution,

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

- dams (that silt up and prevent nutrients from going downstream or flooding from rejuvenating the lower lands),
- irrigation (leading to salination such that hundreds of thousands of acres are now infertile and being taken out of production),
- over-engineering, and
- excessive water mining from aquifers, which are in serious danger of drying up in key areas in the US as well as overseas within the next twenty years.

The author provides a balanced and well-documented view overall. His final chapter on solutions explores conservation, technical, and political options.

Two statements leapt off the page:

- first, that it is the average person, unaware of the fragility of our water system, that is doing the most damage, not the corporations or mega-farms; and
- second, that for the price of one military ship or equipped unit (\$100 million), one can desalinate 100 million cubic meters of water.

The bottom line is clear: we are close to a tipping point toward catastrophe but solution are still within our grasp, and they require, not world government, but a virtual world system that permits the integrated management of all aspects of water demand as well supply. This book should be required reading for every college student and every executive and every government employee at local, state, and federal levels; and every citizen.

Fagan, Brian M., *Floods, Famines, and Emperors: El Nino and the Fate of Civilizations* (HarperCollins, 2000)

This book is an excellent complement to David Key's book on *Catastrophe* (reviewed in this section), and I found it a worthwhile fast read.

It has one really big core idea that ties environmental, political, economic, and cultural readings together--it explores the inter-relationship between sustainability of any given society within the constraints of the time and the legitimacy of the government or other form of political organization.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Two things appear to help: long-term vision on the part of the leader, and whatever it takes to maintain the people's faith in their leadership.

The author concludes with an overview of where we stand today, and draws attention to the especially dangerous combination of overpopulation, global warming, and rapid climate changes occurring all at once.

For me, this book combined an overview of how seriously we must take ocean currents and related climate changes; and how important it is that our leaders understand these issues and take long-term views that add stability and sustainability in the face of varying challenges to our well-being.

Garrett, Laurie, *BETRAYAL OF TRUST: The Collapse of Global Public Health* (Hyperion, 2000)

It took me over a month to do justice to this book, and I have taken into account the thoughts of other reviewers. A book of this importance would indeed have benefited from an international advisory board of public health, medical, insurance, and policy experts; it would certainly have benefited from greater structure, firmer editing, and a foreword by someone like a former Surgeon General of the United States.

As it is, it appears to have overcome these deficiencies with hyped-up marketing and sweetheart reviews, and this in some ways counterproductive because this book could have, should have, become a mainstream topic in the Presidential campaign. It failed to do so for several reasons, not least of which is the propensity of both candidates and their advisors to avoid serious thinking, but also because the book is not helpful to a popular understanding of the very real global and domestic threats to the health of our children today and in future generations.

Having said all this, I commend the book for its content. It is worth the effort! There are some very important points that the book brings out, and I will itemize these in order of importance:

- 1) Public health is about detection and prevention, medicine is about remediation. In the long run, investments in public health are vastly cheaper and more effective than after-the-fact medical intervention;
- 2) The insurance industry in the developing world has failed to support public health investments, and in a remarkable collusion with the pharmaceutical, hospital and managed health care industries, has created a very expensive and increasingly

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

ineffective system focused on drugs (to which diseases are increasingly resistant) and hospitals;

- 3) Hospitals are no longer reliable in terms of protecting patients from both error and secondary infection from other patients. People are coming out of hospitals, in many cases, with more diseases than when they went in;
- 4) The health of our nation depends on the health of all other nations-not only does a collapse of public health in Africa lead to failed states and forced migrations, but it also is but an airline flight away from infecting Kansas;
- 5) Clean drinking water, uninfected food, and good environmental and occupational health conditions are at risk in many parts of the United States and Europe, not only in Russia and the rest of the world;
- 6) The United Nations, and the World Health Organization in particular, are in disarray and ineffective-in large part because of a lack of support from member nations-at dealing with the public health commons. There is no question but that the author has hit a "home run" in terms of describing the harsh reality of epidemics in India and Africa, the collapse of public health in Russia, the rapid migration of many diseases from Russia through Germany to the rest of Europe and the U.S., and the severe costs in the U.S. of a retreat from the collective good with respect to public health.

Unfortunately, it is a home run hit in isolation, not a game-winning home run, because it fails to drive home, to the only audience that matters-the U.S. voter-exactly what political and economic initiatives are required to achieve three simple objectives:

- 1) re-establish the public health infrastructure in the U.S.;
- 2) redirect the entire health care industry toward preventive measures-including water and food quality controls-instead of remedial prescriptions; and
- 3) provide compelling incentives to the rest of the world for cleaning their own house (this presumes that we are able to clean our own first, a very questionable assumption at this point in time).

This is a valuable book, a five in terms of content, a three in terms of execution, and I am glad that I took the time to read it. It provides a wonderful foundation for enjoying, at an intellectual and policy level, the medical and public health novels by Robin Cook.

Helvarg, David, *Blue Frontier: Saving America's Living Seas* (W. H. Freeman, 2001)

This is the worst of several environmental books I have reviewed, largely because its style is too chatty, the type and presentation formats chosen by the editor are terrible and make it difficult to read and enjoy, and there is isn't a single map or chart or table or figure in the entire book. This is a *super book* that got screwed up by the publisher and a lack of decent editorial guidance. It should be fixed in the second edition, and I hope it gets to a second edition. Given the author's clearly superior access to and understanding of the individual personalities and organizational players across America, I am really stunned and disappointed that there is not an appendix to the book listing all of these, with contact information and URLs.

There is so much solid, worthwhile information in this book, including valuable insights in why Western political interests are undermining proper representation of our national oceans, coasts, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in Congress, that I would urge those interested in the oceans (hugely more important to our future than the Amazon or global forestry, just to make the point), to buy this book, suffer its limitations, and ultimately benefit from the wisdom and experience of the author, for whom my respect is unqualified and whole-hearted. In passing, it would probably be helpful if the first thing we all demanded was that EEZ stand for Exclusive Environmental Zone, rather than treating the oceans as a for-profit target area.

There is one other information-related observation I would make that emerged from reading this book: both the United Nations and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are clearly doing heroic and deeply important work vital to the future of the oceans--and they are doing a terrible job of communicating the basic information about the oceans and their work to the larger world of voters and concerned citizens. What really came home to me as I reflected on what to emphasize in this review is that there is a very wide, almost impenetrable, barrier between what the UN and NOAA know, and what is being communicated to the citizens who have the right to know (they paid for that information with their tax dollars) and the need to know and the desire to know. From this I would say that the next big step for those who would seek to save the oceans, is to demand that all UN and US Government information paid for by the taxpayer be put online henceforth, available at no further cost to the public. It is this information, the bullets and beans of the information war between corporate and citizen interests, that will decide the future of the oceans.

Keys, David, *Catastrophe: An Investigation into the Origins of Modern Civilization* (Ballantine, 2000)

The ending is meant to be a surprise, so care must be taken, but this book is really extremely worthwhile to anyone who wants to have their thinking stretched.

It starts with an examination of the Dark Ages (literally) and how the loss of sunlight and all the related catastrophes, from drought and famine followed by flooding and plagues and epidemics, impacted on each continent in turn--including the Islam and Turkish and Jewish dimensions.

This is humbling book, for its grasp of time and the movement of history--in stretches of hundreds of thousands of years--does tend to call into question any human anxiety over current events.

Yet, at the same time, and in keeping with other books reviewed in this series pertaining to the decline of the state (nation) and the environmental situation, the author takes great care to make this sweeping work relevant to today's concerns.

Without revealing the details, I will just say that the way in which this books links cause and effect and new cause and new effect, across many continents, over decades and then centuries and then tens of centuries, provides an excellent foundation for putting everything else in perspective.

Two aspects stand out: the degree to which natural causes of catastrophe lurk within the Earth and are predictable yet taken with enormous complacency because they seem so remote until they actually occur; and the degree to which an established well-organized state (nation) can dramatically reduce the effects of drought, famine, or other disasters if it has planned ahead.

When a recurring catastrophe is known to occur every 600,000 to 700,000 years, and the last occurrence was well into the middle of this period (i.e. we are at 650,000 years), one can ignore it, or ponder our readiness for an imminent recurrence.

Lomborg, Bjorg, *The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World* (Cambridge, 2001)

I rate this book a 5 for effort, a 3 for half-truths, and a 4 over-all. It is a *tour de force* for Lomborg and his students (the latter appear to have done most of the tedious data gathering and basic analysis)---at its best, it provides a severe spanking for environmentalists who get careless with their data and their assertions. At its worst, it

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

provides a semblance of cover for corporate carpet-baggers intent on liquidating what any child can understand is a closed system with limits.

At root, Lomborg is a disciple and blind follower of the paradigm best articulated by Julian Simon, who has himself been discredited here and there by well-educated environmentalists. Lomborg's professionalism and devotion to data are not questioned here—one either shares his paradigm or one does not. It merits comment that there are now several web sites, one of them in Denmark founded by his own colleagues, dedicated to exposing the flawed assumptions and analysis that went into this corporately attractive politically-biased treatise.

This is indeed a brilliant and powerful book, just as a nuclear explosion is brilliant and powerful—and very destructive. However well-intentioned—and I do not question, even applaud, the author's intentions, what we have here is a rather scary combination of fragmentary analysis in depth, combined with a strong belief system that accepts as a starting point the concept that the earth is infinitely renewable and no matter what happens, that is a "natural" turn of events.

I found Brian Czech's *Shoveling Fuel for a Runaway Train* (reviewed in section on Corporate Consumerism & Irresponsibility) much more persuasive and much more useful to the average citizen whose common sense is always under-estimated by the politicians and the corporate patricians who support them. Czech's effort, including a complete chapter refuting Julian Simon's assertions, actually provides a theoretical foundation for resolving the conflict between economic growth and environmental protection.

Just as 9-11 was necessary before a paradigm shift in national security concepts could be achieved (now we know that individuals without weapons can turn our own civilian instruments against us in really damaging ways), I fear that a major environmental—perhaps even a terrorist-environmental event, such as exploding train cars full of chlorine, will be required before citizens as a whole experience the paradigm shift and understand that a) we live in the closed system and b) the burden of proof must be precautionary rather than exploitative.

We are soiling our seed corn and the earth it grows in. Lomborg would have us believe that what we grow within such a paradigm is natural and good—no doubt he has an explanation for the dramatic drops in sperm counts around the world, the troubling increases in asthma across Canada and the East Coast and other nations reeling from antiquated coal-fueled power plants (most of them in the mid-West), and other documented demographic costs to uncontrolled liquidation of the earth.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

I will end with one very significant concession to Lomborg and his adherents: this book, compelling in isolation, makes it clear that nothing less than the full application of the distributed intelligence of the citizenry on a 24/7 basis, will be sufficient to monitor, evaluate, and comprehend the breadth and depth of our attacks on the earth. It is now clear to me that until we have a global web-based community of citizen observers able to enter data at the neighborhood level, using peer-to-peer computing power to analyze distributed data, that the citizens will continue to be at the mercy of corporate computers and political manipulation.

I strongly recommend this book, and Czech's book, as companion volumes framing a much higher level of data and debate that is now beginning.

Novacek, Michael J. (contributing editor), *The Biodiversity Crisis: Losing What Counts* (New Press, 2001)

This is very much an edited work, with most of the entries being but two or three pages in length. All of the authors are world-class proven naturalists and related professionals, and the photography that accompanies each work is top of the line. Of all the biodiversity books available, this one appears to be both the easiest to digest and the most pleasing to the eye.

Biodiversity is an option-generator. More diversity, more options for the future. See also Howard Bloom, *Global Brain*.

Hyperdisease happens more often than we might think, and is very relevant to concerns today about the collapse of public health. See also Laurie Garrett, *Betrayal of Trust*.

Biological elements are being inserted into commercial off the shelf products with unanticipated effects, some of which are damaging to humans. One noteworthy example: Corning added an ingredient to its tubes to make them less brittle, and scientists were finding their experiments infected and contaminated. Corning would not reveal what had changed, claiming it was a trade secret. Independent investigation finally determined that there was a synthetic chemical mimicking estrogen and having the effect of an estrogen injection on the cells exposed to the Corning tubes. Buyers beware--there would appear to be some disclosure standards required!

Mass catastrophes have occurred many times over history, eliminating up to 75% of all living things, with varied outcomes in the millions of years thereafter. See also David Keys, *Catastrophe*, on the most recent, the Dark Ages, circa 535 A.D.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Naturalists and natural science--the study of nature in its own environment, are endangered. Most universities are failing to support this vital area of study, with a result that our understanding of nature stems largely from lab work and computer models that are far removed from reality. See also John Paul Ralston, *Voltaire's Bastards*.

I highly recommend this book. It is both discouraging (so much yet to be done to stabilize the world) and encouraging (many good things being done by many small groups).

Raffensperger, Carolyn and Joel Tickner, *Protecting Public Health & The Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle* (Island Press, 1999)

This is the second best of several books on environmental policy I have reviewed, and it merits careful scrutiny in part because it brings together a number of expert authors and there is in essence "something for everyone" in this edited work. What it lacks, though, is a good summary chapter that lists how the "precautionary principle" should be applied across each of the top ten environmental areas of concern--something that could circulate more easily than the book, and perhaps have a beneficial policy impact at the local, state, and national levels--and I suggest this because the meat of the book is good, it needs an executive summary.

As I was reading through the book, I suddenly realized that many of its contributions could be better understood if one adopted the paradigm from *Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*¹ to see that what they are talking about is the *important* but seemingly non-urgent--when plotted on an XY matrix with gravity on the X and time lapse to irrecoverable disaster on the Y, both public health and the environment are way up and out, while senior issues, crime, and day to day politics are near the double zero--and everything else, including education, taxes, government debt and immigration, is in the loose middle.

The chapter that was most meaningful to me, the one that I think needs to be migrated into business education, international affairs education, science & technology policy education, is by Gordon K. Durnil, Chapter 16, and it deals with "How Much Information Do We Need Before Exercising Precaution." This is a brilliant piece of work that dissects our current environmental policy information collection, processing, and analysis system, and finds it very deceptive, disingenuous, and consequently seriously flawed.

¹ Stephen R. Covey, *Seven Habits of Highly Effective People* (Running Press, 2001).

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

For the best on the environment, read *Pandora's Poison*. For the best on public health, read *Betrayal of Trust*. For a very fine cross-over book that has good chapters from various good people, this is the book to buy and enjoy.

Thornton, Joe, *Pandora's Poison: Chlorine, Health, and a New Environmental Strategy* (MIT, 2000)

This is the best of the several environmentally-oriented books I have reviewed recently, and it offers a double value: not only does it lay out a persuasive social, economic, and political case for abandoning the Risk Paradigm of permissive pollution in favor of an Environmental Paradigm of zero pollution; but it also provides a very fine—really excellent—case for why the current government and industry approaches to information about the environment and threats to the environment are severely flawed. In a nutshell, the current approach divorces "good science" (code for permitting what you can't prove will kill the planet today) from social consciousness and good policy; and the current approach insists on studying risk one contaminant at a time, rather than as a whole.

This book is persuasive; I believe the author has the right stuff and should be consulted on major policy issues. I believe the underlying moral values and intellectual arguments that this book makes, about both science and social policy, should be adopted by the Cultural Creatives and the independent voters of America, and that the recommendations of this book are so serious as to warrant country by country translations and promulgation.

This book is exceptional in that it combines a readable policy essay for the non-technical citizen, with deeply documented technical appendices and notes that support a middle ground series of chapters relating scientific findings to long-term policy issues.

From many small actions come revolutionary change--this book is a necessary brick in the road to environmental reform. The bottom line is clear: every year more and more toxins are building up in our blood streams, and this is going to have an overwhelmingly negative impact on the humanity, capability, and survivability of our great grandchildren three generations down--we have not have grandchildren seven generations down if the insights from this book fail to reach the people, and through the people, the policy makers and legislators.

Wilson, Edward O., *The Future of Life* (Knoph, 2002)

Whereas the author's last really big book, *Consilience*, addressed the integral relationship between the knowledge offered by the humanities and that of the sciences

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

(too often isolated and out of context), this book brings together political economy and nature.

It is more easily readable than his more heavily foot-noted and astonishingly deep earlier work, but all the more valuable for its smooth overview of why life on the rest of the planet matters to the American heartland; why we must deal with the limits of food production and control population (both in terms of numbers and in terms of consumption per capita).

The heart of the book, for me, can be found in three profound numbers—numbers that we must all appreciate:

Value of the Ecosystem/Cost to Replace: \$33 trillion per year in increased Gross National Product (GNP)—and presumably everything would be artificially recreated.

One-Time Cost of Fund for Preserving Nature: \$24-72 billion one-time funding. His numbers vary from \$24 billion (one -time) to preserve 800,000 square kilometers already under protection, to \$28 billion to preserve a (different?) representative sample. The bottom line: for a one-time \$100 billion investment, 25% of what the US spends on its military *every* year, we could, at our own expense, save the world.

Subsidies for Unsound Acts Against Nature: \$2 trillion per year and rising (\$2000 per American alone--this refers to energy, water, deforestation, and agricultural subsidies that encourage and perpetuate unsound acts against nature as well as unneeded exploitation--one example: \$20 billion a year in subsidies for fishing--this is the difference between the actual value of \$100 billion and the lower subsidized revenues of \$80 billion a year).

Wilson's book, in combination with those by Brian Czech and L. O. Stromborg, is in my view a capstone endeavor that moves the environment to the forefront of any intelligent person's agenda. As he concludes, we have entered the century of the environment--we must save it or lose it.

Foreign Affairs and International Security Policy

Boren, David L. and Edward J. Perkins, *Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century* (University of Oklahoma, 1999)

I know of no finer collection of relevant views on our current and prospective foreign policy challenges. In the foreword to the book, William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then Ambassador to the Court of Saint James, observes that "A reappreciation of government is also in order." He clearly articulates both the range of challenges facing us (most of them non-military in nature), and the disconnect between how we organize our government and how we need to successfully engage. His bottom line is clear: we are not spending enough on the varied elements of national security, with special emphasis on a severely under-funded and under-manned diplomatic service.

