


WESTERN HEMISPHERE SUMMARY

The expeditionary environment countries in the **Western Hemisphere** are those that are shaded in gray on the accompanying map. Many of these countries are faced with existing ongoing conflicts and a high likelihood of continued instability in the 1990s. The deliberate sinking of a major vessel in the **Panama Canal** is a possible threat which would be difficult to defend against. As such threats begin to concern policy - makers, the prospects for the employment of **U.S.** forces in the region for preemptive attacks will increase. The war on drugs is developing into a real war and, **Latin America** in particular, offers a "target rich environment" where Marine Corps forces can expect to be on call to aid law enforcement agencies. The most common form of assistance will be wide - area surveillance and interdiction. This challenge will tax to the utmost Marine Corps reconnaissance, intelligence, and communications assets. Terrorism is an unpredictable global threat and **Latin America** has been the location for the greatest number of terrorist events. Terrorists do not have rules of engagement, and they generally cannot be detected until after they have struck. MAGTFs must plan for perimeter security and be able to conduct short notice preemptive raids to divert terrorists or assist in hostage rescue. Gray arms trafficking and technology theft are also possible reasons for employing Marine forces in the 1990s. **Panama**, for example, is a major transshipment site for computer technology enroute from the **U.S.** to **Eastern Europe** and as such could be a likely location for crisis response. Most countries in the **Western Hemisphere** had small-to-medium Orders of Battle (OOBs) capabilities. The countries with the most significant ground OOB resources were **Cuba, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Mexico**. Those with the largest air OOB were **Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru**. **Cuba** again had the region's largest naval OOB. Although these forces are somewhat modest compared to those of other regions, MAGTFs must be prepared to meet some strong opposition in these countries. Overall in the **Western Hemisphere, Peru, Mexico, and Cuba** emerged as representative of general conditions in the geographic region. Such countries would be good candidates for new and refined Marine Corps scenarios. In the area of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) weapons **Latin America** is relatively benign. Only **Cuba** is alleged to have used chemical weapons while operating in Angola. However, these weapons are rapidly proliferating and MAGTFs must be ready to deal with them while operating in any **Third World** country.

In the area of culture (language and religion) most **Western Hemisphere** countries were not found to be greatly different from the **U.S.** MAGTFs with strong **Spanish** language skills can generally communicate without difficulty with the people in the region. For operations in **Latin America** and the **Caribbean**, MAGTFs should be prepared for wet and hot conditions. In this region, over half the countries had significant mountain ranges while **Cuba, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela** were found to have highly urban populations. **Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Surinam** were predominantly jungle. Of the 16 countries in the region that were addressed, 12 were found to be generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. Over 80 percent of the countries have poor intervisibility which precluded exploitation of line of sight weapons designed for engagements at 2,000 to 3,000 meters. In the **Western Hemisphere**, most of the countries have hydrographic conditions which did not prove to be a constraint to delivering Naval Gunfire (NGF) support. Only **Surinam** had unsatisfactory conditions. However, when considering a firepower advantage against the standard 5 inch gun on most **U.S.** Navy platforms, **Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela** have greater coastal defense firepower, while **Honduras and Nicaragua** have an equal capability. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) remains a critical problem area for Marine Corps forces. Only four countries in the region (**Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica**) had full coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps. Most countries such as **Colombia, El Salvador, and Panama** had partial coverage by 1:50,000 maps, while three countries (**Grenada, Mexico, and Surinam**) had none at all. In these latter countries MAGTFs must rely solely on Multispectral Imagery (MSI) to support ground combat operations. In the area of strategic mobility, half the countries in the region had more than one airfield able to accommodate C-5 aircraft. The other half had at least one airfield to receive C-5s. However, nine countries in the region (56 percent) had marginal ports, or none at all to accommodate strategic sealift. From the standpoint of key installations, and associated military targeting, **Cuba** was most relevant due to the possible presence of chemical weapons storage facilities. When looking at sea-based MEU response times, most countries in the region require in excess of six days to be reached. Only **Cuba** and parts of **Mexico** can be arrived at in less time. Despite emphasis in recent years on the importance of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), the study found that these operations would be extremely difficult to execute in 80 percent of the region's countries due primarily to the large number of potential evacuees (mainly **U.S.** citizens). Overall, the **Western Hemisphere** emerged among the most challenging and likely environments for the employment of expeditionary forces in the 1990s. This region is expected to present more opportunities and threats related to drugs and terrorism. It contains an equal mix of two tough types of terrain: mountains and large urban areas. Close combat, defined as engaging the enemy at less than 1,000 meters distant, will be the norm. Strategic air offers some relief against the lack of ready sea-launched forces.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TAB</u>
COLOMBIA	1
COSTA RICA	2
CUBA	3
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	4
EL SALVADOR	5
GRENADA	6
GUATEMALA	7
HAITI	8
HONDURAS	9
JAMAICA	10
MEXICO	11
NICARAGUA	12
PANAMA	13
PERU	14
SURINAME	15
VENEZULA	16

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COLOMBIA

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG I MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 365-9103
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2// STU-III AV 282-3209
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C// STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO BOGOTA CO//DATT// Direct 011-57-1-232-9978




SUMMARY

Colombia is the world's third largest producer of coca and the center of **South American** cocaine trafficking. It is involved in drug production and processing, and the distribution of precursor chemicals. Narco-terrorism is also a serious threat. Terrorist organizations operating in **Colombia** include the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and at least three others. **Colombia** has medium sized ground, air, and naval Order of Battle (OOB) capabilities as compared to other expeditionary environment countries.

A wet/hot climate, mountainous terrain, and high elevation make **Colombia** one of the most difficult countries in **South America** in which to conduct operations. This country is generally unsuited for cross-country movement by tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. There is only partial coverage of this country by 1:50,000 scale maps. This coverage exists for locations such as **Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Punta Chirambira** and the northern coastal area. The 1:50,000 scale maps are not available for the large riverine networks along **Colombia's** borders with **Venezuela** to the northeast and **Peru** to the south. From the standpoint of key installations, **Colombia** has numerous industrial sites plus oil fields and pipelines for crude oil, refined products, and natural gas. The typical response time for a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and move to **Colombia** is in excess of six days. In terms of the potential number of evacuees (over 18,000) and the distance they must be transported (217 nautical miles from off the coast to **Bogota**), the conduct of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) by a MEU would be very difficult. **Colombia** is accessible by air with three C-5 capable airfields (two are daylight only) and has three moderate size ports with **Santa Marta** having the best capabilities.

COLOMBIA - THREAT SUMMARY




Colombia - 1

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COLOMBIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

Killings by guerrillas, death squads, and drug traffickers are common occurrences in **Colombia**. It has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between the different groups. Reports indicate that drug traffickers have laundered over \$5 billion during the past 10 years by using it to purchase real estate, including rural land. Guerrilla groups which operate in rural areas are subsidized by private armies which the drug barons set up to police them. The drug economy is thus a key element in **Colombian** agriculture as well as finances. The country has become accustomed to killings as the **Medellin** and **Call** drug cartels continue to feud among themselves and terrorize government officials.

U.S. Equities in Colombia

Generally, the record of **U.S.-Colombian** relations has been one of constructive cooperation. In recent years the two governments have closely cooperated in narcotics control efforts. Currently several prominent drug traffickers are being extradited from **Colombia** for trial in the **U.S.** **Colombia** is the third ranking trading partner with the **U.S.** in **Latin America**, after **Mexico** and **Venezuela**. There are about 18,000 **U.S.** citizens in **Colombia** and the total **U.S.** equity (direct investment and trade) amounts to over 5 billion dollars.

