

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Public Release Approved  
2021 Dated Information


## MIDDLE EAST SUMMARY

The expeditionary environment countries in the **Middle East** are those that are shaded in gray on the accompanying map. Some of these countries such as **Iraq** and **Saudi Arabia** are presently poised for conflict that could erupt at any time. U.S. forces, through the deployment of Operation Desert Shield, are getting a first hand orientation of **Saudi Arabia** and military planners are assessing the options for combat operations against **Iraq**. In this region, the emerging threat has presented "worst case" scenarios for which Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) must prepare. Besides the likely prospect of conventional warfare, there is the distinct possibility that **Iraq** may be contemplating the employment of chemical and biological weapons against the U.S. and its allies in the Gulf area. The nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) threat must be factored into service capabilities planning and programming. In addition to **Iraq**, countries such as **Iran** and **Libya** have used chemical weapons and in the future can be expected to use them again. In the **Middle East**, there are increasing numbers of countries that are acquiring stocks of bio-chemical weapons, and other countries working to develop nuclear capabilities. Perhaps most threatening, as NBC technology and weapons proliferate, the opportunities for non-governmental groups to steal working weapons and active bio-chemical agents increases dramatically. The next decade may well see a large metropolitan area held hostage to the threat of covertly emplaced and remotely detonated NBC weapons. All MAGTFs should be prepared to execute raids to seize and neutralize NBC weapons under development or in transit. The expeditionary environment of the **Middle East** is volatile and U.S. investments and U.S. citizens no longer enjoy the relative immunity from local violence which characterized earlier decades. The increasing lethality of both governments and non-conventional groups in this region places at risk strategic choke points and assets that in the past could only have been attacked by a major power. Terrorism is an unpredictable global threat and the **Middle East** contains the greatest number of terrorist training camps and other targetable facilities. To counter this threat, preemptive raids could become more common in the 1990s. MAGTFs can expect to engage trained and experienced infantry, modern armor, and relatively sophisticated artillery. There is likely to be aviation with some night or all-weather capability as well as smart or stand-off munitions. The **Middle East** countries with the most significant ground, air, and naval OOBs were found to be **Egypt**, **Iran**, **Iraq**, and **Syria**. Overall in the **Middle East**, **Libya** and **Syria** emerged as most representative of general conditions in the geographic region.

Most **Middle Eastern** countries, with the Arabic language and Islamic religion, have a culture significantly different from that of the U.S.. MAGTFs are not strong in **Arabic** language skills and would have difficulty communicating with the people in the region. For operations in the **Middle East**, MAGTFs should be prepared for dry/hot conditions as about 80 percent of the countries were in this climatic category. Over half the countries had predominately desert terrain while **Iran**, **North Yemen**, and **Oman** were mountainous. Of the 14 countries in the region that were assessed, two were found generally suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles, six were partially suited, and six were unsuited. Over 50 percent of the countries have poor intervisibility which restricts the exploitation of line of sight weapons designed for engagements at 2,000 to 3,000 meters. In the **Middle East**, five countries have hydrographic conditions which do not constrain NGF support. Half of the countries have fair hydrographic conditions where NGF platforms can approach the coast, but are restricted from providing optimum support for operations ashore. Only two countries (**Iraq** and **North Yemen**) have poor hydrographic conditions which would severely limit NGF support. However, when considering the firepower advantage, it was found that 10 of 14 countries in the region had coastal defense weapons that could out-range the standard 5 inch guns on most U.S. Navy platforms. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) is a critical problem area for Marine Corps forces in the **Middle East**. Only one country of those assessed (**Bahrain**) had full coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps. There were eleven countries such as **Iran**, **Iraq**, **Libya**, and **Saudi Arabia** which had only partial 1:50,000 map coverage while two countries (**Kuwait** and **North Yemen**) had none at all. MAGTFs operating in these latter countries would have to rely heavily on Multispectral Imagery (MSI). In the area of strategic mobility, ten countries had one or more airfield able to receive C-5 aircraft. **Iraq**, **North Yemen**, and **Qatar** were the most limited in airfields. **Lebanon**, **Saudi Arabia**, and the **United Arab Emirates** had the most capable ports, while **Iraq** and **Libya** were highly constrained and **North Yemen** and **Oman** had no ports that could accommodate strategic sealift. In addressing key installations, it was found that five countries (**Egypt**, **Iran**, **Iraq**, **Libya**, and **Syria**) probably have facilities for chemical or biological weapons and that at least ten countries have oil fields with associated pipeline and industrial complexes. When assessing sea-based MEU response times, it was estimated that most of the countries could be reached in less than two days. Only **North** and **South Yemen** were thought to require between two to four days. The study found that Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) would be extremely difficult to execute in over 70 percent of the countries due primarily to the large number of potential evacuees (mainly U.S. citizens). In **Iran** and **Iraq**, NEO conducted by a sea-based MEU would be hampered by the over 300 nautical mile distances to the capital cities (probable evacuation sites). Of the five regions considered by this study, the **Middle East** emerged as one of the highest threat environments. It combined a very high-level order of battle threat with a very serious NBC threat, and the most difficult of cultural environments, the combination of a hard language--Arabic in all its variations--and the most distant of religions, Islam.

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MIDDLE EAST/SOUTHWEST ASIA

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**MIDDLE EAST/SOUTHWEST ASIA**

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TAB</u>
BAHRAIN	1
EGYPT	2
IRAN	3
IRAQ	4
KUWAIT	5
LEBANON	6
LIBYA	7
NORTH YEMEN	8
OMAN	9
QATAR	10
SAUDI ARABIA	11
SOUTH YEMEN	12
SYRIA	13
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	14



**BAHRAIN**

MEF G-2:  
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CG I MEF//G-2//  
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:  
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USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//  
STU-III AV 968-6265

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DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//  
STU-III AV 243-4315

Embassy Defense Attache:  
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DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//  
STU-III AV 243-0597




**SUMMARY**

**Bahrain** has strategic significance through its oil fields and important location in the **Persian Gulf**. It also provides a convenient port-of-call for ships of the U.S. Navy's **Middle East Force**. **Bahrain** by itself, constitutes a negligible threat to the **U.S.** It is only through its oil resources in conjunction with other **Middle East** oil producers that this country can have an impact on the Western world.


With a considerable cultural diversity with the **U.S.** and a dry/hot climate, this country would present obstacles for military operations. Only small portions of **Bahrain** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. While NGF ships can approach the coast to provide fair support for operations ashore, **Bahrain**, through its coastal defense weapons, could pose a substantial threat. Mapping of **Bahrain** is barely adequate through the use of old 1:50,000 scale maps. With many modern communications networks and key installations, detailed planning would be necessary for military operations in this country. Likewise, with over 300 potential evacuees in **Bahrain**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would require a strong effort.

BAHRAIN - THREAT SUMMARY



1-05

BAHRAIN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Bahrain

In addition to being an important source of oil, **Bahrain** lies near **Saudi Arabia** midway between the **Strait of Hormuz** and the **Shatt al-Arab Waterway**. A government in **Bahrain** unfriendly to the Saudis would seriously threaten **Saudi Arabia** and the **United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)**. In addition, **Bahrain** provides an important port-of-call for ships of the U.S. Navy's **Middle East Force**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
31	-	-	-	31	325	1 2	3	Low

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## Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Bahrain** constitutes a negligible threat to the **U.S.** in the areas of drug trafficking, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

## General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	M-60	Howitzers	2	4	86	B

Ground OOB includes 2,300 troops, all of whom are volunteers. The army is composed of one brigade for internal security and coastal patrol. Some foreign officers are on contract for training and assistance. Additional armor and artillery units are planned. The tank is the M-60A3, while artillery includes 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers.

## General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	None	Hand-Held SAMs	Negligible	4	44	B

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E/F; Close Air: None; Air Defense: Stinger and RBS SAMs. **Bahrain** will be included in the air defense coverage provided by the Saudi Peace Shield system.

## General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	1	4	65	C

Ships: None; SSMs: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with Exocet SSMs, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 4 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 3 Small Gun Boats; 17 Speed Boats.

## Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Persian, English)

Primary religion - Islam

There is a relatively large cultural difference between **Bahrain** and the **U.S.**

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**Weather**

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
57-99	70	4	Dry/Hot

Hot and humid from April through October; temperate from November through March.

**General Geographic Conditions**

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

**Bahrain** is composed of a group of islands in the **Persian Gulf** midway between the top of the **Qatar Peninsula** and mainland **Saudi Arabia**.

**Operational Elevation**

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

**General Cross-Country Mobility**

- Small portions of **Bahrain** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The topographical characteristics and features of **Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar,** and the **U.A.E.** are quite similar. The four states are collectively divided into two distinct topographical regions, the Desert Plains and Eastern Highlands. The Desert Plains are generally poorly suited for tracked and wheeled vehicles due to extensive sand dunes, sebkhahs (crusted surface over soft ground), and steep-sided wadis. One-third of this region, mainly in **Kuwait** and **Qatar,** offers more suitable conditions. Throughout the Eastern Highlands, tracked and vehicular movement is restricted to the floors of narrow, steep-sided wadis due to rugged terrain, nearly vertical valley sides, and seasonal flooding.

**Intervisibility (Line of Sight)**

- Poor

The terrain of this small country consists of low rolling hills with numerous rocky cliffs and wadis. From the shoreline the land surface rises gradually toward the center where it drops into a basin surrounded by steep cliffs. Line of sight distances are expected to be under 1,000 meters over most of this country.



**Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)**

- Fair NGF support for amphibious operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62420	11,270	Fair

**Hydrography (Coastal Threat)**

- Substantial coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-198	24,000	U.S. NGF and Threat Equal

**MC&G Shortfalls**

- Complete coverage with older 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

**Airfields**

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-5	1/0	1/C-5

Airfield	Type Aircraft	Comments
Bahrain International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	No restrictions

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## Ports

- One port with a small harbor and depths over 40 feet.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Sitrah	Small	41-45/41-45	-	Yes

## Key Installations

Numerous oil fields, pipelines, and communications facilities will necessitate in-depth planning for military operations. Oil fields are located throughout central **Bahrain**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Manama	- Excellent international/adequate domestic telecomm - 3 Radio stations - 2 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	225 km	None	1	1	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	None

## Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** could reach **Bahrain** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

## NEO

- Due to the number of potential evacuees in **Bahrain**, NEO conducted by a **MEU** would require a strong effort.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
35	290	7 (Manama)	D

Note: In **Bahrain**, the following factors are of little significance:

- Drugs
- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC

EGYPT

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


SUMMARY

**Egypt** is a strong **U.S.** ally in the **Middle East**. **U.S.-Egyptian** strategic cooperation, including joint military endeavors, have improved the capacity of both countries to respond to regional security threats. **U.S.** military support has helped **Egypt** update its defense inventory with modern equipment. **Egypt** is a large consumer of narcotics and a transit point for drugs intended for **U.S.** and **European** markets. **Egypt** has the largest air and naval capabilities in the region and the fourth largest ground OOB with about 320,000 troops. **Egypt** is alleged to possess chemical weapons and may have delivery systems for chemical warheads.

With a culture much different from the **U.S.**, a dry/hot climate, and topography which is mainly desert, military operations in **Egypt** would present some difficulties. Large portions of the western and eastern desert plains are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. Although NGF ships can approach the **Mediterranean** and **Red Sea** coasts to provide fair support for operations ashore, the **Egyptian** coastal defense weapons could present a serious threat. Mapping of **Egypt** is limited, with 1:50,000 scale map coverage available only along the **Mediterranean** coast and south along the **Nile River** (including **Cairo**) to the town of **Al Minya**. **Egypt** is suspected of having facilities for storage and possible production of chemical weapons. Oil fields are mainly located on the **Sinai Peninsula** and offshore in the **Gulf of Suez**. The planning and execution of NEO by a MEU under normal conditions in **Egypt** would be highly difficult due to the presence of over 11,000 potential evacuees.


EGYPT - THREAT SUMMARY



Egypt - 1

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EGYPT - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Egypt

- **Egypt** is a strong **U.S.** ally in the **Middle East** region.

**Egypt** is the most populous **Arab** country and a strong ally of the **U.S.** The Camp David accords of 1978 and the **Egypt-Israel** Peace Treaty of 1979 have opened the way for wider regional cooperation. The **U.S.** provides a large amount of economic and military aid to **Egypt**. **U.S.** equities in **Egypt** are the second highest in the region behind only **Saudi Arabia**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
1,441	-	-	1,608	3,049	11,210	4 6	10	High

Drug Threat

- Important consumer of opium, heroin, and hashish.
- Transit point for drugs intended for **U.S.** and **European** markets.

