

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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


SUMMARY

There is potential for renewed conflict between **Taiwan** and the **People's Republic of China (PRC)**. U.S. equity in the **PRC** is high. The two countries conduct bilateral trade and the **U.S.** is the **PRC's** third largest trading partner. With increased normalization, direct **U.S.** investment in the **PRC** has increased significantly. Over 2,500 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country. The **PRC** is a transit point for precursor chemicals and heroin moving to and from the **Golden Triangle**. The **PRC** provides illicit weapons to a number of Third World countries. The **PRC** rates special attention because of its involvement in both drug trafficking and gray arms trade. The **PRC** continues to maintain the largest army, navy, and air force in the **Asia/Pacific** region. Efforts are underway to make the military leaner, and better equipped in the 1990s. The **PRC** may have a chemical weapons production capability and may be expanding its stocks of nuclear weapons.

There is a cultural difference between the **PRC** and the **U.S.** The **PRC** is almost entirely in the temperate zone and has a mixed climate. Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is precluded in most of the country except for the northern desert plains. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally limited to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions prevent NGF ships from coming within range to provide support for operations ashore. When they are able to approach the shore, they would be out-gunned by **Chinese** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to scattered areas throughout the **PRC**. Key installations include facilities for the production and storage of nuclear and chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require between two to four days to reach the **Chinese** coast. **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be very difficult due to over 2,500 potential evacuees and the 124 nautical miles distance to **Beijing**, the most likely evacuation site.


PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA - THREAT SUMMARY



People's Republic of China - 1

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## PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



### Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Potential for renewed conflict between **Taiwan** and the mainland communists.
- **China** has disputes with **India**, the **Soviet Union**, and **Vietnam**.

The 50-year-old **Chinese** civil war is not finished, and both sides maintain significant armed forces. The communists occupy mainland **China**, while the nationalists hold the island of **Taiwan**. Neither side is strong enough to invade the other. However, a major disorder in the **PRC** could bring the nationalists back. The **PRC** also has longstanding disputes with **India**, the **Soviet Union**, and **Vietnam** which could easily erupt into conflict.

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## U.S. Equities in the PRC

- Overall **U.S.** equity is high.

Since normalization occurred in 1979, the **U.S.** has worked toward improved relations with the **PRC** while maintaining informal links with **Taiwan**. The **U.S.** is the **PRC's** third largest trading partner after **Japan** and **Hong Kong**. The **PRC** is the **U.S.'s** 16th largest trading partner. **U.S.** controls on technology and equipment exports to the **PRC** have been gradually liberalized over the past several years and direct **U.S.** investment there has increased. Over 2,500 **U.S.** citizens live in the **PRC**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating		Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
						6	4		
173	3,497	6,911	9	10,590	2,525	6	4	10	High

## Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
		X	X	X

- Transit center for **Golden Triangle** heroin.
- Traffic in precursor chemicals.
- **Hong Kong** is financial and money laundering center.

The **PRC** does not produce significant amounts of illicit narcotics, but **U.S.** officials are increasingly concerned about the transshipment of **Golden Triangle** heroin through the southern **PRC** to **Hong Kong** and traffic in precursor chemicals into the **Triangle**.

**Hong Kong** is both the financial and money laundering center of the **Far East** narcotics trade and an important transit center for **Golden Triangle** heroin destined for **Australia**, **Canada**, the **U.S.**, and **Europe**. **Hong Kong** police, who made record heroin seizures and arrested a number of key traffickers in 1988, believe that as much as half the heroin seized came overland through the **PRC**.

## Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

- Provided arms to **Cambodia's** Khymer Rouge.
- Equipped **Afghanistan's** Mujahideen guerrillas.
- Sold high-technology missiles to **Saudi Arabia**.
- **Hong Kong** is an important transshipment point.

The **PRC's** emerging role as an aggressive arms dealer is a disturbing precedent. The **PRC** is the main provider of arms to **Cambodia's** Khymer Rouge and also equips **Afghanistan's** Mujahideen guerrillas. **Hong Kong** is a transshipment point for gray arms to various locations in **Asia**.

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## Consolidated Threat

The PRC warrants special attention due to its involvement in drug trafficking and gray arms/technology transfer.

## General Ground OOB

The PRC has the largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-54	Bloc	2,300	16	2,386	F

Ground OOB consists of 2,300,000 personnel of which 1,075,000 are conscripts. The training of regular soldiers places great emphasis on the political and psychological aspects of warfare. Soldiers are indoctrinated that political motivation and high morale can enable them to overcome enemies with superior firepower. Military training concentrates on the basic skills. Recruits do much weapons training with rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenades, and mines. Due to shortages of ammunition, live-fire exercises are rare. Physical fitness and personal mobility are stressed. Tactical training concentrates on fieldcraft and small-scale operations; in particular, ambushes, patrols, infiltration, and close assault at night. Map exercises and war games are used to train senior commanders. Tanks: IS-2, T-34, T-54, Type 59, Type 69, Type 69II; Artillery: A wide range of **Soviet** and **Chinese** weapons including HY-2 SSM.

## General Air OOB

The PRC has the largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	400	16	546	F

Fighter Aircraft: **Chinese** versions of the MiG-17, MiG-19, and MiG-21, and Shenyang J-8; Close Air: Tu-16, Il-28, Shenyang J-6; Air Defense: FM-80, HQ-61, SA-2, SA-7 SAMs and AA guns with fire control radars. The PRC has a network of air defense radars which provides surveillance and control and an early warning system for the detection of hostile missiles. Despite some recent improvements, the overall air defense network has major deficiencies such as an outdated C3 system and lack of automation.

## General Naval OOB

The PRC has the largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	340	16	486	F

Ships: 16 Destroyers and 35 Frigates with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: CSS-N-2, Hai Ying 2, C801 Ying-ji Eagle Strike; Patrol Craft: 224 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (**Soviet** and **Chinese**) with SSMs, guns, and radars; 343 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 260 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo; 61 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol; 20 Large Patrol Craft; 5 Coastal Patrol Craft; 80 River Patrol Craft.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Believed to have chemical weapons and numerous delivery systems.
- Reported to be expanding an already large nuclear weapons capability.

The PRC is known to have been a possessor or repository of chemical weapons in the past and reportedly has a current production capability. This country is also suspected to have a variety of means to deliver these weapons, ranging from artillery and rockets to aircraft and missiles. The PRC, as a declared nuclear power, also proceeded with a number of nuclear weapons-related developments in 1988 that suggest no lack of interest in modernizing its nuclear forces. It has been predicted that by 1996 the PRC will have 600 to 700 nuclear warheads.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Chinese  
Primary religion - Eastern

There is a significant cultural difference between the PRC and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
17-81	45-86	4-80	Mixed

The PRC is almost entirely in the temperate zone. Only portions of the southernmost area are within the tropics. The climate is heavily affected by the regional monsoon. Summers are hot and humid while winters are dry and unusually cold. In the summer heavy rains cause frequent floods.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

The PRC is the third largest country in the world in terms of total land area (after the Soviet Union and Canada). Two-thirds of the country is mountainous or semi-desert while only one-tenth is cultivated. Ninety percent of the people live on one-sixth of the land, mainly on the fertile plains and deltas of the east.

### General Cross-Country Mobility

- The **PRC** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The majority of the **PRC** is unsuitable for the cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles due to extensive mountain networks, steep slopes, and plateaus interrupted by deep depressions. Cross-country movement is feasible throughout a northern belt comprised of northern desert plains. Vehicular movement throughout the Central and Southern **PRC** is precluded by mountains, steep slopes, and severely dissected plains.

### Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The greater part of the **PRC** is mountainous, and only in the lower reaches of the **Yellow** and **Yangtze Rivers** are there extensive lower plains. Line of sight distances throughout the central and southern **PRC** are limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the mountains and severely dissected plains. In the desert plains of the northern **PRC** visibilities beyond 1,000 meters would be encountered.

### Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Hydrographic conditions would prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast to provide support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
94004	28,980	Unsatisfactory

### Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
HY-2 SSM	40,000	Threat Advantage

### MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for **Beijing** and the southeast coastal area including **Hong Kong**. There is only spotted coverage elsewhere.

**Airfields**

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields -	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	2 C-5 2 C-141B	3/1	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Baiyun	C-141B, C-130	-
Beijing (Peking Capital)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Beijing (Shenyang)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s and C-141Bs. Daylight/VFR only.
Hongqiao	C-141B, C-130	-

**Ports**

- Ports are available with capabilities to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Hsia Men	Small	41-45/41-45	21-25	Yes
Ching Tao	Medium	26-30/Over 76	31-35	Yes
Chin Huang Tao	Small	26-30/36-40	31-35	Yes
Hu Lu Tao	Small	26-30/26-30	26-30	Yes
Lu Ta	Medium	46-50/31-35	31-35	Yes

**Key Installations**

The PRC is suspected of having facilities for the production and storage of both chemical and nuclear weapons. The PRC is the world's sixth largest producer of oil and has several large oil fields. The country also has an offshore oil exploration program underway. Nuclear power plants are located at **Guangzhou** and **Quinshan** (south of **Shanghai**). A hydropower project has been started which involves plans for construction of the world's largest dam at the **Three Gorges** site on the **Yangtze River**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Beijing	- Fair urban telcomm - 274 Radio stations - 407 TV stations - 3 Domestic satellite systems - 2 International satellite stations	962,800 km	52,500 km	5	4	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	NC

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## Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach the PRC. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

## NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 2,500) and the 124 nautical miles distance to the most likely evacuation site (Beijing), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in the PRC would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
207	2,525	124 (Beijing)	F

Note: In the PRC, terrorism is of little significance.