From Gaddis Smith and Walter Mondale to Sam Nunn and Robert Oakley, from David Gergen to David Abshire to David Boren, from Kissinger to Brzezinski to Kirkpatrick, in combination with a whole host of lesser known but equally talented practitioners, capped off by comments from five Directors of Central Intelligence, this book sets a standard for organized high quality reflection on the future of U.S. foreign policy.

Most interestingly, there is general consensus with David Abshire's view that we are in a strategic interregnum, and still lacking for a policy paradigm within which to orchestrate our varied efforts to define and further our vital interests.

David Gergen clearly articulates the shortfalls in our national educational, media, and political patterns that leave the vast majority of Americans ignorant of our foreign interests and unsupportive of the need for proactive engagement abroad. Reading this book, I could not help but feel that our national educational system is in crisis, and we need both a wake-up call and a consequent national investment program such as occurred after the first Sputnik launch.

David Boren is clearly a decade or more ahead of most current commentators in his call for a new paradigm, for a new analytical framework, for the internationalization of American education across the board. I am reminded of the quotation from early America: "A Nation's best defense is an educated citizenry." Interestingly, he cites Daniel Boorstein's caution that we must not confuse information with knowledge, and in the next sentence notes: "I watched during my term as chairman of the Senate

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Intelligence Committee while the CIA greatly increased its information, its raw data, but became overwhelmed and unable to separate the important from the unimportant."

I would itemize just a few of the many, many useful insights that this book offers:

- 1) Diplomacy is the sum total of familiarity with the role, knowledge of the component parts of the overall national security policy, and the ability to design and implement comprehensive policies that achieve the national objectives;
- 2) Politicians and policy-makers are losing the ability to think objectively and act with conviction...they are too dependent on short-term domestic polling and opinion;
- 3) (Quoting Donald Kegan): Power without the willingness to use it does not contribute to world peace;
- 4) We must strengthen the domestic roots of national power if we are to have a sound strategy;
- 5) Future of U.S. education and strength of U.S. family unit will quite simply determine whether U.S. can meet the economic challenges of the 21st Century;
- 6) Our domestic insecurity and domestic violence-and resulting foreign perceptions and disrespect for our competence at home-reduce our effectiveness overseas;
- 7) U.S. is its own worst enemy, with declining attention to foreign policy matters;
- 8) Weapons of mass destruction are our only substantive vital interest today;
- 9) Hunger, pestilence, and refugees within Africa will affect all nations;
- 10) Corruption has replaced guerrilla movements as the principal threat to democratic governance;
- 11) Commerce rather than conflict will be the primary concern of 21st century foreign policy;
- 12) The environment joins trade and commerce as an essential objective for foreign policy;
- 13) Long-term non-military challenges, and especially global financial markets, require refocusing of our security perspectives;

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

- 14) Asia will edge out Europe as our primary trading partner;
- 15) China in Asia and Turkey in the West are linch-pin nations;
- 16) NATO will survive but we must take care not to threaten Russia;
- 17) The UN is not very effective at peacekeeping operations—it is best confined to idea exchanges;
- 18) Our military is over-extended and under-funded but still the best in the world;
- 19) For the cost of one battalion or one expensive piece of military equipment, one thousand new Foreign Service officers could be added toward preventive diplomacy;
- 20) Lessons from the Roman empire: its decline results in part from a loss of contact with its own heartlands, a progressive distancing of the elite from the populace, the elevation of the military machine to the summit of the power hierarchy, and blindness in perceiving the emergence of societies motivated by nationalism or new religious ideologies; and
- 21) We may need a new National Security Act.

If I had one small critical comment on the book it would be one of concern—concern that these great statesmen and scholars appear—even while noting that defense is under-capitalized—to take U.S. military competence at face value. I perceive a really surprising assumption across a number of otherwise brilliant contributions to the effect that we do indeed have all that we need in the way of information dominance, precision firepower, and global mobility (strategic lift plus forward presence) —we just need to use it with greater discretion. I do not believe this to be the case. I believe—and the Aspin-Brown Commission so stated—that we lack effective access to the vast range of global multi-lingual open sources; that our commitment to precision munitions is both unaffordable and ineffective (we ran out in 8 days in the Gulf, in 3 days in Kosovo); and that we fail terribly with respect to mobility—naval forces are generally 4-6 days from anywhere, rather than the necessary 24-48 hours. This book is a very fine starting point for the national dialogue that must take place in 2001 regarding our new national security strategy.

Crevelde, Martin van, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge, 1999)

Anything Martin van Crevelde writes is a five, and this book is as good as history can get. His notes are world-class, including a highly relevant note in the final chapter, to wit, that according to Soviet General Lebed's 1997 public statement that, "out of 100 suitcase-sized nuclear bombs manufactured for the Soviet Union's special forces, two-thirds could no longer be accounted for."

To begin with, van Crevelde damns the state for its consistent increase of taxes and its decrease in public services. The state has become, in a word, incompetent and archaic--its grossly over-funded militaries are increasingly helpless in the face of covert and guerrilla violence, at the same time that states are spending more and more on police forces and less and less on a rapidly growing politically deprived disenfranchised underclass.

He ends, as a historical purist, without making recommendations for change. Indeed, he quotes Mao Tse Tung, "The sun will keep rising, trees will keep growing, and women will keep having children."

In many ways van Crevelde's book serves as a capstone to the fifty or so books I have reviewed in the past year, most of them about strategy, threat, intelligence, and the so-called revolution in military affairs, for what I take from this work is that the state does have an extremely important role to play in assuring the common security and prosperity of the people, and we abandon the state at our own peril.

Every nation, but especially the most prosperous nations that have allowed virtually out of control immigration and set no real standards for citizenship, must very carefully examine its policies and premises, both with regard to what constitutes citizenship and loyalty, and what services it must offer to preserve and protect the commonwealth.

I am told that the FBI was prevented from searching the homes of several of the suspects in the weeks prior to the 11 September attacks, because we have granted to our visitors--illegal as well as legal--all those rights that might better be reserved for proven citizens. Van Crevelde's work is not, as some might take it, the death knell for the state, but rather the bath of cold water for the statesmen--and for those citizens who care to instruct their politicians on our demand for renewed focus on resurrecting the connection between citizenship, taxation, representation, and security.

Hoge, James F. Jr. and Fareed Zakaria, *The American Encounter: The United States and the Making of the Modern World* (Basic Books, 1997)

This compilation of the "best of the best" articles from the journal *Foreign Affairs* is a real gem that is especially relevant today as America continues to neglect its international responsibilities and certain Senators and Congressman have the ignorant temerity to brag that they don't own nor need an American passport. The conclusion of the July 1932 article by Edwin F. Gay, "The Great Depression", is instructive: "The world war affirmed the international political responsibilities of the United States; the world depression demonstrates the economic interdependence of the United States with other states. It cannot be a hermit nation."

With four seminal articles from each decade (1920's forward), including just about every great name in the international discussions of the century, this book is a fundamental reference point for those who would dare to craft a vibrant foreign policy for the United States in the 21st Century. The book ends with several thoughtful pieces including, most fittingly, an interview with Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore on culture as destiny, an article whose subtitle might have been "How extended families and the collective good still matter."

Kissinger, Henry, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (Simon & Schuster, 2001)

The book begins with a lamentation that foreign policy has been neglected in the last three Presidential campaigns; that the American public is terribly apathetic about foreign affairs; and that Congress is overly interventionist—he refrains from adding the obvious caveat regarding most Members lack of knowledge of the world. In brief, we have a long way to go as a Nation before we can devise and sustain a credible foreign policy.

The core point in this entire work is that both economics and technologies, including Internet and communications technologies, have so out-paced politics that the world is at risk. Globalization, terrorism, and other threats cannot be addressed with our existing international, regional, and national political constructs, and new means must be found—new political solutions must be found—if we are to foster security and prosperity in the age of complexity, discontinuity, and fragmentation.

There are some useful sub-themes:

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

- 1) Each region must be understood in its full complexity, with special attention to both emerging powers and to the subtleties of relations between regional actors--we should not confine ourselves to simply addressing each actor's relationship to the United States.
- 2) We must take great care to never interpose ourselves or allow ourselves to become a substitute for a regional power, e.g. in the dialog between North and South Korea, or India and Pakistan.
- 3) We must strive at all times to ensure that the historic context is clearly appreciated and underlying every policy formulation, at the same time that we must recognize and define the vast cultural differences between US approaches to foreign policy, and the approaches of others, such as China.
- 4) Military compromise, whether in the Gulf War, Bosnia, or Kosovo, leaves a strategic vacuum that will inevitably require attention.
- 5) Africa is the true test for whether a world community can be devised and new solutions found for addressing the severe conditions in Africa that ultimately threaten the well-being of the rest of the world.
- 6) Our foreign service officers and the political leaders they serve must have history and philosophy restored to their diets, or they will fail to devise long-range concepts, global strategies, and sustainable policies.

Dr. Kissinger ends with what some might overlook and what I found to be absolutely core: no economic system can be sustained without a political basis. However much major multinational corporations may care to buy their comforts and their arrangements of convenience, at root, they prosper only because some set of political arrangements among great nations is providing a safety net, including the financial system with one major node in New York.

The book ends with an appeal for American humility and discretion as it makes its way forward--we must act as if we are one of many co-equal nation-states, while recognizing that our pre-eminence demands more of us than might be expected from others.

There is one major gap in this book, and I suspect it was deliberate: there is no discussion at all of the means by which American foreign policy is to be devised. As America moves into the early months of the "war on terrorism", it would have been helpful to have a really well-qualified rant on how it is impossible for this great Nation to have a foreign policy when we have gutted almost into extinction what passes for a

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Department of State today. Our Foreign Service, our Embassies, our foreign assistance programs, our Peace Corps, our external research, our sponsorship of international conferences on topics of vital importance to the US, have all faded into decrepitude. If ever there was a time when Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Powell should come together and champion a major restoration—at least a \$10 billion a year increase—in Program 150 (our soft power), this is that time. That they have all failed to do so troubles me—that Senator Biden was castigated publicly for speaking the plain truth about how the world perceives us—troubles me. The attacks of 11 September represent, primarily, a failure of our ability to monitor and understand the world. That failure must lie heavily—and equally—on the shoulders of the foreign service (State), the clandestine service (CIA), and the counterintelligence service (FBI).

Shultz, Richard H. Jr., Roy Godson, George H. Quester, *Security Studies for the 21st Century* (Brassey's, 1997)

This book is actually a guide for professors, with chapters presenting specific courses in security studies complete with fifteen-week outlines and all recommended readings. It is in my view a very fine structured reading program for the adult policy maker who is well beyond the need for going back to school, but much in need a fast means of coming to grips with the dramatic changes that have occurred in our international security environment.

Early on the book addresses the competing approaches to security studies—from the traditionalist national, international, and regional security approaches to the emerging transstate (non-state actors acknowledged as major sources of conflict and instability) to the global (to include human rights, environmental protection, economic prosperity, and social development as fundamental security issues).

The book's cataloguing of the weaknesses of 20th century security studies reads like a list of current biases inherent in those prescribing defense reform today: overemphasis on theory (or worst-case scenarios); insufficient attention to non-combat missions for military forces in peacetime; excessive focus on the US, Europe, and Russia to the exclusion of the rest of the world; too little attention to culture and the relationship of culture to conflict deterrence and resolution; insufficient attention to history prior to World War II; and finally, a neglect of non-military instruments of power and their interaction with the military.

Intelligence in particular is singled out as being a relatively recent open topic for discussion, meriting more study. The chapters on Transstate Security by Roy Godson (on non-state actors and the growing prevalence of "global ungovernability") and on

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Nontraditional Uses of Military Force by George H. Quester, as well as the introduction and conclusion by Richard H. Schultz, Jr., are each, alone, worth the price of the book.

Each chapter, with its course outline, discussion, and recommended references, is worthy of careful examination by any serving or aspiring policymaker. However distinguished one's pedigree, we are all students today, and Graham E. Fuller is correct when he notes on page 124 that "most policymakers do not even fully realize the dynamics of the new world we live in."

Intelligence (Fiction)

Bearden, Milt, *The Black Tulip* (Random House, 1998)

I was fascinated to read this book by one of America's greatest espionage warriors—not only did he run the Afghan war from the field, he was also Chief of the Soviet Division and Chief of Station in Germany, the equivalent of an Olympic "clean sweep." I read this book critically. It is simply super, and full of nuances that get better with a second reading. The most important of these is the thoughtful manner in which the fall of the Soviet military in Afghanistan is related to the subsequent weakening of the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe, a hold that eventually broke and led to the unification of Germany and chaos in those portions of Eastern Europe where neither Europe nor the US was ready to help convert communists to capitalists. This is an inspiring book that shows in great detail how covert action—behind the lines action—can serve a great nation. This book will cleanse the palate of all those who soured on covert action as done so badly (and occasionally in violation of the law) in Central America.

Harris, Robert, *ENIGMA* (Ivy Books, 1996)

For captivating true life signals intelligence there are several books one can go to, including those by James Bamford on the American system (*Puzzle Palace*, *Body of Secrets*) but for really getting into the enormity of the challenges and the thrill of the individual code-breakers when they succeeded, this is the book I recommend.

It completely ignores the enormous contributions made by the Poles (who gave the English two Enigma machines at the beginning of the war) as well as the heroic deeds of Tommy Brown (youngest George Medal winner at 16, survived with code materials taken from a sinking German ship), but I have found no better novel to communicate the absolute goose-bump emotional roller-coaster ride that the Bletchley Park gang experienced.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

If anything, this novel convey a human side to code-breaking that offsets the modern-day obsession with massive computers.

Silva, Daniel, *The Unlikely Spy* (Fawcett Crest, 1996)

Together with *Enigma* and *The Black Tulip*, and of course the George Smiley series by John Le Carre, this is one of my few really recommended fictional accounts related to espionage.

The art of lying to one's own people, at multiple levels of duplicity, some venal, much of it unnecessary, has helped to mystify, confuse, and sometimes glorify the intelligence profession.

As an intelligence professional myself, I will simply say that this is one of my top six and that it would not be called fiction if it did not depart for the pure realities as much as it does. This book captures the "essence" of duplicity within government in a time of war, and I find the whole book absolutely captivating and worthwhile.

Intelligence & Information Studies (Non-Fiction)

NOTE: I do not repeat reviews for those books on intelligence and the information and management environments around intelligence—over 150 titles in fifty-one pages—that appear in the first book, *ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World*. There are some exceptions: several books by Berkowitz and Goodman, Moynihan, Turner, and by Zegart are fundamental to the case this book makes; and the books by Johnson and Treverton that were reviewed in more depth after their formal publication; and new original reviews are provided here.

Allen, George, *NONE SO BLIND: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam* (Ivan R. Dee, 2001)

This book is destined to be a classic. There is no other person who spent over 17 years focused on intelligence about Viet-Nam, and very rare is the person who can say they have spent over 50 years in continuous intelligence appointments, 20 of them after retirement. It is a personal story that I consider to be balanced, deep, and trustworthy.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

While it has gaps, these are easily addressed by reading, at least on the intelligence side, such books as Bruce Jones' *War Without Windows*, Orrin DeForest's *SLOW BURN*, Douglas Valentine's *The Phoenix Program*, Jim Wirtz's *The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War*, Tom Mangold & John Penycate's *The Tunnels of Chu Chi* and the Viet-Nam portions of Jim Bamford's *Body of Secrets*.

I mention these books in part to emphasize that George Allen has produced a book that will stand the test of time and should be regarded as an exceptional historical, policy, intelligence, and public administration case study. It is truly humbling and sobering to read such a calm, complete, and broad treatment of the history of both American intelligence in relation to Viet-Nam, and the consistent manner in which policy-makers refused to listen to accurate intelligence estimates, while their Generals and Ambassadors steadfastly "cooked the books." The manipulation of truth from the Saigon end, and the refusal to listen to truth on the Washington end, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, and American, as well as allied nationalities.

This book is gripping. I could not put it down. It is one of the most serious personal accounts I have ever read where the vivid realities of intelligence, ignorance, and policy come together. The author excels at painting the details in context, and his many specific portraits of key individuals and situations are superior.

This book is relevant to today's war on terrorism. Many of the same issues prevail—rather than enumerate them, I will give this book my very highest mark, and simply say that you cannot understand intelligence, or the intelligence-policy relationship, without having absorbed all this author has to say.

He's hit it out of the park. Every voter who wonders what it will take to hold politicians accountable for "due diligence" in decision-making, needs to read this book.

Arnold, Stephen E., *New Trajectories of the Internet: Umbrellas, Traction, Lift and Other Phenomena* (infonautics UK, 2001)

You won't find this book on amazon.com. It is one of two examples (the book by Ben Gilad in this section being the other) of extremely good stuff that never gets into the mainstream. Although readily available if you know how to get hold of the publisher (send email to hcollier@infonortics.com) this is a "niche" book that reaches the top information professionals who follow niche publishers, but it does not reach the normal academic, industry specialist, or government specialist.

Baer, Robert, *SEE NO EVIL: A True Story of a Ground Soldier in CIA's War on Terrorism* (Crown, 2002)

As a former clandestine case officer, leaving the Agency in 1988 after unsuccessfully chasing terrorists for a few years, I knew we were in bad shape but I did not realize just how bad until I read this book. The author, working mostly in the Near East (NE) Division of the Directorate of Operations, and then in the Counter-Terrorism Center when it was just starting out, has an extremely important story to tell and every American needs to pay attention. Why? Because his account of how we have no assets useful against terrorism is in contradiction to what the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) told the President and his top advisors at Camp David on Saturday 15 September. According to the Washington Post of 31 January 2002, page A13, on the 15th the DCI laid out an ambitious "Worldwide Attack Matrix" and told the President that the United States had a "large asset base" from its years of working the terrorism target. One of these two men one is closer to the truth than the other. In my judgment, I believe Baer has three-quarters of the weight on his side. This discrepancy warrants investigation, for no President can be successful if he does not have accurate information about our actual capabilities. [NOTE: It is of course possible that the DCI himself has been lied to and deceived by the people he has in charge of clandestine operations, in which case one would expect an investigation to lead to a change in management at lower levels.]