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
			X	X

**Egypt** is an important consumer of opium, heroin, and hashish, supporting production in **Asia** and the **Middle East**, and is increasingly important as a transit point for drugs intended for **European** and **U.S.** markets. Heroin moves from both **Southwest** and **Southeast Asia** as well as **Lebanon** and **Syria** which are also principal suppliers of hashish. Some money laundering occurs but most profits flow abroad.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Egypt** constitutes a drug threat which is one of the three (drugs, terrorism, and gray arms technology transfer) consolidated threat categories.

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## General Ground OOB

- **Egypt** has the fourth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-62	Bloc	320	22	432	F

Ground OOB includes about 320,000 troops of whom 140,000 are regulars and 180,000 are conscripts. **Egypt** has a large, competent, and experienced cadre of NCOs with an average of over 10 years' service and experience in at least one war. NCOs are also technically proficient and in many ways constitute the backbone of the **Egyptian** armed forces. Regular officers are trained in service academies and the tri-service Armed Forces Technical College. There is an extensive system of technical, branch, and staff schools for military officers. **Egyptian** officers have also had opportunities over the years to attend both **U.S.** and **Soviet** schools which have given them a broad perspective of modern warfare. Tanks: M60A3, PT-76, T-54, T-55; Artillery: D-30, M-31, M-37, M-46, M-109A2, M-1937, M-1938, Samlet SSM.

## General Air OOB

- **Egypt** has the largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	105	22	277	F

Fighter Aircraft: F-4E, F-16A/B, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21, Mirage 5SDE, Mirage 2000; Close Air: Il-28, Su-7, Su-20, Tu-16; Air Defense: Amoun/Sparrow, Crotale, HAWK, SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 SAMs and AA guns. **Egypt** is developing an integrated air defense system to include ground radars such as the AN/TPS-59 (3-dimensional) and AN-TPS-63. To further enhance air defense coverage, **Egypt** is acquiring the E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platform. In addition to 25,000 air force personnel, there is a separate air defense force of 80,000.

## General Naval OOB

- **Egypt** has the largest naval OOB in the region

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	20	22	172	F

Ships: 1 destroyer and 5 frigates with SSMs, SAMs, guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine mortars, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSMs: Harpoon, SS-N-2A, Otomat, CSS-N-1 Styx; Patrol Craft: 37 Fast Attack Craft-Missile Gun, and Torpedo (Ex-Soviet and Ex-Chinese) with SSMs, SAMs (SA-N-5 Grail), guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Possession of chemical weapons date to 1952.
- Suspected of having chemical weapon delivery systems.

**Egypt** is suspected to be the first **Middle Eastern** possessor of chemical weapons. This country reportedly recommissioned chemical stocks abandoned by **British** forces when they departed **Egypt** in 1952. Delivery systems for chemical weapons are suspected.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (English)  
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Egypt** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
45-97	68-77	1-8	Dry/Hot

The hot summer extends from April to October and a relatively cool winter lasts from November to March. Hot, driving windstorms called "khamsin" occur in the spring. The sparse rainfall falls mainly along the coast.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

The **Western Desert** accounts for about two-thirds of the country's land area. The **Eastern Desert** and **Sinai Peninsula** comprise the remainder of the country.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Egypt** is generally well suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The vast majority of **Egypt**--the western and eastern desert plains--allows for tracked movement over extensive areas of hard, stony desert. Movement would be precluded, however, in portions of this region by dunes, numerous depressions, and in many places, by high escarpments. The rest of **Egypt**--the **Nile** delta and the highlands bordering the **Red Sea**--consists of terrain unsuited for tracked movement.

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## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum, with line of sight distances exceeding 2,000 meters.

The western desert accounts for two-thirds of the country's land area and is mainly a massive, flat sandy plateau. It is expected that line of sight distances in this region, and to a lesser degree in the eastern desert, would range above 2,000 meters. In the spring however, this visibility could be occasionally reduced due to hot, driving wind storms called khamsin.

## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
56105 (Port Said)	10,980	Fair

## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons have significant capability.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
Samlet SSM	145,000	Threat Advantage

## MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available along the **Mediterranean Coast** and south along the **Nile River** (including **Cairo**) to the town of **Al Minya**.

## Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with 6 airfields that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
19	6 C-5 10 C-141B 3 C-130	4/15	>1/C-5



Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Alexandria	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Aswan	C-141B, C-130	
Beni Suef	C-5, C-141B, C-130	The C-5 operations are limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only.
Cairo East International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Cairo West International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Dekhaylan	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
El Arish	C-141B, C-130	The C-141B is limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only.
El Gora	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Inshas	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Jeyanklis New	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Luxor	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Mersa Matruk	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
New Valley	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Port Said	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Ras El Nakab	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s. Daylight/VFR only.
Ras Gharib	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Ras Nasrani	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Wadi Adu Rish	C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.
Wadi Al Jandali	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.

**Ports**

- Eight major ports with **Sidi Kerir** providing the greatest accessibility.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Bur Said	Large	36-40/36-40	31-35	Yes
Al Iskandariyah	Large	36-40/36-40	36-40	Yes
Sidi Kerir	Small	Over 76/over-76	66-70	-
Jazirat Safajah	Small	31-35/over 76	26-30	-
As Suways	Medlum	26-30/31-35	26-30	Yes
Adabiyah	Small	-/31-35	26-30	-
Zanimah	Small	Over 76/over-76	31-35	-
At Tur	Small	36-40/56-60	26-30	-

**Key Installations**

Egypt is suspected of having facilities for storage and possible production of chemical weapons. There are about 36 oil fields located on the **Sinal Peninsula** and offshore in the **Gulf of Suez**. Oil exploration continues, particularly in the **western desert**. Although communications networks are numerous, telephone service is erratic and delays are frequent. Rail service is available from **Cairo** to **Aswan** in the south and **Alexandria** in the north. The **Nile River** system plus other navigable canals are important for inland transport.

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U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Cairo	- Inadequate telecomm - 30 Radio stations - 47 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	47,025 km	4,857 km	8	19	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	C

**Strategic and Tactical Lift**

The Atlantic ARG with its embarked MEU, which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea**, could reach **Egypt** in less than two days. It is estimated that the Pacific ARG would require in excess of 6 days to reach the **Egyptian coast on the Red Sea**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

**NEO**

- Due to the very large number (over 11,000) of potential evacuees in **Egypt**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be highly difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
436	11,210	91 (Cairo)	F

Note: In **Egypt**, the following factors are of little significance:

- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

**IRAN**

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


**SUMMARY**

With a fundamentalist Moslem government and strong anti-U.S. sentiments, Iran is a major source of instability in the Middle East. Relations between the U.S. and Iran continue to be at a low point due to Iran's support for terrorism, including association with the hostage-takings in Lebanon. Iran is a significant producer of opium and a transit point for narcotics moving from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Western markets. Iran uses terrorism as a basic tactic against the U.S. and other Western influence, and also as a means to intimidate Arab nations in the Persian Gulf. This country is a major buyer of black market weapons and technology from Europe and other Third World countries. Iran has the second strongest ground OOB in the region (after Iraq) with about 305,000 experienced troops and a variety of weapons from many sources. It also has the third largest naval capability and fourth largest air OOB in the region. Iran reportedly used chemical weapons against Iraq and may have production facilities for biological weapons. It is suspected that Iran would like to develop nuclear weapons.

There is a distinct cultural difference between Iran and the U.S. which could significantly impact on military operations. Rugged terrain, generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles, and hot, humid, summer conditions along the coasts would also pose problems for military planners. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the extensive mountain ranges and irregular terrain. Hydrographic conditions will allow NGF ships to within range of some coastal targets, but Iranian coastal defense weapons could out-gun these ships. Iran has limited mapping although 1:50,000 scale maps are available for coastal areas along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, the capital Tehran, the area around Lake Urmia in the northwest, and scattered locations elsewhere. Facilities for the production and/or storage of chemical and biological weapons are suspected at unknown locations in Iran. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in this country would pose some problems due to the distance from the coast to the probable evacuation site (Tehran at 348 nm).


**IRAN - THREAT SUMMARY**



Iran - 1

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## IRAN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Unpredictable fundamentalist Moslem government.
- Long war with **Iraq** recently suspended.
- Islamic terrorists pose a threat to the **West**.

The fundamentalist Moslem government of **Iran** is confronted by resistance from a broad range of groups, including Kurds, rightists, monarchists, and leftists, some of whom are receiving aid from **Iran's** external enemy, **Iraq**. However, without unity among the insurgents, it is doubtful that they can seriously threaten the regime. **Iranian** terrorists continue to pose a threat to all they oppose. A worrisome possibility is that these terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon by theft or black-market purchase for use against their targets in the **West**.

### U.S. Equities in Iran

Relations between the **U.S.** and **Iran** suffer due to **Iran's** financial, logistical, and material support for acts of terrorism, including association with the hostage-takings in **Lebanon**. In spite of this, the **U.S.** tries to maintain third-party contacts within **Iran** in an attempt to moderate actions of its unstable Government and maintain the flow of oil through the **Persian Gulf**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
32	54	1,752	-	1,838	100	3 1	4	Low

**Drug Threat**

- Produced 200-400 metric tons of opium in 1988.
- Transit point for drug flow.
- Does not cooperate in efforts against drugs.

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

Iran has not cooperated with efforts against drug production and trafficking. U.S. officials estimate the annual Iranian opium production at 200 to 400 metric tons. While this amount would not satisfy Iran's domestic addict population, opium and heroin are flowing across Iran from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and exported through Turkey and other routes to Western markets.

**Terrorism**

- Supports surrogate Hizballah movement in Lebanon.
- Uses terrorism as a basic tactic against the West.
- Uses terrorism to further Islamic fundamentalist revolution.
- Uses terrorism to intimidate Arab states in the Persian Gulf.

The regime in Iran views terrorism as a basic tactic to be used against U.S. and other Western influence and presence in the Middle East as well as a tool to foment Islamic fundamentalist revolution. Iran also uses terrorism to intimidate Arab states in the Persian Gulf.

Iran's principal surrogate, the Hizballah movement in Lebanon, has carried out car bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, and other acts of terrorism against Western interests since 1983. Like Libya, and previously Syria, Iran uses its government apparatus to recruit, train, finance, and deploy terrorists, especially in Lebanon.

**Gray Arms/ Technology Transfer**

Iran is a major buyer of illegal weapons and technology from Europe and other Third World nations. In the mid-1980s countries such as Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Scotland, and Sweden reportedly sent large quantities of explosives to Iran. In particular, the Swedish firm Novel Industries provided an estimated 400 tons of illegal munitions. In 1987, the British Government approved a 400-million dollar sale of radar equipment to Iran on the basis that it was a defensive system for use along the Soviet-Iranian border and not in the Gulf war.

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### Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Iran** constitutes a very serious concern through involvement in all three threat categories (narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer).

### General Ground OOB

- Second largest ground capability in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	305	22	467	F

Ground OOB includes 305,000 troops of whom about 55,000 are regulars and 250,000 are conscripts. Recruits receive 13 weeks of basic training at one of six induction centers and are then sent off to their units for more advanced training. The majority of officers and NCOs are regulars. Officers attend a military college and are trained in combat tactics at schools run by different branches of the army. Higher military education is also provided by the Army Staff College and the War Academy. **Iranian** troops gained much experience during the **Iran-Iraq** War. Tanks include: M-60A1, M-47, M-48, T-54, T-55, T-59, T-62, and T-72. Artillery includes: HY-2 SSM, M-46, M-107, M-109A1, and M-114.

### General Air OOB

- Fourth largest air capability in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	NT/AW	Bloc	35	22	197	F

Fighter Aircraft: F-14, J-6; Close Air: F-4D/E, F-5E/F; Air Defense: CSA-1 (Chinese version of the SA-2), Improved HAWK, Rapier, RBS-70, and SA-7 SAMs and AA guns.

### General Naval OOB

- Third largest naval capability in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	15	22	147	E

Ships: 3 Destroyers, 4 Frigates, and 4 Corvettes with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: Sea Killer II, Harpoon (stockpiles may have been depleted during war with **Iraq**); Patrol Craft: 11 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, and radars; 3 Fast Attack Craft-Gun (Ex-**Chinese**); 6 Large Patrol Craft; 13 Hovercraft.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Reportedly used chemical weapons against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.
- May have production facilities for biological weapons.
- Suspected to have an interest in nuclear weapons.

