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HAITI

| | |
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


SUMMARY


Haiti is one of the most underdeveloped and repressed states in the **Western Hemisphere**. Government instability and human rights violations have prevailed through numerous regimes. The U.S. has sought to foster constructive and cooperative relations with Haiti which occupies an important location on the western third of the island of Hispaniola in the **Caribbean Sea**. While U.S. equity in Haiti is not high, about 6,000 U.S. citizens reside in the country and a bilateral trade relationship is maintained. Haiti is being used increasingly as a transshipment center for cocaine moving to the U.S. from **South America**. It has a small, poorly trained and equipped armed force. Military officers are frequently involved in corruption and attempts to overthrow the government.

Haiti consists of rough, mountainous terrain and has a generally semiarid climate. Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would not be possible in most of the country due to the broken terrain, swamps, and marshes. The geography and significant ground cover also limits the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage of this country by older 1:50,000 scale maps is likely to be outdated. **Port-au-Prince** International Airport is able to accommodate C-5 aircraft but the single major port, also at **Port-au-Prince**, has restricted capability to receive strategic sealift. The estimated response time for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and move to Haiti is in excess of six days. Due to the potential requirement to evacuate about 6,000 persons from Haiti, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

HAITI - THREAT SUMMARY



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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Poorest and most repressed state in the Americas.
- Government instability and human rights violations prevail.

Haiti remains one of the poorest countries in the world, suffering shortages of most resources as well as the skilled labor needed for instituting reform. Haiti's recent history was marked by the strong and autocratic rule of the late President Francois Duvalier, and to a lesser extent his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier. Since the younger Duvalier relinquished power in 1986, there has been even greater Government instability and a series of coups or attempted coups. The Government's human rights record has recently come under increasing criticism. Also, the Tontons Macoutes, a former presidential security force, remains a source of potential violence. Cuban activities against Haiti are noteworthy, particularly since the Cuban ouster from Grenada.

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U.S. Equities In Haiti

- Haiti is a non-communist country strategically located in the Caribbean.
- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

U.S. policy seeks to foster constructive and cooperative relations with Haiti, which occupies a strategic location on the western third of the island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean Sea. Although poor and underdeveloped, Haiti is presently transitioning to democracy and has no strong ties with communist countries.

The U.S. purchases about 75 percent of Haiti's exports. Some 60 percent of Haitian imports come from the U.S., including machinery, food products, petroleum, and cotton textiles. The U.S. Agency for International Development provides assistance to Haiti.

| Direct Inv (Mil of \$) | Exports (Mil of \$) | Imports (Mil of \$) | U.S. Aid (Mil of \$) | Total Equity (Mil of \$) | U.S. Citizens | \$ Rating | | Total Numerical Rating | Overall U.S. Equity |
|---------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|-----------|--------|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | | Rating | Rating | | |
| 24 | 204 | 145 | 92 | 465 | 6,000 | 1 | 5 | 6 | Medium |

Drug Threat

| Drug Production | Drug Processing | Precursor Chemicals | Money Laundering | Transit Point |
|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| | | | | X |

- The weak, unstable Government of Haiti is unable to control drug trafficking and transshipment.

Haiti improved its drug interdiction efforts in 1988, despite two coups and four Governments. Seizures increased substantially in 1988, thanks in part to a new Center for Information and Coordination at Port au Prince airport, but the volume of trafficking remains beyond the capability of the narcotics police. U.S. enforcement agencies are concerned that the uncertain situation in Haiti and lack of strong control by the central Government has led to the increasing use of Haitian waters and Haitian-registered vehicles for the transshipment of cocaine. Although corruption remains a problem, the Government did remove from service a number of military officers suspected of involvement.

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General Ground OOB

| Infantry | Tank OOB | Artillery | Army Size (Thousands) | Quality | Total Capability Value | Rating |
|----------|----------|-----------|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|--------|
| Reg/TR | LAV | Howitzers | 7 | 0 | 77 | B |

Ground OOB consists of about 7,000 volunteers. The army has many roles including internal security, fire-fighting, and immigration. Training in the armed forces is marginal. Tanks: M-5A1; Artillery: 75 mm, 105 mm.

General Air OOB

| Air OOB | Close Air | AAW (IAD) | Air Force Size (Thousands) | Quality | Total Capability Value | Rating |
|---------|-----------|-----------|----------------------------|---------|------------------------|--------|
| Props | Props | Early AAA | Negligible | 0 | 30 | B |

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: Cessna 0-2A (COIN); Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

| Naval OOB | S/S Missiles | Patrol Craft | Navy Size (Thousands) | Quality | Total Capability Value | Rating |
|---------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|--------|
| Small Surface | None | Lg Gun Boats | Negligible | 0 | 40 | B |

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 1 Large Gun Boat (860 displacement tons); 11 Small Coastal Patrol Craft; 2 Small Harbor Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - French (Creole)
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between Haiti and the U.S.

Weather

| Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit) | Average Relative Humidity (Percent) | Average Annual Rainfall (Inches) | Rating |
|--|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|
| 73-88 | 49 | 53 | Mixed |

Although in the tropics, Haiti is generally semiarid due to the mountains between Haiti and the Dominican Republic that cut off the moist trade winds.

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General Geographic Conditions

| URBAN | DESERT | JUNGLE | MOUNTAINOUS |
|-------|--------|--------|-------------|
| | | | X |

Operational Elevation

| <2,000 FT | <4,000 FT | <6,000 FT | >6,000 FT | >9,000 FT | >12,000 FT |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| | X | | | | |

About two thirds of the country is rough, mountainous terrain.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Haiti is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be infeasible in most of Haiti due to steep hills and mountains, roughly dissected plains, and swamps and marshes. Conditions are fair for tracked movement along the coast plains.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Most of Haiti consists of rough, mountainous terrain which would severely limit line of sight distances for the employment of extended range direct-fire weapons. Along the coastal plains occasional line of sight distances may be possible up to 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

| DMA Chart # | 5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters) | NFG Rating |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|------------|
| 26100/26190 | 5,635 | Good |

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

| Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon | Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters) | Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal) |
|---|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 105 mm M-101 | 11,000 | U.S. NGF Advantage |

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage with old 1:50,000 scale maps.

| 1:50 New | 1:50 Old | Some 1:50 | MSI Avail | 1:250 New | None |
|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------|
| | X | | | | |

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

| Number of Airfields | Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated | Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained) | Rating |
|---------------------|---|--|--------|
| 3 | 1 C-5 2 None | 0/3 | 1/C-5 |

| Airfields | Type Aircraft | Comments |
|--|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Bowen Field Cap Haitien Port-au-Prince International | None None C-5, C-141B, C-130 | - - Narrow runway for C-5. |

Ports

One small port is available with limited capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

| Major Ports | Harbor Size | Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet) | Cargo Pier Depth (Feet) | Cranes |
|----------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| Port au Prince | Small | 26-30/31-35 | 36-40 | Yes |

Key Installations

Most of Haiti's communications and transportation facilities are barely adequate. Although outside agencies such as the U.S. AID provides assistance, infrastructure development progresses very slowly.

| U.S. Embassy | Communications | Highways | Railroads | Major Ports | Primary Airfields | Pipeline | Oil Field | NBC |
|----------------|---|----------|-----------|-------------|-------------------|----------|-----------|------|
| Port-au-Prince | - Barely adequate telecomm - 30 Radio stations - 4 TV stations - Satellite station | 4,000 km | 40 km | 1 | 3 | None | None | None |

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to Haiti is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Haiti would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (6,000).

| Embassy Staff | Evacuees | Inland Objective (nm) | Rating |
|---------------|----------|--------------------------|--------|
| 35 | 6,000 | 0 (Port-au-Prince) | F |

Note: In Haiti the following factors are of little significance:

Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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YANGI DAVU ISHCHIYI BOSH

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1. Ismi: 2. Familiyasi: 3. Yil:

4. Manzili: 5. Telefon:

| № | Ismin | Manzili | Telefon |
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6. Tug'ilgan joyi:

7. Tug'ilgan kuni: