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Society, Satisfaction, and Suppression ---  
The Marcusean Perception of Functional Morality

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Essentially, a thoughtful

review of the major assumptions  
made by Marcuse in his social  
theory about man and society.  
Your conclusions and judgments  
could have been better organized  
and reduced in number. Your  
interpolated material hardly  
seems to address itself to the  
Freudian psychology which  
Marcuse uses and is so abstract  
as to be outside the possibility of  
specific application to the  
problems Marcuse raises. By the  
way, how do you define  
"functional morality"?

## Preface

Initially this project was intended to be an evaluation of the future alternatives to education, a la Goodman et al. That particular prospect proved so depressing that the topic was changed to an examination of the vacillating value system of today, and the likelihood of change there. Not having time for a ~~Master's~~ thesis this month, the scope of that examination was reduced to a proposed contrast of Goodman, Brown, and Marcuse. The thought of this effort induced such strain and consequent use of Visine, that the attempt had to be abandoned due to a lack of sufficient quantities of that medication. We are left then, with a perusal of five books and two articles by Marcuse, a study which had been limited to a search for the man's thoughts on "morality" as a general topic, past, contemporary, and utopian. Having finished the journey through what were often very tautological writings, we are forced, due to the amount of material, to limit the final report to a recapitulation of Marcuse's thoughts.

We also released a sigh of despair. Papers should preferably be in-depth examinations of specified topics. If it is any consolation, we believe that an in-depth examination was made--it simply is not worthwhile to report the results to that extent, for only a careful reading of the original efforts would best serve that degree of education. Instead, a summary of the material will be offered, with extensive footnotes and very comprehensive references. Thus, the reader will be offered a perspective which would otherwise be impossible, and will be able ~~to~~ easily refer to the specific sections of the original works where more detailed material is desired.

During the course of the project, a few thoughts arose as a result of Marcuse's discussion of the mutilation of the ego as a result of the social influence. The conclusion of the paper will comment on the included thesis statement, which is not intended to apply to this paper, but which rather arises as a result of the work described within the paper.

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## The Freudian Basis for Marcuse

Prior to the Marcusean review of contemporary society and its effect on the individual, one finds a few Freudian concepts, vital to the understanding of the new Leftist critique of society.<sup>1</sup>

In attempting to explain the origin of repression<sup>2</sup> in his time, Freud harked back to the primal hordes, exploring the role of the primal father. It has been his suggestion, accepted as a foundation for the Marcusean psychology, that the primal father, possessor of the mother, established his domination over the sons in order to best serve his own interests in the face of conditions of scarcity and insecurity. His rule was justified by his age, by his biological function, and by the conditions of order and constancy which he created.<sup>3</sup>

By controlling the available pleasures, the father "enforced abstinence; he thus created the first preconditions for the disciplined 'labor force' of the future."<sup>4</sup> This suppression of the son's natural inclination to gratification (see footnote two above) was resented, and culminated in the overthrow of the father and the establishment of brother clans. The brothers, themselves fathers, now, and faced with the same conditions of scarcity, came to believe that the taboos previously imposed by the father and despised by the sons were necessary, and therefore voluntarily imposed these taboos, this morality, on themselves, implanting repression in the common interest. It is the brother clan, and the "voluntary subjection to socially required instinctual renuncia-

tion" that serves as the preamble to modern civilization's control of the individual.<sup>5</sup>

The next development in this vein is the institutionalization of the father image; as institutions concerned with the optimal utilization of limited resources arise, the image of the father, as with his role, is pre-empted by "duly constituted authority," which includes God. The path from primal father to almighty father is interesting: the father-function moves from the individual to his social position, to the image the son retains (conscience), to God (species conscience), to the new institutions (including the church) which serve as the socializing agencies today.<sup>6</sup>

The father, as paterfamilias, still performs the basic regimentation of the instincts which prepares the child for surplus-repression on the part of society during his adult life. But the father performs this function as the representative of the family's position in the social division of labor rather than as the "possessor" of the mother. Subsequently, the individual's instincts are controlled through the social utilization of his labor power... [not only is he required to work, and expend energy in work for a time\_] but also during these hours and the remaining ones [he is expected to exhibit\_] a behavior in conformity with the standards and morals of the Performance Principle.<sup>7</sup>

It may be wise to emphasize briefly the origin of the Reality Principle: scarcity, and the inclement nature of the environment, force the individual to accept delays in gratification; according to Freud, man learns to renounce immediate and uncertain pleasures for the restrained and "assured" pleasures available through association founded on repression.<sup>8</sup>

To sum up then, we note that according to the Freudian theory, which is so important to the development of the Marcusean commentary on society, civilization is founded on the repression of the primary instincts, of the life instincts (Eros) and the death instincts; the one is inhibited

through desexualization (the labeling of those momentary pleasures as perversions, to be repressed in conformity to the contemporary morality), the other through productive harnessing, leading to "the mastery of man and nature, to individual and social morality."<sup>9</sup>

Every form of the Reality Principle must be embodied in a system of societal institutions and relations, laws and values which transmit and enforce the required "modification" of the instincts.<sup>10</sup>

Such a system can not be avoided if we believe, as we now do, that even the most harmonious conditions will require a certain degree of labor, for the moment defined as essentially unpleasurable work leading to the eventual <sup>socially-defined</sup> gratification of our needs.<sup>11</sup>

## Society and its Components

In keeping with the functional nature of the father image and the repressive tendencies of the social institutions, Marcuse develops a profile of the individual as an instrument of society, as a functionally defined unit. Instead of autonomous qualities, the criteria for evaluating each individual are based on the possession of "standardized skills and qualities of adjustment."<sup>12</sup> The body and the mind-will of each person is utilized, "co-ordinated" constantly by the technostructure through the technical division of labor.<sup>13</sup>

From this it follows that society becomes a "system of useful performances" which are perceived as ultra-rational in the light of the original justification for repression and the continuing introjection of the Reality Principle and its values, which are defined and ordered by the laws and values which represent the very essence of society.<sup>14</sup> Just as the primal brothers introjected the father's taboos, so do the individuals of today's society reproduce, "on the deepest level, in [their] instinctual structure, the values and behavior patterns that serve to maintain domination, while domination becomes increasingly less autonomous, less 'personal,' more objective and universal."<sup>14</sup> The loss of autonomy and "personality" can be attributed to the institutionalization of authority, to the subversion of individual ends to the ends of the institution. The prevailing example of this trend, the Performance Principle, is manifested in the concern with production as an end in itself, rather than as a means to achieve the conditions for liberation.



The insidiously detrimental nature of this value introjection is seen when one realizes that the people adjust to the prevailing principle and its "assured" satisfactions, and in the process lose sight of the existing potential for fulfillment which is being repressed<sup>15</sup> by the identification of the individuals with the imposed perception of existence. Commodity ownership is assuredly pleasurable, and much less tenuous than whatever satisfaction may possibly be found outside the confines of the social system.