Iran reportedly used chemical weapons against Iraq during the Gulf War. Mortars and artillery were employed to deliver mustard gas and phosgene. This country is alleged to have production facilities for biological warfare agents. Iran has two nuclear power reactors under construction. Although possession of nuclear weapons is improbable, Iran's commitment to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been publicly questioned. However, this country is in the very early stage of nuclear development and lacks the industrial infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons program.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Persian (Kurdish, Arabic, Turkish, English, French)  
Primary religion - Islam

There is a very large cultural difference between Iran and the U.S. which would impact significantly on military operations in the country.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
51-73	59	10	Dry/Warm

Iran's climate is characterized by wide variations in precipitation and temperature. Seasonal changes are abrupt with a short fall and spring. There is adequate rainfall in the northwest and along the Caspian Sea but almost none in the eastern deserts and in the south. Most of Iran experiences long, hot, dry summers. Along the Persian Gulf very high humidity accompanies the heat.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

About one-fifth the size of the U.S., Iran is in the highlands of southwest Asia. About 70 percent of the country (mostly mountains and desert areas) is virtually uninhabited. The heaviest populated areas are along the Caspian coast, in Tehran, and in the provinces of East and West Azerbaijan.

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## Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

The mountain rimland, comprising about one-half of Iran, is dominated by two major mountain chains, the Zagros and the Elburz.

## General Cross-Country Mobility

- Iran is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be precluded at all times in about two-thirds of Iran due to rugged hills and mountains, and smaller areas of wet or flooded salt flats, marshes, and swamps. Tracked movement is generally good in only a few regions, such as the coastal plains near **Bandar Abbas**. Even in these areas, movement may be restricted by sebkhas.

## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with average line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances in about two-thirds of Iran would be limited to under 1,000 meters due to extensive mountain ranges and irregular terrain. Only in a few areas, such as the coastal plains near **Bandar Abbas**, could line of sight visibility exceed 1,000 meters.

## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62394 (Bandar Abbas)	9,150	Fair

## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
HY-2 SSM	40,000	Threat Advantage



**MC&G Shortfalls**

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists for coastal areas along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, the area around Tehran, the vicinity of Lake Urmia in the northwest, and scattered locations elsewhere.

**Airfields**

- Accessible by air, with eight airfields that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
17	8 C-5 8 C-141B 1 None	9/8	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Abadan	None	
Ahwaz	C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Badr	C-141B, C-130	
Bandar Abbas International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Bushehr	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles.
Dezful	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Esfahan Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Hamadan Military	C-5, C-141B, C-130	The C-5 and C-141B operations are limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only.
Jask	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Kerman	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Khark Island	C-141B, C-130	Runway is less than 6,000 feet. Daylight/VFR only.
Mehrabod International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Shiraz International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Tabriz	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Uromiyeh	C-141B, C-130	
Yazd	C-141B, C-130	
Zahedan International	C-141B, C-130	

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### Ports

- There are seven major ports with **Jazireh Ye Khark** being most accessible.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Khorramshahr	Medium	31-35/26-30	26-30	Yes
Abadan	Medium	31-35/31-35	31-35	Yes
Bandar E Mah Shahr	Small	36-40/-	-	Yes
Bandar E Shahpur	Small	26-30/61-65	36-40	Yes
Jazireh Ye Khark	Small	Over 76/71-75	-	-
Bushehr	Small	26-30/-	31-35	Yes
Bandar Abbas	Small	26-30/31-35	46-50	Yes

### Key Installations

Facilities for the production and/or storage of chemical and biological weapons are suspected at unknown locations in Iran. Two nuclear powered reactors are also under construction. Oil fields are located in west-central Iran in the vicinity of **Bandar Khomeini, Ahvaz, Dezful, and Masjed Soleyman**. Other key installations include oil refineries, pipelines, power stations, and communications networks.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Radio relay system centered in Tehran - 90 Radio stations - 250 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations (Note: some may be inoperable)	136,372 km	4,601 km	7	16	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	C

### Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach Iran in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

### NEO

Due to the distance from the coast to the probable evacuation site (**Tehran** at 348 nm), NEO conducted by a MEU in Iran would present considerable difficulty.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	100	348 (Tehran)	D

IRAQ

MEF G-2: CG I MEF//G-2//  
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Embassy Defense Attache: USDAO BAGHDAD IZ//DATT//  
Telephone: 719-6138




SUMMARY

Iraq is strong militarily and has designs on becoming the dominant power in the oil-rich Persian Gulf area. It has used brutal, repressive measures against its own Kurdish minority. Overall U.S. equity in Iraq is low. Iraq has sponsored terrorist acts against European and African countries and presently provides safe haven for the notorious terrorist Abu Nidal. It is a major buyer of gray arms and illicit technology from all available sources. Iraq has the largest ground OOB in the Middle East with over 475,000 experienced regular troops and advanced Soviet-provided tanks and SSMs. It also has among the strongest air and naval capabilities in the region, backed by Soviet equipment and on-site advisors. Iraq is known to maintain quantities of chemical and biological weapons and is reported to have used these weapons against Iran and the Kurds. It is also suspected that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons production capability.

With a hot, dry climate and strong anti-Western sentiment, military operations in Iraq would present a serious challenge. While the steep and desert region bordering Saudi Arabia and Syria is generally well suited for tracked movement, the northeast highlands bordering Turkey are not. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is restricted to 2,000 meters or less mainly in the mountainous northeast and marshy southeast. The basic land-locked geography of Iraq, plus the poor hydrography at Al Faw and the considerable coastal defense threat in that area would all serve to limit the effectiveness of NGF support. The restricted map coverage would also adversely affect military operations in this country. Presently, 1:50,000 scale maps are available only for northeastern Iraq and the area east of Basra to the Persian Gulf. Accessibility to Iraq would be limited by the availability of only one airfield (Baghdad) which can handle C-141B aircraft (not C-5s) and one major port at Basra with marginal capabilities. The chemical/biological weapons complexes, oil fields, refineries, and communications networks in Iraq should receive priority consideration by military planners. NEO conducted by a MEU in this country under normal circumstances would present difficulty due to the distance (302 nm) from the gulf to the probable evacuation site (Baghdad) and the large number of potential evacuees (500).


IRAQ - THREAT SUMMARY



Iraq - 1

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## IRAQ - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Wants to be the dominant power in the oil-rich **Persian Gulf** area.
- Has used brutal, repressive measures against its own Kurdish minority.

In 1980, due to religious tensions with revolutionary **Iran** and dispute over the **Shatt Al-Arab waterway**, **Iraq** attacked **Iran**. The long and costly war continued until 1988 when a ceasefire was declared. However, the tensions remain. **Iraq** has battled its Kurdish minority for years with brutality and chemical weapons, but Kurdish rebels continue their resistance to Government demands. **Iraq** is strong militarily and wants to be the dominant power in the **Persian Gulf** region. The alienation of **Iraq** from **Syria**, which supports **Iran**, is a potential source of confrontation in the **Iraqi** rear.

### U.S. Equities in Iraq

**Iraq** is strong militarily as well as being an important player in the **Arab** world. **U.S.** trade with **Iraq** peaked in 1981 and has since been on the decline. **U.S.** exports to this country have been primarily agricultural.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating		Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
							Rating		
	683	526	21	1,230	500	3	1	4	Low

**Terrorism**

- Past sponsor of the Abu Nidal Organization.
- Sponsored three terrorist assassinations in 1988.

Iraq sponsored three assassinations of exiled dissidents in the **United Kingdom, Sudan, and Norway** in 1988. It is suspected that the **Iraqi-backed Mujahedin-e-Khalq** was responsible for an attempted bombing at a **Tehran** bus terminal. **Iraq** also continued to provide safe haven to some **Palestinian** groups, such as the **Iraqi-created Arab Liberation Front** and the **Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)**, responsible for the **Achille Lauro** hijacking in 1985. **Baghdad** views its safe haven to **Palestinian** groups as legitimate assistance to the struggle for a **Palestinian** homeland. The notorious terrorist **Abu Nidal** presently enjoys the hospitality of **Iraq**.

**Gray Arms/Technology Transfer**

**Iraq** is a major buyer of gray arms and technology from the **Soviet Union** and other **Western European** countries. The availability of critical technology can allow **Iraq** to develop sophisticated weapons more quickly and at lower cost than might occur if it had to rely exclusively on the output of its own research. **Iraq** is known to have a clandestine program for acquiring weapons, particularly **SMS** and air defense systems. It is also alleged to be actively seeking nuclear technology transfer from any available source.

**Consolidated Threat**

In the **Middle East**, **Iraq** presents the most serious threat in the combined areas of terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer.

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### General Ground OOB

- Largest ground capability in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	475	24	639	F

Ground OOB includes 475,000 regular troops, all of whom are conscripts. A large part of the enlisted strength, including NCOs, is composed of career personnel. Recruits receive basic training and then advanced instruction with their assigned units. Regular personnel attend service schools for the combat arms as well as technical and support services. **Soviet** advisors assist in training and employment of advanced **Soviet** weapons. Most officers are graduates of the Military College at **Baghdad**. **Iraqi** forces gained combat experience during the **Iran-Iraq** War. Tanks include: Chieftain, PT-76, T-54, T-55, T-62, and T-72. Artillery includes: 2S1, 2S3, D-30, D-74, M-46, M-56, M-1938, SCUD SSM, and Al Abbas SSM.

### General Air OOB

- Third largest air capability in the region after **Egypt** and **Syria**.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	38	24	212	F

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-19, MiG-21, MiG-25, MiG-29; Close Air: MiG-23BM, Mirage F-1EQ5 (Exocet-equipped), Mirage F-1EQ-200, Su-7, Su-20; Air Defense: Roland, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, and SA-9 SAMs, AA guns.

### General Naval OOB

- Second largest naval capability in the region after **Egypt**.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	4	24	158	E

Ships: 5 Frigates and 6 Missile Corvettes with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: Otomat, SS-N-2 Styx; Patrol Craft: 2 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-**Soviet**) with SSMs, guns, and radars; 6 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Ex-**Soviet**); 5 Large Patrol Craft (Ex-**Soviet**); 16 Coastal Patrol Craft (Ex-**Soviet**).

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Suspected to maintain quantities of chemical and biological weapons.
- Reported to have used chemical weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish citizens.
- May have used biological weapons against Kurdish civilians.
- Alleged to have an interest in producing nuclear weapons.

Iraq is considered to be a significant possessor of chemical weapons and has reportedly used blister, blood, and nerve gas against Iran during the Gulf War. Reports indicate Iraq has established an indigenous production capability for certain chemical warfare agents. Iraq has allegedly employed aerial bombs and very probably rockets with chemical agents. In 1987, there were reports of Iraqi air attacks with chemical weapons on a succession of Kurdish villages in Iraq as well as Iranian Kurdistan, with many hundreds of civilian casualties. It is suspected that Iraq has a biological weapons production complex southeast of Baghdad. Biological agents were allegedly used against the Kurds in the vicinity of As Sulaymaniyeh. Although it is unlikely that Iraq has nuclear weapons, its support of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty has been publicly questioned. However, this country is in the early stage of nuclear development and lacks the industrial base to support nuclear weapons production.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic  
Primary religion - Islam

There is a relatively large cultural difference between Iraq and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
59-87	29	6	Dry/Hot

Average temperatures range from higher than 120 degrees Fahrenheit in July and August to below freezing in January. The most rainfall occurs from December through April and averages between four and seven inches annually.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X	X		

About 75 percent of Iraq's population live in the flat alluvial plain stretching southeast toward Baghdad and Basra to the Persian Gulf. Much of the land is desert or wasteland with some mountains in the northeast.

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

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## General Cross-Country Mobility

- Iraq is moderately suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

While the steep and desert region bordering Saudi Arabia and Syria is generally well suited for tracked movement, the northeastern highlands bordering Iraq and Turkey are not. The Tigris-Euphrates delta region of Iraq is generally unsuited for tracked vehicles due to irrigated plains, marshes, and other wet areas.

## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Restricted to 2,000 meters or less.

The desert and wasteland region bordering Saudi Arabia would accommodate line of sight distances of between 1,000 and 2,000 meters and perhaps more in some locations. The mountains in the northeast and covered marshes in the southeast, however, would limit line of sight distances to well under 1,000 meters.

## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Poor NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62434 (Al Faw)	20,130	Poor

## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
SCUD SSM	80,000	Threat Advantage

## MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists for northeastern Iraq and the area east of Basra to the Persian Gulf.