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Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2,037	1,411	1,737	12	5,197	18,000	5 6	11	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X	X	X		

- Third largest producer of coca.
1988 produced 19,000 - 24,200 metric tons
1987 produced 18,000 - 23,000 metric tons
1986 produced 12,000 - 13,600 metric tons
1985 produced 12,400 metric tons
- Center of **South American** cocaine trafficking.
- Largest producer of marijuana.
1988 produced 5,927 - 9,625 metric tons
1987 produced 3,435 - 7,760 metric tons
1986 produced 2,530 - 3,630 metric tons
1985 produced 2,000 - 4,000 metric tons

Colombia has destroyed more than 90 percent of cannabis growing in traditional northern areas, but traffickers have planted extensively in the **San Lucas Mountains** and south in **Cauca**. Marijuana tonnage increased in 1988 despite an aggressive eradication campaign. Coca cultivation increased above the 1987 level although eradication of 230 hectares was conducted manually. Despite police efforts to harass the **Medellin** cartel and other trafficking groups, large amounts of cocaine continued to flow to the **U.S.**; almost 20 metric tons were seized by **U.S.** Customs. Overall enforcement remains hampered by a judicial system that has been intimidated by violence. Drug profits flow into and out of **Colombia**, but money laundering per se is not a major activity.

Terrorism

Increased efforts against international narcotics trafficking are generating growing, violent reactions from the narcotics traffickers, who often employ the tactics of terror. A marriage of convenience between some traffickers and insurgents occasionally has produced common objectives in **Colombia** where assassination-for-hire arrangements have occurred between narcotics dealers and leftist terrorists.

M-19 is a leftist guerrilla group in **Colombia** with ties to **Cuba**, **Nicaragua**, and **Libya** which carried out nine attacks on international targets in 1988. In late March 1988 the group fired a rocket at the **U.S.** Embassy in **Bogota** to protest **U.S.** troop maneuvers in **Central America**.

Another terrorist group is FARC. It is reputed to be the largest, best-trained and equipped, and most effective insurgent organization in **South America**. Since May 1984, FARC has carried out terrorist actions such as extortion, kidnappings, and killings, as well as armed attacks against military units.

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The National Liberation Army (ELN) is a terrorist group of about 1,000 operating in **Colombia** and supported by **Cuba**. It has most recently concentrated its efforts on attacking petroleum pipelines and facilities, damaging **Colombia's** economic infrastructure and investment climate.

Colombia's democratic institutions are also threatened from terrorist attacks by narcotraffickers. Narcotics-connected violence has recently been intense and designed to intimidate government officials to allow unrestricted pursuit of the narcotics trade.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Colombia** constitutes the most serious threat in the combined areas of narcotics and terrorism.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	69	6	145	D

Ground OOB includes 69,000 troops of whom 25,800 are conscripts. The army has recently reorganized and is among the better counterinsurgency forces in the region. The tank is the M-3A1, and the primary artillery piece is the M-101.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	EW Radar	4	6	80	C

Fighter Aircraft: Kfir C-2; Close Air: AT-33A (light attack), Cessna A-37B, Mirage 5COA, T-37C; Air Defense: Cactus/Crotale SP SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	9	6	95	D

Ships: 4 Frigates with SSMs and SAMs; SSMs: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 2 Fast Attack Craft with guns, fire control, and radars; 3 River Gun Boats; 2 Coastal Patrol Craft; 6 River Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Colombia** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
58-82	56	81	Wet/Hot

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

The wet/hot and humid climate of **Colombia**, combined with significant elevation associated with mountainous terrain, makes operations difficult.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Colombia** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

In about two-thirds of **Colombia**, conditions for cross-country movement are unsuited at all times for tracked vehicles due to steep slopes, dense forest, soft ground, and streams and gullies with wide banks. In the remaining third of the country, much of the tracked movement is limited during the wet season, mid-April through November.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor.

Conditions in about two-thirds of **Colombia** limit line of sight distances to less than 1,000 meters. This is due to the large amount of broken and covered terrain including steep slopes, dense forests, and deep gullies.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Good NGF support for amphibious operations.

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DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
21033/22040	1,610	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-101	11,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for locations such as **Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Punta Chirambira** and the northern coastal area.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
10	3 C-5 4 C-141B 2 C-130 1 None	3/7	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Alfonso Bonilla Aragon (Cali)	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only. Daylight only. Narrow taxiway. The C-5s are limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway Weight Bearing Capacity (WBC), however a weight waiver is possible. Low runway WBC. Daylight/VFR only. Daylight/VFR only.
Ernest Cortesoz (Barranquilla)	C-141B, C-130	
Eldorado International (Bogota)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Polonegro (Bucarãmanga)	C-141B, C-130	
Rafael Nunez (Cartagena, Crespo)	C-141B, C-130	
German Olano Air Base (Palanquero)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Jose Maria Cordova (Rionegro)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Los Garzones (Monteria)	C-130	
Olaya Herrera (Medellin)	None	
Sesquicentenario (San Andres)	C-130	

Ports

Three moderate size ports, with **Santa Marta** being most accessible.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Cartagena	Small	36-40/46-50	36-40	Yes
Barranquilla	Medium	26-30/56-60	31-35	Yes
Santa Marta	Small	Over 76/Over 76	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

Oil fields, industrial centers, and communications networks will make military operations more complex. Oil fields are found in the vicinity of **Santander, Norte de Santander, Putumayo**, and the **Guajira Peninsula**. There are exploratory wells in the eastern part of the country.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Bogota (Colombia's major industrial centers are Barranquilla, Cali, Medellin, and Bogota)	- Radio relay system - Satellite station - 439 Radio stations - 33 TV stations	75,450 km	3,563 km	3	10	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas - Natural gas liquids	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Colombia** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

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NEO

- NEO conducted in **Colombia** by a MEU would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
444	18,000	217 (Bogota)	F


Note: In **Colombia** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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COSTA RICA

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG I MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 365-9103
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2// STU-III AV 282-3209
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C// STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO SAN JOSE CS//DATT// DIRECT 506-20-2375; EMB: 506-20-3939 EXT: 2351/2361




SUMMARY

Costa Rica is a major trading partner with the **U.S.** and shares an interest in promoting democracy in **Central America**. This country is increasingly important as a transit point for narcotics, with estimates that 6 to 12 metric tons of cocaine are being transported through its territory yearly. **Libyan** terrorists are suspected of attacking **U.S.** citizens in **Costa Rica**. The armed forces of **Costa Rica** are practically negligible and this country would be hard pressed to defend itself from outside invasion.


With a hot, humid climate, dissected terrain, and thick ground cover, **U.S.** military operations in **Costa Rica** would prove difficult. A rugged, central massif runs the length of the country separating coastal plains. Trafficability by tracked vehicles would be severely limited and cross-country movement would be feasible only for foot troops. Due to the rough topography and jungle conditions, the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the area around **San Jose**, the northern border with **Nicaragua**, the eastern coast on the **Caribbean**, and the southern border with **Panama**. One airfield is available at **San Jose** to accommodate C-5 aircraft. **Costa Rica** has three small ports, all having limited accessibility to strategic sealift. The estimated response time for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Costa Rica** is in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Costa Rica** would be quite difficult due to the sizeable number (20,000) of potential evacuees.

