

IRAN

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:
Telephone:

USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597




SUMMARY

With a fundamentalist Moslem government and strong anti-U.S. sentiments, Iran is a major source of instability in the Middle East. Relations between the U.S. and Iran continue to be at a low point due to Iran's support for terrorism, including association with the hostage-takings in Lebanon. Iran is a significant producer of opium and a transit point for narcotics moving from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Western markets. Iran uses terrorism as a basic tactic against the U.S. and other Western influence, and also as a means to intimidate Arab nations in the Persian Gulf. This country is a major buyer of black market weapons and technology from Europe and other Third World countries. Iran has the second strongest ground OOB in the region (after Iraq) with about 305,000 experienced troops and a variety of weapons from many sources. It also has the third largest naval capability and fourth largest air OOB in the region. Iran reportedly used chemical weapons against Iraq and may have production facilities for biological weapons. It is suspected that Iran would like to develop nuclear weapons.

There is a distinct cultural difference between Iran and the U.S. which could significantly impact on military operations. Rugged terrain, generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles, and hot, humid, summer conditions along the coasts would also pose problems for military planners. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the extensive mountain ranges and irregular terrain. Hydrographic conditions will allow NGF ships to within range of some coastal targets, but Iranian coastal defense weapons could out-gun these ships. Iran has limited mapping although 1:50,000 scale maps are available for coastal areas along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, the capital Tehran, the area around Lake Urmia in the northwest, and scattered locations elsewhere. Facilities for the production and/or storage of chemical and biological weapons are suspected at unknown locations in Iran. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in this country would pose some problems due to the distance from the coast to the probable evacuation site (Tehran at 348 nm).


IRAN - THREAT SUMMARY



Iran - 1

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IRAN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Unpredictable fundamentalist Moslem government.
- Long war with Iraq recently suspended.
- Islamic terrorists pose a threat to the West.

The fundamentalist Moslem government of Iran is confronted by resistance from a broad range of groups, including Kurds, rightists, monarchists, and leftists, some of whom are receiving aid from Iran's external enemy, Iraq. However, without unity among the insurgents, it is doubtful that they can seriously threaten the regime. Iranian terrorists continue to pose a threat to all they oppose. A worrisome possibility is that these terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon by theft or black-market purchase for use against their targets in the West.

U.S. Equities in Iran

Relations between the U.S. and Iran suffer due to Iran's financial, logistical, and material support for acts of terrorism, including association with the hostage-takings in Lebanon. In spite of this, the U.S. tries to maintain third-party contacts within Iran in an attempt to moderate actions of its unstable Government and maintain the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating		Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
						Rating	Rating		
32	54	1,752	-	1,838	100	3	1	4	Low

Drug Threat

- Produced 200-400 metric tons of opium in 1988.
- Transit point for drug flow.
- Does not cooperate in efforts against drugs.

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

Iran has not cooperated with efforts against drug production and trafficking. U.S. officials estimate the annual Iranian opium production at 200 to 400 metric tons. While this amount would not satisfy Iran's domestic addict population, opium and heroin are flowing across Iran from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and exported through Turkey and other routes to Western markets.

Terrorism

- Supports surrogate Hizballah movement in Lebanon.
- Uses terrorism as a basic tactic against the West.
- Uses terrorism to further Islamic fundamentalist revolution.
- Uses terrorism to intimidate Arab states in the Persian Gulf.

The regime in Iran views terrorism as a basic tactic to be used against U.S. and other Western influence and presence in the Middle East as well as a tool to foment Islamic fundamentalist revolution. Iran also uses terrorism to intimidate Arab states in the Persian Gulf.

Iran's principal surrogate, the Hizballah movement in Lebanon, has carried out car bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, and other acts of terrorism against Western interests since 1983. Like Libya, and previously Syria, Iran uses its government apparatus to recruit, train, finance, and deploy terrorists, especially in Lebanon.

Gray Arms/ Technology Transfer

Iran is a major buyer of illegal weapons and technology from Europe and other Third World nations. In the mid-1980s countries such as Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Scotland, and Sweden reportedly sent large quantities of explosives to Iran. In particular, the Swedish firm Novel Industries provided an estimated 400 tons of illegal munitions. In 1987, the British Government approved a 400-million dollar sale of radar equipment to Iran on the basis that it was a defensive system for use along the Soviet-Iranian border and not in the Gulf war.

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Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Iran** constitutes a very-serious concern through involvement in all three threat categories (narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer).

General Ground OOB

- Second largest ground capability in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	305	22	467	F

Ground OOB includes 305,000 troops of whom about 55,000 are regulars and 250,000 are conscripts. Recruits receive 13 weeks of basic training at one of six induction centers and are then sent off to their units for more advanced training. The majority of officers and NCOs are regulars. Officers attend a military college and are trained in combat tactics at schools run by different branches of the army. Higher military education is also provided by the Army Staff College and the War Academy. **Iranian** troops gained much experience during the **Iran-Iraq** War. Tanks include: M-60A1, M-47, M-48, T-54, T-55, T-59, T-62, and T-72. Artillery includes: HY-2 SSM, M-46, M-107, M-109A1, and M-114.

General Air OOB

- Fourth largest air capability in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	NT/AW	Bloc	35	22	197	F

Fighter Aircraft: F-14, J-6; Close Air: F-4D/E, F-5E/F; Air Defense: CSA-1 (Chinese version of the SA-2), Improved HAWK, Rapier, RBS-70, and SA-7 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- Third largest naval capability in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	15	22	147	E

Ships: 3 Destroyers, 4 Frigates, and 4 Corvettes with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: Sea Killer II, Harpoon (stockpiles may have been depleted during war with **Iraq**); Patrol Craft: 11 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, and radars; 3 Fast Attack Craft-Gun (Ex-**Chinese**); 6 Large Patrol Craft; 13 Hovercraft.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Reportedly used chemical weapons against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.
- May have production facilities for biological weapons.
- Suspected to have an interest in nuclear weapons.

Iran reportedly used chemical weapons against Iraq during the Gulf War. Mortars and artillery were employed to deliver mustard gas and phosgene. This country is alleged to have production facilities for biological warfare agents. Iran has two nuclear power reactors under construction. Although possession of nuclear weapons is improbable, Iran's commitment to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been publicly questioned. However, this country is in the very early stage of nuclear development and lacks the industrial infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons program.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Persian (Kurdish, Arabic, Turkish, English, French)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a very large cultural difference between Iran and the U.S. which would impact significantly on military operations in the country.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
51-73	59	10	Dry/Warm

Iran's climate is characterized by wide variations in precipitation and temperature. Seasonal changes are abrupt with a short fall and spring. There is adequate rainfall in the northwest and along the Caspian Sea but almost none in the eastern deserts and in the south. Most of Iran experiences long, hot, dry summers. Along the Persian Gulf very high humidity accompanies the heat.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

About one-fifth the size of the U.S., Iran is in the highlands of southwest Asia. About 70 percent of the country (mostly mountains and desert areas) is virtually uninhabited. The heaviest populated areas are along the Caspian coast, in Tehran, and in the provinces of East and West Azerbaijan.

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Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

The mountain rimland, comprising about one-half of **Iran**, is dominated by two major mountain chains, the **Zagrose** and the **Elburz**.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Iran** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be precluded at all times in about two-thirds of **Iran** due to rugged hills and mountains, and smaller areas of wet or flooded salt flats, marshes, and swamps. Tracked movement is generally good in only a few regions, such as the coastal plains near **Bandar Abbas**. Even in these areas, movement may be restricted by sebkhas.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with average line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances in about two-thirds of **Iran** would be limited to under 1,000 meters due to extensive mountain ranges and irregular terrain. Only in a few areas, such as the coastal plains near **Bandar Abbas**, could line of sight visibility exceed 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NFG support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62394 (Bandar Abbas)	9,150	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
HY-2 SSM	40,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists for coastal areas along the **Persian Gulf** and **Gulf of Oman**, the area around **Tehran**, the vicinity of **Lake Urmia** in the northwest, and scattered locations elsewhere.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with eight airfields that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
17	8 C-5 8 C-141B 1 None	9/8	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Abadan	None	Low runway WBC.
Ahwaz	C-141B, C-130	
Badr	C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.
Bandar Abbas International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Bushehr	C-5, C-141B, C-130	The C-5 and C-141B operations are limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only.
Dezful	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Esfahan Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC. Daylight/VFR only.
Hamadan Military	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Jask	C-141B, C-130	Runway is less than 6,000 feet. Daylight/VFR only.
Kerman	C-141B, C-130	
Khark Island	C-141B, C-130	
Mehrabod International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Shiraz International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Tabriz	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Uromiyeh	C-141B, C-130	
Yazd	C-141B, C-130	
Zahedan International	C-141B, C-130	

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Ports

- There are seven major ports with **Jazireh Ye Khark** being most accessible.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Khorramshahr	Medium	31-35/26-30	26-30	Yes
Abadan	Medium	31-35/31-35	31-35	Yes
Bandar E Mah Shahr	Small	36-40/-	-	Yes
Bandar E Shahpur	Small	26-30/61-65	36-40	Yes
Jazireh Ye Khark	Small	Over 76/71-75	-	-
Bushehr	Small	26-30/-	31-35	Yes
Bandar Abbas	Small	26-30/31-35	46-50	Yes

Key Installations

Facilities for the production and/or storage of chemical and biological weapons are suspected at unknown locations in **Iran**. Two nuclear powered reactors are also under construction. Oil fields are located in west-central **Iran** in the vicinity of **Bandar Khomeini, Ahvaz, Dezful, and Masjed Soleyman**. Other key installations include oil refineries, pipelines, power stations, and communications networks.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Radio relay system centered in Tehran - 90 Radio stations - 250 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations (Note: some may be inoperable)	136,372 km	4,601 km	7	16	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **Iran** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

Due to the distance from the coast to the probable evacuation site (**Tehran** at 348 nm), NEO conducted by a MEU in **Iran** would present considerable difficulty.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	100	348 (Tehran)	D