**Airfields**

- Poor accessibility by air with only one airfield which is not C-5 capable.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-141B	0/1	1/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Saddam International (Baghdad)	C-141B, C-130	Cannot accommodate C-5 aircraft

**Ports**

- One major port with marginal capabilities.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Basra	Medium	26-30/31-35	26-30	Yes

**Key Installations**

There are several chemical or biological weapons research or production complexes located in central and northern Iraq that should constitute priority targets for military planners. Oil fields are found in **Kirkuk**, **Basra**, and **Mosul**. Oil refineries are in operation in northeast Iraq and near the **Persian Gulf**. Communications networks are adequate but prolonged outages are common. Paved highways connect major cities although some are in poor condition.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Baghdad	- Good telecomm - 10 Radio stations - 81 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	25,379 km	2,710 km	1	1	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes (3 major)	BC

**Strategic and Tactical Lift**

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach Iraq in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

**NEO**

Due to the distance to the probable evacuation site (**Baghdad** at 302 nm), NEO conducted by a MEU would present considerable difficulty.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
37	500	302 (Baghdad)	E

Note: In Iraq, the drug threat is of little significance.



**KUWAIT**

MEF G-2:  
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STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:  
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
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STU-III AV 243-4315

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Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//  
STU-III AV 243-0597




**SUMMARY**

**Kuwait** has strategic significance through its oil resources, important location on the **Arabian Peninsula**, and its relationships with other **Arab** countries in the region. In recent years, strong ties have formed between the **U.S.** and **Kuwait** in the areas of trade and **Kuwait** defense. Within the **Middle East**, **Kuwait** has a relatively small armed force and is dependent on the **U.S.** and other friendly nations for protection against attack.


With a culture much different from the **U.S.** and intensely hot, dry summers, military operations in **Kuwait** would pose some problems. The terrain consists mainly of desert plains and trafficability of tracked vehicles is possible in about one-half of the country. Hydrographic conditions will allow **NGF** ships to approach the coast within range of most targets ashore but **Kuwaiti** coastal defense weapons could out-gun these ships. The most serious setback to military operations in **Kuwait** could be the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. The numerous oil fields and refineries, as well as many vital communications networks, should require careful consideration by military planners. Also, **NEO**, conducted by a **MEU** under normal circumstances would be very difficult due to the large number (2,500) of potential evacuees in **Kuwait**.

KUWAIT - THREAT SUMMARY



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KUWAIT - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### U.S. Equities In Kuwait

In recent years, cooperation between the U.S. and Kuwait has increased due to efforts to ensure freedom of navigation through the Persian Gulf for Kuwaiti oil in U.S. flag ships. The U.S. is currently Kuwait's second largest supplier (after Japan) and provides substantial military support. Kuwait comprises the fifth largest market in the Middle East for U.S. goods and services.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating / Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
7	505	587	-	1,099	2,500	3 / 4	7	Medium

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## Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Kuwait** constitutes a negligible threat to the **U.S.** in the areas of drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/ technology transfer.

## General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	LAV	Howitzers/SP	16	5	61	A

Ground OOB includes 16,000 troops, all of whom are conscripts. Officers are recruited mainly from the ruling clan to ensure loyalty. The army remains heavily dependent on foreign training assistance although there are plans to create new military colleges and technical schools. Tanks include the Centurion, Chieftain, and Vickers Mk 1 while the main artillery piece is the M-109 155-mm SP howitzer.

## General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	Bloc	2	5	117	D

Fighter Aircraft: Mirage F-1BK, Mirage F-1CK; Close Air: A-4KU, TA-4KU; Air Defense: Improved HAWK, SA-6, SA-7, and SA-8 SAMs. Enhancements have recently been made through the acquisition of 3-dimensional radars. Also, a product improvement program has been initiated to use the AN/TSQ-73 command and control system with HAWK SAMs.

## General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Antiair	1	5	56	C

Ships: None; SSMS: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 8 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMS, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 5 Large Patrol Craft; 39 Coastal Patrol Craft.

## Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Persian and English)  
Primary religion - Islam

There is a significant cultural difference between **Kuwait** and the **U.S.**

Kuwait - 3

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**Weather**

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
69-85 -	55	5	Dry/Hot

Intensely hot and dry summers; short, cool winters. Rainfall averages five inches or less annually.

**General Geographic Conditions**

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Kuwait is situated in the northeast corner of the **Arabian Peninsula**, bounded on the north and west by **Iraq**, on the south by **Saudi Arabia**, and on the east by the **Persian Gulf**.

**Operational Elevation**

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

**General Cross-Country Mobility**

- Portions of **Kuwait** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The topographical characteristics of **Kuwait** consist primarily of desert plains with extensive sand dunes, sebkhas (crusted surface over soft ground), and steep-sided wadis. About one-half of this region offers suitable terrain for cross-country trafficability of wheeled and tracked vehicles.

**Intervisibility (Line of Sight)**

- Optimum

**Kuwait** consists almost entirely of flat rolling desert and mud flats. Line of sight distances would mainly exceed 2,000 meters except during occasional heavy cloudbursts and sand storms.

**Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)**

- NGF ships are able to approach the coast and provide good support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62433	5,490	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Serious coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
Frog SSM	70,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Major shortfalls due to no coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	1 C-5 2 C-141B 1 C-130	1/3	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Ahmadi Ahmed al Jaber Air Base Ali al Salem Air Base Kuwait International	C-130 C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC. Daylight/VFR only. Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- Two ports with small harbors and depths over 40 feet.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Mina al Ahmadi Al Kuwayt	Small Small	Over 76/Over 76 26-30/41-45	46-50 31-35	Yes Yes

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## Key Installations

**Kuwait** is an oil rich country with numerous onshore and offshore oil fields. Oil refineries are located in central **Kuwait** and along the southeastern coast near the **Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone**. Communications networks are excellent with direct-dial links available to most countries. All-weather highways run north to **Iraq** and south to **Saudi Arabia**. Most-principal roads are at least four lanes.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Kuwait	- Excellent international/ adequate domestic telecomm - 4 Radio stations - 3 TV stations - 5 Satellite stations	2,600 km	None	2	4	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	None

## Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **Kuwait** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

## NEO

- Due to about 2,500 potential evacuees in **Kuwait**, NEO conducted by a MEU would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
84	2,500	3 (Kuwait)	F

Note: In **Kuwait** the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs  
Terrorism  
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer  
NBC



LEBANON

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG II MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 484-8095
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2// STU-III AV 430-8003
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C// STU-III AV 243-4315
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO BEIRUT LE//DATT// 417774/415802/415803/414712 EXT 314/315




SUMMARY

**Lebanon** is located on the eastern shore of the **Mediterranean Sea**, bounded by **Syria** and **Israel**, and forms a strategic bridge between the **West** and the **Middle East**. In recent years it has become a battleground for the diverse and hostile forces in the region. Combat ranges from sniping and unorganized street fighting to sophisticated electronic warfare and the use of surface-to-surface missiles. **Syria** has positioned sizable forces in **Lebanon** and engaged various Lebanese factions. **Lebanon** is a major narcotics producing and trafficking country, supplying heroin to **Europe** and the **U.S.**, as well as hashish to the **Middle East** and **Western** countries. The **Iranian** backed Hizballah group operates primarily in **Lebanon** and employs terrorism as a tactic to support its political and religious goals. **Lebanon** has a small armed force which is presently rather ineffective due to the political instability and civil war.

The considerable cultural difference between the **U.S.** and **Lebanon** as well as the presence of various, potentially hostile forces could pose a variety of problems for **U.S.** military operations in the country. Only portions of **Lebanon**, mainly on the interior plain, are suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. While **NGF** ships can approach the coast to provide good support for combat operations along the coast, **Lebanon**, through its organic coastal defense weapons could present effective opposition. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is available for most of **Lebanon** except for areas along the southern borders with **Israel** and **Syria**. The continuing civil war has inflicted massive damage on **Lebanon's** key installations and significant investment would be necessary for their reconstruction. With over 1900 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Lebanon** would require precise planning and execution.


LEBANON - THREAT SUMMARY



Lebanon - 1

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## LEBANON - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Displaced **Palestinians**, **Syrian** encroachment, and political instability cause serious conflict.
- Continuous war and violence have all but destroyed this country.

The current conflict in **Lebanon** is technologically and politically complex. Combat ranges from sniping and unorganized street fighting to sophisticated electronic warfare and the use of surface-to-surface missiles. The weapons and tactics reflects the spectrum of battle from neighborhood versus neighborhood to superpower versus superpower. Two problems lie at the heart of the conflict. These are the disposition of **Arab** and **Palestinian** Christians and the need for a new homeland for **Palestinians** since the creation of **Israel**. There have been numerous peacekeeping forces in **Lebanon** but none have been very effective. Recently, **Syria** has positioned sizable forces in **Lebanon** and engaged Christian **Lebanese** forces. **Syria** would like to expand its borders to include **Lebanon**.

U.S. Equities in Lebanon

- Lebanon forms a strategic bridge between the **West** and the **Middle East**.

**Lebanon** is strategically located on the eastern shore of the **Mediterranean Sea**, bounded by **Syria** and **Israel**. It has traditionally been a bridge between the **West** and the **Middle East** but in recent years has become a battleground for the diverse and hostile forces in the region.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2	97	34	-	133	1,900	1 3	4	Low

Drug Threat

- Leading producer of hashish
- **Syria** conducts trafficking in the **Bekaa Valley**.

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

**Lebanon** continues to be a major narcotics producing and trafficking country, supplying heroin to **Europe** and the **U.S.**, as well as hashish to the **Middle East** and **Western** countries. The assessment of **Lebanon** takes into account the limited control of the central Government. **Syria** controls an estimated 65 percent of the country, including the strategic **Bekaa Valley** where crops are cultivated and processed and trafficking originates.

Terrorism

- Hizballah and other **Middle East** factions promote terrorism.

The Hizballah group operates primarily in **Lebanon** and employs terrorism as a tactic to support its political and religious goals. The group seized at least eight foreigners in 1988, including U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Higgins who was assigned to **United Nations** peacekeeping duties in **Lebanon**. Other groups conducting terrorist attacks in **Lebanon** have included **Palestinian** factions, **Lebanese** Christian militias, and **Lebanese** Shia and Sunni fundamentalists.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Lebanon** constitutes a serious threat by its involvement in drugs and terrorism which are two of the three consolidated threat categories (drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer).

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## General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	M-48	Howitzers	15	8	103	C

Ground OOB includes about 15,000 troops, most of whom are volunteers. The army is presently rather ineffective due to political instability and civil war. Syrian, Palestinian, and Israeli forces occupy parts of the country. A military academy for officers and technical school for NCOs was previously in existence, but due to the current situation it is not known if they are open. Tanks: AMX-13, M-41, M-48; Artillery: D-30, M-46, M-50, M-101A1, M-102, M-114, M-198, M-1938

## General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Props	Early AAA	1	8	49	B

Fighter Aircraft: F-70 Hunter; Close Air: AS-11/12 ASM, SA-342 Gazelle; Air Defense: AA guns

## General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Sm Gun Boats	Negligible	8	38	A

Ships: None; SSM: None; Patrol Craft: 4 Small Gun Boats, 2 Speed Boats

## Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (French, and English)

Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between Lebanon and the U.S.

## Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
63-75	64	35	Mixed

The climate is typically **Mediterranean** and resembles that of southern California. Temperatures rarely exceed 85 degrees Fahrenheit during the summer, but humidity is high.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

The urban population of **Lebanon** is mainly concentrated in **Beirut**. The country's principal topographic features are a narrow coastal plain behind which are the high **Lebanon Mountains**, the fertile **Bekaa Valley** and the **Anti-Lebanon Mountains** extending to the **Syrian** border.

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Lebanon** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Trafficability is restricted in the mountainous areas, with movement limited to roads. The interior plain, however, is well suited for tracked movement.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distance limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The mountain ranges which cover much of **Lebanon** would restrict line of sight distances to well under 1,000 meters. Only on the narrow coastal plain and the interior plain behind the mountains would line of sight visibility exceed 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Good NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
56043 (Beirut)	1,000	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons have significant capability.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
130 mm M-46	27,000	Threat Advantage

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## MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New -	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available for most of **Lebanon** except for the areas along the southern borders with **Israel** and **Syria**.

## Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-5	1/0	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Beirut International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	

## Ports

**Lebanon** has one major port at **Beirut** with excellent capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Beirut	Medium	61-65/Over 76	46-50	Yes

## Key Installations

The civil war has inflicted massive damage on **Lebanon's** economic infrastructure. **Beirut** and southern **Lebanon** have been particularly hard hit. Industry, housing, roads, telecommunications, and water-supply systems will require major reconstruction to attain pre-civil war condition. One estimate indicates it will take a 10-year investment at a rate of \$1.2 billion annually to reconstruct the country.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Awkar	- Telecomm disrupted - 8 Radio stations - 15 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations (Note: some are inoperable)	7,370 km	378 km	1	1	- Crude oil	None	None

**Strategic and Tactical Lift**

The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU, which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea**, could reach **Lebanon** in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

**NEO**

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees in **Lebanon** (1900), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	1,900	0 (Beirut)	F

Note: In **Lebanon** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer  
NBC





**LIBYA**

MEF G-2:  
Telephone:

CG II MEF//G-2//  
STU-III AV 484-8095

Theater J-2:  
Telephone:

USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//J-2//  
STU-III AV 430-8003

DIA DB Desk Code:  
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//  
STU-III AV 243-4315

Embassy Defense Attache:  
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//  
STU-III AV 243-0597




**SUMMARY**

Since 1969, when Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi came to power through a coup, U.S. - Libyan relations have been increasingly strained because of Libya's foreign policies supporting international terrorism and subversion against moderate Arab and African Governments. Due to its involvement in numerous incidents of terrorism, the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions against Libya, ordered all Americans to leave the country, and frozen Libyan assets in the U.S. In recent years, Qaddafi has shown no sign of giving up terrorism, and Libyan agents continue to track and kill opponents of the regime. Besides exporting terrorism, Libya is a major buyer of illegal weapons and technology from all available sources. Libya has the fifth largest ground, air, and naval OOBs in the region. Numerous regular force personnel receive training outside the country, mainly in the Soviet Union. Libya is believed to maintain stores of chemical weapons, and is suspected to have an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

Cultural differences and the hot/dry desert conditions of Libya could present obstacles to U.S. military operations in this country. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally restricted to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters due to terrain contours and dusty windstorms. Although NGF ships can approach the coast to provide fair support for operations ashore, Libyan coastal defense weapons could pose a serious threat. Mapping of Libya is limited, with 1:50,000 scale map coverage available along the Mediterranean coast, but not inland. Marginal and constrained airfields and ports provide limited accessibility to this country. Libya has numerous key installations including oil fields and refineries.


LIBYA - THREAT SUMMARY



Libya - 1

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## LIBYA- TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### U.S. Equities in Libya

Overall U.S. equity in Libya is low. Due to its involvement in numerous incidents of international terrorism, the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions against Libya, ordered all Americans to leave, and frozen all Libyan assets in the U.S.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating / Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
252	-	-	-	252	-	1 / 1	1	Low

Terrorism

- Notorious for state sponsored terrorism.
- Recently hosted the most extreme **Palestinian** terrorist group, the Abu Nidal Organization.

The **Middle East's** most notorious practitioner of terrorism, Qaddafi historically has employed terrorism to lash out against regime opponents and to further his own foreign policy objectives within the **Arab** political arena and within worldwide revolutionary movements. **Libyan** People's Bureaus abroad, Revolutionary Committees, the Anti-Imperialism Center in **Tripoli**, numerous front organizations, and intelligence and security services all have been called upon at times to support **Libyan** terrorism. Following the April 1986 **U.S.** air strikes, however, detectable **Libyan** involvement in terrorist activity dropped significantly through 1987. Nevertheless, Qaddafi shows no sign of forsaking terrorism, and **Libyan** agents continue to track and kill opponents of the regime. Qaddafi has turned increasingly to surrogates for attacks, seeking greater plausible denial and safety from retaliation. **Libya** recently hosted the most extreme **Palestinian** terrorist group--the Abu Nidal Organization--and there are other signs that **Libyan** involvement in terrorism may be again on the rise.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

**Libya** is a major buyer of illegal weapons and technology from all available sources.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Libya** presents terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer threats which are two of the three consolidated threat categories (drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer).

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## General Ground OOB

- **Libya** has the fifth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	60	4	204	E

Ground OOB includes about 60,000 troops (regulars and conscripts). Numerous regular force personnel receive training outside **Libya**, mainly in the **Soviet Union**. The **Soviets** also have a large training cadre inside **Libya** to instruct **Libyan** personnel and help operate equipment. As yet, **Libyans** are unable to perform many of the technical functions themselves. **Libyan** forces obtained combat experience during their invasion of **Chad**. Tanks: T-54, T-55, T-62, and T-72; Artillery: 2S1, 2S3, ASTROS MRS, D-30, D-74, M-46, M-101, and M-109.

## General Air OOB

- **Libya** has the fifth largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	9	4	163	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, Mirage 5DE, Mirage F1AD/ED; Close Air: J1 Jastreb, Mi-24, Mirage 5D, Su-20, Tu-22; Air Defense: Crotale, SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, and SA-13 SAMs and AA guns. Air defense is modeled after **Soviet** equipment and doctrine. An integrated air defense system known as SENEZH is operational.

## General Naval OOB

- **Libya** has the fifth largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	7	4	141	E

Ships: 4 Frigates, 7 Missile Corvettes, and 1 Corvette with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: SS-N-2C, Otomat; Patrol Craft: 28 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (12-Ex-**Soviet**, 4 **Yugoslav**) with SSMs, guns, fire control, and radars.

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**Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat**

- Reportedly used chemical weapons against **Chad**.
- Alleged to have obtained chemical weapons from **Iran**.
- Suspected to have an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

There were reports during 1987 that **Libya** used air-delivered toxic gas, as well as napalm against **Chadian** forces. Other reports indicate **Libya** agreed to provide **Iran** with **Soviet** - made sea-mines in return for **Iranian**-manufactured chemical weapons. **Libyan** support for the nuclear non proliferation treaty has been publicly questioned but it is unlikely that this country has a nuclear weapons production capability.

**Culture (Language and Religion)**

Primary language - Arabic (Berber)  
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Libya** and the **U.S.**

**Weather**

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
60-85	57	10-15	Dry/Hot

Rainfall is greatest on the coast and less in the interior, with occasional complete rain failures. The coastal temperature is influenced by the **Mediterranean**, but the interior experiences the hot, wideranging extremes of the desert. A special feature of the **Libyan** climate is the "ghibi", a hot dry, dust-laden, southern wind lasting for 1 to 4 days. The ghibi usually occurs in the spring and fall and can cause temperatures to rise within hours to over 110 degrees Fahrenheit.

**General Geographic Conditions**

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

**Operational Elevation**

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

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## General Cross-Country Mobility

- Libya is generally well suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be possible all year throughout the greater part of Libya. This movement would be restricted in some areas, however, by the severely dissected plains, steep hills, mountains, marshes, and sebkhas.

## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Restricted, with line of sight distances ranging between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

About 93 percent of Libya consists of desert or semidesert. In between occasional hills and mountains are largely barren plains and vast sand seas. Hot, dry, dusty windstorms occasionally occur in the spring and fall that would reduce visibility. Line of sight distances would be expected to range between 1,000 and 2,000 meters over more than 50 percent of the country.

## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
56190	9.660	Fair

## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant opposition could be expected from coastal defense weapons.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
ASTROS MRS	60,000	Threat Advantage

## MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available along the Mediterranean coast but not inland.

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## Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-141B aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	4 C-141B	1/3	2-4/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Aozou	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Benina	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Okba Ibn Nafa	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Tripoli International	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

## Ports

Libya has three major ports with poor capability to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Tobruk	Small	56-60/31-35	26-30	Yes
Banghazi	Small	36-40/31-35	26-30	Yes
Tripoli	Medium	31-35/31-35	26-30	Yes

## Key Installations

Libya is suspected to have facilities for the production and or storage of chemical weapons. Oil fields are located at **Sarir**, **Tripolitania**, **Fezzan**, and the **Sirtica** basin southeast of the **Gulf of Sidra**; the **Ghadamis** basin (400 kilometers southwest of **Tripoli**); and offshore fields (30 kilometers northwest of **Tripoli** at **Bour**).

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Modern telecomm - 21 Radio stations - 13 TV stations - 16 Satellite stations	19,300 km	None	3	4	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	C

## Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Atlantic ARG with its embarked MEU which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** could reach **Libya** in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

Libya - 7

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## NEO

With few **U.S.** citizens in **Libya** and the location of the most likely evacuation site (**Tripoli**) on the coast, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	5 (Tripoli)	A

Note: In **Libya** the drug threat is of little significance.



**NORTH YEMEN**  
**(YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC)**

MEF G-2: CG I MEF//G-2//  
Telephone: STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//  
Telephone: STU-III AV 968-6265

DIA DB Desk Code: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//  
Telephone: STU-III AV 243-4315

Embassy Defense Attache: USDAO SANAA YE//DATT//  
Telephone: 967-2-271-950 to 958, EXT 218/9




**SUMMARY**

The **U.S.** has helped to expand the security assistance program in **North Yemen** as well as providing this country with significant economic support. **North Yemen** has modest armed forces which would have difficulty in dealing with an attack from outside its borders. Almost all military training beyond the basic level is done outside the country mainly in **Egypt** and **Saudi Arabia**. Some foreign advisors are present in **North Yemen** to perform technical tasks and operate advanced equipment.

With a much different culture from the **U.S.**, a hot/dry climate, and mostly mountainous terrain, military operations in **North Yemen** would present some difficulties. While some parts of the coastal plains would allow trafficability, the country in general is unsuited for off-road movement of tracked vehicles. Due to the dissected terrain, the average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Because of shallow water off much of the **Red Sea** coast, NGF platforms would have a poor capability to approach the coast and provide support for operations ashore. A most serious setback to military operations in **North Yemen** could be the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. While **North Yemen** is accessible by air with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft it has no major ports to accommodate strategic sealift. Oil fields are located in the eastern part of the country near the town of **Marib**. Communications facilities are underdeveloped but gradually improving. In a crisis situation, it is estimated that the Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach **North Yemen** in two to four days. Under normal conditions, NEO conducted by a MEU would be quite difficult due to over 2000 potential evacuees.


NORTH YEMEN - THREAT SUMMARY



North Yemen - 1

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## NORTH YEMEN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### U.S. Equities in North Yemen

Since 1979 the U.S. has cooperated with Saudi Arabia to greatly expand the security assistance program in North Yemen. An American company, Hunt Oil of Dallas, Texas discovered oil in North Yemen in 1984. In addition to the Agency for International Development (AID) program, the U.S. has about 50 Peace Corps volunteers in North Yemen engaged in agricultural development, irrigation, nursing, and teaching.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	533	47	580	2,340	2 3	5	Medium

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## General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-62	Howitzers	35	6	101	C

Ground OOB includes about 35,000 troops, most of whom are conscripts. Almost all training beyond the basic level is done outside the country, mainly in **Egypt** and **Saudi Arabia**. Foreign advisors are also present inside **North Yemen** to perform technical tasks and operate advanced equipment. Tanks: M-60, T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62; Artillery: BM-21 MRS, M-101, M-115, M-1931, M-1937, M-1942.

## General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	1	6	137	D

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E, MiG-17, MiG-21; Close Air: Il-28, Su-22; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-6, SA-7 SAMs, and AA guns.

## General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Bloc	1	6	67	C

Ships: None; SSM: None; Patrol Craft: 5 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol (Ex-Soviet), 3 Small Coastal Patrol Craft.

## Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic

Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **North Yemen** and the **U.S.**

## Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
80-91	60	3	Dry/Hot

Temperate in the interior with some rainfall; hot and humid on the coastal plain. Recently, severe drought conditions have prevailed.

North Yemen - 3

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## General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

## Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

North Yemen is mostly mountainous with a 40-mile wide coastal plain.

## General Cross-Country Mobility

- The country is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement would be restricted by steep slopes and by dissected areas, salt flats, and dunes on the coastal plains. While there are some parts of the coastal plains which would allow tracked movement, the interior desert plains would not due to the extensive sand dunes, escarpments, lava fields, sebkhas, and steep-sided wadis.

## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distance limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Except for the coastal plains which border the **Red Sea**, North Yemen consists of mountains, dissected terrain, and a series of highland plateaus. Line of sight distances over most of the country, with the possible exception of the coastal plains, would be restricted to less than 1,000 meters.

## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Poor capability to approach the coast and provide NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62292	20,000	Poor

## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons cannot out-gun U.S. NGF.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
BM-21 MRS	20,500	U.S. NGF Advantage

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## MC&G Shortfalls

- Major shortfalls due to no coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

## Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
2	1 C-5 1 C-141B	0/2	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Sanaa Taizz	C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-141B	Daylight only. Daylight/VFR only.

## Ports

- No accessible ports.

