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CUBA

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


SUMMARY

The primary U.S. equity in Cuba is the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. U.S. relations with Cuba have suffered in recent years due to its support for violent political change and its plans for expanding revolution in the Caribbean basin. Cuba is located along some of the primary drug routes from South America to the U.S. and has acted as a transit point for narcotics and provided support to traffickers. For nearly 30 years Cuban President Fidel Castro has been instrumental in sponsoring terrorism within Latin America and elsewhere. Cuba maintains close ties with the M-19 insurgent group in Colombia and has helped them acquire arms, training, and supplies. Because of its involvement in drug trafficking, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, Cuba deserves special attention by military planners. This country also has the most experienced and powerful armed forces in Latin America. Most of its military equipment is obtained from the Soviet Union. Cuba reportedly has stocks of chemical weapons and allegedly used these weapons during the recent conflict in Angola.

With a semitropical climate and predominately flat or gently rolling terrain, Cuba would not pose as many problems to U.S. military operations as many other Latin American countries. The country is generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. While U.S. NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide adequate support for operations ashore, they are likely to be out-gunned by Cuban coastal defense weapons. The 1:50,000 scale maps which are available for Cuba may be somewhat outdated. The primary Cuban airfield outside of the U.S. facility at Guantanamo Bay is located at Havana. There are three major ports other than Guantanamo Bay but they have limited capability to handle strategic sealift. The estimated time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to deploy to Cuba is between two and six days.

CUBA - THREAT SUMMARY




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CUBA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Cuba

- Naval base at **Guantanamo Bay**.
- Other **U.S.** equities in **Cuba** are low.

The **U.S.** Naval Base at **Guantanamo Bay**, is leased to the **U.S.** and only mutual agreement or **U.S.** abandonment of the area can terminate the lease. Since the **U.S.** broke diplomatic relations with **Cuba** in 1961, **U.S.-Cuban** relations have been characterized by varying degrees of hostility.

| Direct Inv (Mil of \$) | Exports (Mil of \$) | Imports (Mil of \$) | U.S. Aid (Mil of \$) | Total Equity (Mil of \$) | U.S. Citizens | \$ Rating Rating | Total Numerical Rating | Overall U.S. Equity |
|---------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| - | - | - | - | - | 24 | 0 1 | 1 | Low |

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Drug Threat

| Drug Production | Drug Processing | Precursor Chemicals | Money Laundering | Transit Point |
|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------|
| | | | | X |

- Drug transit point and support to traffickers.

Cuba is located on some of the primary drug routes into the **U.S.** and airlift and sealift are reportedly eluding **U.S.** agents by entering **Cuban** territorial waters or airspace. In the past, **U.S.** officials have accused **Cuban** officials of involvement, and indictments were returned against four ranking officials in 1982. **Cuban** authorities have publicly expressed an interest in antidrug cooperation with the **U.S.** but have not elaborated on what kind of cooperation they envision.

Terrorism

- **Cuba** sponsors terrorism in **Latin America** and elsewhere.

For nearly 30 years now, **Cuban** President Fidel Castro has trained and supported guerrillas from many parts of the world, including **Palestinians**, who have relied in part on terrorist operations against noncombatants to advance their political aims. **Cuba** has maintained a large and complex apparatus for subversion that has substantially assisted guerrilla movements throughout **Latin America**, and many of **Latin America's** radical leftist organizations look to Castro for guidance and advice.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Cuba has maintained close ties with the M-19 insurgent group in **Colombia** and has helped them acquire arms, training, and supplies. Arms obtained from external sources were reportedly provided to M-19 guerrillas while they were being trained in **Cuba**. The **U.S.S.R.** has been a primary provider of arms to **Latin American** insurgent groups and has frequently used **Cuba** as a transit point for moving these arms.

Consolidated Threat

Cuba deserves special attention by military planners because of its involvement in all three of the threat categories: drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

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General Ground OOB

- **Cuba** has the largest ground OOB in the region.

| Infantry | Tank OOB | Artillery | Army Size (Thousands) | Quality | Total Capability Value | Rating |
|----------|----------|-----------|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|--------|
| Reg/Exp | T-72 | Bloc | 145 | 15 | 300 | E |

Ground OOB includes about 145,000 troops which includes 15,000 ready reservists and 60,000 conscripts. There has been a recent increase in **Cuban** overall military strength. This country has the most experienced and powerful military in **Latin America**. Tanks: PT-76, T-54, T-55, T-62, T-72; Artillery: FROG SSM, Guns/howitzers including 76 mm, 85 mm, 122 mm, 130 mm, 152 mm.

General Air OOB

- **Cuba** has the largest air OOB in the region.

| Air OOB | Close Air | AAW (IAD) | Air Force Size (Thousands) | Quality | Total Capability Value | Rating |
|---------|-------------|-----------|----------------------------|---------|------------------------|--------|
| Bloc | Early Smart | Bloc | 19 | 15 | 164 | E |

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-19, MiG-21, MiG-23; Close Air: Mi-24, MiG-17, MiG-23BN; Air Defense: SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, SA-13, and SA-14 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- **Cuba** has the largest naval OOB in the region.

| Naval OOB | S/S Missiles | Patrol Craft | Navy Size (Thousands) | Quality | Total Capability Value | Rating |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|--------|
| ASUW/Air/ASW | Bloc | Bloc | 14 | 15 | 159 | E |

Ships: 2 Frigates (**Soviet** Koni Class) with SAMs, guns, and antisubmarine mortars; SSM: SS-N-2 Styx; Patrol Craft: 5 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-**Soviet**); 3 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol (Ex-**Soviet**); 9 Fast Attack Craft-Hydrofoil (Ex-**Soviet**), 2 Large Patrol Craft (Ex-**Soviet**).

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- The **Soviets** have reportedly supplied chemical weapons to **Cuba** since 1970.
- **Cuba** is alleged to have used chemical weapons in **Angola**.

Reports have indicated that **Soviet**-supplied chemical weapons similar to "yellow-rain" have existed in **Cuba** since 1970. **Cuba** is alleged to have used chemical weapons in **Angola**. Two nuclear power reactors are under construction. No nuclear weapons are suspected.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Cuba** and the **U.S.**

Weather

| Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit) | Average Relative Humidity (Percent) | Average Annual Rainfall (Inches) | Rating |
|--|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|
| 70-84 | 63 | 48 | Mixed |

Cuba is in the tradewind belt, making its climate generally semitropical.

General Geographic Conditions

| URBAN | DESERT | JUNGLE | MOUNTAINOUS |
|-------|--------|--------|-------------|
| X | | | |

Operational Elevation

| <2,000 FT | <4,000 FT | <6,000 FT | >6,000 FT | >9,000 FT | >12,000 FT |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| X | | | | | |

Cuba is the largest island in the **West Indies**. About three-fifths of the country is flat or gently rolling with many wide, fertile valleys or plains. The remaining two-fifths is mountainous or hilly. About 70 percent of the population is urban.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Cuba** is generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement of vehicles would be feasible in most of **Cuba**. In some areas--on the low plains bordering some coastal zones, in dense forests, and in steep and rougher terrain--movement would be precluded most of the year.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Line of sight visibility is generally restricted to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

While more than half of the country is flat, there is forest and savanna over roughly two-thirds of the land area. It is estimated that line of sight distances of between 1,000 and 2,000 meters can be found in many coastal and inland locations.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

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| DMA Chart # | 5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters) | NFG Rating |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|------------|
| 27083/27084 | 1,830 | Good |

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal defense weapons.

| Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon | Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters) | Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal) |
|---|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| FROG SSM | 70,000 | Threat Advantage |

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage with old 1:50,000 scale map.

| 1:50 New | 1:50 Old | Some 1:50 | MSI Avail | 1:250 New | None |
|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------|
| | X | | | | |

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

| Number of Airfields | Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated | Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained) | Rating |
|---------------------|---|--|--------|
| 3 | 1 C-5 1 C-141B 1 C-130 | 1/2 | 1/C-5 |

| Airfields | Type Aircraft | Comments |
|--|-----------------------------|--|
| McCalla Field (Guantanamo Bay) Guantanamo Bay Naval Air Station | C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130 | Daylight/VFR only. Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only. |
| Jose Marti International (Havana) | C-141B, C-130 | |

Ports

- Three moderate size ports with limited capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

| Major Ports | Harbor Size | Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet) | Cargo Pier Depth (Feet) | Cranes |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| La Habana | Medium | 36-40/31-35 | 36-40 | Yes |
| Caibarien | Small | 26-30/31-35 | 6-10 | - |
| Cienfuegos | Medium | 26-30/26-30 | 26-30 | - |

Key Installations

There are suspected storage facilities for chemical weapons in **Cuba**, probably in the vicinity of **Havana**. Two nuclear power reactors are being built.

| U.S. Embassy | Communications | Highways | Railroads | Major Ports | Primary Airfields | Pipeline | Oil Field | NBC |
|---|--|-----------|-----------|-------------|-------------------|----------|-----------|-----|
| None (U.S. Interests Section is in the Swiss Embassy in Havana) | - Satellite ground station - 148 Radio stations - 52 TV stations | 21,000 km | 14,921 km | 3 | 3 | None | None | C |

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Cuba** is between two and six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Based on the small number of potential evacuees (24) and the short distance to the probable evacuation site (Havana), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would not be difficult. (This does not address NEO at the **Guantanamo Bay** Naval Base.)

| Embassy Staff | Evacuees | Inland Objective (nm) | Rating |
|---------------|----------|-----------------------|--------|
| 0 | 24 | 0 (Havana) | D |

