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SOUTH YEMEN (PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN)

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


SUMMARY

The **U.S.** has no formal diplomatic relationship with **South Yemen** because of the antagonism with which this **Arab** country views the **U.S.** The Government is modeled after the communist regimes of the **Soviet Union** and **Eastern Europe**. **Aden**, the principal city and capital, has served as a major training base for terrorists. **South Yemen** has actively provided weapons, explosives, and safe haven to terrorist groups. It has also reportedly been a transit point for gray arms shipments to other **Middle East** countries. **South Yemen** has moderate size armed forces with much of its equipment being furnished by communist countries. It intends to increase the size of its army to about 40,000 personnel. The **U.S.S.R.**, **East Germany**, **Cuba**, and **North Korea** have sent training missions to **South Yemen**.

Cultural differences, a hot, dry climate, and diverse terrain conditions would pose difficulties to **U.S.** military operations in **South Yemen**. With a mountainous interior and dissected terrain, cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be generally limited to small flat areas along the coastal plain. The geographic conditions also cause the average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) to be limited to less than 1,000 meters. Although NGF ships can approach the coast along the **Gulf of Aden** to provide adequate support for operations ashore, significant opposition could be expected from **South Yemen** coastal defense weapons. Mapping of this country is very limited with 1:50,000 scale maps available only for the city of **Aden**. Airlift accessibility is also limited to one airfield at **Aden** which cannot handle C-5 aircraft. Two moderate size ports are available at **Aden** and **Al Mukalla** to accommodate strategic sealift. In a crisis situation, it is estimated that the **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **South Yemen** in two to four days.


SOUTH YEMEN - THREAT SUMMARY



South Yemen - 1

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SOUTH YEMEN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in South Yemen

The **South Yemen** Government has viewed the **U.S.** with antagonism due to the close **U.S.** relationship with **Saudi Arabia** and what **South Yemen** regards as a pro-**Israel** - **U.S.** policy. The **U.S.** has no formal diplomatic relationships with **South Yemen**. The **United Kingdom**, acts as the protecting power for the **U.S.** in this country. **U.S.** equities in **South Yemen** are rated as low.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	-	-	-	0 0	0	Low

Terrorism

- South Yemen serves as a major terrorist training base.

South Yemen has actively provided weapons, explosives, training, safe passage, and safe haven to terrorist groups. This country continues to play host to a number of **Palestinian** factions, including the Abu Nidal Organization, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of **Palestine**, the Popular Struggle Front, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of **Palestine**.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

South Yemen has been reported to be a transshipment point for gray arms to **Middle East** countries. This country has been involved in the training and equipping of **Middle Eastern** terrorists.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, South Yemen presents a serious threat through involvement in terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-62	Bloc	24	8	122	C

Ground OOB includes about 24,000 troops, most of whom are conscripts. The intention is to increase the size of the army to 40,000. The **U.S.S.R.**, **East Germany**, **Cuba**, and **North Korea** have sent training missions to **South Yemen**. Tanks: T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62; Artillery: BM-25 MRS, D-20, D-30, M-38, M-46.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	3	8	141	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-17, MiG-21; Close Air: Il-28, Mi-24, Su-22; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	Bloc	Bloc	1	8	119	D

Ships: none; SSM: SS-N-2B Styx; Patrol Craft: 5 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-Soviet) with SSMs, guns, and radars; 2 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Ex-Soviet); 2 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol (Ex-Soviet).

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (English)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **South Yemen** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
80-91	60	3	Dry/Hot

The entire country is extremely hot and humid with minimal rainfall.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

A sandy coast rises to mountains which give way to desert sands.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **South Yemen** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The southwestern highlands are poorly suited for cross-country tracked movement due to mountain slopes, dunes, boulder fields, and lava plains. Movement is limited to small flat areas along the coastal plain, and to wadi bottoms.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances generally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The coastal areas of **South Yemen** are sandy and flat while the interior is mainly mountainous and irregular with occasional dunes, boulder deposits, and lava fields. Due to the broken and dissected terrain over more than half the country, line of sight distances would be generally under 1,000 meters.

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Public Release Approved
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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Good capability to approach the coast along the **Gulf of Aden** and provide NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62097/62098	7,320	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant opposition could be expected from coastal defense weapons.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
BM-25 MRS	55,900	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available only for the capital city of **Aden**.

Airfields

- Poor accessibility by air with only one airfield which is not C-5 capable.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-141B	1/0	1/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Aden International	C-141B, C-130	

South Yemen - 5

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Ports

South Yemen has two moderate size ports which can handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Aden	Medium	36-40/36-40	16-20	Yes
Al Mukalla	Small	over 76/56-60	6-10	Yes

Key Installations

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Small telecomm system - 1 Radio station - 5 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	5,800 km	None	2	2	- Refined products	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach South Yemen in less than four days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- With few U.S. citizens in South Yemen and the location of the most likely evacuation site (Aden) on the coast, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	4 (Aden)	A

Note: In South Yemen the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
NBC