This institutionalization, as has been implied before, drastically changes the role of the father and the family in the socialization of the young members of the society. The family is no longer the dominant influence in the education of the youth. The family no longer provides an environment wherein the individual, through his relation and reaction to the father and the mother, can develop a relatively independent superego.<sup>16</sup>

Now, however, under the rule of economic, political, and cultural monopolies, the formation of the mature superego seems to skip the stage of individualization: the generic atom becomes directly a social atom. The repressive organization of the instincts seems to be collective, and the ego seems to be prematurely socialized by a whole system of extra-familial agents and agencies. As early as the preschool level, gangs, radio, and television set the pattern for conformity and rebellion; deviations from the pattern are punished not so much within the family as outside and against the family. The experts of the mass media transmit the required values; they offer the perfect training in efficiency, toughness, personality, dream, and romance. With this education, the family can no longer compete. In the struggle between the generations, the sides seem to have shifted: the son knows better; he represents the mature reality principle against its obsolescent paternal forms.<sup>17</sup>

Before moving into the Marcusean description of society's redirection and redefinition of the functions of the superego and the ego in relation to the id, it might prove profitable [!] to define briefly

the basic terms, ego, superego, and id. According to the 1967 edition of the unabridged Dictionary of the English Language published by Random House:

EGO: the "I" or self of any person. the enduring and conscious element that knows experience. the part of the psychic apparatus that reacts to the outside world and mediates between the primitive drives of the id and the demands of the social [!\_] and physical environment.

ID: the part of the psyche, residing in the unconscious, that is the source of instinctive energy. its impulses, of a hedonistic nature, are modified by the ego and the superego before they are given overt expression.

SUPEREGO: the part of the psychic apparatus which mediates between ego drives and social ideals, acting as a conscience which may be partly conscious and partly unconscious.

Fundamental to the understanding of the original justification of repression, and the previously true dichotomy of unpleasurable work and sensuous play, is the appreciation for the ego's prior perception of the world, of its environment. According to Marcuse, nature was so inimical to survival that the ego came to regard each existential condition as a restraint that had to be overcome...consequently work is a priori a struggle with nature, the overcoming of resistance, the expression of aggression.<sup>18</sup> This perception was valid so long as a condition of real scarcity did exist. Once, however, that the progress of technology eliminated such a condition, the perception could be maintained only by the suppression of true consciousness and the introjection of a socially created ego consistent with the needs of the society. For this reason, Marcuse maintains, the established society today "imposes upon all its members the same medium of perception; and through all the differences of individual and class perspectives, horizons, backgrounds, society provides the same general universe of experience...the ego <sup>?</sup> shaped by

the established society [is identical for all]."<sup>19</sup>

Because of the very progress which could make aggressive (destructive) work unnecessary, an environment and satisfactions are created which provide for participating individuals a reasonably happy means of survival. As a result, individuals gradually lose their ability to perceive contradictions within the process and become reconciled to the "happy consciousness," really an unconsciousness. They allow the system, in effect agent for thought and action, to become moral agent as well.<sup>20</sup> As the masses come to depend more and more on the political-administrative leader-fathers [notice the hyphenation, a characteristic of the language which is able to reconcile paradoxical and contradictory terms], the result is seen in the formation of a mass ego; the ego ideal, uniting all members of the society, transcending all particular individuals and groups, "becomes 'embodied' in the very tangible laws which move the apparatus and determine the behavior of the material as well as the human object; the technical code, the moral code, and that of profitable productivity are merged into one effective whole."<sup>21</sup>

A very important implication inherent in this idea of the mass ego and the extra-familial socialization of members is the suggestion of the "automization" of the social ego and the superego. Because the values of the social institutions are accepted, over time they become introjected and are eventually unconscious. In being unconscious, they become removed from the individual's field of perception; they become unquestionable, unexposed, parts of the psychic apparatus. It is even suggested by Marcuse, citing and elaborating upon the work of Franz Alexander, that a specific morality may "sink down" into the "biological" dimension<sup>22</sup> in

that the organism will "receive and react" to certain stimuli and will "ignore and repel" others, all in accordance with the introjected morality. In this fashion, it is suggested, society constantly re-creates patterns of behavior and aspiration; unless the Refusal (defined further on) is able to reach this dimension, social change will be "incomplete" or self-defeating.<sup>23</sup>

One further point is worthy of mention in this context: the destructive tendencies of the superego, which must turn parts of the psyche against each other in order to achieve its function as conscience. This condition will exist so long as the ego-experience is incompatible with the sensual desires of the id. Liberation (from the imposed ego-ideal) will therefore serve the dual purpose of fulfilling the life instincts and retarding the destructive instinct.<sup>24</sup>

In summary, we reiterate the assumption of the primal father's function by anonymous and overbearing institutions. The role of the family in developing the superego and guiding the ego has been assumed by these same institutions. A mass morality, a mass ego, a mass superego, a mass father-image; these are all part of the contemporary society, and all contribute to the ease with which the instincts continue to be repressed, our next topic of discussion.

## The Mechanics of Repression

Whereas the organism is instinctively oriented toward the achievement of pleasure, toward the Pleasure Principle, we have indicated that the struggle for existence, of which civilization is an organized manifestation, requires delay, limitation, sublimation, and thereby causes a repressive Reality Principle to achieve dominance in the psychic process. In discussing the primal father, we found justification for some repression; happiness and consistent gratification did require, or seem to require, acceptance of the Reality Principle. Today, however, society had transcended the conditions which originally justified repression, but it has not transcended the repression, which remains in the service of the dominant force of civilization, capitalism. The Performance Principle,<sup>25</sup> because it has improved the so-called "standard of living" by which the quality of life is now judged (as a result of the introjection of the same Performance Principle!), it has depreciated the importance of and the interest in less tangible desires, of which some trace remain today, but which appear to have been effectively and completely suppressed.<sup>26</sup> It is exchange value, not "truth" value which is consistent with the ego ideal of today's society.<sup>27</sup> By providing commodities which in turn provide degrees of satisfaction and stimulation, the society encourages and imposes on the individual false needs<sup>28</sup> which superimpose themselves on definites? the true needs<sup>29</sup> and thus extend even further the control of society, creator of false needs, over man, now an unconscious, administered, instrument of civilization, a man without human dignity.<sup>30</sup> "The better

living is offset by the all pervasive control over living. <sup>(31)</sup>

The Performance Principle depends on work to sustain itself. It requires increasing degrees of productivity (which are manifested in increasing quantities of commodities) to maintain its control of the mass conscience through satisfaction. The goal of the society adhering to the Performance Principle is thus the diversion of instinctual energies from libidinal activities (sensual-sexual activities arising from the id) toward social-ego activities, or work. Recall the original incompatibility between work and play (comments began in middle of page six), which is continued today under the prevailing form of the Reality Principle, as the ego and its perceptions are mutilated and alienated from true consciousness and the potential for liberation. The simple word favored by Marcuse to describe this alienation is "repression." An elaboration on the word and its conditions leads to the term "surplus-repression." Both are sustained through three or four interlocked techniques, and both "obtain their full significance only in relation to the historically possible extent of freedom."<sup>32</sup> In other words, the greater the achievements of technology, the closer civilization is to being capable of realizing its capacity for liberation.<sup>(33)</sup> But the closer civilization comes, the greater the need for the suppression of instinctual tendencies becomes, if an effort is to be made to retain the prevailing, and by definition, archaic, form of the Reality Principle.<sup>(34)</sup>

The superego, its role as conscience, and morality have been mentioned briefly. All of these are related to the introjection of social values by the individual, and all of course support the existing form of civilization. The body as a "mere object, means, instrument of pleasure" is subject to the dictates of morality. "The full force of civilized

morality is engaged against such reification. <sup>35</sup>

Beyond the superego and overtly oppressive morality lie other techniques which Marcuse indicates are used by productive society to further repress libidinal tendencies and divert energy into the service of the dominant Reality Principle. The body can be desexualized; the sensual nature can be sublimated <sup>36</sup> or repressed; nature can be controlled by the apparatus (thus restricting the field of expression); and leisure hours can be controlled or at least influenced. These are all interrelated, so that a relative increase in the influence of one may allow a relaxation of control through another; for instance, increased control over nature and the predominance of genital sex could be the basis for a relaxation of the morality inhibiting the practice of fetishes and perversions. <sup>37</sup>

