

**BAHRAIN**

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


**SUMMARY**

**Bahrain** has strategic significance through its oil fields and important location in the **Persian Gulf**. It also provides a convenient port-of-call for ships of the U.S. Navy's **Middle East Force**. **Bahrain** by itself, constitutes a negligible threat to the **U.S.** It is only through its oil resources in conjunction with other **Middle East** oil producers that this country can have an impact on the Western world.


With a considerable cultural diversity with the **U.S.** and a dry/hot climate, this country would present obstacles for military operations. Only small portions of **Bahrain** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. While NGF ships can approach the coast to provide fair support for operations ashore, **Bahrain**, through its coastal defense weapons, could pose a substantial threat. Mapping of **Bahrain** is barely adequate through the use of old 1:50,000 scale maps. With many modern communications networks and key installations, detailed planning would be necessary for military operations in this country. Likewise, with over 300 potential evacuees in **Bahrain**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would require a strong effort.

BAHRAIN - THREAT SUMMARY



1-105

BAHRAIN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Bahrain

In addition to being an important source of oil, **Bahrain** lies near **Saudi Arabia** midway between the **Strait of Hormuz** and the **Shatt al-Arab Waterway**. A government in **Bahrain** unfriendly to the Saudis would seriously threaten **Saudi Arabia** and the **United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)**. In addition, **Bahrain** provides an important port-of-call for ships of the U.S. Navy's **Middle East Force**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
31	-	-	-	31	325	1 2	3	Low

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## Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Bahrain** constitutes a negligible threat to the **U.S.** in the areas of drug trafficking, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

## General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	M-60	Howitzers	2	4	86	B

Ground OOB includes 2,300 troops, all of whom are volunteers. The army is composed of one brigade for internal security and coastal patrol. Some foreign officers are on contract for training and assistance. Additional armor and artillery units are planned. The tank is the M-60A3, while artillery includes 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers.

## General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	None	Hand-Held SAMs	Negligible	4	44	B

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E/F; Close Air: None; Air Defense: Stinger and RBS SAMs. **Bahrain** will be included in the air defense coverage provided by the Saudi Peace Shield system.

## General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Antiair	1	4	65	C

Ships: None; SSMs: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with Exocet SSMs, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 4 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 3 Small Gun Boats; 17 Speed Boats.

## Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Persian, English)

Primary religion - Islam

There is a relatively large cultural difference between **Bahrain** and the **U.S.**

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## Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
57-99	70	4	Dry/Hot

Hot and humid from April through October; temperate from November through March.

## General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

**Bahrain** is composed of a group of islands in the **Persian Gulf** midway between the top of the **Qatar Peninsula** and mainland **Saudi Arabia**.

## Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

## General Cross-Country Mobility

- Small portions of **Bahrain** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The topographical characteristics and features of **Bahrain**, **Kuwait**, **Qatar**, and the **U.A.E.** are quite similar. The four states are collectively divided into two distinct topographical regions, the Desert Plains and Eastern Highlands. The Desert Plains are generally poorly suited for tracked and wheeled vehicles due to extensive sand dunes, sebkhas (crusted surface over soft ground), and steep-sided wadis. One-third of this region, mainly in **Kuwait** and **Qatar**, offers more suitable conditions. Throughout the Eastern Highlands, tracked and vehicular movement is restricted to the floors of narrow, steep-sided wadis due to rugged terrain, nearly vertical valley sides, and seasonal flooding.

## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor

The terrain of this small country consists of low rolling hills with numerous rocky cliffs and wadis. From the shoreline the land surface rises gradually toward the center where it drops into a basin surrounded by steep cliffs. Line of sight distances are expected to be under 1,000 meters over most of this country.

**Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)**

- Fair NGF support for amphibious operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62420	11,270	Fair

**Hydrography (Coastal Threat)**

- Substantial coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-198	24,000	U.S. NGF and Threat Equal

**MC&G Shortfalls**

- Complete coverage with older 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

**Airfields**

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-5	1/0	1/C-5

Airfield	Type Aircraft	Comments
Bahrain International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	No restrictions

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## Ports

- One port with a small harbor and depths over 40 feet.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Sitrah	Small	41-45/41-45		Yes

## Key Installations

Numerous oil fields, pipelines, and communications facilities will necessitate in-depth planning for military operations. Oil fields are located throughout central **Bahrain**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Manama	- Excellent international/adequate domestic telecomm - 3 Radio stations - 2 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	225 km	None	1	1	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	None

## Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **Bahrain** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

## NEO

- Due to the number of potential evacuees in **Bahrain**, NEO conducted by a MEU would require a strong effort.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
35	290	7 (Manama)	D

Note: In **Bahrain**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs  
Terrorism  
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer  
NBC