## Key Installations

Oil fields are located 70 kilometers northeast of the town of **Marib**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Sanaa	- Poor but improving telecomm - 3 Radio stations - 17 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	4,000 km	None	0	1	- Crude oil	Yes	None

North Yemen - 5

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TAB ME 9

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## Strategic and Tactical Lift

- The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU could reach **North Yemen** in less than four days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

## NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
73	2,340	88 (Sanaa)	F

Note: In **North Yemen** the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs  
Terrorism  
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer  
NBC

**OMAN**

MEF G-2:  
Telephone:

CG I MEF//G-2//  
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:  
Telephone:


USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//  
STU-III AV 968-6265

DIA DB Desk Code:  
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//  
STU-III AV 243-4315

Embassy Defense Attache:  
Telephone:

USDAO MUSCAT OM//DATT//  
737050




**SUMMARY**

While the Dhafari insurgents in southern Oman were all but wiped out in 1975, remnants of the group remain in the field and there is a possibility that this conflict may resume. There are also a number of border disputes ongoing between Oman and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). Oil is the major source of income for Oman, and this country has strong political ties to the U.S. In northern Oman, the tip of the Ruus-al-Jebal peninsula controls access to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Under a U.S.-Omani agreement, the U.S. is provided access to Omani military facilities. These facilities are being upgraded for mutual use. Oman has a small armed force, which would have difficulty in defeating an attack from outside its borders.

A much different culture as well as a hot, dry climate and diverse terrain conditions would cause some difficulties for U.S. military operations in Oman. About two-thirds of Oman is unsuitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the extensive volcanic mountain network and dissected geography. Due to adverse terrain and climatic conditions, the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. While NGF ships can approach the coast to provide adequate support for operations ashore, the standard naval gun (5 inch, 54 caliber) would be out-gunned by Omani coastal defense weapons. Only northern Oman, including Muscat, has coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps. A major drawback to operations in Oman is that this country has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift. Key military installations in Oman are being improved by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. With over 800 potential evacuees in Oman, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would require a significant effort.


OMAN - THREAT SUMMARY



Oman - 1

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## OMAN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Dhafari insurgents operate in southern Oman.
- Border disputes ongoing with the U.A.E.

Although the Dhafari insurgents in southern Oman received losses in 1975 by Omani, British, and Iranian forces while South Yemeni attentions were focused on Ethiopia, they remain in the field in reduced numbers and there is a serious possibility of a revival of this once broadly based insurrection. Also, there are numerous border disputes ongoing between Oman and the U.A.E.



U.S. Equities in Oman

Under a U.S. - Omani agreement, the U.S. is provided access to Omani military facilities.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating		Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
						Rating	Rating		
19	156	-	-	175	830	1	2	3	Low

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	M-60	Howitzers	17	3	100	C

Ground OOB includes about 17,000 regular troops. The army was mostly run by British officers at the time of independence but is now going through transition to Omani officers. Basic recruit training is accomplished at a center near Muscat. Basic officer training also begins there with additional instruction obtained in U.K., Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. Tanks: Chieftain, M-60; Artillery: M-46, M-109A2.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	3	3	96	C

Fighter Aircraft: F-70 Hunter, Jaguar; Close Air: BAe Strikemaster, Hawk, Air Defense: Blowpipe and Rapier SAMs and AA guns. The Omani air defense system was recently upgraded with 28 Rapier fire units equipped with Blindfire radars. Also acquired were two long-range, 3-dimensional radars to extend air surveillance coverage. Additionally, improvements were made to existing air control facilities.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	3	3	66	C

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 4 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 4 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 4 Inshore Patrol Craft.

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## Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic  
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between Oman and the U.S.

## Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
78-89	71	4	Dry/Hot

Hot and humid along the coast; hot and dry in the interior; summer monsoon in the far south.

## General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

## Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

The terrain of Oman includes mountains, plains, and arid plateau. A negligible amount of land is forested; much is desert, waste or urban.

## General Cross-Country Mobility

- Oman is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Approximately two-thirds of Oman is unsuitable for the cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles due to the extensive volcanic mountain network. On the coastal plains, cross-country movement would be restricted by steep slopes, dissected areas, salt flats, and dunes. While there are some parts of the coastal plains which would allow tracked movement, the interior desert plains would not due to the extensive sand dunes, escarpments, lava fields, sebkhas, and steep-sided wadis.

## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances in about two-thirds of Oman would be less than 1,000 meters due to the large volcanic mountain complex. Along the coast, visibility would be restricted by steep slopes, irregular areas, salt flats, and dunes. In the south, the region of Dhofar experiences a strong monsoon season from May to September with frequent, heavy mists that would reduce visibility.

**Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)**

- NGF ships can approach the coast to provide good support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62355	3220	Good

**Hydrography (Coastal Threat)**

- Coastal defense weapons have significant capability.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
130 mm M-46	27,000	Threat Advantage

**MC&G Shortfalls**

- Limited map coverage

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available only for northern **Oman**, including **Muscat**.

**Airfields**

- **Oman** is accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	2 C-5 2 C-141B	1/3	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Masirah Salalah Seeb International (Muscat) Thumrait	C-141B, C-130 C-141B- C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow. Daylight/VFR only. Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.

7,12 Me 10

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## Ports

- Oman has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift.

## Key Installations

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has worked on upgrading Omani military airfields.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Muscat	- Fair Telecomm - 6 Radio stations - 11 TV stations - 10 Satellite stations	16,900 km	None	0	4	- Crude oil - Natural gas	Yes	None

## Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach Oman in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

## NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would require a significant effort.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
71	830	2 (Muscat)	F

Note: In Oman the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs  
Terrorism  
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer  
NBC

**QATAR**

MEF G-2: CG I MEF//G-2//  
Telephone: STU-III AV 365-9103

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


**SUMMARY**

**Qatar** has importance through its oil production and refining capabilities and its strategic location along the western coast of the **Persian Gulf** adjacent to **Saudi Arabia** and the **United Arab Emirates**. It has a modest defense establishment which would have difficulty in dealing with an attack from outside its borders.

A much different culture from the **U.S.** and a dry, hot climate with temperatures reaching 120 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer would make military operations in **Qatar** quite difficult. While cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is better than many other **Middle East** countries, only about 40 percent of the country is trafficable. Mapping by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to central **Qatar** including the area around the capital of **Doha** on the east coast and the city of **Dukhan** on the west coast. Accessibility to **Qatar** by air is generally poor with only one airfield available at the city of **Doha**. This airfield can accommodate C-141B aircraft but not C-5s. The two ports in **Qatar** are also somewhat constrained by small harbors and limited channel/anchorage depths, and would have some difficulty in handling cargo ships with deep drafts. Numerous key installations, including oil fields and communications networks, would need to be considered during military operations. With over 500 potential evacuees, NEO under normal circumstances conducted by a MEU equipped with the aging CH-46 helicopter would require a significant effort.


QATAR - THREAT SUMMARY



Qatar - 1

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## QATAR - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### U.S. Equities in Qatar

Although the U.S. is a major equipment supplier for Qatar's oil and gas industries, to date there has been little American investment in Qatar. Over the past two years, two U.S. oil firms, Sohio and Amoco, concluded oil and gas exploration agreements for on- and offshore operations. These agreements are for 25-year terms and may lead to increased U.S. investment.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2	-	-	-	2	500	1 2	3	Low

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Qatar** constitutes a negligible threat in the areas of drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers/SP	6	2	78	B

Ground OOB includes 6,000 troops all of whom are volunteers. Military forces are small and inexperienced and would have difficulty coping with an outside attack, possibly from **Iraq**. There are numbers of expatriate personnel assisting the army from **Britain** and other **Arab** countries. The tank is the AMX-30. Artillery consists of 88-mm towed, and the Mk F-3 155-mm SP.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	1	2	93	C

Fighter Aircraft: Hunter FGA-78, Mirage F1C; Close Air: Alpha Jet, Hunter FGA-78; Air Defense: Blowpipe, Rapier, Roland, Stinger, and Tigercat SAMs with Blindfire radars.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	1	2	63	C

Ships: none; SSMS: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 3 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMS, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 6 Large Patrol Craft; 17 Coastal Patrol Craft; 25 Small Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic

Primary religion - Islam

There is a significant cultural difference between **Qatar** and the **U.S.**

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## Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
59-108	70	3	Dry/Hot

The hottest time of the year is between June and the end of September when temperatures reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit. The winter is mild with little rain. Rain averages three inches or less annually.

## General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

**Qatar** is on a peninsula jutting northward into the sea halfway along the west coast of the **Persian Gulf**.

## Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

## General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Qatar's** desert plains are suited for cross-country movement by tracked vehicles.

The topographical characteristics and features of **Qatar** are divided into two distinct regions, the Desert Plains and the Highlands. The Desert Plains consist mainly of sand dunes, *sebkas* (crusted surface over soft ground), and steep-sided wadis. Roughly one-third of the region offers suitable terrain for cross-country movement of tracked or wheeled vehicles. The Highlands in the northwest consist of some modest hills and sparse vegetation and would be less accommodating to cross-country vehicular movement.

## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum.

The terrain of **Qatar** is generally flat and low-lying except for a few modest hills to the northwest. The north has some sparse vegetation while the south is arid with stretches of salt flats. It is expected that over 50 percent of this country would accommodate line of sight distances exceeding 2,000 meters.

## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62409	9,155	Fair



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## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm SPH	18,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

## MC&G Shortfalls

- Restricted map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for central **Qatar** including the capital of **Doha** on the east coast and the city of **Dukhan** on the west coast.

## Airfields

- Poor accessibility by air with only one airfield which is not C-5 capable.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-141B	1/0	1/C-130

Airfield	Type Aircraft	Comments
Doha International	C-141B, C-130	Cannot accommodate C-5 aircraft

## Ports

- Two relatively small ports, with **Musayid** being the most accessible.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Musayid	Small	36-40/41-45	6-10	Yes
Ad Dawhah	Small	26-30/26-30	26-30	-

Qatar - 5

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## Key Installations

**Qatar** has numerous oil fields and industrial centers, as well as excellent communications facilities. Most industrial projects are based in **Umm Said** and include an oil refinery with a 50,000 barrel/day capacity, a fertilizer plant for urea and ammonia, a steel plant, and a petrochemical plant.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Doha	- Good urban telecomm - 3 Radio stations - 2 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	805 km	None	2	1	- Crude oil - Natural gas	Yes	None

## Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** could reach **Qatar** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

## NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees in **Qatar**, NEO conducted by a **MEU** would require a significant effort.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
8	500	5 (Doha)	E

Note: In **Qatar**, the following factors are of little significance:

- Drugs
- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC

**SAUDI ARABIA**

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG I MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 365-9103
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2// STU-III AV 968-6265
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C// STU-III AV 243-4315
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO RIYADH SA//DATT// 966-1-488-3800, Ext 275-282




**SUMMARY**

**Saudi Arabia** is of major importance due to its oil reserves, strategic location on the **Arabian Peninsula** bordering **Kuwait, Iraq, and Jordan**, and because over 20,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. **Saudi Arabia** is the largest trading partner of the **U.S.** in the **Middle East** and continued availability of oil from the country is important to the **U.S.** economy. In recent years, the **U.S.** has provided significant military support to **Saudi Arabia** to help strengthen its defenses from outside attack. As compared with other countries within the region, **Saudi Arabia** has moderate size armed forces equipped with many modern **U.S.**-supplied weapon systems. Military training is patterned after the **U.S.** armed forces.

With a culture quite different from the **U.S.**, a dry/hot summer climate, and topography which is mainly desert, ground combat operations in **Saudi Arabia** would present some difficulties. The northern part of the country is generally suited for cross-country movement of vehicles while the western highlands are basically unsuited due to the rugged terrain. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is mainly limited to less than 1,000 meters. Although **NGF** ships can approach the **Red Sea** and **Persian Gulf** coasts to provide fair support, the **Saudi Arabian** coastal defense weapons could present a serious threat. There is limited mapping throughout the country with sporadic 1:50,000 scale map coverage along the **Persian Gulf**, the capital of **Riyadh**, and the area around **Jeddah** on the **Red Sea**. **Saudi Arabia** has many key installations, including oil fields, pipelines, refineries, and modern communication and transportation facilities which should be considered when planning military operations. Likewise, the planning and execution of **NEO** by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be exceedingly complex due to the presence of many **U.S.** citizens who might require evacuation.