The Reality Principle as it directs or sublimates Eros can be seen in the increasing primacy of genital sexuality and the function of reproduction. This is an obvious suppression of the Pleasure Principle, seen as antithetical to the Reality Principle. The body must be desexualized in order to enable it to perform unpleasurable work. <sup>38</sup> "the gratification of the partial instincts, and of non-procreative genitality are, according to the degree of their independence, tabooed as perversions, sublimated, or transformed into subsidiaries of procreative sexuality." <sup>39</sup> This limitation of Eros is a "basic condition" for sustaining civilized society. Eros can no longer attempt to become the "formative principle for the human and natural environment." <sup>40</sup> The human body is released for the guidance of Eros and becomes available as the instrument of the society. <sup>41</sup>

The mechanization of nature will be mentioned only briefly, being but peripherally related to the topic of morality. It is however a vital means of control, deserving of its own examination <sup>(42)</sup> In mastering the environment, and the individual's communion with that environment, technology has limited the amount of libidinal energy which can be expended through the environment. "The environment from which the individual could obtain pleasure--which he could cathect <sup>(43)</sup> as gratifying almost as an extended zone of the body--has been rigidly reduced. Consequently, the 'universe' of libidinous cathexis is likewise reduced. The effect is a localization and contraction of the libido, the reduction of erotic to sexual experience and satisfaction. <sup>"44</sup> What this means, in less esoteric language, is that with the mechanization of nature, with the vast expanses of concrete, it is increasingly difficult to find a nice place to make love outside of the marriage chamber. It is harder to find a place where the senses of smell and sight and hearing will not be overwhelmed with the smell of pollution, the sight of cement, the sound of automobiles. Thus even the senses become acclimated to the technological society. *and where other signals, not created by the society, are in force*

Freud points out, and Marcuse concurs, that the "loosening of sexual morality makes it easier to overcome the Oedipus complex: the struggle against the father loses much of its decisive psychological significance [with the strengthening of extra-familial authority]."<sup>45</sup> This increases public influence in the socialization process of the young. This is not the contradiction which superficially appears; when we realize that this relaxation of taboos is carried out as an integral part of the processes of society, we can see that within the context of



society, cohesion is strengthened.<sup>46</sup> By acting to liberalize taboos, commercialize sexuality, and define sexual procedures through the socially created "rules of the game," the Reality Principle extends its influence over Eros, and increases the scope of socially provided satisfaction.<sup>47</sup> Libidinal energy loses its primary function:

To the degree to which sexuality is sanctioned and even encouraged by society...it loses the quality which, according to Freud, is its essentially erotic quality, that of freedom from social control.<sup>48</sup>

The importance of the sexual revolution and its relation to the political revolution is implied in ~~its~~ negation below:

This mobilization and administration of libido [through the operationalization of sexuality (see footnote 44) in the productive processes] may account for much of the voluntary compliance, the absence of terror, the pre-established harmony between individual needs and socially-required desires, goals, and aspirations. The technological and political conquest of the transcending factors in human existence, so characteristic of advanced industrial civilization, here asserts itself in the instinctual sphere: satisfaction in a way which generates submission and weakens the rationality of protest.<sup>49</sup>

The influence over leisure hours is immediately visible in two ways: the social use of morality and desexualization to direct the activities of individuals, and the direct control of leisure through the development of an entertainment industry. By making the existing liberties enjoyed during the leisure hours an integral part of the apparatus, they become in themselves instruments of satisfaction with the status quo, and thus instruments of repression.<sup>50</sup>

No great effort has been made in this discussion to differentiate between repression and surplus-repression. That is not to say that such a distinction could be easily done. With regard to the topic at hand, the social use of morality, they both serve the same purpose. However,

in the interests of perspective, and because Marcuse seems to be rather proud of his new term, which does provide a needed distinction in another context, the following paragraphs are included.

Repression is defined by Marcuse as the "modifications" of the instincts required for the "perpetuation" of the species in civilization. "In civilization" is certainly an important qualifier, and might lead, on examination, to an overlapping of meaning with surplus-repression. Surplus-repression, by contrast, describes the "restrictions necessitated by social domination," i.e. the controls arising from specific institutions.<sup>51</sup>

Marcuse provides an example of what he considers surplus-repression:

The vicissitudes of the "proximity senses" (smell and taste) provide a good example for the interrelation between basic repression and surplus-repression...they succumb to the rigidly enforced taboos on too intense bodily pleasure. ..they relate (and separate) individuals immediately, without the generalized and conventionalized forms of consciousness, morality, aesthetics. Such immediacy is incompatible with the effectiveness of organized domination, with a society which "tends to isolate people, to put distance between them, and to prevent spontaneous relationships and the 'natural' animal-like expressions of such relations." The pleasure of the proximity senses plays on the erotogenic zones of the body--and does so only for the sake of pleasure. Their unrepressed development would eroticize the organism to such an extent that it would counteract the desexualization of the organism required by its societal utilization as an instrument of labor.<sup>52</sup>

If we recall the distinction between true and false needs (which were defined in footnotes 28 and 29) we can readily see that sense repression such as that described immediately above is not justified by the need to achieve the basic true needs.

Society today, as a result of adherence to the Performance Principle, is able to provide its members with increasing satisfactions in

terms of commodities and sublimated libidinal activities. These tend to depreciate the value of intangible true needs, and lead to a condition of unconsciousness, in which the false needs have been completely assimilated, to the point where the true needs are forgotten and unrecognized.

Through desexualization, sublimation, manipulation, and mechanization, the contemporary society is able to increase its influence over the life instincts, diverting them to the purposes of the society. In so far as this diversion is not necessary for the "perpetuation" of the species, it can be considered "surplus-repression."

## Society, Morality, and Rebellion

The surplus-repression of today's society is condemned throughout the examined works as immoral, repression being by definition unjustified. The entire society, oriented as it is toward the support of business (which in turn implies instrumentality, desexuality, discrimination, and sublimation) is judged hypocritical and cynical. The values and goals for which it originally justified repression, the conditions which originally required, or seemed to require, repression, no longer hold.<sup>53</sup>

Morality for the society is itself an instrument. The social morality is utilized as a means of achieving desexualization and sublimation. Perversions which might, through their libidinal and totally pleasure-inclined tendencies, threaten the instrumentality of the body, are tabooed.<sup>54</sup> Any opposition to the established morality will, by definition (kindly provided by the society's lexicographers) be illegal, for it will be opposing the established morality, consort of the established law.<sup>55</sup> By the same token, opposition to the Establishment becomes moral (or immoral) opposition, in that it questions the actual or rhetorical values and goals of the society.<sup>56</sup>

The conflict is clear: it is a case of right against right:

the positive, codified, enforceable right of the existing society against the negative, unenforceable right of transcendence which is part of the very existence of man in history: the right to insist on a less compromised, less guilty, less exploited humanity.<sup>57</sup>

Marcuse refers briefly to a transcendent morality, one capable of justifying civil disobedience. "The idea that there is a right or law higher than positive law is as old as this civilization itself...without this point of resistance, without activation of a higher law against existing law, we would still be today at the level of the most primitive barbarism."<sup>58</sup> It is this morality that the radical opposition represents in its protest against the false values and false morality of the present society.<sup>59</sup>

The importance of the "moral fiber" to society has already been touched upon, most specifically in footnote 35. It is this "fiber" which will be weakened under the pressure from the opposition, despite its minority status.<sup>60</sup> It is the moral fiber, and the system behind it, and the subjects of that system, the workers, which the opposition must seek to subvert and alter.<sup>61</sup> The success of the opposition may be judged in the "dissolution" of the Establishment's morality; it will be manifest in a collapse of work discipline, slowdown, spread of disobedience to rules and regulations, wildcat strikes, boycotts, sabotage, gratuitous acts of noncompliance. The violence built into the system of repression may get out of control, or necessitate even more totalitarian controls.<sup>62</sup>

The creation of such a situation will be extremely difficult. As was pointed out earlier, in our discussion of the components of society, the social values have become such an integral part of the individuals' psyche, dominating the ego and the superego, that any contradiction can not be recognized as a truth and will instead be rejected as incredible. Because the ~~workers~~ <sup>elite</sup> are what could be called "unconscious," Marcuse returns to Rousseau in order to justify his "educational, preparatory dictatorship" which is an "integral element of revolution." Because

the workers' society "uses all available means in order to shape and preform their consciousness and to make it immune against possible alternatives," the unaware "slaves" must be guided to freedom.<sup>63</sup> The workers are still reserved as the class with a <sup>(collegiate but not industrial)</sup> potential for revolution (in concert with the guiding opposition), and for this reason must achieve a change in consciousness if a qualitative change is to be achieved within the society.<sup>64</sup>

Marcuse offers a hypothesis elaborating on the workers' hate for the Refusal, which seems to presume a certain consciousness of the Refusal as an enjoyable experience:

It [the opposition, the Refusal] is utterly unpopular; the people hate it, "the masses" despise it. Perhaps they feel that the rebellion really strikes out against the whole, against all its rotten taboos--that it endangers the necessity, the value, of their performance, their fun, the prosperity around them. Prevailing is the resentment against the new morality, the feminine gesture, the contempt for the jobs of the Establishment--resentment against the rebels who permit themselves what the people have to forego and repress.<sup>65</sup>

We can conclude, however, that even this consciousness can prove repressive. The knowledge of the play of the opposition can be used as a justification for greater work on the part of the workers, who can be convinced that it is they, through taxes, welfare, and so on, that are "supporting" the ingrates. This will contribute to the hatred, and it will "explain" the paradox.

<sup>define?</sup>  
Moral change is a means of inducing political change. The sexual revolution can serve as a preamble to the new sensuality, the new humanism, which is being repressed by the "material fundamentals" of capitalism. Where morality is used as a means of sustaining an unconscious state (in all senses of the word), the negation of this morality

force (educational law, identical with the sovereign<sup>71</sup>).<sup>72</sup> While Marcuse frankly points out that there is no justification for any manner of suppression, including revolutionary suppression "justified" by the promise of future freedom, he clearly indicates that this is valid only when discussing absolute ethics. By way of practical contrast, he goes on to say:

But in historical terms we are confronted with a distinction and a decision. For suppression and sacrifice are daily exacted by all societies, and one cannot start--indeed I would like to say this with all possible emphasis--one cannot start becoming moral and ethical at an arbitrary but expedient point of cut off: the point of revolution.<sup>73</sup>

Freedom is thus linked to subversion, suppression, and coercion. Freedom will always be subversive, in that progress will continually create <sup>but what?</sup> potential in which case the existing conditions will always be relatively unfree, and freedom will therefore call for transcending, subverting, the existing conditions.<sup>74</sup> So long as the true end (unlike the imposed end of productivity) is kept in mind, so long as it is this end which motivates the revolutionary means, then temporary repression, coercion, will be justified,<sup>75</sup> in the effort ~~to~~ radically ~~to~~ transform the system, its process, its subjects' consciousness, and their needs.<sup>76</sup>

## The Great Refusal

We have examined the transition from social morality to revolutionary immorality, and then from immorality to a transcendent morality in which coercion is "justified" by the promised end of future freedom. The revolution should succeed in establishing its own moral code, which will serve as the basis for future patterns of behavior and aspiration.<sup>77</sup>

What is at stake in the Great Refusal are the false and true needs determined by the instincts, the environment, and the society. Marcuse indicates that the search for liberation requires a process which will satisfy individual needs without harming the organism, and without inducing, through satisfaction, dependence on the system, however satisfying it may be. Dependence is seen as servitude, and servitude ~~is~~<sup>is</sup> the result of exploitation.<sup>78</sup> Recall our comments on the nature of true needs in footnote 29, wherein a standard of priority was established. Marcuse points out two value judgements which must be prior to any refusal, or criticism, of existing conditions:

1. the judgement that human life is worth living, or rather can be and ought to be made worth living. This judgement underlies all intellectual effort; it is the a priori of social theory...

2. the judgement that, in a given society, specific possibilities exist for the amelioration of human life and specific ways and means of realizing these possibilities.<sup>79</sup>

These judgements, and the distinction between true and false consciousness, must be an integral part of the Refusal; men must realize the validity of these judgements, and must live for "refusing."<sup>80</sup>



This desire to live for the Refusal can only be brought about through the institution of a new consciousness which is capable of recognizing and combating the repression inherent in the consumer ethic of today's society. This will require a new "sensitivity" which will be aware of the sublimating effect of satisfaction within the context of the Performance Principle.<sup>81</sup> The development of this consciousness is the most important task of the opposition.<sup>82</sup>

The creation of conscious sensitivity (which will be discussed beyond this point) will credit the Refusal with its own values, based on the satisfaction of the new and true needs. The false needs of the Performance Principle will be resisted; new values, new countervalues, will include:

the exhibition of a noncompetitive behavior, the rejection of brutal "virility," the debunking of the capitalist productivity of work, the affirmation of the sensitivity, sensuality of the body, the ecological protest, the contempt for the false heroism in outer space and colonial wars.<sup>83</sup>

Recall also, our definition of liberation and its values in footnote 33; the search for calmness, beauty, solitude, happiness. It must be emphasized that this Refusal is not visualized as a personal refusal in the sense of particularity. While each individual must assert his own beliefs and arrive "freely" at his conscious state, the revolt is seen as universal, as inclusive of all aspects and members of the society. It can not be satisfied with individual liberation outside the context of the political society. It must include the Establishment.<sup>84</sup> The change in the values of individuals should lead to the disintegration of the institutions characteristic of the productivity ethic and the organization of the body and mind-will.<sup>85</sup>

## The Mechanics of Revolution

Prior to our discussion of the nature of the new sensibility, our next topic, it may be advantageous to briefly enumerate three formats for the achievements of such a sensibility; language, aesthetics, and phantasy. Each of these topics, as with nature, is deserving of its own examination<sup>86</sup> and here will be treated only in so far as it touches on the theme of morality.

Language is seen by Marcuse as another tool of the dominant society. In keeping with the conformity created and expected within the society, language encourages the suppression of opposing concepts; i.e. each noun, such as "freedom," or "morality," or "obscenity," is accompanied by a packaged set of attributes consistent with the existing reality. Contradictions will therefore be incomprehensible within the context of the language and its promulgated word-concepts.<sup>87</sup> Language, through the use of hyphenation and abbreviation<sup>88</sup> is able to combine or suppress opposing qualities, institutionalizing nouns to the extent that the transcending conceptual thought is "truncated," thereby discarding language (as used by society) as a tool for "differentiating, separating, and defining."<sup>89</sup> The word absorbs the prescribed definition, thus in effect proscribing conflicting perceptions, interpretations, and eliciting only the standard, patterned behavior and reaction.<sup>90</sup>

The revolutionary efforts must include an attempt to "free" words and their concepts from the "all but total distortion of their meanings

by the Establishment."<sup>91</sup> Where language is "moral" according to the Establishment's values, it must be made immoral, and then moralized through the application of "true" meaning. It must be "stripped of its false neutrality," (of which abbreviations, such as AEC for Atomic Energy Commission, are an excellent example)<sup>92</sup> and "methodically and provocatively 'moralized' in terms of the Refusal."<sup>93</sup> The use of obscenity by rebels today is an example of this provocative redefinition of language and concept.<sup>94</sup>

Aesthetics, as an independently valid means of perceiving the environment, has been overwhelmed by the Reality Principle. Just as the libidinal tendencies were sublimated through a loosening of morality and their subsequent inclusion in the "reality," as part of the apparatus, so also has the realm of aesthetics been merged with empirical perceptions. Art (a term meant to include literature and music) does not refute or counter the Performance ethic.<sup>95</sup> Marcuse believes that at this point, when the society is "rational" only in so far as it is able to "contain" liberation, that a new sensibility, with concurrent political action, should occur.<sup>96</sup> Along with the new conscience described earlier would come an "aesthetic reconciliation" which would recognize a new experience, liberating sensuousness from the domination of "reason."<sup>97</sup> This would bring into play the "inherent truth values of the senses against their deprivation under the prevailing reality principle," establishing "the order of sensuousness as against the order of reason."<sup>98</sup>

Citing Schiller (The Aesthetic Letters...), Marcuse goes on to indicate that the play impulse would "abolish competition, and place man,

*with this comment on "performance revolution" in "Counterrevolution and Revolt"?*

both morally and physically, in freedom," leading to a condition of harmony, making compatible the feelings, affections, and faculties of reason.<sup>99</sup> A primary implication inherent in the order of sensuousness is the abolition of the utilitarian, functional picture of man developed earlier by Marcuse. In accordance with the thought of Kant, whom he credits, the object, by being removed from "the world of practical reason;" is subject to perception "as freely being itself."<sup>100</sup>

The aesthetic morality advocated by Schiller and adopted by Marcuse aims at sensuality as the basis for morality, suppressing thereby the destructive, dominant impulse.<sup>101</sup> Aesthetic needs are held to have their own, valid, social content:

they are the claims of the human organism, mind, and body, for a dimension of fulfillment which can be created only in the struggle against the institutions which, by their very functioning, deny and violate these claims...the aesthetic morality is the opposite of puritanism...it insists on freedom as a biological necessity: being physically incapable of tolerating any repression other than that required for the protection and amelioration of life.<sup>102</sup>

Together with the liberation of language and aesthetics, Marcuse points out the need to take advantage of phantasy and the imagination as forces countering the Reality Principle, forces which are presently suppressed as "immoral," and are allowed expression only within the "general framework of repression; beyond these limits" the practice of imagination and phantasy prove threatening to the social order, and are considered violations of "the taboos of social morality," are labeled perversions.<sup>103</sup> By virtue of their opposition to the Reality Principle and phantasy's nature as a "fundamental, independent mental process" distinct from the reasonable ego, imagination and phantasy are said to have a truth value of their own, arising from an independent experience.<sup>104</sup>

## The New Sensibility

With the liberation of language and aesthetics, and with the new consciousness and the free use of phantasy and the imagination, the individual will be able to make optimal use of his senses, which will no longer be bound to the imposed angles of perception. The new sensibility would be the "negation of the entire Establishment, its morality, culture" and would become the harbinger of the "sensuous, the playful, the calm, the beautiful," all of which define forms of existence and thereby define the Form of the new society.<sup>105</sup>

Marcuse specifies the two ways in which the senses would counter the Performance Principle:

negatively--inasmuch as the Ego, the other, and the object world would no longer be experienced in the context of aggressive acquisition, competition, and defensive possession; positively---through the "human appropriation of nature," i.e., through the transformation of nature into an environment (medium) for the human being as a "species being," free to develop the specifically human faculties: the creative, aesthetic faculties.<sup>106</sup>

The world becomes a "totality of sensuous qualities" by virtue of the free use of "all human senses (hearing, smelling, touching, tasting)."<sup>107</sup> Marcuse recalls Marx's distinction between the senses of the social and the non-social man. In speaking of the "emancipation of the senses" of the social man, Marcuse ~~means to imply~~ <sup>states</sup> that these senses begin to define the new patterns of the new society, the "relationships between man and man, man and things, man and nature."<sup>108</sup>

The new sensibility would lead to a new sexuality which would in

## Conclusion & Commentary

We have completed our delineation of Marcuse's perception of functional moralism. *defined when?* Beginning with the Freudian description of the origin of civilization, morality, and repression, we moved on to describe the Marcusean interpretation of role played by the ego, the superego, and the id, and his feelings concerning the "automized" superego and the "corporate" ego. The mechanics of repression, i.e. desexualization, sublimation, mechanization (of nature), and satisfaction (false needs, false leisure) were outlined. "Morality" was a most prominent term in the next section, dealing with the social and revolutionary use and interpretation of morality; morality as an instrument, the "legality" of morality under any given conditions, the importance of the "moral fiber" of the society (or, for that matter, of the revolution). The need to reform the workers' consciousness, presumably all the way down into the biological dimension, was reiterated and emphasized. The utility and importance of the sexual revolution were defended on the basis of the revolution's potential for weakening the society's own "moral fiber" and for displaying "impressive" unity among the rebels. Most interestingly, freedom was linked on a permanent basis with subversion of existing conditions.

In achieving the Refusal, Marcuse called for a new consciousness, new countervalues, renewed needs. He emphasized the need for a universal (all-encompassing in terms of facets of life) refusal, and decried the

continuing dependence on the "system." Language, aesthetics, and imaginative phantasy were all apotheosized as the means of achieving the new sensibility, as the method for arriving at the order of sensuousness, which would institute the calm, the beautiful, the sensuous, the playful as dominant tendencies in the new society. Sensuality and sexuality were promoted as the foundations for the new freedom, and as the key to finding new incentives for work, which would reachieve its originally libidinous nature.

The liberated condition was not well defined; almost no specific statements were available. Individuals in such a condition would be able to give free rein to all means of expression; there would be a new balance of energies, a balance favoring, obviously, libidinal tendencies to the detriment of productivity. Two key points, which we will seek to utilize in our criticism immediately following, were brought out: the need for self-sublimation, and the necessity for a new rationality, a libidinal rationality.

To sum up rather crudely, Marcuse seems to be an advocate of the "let it all hang out" school of pyrrhonists; unfortunately Marcuse does not really offer a definitive alternative which promises to maintain progressive conditions. Assuming that the attempt ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> even understand Marcuse precludes too great a degree of "unconsciousness," our criticism of "incomprehensibility" of the preferred (dictated?) future will bear review.

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~~DE~~ DENIGATOR!

THIS IS NOT THE  
PLEASE WORD.  
"PESSIMISTIC UTOPIANS"  
MIGHT BE CLOSER.

The following commentary will not be organized along specific lines intended to emphasize two or three key points. The format of the preceding recapitulation of Marcuse's moral concept has been followed, and comments will address themselves sequentially to corresponding portions of the concept as outlined in this paper.

The first criticism is perhaps reflectively picayune, but nevertheless valid. Marcuse (and apparently his contemporaries) do not seem to draw a proper distinction between repression and suppression. The one is unconscious, the other conscious. The one is rejection, the other inhibition. The one specifies "painful or disagreeable" impulses, the other inhibition.<sup>129</sup> This may prove to be an important distinction that must be made.

In glancing over the comments I have jotted down, I see that it may be more useful to first put down the comments of a questioning nature, without necessarily answering them to my satisfaction, and then, in conclusion, place together my responding commentaries, which will hopefully define my alternative to some of Marcuse's shortcomings, as judged by myself.

One of my greatest disappointments, and this will run throughout the examination, was Marcuse's disregard for the role of morality in helping man achieve greater ends, mutually defined. Morality as Marcuse understands it is repressive; libidinal morality is not really a morality, it is an instinct. There is nothing to promulgated, nothing which can be changed as circumstances demand. Marcuse does not really



offer a conception of "true" priorities differentiating between lesser and greater desires. He has a clear perception of the Performance Principle as "bad" and of the New Sensuality as "good," but this is not enough. Exactly what role do perversions play in the new society? Are they detrimental to the over-all development of all men? To what end is the over-all development of men dedicated? Without a specification of the ultimate telos (and again, libidinal "fulfillment" is an unsatisfactory proposal), the means of movement can not be judged. Just what constitutes an independent ego, and how was this really achieved in the past? Marcuse indicates that the family was able to counter the extra-familial impression, and that in the conflict and relation with the father and the mother the youth developed an ego-ideal which was largely his own. How? Why? Could it be because the family negated the ego's possible perception of experience as "resistance" and thereby allowed the ego to move to other paths? Are the individual members of society actually enveloped by the "happy consciousness" or do they simply realize the futility of attempting to resist or diverge? Is morality actually introjected all the way down to the biological dimension, or are individuals simply biding their time, taking advantage of private opportunities for being "immoral" and public opportunities for gratification, such as commodities and services which would not be available to "immoral" persons? Marcuse has not convinced me of the viability of his introjection thesis. It is here that the question, an important one in my opinion, arises regarding the definition of repression as opposed to suppression. Which is it? Do false needs repress

*no information here?*

true needs, or suppress them? Are false needs really the only ones that are eventually recognized, or are they simply easier to satisfy? Both of Marcuse's concepts of repression and surplus-repression depend on the "unconscious" nature of the inhibition. Is this justified? I am not convinced. Could an unrestricted Eros (and I do not consider his suggested self-sublimation as feasible restriction) ever be the "formative principle for the human and natural environment?"

Marcuse does not, in my opinion, draw a careful enough distinction between "the people," "the masses," and "the society." He does try in many cases. What I am concerned with here is the problem of finding the people with the independent egos. I do not believe, as Marcuse does, that only the students and the ghettos have achieved true consciousness. Not only do I know very few students, <sup>who meet this characteristic,</sup> but from what I've seen of ghettos, the greatest motivation is the desire for a Cadillac. I would look for my independents among the children of the well-off, who are able to take comfort as a "given," and among the children of the very primitive <sup>explain?</sup> cul-tures. Marcuse does hint at this last search (for primitive children) in his discussion of the role of the third world; but for the wrong reasons. He is not concerned with independents, but with the force of one tradition against the incoming force of another.

I do not understand how Marcuse can qualify "repression" in terms of the perpetuation of the species in civilization, and then suggest that any repression reflecting the dominant force's interests in a society is surplus-repression. It strikes me that any and all forms of civilization, of association, will always have some unifying goal, mani-

fest in an associational institution. To the extent that this is so, there can be no real distinction between the two repressions. But this is based on by own biases, which will emerge at the end of the paper, when I discuss my belief in individual autonomy.

Here once again I wonder if a distinction could not be drawn between associational morality and personal morality. This would have to consider the strength of the individual's psyche, and the extent to which he has constructed a favored model of personal behavior.

I believe that just as Marx did not take into account the flexibility of capitalism, so also is Marcuse making the same mistake. This will be discussed.

I wonder if perhaps the worker's hate of the Refusal is justified? Do the so-called "free" people exercise their freedom, or do they place a greater burden on the workers? Again with regard to the workers, Marcuse displays an extreme pessimism with regard to their ever achieving consciousness. Is this justified?

If a preparatory dictatorship is justified in repressing, how can another form of dictatorship be condemned? I know that Marcuse would jump up and begin speaking about transcendent moralities, historical ethics, the greater promise of freedom, etcetera, ad mauseum. But who is he?

What is wrong with dependence on the system? That is what the thing was created for in the first place: because one man could not overcome the very real and very repressive and very inimical forces of nature. I realize that Marcuse's definition of "dependence" speaks of

doesn't  
Marcuse  
do this?

psychological dependence of an "involuntary" sort. I simply have not convinced myself that this is necessarily "bad" and would like to explore the thought further.

Marcuse calls for the development of a "new sensibility." Could it be that what we really need is a new motivation? a new organization? The mechanics of revolution sound reasonable enough. They are an organized extension of sensibility. I agree that we have been carried away, and that the society today is producing many superfluous and even degrading goods. But to assume that this is due to a repressive organization which must be countered with repression does not necessarily follow. Could it be that we are suffering from a lack of organization, from a lack of participation by citizens? It seems that the recent rise of ecological organizations, and the increasing involvement of businessmen (those repressive bastards!) and non-businessmen in these movements would indicate that some sort of "consciousness" is lurking in the background, ready to be demonstrated, awaiting only the proper moment, the right stimulus, the appropriate target. Marcuse is correct when he indicates that the liberated condition will be achieved only at the highest point of civilization. But he is wrong when he assumes that this is necessarily defined in materialistic (capitalistic) terms. Rather, I might venture to suggest, it is defined in terms of the increasing organization and motivation of concerned human relations. Just as the brother clan organized to survive in physical terms, just as the technocrats organized to survive in structural terms, so will the people organize to survive on human terms.

A major weakness of Marcuse, and this will be my last criticism, is his utter disregard for the <sup>re</sup>quisite solutions which must accompany his so-called "liberation." It is all well and good to prescribe the play impulse with its disregard for productivity. This manner of progress will be quite sufficient, so long as the resources remain available and the population either remains static or decreases. <sup>Nowhere</sup> does Marcuse indicate that he has considered such <sup>pres</sup>positions. A rapidly increasing population, therefore, will destroy very quickly the liberated condition, which will be able to provide for the human needs "with a minimum of labor in a minimum of time" for only so long.

Marcuse does address himself to this point!

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In glancing over the immediately preceding polemical monologue, I notice that many of the questions answer themselves, particularly toward the end. Left over are the questions concerning the definition of man's telos, the search for a system of priorities (lesser, i.e. false, goods vs. greater, i.e. true goods), the justification of the worker's hate of the Refusal, the justification of dependence on the system, and, most importantly, the search for individuals who are independent of the system in that they do not conform to the ego-ideal, are not members of the corporate ego. <sup>Some elaboration on the real utility, from my point of view, of morality in reaching the defined ends would of course be desirable.</sup> ~~defined how?~~

Closer analysis of all of these questions leads us to one fundamental question: How can we establish the autonomy of the individual

within any given association? Further, with which individuals are we concerned? My simplistic answer would hark far back to Plato, in that I would withdraw my independents from society--not physically, and not at the age of ten, as Plato would have it, but spiritually, morally, and at whatever age (early, most likely) they were recognized as independent spirits. These independents will form an association within the association. All others outside the inner circle will assume the roles of "necessaries." The inner circle will most likely never become a majority, since it is least likely to be prolific, not being oriented toward genital sex and procreation; nor is it likely to convert the necessaries, who are easily satisfied with the lesser (false) goods; nor should it try to convert the necessaries, because this would be a waste of imaginative energy. Rather, it should develop its inner relationships, which would be far more likely to lead to the kind of stimulation required for the achievement of the ultimate insight.

At this point I am going to quit, complete answers or not. I have included at the end of the paper two previous works, one a paper/exam for Dr. Howell, the other a commentary for Dr. Schlecht. Both are very relevant to the project at hand, although including them is an imposition, since it is that much more material to peruse. It just wasn't worth rewriting *in abridgement*.

I am very discouraged with what appears to be a set tendency to degenerate into polemical, personal, subjective conclusions to what otherwise are excellent and dilligent works. You will have noticed this tendency in my last paper, the independent study of foreign policy attitudes. I have no doubt that this can be remedied, particularly in situation which provide time for incubation and rewriting. But right now I don't have that kind of time. This is very definitely my own work.



## Footnotes

1 Whereas once the political aspects of revolutionary critiques were predominant, it appears that the psychological-philosophical school is rapidly achieving greater impact; witness Daniel Bell's early comment that "The mark of the new cultural avant-garde, we are told, is the attack on repression. In the work of Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown and R. D. Laing, a new trinity for a new left, the target is now, fully, modern civilization which is seen as restrictive and repressive. The enemy for all three is bourgeoisie society, which has distorted original human nature by its demands for delayed gratification, its insistence on heterosexual monogamy, and its specialized division of sexual labor in which all pleasure is restricted to the sexual organs. The revolution that must come, they proclaim, must be not only political but sexual as well. For Marcuse, it will liberate Eros, ontologically defined; for Brown, it will reinstate polymorphous-perverse pleasures; for the British psychoanalyst Laing, following the French moralist Michel Foucault, it will erase the distinction between sanity and madness." Bell goes on to describe a forebearer of this thought, Charles Fourier, and his similar emphasis on feeling, sentiment, emotion, sensation, impulse, and the "natural man" unencumbered by "restraint and denial." (*Italics mine*).

Daniel Bell, "Charles Fourier: Prophet of Eupsychia," The American Scholar, (Winter 1968-1969), pp. 41-58.

(Bell notes that "the term 'eupsychia' is that of the neo-Freudian psychoanalyst A. H. Maslow, which has been used by Frank E. Manuel to designate a kind of utopian thinking oriented to the release of psychic impulses rather than to the restructuring of social arrangements.") Only those footnotes which are circled provide remarks.

2 Put very simplistically, and honoring the latest stage of development in Freud's instinct theory (as reported by Marcuse), it appears that the mental apparatus is regarded as a union of opposites. "At the earliest stage of its development, Freud's theory is built around the antagonism between sex (libidinous) and ego (self-preservation) instincts; at the latest stage, it is centered on the conflict between the life instinct (Eros) and the death instinct." Both instincts are regarded as "conservative" in that both seek to achieve a condition of painless quiescence, the one through gratification, and the achievement of "ever greater unities of life" and the other through a return to the womb. So long as the environment is inimical, there will be a conflict between the instincts, the life instinct repressing the death instinct's tendencies toward destruction of self, and the death instinct, through the ego-reaction to nature, repressing the life instinct's desires for immediate gratification, providing instead the



delayed, "assured" satisfaction characteristic of civilization. It was significant to me that the death instincts sought to return to the womb in the face of the painful environment. The implication which Marcuse seems to draw from this is that with the creation of a harmonious environment, the death instincts would no longer be alienated, and might be reconciled within the "fulfilled" life.

Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud, (Vintage Edition; New York: Vintage Books, 1962), pp. 21ff, 25ff, 119 ff.

3 Ibid., p. 56.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., pp. 57-58. See also Marcuse's Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro and Sherry M. Weber, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), specifically the lecture on "Progress and Freud's Theory of Instincts," pp. 37-38.

6 Eros, op. cit., pp. 60, 68, 70, 109.

7 Ibid., pp. 81-82.

8 Ibid., pp. 13,33, citing Freud's work.

9 Ibid., p. 97.

10 Ibid., p. 34.

11 Ibid., p. 140.

12 Ibid., p. 87.

13 Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 14. See also pp. 11-13. See also Eros, op. cit., pp. 1, 141.

14 Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lecture on "Freedom and Freud's Theory of Instincts," p. 3. See also Marcuse's An Essay on Liberation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 13.

15 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 12. See also Eros, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

- 16 See the definition of superego provided at the top of the next page.
- 17 Eros, op. cit., p. 88. See also Lectures, op. cit., p. 10; Revolt, op. cit., p. 15; Man, op. cit., pp. 8-9; and Eros, op. cit., p. 42.
- 18 Eros, op. cit., p. 100.
- 19 Liberation, op. cit., p. 37.
- 20 Man, op. cit., p. 79.
- 21 Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lecture on "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man," pp. 54, 59-60.
- 22 Liberation, op. cit., p. 11; and Eros, op. cit., p. 51. Marcuse defines biological needs as those which must be satisfied and for which no adequate substitute may be found--thus certain introjected cultural needs may "sink down." See the footnote in Liberation, op. cit., p. 10.
- 23 Liberation, loc. cit. For other references to the "automization" of the superego, see Eros, op. cit., pp. 29-30, 85.
- 24 Eros, op. cit., p. 48. For other references to introjection, see Revolt, op. cit., p. 15; Man, op. cit., pp. 8, 9, 12; Eros, op. cit., pp. 42, 88; Liberation, op. cit., p. 13; and Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lecture on "Freedom and Freud's Theory of Instincts," pp. 3, 10. For further comments on the corporate ego, refer to Man, op. cit., p. 79; Liberation, op. cit., p. 37; Eros, op. cit., pp. 100, 128, 129; and Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lecture on "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man," pp. 54, 59, 60.
- 25 The Performance Principle is defined specifically as the "prevailing historical form of the Reality Principle," characterized, it is manifest throughout, by today's capitalist society and the commodity ethic, which sublimates the libidinous inclinations of the individual, and develops him into an instrument, a commodity, within the confines of the society. Eros, op. cit., p. 32. See also footnote number 32 in this paper for the esoteric definition of sublimation. The references to functionalism are contained in footnotes 12 and 13.
- 26 Man, op. cit., p. 56. For more material (not necessarily elaboration) on satisfaction and suppression, see Eros, op. cit., p. 91; Liberation, op. cit., pp. 13, 16, 17; and Man, op. cit., pp. xiv, xv, 49.

27 Man., op. cit., p. 57.

28 Marcuse defined false needs as "those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression." These needs have a "societal content and function which are determined by external powers over which the individual has no control...no matter how much he identifies himself with them and finds himself in their satisfaction, they continue to be what they were from the beginning--products of a society whose dominant interest demands repression."

Ibid., pp. 4-5.

29 True needs, by way of contrast, are referred to in this fashion: "The only needs that have an unqualified claim for satisfaction are the vital ones--nourishment, clothing, lodging at the attainable level of culture." The latter qualifier naturally requires a sense of judgment and priorities. Because Marcuse feels that resources are increasingly calculable, the "truth" and "falsehood" of needs reflect "objective" conditions "to the extent to which the universal satisfaction of vital needs and, beyond it, the progressive alleviation of toil and poverty, are universally valid standards."

Ibid., pp. 4, 6.

30 Revolt, op. cit., p. 14.

31 Eros, op. cit., pp. 90-91. The following quotation, cited by Marcuse, offers an indication of the methods by which the society achieves and manifests its all-pervasive control over living: "Capitalism has also succeeded, through the constant development of income, the complexity of the instruments of mediation, the international organization of exploitation, to offer to the majority of the population a possibility of survival, and, frequently, a partial solution to immediate problems." A bit vague, but it leads to another source.

Revolt, op. cit., p. 8, citing Lucio Magri, "Parlement ou Conseils" (1970) in Il Manifesto: Analyses et Theses...., Rossana Rossanda, editor, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1971), pp. 332ff.

32 Eros, op. cit., p. 81.

33 Liberation is not a term to be defined in one paragraph. It will be discussed more fully toward the end of the paper, when the Refusal and its counter-values are examined briefly. For the moment, we will assume that liberation includes but is not limited to the negation of the need to earn one's living, of the performance principle, of the need for wasteful, ruinous productivity, and of the need for deceitful repression of the instincts. It is the assertion

of the need for calm, the need for the beautiful, the need to be alone, and the need for "undeserved" happiness.

Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lecture on "The Problem of Violence and the Radical Opposition," p. 67.

34

Marcuse points out that the values of today are in some ways based on those of the past Western civilizations. That Western culture was pre-technological, with a reality that included "valleys and forests, villages and inns, nobles and villains, salons and courts.. .. [it reflected the values] of those who... [had] the time and the pleasure to think, contemplate, feel, and narrate." This reality is no longer valid; it has been mutilated and in some sense transcended by the world of technology. These values are therefore archaic, and in so far as they are retained, lead to hypocrisy. The prevailing form of the Reality Principle, it may be added, always appears to be an anachronism when contrasted with the potential for liberation which it possesses, so long as any institution is able to continue the program of repression.

Man, op. cit., pp. 58,59. For the source of the second thought see the article by Marcuse, "Ethics and Revolution," in R. T. De George (editor), Ethics and Society, (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 133-147.

35

Eros, op. cit., p. 183; and, respectively, Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lecture on "Freedom and Freud's Theory of Instincts," p. 8.

The importance of morality to the civilization is pointed out by Marcuse when he indicates the dependence of "even the most totalitarian, technocratic political administration" on what is usually called the "moral fiber," defined as "a (relatively) 'positive' attitude among the underlying population toward the usefulness of their work and toward the necessity of the repressions exacted by the social organization of work." This "operationalism," (the belief of members in the operative value of society's values), is pointed out as an additional means, beyond fear and the provision of commodities, of achieving cohesion.

Liberation, op. cit., pp. 83, 84.

36

The Freudian concept of sublimation must be specified here. The dictionary (Random unabridged, 1967) describes sublimation as the diversion of energy (of a sexual or other biological impulse) from its immediate goal to one of a higher social, moral, or aesthetic nature or use. (*Italics mine*). By contrast, Marcuse indicates that the Freudian concept "refers to the fate of sexuality under a repressive reality principle. Thus sublimations means a change in the aim and object of the instinct 'with regard to which our social values

come into the picture'...this mode of sublimation is to a high degree dictated by specific societal requirements and cannot be automatically extended to other and less repressive forms of civilizations with different 'social values.'" In so far as existing liberty is gained at the expense of the full satisfaction of needs, the unfreedom of civilization is repressive sublimation. Further, it is not just the range of choice available to the individual which describes freedom, but "what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual."

Respectively, Eros, op. cit., pp. 188, 17; and Man, op. cit., p. 7.

37 Eros, op. cit., pp. 85-86. See also in relation to all techniques of control: Revolt, op. cit., p. 76; Man, op. cit., p. 75; Eros, op. cit., pp. 3, 182-183; and Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lectures regarding freedom, progress, and Freud's instinct theory, pp. 17, 35.

38 Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lecture on "Freedom and Freud's Theory of Instincts," p. 9.

The dynamic of the instincts with regard to the labor process is discussed in the lecture cited immediately above. The repressive modifications of sexuality are seen as freeing the organism for work of and "unpleasurable but socially useful" nature. Once labor occupies the organism, its instincts are further "distorted" in that the "content of life is no longer gratification but rather working toward it." In this fashion civilization sustains itself--the energy diverted from sexuality leads to greater productivity which reinforces, as described in the paper, further diversions of libidinal energies.

39 Eros, op. cit., p. 37.

40 Lectures, loc. cit.

41 Ibid., specifically the lecture on "Progress and Freud's Theory of Instincts," p. 34. See also in reference to the organism as an instrument of society Ibid., pp. 21-22; and Eros, op. cit., pp. 11, 15-16, 81, 117-119, 141.

42 For Marcuse's discussion of "Nature and Revolution" refer to Chapter Two of Revolt, op. cit., pp. 59-78.

43 Marcuse sees nature as a "cosmos with its own potentialities, necessities, and chances. And these potentialities can be, not only in the sense of their value-free function in theory and practice, but also as bearers of objective values." Marcuse suggests that human action against nature violates "certain objective qualities of nature" and it is on this basis that he find "truth in things, in nature." It is this truth which the society can suppress by

asserting control over nature. Nature must be "freed" by freeing the senses, in order to allow man to take full advantage of the "inherent measure" (Marx's term), of the inherent potential, and thereby optimize his reach for his own potential.

Revolt, op. cit., pp. 62, 69, 67.

- 43 Cathexis may be defined as the investment of emotional significance in an activity, object, or idea. Freud's term would lean toward a possessive connotation in that the investment of this energy would unite the participants with each other (nature being considered a subject in its own right).

Dictionary, op. cit.

- 44 Man, op. cit., p. 73. Note: Marcuse points out that in keeping with Freud's later terminology, sexuality is seen as a "specialized" and partial drive, while Eros is that of the entire organism.

- 45 Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lecture on "Freedom and Freud's Theory of Instincts," p. 15.

- 46 Liberation, op. cit., p. 9.

- 47 Eros, op. cit., pp. ix-x.

- 48 Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lecture on "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man," p. 57.

- 49 Man, op. cit., p. 75.

- 50 Eros, op. cit., pp. 43, 84.

- 51 Ibid., pp. 32, 34.

- 52 Ibid., pp. 35-36.

- 53 Revolt, op. cit., pp. 84, 85.

- 54 Eros, op. cit., p. 46.

- 55 Liberation, op. cit., p. 66.

- 56 Ibid., p. 62.

- 71 The Sovereign described by Rousseau is the association of all citizens which prescribes the General Will. Two points move from this: first that moral liberty is achieved when one obeys the laws which one has helped made (as opposed to civil liberty under the laws of another), and second, that the General Will, being infallible in its universality, justifies "forcing the minority to be free" since their perception of the General Will was misguided, and it would be in their best interests to follow the General Will.
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in Sir Ernest Barker's Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 167-307, specifically pp. 184-185.
- 72 Ethics, op. cit., p. 137.
- 73 Ibid., p. 145.
- 74 Ibid., p. 139.
- 75 Ibid., p. 147.
- 76 Revolt, op. cit., p. 17.
- 77 Ethics, op. cit., p. 141.
- 78 Liberation, op. cit., p. 4.
- 79 Man, op. cit., pp. x-xi.
- 80 Ibid., p. xiii-xiv.
- 81 Revolt, op. cit., p. 32; and Liberation, op. cit., pp. ix-x.
- 82 Lectures, op. cit., specifically the lecture on "The Problem of Violence and the Radical Opposition," p. 74.
- 83 Revolt, op. cit., p. 31; and Liberation, op. cit., p. vii.
- 84 Revolt, op. cit., p. 49.
- 85 Eros, op. cit., p. 184.
- 86 For Marcuse's discussion of aesthetics, see "Art and Revolution," Chapter 3 of Revolt, op. cit. For language, refer to Chapter 4

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The following listings are included with the intention of providing a starting point for any person interested in expanding on this paper. One of the major frustrations, as always, was the lack of time and the inability to acquire a true perspective. Each category below represents an area of interest arising from the exploration of Marcuse's morality.

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It should have been clear that the first category involved the measurement of values and their inculcation; the second concerned constructive critiques of education today; the third involved the Freudian basis for Marcuse's instinct theory and morality; and the fourth explored the work of Brown, Goodman, et al with regard to technological values.