

IRAQ

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


SUMMARY

Iraq is strong militarily and has designs on becoming the dominant power in the oil-rich Persian Gulf area. It has used brutal, repressive measures against its own Kurdish minority. Overall U.S. equity in Iraq is low. Iraq has sponsored terrorist acts against European and African countries and presently provides safe haven for the notorious terrorist Abu Nidal. It is a major buyer of gray arms and illicit technology from all available sources. Iraq has the largest ground OOB in the Middle East with over 475,000 experienced regular troops and advanced Soviet-provided tanks and SSMs. It also has among the strongest air and naval capabilities in the region, backed by Soviet equipment and on-site advisors. Iraq is known to maintain quantities of chemical and biological weapons and is reported to have used these weapons against Iran and the Kurds. It is also suspected that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons production capability.

With a hot, dry climate and strong anti-Western sentiment, military operations in Iraq would present a serious challenge. While the steep and desert region bordering Saudi Arabia and Syria is generally well suited for tracked movement, the northeast highlands bordering Turkey are not. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is restricted to 2,000 meters or less mainly in the mountainous northeast and marshy southeast. The basic land-locked geography of Iraq, plus the poor hydrography at Al Faw and the considerable coastal defense threat in that area would all serve to limit the effectiveness of NGF support. The restricted map coverage would also adversely affect military operations in this country. Presently, 1:50,000 scale maps are available only for northeastern Iraq and the area east of Basra to the Persian Gulf. Accessibility to Iraq would be limited by the availability of only one airfield (Baghdad) which can handle C-141B aircraft (not C-5s) and one major port at Basra with marginal capabilities. The chemical/biological weapons complexes, oil fields, refineries, and communications networks in Iraq should receive priority consideration by military planners. NEO conducted by a MEU in this country under normal circumstances would present difficulty due to the distance (302 nm) from the gulf to the probable evacuation site (Baghdad) and the large number of potential evacuees (500).


IRAQ - THREAT SUMMARY



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IRAQ - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Wants to be the dominant power in the oil-rich **Persian Gulf** area.
- Has used brutal, repressive measures against its own Kurdish minority.

In 1980, due to religious tensions with revolutionary **Iran** and dispute over the **Shatt Al-Arab** waterway, **Iraq** attacked **Iran**. The long and costly war continued until 1988 when a ceasefire was declared. However, the tensions remain. **Iraq** has battled its Kurdish minority for years with brutality and chemical weapons, but Kurdish rebels continue their resistance to Government demands. **Iraq** is strong militarily and wants to be the dominant power in the **Persian Gulf** region. The alienation of **Iraq** from **Syria**, which supports **Iran**, is a potential source of confrontation in the **Iraqi** rear.

U.S. Equities in Iraq

Iraq is strong militarily as well as being an important player in the **Arab** world. **U.S.** trade with **Iraq** peaked in 1981 and has since been on the decline. **U.S.** exports to this country have been primarily agricultural.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
	683	526	21	1,230	500	3 1	4	Low

Terrorism

- Past sponsor of the Abu Nidal Organization.
- Sponsored three terrorist assassinations in 1988.

Iraq sponsored three assassinations of exiled dissidents in the **United Kingdom, Sudan, and Norway** in 1988. It is suspected that the **Iraqi-backed Mujahedin-e-Khalq** was responsible for an attempted bombing at a **Tehran** bus terminal. **Iraq** also continued to provide safe haven to some **Palestinian** groups, such as the **Iraqi-created Arab Liberation Front** and the **Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)**, responsible for the **Achille Lauro** hijacking in 1985. **Baghdad** views its safe haven to **Palestinian** groups as legitimate assistance to the struggle for a **Palestinian** homeland. The notorious terrorist **Abu Nidal** presently enjoys the hospitality of **Iraq**.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Iraq is a major buyer of gray arms and technology from the **Soviet Union** and other **Western European** countries. The availability of critical technology can allow **Iraq** to develop sophisticated weapons more quickly and at lower cost than might occur if it had to rely exclusively on the output of its own research. **Iraq** is known to have a clandestine program for acquiring weapons, particularly **SSMs** and air defense systems. It is also alleged to be actively seeking nuclear technology transfer from any available source.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Iraq** presents the most serious threat in the combined areas of terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer.

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General Ground OOB

- Largest ground capability in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	475	24	639	F

Ground OOB includes 475,000 regular troops, all of whom are conscripts. A large part of the enlisted strength, including NCOs, is composed of career personnel. Recruits receive basic training and then advanced instruction with their assigned units. Regular personnel attend service schools for the combat arms as well as technical and support services. **Soviet** advisors assist in training and employment of advanced **Soviet** weapons. Most officers are graduates of the Military College at **Baghdad**. **Iraqi** forces gained combat experience during the **Iran-Iraq** War. Tanks include: Chieftain, PT-76, T-54, T-55, T-62, and T-72. Artillery includes: 2S1, 2S3, D-30, D-74, M-46, M-56, M-1938, SCUD SSM, and Al Abbas SSM.

General Air OOB

- Third largest air capability in the region after **Egypt** and **Syria**.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	38	24	212	F

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-19, MiG-21, MiG-25, MiG-29; Close Air: MiG-23BM, Mirage F-1EQ5 (Exocet-equipped), Mirage F-1EQ-200, Su-7, Su-20; Air Defense: Roland, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, and SA-9 SAMs, AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- Second largest naval capability in the region after **Egypt**.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	4	24	158	E

Ships: 5 Frigates and 6 Missile Corvettes with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: Otomat, SS-N-2 Styx; Patrol Craft: 2 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-**Soviet**) with SSMs, guns, and radars; 6 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Ex-**Soviet**); 5 Large Patrol Craft (Ex-**Soviet**); 16 Coastal Patrol Craft (Ex-**Soviet**).

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Suspected to maintain quantities of chemical and biological weapons.
- Reported to have used chemical weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish citizens.
- May have used biological weapons against Kurdish civilians.
- Alleged to have an interest in producing nuclear weapons.

Iraq is considered to be a significant possessor of chemical weapons and has reportedly used blister, blood, and nerve gas against Iran during the Gulf War. Reports indicate Iraq has established an indigenous production capability for certain chemical warfare agents. Iraq has allegedly employed aerial bombs and very probably rockets with chemical agents. In 1987, there were reports of Iraqi air attacks with chemical weapons on a succession of Kurdish villages in Iraq as well as Iranian Kurdistan, with many hundreds of civilian casualties. It is suspected that Iraq has a biological weapons production complex southeast of Baghdad. Biological agents were allegedly used against the Kurds in the vicinity of As Sulaymaniyeh. Although it is unlikely that Iraq has nuclear weapons, its support of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty has been publicly questioned. However, this country is in the early stage of nuclear development and lacks the industrial base to support nuclear weapons production.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic
Primary religion - Islam

There is a relatively large cultural difference between Iraq and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
59-87	29	6	Dry/Hot

Average temperatures range from higher than 120 degrees Fahrenheit in July and August to below freezing in January. The most rainfall occurs from December through April and averages between four and seven inches annually.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X	X		

About 75 percent of Iraq's population live in the flat alluvial plain stretching southeast toward Baghdad and Basra to the Persian Gulf. Much of the land is desert or wasteland with some mountains in the northeast.

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

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General Cross-Country Mobility

- Iraq is moderately suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

While the steep and desert region bordering **Saudi Arabia** and **Syria** is generally well suited for tracked movement, the northeastern highlands bordering **Iraq** and **Turkey** are not. The **Tigris-Euphrates** delta region of **Iraq** is generally unsuited for tracked vehicles due to irrigated plains, marshes, and other wet areas.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Restricted to 2,000 meters or less.

The desert and wasteland region bordering **Saudi Arabia** would accommodate line of sight distances of between 1,000 and 2,000 meters and perhaps more in some locations. The mountains in the northeast and covered marshes in the southeast, however, would limit line of sight distances to well under 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Poor NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62434 (Al Faw)	20,130	Poor

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
SCUD SSM	80,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists for northeastern **Iraq** and the area east of **Basra** to the **Persian Gulf**.

Airfields

- Poor accessibility by air with only one airfield which is not C-5 capable.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-141B	0/1	1/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Saddam International (Baghdad)	C-141B, C-130	Cannot accommodate C-5 aircraft

Ports

- One major port with marginal capabilities.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Basra	Medium	26-30/31-35	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

There are several chemical or biological weapons research or production complexes located in central and northern Iraq that should constitute priority targets for military planners. Oil fields are found in Kirkuk, Basra, and Mosul. Oil refineries are in operation in northeast Iraq and near the Persian Gulf. Communications networks are adequate but prolonged outages are common. Paved highways connect major cities although some are in poor condition.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Baghdad	- Good telecomm - 10 Radio stations - 81 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	25,379 km	2,710 km	1	1	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes (3 major)	BC

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach Iraq in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

Due to the distance to the probable evacuation site (Baghdad at 302 nm), NEO conducted by a MEU would present considerable difficulty.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
37	500	302 (Baghdad)	E

Note: In Iraq, the drug threat is of little significance.

7/18 MC