**SAUDI ARABIA - THREAT SUMMARY**



Saudi Arabia - 1

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## SAUDI ARABIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### U.S. Equities in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is the U.S.'s largest trading partner in the Middle East. There are over 20,000 U.S. citizens in this country, and total U.S. equity exceeds 10 billion dollars. However, U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia go far beyond trade. Saudi Arabia's unique role in the Arab and Islamic worlds and its strategic location on the Arabian Peninsula make its friendship critical to the U.S. for Middle Eastern stability. The continued availability of oil from Saudi Arabia remains very important to the economy of the U.S. as well as those of European countries and Japan. In recent years the U.S. has sold a significant amount of military equipment to Saudi Arabia including F-15 aircraft, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, and air defense weapons in order to strengthen its defenses from outside attack.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2,385	3,373	4,887	-	10,645	21,600	6 6	12	High

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Saudi Arabia** constitutes a negligible threat to the **U.S.** in the areas of drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	M-60	Howitzers/SP	38	11	129	D

Ground OOB includes 38,000 regular troops, all of whom are volunteers. Conscription is used to augment this force. Training is patterned after the **U.S.** armed forces. There are recruit training and numerous branch technical schools. The **U.S.** Training Mission in **Saudi Arabia** provides direct training assistance to the **Saudi** army and supervises contractor personnel providing training, construction, and logistical support. Conditions of service in the regular forces are good and pay is the highest of any military force in the **Middle East**. The tank inventory consists of the AMX-30, M-60A1, and M-60A3. Artillery includes the ASTROS MRS, M-101, M-102, M-109, and M-198.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	NT/AW	3d Gen SAMs	15	11	156	E

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E, F-15C/D, F-53, Tornado ADV; Close Air: Tornado IDS; Air Defense: Crotale, HAWK, Redeye, Shaline, and Stinger SAMs and AA guns. The **U.S.** has provided 3-dimensional air surveillance radars and AWACS aircraft. A joint air defense system called Peace Shield has been established using the AWACS and ground-based radars to provide integrated coverage for **Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, U.A.E., Bahrain, Qatar,** and **Oman.**

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	8	11	129	D

Ships: 4 Frigates and 4 Missile Corvettes with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMS: Otomat, Harpoon; Patrol Craft: 9 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMS, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 3 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo; 1 Large Patrol Craft; 8 Coastal Patrol Craft.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic  
Primary religion - Islam

There is a relatively large cultural difference between **Saudi Arabia** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-92	55	3	Dry/Hot

Rainfall is erratic, averaging 2 to 4 inches annually, except in **Asir** (mountainous region along the southern **Red Sea** coast), which averages 12 to 30 inches in the summer. During summer, the heat is intense over much of the country, frequently exceeding 120 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade, with high humidity along the coasts. In winter, temperatures sometimes drop below freezing in the central and northern areas, but snow and ice are uncommon.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

**Saudi Arabia** occupies about four-fifths of the **Arabian Peninsula** which is roughly the size of the **U.S.** east of the **Mississippi**. Boundaries are not fully defined in the south and southeast. From the mountain ranges near the **Red Sea**, the land slopes gently eastward toward the **Persian Gulf**. The topography is mainly desert. **Saudi Arabia** has no permanent rivers or bodies of water.

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

The higher elevations are in the mountain ranges near the **Red Sea**.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Saudi Arabia** are generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Conditions for cross-country movement are fair to good in about a third of the country, where vehicles can move freely across firm sandy and gravelly surfaces. Elsewhere, extensive sand dunes, high escarpments, lava fields, sebkhas, and steep-sided wadis would limit movement. The western highlands are also unsuited for tracked movement due to the rugged terrain.

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## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with average line of sight distance limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Well over half of **Saudi Arabia** would have line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters due to high escarpments, lava fields, steep-sided wadis, and sand dunes. The mountains in the west near the **Red Sea** would be particularly restrictive. The eastern part of the country is noted for having heavy fogs.

## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62242 (Jeddah)	9,155	Fair

## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal defense threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
ASTROS MRS	60,000	Threat Advantage

## MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists for the **Saudi Arabian** coast north of **Dhahran** along the **Persian Gulf**, for the area around the capital **Riyadh**, and for the area around **Jeddah** on the **Red Sea**.

## Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than nine unconstrained airfields that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
18	10 C-5 8 C-141B (1 Emergency use)	14/4	>1/C-5

Saudi Arabia - 5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Abha	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Daylight/VFR only.           Daylight/VFR only.           Emergency use only.
Dhahran International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Gizan	C-141B, C-130	
Jeddah	C-141B, C-130	
Jubail	C-141B, C-130	
Abdul Aziz International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Abdul Aziz Naval Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
King Khalid Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
King Khalid International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
King Khalid Military City	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Madinah	C-141B, C-130	
Riyadh International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Sharourah	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Sulayel	C-141B, C-130	
Tabuk Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Taif	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Wejeh	C-141B, C-130	
Yenbo	C-141B, C-130	

## Ports

- Six major ports with Jubail being the most accessible.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Jiddah	Small	Over 76/Over 76	31-35	Yes
Ad Damimam	Small	46-50/46-50	36-40	Yes
Jubail	Medium	Over 76/Over 76	71-75	Yes
Ras At Tannurah	Medium	56-60/26-30	46-50	Yes
Juaymoh Oil Terminal	Small	66-70/Over 76	-	-
Ras Al Khafji	Small	51-55/41-45	16-20	-

## Key Installations

Oil fields are located onshore and offshore in the **Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone**. Production is shared equally between these countries. Other oil fields in **Saudi Arabia** are at **Al Ghawar**, **As Saffaniyah**, and **Khurays**. Most oil exports move by tanker from the **Eastern Province** oil terminals of **Ras Tanura** and **Ju 'Ayman**. The remaining oil exports are mainly transported by a pipeline running east-west across the country to the **Red Sea** port of **Yanbu**. Communications networks are excellent with expanding telephone and telegraph service. Transportation facilities are quite modern with many domestic and international airline flights scheduled daily.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Riyadh	- Good telecomm - 37 Radio stations - 97 TV stations - 8 Satellite stations	74,000 km	886 km	6	18	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	None



Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach Saudi Arabia in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the very large number (21,600) of potential evacuees in Saudi Arabia, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be a formidable endeavor.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
132	21,600	196 (Riyadh)	F

Note: In Saudi Arabia the following factors are of little significance:

- Drugs
- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC



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## SOUTH YEMEN (PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN)

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG I MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 365-9103
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2// STU-III AV 968-6265
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C// STU-III AV 243-4315
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6// STU-III AV 243-0597




### SUMMARY

The U.S. has no formal diplomatic relationship with **South Yemen** because of the antagonism with which this **Arab** country views the U.S. The Government is modeled after the communist regimes of the **Soviet Union** and **Eastern Europe**. **Aden**, the principal city and capital, has served as a major training base for terrorists. **South Yemen** has actively provided weapons, explosives, and safe haven to terrorist groups. It has also reportedly been a transit point for gray arms shipments to other **Middle East** countries. **South Yemen** has moderate size armed forces with much of its equipment being furnished by communist countries. It intends to increase the size of its army to about 40,000 personnel. The U.S.S.R., **East Germany**, **Cuba**, and **North Korea** have sent training missions to **South Yemen**.

Cultural differences, a hot, dry climate, and diverse terrain conditions would pose difficulties to U.S. military operations in **South Yemen**. With a mountainous interior and dissected terrain, cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be generally limited to small flat areas along the coastal plain. The geographic conditions also cause the average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) to be limited to less than 1,000 meters. Although NGF ships can approach the coast along the **Gulf of Aden** to provide adequate support for operations ashore, significant opposition could be expected from **South Yemen** coastal defense weapons. Mapping of this country is very limited with 1:50,000 scale maps available only for the city of **Aden**. Airlift accessibility is also limited to one airfield at **Aden** which cannot handle C-5 aircraft. Two moderate size ports are available at **Aden** and **Al Mukalla** to accommodate strategic sealift. In a crisis situation, it is estimated that the **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **South Yemen** in two to four days.


SOUTH YEMEN - THREAT SUMMARY



South Yemen - 1

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SOUTH YEMEN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in South Yemen

The **South Yemen** Government has viewed the **U.S.** with antagonism due to the close **U.S.** relationship with **Saudi Arabia** and what **South Yemen** regards as a pro- **Israel** - **U.S.** policy. The **U.S.** has no formal diplomatic relationships with **South Yemen**. The **United Kingdom**, acts as the protecting power for the **U.S.** in this country. **U.S.** equities in **South Yemen** are rated as low.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	-	-	-	0 0	0	Low

Terrorism

- South Yemen serves as a major terrorist training base.

South Yemen has actively provided weapons, explosives, training, safe passage, and safe haven to terrorist groups. This country continues to play host to a number of **Palestinian** factions, including the Abu Nidal Organization, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of **Palestine**, the Popular Struggle Front, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of **Palestine**.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

South Yemen has been reported to be a transshipment point for gray arms to **Middle East** countries. This country has been involved in the training and equipping of **Middle Eastern** terrorists.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, South Yemen presents a serious threat through involvement in terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-62	Bloc	24	8	122	C

Ground OOB includes about 24,000 troops, most of whom are conscripts. The intention is to increase the size of the army to 40,000. The **U.S.S.R.**, **East Germany**, **Cuba**, and **North Korea** have sent training missions to **South Yemen**. Tanks: T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62; Artillery: BM-25 MRS, D-20, D-30, M-38, M-46.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	3	8	141	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-17, MiG-21; Close Air: Il-28, Mi-24, Su-22; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	Bloc	Bloc	1	8	119	D

Ships: none; SSM: SS-N-2B Styx; Patrol Craft: 5 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-Soviet) with SSMs, guns, and radars; 2 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Ex-Soviet); 2 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol (Ex-Soviet).

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## Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (English)  
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **South Yemen** and the **U.S.**

## Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
80-91	60	3	Dry/Hot

The entire country is extremely hot and humid with minimal rainfall.

## General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

## Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

A sandy coast rises to mountains which give way to desert sands.

## General Cross-Country Mobility

- **South Yemen** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The southwestern highlands are poorly suited for cross-country tracked movement due to mountain slopes, dunes, boulder fields, and lava plains. Movement is limited to small flat areas along the coastal plain, and to wadi bottoms.

## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances generally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The coastal areas of **South Yemen** are sandy and flat while the interior is mainly mountainous and irregular with occasional dunes, boulder deposits, and lava fields. Due to the broken and dissected terrain over more than half the country, line of sight distances would be generally under 1,000 meters.

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## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Good capability to approach the coast along the **Gulf of Aden** and provide NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62097/62098	7,320	Good

## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant opposition could be expected from coastal defense weapons.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
BM-25 MRS	55,900	Threat Advantage

## MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available only for the capital city of **Aden**.

## Airfields

- Poor accessibility by air with only one airfield which is not C-5 capable.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-141B	1/0	1/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Aden International	C-141B, C-130	

South Yemen - 5

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## Ports

South Yemen has two moderate size ports which can handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Aden	Medium	36-40/36-40	16-20	Yes
Al Mukalla	Small	over 76/56-60	6-10	Yes

## Key Installations

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Small telecomm system - 1 Radio station - 5 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	5,600 km	None	2	2	- Refined products	None	None

## Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach South Yemen in less than four days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

## NEO

- With few U.S. citizens in South Yemen and the location of the most likely evacuation site (Aden) on the coast, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	4 (Aden)	A

Note: In South Yemen the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs  
NBC



**SYRIA**

MEF G-2:  
Telephone:

CG II MEF//G-2//  
STU-III AV 484-8095

Theater J-2:  
Telephone:

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//  
STU-III AV 430-8003

DIA DB Desk Code:  
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//  
STU-III AV 243-4315

Embassy Defense Attache:  
Telephone:

USDAO DAMASCUS SY//DATT//  
332814/332315/330416 Ext 234 and 250




**SUMMARY**

Acute political and social instability and expansionist intentions toward **Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel** characterize the position of **Syria** in the **Middle East**. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Syria** is low due mainly to **Syria's** adamant rejection of attempts to mediate peace in the area, its support for international terrorism, and close military ties with the **Soviet Union**. **Syria** is a transit point for illegal narcotics, as well as a heroin refining center. Its military forces allegedly profit from drug production and trafficking in **Lebanon's Bekaa Valley**. **Syria** is known to sponsor terrorism in the **Middle East** and **Western Europe**. **Syria** is also involved in acquiring illicit weapons and technology for a major arms buildup against **Israel**. **Syria** should receive special attention by military planners because of its association with all three threat categories of narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer. It has one of the largest armed forces in the **Middle East** and depends heavily on **Soviet** military equipment and technical assistance. **Syria** is reported to have a significant chemical weapons production capability to include the arming of **Soviet-supplied SS-21 SSMs** with chemical warheads.

A large cultural difference exists between **Syria** and the **U.S.** The rugged mountains and broken terrain in the west would present obstacles for military operations in **Syria**. Only portions of **Syria**, mainly on the eastern plain, are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters in large parts of the country due to the rough terrain and ground cover. While **NGF** ships can approach the coast to provide good support for operations ashore, **Syrian** coastal defense weapons would have them seriously out-gunned. Mapping by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to western **Syria** including the coastal area bordering the **Mediterranean**. **Syria** has one airfield that can accommodate **C-5** aircraft and two moderate size ports with depths exceeding 40 feet. Key installations include oil fields, refineries, and pipelines, as well as suspected factories for the production of chemical weapons. Due to over 1,000 potential evacuees in **Syria**, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would present numerous difficulties.


SYRIA - THREAT SUMMARY



Syria - 1

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SYRIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Has expansionist intentions toward **Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel**.
- Has acute political and social instability.

President Hafez al-Assad must keep his country militarized to maintain control of the people. Almost all of the **Syrian** political factions have visions of a **greater Syria**, an idealized state that encompasses **Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel**. In particular, **Syria** strives to maintain an active presence in **Lebanon**. Visions of greater **Syria**, a threatened dictatorship, and militant Arabs lead **Syria** into an ongoing struggle with **Israel**. **Syria** also supports insurgent PLO elements in an attempt to further its ambitions.

### U.S. Equities in Syria

**Syria** is a strong military force in the **Middle East** and plays an important role in the Arab world. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Syria** is low.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2	93	66		161	1,043	1 3	4	Low

**Drug Threat**

- Transit point for illicit narcotics.
- Heroin refining center.
- Profits from drug trafficking in the **Bekaa Valley**.

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
	X			X

**Syria** is a transit point for illicit narcotics, as well as a heroin refining center. Its military exerts significant influence over **Lebanon's Bekaa Valley**, allegedly profiting from widespread drug production and trafficking in that area.

**Terrorism**

- Sponsors terrorism in the **Middle East** and **Western Europe**.

**Syria**, under President Assad, previously was an active, if not a more calculated, sponsor of terrorism. **Syrian** operations normally were confined to the **Middle East**, although **Western Europe** occasionally has been the venue for its activities. Three acts of **Syrian** terrorism occurred in **Europe** in 1986: an attempted bombing of the El Al airline in **London**; the bombing of the **German-Arab** friendship society in **Berlin**; and the bombing of the El Al ticket counter in **Madrid**. These attacks drew intense international criticism and sanctions, forcing **Syria** to distance itself from its previously close association with terrorism, although more circumspect support for terrorist acts in the **Middle East** likely will continue.

**Gray Arms/Technology Transfer**

**Syria** is involved in acquiring illicit weapons and technology for a major arms buildup against **Israel** and to pursue its interests in **Lebanon**. The **Syrian** cities of **Damascus** and **Aleppo** are centers of commerce and, as such, act as transit points for gray arms shipments to the **East**, particularly **Iran** and **Iraq**.

**Consolidated Threat**

**Syria** deserves special consideration by military planners because it is involved in all three of the threat categories: narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

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## General Ground OOB

- Syria has the third largest ground OOB in the **Middle East** following **Iraq** and **Iran**.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	300	10	450	F

Ground OOB includes about 300,000 troops of whom 120,000 are regulars, 130,000 are conscripts, and 50,000 are reserves. The general standard of individual training in the **Syrian** army is considered good. It is largely independent of **Soviet** training assistance except for specific highly advanced training subjects. **Syrian** forces have gained combat experience during operations in **Lebanon** and against **Israel**. Tanks: T-54, T-55, T-62, T-72, T-72M. Artillery: 2S1, 2S3, D-30, M-1931, M-1937, M-1938, M-1943, SS-21 SSM.

## General Air OOB

- Syria has the second largest air OOB in the region behind **Egypt**.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	95	10	255	F

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-29; Close Air: Gazelle, Mi-24, Su-7, Su-22, Su-25; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, SA-11, SA-13, and SA-14 SAMs and AA guns. In addition to 45,000 air force personnel, there are 50,000 personnel in a separate air defense command.

## General Naval OOB

- Syria has the fourth largest naval OOB in the region behind **Egypt**, **Iraq**, and **Iran**.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	3	10	143	E

Ships: 2 Frigates (Ex-**Soviet**) with guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine mortars, depth charges, mines, and radars; SSMs: SS-N-2A; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-**Soviet**) with SSMs, SAMs (Crotale), guns, countermeasures, fire control and radars; 6 Large Patrol Craft; 3 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Reported to have a significant chemical weapons production capability.
- Delivery systems for chemical weapons may include the Soviet-supplied SS-21 missiles.

Syria is reported to have weapons production capability at two factories including capacity for arming Soviet-supplied SS-21 missiles with chemical warheads. No nuclear weapons are suspected.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Armenian, Kurdish, French, English)  
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between Syria and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
51-76	36	9	Dry/Warm

The weather in Syria can be compared to Phoenix, Arizona; summer days are dry and hot with average maximum temperatures above 80 degrees Fahrenheit. From December to March it is quite cold but seldom reaches freezing. Precipitation may reach 30 inches annually along the coast, decreasing to less than 10 inches in the eastern desert area. The rainy season is generally from November to April.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

The topography consists of a coastal zone with a narrow double mountain belt enclosing a depression in the west, deserts, and a much larger eastern plateau.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of Syria are generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The large eastern plateau can generally accommodate cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The northwestern coastal highlands and the area bordering Lebanon however, are basically unsuited due to steep slopes and rough terrain.

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## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, limited to less than 1,000 meters in large parts of the country.

About 75 percent of **Syria** consists of mountainous and rough terrain which would limit line of sight distances to less than 1,000 meters. Only the narrow coastal plain along the **Mediterranean Sea**, the **Euphrates River** valley, and portions of the eastern plateau would accommodate unrestricted visibility beyond 1,000 meters.

## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Good NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
56041 (Baniyas)	2,100	Good

## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons have significant capability.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
SS-21 SSM	120,000	Threat Advantage

## MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available for western **Syria** including the coastal area.

## Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
2	1 C-5 1 C-141B	1/1	1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Damascus International Tiyas	C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

## Ports

- Two moderate size ports with small harbors and depths exceeding 40 feet.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Al Ladhqiyyah Atarus	Small Small	-/46-50 61-65/66-70	31-35 -	Yes -

## Key Installations

It has been reported that there are facilities in **Syria** which are producing chemical weapons. Oil fields are found at **Qarah Shuk** in the northeast near the **Iraqi** border, **Suwaydiyah**, **Remaylan**, **Jubaysah**, **Dayr az Zawr**, **Sharifah**, **Qayrik**, **Wahab**, **Said**, **As Safih**, and **Thaylm**. There have been recent improvements in roads, railroads, ports, electricity, and communications networks.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Damascus	- Fair telecomm currently being improved - 10 Radio stations - 40 TV stations - 1 Satellite station and 1 under construction	27,000 km	1,997 km	2	2	- Crude oil - Refined products	Yes	C

## Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked **MEU**, which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea**, could reach **Syria** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

## NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,043) in **Syria**, NEO conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would present numerous difficulties.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
42	1,043	45 (Damascus)	F





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MEF G-2:  
Telephone:

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STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:  
Telephone:


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STU-III AV 968-6265

DIA DB Desk Code:  
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//  
STU-III AV 243-4315

Embassy Defense Attache:  
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//  
STU-III AV 243-0597




### SUMMARY

For some years, the U.S. has enjoyed a friendly, informal and mutually advantageous relationship with the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). This country has been an important source of petroleum for the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. The U.A.E. is also a significant importer of goods from the U.S. It has moderate sized armed forces compared to other countries in the region and is equipped with fairly modern systems. The U.S., France, and the U.K. are the main suppliers of military equipment to the U.A.E. Expatriates from Oman, Pakistan, and Jordan, are heavily represented in the U.A.E. armed forces along with every other Arab country and India. The U.A.E. however, seeks to place its own citizens in leadership positions.

With an extreme cultural difference, a hot/dry climate, and primarily desert terrain, there would be some difficulties to overcome during U.S. military operations in this country. A major shortfall would be the limited mapping available. Only the northeastern part of the U.A.E. from the Strait of Hormuz to Dubai, and the area around Abu Dhabi have coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps. The country has several major airfields and ports to enable access by strategic airlift and sealift. There are a number of modern key installations in place throughout the country and many more new infrastructure projects are planned. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (5,000).


UNITED ARAB EMIRATES - THREAT SUMMARY



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## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### U.S. Equities in the UAE

Oil revenues have given the U.A.E. one of the highest gross national products in the world. The U.S. share of the U.A.E.'s oil exports is about 5.6 percent. The U.A.E. is also a significant importer of goods from the U.S. Overall U.S. equity in the U.A.E. is high.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	Rating		Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
						\$ Rating	Rating		
762	1,029	862	-	2,653	5,000	4	5	9	High

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## General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers/SP	40	1	111	C

Ground OOB includes 40,000 troops, most of whom are volunteers. A large portion of the army is composed of foreign mercenaries from other Arab states, Pakistan, and the U.K. Tanks: AMX-30; Artillery: M-56 pack howitzer, Mk F-3 155mm SP, ROF 105mm.

## General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	2	1	93	C

Fighter Aircraft: Hawk, Mirage 5AD, Mirage 2,000; Close Air: Alpha Jet, Hunter, Mirage 5AD; Air Defense: Crotale, Rapier, and RBS-70 SAMs and AA guns. This country is seeking and may already have acquired radar and telecommunications equipment for a ground-based air defense system. Negotiations for this equipment have been conducted with the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R.

## General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	2	1	63	C

Ships: None; SSM: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 8 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, SAMs (Crotale), guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 6 Large Patrol Craft; 3 Coastal Patrol Craft.

## Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Persian, English)  
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between the U.A.E. and the U.S.

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## Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
57-100	70	3	Dry/Hot

The **U.A.E.** is largely a hot, dry desert where temperatures in the shade reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit. In the eastern mountains, the climate is cooler with enough rainfall to permit some cultivation.

## General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

## Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

The terrain is mostly desert with a few agricultural areas.

## General Cross-Country Mobility

- Large portions of the **U.A.E.** are suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

It is estimated that over one-half of the **U.A.E.** is suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. This includes the flat, barren coast, the inland plain, and some of the large, virtually uninhabited wasteland which borders on **Saudi Arabia**. In the eastern highlands, tracked and vehicular movement is more restricted and channeled due to the dissected terrain conditions.

## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum, with line of sight distances exceeding 2,000 meters.

Coastal areas of the **U.A.E.** are mainly barren and flat. Inland, the coastal plain gradually gives way to rolling sand dunes which eventually merge into the expansive wasteland called the Empty Quarter. Line of sight distances are considered to exceed 2,000 meters in more than 50 percent of the country.

## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62400/62449	16,100	Fair

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## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- U.S. NGF has an advantage in firepower over U.A.E. coastal defense weapons.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155mm SPG	18,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

## MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

Only the northeastern part of the U.A.E. to Dubai, and the area around Abu Dhabi have coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps.

## Airfields

The U.A.E. is highly accessible by air with more than one airfield capable of accommodating C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
6	2 C-5 4 C-141B	4/2	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Abu Dhabi International	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Al Dhafra Air Base	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Bateen	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Dubai International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Ras al Khaimah International	C-141B, C-130	
Sharjah International	C-141, C-130	

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## Ports

- The **U.A.E.** has several major ports which can handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Khor Al Fakkan	Small	36-40/-	36-40	Yes
Mina Saqr	Small	36-40/-	36-40	Yes
Port Rashid	Small	31-35/31-35	46-50	Yes
Mina Jebel Ali	Medium	Over 76/Over 76	36-40	-
Das	Small	71-75/36-40	16-20	-
Abu Dhabi	Small	31-35/31-35	46-50	Yes

## Key Installations

The emirate of **Abu Dhabi** contains major oil producing facilities including the major **Ruwais** refinery complex and the **Upper Zakum** off-shore oil structure. The **U.A.E.** is planning the construction of a pipeline from the main oil fields in **Abu Dhabi** through **Fujairah** to the **Indian Ocean** to eliminate the need for its oil to pass through the **Strait of Hormuz**. While many modern facilities are in place currently, infrastructure projects such as roads, schools, and hospitals are still planned throughout the **U.A.E.**

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Abu Dhabi	- Adequate telecomm - 11 Radio stations - 12 TV stations - 4 Satellite stations	2,000 km	None	6	6	- Crude oil - Natural gas	Yes	None

## Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** could reach the **U.A.E.** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

## NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (5,000), **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
66	5,000	10 (Abu Dhabi)	F

Note: In **U.A.E.** the following factors are of little significance:

- Drugs
- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC