


NORTH KOREA

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG III MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 635-6910
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2// STU-III AV 477-7323
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C// STU-III AV 243-2491
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-3// STU-III AV 243-0566




SUMMARY


Since 1950, **North Korea** has maintained a large, well-equipped armed force. Overall **U.S.** equity in **North Korea** is low. The **U.S.** maintains no diplomatic representation and conducts no trade with this country. Terrorist attacks by **North Korea** are evidenced by the 1987 bombing of a **South Korean** airliner and the 1983 assassination of **South Korean** officials in **Burma**. **North Korea** has provided training and support to international terrorist groups. It is suspected that **North Korea** supplies large quantities of major weapons to **Iran** as well as other Third World countries. **North Korea** illegally acquired **U.S.**-made Hughes helicopters in order to improve its military posture. The **North Koreans** have one of the largest armed forces in the **Asia/Pacific** region. They reportedly possess stocks of chemical weapons and the means of delivery. **North Korea** rates particular attention by military planners due to its involvement in terrorism, gray arms/technology, chemical weapons development, and its large ground, air, and naval OOBs.

**North Korea's** culture is different from that of the **U.S.** Mountains and hills cover nearly all of the country, with narrow valleys and small plains in between. The climate is temperate with July and August the warmest months. In the winter, snowfall is generally light, but the ground is covered for long periods. Conditions are poor for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters because of the broken terrain, forested areas, and cultivated plains. Hydrographic conditions at some locations along the coast would prevent NGF platforms from providing support for operations ashore. **North Korean** coastal defense weapons would be able to out-gun the standard **U.S.** NGF weapon (5"/54 cal). Mapping is available for the country by older 1:50,000 scale maps, but they may be outdated. More than one airfield and port are considered capable of receiving strategic lift. Key installations may include facilities for the production and storage of chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require in excess of six days to reach **North Korea**.

NORTH KOREA- THREAT SUMMARY



North Korea - 1



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

The 1950 war was never officially ended; only a ceasefire and an armistice were agreed to in 1953. Despite some desire on both sides (**North and South Korea**) for reunification, each maintains a large, well-equipped armed force. **North Korea** wages a terrorist war against **South Korea**, including assassination of Government officials. If full-scale war occurred, the **North Koreans** would most likely use chemical weapons and **South Koreans** might be inclined to respond in kind. The **North Koreans** realize that they would have to win the war quickly. Therefore, any future **Korean** war would probably be massive, bloody, and short unless the **Soviets** or **Chinese** intervene.

U.S. Equities in North Korea

- Overall U.S. equity is low.

The U.S. maintains no representation and conducts no trade with North Korea. Financial and commercial transactions by persons or firms subject to U.S. jurisdiction are prohibited under U.S. law except through special license by the Secretary of the Treasury. The U.S. supports the objective of peaceful reunification of North and South Korea.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	-	-	-	0 0	0	Low

Terrorism

North Korea practices terrorism on its own behalf against South Korea, as illustrated dramatically in November 1987 when two North Korean agents placed bombs aboard a Korean Air flight (KAL 858), causing the loss of the aircraft and all 115 passengers. Prior to that incident, North Korean terrorism had been directed principally against senior South Korean leaders, as evidenced in a 1983 bombing incident in Rangoon in which several South Korean Cabinet ministers died. North Korea also provided training to various international terrorist groups in the 1970s.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

North Korea continues to sell large quantities of major weapons to Iran as well as other Third World countries. It is widely thought that North Korea supplied the mines used by Iran against merchant vessels in 1987. North Korea secretly and illegally acquired 87 U.S.-made Hughes helicopters during 1983-84 in order to improve its military capabilities over South Korea. The U.S. views illegal acquisition of U.S. equipment and technology with concern. The 1983-84 diversion is the subject of an investigation by Federal authorities.

Consolidated Threat

North Korea rates special consideration by military planners due to its involvement in both terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer.

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## General Ground OOB

**North Korea** has the fourth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-62	Bloc	750	15	855	F

Ground OOB consists of 750,000 troops which are mainly conscripts. Recruits enter the army with some basic military training obtained in the youth corps called the Red Militia. During active service they are trained with their units. Officers are either regular or short-service. The regulars receive a longer, more formal course of instruction at a military academy or war college. Advanced training is provided to higher ranking officers. Tanks: T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62; Artillery: D-20, D-30, D-74, M-46, M-1931, M-1937, M-1944, M-1974, M-1975, M-1977, M-1978, M-1981, M-1985, SCUD SSM.

## General Air OOB

**North Korea** has the fourth largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	55	15	200	F

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, MiG-23; Close Air: A-5, MiG-17, MiG-19; Air Defense: HN-5A, SA-2, SA-5, and SA-7 SAMs and AA guns.

## General Naval OOB

**North Korea** has the fourth largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	35	15	180	F

Ships: 2 Frigates with SSMs, guns, antisubmarine mortars, depth charges, mines, and radars; SSMs: SS-N-2A; Patrol Craft: 28 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (18 Ex-Soviet) with SSMs and guns; 135 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 137 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo; 33 Large Patrol Craft (15 Soviet, 6 Ex-Chinese); 10 Coastal Patrol Craft (Soviet).

## Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

It has been alleged that **North Korea** has up to 250 agent tons of lethal offensive chemical weapons now stockpiled. Artillery, rocket, and aerial delivery means for these weapons are suspected. No nuclear weapons are suspected.

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Public Release Approved  
2021 Dated Information

## Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Korean  
Primary religion - Eastern

There is a significant cultural difference between **North Korea** and the **U.S.**

## Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
1-75	-	20-40	Mixed

The climate of **North Korea** is temperate with July and August the warmest months. Rainfall is concentrated in the summer months. January is the coldest month. Snowfall is generally light but the ground is covered for long periods.

## General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

## Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

Mountains and hills cover nearly all the country, with narrow valleys and small plains in between. The northeast coast is the most rugged area.

## General Cross-Country Mobility

- **North Korea** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

- The country is poorly suited for tracked movement, which in the rugged hills and mountains is confined to the existing roads. Tracked vehicles could traverse rice fields when the ground is frozen. This is only possible from early January through mid-February.

## Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

**North Korea's** terrain consists of numerous ranges of moderately high and partially forested mountains and hills separated by deep, narrow valleys and small cultivated plains. The most rugged area is along the northeast coast. These irregular terrain conditions would limit line of sight visibility to under 1,000 meters in most of the country.

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## Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Hydrographic conditions at some locations prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast to provide support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
95043	32,200	Unsatisfactory

## Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
SCUD SSM	80,000	Threat Advantage

## MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage of North Korea by old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

## Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Note: Contact with Headquarters, Military Airlift Command indicated North Korea was not addressed in the Airfield Suitability Report used as a basis for this document due to the classified nature of airfields in that country. However, it was determined that an assumption could be made that North Korea has more than one airfield that could accommodate C-5 aircraft.

## Ports

- Moderate size ports are available to handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Namp O	Small	36-40/36-40	26-30	Yes
Wonsan	Small	41-45/36-40	21-25	-
Hungnam	Small	26-30/26-30	26-30	Yes
Kimchaek	Small	41-45/31-35	31-35	-
Chongjin	Small	31-35/31-35	26-30	Yes
Najin	Small	41-45/31-35	31-35	Yes
Unggi	Small	41-45/31-35	21-25	Yes

**Key Installations**

Facilities may be in operation for the production and storage of chemical weapons. Efforts were made during the 1980s to upgrade the country's infrastructure, especially power plants and transportation facilities.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- 18 Radio stations - 11 TV stations - 1 Satellite station	20,280 km	4,535 km	7	20	- Crude oil	None	C

**Strategic and Tactical Lift**

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach North Korea. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

**NEO**

- It is unlikely that NEO would be conducted by a MEU in North Korea due to the lack of potential evacuees.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	59 (Pyongyang)	B

Note: In North Korea the drug threat is of little significance.

