

LIBYA

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


SUMMARY

Since 1969, when Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi came to power through a coup, U.S. - Libyan relations have been increasingly strained because of Libya's foreign policies supporting international terrorism and subversion against moderate Arab and African Governments. Due to its involvement in numerous incidents of terrorism, the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions against Libya, ordered all Americans to leave the country, and frozen Libyan assets in the U.S. In recent years, Qaddafi has shown no sign of giving up terrorism, and Libyan agents continue to track and kill opponents of the regime. Besides exporting terrorism, Libya is a major buyer of illegal weapons and technology from all available sources. Libya has the fifth largest ground, air, and naval OOBs in the region. Numerous regular force personnel receive training outside the country, mainly in the Soviet Union. Libya is believed to maintain stores of chemical weapons, and is suspected to have an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

Cultural differences and the hot/dry desert conditions of Libya could present obstacles to U.S. military operations in this country. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally restricted to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters due to terrain contours and dusty windstorms. Although NGF ships can approach the coast to provide fair support for operations ashore, Libyan coastal defense weapons could pose a serious threat. Mapping of Libya is limited, with 1:50,000 scale map coverage available along the Mediterranean coast, but not inland. Marginal and constrained airfields and ports provide limited accessibility to this country. Libya has numerous key installations including oil fields and refineries.


LIBYA - THREAT SUMMARY



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LIBYA- TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Libya

Overall U.S. equity in Libya is low. Due to its involvement in numerous incidents of international terrorism, the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions against Libya, ordered all Americans to leave, and frozen all Libyan assets in the U.S.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
252	-	-	-	252	-	1	1	Low

Terrorism

- Notorious for state sponsored terrorism.
- Recently hosted the most extreme **Palestinian** terrorist group, the Abu Nidal Organization.

The **Middle East's** most notorious practitioner of terrorism, Qaddafi historically has employed terrorism to lash out against regime opponents and to further his own foreign policy objectives within the **Arab** political arena and within worldwide revolutionary movements. **Libyan** People's Bureaus abroad, Revolutionary Committees, the Anti-Imperialism Center in **Tripoli**, numerous front organizations, and intelligence and security services all have been called upon at times to support **Libyan** terrorism. Following the April 1986 **U.S.** air strikes, however, detectable **Libyan** involvement in terrorist activity dropped significantly through 1987. Nevertheless, Qaddafi shows no sign of forsaking terrorism, and **Libyan** agents continue to track and kill opponents of the regime. Qaddafi has turned increasingly to surrogates for attacks, seeking greater plausible denial and safety from retaliation. **Libya** recently hosted the most extreme **Palestinian** terrorist group--the Abu Nidal Organization--and there are other signs that **Libyan** involvement in terrorism may be again on the rise.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Libya is a major buyer of illegal weapons and technology from all available sources.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Libya** presents terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer threats which are two of the three consolidated threat categories (drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer).

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General Ground OOB

- **Libya** has the fifth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	60	4	204	E

Ground OOB includes about 60,000 troops (regulars and conscripts). Numerous regular force personnel receive training outside **Libya**, mainly in the **Soviet Union**. The **Soviets** also have a large training cadre inside **Libya** to instruct **Libyan** personnel and help operate equipment. As yet, **Libyans** are unable to perform many of the technical functions themselves. **Libyan** forces obtained combat experience during their invasion of **Chad**. Tanks: T-54, T-55, T-62, and T-72; Artillery: 2S1, 2S3, ASTROS MRS, D-30, D-74, M-46, M-101, and M-109.

General Air OOB

- **Libya** has the fifth largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	9	4	163	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, Mirage 5DE, Mirage F1AD/ED; Close Air: J1 Jastreb, Mi-24, Mirage-5D, Su-20, Tu-22; Air Defense: Crotale, SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, and SA-13 SAMs and AA guns. Air defense is modeled after **Soviet** equipment and doctrine. An integrated air defense system known as SENEZH is operational.

General Naval OOB

- **Libya** has the fifth largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	7	4	141	E

Ships: 4 Frigates, 7 Missile Corvettes, and 1 Corvette with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: SS-N-2C, Otomat; Patrol Craft: 28 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (12-Ex-**Soviet**, 4 **Yugoslav**) with SSMs, guns, fire control, and radars.

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Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Reportedly used chemical weapons against **Chad**.
- Alleged to have obtained chemical weapons from **Iran**.
- Suspected to have an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

There were reports during 1987 that **Libya** used air-delivered toxic gas, as well as napalm against **Chadian** forces. Other reports indicate **Libya** agreed to provide **Iran** with **Sovlet** - made sea-mines in return for **Iranian**-manufactured chemical weapons. **Libyan** support for the nuclear non proliferation treaty has been publicly questioned but it is unlikely that this country has a nuclear weapons production capability.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Berber)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Libya** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
60-85	57	10-15	Dry/Hot

Rainfall is greatest on the coast and less in the interior, with occasional complete rain failures. The coastal temperature is influenced by the **Mediterranean**, but the interior experiences the hot, wideranging extremes of the desert. A special feature of the **Libyan** climate is the "ghibi", a hot dry, dust-laden, southern wind lasting for 1 to 4 days. The ghibi usually occurs in the spring and fall and can cause temperatures to rise within hours to over 110 degrees Fahrenheit.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

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General Cross-Country Mobility

- Libya is generally well suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be possible all year throughout the greater part of Libya. This movement would be restricted in some areas, however, by the severely dissected plains, steep hills, mountains, marshes, and sebkhas.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Restricted, with line of sight distances ranging between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

About 93 percent of Libya consists of desert or semidesert. In between occasional hills and mountains are largely barren plains and vast sand seas. Hot, dry, dusty windstorms occasionally occur in the spring and fall that would reduce visibility. Line of sight distances would be expected to range between 1,000 and 2,000 meters over more than 50 percent of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
56190	9.660	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant opposition could be expected from coastal defense weapons.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
ASTROS MRS	60,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available along the Mediterranean coast but not inland.

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Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-141B aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	4 C-141B	1/3	2-4/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Aozou	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Benina	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Okba Ibn Nafa	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Tripoli International	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

Libya has three major ports with poor capability to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Tobruk	Small	56-60/31-35	26-30	Yes
Banghazi	Small	36-40/31-35	26-30	Yes
Tripoli	Medium	31-35/31-35	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

Libya is suspected to have facilities for the production and or storage of chemical weapons. Oil fields are located at **Sarir**, **Tripolitania**, **Fezzan**, and the **Sirtica** basin southeast of the **Gulf of Sidra**; the **Ghadamis** basin (400 kilometers southwest of **Tripoli**); and offshore fields (30 kilometers northwest of **Tripoli** at **Bouri**).

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Modern telecomm - 21 Radio stations - 13 TV stations - 16 Satellite stations	19,300 km	None	3	4	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked **MEU** which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** could reach **Libya** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

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NEO

With few U.S. citizens in Libya and the location of the most likely evacuation site (Tripoli) on the coast, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	5 (Tripoli)	A

Note: In Libya the drug threat is of little significance.