There are four other stories within this excellent book, all dealing with infirm bureaucracies. At one level, the author's accounting of how the Directorate of Operations has declined under the last three leaders (as the author describes them: a recalled retiree, an analyst, and a "political" (pal)) is both clearly based on ground truth, and extremely troubling. The extraordinary detail on the decline and fall of the clandestine service is one that every voter should be thinking about, because it was the failure of the clandestine service, as well as the counterintelligence service (the Federal Bureau of Investigation) that allowed 9-11 to happen...at the same time, we must note that it was a policy failure to not have investigated similar incompetencies when a military barracks in Saudi Arabia, two Embassies, and a naval destroyer were attacked, and it was clearly known in open sources that bin Laden had declared war on America and had within America numerous Islamic clerics calling for the murder of Americans--all as documented in an excellent Public Broadcast Service documentary.

At a technical level, the author provides some really excellent real-world, real-war anecdotes about situations where clandestine reporting from trusted operations officers has not been accepted by their own superiors in the absence of technical confirmation (imagery or signals). As he says, in the middle of a major artillery battle and break-out of insurgent elements, screaming over the secure phone, "its the middle of night here". We've all known since at least the 1970's that the technical intelligence side of things

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

has been crushing human sensibility, both operational and analytical, but this book really brings the problems into the public eye in a compelling and useful manner.

At another level, the author uses his own investigation for murder (he was completely cleared, it was a set-up) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and at one point by the Secret Service, to shed new light on the complete break-down of internal security processes within the CIA. At its lowest point, he is pressured by DO management with a psychological evaluation to determine his fitness for duty--shades of Stalinism! I know this technique, of declaring officers unfit for duty based on psychological hatchet jobs, to be a common practice over the past two decades, and when Britt Snider was appointed Inspector General at CIA, I told him this was a "smoking gun" in the 7th floor closet. That it remains a practice today is grounds for evaluating the entire management culture at CIA.

There is a fourth story in the book, a truly interesting account of how big energy companies, their "ambassadors" serving as Presidential appointees within the National Security Council, and corrupt foreign elements, all come together. In this the spies are not central, so I leave it as a sidenote.

In my capacity as a reviewer of most intelligence-related books within these offerings, I want to make it clear to potential buyers of this book that the author is not alone. His is the best, most detailed, and most current accounting of the decrepit dysfunctionality of the clandestine service (as I put it in my own book's second edition), but I would refer the reader to two other books in particular: David Corn's *Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades*--its most memorable quote, on covert action in Laos, being "We spent a lot of money and got a lot of people killed, and we didn't get much for it."--and Evan Thomas' *The Very Best Men--Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA*--its best quote: "Patriotic, decent, well-meaning, they were also uniquely unsuited to the grubby, necessarily devious world of intelligence." There are many other books, including twelve (12!) focused on reform and recommended by the Council on Intelligence.

The author is a brave man--he was brave on the fields of war and clandestinity, and he is braver still for having brought this story to the public. We owe him a hearing.

Bamford, James, *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency—From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century* (Doubleday, 2001)

I like this book because it is a deeply researched investigation of the National Security Agency, a part of the U.S. government that is always "in harms way", and because it

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

offers up over 15 genuine journalistic investigative "scoops", shows how much can be learned about secret matters through persistent and professional exploitation of open sources, and paints a compelling dramatic picture of the honorable and courageous NSA employees, the less capable senior officers in the Joint Chiefs of Staff who risk their lives and do not provide them with emergency plans and air cover, and the man in the middle, LtGen Mike Hayden, whom the book portrays as a truly competent person who "gets it." This is the stuff of history and a very well-told tale.

Among the "scoops" that I as a professional intelligence officer will list for the sake of showing how wide and deep the book goes, are:

- 1) Extremely big scoop. Israel attacked U.S. military personnel aboard the USS Liberty with the intent of simulating an Egyptian attack on US forces that would permit a joint US and Israeli retaliation. Even after the ship was destroyed, with very clear evidence from NSA tapes that the Israeli's deliberately attacked a US ship while the ship was flying US colors, President Johnson is reported to have betrayed his military and his Nation by covering this up, intimidating all survivors, and saying he would "not embarrass our allies." In consultation with my naval colleagues, I am satisfied that the author has it right.
- 2) US SIGINT failed as North Korea invaded South Korea. Our lack of preparedness, in both systems and linguists, was dereliction of duty at the highest levels. Fast forward to Sudan, East Timor, Burundi, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti.
- 3) US "Operations Security" (OPSEC) is terrible! Bad in World War II, bad in Korea, bad in Viet-Nam, bad in Somalia and bad today. This book is a stark and compelling indictment of the incompetence of U.S. military and political leaders who refuse to recognize that the rest of the world is smart enough to collect our signals and predict our intentions with sufficient effectiveness to neutralize our otherwise substantial power.
- 4) Eisenhower, as President, controlled the U-2 operations over Russia and lied to the world and the people about his individual responsibility for those missions.
- 5) US SIGINT failed in Arabia and against Israel. "The agency had few Arabic or Hebrew linguists and it was not equipped to eavesdrop on British, French, or Israeli military communications." We are often unable to sort out the truth in conflicts between Arabs and Israel, and this allows Israel to deceive and manipulate American policy makers.
- 6) In the early years of the Cold War, the US was the aggressor, and ran incredibly provocative full bombing runs into northern Russia, simply to test for defenses

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

and to see if it could be done. Young American military personnel were sent as expendable cannon fodder, with the ultimate result that Russia spent billions more on its defenses than it might have if America have been a "good neighbor."

- 7) The Joint Chiefs of Staff was "out of control" during our confrontations with Cuba, and proposed to the President of the United States that U.S. military capabilities be used to murder Americans in order to provide a false cover for declaring war on Cuba.
- 8) The most senior military officers serving under Kennedy did not have the moral courage to tell him that the Bay of Pigs was a doomed operation. They allowed hundreds to die and be captured rather than "speak truth to power." NSA provided ample SIGINT.
- 9) Imagery intelligence beat signals intelligence in answering the ultimate question about the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Those who practice "OPSEC" can defeat our SIGINT capabilities.
- 10) US telecommunications companies have for years been giving NSA copies of all telegrams sent by foreign embassies and corporations, compromising their private sector integrity.
- 11) US military power is hollow. For both the USS Liberty and the USS Pueblo, a combination of screw-ups put military personnel in harms' way and a combination of incapacities helped get them killed and captured. In all of Korea only six U.S. aircraft were available to help protect the USS Pueblo, and they required several hours to get ready. The South Koreans, ready to launch defense forces instantly, were forbidden to do so, US leaders being more concerned about avoiding provocation of the North Koreans than about protecting U.S. military personnel.
- 12) US successes against the Russians and other targets were completely offset by the combination of the John Walker betrayal (turning over the key lists, this has been known) and the Soviet receipt from the Vietnamese (this has not been known) of a complete warehouse of NSA code machines left behind in Saigon. The Soviets have been reading our mail since 1975, and NSA did not want the President or Congress or the people to know this fact.
- 13) The North Vietnamese beat us on SIGINT, with 5000 trained SIGINT personnel and a system that stretched from Guam (where the B-52's were launched and the ground crew radios were in the clear) to the day-to-day operational orders going out to helicopters and fighters "in the clear". The book paints an extraordinarily

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

stark contrast between North Vietnamese competence and US incompetence across all areas of SIGINT and OPSEC.

- 14) There are others, but the final scoop is summed up in the author's concluding chapter on NSA's race to build the largest fastest computer at a time when relevant signals are growing exponentially: "Eventually NSA may secretly achieve the ultimate in quickness, compatibility, and efficiency—a computer with petaflop and higher speeds shrunk into a container about a liter in size, and powered by only about ten watts of power: the human brain."

Beesley, Patrick, *Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945* Stackpole, 2000)

This is a brilliant piece of work, and extremely relevant today. Had America had an Operational Intelligence (OpIntel) Plot (24/7 operationally-oriented put it all together all the time watch center), I daresay the terrorist attacks on America would have been prevented in good time. This work provides valuable insights on how best to manage an operationally-oriented watch center that does "all-source fusion" against a constantly changing real-time real-world threat. The Operational Intelligence Center (OIC) whose story is told here worked with no fewer than seventeen distinct sources streams, each with its own idiosyncrasies, its own fits and starts—and it worked directly with its operational clients, fully appraised of friendly plans and intentions and able to provide workmanlike inputs at every turn.

There are a number of vital lessons to be learned from this book, which I recommend in the strongest terms as one of my "top ten" relevant *today*. Among them:

- 1) **Sharing Secrets Matters.** It was the Russians who helped the British get started in 1914 with a gift of a German Naval Signal book, and it was the Poles who saved the day early on in World War II with a gift of two working Enigma machines.
- 2) **Ops Must Sleep With Intel.** Operators ignore intelligence because they do not understand it—there are too many breakdowns in communication along the way, and if the operators have not really gotten to know their intelligence counterparts, the two cultures do not come together effectively in times of crisis.
- 3) **Ops Cannot Do Raw Sources.** The corollary of the above is that Ops simply cannot keep up with nuances and is not able to evaluate sources in context to good effect.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

- 4) **Intel Must Sleep With Ops.** The intelligence propensity to compartment everything to the point of meaningless, and the "green door" mentality that is especially characteristic of the crypto-analysis community, amounts to a death wish. Some secret sources must be "ultra" secret, but some form of bridge is needed—the OpIntel Center appears to be a vital and relevant solution.
- 5) **Plots Must Be Co-Located and Ideally Integrated.** Early separation and distance between the intelligence plot, the commercial shipping plot and the operational plot leads to waste and death. Ultimately an integrated plot, or at least a blue-green plot next door to the red plot, is vital to effective prosecution of real-time war.
- 6) **Lose the Old Guys.** The first thing that needs doing when preparing for a long war is to lose the old guys. No disrespect intended, but as has been documented time and again, those that get promoted in peacetime bureaucracies tend to be too conformist and too subservient to peacetime protocols to adapt well to unconventional and very fast-moving wartime conditions.
- 7) **Hire the Retired.** This is not a contradiction. Old guys with big egos and high ranks have to go—but bringing in the best of the retired, generally at the field grade level, can have an extraordinary positive impact in the rapid maturation and stabilization of the full-speed-ahead wartime watch.
- 8) **Doctrinal Disputes Kill.** Unless there is a homeland defense doctrine that fully integrates and exercises the capabilities and internal cultures of the Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and civilian agencies there will be a year or two of major and almost catastrophic losses until it gets sorted out the hard way.
- 9) **Home Arrogance Kills (UK Version).** The persistent unwillingness of home side personnel to admit that their own security measures can be broken by clever enemies, and the general sloppiness of all hands with respect to Operations Security (OPSEC) will take a heavy toll.
- 10) **Home Arrogance Kills (US Version).** There is a theme with regard to the Americans. While their money and their manpower are gratefully accepted, their arrogance knows no bounds. They entered the war believing that there was nothing the British could teach them—further on into the war, the Americans risked Ultra by acting too aggressively on its information.
- 11) **Red Cell Oversight Needed.** One thing that jumped out at me from this book was the urgent need for having a very senior person—a retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, managing a Red Cell to provide oversight over operational decisions to exploit the most sensitive sources. [By this I mean, a

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

senior authority who can overrule and forbid operations whose success might endanger the special source.]

- 12) **Negative Reports Matter.** I was really struck by the circumstances surrounding a German break-out up the Channel, in which a number of normally reliable and overlapping intelligence collection endeavors all were forced back by weather, broken down or what-not. From this I took the lesson that negative reports matter. By failing to report to the OIC on their non-status, they failed to focus the OIC on all the possibilities. Thinking the flank covered, the OIC left the flank open.
- 13) **Tommy Brown Matters.** The book ends on a marvelous note, pointing out that without the heroism of Tommy Brown, a 16-year-old cabin boy and youngest recipient of the George Medal as well as two other adults who died in the process of grabbing vital enemy signals materials off a sinking vessel, the allies would have been deaf for much of 1943. At the end of the day the best technical intelligence comes down to a brave human who risks all to make it possible.

Bowden, Mark, *Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw* (Atlantic Monthly, 2001)

This book provides an excellent overview of sensitive sources and methods used by the U.S. military to intercept and locate electronic transmissions. It specifically "blows" a cover company, two specific kinds of aircraft, and several U.S. Special Operations Forces standard operating procedures. I suspect that NSA and the CIA Centers dealing with terrorism and with crime and narcotics are having the same difficulties recovering from this book that NSA had when President Reagan inadvertently revealed in public that he was receiving transcripts of Politburo cell phone conversations made while in transit, from their car phones.

Having said that, I find that the author has performed very responsibly as an investigative journalist, and that his story is superior in every respect. I even find that he has withheld some key information out of respect for his sources, and that there are many lessons to be learned from this book about how we might improve our transnational campaign against non-state forces that have vastly more money, ruthlessness, and sheer people power than we do.

I like and recommend this book--it is a real-world story, well-researched and well-told.

Cronin, Blaise and Helen Barsky Atkins, *The Web of Knowledge: A Festschrift in Honor of Eugene Garfield* (Information Today, 2000)

This was not the book I was looking for, but it is still worthy of buying if you have any interest at all in charting knowledge terrain and "knowing who knows". In honor of Eugene Garfield, arguably the most influential man in the sociology of knowledge in this century or any other, the book provides a wonderful collection of *methodological* articles about the bibliometrics and indicators associated with charting who quotes whom and what does it mean in terms of influence within and among nations, organizations, schools of thought, and individual cabals.

I was intrigued to find that the book, perhaps because it is so original and represents the first book-length collection of its kind, did not include an article on a topic near and dear to my heart, that is, developing algorithms to identify anomalies in citation such that one can weed out those who are citing one another simply to "beat the game." As citation analysis becomes a more mainstream means of measuring intellectual contributions (it is still not mainstream--too many otherwise talented intelligence community managers of analysts have no clue it exists), some form of citation validation and policing will be needed.

There are three other areas where I would say that this book is a vital and valuable foundation, and desperately in need of three distinct sequel publications:

First, we need to migrate the value of citation analysis to the Internet, not only to electronic journals but to citations of self-published papers on web sites as well as to informed observations in expert forums. Neither the classification schema nor the industry standards for making this possible exist today. I would go so far as to suggest that a new Internet standards committee dedicated to this specific issue should be created, immediately.

Second, an analogous situation exists with those experts who are not permitted to publish in the open literature, but who are very well known by virtue of their title, organizational affiliation, participation in conferences, or classified work revealed to a very few. As the core competency of government becomes the nurturing of national knowledge--not only in science and technology but also in all international as well as domestic matters--some form of citation analysis process must be developed that makes these experts (or if not expert, then influentials by virtue of their position at the international, national, state/provincial, or local levels) and their counterparts in non-governmental organizations (e.g. Red Cross, World Bank, elements of the United Nations) readily identifiable. The Internet, and the public availability of email

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

communication pattern analysis information that does not intrude on the substantive privacy of electronic communications, may possibly be helpful here.

Third, and finally, we come to the area of interest that originally led to my purchasing this book, which is that of actually identifying centers of excellence and "portals" into the entire range of published and unpublished knowledge on any given topic. Such a sequel publication must not only document, in an evolutionary or "living" way, who the top 100 people are across every social science and science topic, but also the top 25 institutions with deliberate distinctions between Asian, Americas, European, and African centers of excellence. The Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) has been unwilling to do this as an internal investment, and has not heard from enough governments and corporations to warrant its moving aggressively to create what I would regard as an extraordinarily valuable and relevant guide for all manner of investments and improvements in international, national, and state-based research and education. I would go so far as to say that such a guide, such a service of common concern, would go a very long way toward making possible extraordinary new means of leveraging distributed intellectual resources, lowering the cost of seminal research, and introducing new forms of transnational collaborative work.

Garfield, and citation analysis and all those who have built on Garfield's work, together represent the first mile in a hundred mile journey toward creating the *World Brain* that H.G. Wells, among a select few, has envisioned. There is much yet to be done.

Davenport, Thomas H. and John C. Beck, *The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of Business* (Harvard, 2001)

I rank this book as easily one of the top 25 books on information fundamentals, and quite possibly in the top 10. The book is well-presented and what some might see as showmanship I consider to be good editing and publishing. The book starts strong, focusing on "attention deficit" in both individuals and organizations, and the consequences of failing to pay attention to the right things at the right time—corporate CEOs and their business intelligence professionals, as well as government leaders and their national intelligence professionals, can learn a great deal from this book.

Especially useful to me, and a major reason why I rank this book so highly, was its distinction between the need to first, constantly scan the world ("global coverage") for AWARENESS; second, be able to surge resources to accomplish local focus for ATTENTION; and finally, third, to be conscious of domestic (or internal corporate) political considerations before taking ACTION.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

At a national level, I found myself thinking that this book could be the first step in an evaluation of how we spend our time--and how we compensate ourselves for spending our time. Of course others have observed that we spend too much time in front of the television or eating fast food or whatever, but I found this book extremely helpful in thinking about the economics of personal and organizational information management. Applying this book's lessons, for example, might cause any manager to forbid Internet access because of the very high negative return on investment--searches should be done by specialists who can be relied to avoid personal browsing on company time. The author's specifically note that the Western culture is less well equipped to manage "attention" than other cultures. The book also focuses on the fact that client attention and teamwork *compete* with innovation, and that some form of time management guidance is needed that permits employees to focus on just one of these primary duties.

The author's identification of relevance, community, engagement, and convenience as the four key factors in attracting and holding attention from individuals--and the lengthy discussion in the book on each of these--is very worthwhile. So also is their specification of four "attention tracks" that each individual must manage: focusing one's own attention; attracting the right kind of attention to oneself; directing the attention of those under one's oversight; and maintaining the attention of one's customers and clients (and one could add, one's family). It goes well beyond the current state of the art and outlines new ideas that could and should have a fundamental impact on how we spend our time, what information services we buy, and how we use information technology.

Dertouzos, Michael L., *The Unfinished Revolution: Human-Centered Computers and What They Can Do For Us* (Harperbusiness, 2001)

In some ways this is the gold-collared knowledge worker counterpart book to Ted Halstead and Michael Lind's *The Radical Center: The Future of American Politics* (citizen-centered). Those who liked *The Cultural Creatives* or *IMAGINE: What America Could be in the 21st Century*, can adopt this book as their user's guide for demanding change in information technology.

I recommend it because it is full of common sense, is the first really helpful "requirements document" for a clean sheet new approach to software and hardware and ergonomics (\$3000 word for user friendly). The bad news is that nobody is listening. We are ten years away from this being a reality because the legacy providers (big hardware, one certain software company) are not about to retool their empires for the sake of delivering better value.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

It is more than a little amusing to me to have this book endorsed by the CEO of the one company that prides itself on producing software with mutated migrated Application Program Interfaces that are used to extort tribute from third party software developers, where no sane consumer will invest in his products until they've had three years to "mature" in the marketplace.

The opening listings of the "standard faults" in today's "consumer electronics" is alone worth the price of the book--unintegrated systems fault; manual labor fault; human servitude fault; crash fault; excessive learning fault; feature overload fault; fake intelligence fault; waiting fault; ratchet fault...

The book ends on a low note and high note. The low note is a description of Oxygen, a \$50M project seeded by DARPA and including several major company partners such as HP and Nokia. This project has some excellent ideas, including a new focus on an architecture for nomadic computing with three aspects: a Handy 21 (hand-held), Enviro 21 (intermediate personal computers at home, office, and in car), and N21 Network (Intentional Naming System, every computer and peripheral everywhere is in the public domain and broadcasting its location and status, use on the fly). Good stuff. What he doesn't mention is that the U.S. Government is spending over half a billion dollars on completely uncoordinated desktop analysis toolkits, and there is probably 2-3X that much being spent in the private sector. He does note that we will never get our act together if we continue to develop hardware and software in a very fragmented and hardware-based manner.

On the high note, the author has clearly thought about the consequences of having an information revolution here in the USA, creating information royalty, while leaving the rest of the world dispossessed, in poverty, and unconnected. He has a very practical appreciation for the fact that the USA must fund two distinct foreign assistance programs--a Digital Marshall Plan (my phrase) to jack in the entire world; and a commensurate literacy, birth control, disease control, and famine control program to stabilize populations to the point where they can be productive within the global grid.

I read this book on the airplane coming back from the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas (Federal Emerging Technologies Conference sub-set), and I was really struck by the contradiction between the vast fragmentation spread out over Las Vegas (the man who has everything also has to carry it) and the elegant simplicity of this book's vision--one hand-held able to be any of 100+ devices. "It's the software, simpleton...."

What saddens me, especially when considering the billions of dollars being given away by our richest software developer, someone who seems to favor gestures on the margin instead of quality control and open source at the core, is that we knew all this in the

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

mid-1980's. The eighteen distinct functionalities needed for a desktop analysts' workstation were identified by CIA in 1986—everything from data ingestion and conversion softwares to modeling and simulation and pattern detection and of course desktop publishing. The year after the CIA prototypes were working so successfully on UNIX (Sun), CIA decided that the PS2 would be the standard "dumb" terminal, and all UNIX efforts were ordered to shut-down. The big organizations, the ones with the power to make the revolution, chose control and dumb terminals over freedom and smart software. I am very skeptical that the vision in this book will come to fruition...

Drucker, Peter, *Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles* (Harperbusiness, 1993)

Drucker has a remarkable ability to deflate any self-styled entrepreneur and "innovator." His book discusses the sources of innovation, concluding rather significantly that knowledge-based innovation is rarely successful—that innovation generally works best when all the factors are known and put into new combinations that work exceedingly well—and that successful innovations start small, focus on the simplest element that can be understood by any half-wit, don't cost a lot, and are never grandiose.

Drucker, Peter, *Post-Capitalist Society* (Harperbusiness, 1994)

Drucker and Toffler agree on one important idea: fiscal and monetary policy is no longer the real driver for national prosperity. At best it is a place-holder, a means of keeping the economy stable. There is a strong element of accountability throughout the book, first with respect to the managers of governments and corporations, and finally with the managers of schools that must ultimately be held accountable for producing students who are competent at both learning and sharing knowledge. For Drucker, the organization of the post-capitalist society must commit itself to being a destabilizer able to change constantly. "It must be organized for systematic abandonment of the established, the customary, the familiar, the comfortable—whether products, services, processes, human and social relationships, skills, or organizations themselves. It is the very nature of knowledge that it changes fast and that today's certainties will be tomorrow's absurdities." So speaketh Drucker of the U.S. Intelligence Community....

Gilad, Benjamin, *Business Blindspots: replacing myths, beliefs and assumptions with market realities* (infonortics UK, 1996)

This is a "gray literature" gem. Although published by a very reputable organization in the United Kingdom, amazon.com does not accept books for listing from international

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

publishers that do not have a U.S. warehouse or representative. This is an extraordinary book, perhaps the finest book on real-world intelligence using legal sources and methods, ever written. It is especially valuable to the chief executive officer willing to entertain the possibility that they just might *not* know how to properly follow external developments in the most methodical manner possible. This excellent work is especially strong because of its deep knowledge and consequently its deep credibility, in presenting anecdotes that make it clear that the largest corporations and banks are not immune to the ignorance and myopia that prevail among spies and others who think that their secrets are all that matter. Order via email to hcollier@infonortics.com.

Herman, Michael, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge, 1999)

This is the textbook for the best and the brightest of both the academic world and the policy world. It is not an easy read, between the British language form and the deep thinking, but it is, as Christopher Andrew says, "the best overview" and "surely destined to become a standard work". I especially liked its attention to components and boundaries, effects, accuracy, and evaluation. Perhaps most usefully within the book is the distinction between long-term intelligence endeavors that rely primarily on open sources and serve to improve state understanding and state behavior, and short-term espionage that tends to be intrusive and heighten the target state's feelings of vulnerability and hostility. No intelligence library is complete without this book—it provides a rock-solid foundation for serious thinking about the intelligence in the 21st Century.

Herman, Michael, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age: Theory and Practice* (Cass, 2002)

Intelligence Power in Peace and War remains the author's greatest work but this collection of well-focused essays, most never before available to the general public, provides a very easy-going (that is to say, easy to read) advanced reader that touches of some vital issues for the future including the restoration of ethics to the practice of intelligence, and the need to internationalize intelligence in the war between governments and gangs or other threats of common concern.

Every essay has its gems, from the first that explores the contradicting views of the essence of intelligence (one view from Kent has it as a particular kind of knowledge, another view has it as defined solely by its secrecy). The author excels at drawing out the relativism of intelligence as well as the changes—more concerned today with the security of others than of one's own state; and more committed (in the best of the services) to forecasting the future rather than manipulating the present.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

The essay on intelligence and diplomacy is absolutely vital, beginning with the observation that we are now spending more on intelligence than diplomacy (in the US, 10 times more on secret intelligence than on normal diplomacy). The author concludes, without belaboring the paucity of diplomatic resources, that the UK model of intelligence--the allied model in some respects--has done well in not abusing its special knowledge to influence policy.

Discussing intelligence and the Revolution in Military Affairs, there are several trenchant observations, among the most helpful being that the current RMA is too obsessed with technology applicable to "things" (both as tools and as targets) while completely over-looking a revolution in technology applicable to text and to thinking. This is down-right brilliant and a long over-due issue for policy consideration. Interestingly, the National Imagery and Mapping Commission Report concluded in December 2000 that the USA has spent billions on collection technology during the Cold War, without a commensurate expenditure in what the Americans call TPED: tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination. If the Americans are to make a worthy contribution to allied intelligence in the 21st Century, one might hope they heed the author's observation and invest in global multi-lingual open source data ingestion, and multi-media analytic tools for "making sense" of the vast flows of readily available information--most of it not yet digital.

The middle section of the book covers many critical issues including the continued separation of security and foreign intelligence, a separation that allowed 9-11 to occur in the USA. Among the really brilliant gems in this section: "The best test of an intelligence system is the all-source memory it builds up..." The reader can judge for themselves whether any intelligence organization can pass this rather plain-spoken test. The author is in the vanguard in terms of tapping into external expertise, shifting priorities from collection to analysis, and substantially improving inter-departmental coordination of assessments at the action officer level. Two reviews of Norwegian and New Zealand contributions and issues offer a helpful appreciation of where further gains might be made. Over the course of several chapters the author addresses the lessons of history and answers the question "did intelligence make a difference?" All of this material is quite stimulating, coming as it does from a man who was at the very heart of joint intelligence assessments, and his findings, some negative, must bear on how we adjust to the future.

Good as the first parts are, the best is held for last. Part IV, titled "Intelligence and a Better World", contains two chapters--one on intelligence and international ethics, the other an afterword on the attacks of 9-11. These two are my most heavily marked sections, and in my own mind represent some of the author's freshest and most valuable thinking. The author is fully aware of the importance of shifting attention to the sub-

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

state and non-state actors, and also of the need to begin sharing all-source intelligence in a multi-lateral fashion, in effect (citing two former US intelligence leaders) treating intelligence as an international good. He carefully explores the ethical and opportunity cost dimensions of covert intelligence activities against other sovereign state (certainly excluding rogue states), concluding that on balance open sources and good analysis are a better bet when combined with the increased trust that could result from eschewing intrusive covert penetrations that are not really necessary in relation to government secrets (terrorists of course being fair game for all available covert methods).

Addressing 9-11, the author has many helpful things to say, among them the observation that "The problems of counter-terrorist intelligence cannot be solved just by throwing money at them." He ends with the compelling observation that the United States of America is incapable of protecting itself from international threats, even with its vast resources, unless it first devises new means of sharing intelligence and cooperating more closely with all other governments. I agree with him. Both "hard targets" and "global coverage" are beyond the ken of any single nation, and the "new craft of intelligence" that I and others are devising seeks to harness the full distributed intelligence of the Whole Earth--not just the intelligence of governments, but of legal non-state actors and citizens--the intelligence "minutemen" of the future. There are perhaps twelve really high-caliber commentators on intelligence in the English-speaking language, but this author, Michael Herman, continues to be the soft-spoken master of the domain--offering the best combination of erudition, experience, and ethical grounding--and we are lucky to have this book from him to help us all as we seek to revitalize intelligence in the aftermath of 9-11.

This book is especially recommended as a reader for university classes, and one hopes that gradually it will be understood within academia and business that intelligence is not some arcane secret priesthood, but rather the essence of governance in the age of information. The author, and this book, are most helpful contributors to the "Great Conversation".

Holden-Rhodes, James, *Sharing the Secrets* (Praeger, 2002)

It is always a shame when a really great book is badly marketed and consequently does not reach as many professionals and citizens as it should. This is such a book.

What the blurbs don't tell you, such as they are, is that the author was one of the true pioneers in the world of open source intelligence (creating useful actionable intelligence using only legal and ethical sources and methods). His brilliant efforts in the early 1990's were easily a decade ahead of where the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) is today--using a wide variety of Latin American newspapers and lots of

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

brainpower, he was able to create tactical intelligence that contributed significantly to the success of operational missions by the U.S. Southern Command and the Drug Enforcement Administration, leading the destruction of cocaine laboratories, the interdiction of aircraft, and the arrest of key people in the transnational criminal structure.

This book is an essential reference for any agency or command library concerned with asymmetric warfare, unconventional threats, and non-traditional methods of providing intelligence support to those responsible for dealing with anything other than traditional war. The sources and methods that the author discusses are especially pertinent to the study of terrorism, proliferation, transnational crime, cross-national toxic dumping, and other sub-state and non-state threats.

Johnson, Loch, *Bombs, Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs: Intelligence and America's Quest for Security* (New York University Press, 2000)

The opening quotation from Harry Howe Ransom says it all—"Certainly nothing is more rational and logical than the idea that national security policies be based upon the fullest and most accurate information available; but the cold war spawned an intelligence Frankenstein monster that now needs to be dissected, remodeled, rationalized and made fully accountable to responsible representatives of the people."

Professor Johnson is one of only two people (the other being Britt Snider) to have served on both the Church Commission in the 1970's and the Aspin-Brown Commission in the 1990's, and is in my view one of the most competent observers and commentators on the so-called U.S. Intelligence Community. The book is a *tour d'horizon* on both the deficiencies of today's highly fragmented and bureaucratized archipelago of independent fiefdoms, as well as the "new intelligence agenda" that places public health and the environment near the top of the list of topics to be covered by spies and satellites.

Highlights of this excellent work, a new standard in terms of currency and breadth, include his informed judgment that most of what is in the "base" budget of the community should be resurrected for reexamination, and that at least 20% of the budget (roughly \$6 billion per year) could be done away with—and one speculates that this would be good news to an Administration actively seeking trade-offs permitting its promised tax cut program. His overviews of the various cultures within the Central Intelligence Agency, of the myths of intelligence, and of the possibilities for burden sharing all merit close review.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

He does, however, go a bridge too far while simultaneously rendering a great service to the incoming Administration. He properly identifies the dramatic shortfalls in the open source information gathering and processing capabilities of the various Departments of the Federal government—notably the Department of State as well as the Department of Commerce and the various agencies associated with public health—but then he goes on to suggest that these very incapacities should give rise to an extension of the U.S. Intelligence Community's mission and mandate—that it is the U.S. Intelligence Community, including clandestine case officers in the field and even FBI special agents, who should be tasked with collecting open sources of information and with reporting on everything from disease to pollution. This will never work, but it does highlight the fact that all is not well with *both* the U.S. Intelligence Community *and* the rest of the government that is purportedly responsible for collecting and understanding open sources of information.

On balance I found this book to be a very competent, insightful, and well-documented survey of the current stresses and strains facing the U.S. national intelligence community. The conclusion that I drew from the book, one that might not be shared by the author, was that the U.S. Government as a whole has completely missed the dawn of the Information Age. From the National Security Agency, where too many people on payroll keep that organization mired in the technologies of the 1970's, to the U.S. State Department, which has lost control of its Embassies and no longer collects significant amounts of open source information, to the White House, where no one has time to read—we have completely blown it—we simply have not adapted the cheap and responsive tools of the Internet to our needs, nor have we employed the Internet to share the financial as well as the intellectual and time burdens of achieving "Global Coverage." More profoundly, what this book does in a way I have not been able to do myself, is very pointedly call into question the entire structure of government, a government attempting to channel small streams of fragmented electronic information through a physical infrastructure of buildings and people that share no electronic connectivity what-so-ever, while abdicating its responsibility to absorb and appreciate the vast volumes of relevant information from around the globe that is not online, not in English, and not free.

It was not until I had absorbed the book's grand juxtaposition of the complementary incompetencies of both the producers of intelligence and the consumers of intelligence that I realized he has touched on what must be the core competency of government in the Information Age: how precisely do we go about collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information, and creating tailored intelligence, when we are all interdependent across national, legal bureaucratic, and cultural boundaries? This is not about secrecy versus openness, but rather about whether Government Operations as a whole are taking place with the sources, methods, and tools of this century, or the last. To

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

bombs, bugs, drugs, and thugs one must add the perennial Pogo: "We have met the enemy, and he is us."

Matthias, Willard G., *America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001)

I like and recommend this book because it is an important personal account from a very talented senior intelligence estimates professional. It documents in great detail a number of extremely serious mistakes on the part of U.S. policy makers from World War II through to Reagan years, while also recounting the history of how the Pentagon helped destroy CIA's independent assessments capability.

Time and time again throughout this book one sees references to "state of mind" and "mindset", and this is important. The author has a very fine grasp of how debilitating ingrained mindsets can be--the military mindset that focuses on buying more and more high technology even though it is demonstrably irrelevant to our most urgent strategic needs; the policy mindset that emphasizes the need for a tangible "main enemy" even as we destroy the environment and ignore catastrophic diseases and failed states; and the intelligence mindset that values secrecy and blind loyalty over public disclosure and public service.

I am especially impressed by the author's past responsibility for preparing the "Estimate of the World Situation", and how compellingly he distinguishes between the great days when such estimates were both produced and consumed, and today's state of affairs, where only "hard targets" are the object of our obsession, and "rest of the world" is poorly addressed.

The integrity of intelligence is a theme than runs throughout the book, and for that reason alone I recommend it for every policy and intelligence professionals' library. There are also compelling insights and thoughtful quotes.

The author's itemization of seven structural anomalies and states of mind that were present in World War II and can be seen today is worth abstracting here:

- 1) Absolute commitment to unconditional surrender eliminated possibilities for undermining Hitler from within;
- 2) Allied command structure was not unified in fact;

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

- 3) There were no functioning lines of communication between tactical military and tactical (field) intelligence units;
- 4) Military leaders had a tactical intelligence state of mind, not a strategic intelligence state of mind, and were overly dependent on signals intelligence;
- 5) Military leaders were absolutely committed to established plans and unwilling to deviate or consider alternatives even in the face of compelling intelligence;
- 6) Moral self-righteousness and political naiveté blinded Allied political and military leaders to the efforts of moderating forces in Germany ready to start an internal war;
- 7) Concept of war shifted away from the Clausewitzian "trinity" toward a "total war" emphasizing societal destruction and victory at any cost.

As his book goes on to document, these problems have been with us through the entire Cold War period, and have resulted in great waste of the taxpayer dollar as well as extraordinary risk of nuclear war with the Soviets during the 1980's when we played a very confrontational game with very limited policy level appreciation of just how desperate the Soviets might be.

This is not a book that offers solutions or suggestions for improving the vitality of intelligence or the attention span of policy makers, but it is an excellent contribution to what one can only hope will eventually be a truly public debate about the need for restoring America's strategic intelligence analysis capabilities, and making both intelligence producers and intelligence consumers accountable for "informed policy."

Persico, Joseph E., *Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage* (Random House, 2001)

Intelligence professionals will be very disappointed by this book, citizens interested in Presidential approaches to intelligence, somewhat less so. The author's brilliant biography of William Casey, OSS Veteran and Director of Central Intelligence under President Ronald Reagan, was a much more satisfying book. What we have here is by and large a mish-mash of the works of others, together with an original composition on FDR's involvement in intelligence that is uneven--partly because the subject did not put much in writing, and partly because the author chose to rely primarily on secondary published sources.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

From the perspective of one interested in "Presidential intelligence," that is, how does a President manage various means of keeping informed, the book is a must read but also a shallow read. We learn that FDR was a master of deception and of running many parallel efforts, balancing them against one another. We learn that FDR was remarkably tolerant of amateurism and incompetence, while good at finding the gems these same loose but prolific intelligence endeavors could offer.

Perhaps most importantly, we gain some insights into how Presidents, even when properly informed by intelligence (e.g. of Pearl Harbor in advance, or of the lack of threat from domestic Americans of Japanese descent) must yet "go along" and provide either inaction pending the public's "getting it", or unnecessary action (the internments) to assuage public concern.

There are enough tid-bits to warrant a full reading of the book, but only for those who have not read widely in the literature of intelligence and/or presidential history. The British lied to the President and grossly exaggerated their intelligence capabilities, in one instance presenting a man "just back from behind the lines" when in fact he was simply on staff and lying for effect. We learn that the Department of State was twice offered, and twice declined, the lead on a global structure for collecting and processing intelligence. We learn that FDR himself concluded that Croatia and Serbia would never ever get along and should be separate countries.

On the NATO side, we learn that Eisenhower went with bad weather and the invasion succeeded in part because of a successful deception and in part because of Ike's courage in going forward in the face of bad weather--fast forward to how weather incapacitates our high-technology today. Most interestingly, we learn that FDR finally approved Eisenhower as leader of Overload, in lieu of his favorite, General Marshall, in part because he recognized that the allied joint environment required a general and a politician in one man.

This book is a hybrid, attempting to mesh presidential history with intelligence history, and perhaps this should gain the author some margin of tolerance. Unfortunately, in focusing on the relationships among the various intelligence principals and the president, he seriously passes over the enormous contributions of military as well as civilian and allied intelligence to the larger undertaking, and one is left with the narrow impression that American intelligence consisted largely of a number of self-serving clowns vying for Presidential favor.

The flaws inherent in a Federal Bureau of Investigation dominated by J. Edgar Hoover, and the lack of cooperation between the FBI and other major intelligence activities that continues today, are noted throughout the book.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Bottom line: worth buying and reading to gain insight into the challenges facing a President who can become isolated from reality by a corporate staff, but nowhere near the quality of Christopher Andrew's *For the President's Eyes Only*, or any of many good histories of espionage in World War II.

Rudgers, David F., *Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947* (University Press of Kansas, 2000)

This is an admirable and unusual work, of doctoral-level quality in its sources and methods, while also reflecting the professional intelligence career status of the author. It complements Amy Zegart's broader book, *Flawed By Design*, in an excellent manner. This book, focusing as it does on the CIA alone, and on internal sources not readily available to Zegart, fills a major gap in our understanding of the CIA's origins.

The author excels at demonstrating both the actual as opposed to the mythical origins of the agency, and pays particular heed to the role of the Bureau of the Budget and that Bureau's biases and intentions. At the end of it all, the author notes that the agency was moving in controversial directions within four years of its birth, quickly disturbing Harry Truman, who is quoted as saying, twenty-years after the fact (in 1963), "For some time I have been disturbed by the way CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational arm and at times a policy-making arm of Government....I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations."

The author himself goes on to conclude that "the nature of the new threats and the revolution in information acquisition and dissemination have thrown traditional ways of intelligence organization, collection, evaluation, and distribution into question. ... CIA has entered the second half-century of its existence striving to avoid the fate of its OSS parent. In the process, it is groping for new missions and purposes while blighted by the legacy of its past derelictions, and while operating amid a rapidly changing global environment and technological revolution that are rendering its sources, methods, organizations, and mystique obsolete."

I would hasten to add, as my own book documents, that we will always have hidden evil in the world and will always need spies and secret methods to some extent, but this book, combining academic rigor with insider access, must surely give the most intelligent of our policy, legislative, and intelligence managers pause, for it very carefully documents the possibility that 75% of what we are doing today with secret sources and methods need not and should not be done. This book has much to offer those who would learn from history.

Tapscott, Don, *The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked Intelligence* (McGraw Hill, 1996)

After demolishing Business Process Reengineering (BPR) as a necessary element of but insufficient substitute for corporate strategy, organizational learning, or reinvention, the author goes on to address twelve themes central to success in an economic environment characterized by networked intelligence: knowledge, digitization, virtualization, molecularization, integration/internetworking, disintermediation, convergence (a big one), innovation, prosumption, immediacy, globalization, and discordance (another big one). He stressed the need for "busting loose from the technology legacy", the need to dramatically transform both the information management and human resource management concepts and also a turning on its head of how government works—from centralized after the fact "leveling" and gross national security to decentralized, proactive nurturing of individual opportunity before the fact, providing individual security through individual opportunity and prosperity within the network.

Treverton, Gregory F., *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information* (Cambridge, 2001)

There are other books on intelligence reform--the best being those by Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman and by Loch Johnson--but this book is very special because it is written by an insider who has come to grips with the imperative for change and who is able to articulate the case for change in a way that others have not. This is arguably the single best and most elegant presentation for why our \$30 billion a year intelligence industry must be turned upside down and shift resources away from secret satellite technology and toward analysis, analytic tools, and access to open sources of information.

The author very correctly focuses on the fact that intelligence is about getting useful tailored information to the policy consumer, not about secrets per se. He is perhaps the best spokesperson for the view that the old paradigm--collecting secrets at great expense about a single enemy--must be replaced by the new paradigm--making sense of vast quantities of information that is not secret and covers a diversity of constantly changing targets. He correctly focuses on the selection and intelligent analysis of information rather than the collection of isolated secrets--on making the most of open information.

The book is rich with anecdotal examples and makes a compelling case for dismantling the current intelligence stovepipes while simultaneously dismantling the culture of

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

secrecy that prevents the sharing of useful information, not just within the Nation (e.g. with state and local law enforcement) but with coalition government and non-government allies of the moment.

The author, a past Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and a learned man with deep ties to Harvard, the Council on Foreign Relations, and RAND, concludes on a bitter-sweet note that demands Congressional and Presidential reflection. He firmly believes that both the intelligence community budget and as much intelligence analysis as possible should be made public and be in the public service. This book is highly recommended, and could-together with the other intelligence reform books published in the past two years--reasonably be used as the starting point for a complete make-over of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Turner, Stansfield, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* (Harper & Row, 1985)

Stansfield Turner was a Rhodes scholar and naval officer who rose to command of a carrier task group, a fleet, NATO's southern flank, and the Navy's most prestigious intellectual institution, the Naval War College. He served from 1977-1981 as Director of Central Intelligence under President Jimmy Carter, and his book in my mind was the first serious contribution--perhaps even a catalyst--to the growing debate over whether and how much reform is required if the U.S. Intelligence Community is to be effective in the 21st Century. His eleven-point agenda for reform is of lasting value, as are his ideas for intelligence support to those responsible for natural disaster relief and other non-military challenges:

- 1) Convince the IC that good oversight is essential to effective intelligence.
- 2) Improve analysis.
- 3) Broaden the analytic efforts beyond current events and Soviet military strength.
 - a) What makes the Soviet Union tick?
 - b) Secondary country analysis
 - c) Economic analysis
 - d) International threats
- 4) Separate the role of the DCI from that of the head of the CIA.
- 5) Merge the espionage and analytic branches of the CIA.
- 6) Strengthen the DCI's authority over the National Security Agency.
- 7) Help the Defense Intelligence Agency improve its analysis.
- 8) Take more effective precautions against leaks of intelligence information.
- 9) Enact a charter for the Intelligence Community.
- 10) Reduce the emphasis on covert action.
- 11) Depoliticize the role of the DCI.

Wheaton, Kristan J., *The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload* (AFCEA International Press, 2001)

I first heard Kris Wheaton lecture in Europe, and was just blown away by the deep understanding that he demonstrated of why commanders and CEOs are constantly missing the warnings their subordinates and forward scouts are sending back--the huge cost! Kosovo, for example, could have been a \$1 billion a year problem if acted upon wisely and early, instead it became a \$5 billion a year problem. I like this book very much because it makes his deep insights available to everybody in a very readable, well-illustrated, and concise book.

I strongly recommend this book because it offers the only thoughtful explanation I have ever seen on the conflict between the senior decision-maker's attention span (can only think about \$50 billion problems) and the early warning that *is* available but cannot break through to the always over-burdened, sometimes arrogant, and rarely strategic top boss. In this regard, his book is a fine complement to the more historical work by Willard Matthias on *America's Strategic Blunders*.

This book also offers solutions. It is a book that should be required reading for all field grade officers in all military services, as well as state and local governors and majors, university and hospital and other non-profit heads, and of course the captains of industry who spend billions, often unwisely, because they have not established a scouting system that can be heard at the highest levels *in time*. America, among many other nations and organizations, has a habit of ignoring its iconoclasts and mavericks--in an increasingly complex world where catastrophic combinations of failure are going to be more common, such ignorance will eventually become unaffordable and threatening to the national security as well as the national prosperity of those who persist in thinking about old problems in old ways.

There is one other aspect of this book that merits strong emphasis: it focuses on human understanding and human engagement with the world, and makes it clear that technology has almost nothing to do with how well we cope with the external environment that defines our future. There aren't five people in the US government, to take one example, that adequately understand the rich intellectual history of Islam nor the core difference between the Islamic emphasis on knowledge integration as the core value and the Christian emphasis on love as the core value. The author of this book is one of America's foremost authorities on the Balkan conflict and the deep importance of historical and cultural understanding as part of current political and operational competency--we need 1000 more intelligence professionals just like him. This book

will inspire and provoke and is a great value for anyone who deals with the world at large.

Woodward, Bob, *MAESTRO: Greenspan's Fed and the American Boom* (Simon & Schuster, 2000)

I am quite taken with this book, which at 234 pages is "just right" and well crafted and edited to tell an important story. This is a story about applied intelligence in the finest sense of the word. It is a story about a man well-versed in traditional economic research, traditional models, traditional assumptions about the marketplace, who was put into the most important position in the global financial system at just the right time. His intuition allowed him to detect unexplained changes in productivity and to direct new lines of research that helped persuade more conventional authorities to follow his strategy.

This is also a story about a uniquely successful partnership between a Republican central banker and a Democratic President—the very heart of the story centers around Greenspan's ability to persuade a very smart President that deficit reduction was the critical ingredient for a long-term restoration of American prosperity. Aided by an equally smart Secretary of the Treasury, Rubin, it was the President's initiative to reduce the deficit by over \$140 billion dollars that allowed all else to follow. There is a clear message here for those who would reduce taxes before finishing the job of eliminating the deficit.

As a professional intelligence officer, I am very very impressed by the author's recounting of how Greenspan actually "does" the job of intelligence collection and analysis at his level—the Central Intelligence Agency could learn a great deal from this man. The integration of constant (every fifteen minutes) monitoring of key indicators, the preparation of detailed research and statistics reports, and—by far the most important element—the continuous cycle of direct telephone calls and personal meetings across all sectors of the economy and around the globe, define what must be the most efficient and effective and valuable directed intelligence operation in the world—and one that does not steal the information it needs!

There are a number of observations throughout the book that are helpful at a strategic level:

- 1) deficit reduction is the single best thing any President can do—that enables the Fed to be effective;

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

- 2) we forget so quickly how desperate the American economy was in the late 1980's- in a volatile world it would be all too easy to enter a recession or have a major financial panic;
- 3) structured decision-making is extremely dependent on the models and the data- Greenspan's place in history is assured because he had the intellect and the patience and the gut instincts to realize that the data was incomplete or too aggregated and the modeling assumptions were dated and no longer sufficient to plot the course of the new economy;
- 4) the psychology of the marketplace is at least as important as the reality, and is likely to be hurt by loose-cannon White House elements with good intentions but out of bounds;
- 5) even the so-called best and brightest in any Presidential administration will categorize new ideas they do not understand as "incoherent if not idiotic", as Greenspan's emerging new ideas were labeled by the top Treasury economists;
- 6) the concept of wealth redistribution fails to understand that even if \$1 trillion from the 225 richest people in the world were redistributed to the poorest of the earth, this would only give them \$1 a day for a year-Greenspan's focus is on underlying structural changes and the advancement of capitalism such that wealth can be created for the poor on a sustained basis; and
- 7) there will always be wild cards, such as the Savings & Loan crisis, the LTCM (Long Term Capital Management) crisis, and the Mexico crisis, that require a financial management or central banking network able to capitalize on personal relationships and deep knowledge to find impromptu solutions. On the latter note, it makes one realize that in an increasingly volatile marketplace, there should probably be much stricter limits on "leveraged" actions, where the majority of the money for gambling on the stock market or in the bond market-as much as 95% of the money-is borrowed and therefore likely to be defaulted if the wrong bet is placed.

There is nothing in the book regarding any steps that Greenspan has taken or is considering in order to bring added stability to the marketplace. If I have one criticism of this otherwise superb book, a book that sheds light on many aspects of the Fed and its Chairman, it is that there is no hint here of what Greenspan has learned that might lead him to suggest legislative or regulatory changes intended to improve public transparency of key economic transactions, limitations on risk intended to prevent one rogue elephant (e.g. LTCM) from bringing down the market, and so on.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

I would have liked to see a summation, even a two-page appendix, on the "before" and "after" economic models that Greenspan helped to change, and also some sense in the conclusion of what needs to be changed to keep future market crises within the bounds that can be managed by the Fed--Greenspan clearly has broad shoulders and a broad mind, but he can't carry the load forever and this book fails to focus on what changes are needed to institutionalize the Greenspan wisdom.

Zegart, Amy, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, 2000)

This is a very worthy and thoughtful book. It breaks new ground in understanding the bureaucratic and political realities that surrounded the emergence of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA was weak by design, strongly opposed by the military services from the beginning. Its covert activities emerged as a Presidential prerogative, unopposed by others in part because it kept CIA from being effective at coordinated analysis, for which it had neither the power nor the talent.

Most usefully, the book presents a new institutionalist theory of bureaucracy that gives full weight to the original design, the political players including the bureaucrats themselves, and external events. Unlike domestic agencies that have strong interest groups, open information, legislative domain, and unconnected bureaucracies, the author finds that national security agencies, being characterized by weak interest groups, secrecy, executive domain, and connected bureaucracies, evolve differently from other bureaucracies, and are much harder to reform.

On balance, the author finds that intelligence per se, in contrast to defense or domestic issues, is simply not worth the time and Presidential political capital needed to fix but that if reform is in the air, the President should either pound on the table and put the full weight of their office behind a substantive reform proposal, or walk away from any reform at all--the middle road will not be successful.

Reference

***The Economist Pocket World in Figures 1999* (Wiley, 1998)**

This is the best value for having global figures handy, and is one tenth the cost of the other great reference work, the *Fitzroy Dearborn Book of World Rankings*. Perhaps

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

even more to the point, this book has something the other one does not: country by country data (although one could always go to the *CIA World Factbook* online for similar data as well as biographic listings). Having said that, it does not have the full range of detail that is offered by the other, such as domestic water shortages and energy consumption. This book has Internet and music charts—but none of the charts are comprehensive, generally listing top and bottom countries, not all countries. Bottom line: this is the best value for a portable book about global figures relevant to political economy.

***Fitzroy Dearborn Book of World Rankings* (Fitzroy Dearborn, 1998)**

Although this book does not have country by country, and it has not been "modernized" with a special section on the Internet, I could not do without it. While I recommend *The Economist Pocket World in Figures* as the best value (one-tenth the cost), I find that this...book is essential to any serious personal library. However, for what the book costs, I would like to see a web-based password-access database offered that would allow data extraction and chart creation. This book is superior to *The Economist* version in that it lists all countries for which data is available (generally 135-185), and it is a more diverse and well-presented collection of data.

Gessaman, Don, with Michael O'Bannon and Joseph Hezir, *Understanding the Budget of the United States Government* (The EOP Foundation, fifth edition, March 2001) ISBN 0-96582-1-9

This amazing little book is not listed on Amazon, which is a real shame, because it is one of the best guides, be it for citizens or officials, to the ins and outs of the U.S. federal budget process. In nineteen chapters, totaling 201 pages, the book methodically and elegantly covers budget concepts, revenue, taxes, spending, the rules, key players, the inter-play between the Administration and Congress on the three budgets in progress at any one time, and the basics of budget execution, the government performance and results act as well as the government-wide performance plan. The book concludes with chapters on the politics of the budget, governance, the regulatory process, the information collection budget and information technology management, opportunities, challenges, and terms (glossary).

It is my understanding that this book is used by Cabinet officers as a reference. It can be ordered by writing to the EOP Foundation at 819 7th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001, or by calling (202) 833-8940.

Keegan, John and Andrew Wheatcroft, *Zones of Conflict: An Atlas of Future War* (Simon & Schuster, 1986)

Zones of Conflict has not yet been surpassed by other published works, mostly because others focus on specific regions. This is still a valuable work, largely because of the process and the framework it provides for thinking about geographically and culturally based sources of conflict. Published in 1986, it missed some big ones: Somalia, Rwandi-Burundi, the Congo, the break-up of Yugoslavia with the Kosovo aftermath. We'll give them credit for the Gulf flashpoint. What's the point? No one can predict with any certainty where major humanitarian conflicts will emerge, but if one combines Keegan and Wheatcroft's approach with environmental and economic and social overlays (such as are offered by several other *State of the World* endeavors), then a useful starting point is available for asking two important questions: what kinds of conflicts will we be dealing with, under what kinds of terrain and cultural conditions; and second, given those realities, what kinds of forces and capabilities should we be developing? Against this model, the U.S. Joint 2020 vision falls woefully short, and the NATO alliance appears equally unprepared for a future that will be characterized by "dirty little wars" well out of NATO's area but highly relevant to the well-being of the NATO population. One might also make the somewhat puckish point that it does not take a \$30 billion dollar a year spy community to create a common-sense strategic document such as this—it \$20 (now out of print, 16 used copies are available at Amazon for between \$5 and \$7.50).

Pack, Thomas, *10 Minute Guide to Business Research on the Net* (Que McMillan, 1997)

The bottom line on this little book is that it merits buying and throwing in your suitcase if you are the kind of person that needs to do your own research from the road. In a nutshell, it is: 1) valuable because it brings together in one place a very easy to read and use guide to a wide range of Internet-based resources; 2) dangerous because it may tempt business managers to do their own research from a hotel room rather than rely on real information professionals; 3) incomplete in many ways—two obvious ones are its neglect of the meta-search engines such as Copernic and its oversights of the *Burwell Worldwide Directory of Information Brokers*; and 4) worth buying as a light-weight (double entendre intended) reference. I like it, it is worth the price and still relevant today.

Smith, Dan, *The State of the World Atlas* (Penguin, 1999)

This book, together with *The State of War and Peace*, is a desktop classic that would make an outstanding gift for any student of any age, and for any adult concerned about the state of the world we are leaving to our children. This is much more than a book of graphic generalizations; as a researcher myself I especially appreciate the specific identification of the sources that were consulted, and the summaries of each of the major political-legal, socio-economic, techno-demographic, ideo-cultural, and natural-geographic conditions threatening the stability of the "Whole Earth". I dare to think this book should be required reading for our elected representatives as well as our military commanders charged with "shaping" their regional environments.

The past editions Michael Kidron and Ronald Segal, both published by Simon & Schuster in 1981 and 1991, are still worth collecting as the specifics have changed over time and some useful differences remain.

Smith, Dan, *The State of War and Peace Atlas* (Penguin, 1997)

Together with the *State of the World Atlas*, this book ranks as one of the very best and most useful compilations of what I call "strategic generalizations", but with the very great added value of being presented in a graphical form that is easy to understand. As the international media becomes less and less useful as a means of appreciating how global conditions threaten our own internal security and prosperity, guide books like this one become all the more valuable to citizens and their elected representatives. This is an essential desk reference for every student striving to learn how to think, not just memorize, and for every adult who cares to understand just how unstable and diminishing is the world we are leaving to our children. The book is *not* out-of-date in 2000, but we would all benefit from a new edition coming out that might expand on the core value of the 1997 edition.

Strategy

Aaron, Henry J. and Robert D. Reischauer (eds.), *Setting National Priorities: The 2000 Election and Beyond* (Brookings, 1999)

The public policy overviews by Brookings are always among the best, and they are even more valuable this year when several think tanks appear to have defaulted on their traditional role in offering up reviews for consideration by the transition team. Across

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

the various issue areas, including international, social, domestic, and governance policy domains, they present thoughtful recommendations.

Unfortunately, despite their deep understanding of the dilemmas facing the next President, the book does not provide the two things I would most like to have seen:

- one or two page "decision-papers" that set out the choices to be made within each issue area, and the specific budget costs and timelines for those choices; and
- a larger over-all budget choice document in no more than 2 pages that outlines what changes might be made in both the budget construction already underway in CY 2001 that the new President can influence, and the budget to be prepared from scratch in CY 2002 that should reflect the vital trade-offs as well as the vital plus-ups that need to be made in defense, intelligence, public health, and education, to name just my top four.

In defense and intelligence, my specific area of interest, I would have liked to see some specific recommendations, and their costs, for restoring the 450 ship Navy, creating the contingency and peacekeeping force as well as the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief forces, and some specifics on considerably reinforcing diplomatic, peace corps, and economic assistance operations including a Digital Marshall Plan. This is not to quarrel with findings and views of the authors, all of whom merit very serious consideration, but rather to note that the book does not go far enough, either in specific programmatic terms, or in politically useful presentation terms.

This is an excellent book, but it is also a classic example of unfettered brilliance—without the concise decision papers and the over-all budget numbers, this book will only be read by staffers, not by principals, and that is a shame, because on balance I think there is a great deal to be learned from each of the authors contributing to this work.

Abshire, David, *Preventing World War III: A Realistic Grand Strategy* (Harper & Row, 1988)

This book, apart from being the world's longest job description (for a Counselor to the President for Grand Strategy), remains a vibrant and provocative discussion relevant to guiding the Nation into the 21st Century. Part I discusses the "world theater" and Part II discusses in turn a grand strategy and then political, public, deterrence, negotiating, resources, technology, Third World, and economic strategies. The book ends with thoughts on organizing for strategy that should, because of who wrote them and how

good they are, be required reading, in their twelve-page entirety, for the President and his entire Cabinet team.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (Basic Books, 1997)

Anyone concerned with America's national security should be reading this book. The fact that it is four years old (older if one considers the intellectual gestation period), simply adds historical proof that its author is, as the Chinese have noted publicly, America's greatest strategist.

This book is written in plain English. That alone sets it apart from the next level down. This is a carefully presented essay that makes eminent sense. It deals with the most important region in the world: the troubled Eurasian land mass. Rich in resources, rife with ethnic conflict and water scarcity issues, it is surrounded by major powers with global ambitions: France and Germany to the West, Russia to the North, China to East, and Iran and Turkey to the South. A number of clearly presented maps add considerable value to the book.

With a level of calm and reason that is rare in books of this sort, Brzezinski provides an understandable yet sophisticated articulation of a real-world "grand strategy" essential to the future of America in this new century. His strategic vision honors both France and Germany as co-equal and vital elements of a new European community; shows how the larger Europe (ultimately co-equal to America) is essential to the salvation of Russia; makes the case for an American-Chinese strategic accommodation as the anchor for America's involvement in Eurasia; carefully integrates America's direct and special relations with Japan, Korea, and India as the bowl beneath China and Eurasia, and then concludes with decisive evaluations of the future importance of drawing Turkey into the European community while encouraging Iranian-Turkish collaboration and Iranian commercial and commodities channels from Eurasia out to the world. In passing, the author validates Australia's new strategy of working closely with Indonesia to resolve the latter's many ethnic issues while establishing a southern line against excessive Chinese influence in the region.

There are numerous subtle and deep insights throughout the book, from the observation that war may now be a luxury only the poorest of nations can afford, to why China should consider America its natural ally and why Russia is at risk of becoming genetically Asian instead of European within a generation or two. The author proposes a new Trans-Eurasian Security System (TESS) that engages Russia, China, Japan and America—one would assume that at some point Turkey, Iran, and the new Europe would be included. The author goes a number a sacred oxen, including those associated with

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

the demonization of Iran (this should end) and the exaggeration of China as a global threat (it will at best be a regional super-power at the high end of Third World per capita earnings). While other poor Nations have defeated America decisively (Viet-Nam, for example), the author deliberately itemizes China's 3 million men under arms, it's 9,400 tanks and 5,224 fighters, as well as its 57 surface ships and 53 submarines, and offers his final judgment that China and America have too many common interests to permit a demonization of China to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as it might if China were confronted across the board and denied its reasonable historical claim to having influence over the region that hosts the "Middle Kingdom."

A special note is in order about the importance of this book as an antidote to two viral infections now afflicting many otherwise excellent thinkers. This book is a marvelous, deeply grounded treatment of the historical constancy of strategy qua "enduring interests" and grand players-as much as one may wish to speculate about the globalization and localization of international politics, Brzezinski puts it all in a grand strategic context that is compelling in its logic as well as its understanding of the deep cultural threads that we must weave together if we are to survive one another's less enlightened machinations. Another strength of the book is its avoidance of the technophilia that has corrupted strategic thinking at the highest levels. The Revolution in Military Affairs and the "systems of systems", while well-intentioned, are both devoid of serious strategic reasoning-as Colin Gray among others have pointed out, technology is not strategy, nor does it follow that strong technology will defeat an enemy with weak technology but a stronger strategic culture and the ability to wage war by means other than force on force.

This book, together with Colin Gray's *Modern Strategy*, Robert Young Pelton's *World's Most Dangerous Places*, the two books by Robert Kaplan on his travels in the Eurasian region, and both Michael Klare's book on *Resource Wars* as well as Marq de Villier's book on *Water: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource*, will make any intelligent person as conversant as they need to be with the most pressing geopolitical issues of our time. If one adds Joe Thornton's book on *Pandora's Poison*, David Helvarg's book on *Blue Frontier: Saving America's Living Seas*, Laurie Garrett's book *Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health*, and William Shawcross on *Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict*, the lesser but still vital long-term issues of the environment, public health, and ethnic conflict will be fully appreciated.

I mention all these books deliberately, to make the point that it is Brzezinski's book that is both the foundation and the capstone for integrating the analysis from these other diverse renditions into a grand strategy. No one else has done it. He is America's foremost strategist and likely to remain so for some time to come.

Carter, Ashton B. and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Brookings, 1999)

The authors provide a coherent discussion of fully half of the security challenges facing us in the 21st century. They wisely avoid the debate swirling around the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)-but deserve credit for their predecessor "offset strategy"-and simply note that the absence of "A List" threats gives us an opportunity to strengthen and maintain our traditional nuclear and conventional capabilities against the day when a Russia or China may rise in hostility against us. The book as a whole focuses on the "B List" threats, including Russia in chaos, a hostile China acting aggressively within its region, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and catastrophic terrorism. They note, correctly, that most of the spending and effort today is focused on responding to the crisis *de jure*, some but not enough resources are applied to preparing for the future, and virtually nothing is being done against the latest concept, that of "shaping" the environment through "forward engagement." Perhaps most importantly, they introduce the term "defense by other means" and comment on the obstacles, both within the Administration and on the Hill, to getting support and funding for non-military activities with profound security benefits.

Although others may focus on their discussion of Russia and NATO as the core of the book, what I found most helpful and worthwhile was the straight-forward and thoughtful discussion of the need for a new national strategy, a new paradigm, for dealing with potentially catastrophic terrorism. Their understanding of what defense resources can be applied, and of the impediments to success that exist today between state & local law enforcement, federal capabilities such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and defense as well as overseas diplomatic and intelligence capabilities, inspire them to propose several innovative approaches to this challenge. The legal and budgetary implications of their proposals are daunting but essential-their proposals for dealing with this one challenge would be helpful in restructuring the entire U.S. government to better integrate political-diplomatic-military-law enforcement operations with judicial and congressional oversight as well as truly all-source intelligence support.

Interesting side notes include 1) the early discovery in US-Russian military discussions that technology interoperability and future collaboration required the surmounting of many obstacles associated with decades of isolated (and often secret) development; 2) the absence of intelligence from the entire book-by this account, US defense leaders spend virtually all of their time in direct operational discussions with their most important counterparts, and there is very little day to day attention to strategic analysis, estimative intelligence, or coordination with diplomatic, economic, and law

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

enforcement counterparts at home; 3) the difficulty of finding a carrier to send to Taiwan at a time when we had 12 carriers—only four appear to have been "real" for defense purposes; and 4) the notable absence of Australia from the discussion of security in Asia.

The concept of Preventive Defense is holistic (requiring the simultaneous uses of other aspects of national power including diplomacy and economic assistance) but places the Department of Defense in a central role as the provider of realigned resources, military-to-military contacts, and logistics support to actual implementation. Unfortunately the concept of Preventive Defense has been narrowly focused (its greatest success has been the dismantling of former Soviet nuclear weapons in the Commonwealth of Independent States), and neither the joint staff nor the services are willing to give up funds for weapons and manpower in order to make a strategy of Preventive Defense possible.

This resistance bodes ill for the other half of the 21st Century security challenge, what the author's call the "C List"—the Rwandas, Somalias, Haitis and Indonesias. They themselves are unwilling to acknowledge C List threats as being vital to U.S. security in the long-term (as AIDS is now recognized). I would, however, agree with them on one important point: the current budget for defense should be repurposed toward readiness, preparing for the future, and their concept of preventive defense, and it should not be frittered away on "C List" contingencies—new funds must be found to create and sustain America's Preventive Diplomacy and its Operations Other Than War (OOTW) capabilities.

It will fall to someone else to integrate their concept of Preventive Defense with the emerging concepts of Preventive Diplomacy, International Tribunals, and a 21st Century Marshall Plan for the festering zones of conflict in Africa, Arabia, Asia, and the Americas—zones where ethnic fault lines, criminal gangs, border disputes, and shortages of water, food, energy, and medicine all come together to create a breeding ground for modern plagues that will surely come across our water's edge in the future.

On balance, through, this book makes the top grade for serious bi-partisan dialogue, and they deserve a lot of credit for defining solutions for the first half of our security challenges in the 21st Century.

Cimbala, Stephen J., *Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy* (Praeger, 2001)

The author, and this book, may well be among the strongest elements of what I perceive to be a growing backlash against the prevalent technophilia characteristic of the

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

military-industrial complex that President and General Eisenhower warned us against--a technophilia that advocates a "system of systems" with no provision for strategy, doctrine, or intelligence; and a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that looks to micro-UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and robotic ants as the primary means for defeating any enemy. We will simply assume every enemy will conveniently expose themselves to the narrow range of capabilities that we have devised at great expense!

The author provides as good a review of "friction" in war and in policy as one could hope for. Although sometimes tedious and not always easy to follow, this book is a must for any serious scholar of future conflicts between states, nations, and organizations. Above all, this book is a giant compressed Castor Oil pill for the techno-meisters so eager to believe they can shape a world where our money and our technology can overcome every obstacle and every opponent.

A few highlights intended to recommend the purchase of this book and its digestion:

- 1) Friction is not receiving the attention it merits from modern social scientists, including all those on the Department of Defense payroll. We still conceptualize our capabilities along techno-rational lines instead of human-normal chaos lines.
- 2) It is the combination of thoughtful doctrine, individual and unit discipline, initiative at all levels, and good intelligence (individual, organic, and external) that leads to victory through the reduction of friction--what General Alfred M. Gray, former Commandant of the Marine Corps institutionalized with his concept of "commander's intent" on top of training for war with the assumption that communications and computing *will* collapse in the heat of battle.
- 3) Although very brief in his coverage of intelligence per se, the author is helpful in reviewing Clausewitz's top eight sources of friction, the first three of which deal with information: insufficient knowledge of the enemy; unreliable information from patrols and spies; and uncertain knowledge of our own capabilities and dispositions. The author administers the *coup de grace* to technophiles with some elegant quotes from these worthies claiming that the new world of satellite intelligence is taking us to a non-Clauswitzian world where friction can be overcome by "information superiority"--these are the same folks that cannot find Bin Laden and had to invade Panama in order to capture Noriega--the same folks that let a warlord in Somalia run amok and let a small crowd chase away a U.S. Navy ship of war from docking in Haiti...the same folks that ignore 18 distinct genocide campaigns on-going today, with all that implies in terms of forced migration and epidemic disease and failed states and rampant destabilizing crime.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

- 4) The author's review of groupthink (Janis) and how this leads to policy fiascos is very worthwhile, not only because it is acutely relevant to how we are making decisions today in defense, energy, health, and fiscal policy, but because it highlights so clearly the dangers that come from a leadership that thinks it is invulnerable, morally superior, self-censored, sharing illusions of unanimity, subject to stereotyped visions of the world, and--worst of all--protected from reality by self appointed "mind guards" who put direct pressure on "deviant" naysayers (or dump them from the team).
- 6) The author is one of the few to focus on the impact of friction on what Clausewitz calls the ultimate disconnect, that between ends and means in war. As America prepares to rethink its military force structure, it is especially appropriate to note that we are planning to downsize the conventional forces while investing heavily in electronic capabilities, at the same time that the most advanced thinkers have moved beyond asymmetric war to non-traditional soft power including major emphasis on disease control, water preservation, transnational law enforcement, and major diplomatic and economic assistance options. Looking at today's situation through the author's eyes and this book, one can see that we do not have a strategy; we don't even try to understand what everyone else's strategy might be; and we are completely ignoring the need to fully integrate home front and overseas defense, foreign affairs, and trade strategy and capabilities management.

Over the course of 7 chapters, the author reviews friction both at the policy/acquisition level and the operational level of command, in relation to irrelevant and inflexible war plans; nuclear crisis management; within Desert Storm; in small wars, "faux wars" and peace operations; in modern deterrence; and in relation to mass destruction and information warfare paradigms. In the latter instance, he is acutely sensitive to the teachings of Dr. Steve Blank, that one man's information "warning" attack is another man's signal for "total war"--witness Russian doctrine that considers a C4I attack to be fundamental and requiring an immediate "dead hand" retaliatory attack.

The author concludes the book with a review of simple, compound, and complex friction in policy and operations, with examples, and for this section alone the book merits inclusion in any serious library concerned with international security.

Gray, Colin S., *Modern Strategy* (Oxford, 1999)

First published in 1999, this is an original *tour d' horizon* that is essential to any discussion of the theory and practice of conflict in the 21st Century, to include all those discussions of the alleged Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the need for "defense transformation", and the changing nature of civil-military relations.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

I am much impressed by this book and the decades of thinking that have gone into it, and will outline below a few of its many signal contributions to the rather important questions of how one must devise and manage national power in an increasingly complex world.

First, the author is quite clear on the point that technology does not a revolution make—nor can technology dominate a national strategy. If anything—and he cites Luttwak, among others, with great regard—an excessive emphasis on technology will be very expensive, susceptible to asymmetric attack, and subversive of other elements of the national strategy that must be managed in harmony. People matter most.

Second, and this is the point that hit me hardest, it is clear that security strategy requires a holistic approach and the rather renaissance capability of managing a multiplicity of capabilities—diplomatic, economic, cultural, military, psychological, information—in a balanced manner and under the over-arching umbrella of a strategy.

Third, and consistent with the second, "war proper" is not exclusively about force of arms, but rather about achieving the national political objective by imposing one's will on another. Those that would skew their net assessments and force structure capabilities toward "real war" writ in their conventional terms are demeaning Clausewitz rather than honoring him.

Fourth, as I contemplate in this and other readings how best to achieve lasting peace and prosperity, I see implicit in all that the author puts forward, but especially in a quote from Donald Kegan, the raw fact that it is not enough for America to have a preponderance of the traditional military and economic power in the world—we must also accept the burden and responsibility of preserving the peace and responding to the complex emergencies around the globe that must inevitably undermine our stability and prosperity at home.

Fifth, it is noteworthy that of all the dimensions of strategy that are brought forward, one—time—is unique for being unimprovable. Use it or lose it. Time is a strategic dimension too little understood and consequently too little valued by Americans in particular and the Western alliance in general.

Sixth, it merits comment that the author, perhaps the greatest authority on Clausewitz in this era, clarifies the fact that the "trinity" is less about people, government, and an army, than about primordial violence, hatred, and enmity (the people); chance and probability on the battlefield, most akin to a game of cards (the army); and instrumental rationality (the government)—and that these are not fixed isolated elements, but interpenetrate one another and interact in changing ways over time and space.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Seventh, the author devotes an entire chapter to "Strategic Culture as Context" and this is most helpful, particularly in so far as it brings forward the weakness of the American strategic culture, notably a pre-disposition to isolationism and to technical solutions in the abstract. Perhaps more importantly, a good strategic culture with inferior weapons can defeat a weak strategic culture with an abundance of technology and economic power.

Eighth, and finally, the author courageously takes on the issue of small wars and other savage violence, seeking to demonstrate that grand strategy applies equally well to the savage criminal and warlord parasites that Ralph Peters has noted are not susceptible to our traditional legal and military conventions. While he does not succeed (and notes in passing that Clausewitz's own largest weakness was a failure to catalogue the enemy and the dialog with the enemy as a major factor in strategic success and failure), the coverage is acceptable in making three key points:

- 1) small wars and sub-national conflicts are generally not resolved decisively at the irregular level-conventional forces are required at some point;
- 2) special operations forces have a role to play but lack a strategic context (that is to say, current political and military leaders have no appreciation for the strategic value of special operations forces); and
- 3) small wars and non-traditional threats-asymmetrical threats-must be taken seriously and co-equally with symmetrical regular conflicts.

At the end of the day, this erudite scholar finds common cause with gutter warrior Ralph Peters and gang-warfare iconoclast Martin Van Creveld by concluding his book with a quote from Alexander Solzhenitsyn: "In the Computer Age we will live by the law of the Stone Age: the man with the bigger club is right. But we pretend this isn't so. We don't notice or even suspect it-why surely our morality progresses together with our civilization."

Howard, Michael, *The Invention of Peace* (Yale, 2000)

This is an essay with deep insights, but it is not a portal to other knowledge as it lacks any notes or bibliography. The author is one of our top strategists, historians, and teachers of war and peace.

The settlement of disputes among groups whose grievances are so great they are willing to die rather than accept impositions from others, are a fact of life. As 11 September

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

has shown us, we are vulnerable to unconventional attacks against civilians, within our own borders--this book is relevant and readable.

The core idea is that only organized nation-states that can command the loyalty and obedience of their citizens, are capable of preventing war and championing peace. The concepts of corporate peace and non-governmental peace are explicitly disavowed.

Legitimization and brutality are recurring themes in history--peace among nations occurs when mutual respect or fear legitimize the status quo, and incredible brutalities, including routine massacres of "infidel" civilians, occur when states fail to control themselves or their populations.

A major disruptive factor in today's world is the combination of educated but unemployed masses within the Arabian and Islamic nations, and the globalization of communications--but it is a one-way globalization, firehosing the Muslims with corporate consumerist visions and impositions, while a Muslim Press Service has yet to form. Individual states--one could suggest that the United States is among them--failing to nurture a clear definition of citizenship, and the requisite loyalties--are destined to suffer internal fragmentation and external attack.

Strong militaries are needed to win wars, but overt military intervention is not the route to a sustainable peace in today's complex environment--only diplomacy, cultural outreach, and mutually agreed consensus can create and sustain peace....this is the simple yet brutal message of this book, one our leaders have yet to grasp.

Kagan, Donald and Frederick W. Kagan, *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today* (St. Martin's Press, 2000)

Two proven historians, a father-son team, draw stark comparisons between the post World War I period in which Britain took a gigantic "peace dividend" and allows its national defenses to crumble, and the post Cold War period in which America has done the same. Those who trust the Kagan's analysis--as does the distinguished Colin Gray, master of strategic thinking--may skip the first half of the book and go directly to the second half focusing on the American experience.

This is not, as some might claim, an ideological treatise. It is firmly grounded in history and the authors strive to present a balanced reasonable theme. I believe they succeed. Even for those steeped in the literature of the American military, there are new lessons in this book. Perhaps the three most important lessons are these: 1) regional threats can become global threats without sufficient warning such as is necessary to reconstitute

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

global defenses; 2) successful diplomacy is best founded on the immediate availability of armed force that can be projected to any point on the globe with great credibility; 3) national security, unlike domestic policies, is not something to be achieved by consensus—this is where the President earns their keep, by guiding and forging a consensus in the absence of domestic constituencies for spending on external affairs and external security.

Especially gripping for anyone who anticipates a future in which Dick Cheney and Colin Powell have something to say about our national security, is the authors' analysis of their strategic decisions following the Cold War. Both Cheney and Powell get very high marks for understanding that global strength is a pre-requisite for stability and security. The Powell vision for a Base Force with Atlantic, Pacific, Strategic, and Contingency force elements is categorized as brilliant. Powell does, however, get very low marks for being consistently unwilling to use force to impose order in the absence of clear objectives—the authors are very clear in calling the Weinberger Doctrine (setting conditions under which force may be used) completely out of date and at odds with today's needs. Both President Bush and Chairman Powell are severely castigated for having ended the Gulf War too soon and without a decisive result—the author's compare this to the similarly indecisive outcome of World War I, an outcome that left the aggressors strong enough to come back and fight another day.

The authors then go on to systematically review a series of major foreign policy and defense failures in the Clinton administration, an Administration characterized by a consistent failure to understand and address the mismatch between wandering and vacillating foreign policies and attendant commitments, and the real-world capabilities of a declining military force. Especially dangerous, in the authors' view, was the Bottom Up Review approach that abandoned the Cheney-Powell appreciation for maintaining sufficient force to deter two regional surprise attacks (Russia and Iraq on one side, China and North Korea on the other), and instead adopted the premise that 6 months warning would be available, that reconstitution of both the force and its industrial base was possible, and that forces could be justified only in terms of existing threats, most of them from non-state actors. Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Iraq inspections, North Korea inspections, these are all reviewed and all are found to have left America with a legacy of half measures. "By trying to ignore the problem, to leave it to others, whether the UN or NATO, by declaring it to be of no vital interest to the United States, by refusing to use any force once involved and then to use adequate force once committed, they [Bush Sr. and Clinton] found themselves making the very mistakes that brought defeat and disaster in Vietnam, the fear of which had played so great a role, first in their failure to act and then in their inadequate response."

In their conclusion, the authors find that the next Administration will assume responsibility at a time when the rest of the world has learned, from the past eight years,

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

that America is not willing to summon the forces to defeat aggression; that developing weapons of mass destruction is the fastest means to elicit billion dollar bribes from America; that ethnic cleansing and politically driven mass starvation will not inspire intervention by America. "The most likely American response will be neglect, at first, followed by some attempt at negotiation. If, at last, driven to action, the Americans attack, it will be from the air, employing limited rules of engagement, and it will not destroy the aggressor. Ground forces will almost certainly not be used until the aggressor himself invites them in as part of a negotiation that gives him [the aggressor] most of what he wants. Above all, he should be sure to develop weapons of mass destruction. Even the hint of such a program in a threatening country will bring high-level American officials on top-secret missions to bribe its leaders to abandon the program. They will probably be able to keep the bribe and to pursue the programs they like, as well. These are the lessons America has given the world in the past eight years..."

The book closes by concluding that the strategic pause is gone and it is almost too late. Forces have declined severely (one can only lament the ill-considered Navy program for decommissioning destroyers and frigates that, once decommissioned, are almost impossible to resurrect), coalitions and alliances are in disarray, and non-state actors have learned how to play on the naiveté of the U.S. Government. America's responsibilities for global stability and security are "inescapable", and the next President must make the necessary commitments and be materially and morally ready to meet them.

Kagan, Robert and William Kristol (eds.), *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (Encounter, 2000)

This is a very worthy book, and should be much much higher in the popular sales ranking. I bought this book at the same time that I bought the more historically grounded *While America Sleeps*, and could not have asked for a better companion volume. Finally, I understand the forces that are tearing George W. Bush in two on the one side, the conservative isolationists, who believe that we must reject internationalism in all forms, and eschew intervention or "911 missions" at all costs—and on the other side, the conservative internationalists, who by this excellent account have both a pragmatic and realistic grasp of the lessons of history, of the shrinking globe that we find in the present, and of the speed with which "regional" threats can become global challenges.

The two introductory contributions, one on the national interest and global responsibility, the other on the differences between conservative isolationists and

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

conservative internationalists and all others, are extraordinarily essential readings for anyone who hopes to understand the early days-and contradictory signals-of the next Administration. Individual chapters by very well-qualified experts cover the conservative internationalist view of China, Russia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Europe and NATO, Asian Allies, and Israel. More general chapters address the decline of America's armed forces and the strategic case for dealing with weapons proliferation. The book concludes with three truly essential readings for any citizen, student, businessman, bureaucrat, or policymaker: on morality and foreign policy by William Bennett, on statesmanship in the new century by Paul Wolfowitz, and on strength and will in historical perspective by Donald Kagan.

Well-footnoted and indexed, this is a very serious professional contribution to the rather lackluster national discussion about where our national security and foreign policy should be going. As one who previously advocated a change from 2+ major regional conflicts (MRC) to 1 MRC and three separate forces for dealing with crime, environmental and cultural movements, and electronic and economic warfare (1+iii), I am now fully persuaded, mostly by the Kagan's book *While America Sleeps* but also by this book, that we should go toward a 2+iii national security strategy.

My one concern about this book is that it completely ignores what is quaintly called Program 150--all that State Department, Peace Corps, Agency for International Development stuff. It also mentions intelligence and counterintelligence only in passing. Conservative internationalists clearly have the brain power and the strategic vision and the historical understanding to be vital protectors of America's interests, but they must expand their vision to go beyond guns and consider the potential contributions of both diplomatic and economic butter, and applied intelligence. There is in fact a need to have a very strong Presidential program that fully advances, in an integrated fashion, American investments in diplomacy, defense, transnational crime fighting, economic assistance including a Digital Marshall Plan, and cultural exchanges worthy of a great Nation. This book lacks an appreciation for all the "soft" stuff, but it covers three of the four bases very nicely. A "strong buy."

Kupchan, Charles A., *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Cornell, 1994)

This book is extremely relevant to the forthcoming 2001 debate over alternative national security strategies. The author studies a number of cases of "adjustment failure" where great powers, at the height of their strength, engaged in self-defeating behavior—either overly cooperative behavior that resulted in strategic exposure, or overly competitive behavior that resulted in self-encirclement or over-extension.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

The author pays special attention to the inter-relationship between economic versus military resources (means) and international commitments (ends). Strategic culture is defined and discussed in an integrative fashion, in relation to the three levels of analysis (system, state, and individual), and is found to be the critical factor that constrains elites by trapping them in a strategic paradigm of their own making—one used to justify major expenditures that are now counterproductive, but whose abandonment would exact too high a domestic political price if reversed (such as a Revolution in Military Affairs?)

The author finds that strategic culture, unlike individual strategic beliefs, is resistant to incoming information and to change. States that are in decline and states that are rising tend to fall prey to "adjustment failure" and consequently to present other states with instability issues. In both cases elites tend to utilize national propaganda and education to inculcate a mass understanding that may support their intermediate objectives but ultimately frustrates strategic adjustment when they realize that what they are doing is only increasing their vulnerability.

Most interestingly for the United States of America, the author finds that it is only when a state is truly in a position of strength, that it can best recognize and adapt to radical changes in the external environment—in other words, now is the time to dump the 2+ Major Theater War strategy and adopt a competing strategy that more properly integrates economic and military means to achieve our national security ends. The author concludes with several specific prescriptions that are clearly pertinent to forthcoming Presidential and Congressional decisions at the dawn of the 21st Century and that must be appreciated if we are to have an effective national security policy in the next decade or two.

- First, the author is at one with Donald Kegan and Colin Gray in noting that the dissolution of the Soviet Union does not mean the end of U.S. strategic responsibilities in Europe;
- second, that at a time when there are many rising states emerging from the dissolution of the Soviet Union (as well as the fragmentation of larger states elsewhere) it is vital that these states be buffered against economic shock so as to avoid the instability conducive to the rise of aggressor governments;
- third, that there must be deliberate international programs in place to suppress or eliminate domestic pathologies that lead to aggressive behavior, and these must be progressively strong, beginning with economic assistance to eliminate the root causes of the instability; to sanctions and information operations as well as military preparations; and finally to outright military intervention with overwhelming force.

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

The author explicitly notes that the international community must exercise great care to identify and decisively stop emerging aggressors before they can become full-blown aggressor states—history as documented in the case studies contained in the book suggests that when confronted by a full-blown aggressor state, members of the international community will tend toward strategic accommodations policies and tolerance of aggression rather than the decisive interventionist action easiest to adopt at an earlier stage.

Finally, the author offers a prescription for avoiding surprise and confrontation, recommending that some form of international body be used to monitor and sanction any use of nationalist propaganda (such as generally precedes genocidal campaigns), and that this monitoring range from normal public sources down to educational materials used in the schools as well as government archives. By intention, the book focuses only on Europe and only on relations between states—there is much that could be done to broaden these useful insights to inform our strategy toward Asia, the Third World, specific failed states and "states of concern", and non-state groups.

Trade-Offs (Instruments of National Power)

Friedman, George and Meridith, *The Future of War: Power, Technology, and American World Dominance in the 21st Century* (St. Martin's, 1998)

The authors begin by noting that there is "a deep chasm between the advent of technology and its full implementation in doctrine and strategy." In their history of failure they note how conventional wisdom always seems to appreciate the systems that won the past wars, and observes that in the U.S. military there is a long history of transferring power from the political and military leadership to the technical and acquisition managers, all of whom have no real understanding of the current and future needs of the men who will actually fight.

They address America's vulnerability in both U.S.-based logistics and in overseas transport means.

"Destroying even a portion of American supply vessels could so disrupt the tempo of a logistical build-up as to delay offensive operations indefinitely."

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

They have a marvelous section on the weaknesses of U.S. data gathering tools, noting for example that satellites provide only a static picture of one very small portion of the battlefield, rather than the wide-area and dynamic "situational awareness" that everyone agrees is necessary.

They go on to gore other sacred oxen, including the Navy's giant ships such as the carrier (and implicitly the new Landing Platform Helicopters (LPH) for Marines as well as the ill-conceived arsenal ship) and the largest of the aircraft proposed by the Air Force.

They ultimately conclude that the future of war demands manned space stations that are able to integrate total views of the world with control of intercontinental precision systems, combined with a complete restructuring of the ground forces (most of which will be employed at the squad level) and a substantial restructuring of our naval force to provide for many small fast platforms able to swarm into coastal areas.

Goure, Daniel and Jeffrey M. Ranney, *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium* (CSIS, 1999)

The authors provide compelling evidence of a forthcoming "train wreck" in U.S. defensive capabilities, and make an excellent case for increasing the defense budget by \$60-100B a year for a mixture of preserving readiness; acquiring mid-term capabilities needed to replace a 20-30 year old mobility, weapons, and communications base force; and implementing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

This is a well-documented and heavily fact-laden book—the authors as individuals and the case they make in general terms—must be heeded by the next President and the next Congress.

Where the book does not go, and a companion book by the same authors would be of great value, is into the detail of WHAT threat, WHAT force structure. They accept, for example, the Navy's 304-ship Navy that keeps adding gigantic carriers and does nothing for littoral warfare or putting Marines within 24 hours of any country instead of 6 days. Similarly, they accept Air Force emphasis on fewer and fewer bigger and more sophisticated platforms of dubious utility in a 21st Century environment that requires long loiter, ranges of several hundred nautical miles without refueling, full lift in hot humid weather, and survivability in the face of electromagnetic weapons in the hands of thugs.

This book demonstrates a clear mastery of defense economics, and it is an important contribution to the bottom line: our national defense is desperately underfunded, and

this must be in the "top three" issues facing the 43rd President and the 107th Congress. What we buy, and why, has not yet been answered to my satisfaction.

Know, MacGregor and Williamson Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300-2050* (Cambridge, 2001)

This is the only serious book I have been able to find that addresses revolutions in military affairs with useful case studies, a specific focus on whether asymmetric advantages do or do not result, and a very satisfactory executive conclusion. This book is strongly recommended for both military professionals, and the executive and congressional authorities who persist in sharing the fiction that technology is of itself an asymmetric advantage.

It merits emphasis that the author's first conclusion, spanning a diversity of case studies, is that technology may be a catalyst but it rarely drives a revolution in military affairs--concepts are revolutionary, it is ideas that break-out of the box.

Their second conclusion is both counter-intuitive (but based on case studies) and in perfect alignment with Peter Drucker's conclusions on successful entrepreneurship: the best revolutions are incremental (evolutionary) and based on solutions to actual opponents and actual conditions, rather than hypothetical and delusional scenarios of what we think the future will bring us. In this the authors mesh well with Andrew Gordon's masterpiece on the rules of the game and Jutland: we may be best drawing down on our investments in peacetime, emphasizing the education of our future warfighters, and then be prepared for massive rapid agile investments in scaling up experimental initiatives as they prove successful in actual battle.

The book is noteworthy for its assault on fictional scenarios and its emphasis on realism in planning--especially valuable is the authors' staunch insistence that only honesty, open discussion among all ranks, and the wide dissemination of lessons learned, will lead to improvements.

Finally, the authors are in whole-hearted agreement with Colin Gray, author of *Modern Strategy*, in stating out-right that revolutions in military affairs are not a substitute for strategy as so often assumed by utopian planners, but merely an operational or tactical means.

This is a brilliant, carefully documented work that should scare the daylights out of every taxpayer--it is nothing short of an indictment of our entire current approach to military spending and organization. As the author's quaintly note in their understated way, in the last paragraph of the book, "the present trend is far from promising, as the

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

American government and armed forces procure enormous arsenals only distantly related to specific strategic needs and operational and tactical employment concepts, while continu[ing], in the immortal words of Kiffin Rockwell, a pilot in the legendary First World War Lafayette Escadrille, to 'fly along, blissfully ignorant, hoping for the best.'"

Lest the above be greeted with some skepticism, let us note the 26 October 2001 award of \$200 billion to Lockheed for the new Joint Strike Fighter calls into serious question whether the leadership in the Pentagon understands the real world--the real world conflicts of today--all 282 of them (counting 178 internal conflicts) will require the Joint Strike Fighter only 10% of the time--the other 90% of our challenges demand capabilities and insights the Pentagon is not only not capable of fielding, it simply refuses to consider them to be "real war." Omar Bin Laden beat the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, and he (and others who follow in his footsteps) will continue to do so until we find a military leadership that can lead a real-world revolution in military affairs.... rather than a continuing fantasy in which the military-industrial complex lives on regardless of how many homeland attacks we suffer.

Oakley, Robert B., Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.),
Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public
***Security* (National Defense University Press, 1998**

In considerable detail, with substantial commonality between a number of case studies, this book examines the traditional public security (police, internal order) function in relation to failed states and external interventions. This is not a book about the larger issue of when and how to intervene in the internal affairs of states beset by internal conflict and it is not a book about the actual conditions around the world that require some form of imposed or reinforced public order. Rather, it is the most detailed book one could hope for on the need for an international law enforcement reserve that is capable of rapidly filling the gap in local public police services that occurs when the indigenous capability collapses and traditional military forces arrive unprepared to meet this need.

All of the case studies are world-class, with primary source detail unlike any normally seen in the literature. All agree that this is a "force structure" issue that no government and certainly not the United Nations, has mastered, but most give due credit to UN civilian police operations for being the best available model upon which to build a future capability.

The summary of conclusions by Ambassador Oakley and Colonel Professor Dziedzic are alone worth the price of the book. If the Cold War era might be said to have

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

revolved around early perceptions of a "missile gap", the 21st Century with its Operations Other Than War (OOTW) could reasonably be said to have two issues: first, the natural conditions such as depleted water resources, which is not the book's focus, and the "globo-cop gap", which is.

The book documents in a very compelling manner the fact that there is a major capabilities (and intelligence) chasm between preventive diplomacy on the one side, and armed military forces on the other, and that closure of this gap is essential if we are to improve our prospects for rescuing and maintaining public order around the world.

The capabilities of U.S. military police and civil affairs specialists are touched on by several pieces, but I for one would have liked to see more emphasis on what changes in their force structure is required—my understanding is that we have not increased their numbers in the aftermath of the Cold War despite the fact that these units are being used up all over the world, without relief.

The conclusion highlights the need for constabulary forces, and helpfully identifies the following specific national capabilities as being relevant (in this reader's interpretation) to a future standing international gendarmerie: U.S. Military Police and Special Forces, French gendarmerie, Spanish Guardia Civil, Chilean carabineros, Argentine gendarmes, Italian carabinieri, Dutch Royal Marechaussee). I would add the Belgian Gendarme, the first national force to establish an open source intelligence network across all police precincts in the entire country.

It is clear from both the conclusion and the case studies that this constabulary-police capabilities requirement needs agreed-upon international concepts, doctrine, training, earmarked resources including surge capabilities and transport, and so on. We do not appear to have learned any lasting lessons from the various interventions, in that civil affairs and military police continue to be "last in line" for embarkation into areas where military forces are being introduced, and there is no U.S. program within Program 150 where we can demonstrate a real commitment to "law and order" as part of our contribution to peace in the 21st Century.

The book lacks an index, a typical shortcoming of think tank and defense educational institutions, and this is a major flaw that should be corrected in the next printing. This book is "Ref A" for every foreign service, military, and law enforcement officer interested in doing a better job of integrating diplomatic, gendarmerie, and military capabilities in every clime and place.

O'Hanlon, Michael, *Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration 2001-2005* (Brookings, 2001)

Every citizen needs to read and think about the future of national defense. This book is one of the core readings.

Among the recommendations in this book that make it essential reading for anyone concerned with streamlining and revitalizing national security, I consider the following to be sensible:

- 1) cost savings should not be achieved through the wholesale abandonment of overseas commitments (13);
- 2) achieve additional cost savings as well as increased operational utility by sharply limiting spending on the most advanced weapons and mobility systems, applying the savings to maintaining readiness and buying larger numbers of "good enough" weaponry (83);
- 3) citing Stephen Rosen—he could also have cited Colin Gray—he urges a slowdown in the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) while emphasizing that true RMA's are less about technology and more about the very best mix of people, time, and information to produce innovation (88);
- 4) in this vein, he noted the continued excessive focus on mobility platforms rather than C4I or joint service experimentation (90);
- 5) homeland defense needs several billion more dollars per year (129), a recapitalization of the U.S. Coast Guard by with at least a \$750 million a year increase (135), and a sharply increased focus on setting C4I security standards for unclassified communications and computing networks across the nation, with roughly \$100 million a year additional;
- 6) politely put, National Missile Defense is best conceptualized as theater missile defense (TMD, 143); and
- 7) Taiwan would be a nightmare for all sides.

Among the assertions in this book that give me pause are

- 1) defense down-sizing in the past ten years has been successful, trimming a third of the budget and manpower while retaining quality and cohesion (p. 1);
- 2) that 3% of the Gross Domestic Product is adequate for defense spending and we do not need to go to the less-than-traditional 4% (3-4);
- 3) that the Marine Corps should be employed to relieve Army troops in the Balkans (57) or Korea (80);
- 4) that North Korean armored forces would have great difficulty breaking through Allied lines to Seoul (71);

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

- 5) that rogue nations like North Korea would attempt to provide their infantry with chemical protective gear when using chemical weapons (73);
- 6) that US airpower is both a rapid-response solution for distant threats as well as an overwhelming response for sustained threats (76, passim);
- 7) that arsenal ships are survivable in off-shore loiter mode (111); and
- 8) that an overseas deployment rate of 8% of the total force is too high (227).

The author, easily one of the top three citizen-reviewers of the national security spending program, ultimately recommends less expensive weaponry, a different two-war capability ("1+A+i"), selective reductions in overseas deployments, more defense and less nuclear offense, selective increases in homeland defense including the U.S. Coast Guard and joint experimentation, and a modest increase (roughly \$25 billion) of the defense budget that would combine with his recommended savings to yield the \$60 billion or so transformation delta that others have recommended.

I like and recommend this book. Out of context, however, it is a dangerous book, for it will lead an inexperienced President and a Cold War team to the conclusion that only a transformation of the traditional military (Program 50) is necessary. O'Hanlon has done it again—he has provided the baseline from within which a reasonable public debate about defense transformation might ensue. The military issues he addresses comprise both the foundation and one of the four corners of our future national security—my concern about this book is that it is completely isolated and makes no mention of the other three corners without which we cannot maintain a proper roof over our heads: intelligence (threat understanding), strategy, and Program 150 soft power—power that today is both silent and emaciated.

O'Hanlon, Michael, *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare* (Brookings, 2000)

Graciously, and with wicked clarity, the author knocks the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs flat on its back, and then helps it to one knee. His introductory review of the RMA schools of thought (system of systems, dominant battlespace knowledge, global reach, and vulnerability or anti-access or asymmetric), with appropriate notes, is helpful to any adult student.

The heart of his book can be distilled down to one chart showing the expected rates of advance in the various technical domains relevant to military operations. Of 29 distinct technical groups across sensors, computers and communications; projectiles, propulsion, and platforms; and other weapons, he finds only two technology areas—computer hardware and computer software—capable of revolutionary change in the foreseeable future. Eight others—chemical sensors, biological sensors, radio

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

communications, laser communications, radio-frequency weapons, non-lethal weapons, and biological weapons—are judged capable of high but not revolutionary advances.

All other technical areas, namely those associated with mobility platforms and weaponry itself, are unlikely to develop at anything above a moderate pace. In the course of his discussion of each of these he brings forth the basics of physics and real-world constraints and points out that even the best of our sensors are frustrated by heavy rain and other man-made countermeasures.

He correctly evaluates the inability of our existing and planned Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to keep up with targeting needs, particularly in urban and heavy canopy terrain. He also notes in passing that human intelligence may well prove to be the sustaining element in finding individual people, and that there has been no significant change since World War II in the numbers of troops needed per 1,000 inhabitants—infantry is still the core force.

He systematically dismisses a variety of RMA claims, among the most dangerous being that we can afford to stand down many of our forward bases, by pointing out that combat aircraft continue to have short ranges, ground forces continue to require heavy logistics sustainment, ships remain slow to cross oceans, and it continues to be extremely difficult to seize ports and other fixed infrastructure.

He concludes the book with a number of budgeting recommendations, both for the USA and for its allies.

For the USA he would emphasize communications and computing, the one area truly open to an RMA in the near term. Other areas meriting immediate investments include strategic sea and air lift, the rapid development of a lighter tank and a mine-resistant infantry vehicle, and improvements in naval mine warfare. He supports the National Missile Defense and would sustain more robust RDT&E experimentation.

For a major US ally, with a fraction of our funding, he recommends a \$15 billion total investment over several years to acquire a thoughtful mix of advanced C4I enhancements including ground stations, a fleet of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), 1000 cruise missiles, 5000 short-range munitions, 500 advanced air to air missiles, a squadron of stealth aircraft, and several batteries of theater missile defense radars and missiles.

A very nice listing of major Pentagon acquisition programs supports his recommendation that we economize on major weapons platforms and pursue a high-low mixed strategy, limiting, for example, our procurement of the F-22 and joint strike fighters so as to afford more F-15s and F-16s.

Overall this book fulfills its mission of reviewing technologies in relation to the future of warfare, and it provides the reader with a very strong stepping stone for venturing into the literature of defense transformation. Those who would criticize this work for failing to consider the competition or the metrics of evaluation have a point, but only a point—the book does what it set out to do. It evaluates specific technologies in relation to the inflated and often delusional claims of the proponents of the RMA. One book cannot solve all our problems, but it can, as this book does, blow away some of the foggy thinking emanating from the Pentagon and other places where a number of flag officers and their staffs have lost sight of ground truth.

O'Hanlon, Michael and Carol Graham, *A Half Penny on the Federal Dollar: The Future of Development Aid* (Brookings, 1997)

This is a hard-hearted practical look at development aid, and so it should be. The "official development assistance" (ODA) element of Program 150, the international affairs budget commonly recognized as the "preventive diplomacy" budget that runs alongside Program 50 (the traditional military budget), is evaluated by the authors in terms of amounts (are we doing enough), allocations (are we giving to the right countries), and directions (are we doing the right things). It is a small amount of money that is being discussed—\$9 billion a year in 1997 for ODA alone—said to represent a half penny of each dollar spent by the U.S. government.

This works out to about \$15 per year for the members of the targeted populations. Larger more populous states receive less aid per capita than smaller states. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China are especially disadvantaged. In contrast to today's \$15 per person investment, the Marshall Plan provided in excess of \$100 to \$200 per person in Europe (but for only several years, working out to an equivalent amount when compared to sustained aid flows today).

Several thoughtful observations jump out from the book:

- 1) Foreign aid is not preventing conflicts from emerging (if anything, and this is not implied by O'Hanlon but is explicit in William Shawcross' book *DELIVER US FROM EVIL: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict* (Simon & Schuster, 2000), foreign aid contributes to instability by giving rise to warlords and black markets);
- 2) Foreign aid is of limited use in reconstructing societies ravaged by conflict, especially those with limited infrastructures that cannot absorb resources as well as European nations;

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

- 3) Foreign aid's best return on investment appears to be the education of women—even a few years of education has a considerable impact on birth control, health, and other areas of interest;
- 4) Foreign aid shapes both our own philosophy of foreign affairs, and the perceptions others have of our foreign role—it also shapes our domestic constituencies perception of why we should have a foreign policy arm;
- 5) Foreign aid does not play a significant role in most countries where there is access to open markets and stability does not frighten away investors—indeed the emerging expert consensus appears to lean toward debt forgiveness combined with private capital investment as the best approach to economic reform;
- 6) Foreign aid is least effective in those countries that are either unstable or have a range of harmful economic policies including trade barriers, large budget deficits, oversized public sectors, and overvalued exchange rates. Roughly half the countries receiving aid today have poor economic policies in place;
- 7) The U.S. is the least generous of the Office of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members, providing just over one third as much of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the other OECD countries—0.10 percent instead of 0.27 percent.

Having said all this, the author's document their views that our ODA investments need to rise from \$9 billion to at least \$12 billion a year, with other countries increasing their combined contributions from \$51 billion to \$68 billion per year. The authors favor increased foreign aid investments in poor countries with good economic policies, for the purpose of building transportation infrastructure, enhancing local health and education programs, and accelerating the expansion of utilities and communications services.

They also recommend a broader distribution of foreign aid for countries in conflict throughout Africa, and suggest that Public Law 480 food aid should be focused only on responding to disaster relief rather than indiscriminate distribution that benefits U.S. farmers but undermines foreign agricultural programs.

They conclude with the somewhat veiled suggestion that all of this could be paid for by a reduction of foreign military assistance to Egypt and Israel. One is left, at the end of the book, with two strong feelings:

- first, that U.S. foreign aid is on "automatic pilot" and rather mindlessly muddling along; and
- second, that this is a very small but very important part of the total U.S. national security budget, one that merits its own ombudsman within the National Security

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

Council, and one that is worthy of no less than a penny on the dollar as we plan our future Federal investments.

What is left unsaid by the authors is whether the other \$60-80 billion in foreign aid by various actors including the United Nations agencies, is well managed—one is left with the impression that the U.S. really faces two challenges: an internal challenge of improving its performance with respect to foreign aid, and an external challenge in demanding a more rational and coordinated approach to various forms of aid being sponsored by others.

Ould-Abdallah, Ahmedon, *Burundi on the Brink, 1993-95: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy* (US Institute of Peace, 2000)

This book is depressing. One sees both the heroism and the futility of United Nations activities. Sadly, whereas the Texas Rangers might have gotten away with sending one great man to handle a major crisis, the United Nations, sending one great man and an assistant, is decades behind the times in terms of understanding what it is about and how to obtain results in today's world.

The lessons from Burundi summarized by the author at the end of the book are an excellent conclusion:

Problem Area #1: Shortcomings in UN Machinery and Culture, including no intelligence gathering and analysis; weak institutional memory; lack of accountability; and luxury and inefficiency.

Problem Area #2: Overreliance on Military Intervention

Problem Area #3: Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance

This book left me with a profound respect for the people that work for the United Nations, and with a continuing profound distrust and disrespect for the United Nations as an entity. It is not working. It needs a complete make-over, and one wonders if the time has not come for a new international gathering of governments and non-governmental organizations, to conceptualize a completely fresh start that harnesses distributed resources spanning the full range from civil economic assistance to police protection and training, to violent military intervention.

Let me say this again: this is a very good book, it is only for the best and the brightest, and it calls into question the entire United Nations structure and management. Instead

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political—Appendix 3

of paying our dues to the United Nations, instead of Ten Turner giving them a billion dollar tax avoidance contribution, we should probably create a new international Fund for Peace that uses the Internet and the network effect to nurture "many small acts" instead of one large industrial-age monstrosity called the United Nations.

Owens, Bill, *Lifting the Fog of War* (Farrar Straus Giroux, 2000)

This is a well-intentioned book and the best available manifesto for the "system of systems" that can integrate intelligence, precision strike, and communications technologies by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

On balance it provides several important contributions, but its core assumption that technology can be a substitute for people is flawed, as is its completely insupportable assumption that our allies might be willing to follow us down this very expensive and dubious interoperability trail.

Perhaps even more troubling, the school of thought represented by this book suffers from the severe delusion that everything that needs to be seen can be seen by national technical means, and processed in time to be relevant to the commander. Nothing could be further from the truth—fully 90% of what is needed to succeed in today's environment is not in digital form, not in English, and not collectible by technical means.

The most important point made in the whole book, and here I give the author high marks, is its compelling description of why military reform cannot be achieved from within: because there is no decision process by which a "joint" leadership can determine force structure and weapons acquisition without fear of service politics. His approach to reform, shifting from a focus on system stovepipes to joint mission areas, is valuable and could be helpful in defense transformation if it were cleansed of its unhealthy obsession with expensive technology and forced to face the fact that three-quarters of our challenges in this new century are Operations Other Than War (OOTW) that call into question virtually every dollar being spent under existing RMA auspices.

The book is also helpful in pointing out the redundancy between the four services, the 12:1 support ratio in personnel, and the need to embed information handling capabilities in all future mobility and weapons systems.

Perhaps most disappointingly, this book by a distinguished Admiral and apparent out-of-the-box thinker fails to outline a force structure, including a 450-ship Navy, capable of dealing effectively with all four levels of war in every clime and place.

Treason & Traitors

Herrington, Stuart A., *Traitors Among Us: Inside the Spy-Catcher's World* (Harvest, 2000)

This book, highly recommended by the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), grabbed me from the beginning. Stuart, whom I know as one of the most thoughtful and self-effacing Colonels in military intelligence, wisely chooses to focus on the two most important cases in recent U.S. military history. For a catalog of all the others, see *Merchants of Treason* by Tom Allen and Norman Polmar.

A few things about this valuable book bear emphasis here:

- 1) early on, the FBI tried to shut the CIA out of the first case, and Col Herrington very wisely insisted on including them--leading to critical CIA contributions without which the case would not have been solved;
- 2) counterintelligence is incredible tedious, boring, *hard* work, and it takes a special kind of commander to maintain morale under such circumstances;
- 3) both Defense and Justice lawyers screwed up big-time by not being aware that military intelligence activities in Austria were illegal in Austria and therefore warranted early involvement of the Austrian government--this ignorance cost us heavily;
- 4) allowing soldiers to "homestead" in sensitive intelligence positions anywhere is very dangerous; and finally--bringing to bear some personal knowledge here
- 5) success is temporary, failure is forever...I'll wager the Army's Foreign Counterintelligence Activity has gone downhill since this book was written, and that the old "go along easy" habits of those that have been homesteading too long at FCA are again rearing their ugly heads.

Counterintelligence is still a backwater, and any commander, however exceptional, is going to need strong Service-level support if they are to keep their senior civil servant (bureaucratic) elements in line. This book is an excellent touchstone for Congressional members and staff, Service and DoD chiefs who care little for counterintelligence but need to do more, and for citizens who need to know that counterintelligence is on the "front lines" every day, in every clime and place.