COSTA RICA - THREAT SUMMARY



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COSTA RICA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Costa Rica

- Shares with the **U.S.** an interest in promoting democracy in **Central America**.

This country shares with the **U.S.** an interest in, and has played an important role in, promoting democracy in **Central America**, including **Nicaragua**. **Costa Rica** is a major trading partner with the **U.S.**; 53 percent of its exports go to the **U.S.**; and 40 percent of its imports come from the **U.S.** The **U.S.** has also responded to **Costa Rica's** economic plight through developmental assistance and humanitarian aid. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Costa Rica** is high.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
120	415	492	159	1,186	20,000	3 6	9	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

- Cocaine transit country.

Costa Rica is increasingly important as a cocaine transit country, with estimates that 6 to 12 metric tons of cocaine are being transported through its territory by air and sea. Authorities remain vigilant to the possibility of labs being established; but no new labs were found in the last two years. Cannabis cultivation appears to be less extensive than previously estimated and the export trade is a minor enterprise.

Terrorism

- Terrorist attacks against **U.S.** citizens.

In April 1988, a bomb exploded near the **U.S.** binational cultural center in **San Jose, Costa Rica** in which several persons were injured. A group with ties to **Libya** was the prime suspect.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Costa Rica** is involved with both narcotics and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
PM	None	None	0	3	33	A

Costa Rica has no army. There is a 9,500 person paramilitary security force which is considered to be well trained and experienced. Tanks: none; Artillery: none.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Costa Rica has no airforce, therefore it has no aircraft or air defense weapons.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	Negligible	3	43	B

Ships: none; SSMs: none; Patrol Craft: 1 Fast Patrol Craft (118 displacement tons); 4 Coastal Patrol Craft; 11 Inshore Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Costa Rica** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
60-77	68	76	Wet/Hot

The climate is tropical in the lowlands and semitropical on the interior plateau.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

A rugged, central massif runs the length of the country separating coastal plains. There is dense ground cover throughout.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Costa Rica** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement would be feasible only for foot troops in most of **Costa Rica** due to rough or steep terrain, dense forests, and marshes and swamps. In limited areas of the country, tracked movement is feasible, but very difficult.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

In most of **Costa Rica**, the terrain is suitable only for light infantry and line of sight distances beyond 500 meters are infrequent. This is due to the rough or steep topography, dense forests, and marshes and swamps.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
21544/21546	1,830	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Negligible coastal defense threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
	0	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists for the area around the capital of **San Jose**, the northern border with **Nicaragua**, the eastern coast on the **Caribbean Sea**, and the southern border with **Panama**.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield at **San Jose** which can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
7	1 C-5 4 C-130 2 None	1/6	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Cabo Velas	None	-
Chacarita (Puntarenas)	None	-
Juan Santamaria International (San Jose)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Las Canas	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Limon International	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Santa Cruz	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Tomas Guardia International (Llano Grande)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

Three small ports are available with limited accessibility to strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Puerto Limon	Small	26-30/31-35	31-35	Yes
Puerto Golfito	Small	31-35/31-35	26-30	-
Puntarenas	Small	-/26-30	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

While primarily an agricultural country **Costa Rica** is gradually improving its infrastructure. Key industrial facilities are located around **San Jose**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
San Jose	- Satellite station - Good telecomm system - Microwave connection - 71 Radio stations - 18 TV stations	15,400 km	800 km	3	7	- Refined products	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Costa Rica** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to the large number (20,000) of potential evacuees.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
54	20,000	35 (San Jose)	F

Note: In **Costa Rica** the following factors are of little significance:

- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- Ground OOB
- Air OOB
- NBC

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CUBA

MEF G-2: CG II MEF//G-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 484-8095

Theater J-2: USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 564-6626

DIA DB Desk Code: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone: STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-5//
Telephone: STU-III AV 243-0619




SUMMARY

The primary U.S. equity in Cuba is the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. U.S. relations with Cuba have suffered in recent years due to its support for violent political change and its plans for expanding revolution in the Caribbean basin. Cuba is located along some of the primary drug routes from South America to the U.S. and has acted as a transit point for narcotics and provided support to traffickers. For nearly 30 years Cuban President Fidel Castro has been instrumental in sponsoring terrorism within Latin America and elsewhere. Cuba maintains close ties with the M-19 insurgent group in Colombia and has helped them acquire arms, training, and supplies. Because of its involvement in drug trafficking, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, Cuba deserves special attention by military planners. This country also has the most experienced and powerful armed forces in Latin America. Most of its military equipment is obtained from the Soviet Union. Cuba reportedly has stocks of chemical weapons and allegedly used these weapons during the recent conflict in Angola.

With a semitropical climate and predominately flat or gently rolling terrain, Cuba would not pose as many problems to U.S. military operations as many other Latin American countries. The country is generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. While U.S. NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide adequate support for operations ashore, they are likely to be out-gunned by Cuban coastal defense weapons. The 1:50,000 scale maps which are available for Cuba may be somewhat outdated. The primary Cuban airfield outside of the U.S. facility at Guantanamo Bay is located at Havana. There are three major ports other than Guantanamo Bay but they have limited capability to handle strategic sealift. The estimated time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to deploy to Cuba is between two and six days.

CUBA - THREAT SUMMARY




Cuba - 1

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CUBA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Cuba

- Naval base at **Guantanamo Bay**.
- Other **U.S.** equities in **Cuba** are low.

The **U.S.** Naval Base at **Guantanamo Bay**, is leased to the **U.S.** and only mutual agreement or **U.S.** abandonment of the area can terminate the lease. Since the **U.S.** broke diplomatic relations with **Cuba** in 1961, **U.S.-Cuban** relations have been characterized by varying degrees of hostility.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	-	-	24	0 1	1	Low

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Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

- Drug transit point and support to traffickers.

Cuba is located on some of the primary drug routes into the **U.S.** and airlift and sealift are reportedly eluding **U.S.** agents by entering **Cuban** territorial waters or airspace. In the past, **U.S.** officials have accused **Cuban** officials of involvement, and indictments were returned against four ranking officials in 1982. **Cuban** authorities have publicly expressed an interest in antidrug cooperation with the **U.S.** but have not elaborated on what kind of cooperation they envision.

Terrorism

- **Cuba** sponsors terrorism in **Latin America** and elsewhere.

For nearly 30 years now, **Cuban** President Fidel Castro has trained and supported guerrillas from many parts of the world, including **Palestinians**, who have relied in part on terrorist operations against noncombatants to advance their political aims. **Cuba** has maintained a large and complex apparatus for subversion that has substantially assisted guerrilla movements throughout **Latin America**, and many of **Latin America's** radical leftist organizations look to Castro for guidance and advice.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Cuba has maintained close ties with the M-19 insurgent group in **Colombia** and has helped them acquire arms, training, and supplies. Arms obtained from external sources were reportedly provided to M-19 guerrillas while they were being trained in **Cuba**. The **U.S.S.R.** has been a primary provider of arms to **Latin American** insurgent groups and has frequently used **Cuba** as a transit point for moving these arms.

Consolidated Threat

Cuba deserves special attention by military planners because of its involvement in all three of the threat categories: drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

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General Ground OOB

- **Cuba** has the largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	145	15	300	E

Ground OOB includes about 145,000 troops which includes 15,000 ready reservists and 60,000 conscripts. There has been a recent increase in **Cuban** overall military strength. This country has the most experienced and powerful military in **Latin America**. Tanks: PT-76, T-54, T-55, T-62, T-72; Artillery: FROG SSM, Guns/howitzers including 76 mm, 85 mm, 122 mm, 130 mm, 152 mm.

General Air OOB

- **Cuba** has the largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	19	15	164	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-19, MiG-21, MiG-23; Close Air: Mi-24, MiG-17, MiG-23BN; Air Defense: SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, SA-13, and SA-14 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- **Cuba** has the largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	14	15	159	E

Ships: 2 Frigates (**Soviet** Koni Class) with SAMs, guns, and antisubmarine mortars; SSM: SS-N-2 Styx; Patrol Craft: 5 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-**Soviet**); 3 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol (Ex-**Soviet**); 9 Fast Attack Craft-Hydrofoil (Ex-**Soviet**), 2 Large Patrol Craft (Ex-**Soviet**).

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- The **Soviets** have reportedly supplied chemical weapons to **Cuba** since 1970.
- **Cuba** is alleged to have used chemical weapons in **Angola**.

Reports have indicated that **Soviet**-supplied chemical weapons similar to "yellow-rain" have existed in **Cuba** since 1970. **Cuba** is alleged to have used chemical weapons in **Angola**. Two nuclear power reactors are under construction. No nuclear weapons are suspected.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Cuba** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
70-84	63	48	Mixed

Cuba is in the tradewind belt, making its climate generally semitropical.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

Cuba is the largest island in the **West Indies**. About three-fifths of the country is flat or gently rolling with many wide, fertile valleys or plains. The remaining two-fifths is mountainous or hilly. About 70 percent of the population is urban.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Cuba** is generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement of vehicles would be feasible in most of **Cuba**. In some areas--on the low plains bordering some coastal zones, in dense forests, and in steep and rougher terrain--movement would be precluded most of the year.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Line of sight visibility is generally restricted to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

While more than half of the country is flat, there is forest and savanna over roughly two-thirds of the land area. It is estimated that line of sight distances of between 1,000 and 2,000 meters can be found in many coastal and inland locations.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

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DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
27083/27084	1,830	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal defense weapons.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
FROG SSM	70,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage with old 1:50,000 scale map.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
3	1 C-5 1 C-141B 1 C-130	1/2	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
McCalla Field (Guantanamo Bay) Guantanamo Bay Naval Air Station	C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.
Jose Marti International (Havana)	C-141B, C-130	-

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Ports

- Three moderate size ports with limited capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
La Habana	Medium	36-40/31-35	36-40	Yes
Caibarien	Small	26-30/31-35	6-10	-
Cienfuegos	Medium	26-30/26-30	26-30	-

Key Installations

There are suspected storage facilities for chemical weapons in **Cuba**, probably in the vicinity of **Havana**. Two nuclear power reactors are being built.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None (U.S. Interests Section is in the Swiss Embassy in Havana)	- Satellite ground station - 148 Radio stations - 52 TV stations	21,000 km	14,921 km	3	3	None	None	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Cuba** is between two and six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Based on the small number of potential evacuees (24) and the short distance to the probable evacuation site (Havana), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would not be difficult. (This does not address NEO at the **Guantanamo Bay** Naval Base.)

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	24	0 (Havana)	D

TAB WH 4

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG II MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 484-8095
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J-2// STU-III AV 564-6626
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C// STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO SANTO DOMINGO DR//DATT// EMB SWITCH: (809) 541-2171, EXT 220/ 221; DIRECT: (809) 687-5222




SUMMARY

The **Dominican Republic** is geographically the largest and most populous democratic country in the **Caribbean**. It associates closely with the **U.S.** and other states of the inter-**American** system. **U.S.** firms account for nearly all foreign private investment in the **Dominican Republic** and bilateral trade is important to both countries. Because of numerous small airfields and ports, the **Dominican Republic** has become a favored staging area and refueling stop for narcotics traffickers from **South America** smuggling cocaine into the **U.S.** Although the armed forces are relatively modest, they are well trained and equipped to fight internal guerrilla movements.

A maritime tropical climate and mountainous terrain with dense ground cover would pose some problems for **U.S.** military operations in this country. A mountain range with some high elevations crosses the middle of the country. The rough terrain makes conditions generally unsuitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. Likewise, the broken terrain, dense forests, and frequent heavy rainfall causes the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to be less than 1,000 meters. The 1:50,000 scale maps which are available for the **Dominican Republic** may be somewhat outdated. While several C-5 capable airfields are available in this country, the four major ports have restricted capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift. The estimated time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to the **Dominican Republic** is in excess of six days. With an approximate number of evacuees that could reach 69,000, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in this country would require an extraordinary effort.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - THREAT SUMMARY




Dominican Republic - 1

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in the Dominican Republic

- The **Dominican Republic** is a country friendly to the **U.S.**, strategically located in the **Caribbean**.

This country is geographically the largest and most populous democracy in the **Caribbean**. It shares the island of **Hispaniola** with **Haiti**. The **Dominican Republic** maintains cordial relations with the **U.S.** It is located near **Cuba**, as well as astride major shipping lanes between the **Gulf of Mexico** and **Europe**. Bilateral trade is important to both countries, and **U.S.** firms account for nearly all foreign private investment in the **Dominican Republic**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
86	1,142	1,217	62	2,507	69,000	4 6	10	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

- Staging area and refueling site for cocaine traffickers.

The **Dominican Republic** has become an ideal staging area and refueling stop for traffickers smuggling cocaine into the **U.S.** Some marijuana is also transhipped by traffickers, who are attracted by the island's 63 airstrips.

Consolidated Threat

In the region of **Latin America**, the **Dominican Republic** is involved only in the drug threat.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	13	1	84	B

Ground OOB includes about 13,000 volunteers. The army is well trained and equipped to fight internal guerrilla movements. Tanks: AMX-13, M-41A1; Artillery: M-101.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	Props	Early AAA	5	1	36	B

Fighter Aircraft: P51D, T-34B; Close Air: T-28D; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Frigate	None	Lg Gun Boats	15	1	56	C

Ships: 1 Frigate and 5 Corvettes with guns and radars; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 7 Large Patrol Craft; 8 Coastal Patrol Craft.

L-20

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish (French and English)

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between the **Dominican Republic** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
77-86	64	56	Mixed

The **Dominican Republic** has a maritime tropical climate. Ocean currents and year-round trade winds moderate the heat of the tropics.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

A mountain range with the highest peaks in the **Caribbean** crosses the middle of the country. The **Cibao**, a large fertile valley to the north is a major agricultural area.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- The **Dominican Republic** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Conditions for tracked movement are perennially unsuited in about 80 percent of the country due to steep hills and mountains, severely dissected plains, dense forests, and swamps and marshes. In the remainder of the country--chiefly the nearly flat rolling plains in the southeast, and in the valleys of the **Rio Camu** and **Rio Yaque de Norte**--conditions are fair, but may preclude movement during the wet season.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances generally less than 1,000 meters.

A large part of the **Dominican Republic** consists of mountains, rough plains, dense ground cover, and swamps with thick growth. These terrain conditions plus the heavy rainfall would limit line of sight distances to under 1,000 meters in practically all of the country except for the nearly flat rolling plains in the southeast.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
25848	732	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-101	11,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage with old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
10	3 C-5 4 C-130 3 None	1/9	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Arroyo Barril (Samana City)	None	-
Barahma	None	-
Cabo Rojo	None	-
Cibao International (Santiago)	C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Constanza Air Base	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
De Las Americas International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
La Romana	C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Puerto Plata International (La Union)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Narrow taxiway for C-5s.
Punta Cana	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
San Isidro Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.

Ports

- Four ports with restricted capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Santa Domingo	Small	31-35/36-40	31-35	Yes
Rio Haina	Small	36-40/-	36-40	Yes
Barahona	Small	31-35/41-45	31-35	Yes
Cabo Rojo	Small	31-35/41-45	31-35	-

Key Installations

Communications, transportation, and industrial facilities are relatively numerous and gradually improving.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Santo Domingo	- Good telecomm systems - 123 Radio stations - 18 TV stations - Satellite stations	12,000 km	1,655 km	4	10	- Crude oil - Refined products	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to the Dominican Republic is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the very large number of potential evacuees in the Dominican Republic (69,000), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be complex and require additional support.


Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
30	69,000	0 (Santo Domingo)	F

Note: In the Dominican Republic the following factors are of little significance:

- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC

TAB 2.4.5

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Right-wing death squads are financed by wealthy exiles.
- Left-wing guerrillas supported by **Cuba** and **Nicaragua** conduct raids.
- **U.S.** backed Government forces battle both factions.

Land reform has been a central issue. The Government developed a strong land-reform policy, but its implementation has been sporadic and right-wing critics have tried to stop the program. Moderates in **El Salvador**, those who have not fled or been slain, press for a centrist "government of national reconciliation" that would try to incorporate all but the most extreme political elements. This is almost as impossible as trying to stop the right-wing death squads and the left-wing guerrilla raids and terror bombings. The Government is trying to convince the peasants that reform is progressing, to stop left- and right-wing violence, and to ensure continued **U.S.** support. The Government also claims that putting an end to outside support for left- and right-wing violence is beyond its means. Right-wing death squads are financed by wealthy exiles living in **Miami** and elsewhere. The left is supplied by **Nicaragua** and **Cuba**.

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The right wing wants to roll back land reform. Assassination and terror are its tactical methods. The right wing says that labor organizers and clergy who talk about the health needs of peasants are just troublemakers. It argues that the old patriarchal system provided stability.

Left-wing rebels plan to remain in the field. They will continue hitting isolated army posts, seizing and holding villages until the army responds, then engaging Government main-force units when such units are vulnerable. Urban hit-and-run raids and economic disruption also play a part in their strategy. The rebels dynamite electric generators, bridges, and railroads, damaging the economy. Shooting up buses and trucks further weakens the transportation-and-distribution networks. And the right-wing rebels have no monopoly on terror. Assassination of key opponents remains a classic revolutionary tool; the ideal is to shift the blame to someone else.

U.S. Equities in El Salvador

- Non-communist Government which is trying to promote democracy in the region.

U.S.-Salvadoran relations have traditionally been cordial and close. The **U.S.** provides assistance to the **Salvadoran** Government in its effort to build democratic institutions and promote stability in the **Central American** region.

The **U.S.** receives 46 percent of **El Salvador's** exports and provides 32 percent of its imports.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
13	352	354	414	1,133	51	3 1	4	Low

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

El Salvador has been reported to be a transit point for cocaine enroute to the **U.S.** from **South America**.

Terrorism

- FMLN operates in this country sponsored by **Cuba, Nicaragua, U.S.S.R., and Vietnam.**

The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) is a Marxist-Leninist group supported by **Cuba, Nicaragua, the U.S.S.R, and Vietnam** which operates against the Government of **El Salvador**. In 1988, the FMLN stated its intention to increase terrorism in the capital of **San Salvador** and have since carried through with this intention. The guerrillas have warned that **U.S.** personnel would be targeted and there have been a number of terrorist incidents against **U.S.** facilities.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere, El Salvador** constitutes a serious threat in the combined areas of narcotics and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Rog/Exp	LAV	Howitzers	39	8	127	C

Ground OOB includes about 39,000 troops which includes some conscripts. The U.S. provides training and support which has improved capabilities against insurgents. Tanks: AMX-13, M-3; Artillery: M-101, M-102, M-114.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	EW Radar	2	8	80	C

Fighter Aircraft: Super Mystere; Close Air: Cessna A-37, Magister; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	2	8	50	C

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 3 Large Gun Boats (100 displacement tons); 8 Small Gun Boats; 20 Small Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **El Salvador** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
64-90	56	70	Wet/Hot

The climate of **El Salvador** is semitropical with distinct wet and dry seasons.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Mountains separate the country into three regions: the southern coastal belt; central valleys and plateaus; and northern mountains.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- El Salvador is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be impractical in most of El Salvador. Steep hills and mountains, very rough lava flows, and mangrove swamps would preclude vehicular movement at all times in about 70 percent of the country.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances generally less than 1,000 meters.

Steep hills and mountains, frequent lava flows, and covered mangrove swamps preclude line of sight distances beyond 1,000 meters over most of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
21520/21524	1,000	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-114	14,600	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available for most of **El Salvador** except for parts of its northern border with **Honduras**.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield at **San Salvador (Cuscatlan)** which can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
12	1 C-5 1 C-141B 4 C-130 6 None	1/11	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Cangrejera	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Casas Nuevas (La Carrera)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
El Obrajuelo	None	-
El Papalon	None	-
San Salvador International (Cuscatlan)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
El Triunfo	None	-
Golfito	None	-
Hacienda La Mesitas	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Hacienda Madre Sal	None	-
Ilopango (San Salvador)	C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight only.
Laguna de Maquigue	None	-
Tamarindo	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

El Salvador has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift.

Key Installations

With numerous economic and financial problems, communications, transportation, and industrial facilities in **EI Salvador** remain austere.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
San Salvador	- Radio relay system - Microwave connection - 79 Radio stations - 5 TV stations	10,000 km	602 km	0	12	None	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **EI Salvador** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Based on the few number of potential evacuees (131) and the short distance (177 nautical miles) to the likely evacuation site (**San Salvador**), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
80	51	17 (San Salvador)	C


Note: In **EI Salvador** the following factors are of little significance:

- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC

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GRENADA

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG II MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 484-8095
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J-2// STU-III AV 564-6626
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C// STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-5// STU-III AV 243-0619




SUMMARY

The island of **Grenada** is strategically located adjacent to sea lanes off the coast of **South America**. This country can be an influence in the region without the risks and costs of continental involvement. In October 1983 a joint **U.S.-Caribbean** force landed in **Grenada** after a breakdown in civil order to evacuate **U.S.** citizens and help restore the peace. A **U.S.** Agency for International Development (AID) mission assists the **Grenadian** Government in its reconstruction and development efforts. The security in **Grenada** is maintained by the Royal **Grenada** Police Force which includes an 80-man paramilitary unit and a 30-man Coast Guard. The **U.S.** Army and Coast Guard provide periodic training for these forces.

Grenada is a volcanic island with a central mountainous rain forest and tropical climate. While cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is generally feasible on the cultivated coastal plains, it would not be possible in the heavily forested ridges of the interior. The broken terrain, thick ground cover, and frequent heavy rainfall would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available for **Grenada**. The **Point Salines** International Airport can handle C-5 aircraft and the port at **St. George** can readily accommodate strategic sealift. Major infrastructure improvement involve the upgrading of road, electricity, and communications systems. The estimated time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to **Grenada** is in excess of six days. Due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,020), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Grenada** would be difficult.

GRENADA - THREAT SUMMARY




Grenada - 1

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GRENADA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Grenada

- Strategic location in the **Caribbean**.

This island is strategically located near a vital region. The power that controls it can be commercially, politically, and militarily active without the greater costs and risks of continental involvement.

A **U.S.** AID mission assists the **Grenadian** Government in its reconstruction and development efforts. In the area of trade, 27 percent of **Grenada's** exports go to the **U.S.** while 20 percent of its imports are provided by the **U.S.**

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
1	14	9	5	29	1,000	1 3	4	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/NoTR	None	None	0	0	0	A

Grenada has no army but does have a security force, consisting of 80 personnel, receives **U.S.** training and equipment. In addition, the country has a 550-man police force. Tanks: none; Artillery: none.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Sm Gun Boats	Negligible	0	30	A

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 3 Small Gun Boats, 3 Speed Boats.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - English
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a very small cultural difference between **Grenada** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
70-84	High	60-150	Wet/Hot

Tropical hot, humid climate.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

Grenada is a volcanic island with a central mountainous rain forest.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Grenada** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Tracked movement is generally feasible on the cultivated coastal plains. The heavily forested ridges in the interior would limit tracked movement.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

A verdant rain forest covers the center of the island while a mountain ridge forms a spine down the length of the island. Rainfall is frequent, particularly in the mountains. It is estimated that line of sight distances up to 1,000 meters would be feasible only on the cultivated coastal plains. The heavily forested and rugged terrain in the interior would severely limit the employment of armor and antiarmor weapons.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
25400/25481	2,415	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
-	0	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage is not available for **Grenada**.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
2	1 C-5 1 C-130	0/2	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Pearls Point Salines International (Salines)	C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- One port with adequate capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
St. George	Small	41-45/41-45	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

Well financed public works projects have improved development and produced a number of modern communications and transportation facilities.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
St. George	- Automatic telecomm - External comm links - 1 Radio station - 1 TV station	1,000 km	None	1	2	None	None	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to Grenada is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by MEU under normal conditions in Grenada would be difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,020).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
20	1,000	0 (St. George)	F

Note: In Grenada the following factors are of little significance:

- Drugs
- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- Ground, Air, and Naval OOB
- NBC

GUATEMALA

MEF G-2: CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 282-3209

DIA DB Desk Code: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone: STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache: USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT//DATT//
Telephone: 311541, EXT 221/222; DIRECT
011-502-2-317804




SUMMARY

In **Guatemala**, there are continuing domestic, economic, and social problems as well as human rights violations. The **Guatemalan** Government conducts ongoing counterinsurgency operations against communist guerrillas. Relations between the **U.S.** and **Guatemala** have been good and the **U.S.** has helped this country address many of its problems. The **U.S.** exports oil from **Guatemala** and strives to maintain a mutually beneficial trade relationship. **Guatemala** produces a relatively small amount of opium and marijuana and acts as a transit point for cocaine moving to the **U.S.** and precursor chemicals being shipped to **South America**. The URNG is a terrorist group sponsored by **Cuba** which operates in **Guatemala** to promote disorder and instability. Within the region, close attention should be payed to **Guatemala** by military planners due to its involvement in both drug trafficking and terrorism. This country has a moderate sized army, but a small air force and navy. Some military personnel receive training in the **U.S.** and other countries in the region.


Most of the country is mountainous with a fairly narrow coastal plain on the **Pacific** side and fertile river valleys bordering the **Caribbean**. The climate is temperate in the highlands and semitropical on the coasts. Due to the mountainous terrain, **Guatemala** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The geography, together with frequent heavy rainfall, normally limits the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is available for most of **Guatemala** except for the northern extension called the Department of Peten. While more than one airfield is available to handle C-5 aircraft, only one port, with limited capability, can accommodate strategic sealift. Key installations include oil fields in the **Rubelsanto** area. The estimated time for an east coast MEU to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to **Guatemala** is in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Guatemala** would be very difficult due to the 6,500 potential evacuees.

GUATEMALA - THREAT SUMMARY



Guatemala - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Ongoing counterinsurgency operations against communist guerrillas.
- Unresolved domestic, economic, and social problems.

Since the early 1960s, the Government of **Guatemala** has been engaged in counterinsurgency operations against Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. The insurgency lost considerable ground in the late seventies, but has begun to revive, due partially to a rising level of unrest in **Central America**, but primarily to unresolved domestic, economic, and social problems.

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U.S. Equities in Guatemala

- Support for regional peace efforts.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is moderate.

Relations between the **U.S.** and **Guatemala** traditionally have been good. **Guatemala's** major diplomatic interests are related to regional security issues, and it has been an active participant in the Contadora process.

In the area of trade, the **U.S.** receives about 35 percent of **Guatemala's** exports which includes crude petroleum, coffee, sugar, and bananas. The **U.S.** provides about 37 percent of **Guatemala's** imports consisting mainly of agricultural chemicals, machinery, trucks, buses, aircraft, food products, and textiles.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating		Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
							Rating		
123	407	350	156	1,036	6,500	3	5	8	Medium

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X		X		X

- Producer of opium and marijuana.
- Transit point for cocaine and precursor chemicals.

Guatemala increased in importance to the **U.S.** drug situation as larger amounts of opium and marijuana were produced during the past year. **U.S.** officials estimate that as much as 150 kilograms of heroin are smuggled into the **U.S.**, probably under control of **Mexican** traffickers. **Guatemala** is also important to the cocaine trade, serving as a transit point for narcotics headed for **Florida, Louisiana, and Texas** and for precursor chemicals destined for **South America**.

Terrorism

The **Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)** is a terrorist organization sponsored by **Cuba** which operates in rural **Guatemala**. The URNG is anti-**U.S.** and has conducted assassinations of civilians and economic sabotage as well as attacks against the **Guatemalan Army**.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Guatemala** is involved in the two threat areas of narcotics and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	40	1	111	C

Ground OOB includes about 40,000 regular troops. About 75 percent of army personnel are long-service volunteers. Officers are sent to army schools in the U.S. and other countries. Military pay is inadequate and personnel are allowed to obtain other means of income. Tanks: AMX-13, M-3, M-41A3; Artillery: 75 mm, 105 mm.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	Early AAA	1	1	52	B

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	1	1	42	B

Ships: none; SSMs: none; Patrol Craft: 1 Large Gun Boat; 7 Small Gun Boats.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish (Maya)

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Guatemala** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
58-78	65	52	Mixed

The climate is temperate in the highlands and semitropical on the coasts.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

The terrain is mostly mountainous. The **Pacific** plain is a fairly narrow belt between the mountains and ocean while the **Caribbean** lowlands have fertile river valleys.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Guatemala** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement of vehicles would be precluded in about 90 percent of the country, as well as in the rest of the country during seasonal rains. Some tracked movement would be feasible in scrub-covered and cultivated areas along the **Pacific** coast.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Guatemala is mainly mountainous with much ground cover. Rainfall which would obscure visibility is heaviest from May to October with up to 200 inches accumulated in a year. Along the **Caribbean** coast, however, rainfall is frequent throughout the year. Line of sight distances are expected to be less than 1,000 meters over about 90 percent of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
21510	3,220	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-101	11,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available for large parts of the country except for the sparsely populated Department of Peten in the north.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
3	2 C-5 1 C-130	1/2	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
La Aurora (Guatemala City)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Puerto Barrios	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Santa Elena	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

One small port is available with limited capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Santo Tomas	Small	26-30/26-30	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

Primary oil fields in **Guatemala** are located at **Rubelsanto**. Recent development of its hydroelectric resources has made **Guatemala** self-sufficient in electrical energy.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Guatemala City	- Satellite station - Fairly good telecomm - 104 Radio stations - 24 TV stations - Microwave connection	26,429 km	870 km	1	3	- Crude oil	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Guatemala** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Guatemala** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (6,500).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
48	6,500	43 (Guatemala City)	F

Note: In **Guatemala** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

3/10/21

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HAITI

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DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C// STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO PORT AU PRINCE HA//DATT// DIRECT 011-509-1-29397 EMB SWITCH 011-509-1-20200/20368, EXT 236/237




SUMMARY

Haiti is one of the most underdeveloped and repressed states in the **Western Hemisphere**. Government instability and human rights violations have prevailed through numerous regimes. The U.S. has sought to foster constructive and cooperative relations with Haiti which occupies an important location on the western third of the island of **Hispaniola** in the **Caribbean Sea**. While U.S. equity in Haiti is not high, about 6,000 U.S. citizens reside in the country and a bilateral trade relationship is maintained. Haiti is being used increasingly as a transshipment center for cocaine moving to the U.S. from **South America**. It has a small, poorly trained and equipped armed force. Military officers are frequently involved in corruption and attempts to overthrow the government.


Haiti consists of rough, mountainous terrain and has a generally semiarid climate. Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would not be possible in most of the country due to the broken terrain, swamps, and marshes. The geography and significant ground cover also limits the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage of this country by older 1:50,000 scale maps is likely to be outdated. **Port-au-Prince** International Airport is able to accommodate C-5 aircraft but the single major port, also at **Port-au-Prince**, has restricted capability to receive strategic sealift. The estimated response time for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and move to Haiti is in excess of six days. Due to the potential requirement to evacuate about 6,000 persons from Haiti, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

HAITI - THREAT SUMMARY



Haiti - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Poorest and most repressed state in the Americas.
- Government instability and human rights violations prevail.

Haiti remains one of the poorest countries in the world, suffering shortages of most resources as well as the skilled labor needed for instituting reform. Haiti's recent history was marked by the strong and autocratic rule of the late President Francois Duvalier, and to a lesser extent his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier. Since the younger Duvalier relinquished power in 1986, there has been even greater Government instability and a series of coups or attempted coups. The Government's human rights record has recently come under increasing criticism. Also, the Tontons Macoutes, a former presidential security force, remains a source of potential violence. Cuban activities against Haiti are noteworthy, particularly since the Cuban ouster from Grenada.

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U.S. Equities In Haiti

- Haiti is a non-communist country strategically located in the Caribbean.
- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

U.S. policy seeks to foster constructive and cooperative relations with Haiti, which occupies a strategic location on the western third of the island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean Sea. Although poor and underdeveloped, Haiti is presently transitioning to democracy and has no strong ties with communist countries.

The U.S. purchases about 75 percent of Haiti's exports. Some 60 percent of Haitian imports come from the U.S., including machinery, food products, petroleum, and cotton textiles. The U.S. Agency for International Development provides assistance to Haiti.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating		Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
						1	5		
24	204	145	92	465	6,000	1	5	6	Medium

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

- The weak, unstable Government of Haiti is unable to control drug trafficking and transshipment.

Haiti improved its drug interdiction efforts in 1988, despite two coups and four Governments. Seizures increased substantially in 1988, thanks in part to a new Center for Information and Coordination at Port au Prince airport, but the volume of trafficking remains beyond the capability of the narcotics police. U.S. enforcement agencies are concerned that the uncertain situation in Haiti and lack of strong control by the central Government has led to the increasing use of Haitian waters and Haitian-registered vehicles for the transshipment of cocaine. Although corruption remains a problem, the Government did remove from service a number of military officers suspected of involvement.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	7	0	77	B

Ground OOB consists of about 7,000 volunteers. The army has many roles including internal security, fire-fighting, and immigration. Training in the armed forces is marginal. Tanks: M-5A1; Artillery: 75 mm, 105 mm.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	Props	Early AAA	Negligible	0	30	B

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: Cessna 0-2A (COIN); Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	Negligible	0	40	B

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 1 Large Gun Boat (860 displacement tons); 11 Small Coastal Patrol Craft; 2 Small Harbor Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - French (Creole)
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between Haiti and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-88	49	53	Mixed

Although in the tropics, Haiti is generally semiarid due to the mountains between Haiti and the Dominican Republic that cut off the moist trade winds.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

About two thirds of the country is rough, mountainous terrain.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Haiti is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be infeasible in most of Haiti due to steep hills and mountains, roughly dissected plains, and swamps and marshes. Conditions are fair for tracked movement along the coast plains.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Most of Haiti consists of rough, mountainous terrain which would severely limit line of sight distances for the employment of extended range direct-fire weapons. Along the coastal plains occasional line of sight distances may be possible up to 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
26100/26190	5,635	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-101	11,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage with old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
3	1 C-5 2 None	0/3	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Bowen Field	None	-
Cap Haitien	None	-
Port-au-Prince International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Narrow runway for C-5.

Ports

One small port is available with limited capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Port au Prince	Small	26-30/31-35	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

Most of Haiti's communications and transportation facilities are barely adequate. Although outside agencies such as the U.S. AID provides assistance, infrastructure development progresses very slowly.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Port-au-Prince	- Barely adequate telecomm - 30 Radio stations - 4 TV stations - Satellite station	4,000 km	40 km	1	3	None	None	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to Haiti is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Haiti would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (6,000).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
35	6,000	0 (Port-au-Prince)	F

Note: In Haiti the following factors are of little significance:

Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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HONDURAS

MEF G-2: CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 282-3209

DIA DB Desk Code: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone: STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache: USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO//DATT//
Telephone: 504-31-2906




SUMMARY

Honduras feels threatened by the conflict in **El Salvador** and by potential further aggression and hostility of the **Nicaraguan Sandinistas**. It is the least developed country in **Central America** and faces serious economic and social problems. The **U.S.** and **Honduras** maintain close, cordial relations and work together to promote stability in the region. With moderate overall equity in **Honduras**, the **U.S.** supplies about 35 percent of the country's imports and buys more than half its exports. About 3,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Honduras**. In recent years, **Honduras** has been a transit point for **Colombian** cocaine moving to the **U.S.** Several terrorist groups sponsored by **Cuba** and the **Nicaraguan Sandinistas** operate in **Honduras** to promote disorder and instability. **Honduras** has a small armed force which in the past has been poorly trained but recently seems to be improving. In response to the threat of insurgency, **Honduras** has concentrated on building a mobile deterrent force with a strong counterterrorism capability.

With a hot, humid climate, mountainous terrain, and heavy vegetation, **Honduras** would pose some difficulties for **U.S.** military operations. These conditions would preclude cross-country movement of tracked vehicles in most of the country. The steep hills and mountains, dense forests, and frequent abundant rainfall would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. While the hydrography would permit NGF platforms to approach the coast and provide adequate support for operations ashore, **Honduras** coastal defense weapons would present a significant threat. A serious shortfall for military operations would be the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage for eastern **Honduras** and the border area with **El Salvador**. Three airfields are available to handle C-5 aircraft but there is only one major port with limited capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift. By modern standards, communications and ground transportation facilities in **Honduras** are generally poor. The response time for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coast to embark on amphibious ships and proceed to **Honduras** is estimated to be in excess of six days. Due to the large number of potential evacuees (3,000), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Honduras** would be very difficult.


HONDURAS - THREAT SUMMARY



Honduras - 1

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HONDURAS - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Low-level insurgency with potential for growth.
- Severe economic problems and social unrest.

This country feels threatened by the leftist insurgency in **El Salvador** and by aggression and hostility of the **Nicaraguan** Sandinistas. The present low-level conflict has great potential for growth in this country with a new, unstable democratic Government, and serious economic and social problems.

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U.S. Equities in Honduras

- Supports **U.S.** policy towards **Nicaragua**.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is moderate.

This country speaks forcefully on the need for democracy and internal dialogue within **Nicaragua** and has been a strong supporter of **U.S.** policy toward **Nicaragua**.

The **U.S.** has traditionally been **Honduras's** most important trading partner supplying 30 to 40 percent of the country's imports and buying more than half of its exports. Also, significant amounts of economic aid are provided to this country by the **U.S.** About 3,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Honduras**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating		Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
							Rating		
79	543	479	205	1,306	3,000	3	4	7	Medium

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

Honduras is a transshipment point for **Colombian** cocaine moving to the **U.S.**

Terrorism

- Several terrorist groups supported by **Cuba** and the **Nicaraguan** Sandinistas operate in **Honduras**.

The number of leftist guerrilla groups, most of which were supported by **Cuba** and **Nicaragua** and assisted by guerrilla insurgents in **El Salvador**, were active in **Honduras** in 1988. There was a perceptible increase in terrorist attacks over the previous year.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Honduras** is involved in the two threat areas of narcotics and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	LAV	Howitzers	15	1	56	A

Ground OOB consists of 15,400 troops of which 11,000 are conscripts. Training in the past has been poor but now seems to be improving. Tanks: Scimitar, Scorpion; Artillery: M-101, M-102, M-198.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	Early AAA	2	1	53	B

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E; Close Air: Cessna A-37B; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	1	1	42	B

Ships: none; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 3 Large Fast Patrol Craft; 9 Small Coastal Patrol Craft; 8 Small River Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Honduras** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-88	High	96	Wet/Hot

The climate is generally subtropical but varies considerably with elevation.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Honduras is bisected by mountain ranges that run north to south in the western part of the country and tropical lowlands lie along both coasts.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Honduras** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be feasible in most of **Honduras**. In more than 75 percent of the country, movement would be precluded by steep hills and mountains, dense forests, and perennially wet ground.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances of less than 1,000 meters would be encountered in over 75 percent of **Honduras** due to steep hills and mountains, dense forests, and frequent rainfall.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide adequate support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
28143/28163	14,500	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons have significant capability.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-198	24,000	U.S. NGF and Threat Equal

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is absent for eastern **Honduras** and the southeast border with **El Salvador**.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
18	3 C-5 7 C-130 8 None	0/18	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Aguacate	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Amapala	None	-
Catacamas	None	-
Choluteca	None	-
Coyota	None	-
El Paraiso	None	-
Goloson International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Jamastran	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
La Jagua	None	-
La Mesa International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.
Mocoron/Durzuna	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Nacome	None	-
Puerto Lempira	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Roatan Island	None	-
San Lorenzo	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Soto Cano Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.
Tela	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Toncontin International	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

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Ports

One small port is available with limited capability to handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Puerto Cortes	Small	41-45/26-30	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

By modern standards, communication and transportation facilities in this country are poor. Limited rail service is confined to the **Caribbean** coast.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Tegucigalpa	- Inadequate telecomm - Microwave connection - 181 Radio stations - 22 TV stations - 2 Satellite ground stations	8,950 km	545 km	1	18	None	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Honduras** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Honduras** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (3,000).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
76	3,000	52 (Tegucigalpa)	F

Note: In **Honduras** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

JAMAICA

MEF G-2: CG II MEF//G-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 484-8095

Theater J-2: USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 564-6626

DIA DB Desk Code: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone: STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache: USDAO KINGSTON JM//DATT//
Telephone: 809-929-4850, EXT 233/234
DIRECT: 926-6440




SUMMARY

Jamaica has a strategic location in the Caribbean Sea astride the main sea lanes for the Panama Canal. The U.S. maintains close, cooperative relations with this country and overall U.S. equities there are substantial. Over 120 U.S. firms have operations in Jamaica and almost 5,000 U.S. citizens reside there. The island serves as a transit point for drug traffickers moving cocaine from South America to the U.S. Jamaica also produced about 405 metric tons of marijuana in 1988. The country has a very small army of 2,000 regular troops which is inadequate to contain any significant internal conflict or resist foreign invasion. The size of the air force and navy is negligible.


The climate of Jamaica is hot and humid most of the year and the terrain is mountainous. The island is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the steep slopes and unfordable streams in the interior highlands. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters because of the rough terrain, dense ground cover, and frequent heavy rainfall. The mapping of Jamaica by older 1:50,000 scale maps may be somewhat outdated. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to provide good accessibility by strategic lift. Although most main roads are paved, they are often narrow and winding through the mountains. The time required for an east coast MEU to embark on amphibious ships and move to Jamaica is estimated to be in excess of six days. Due to the large number of U.S. citizens in Jamaica (4,803), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

JAMAICA - THREAT SUMMARY



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JAMAICA- TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Jamaica

- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

Jamaica has a strategic location between the **Caymen Trench** and **Jamaica Channel**, the main sea lanes for the **Panama Canal**. The U.S. maintains a close, cooperative relationship with the Government of Jamaica. A bilateral trade situation exists where the U.S. provides 44 percent of Jamaica's imports and buys 33 percent of its exports. The U.S. has been strongly supportive of the Jamaican Government's efforts to revitalize the economy. There are 4,803 U.S. citizens living in Jamaica.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
129	601	422	88	1,240	4,803	3 4	7	Medium

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Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

Jamaica produced about 405 metric tons of marijuana in 1988. The island is also a transit point for cocaine; traffickers are now paying for services in kind, increasing the amount of cocaine available for **Jamaican** consumption. Money laundering does not appear to be a major problem, with most drug proceeds being laundered elsewhere.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	None	Mortars	2	2	54	A

Ground OOB consists of 2,200 regular troops. The army is inadequate to contain any significant internal conflict or resist foreign invasion. Training is obtained from **Britain** and **Canada**. Tanks: none; Artillery: 81 mm mortars.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	None	None	Negligible	2	12	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	Negligible	2	42	B

Ships: none; SSMs: none; Patrol Craft: 1 Large Patrol Craft; 4 Small Patrol Craft.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - English
Primary religion - Protestant

There is no cultural difference between **Jamaica** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
71-88	66	78	Wet/Hot

The climate is humid and tropical most of the year, but temperatures from November to March are cooler, particularly along the north shore where the range is 70 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Jamaica is the third largest island in the **Caribbean**. Mountains cover about 80 percent of its surface.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Jamaica** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The coastal lowlands, ranging from five to twenty miles in width along most of the coast, are generally suitable for tracked movement due to a relatively flat surface and extensive road and trail network. Approximately 75 percent of the country --the interior highlands--is unsuited for tracked movement due to steep forested slopes and unfordable streams.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight generally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Mountains cover about 80 percent of **Jamaica** which severely restrict the distance of line of sight visibility. Only in the coastal lowlands would line of sight distances up to 1,000 meters be feasible.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
26121	4,025	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
81 mm Mortar	4,595	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
2	2 C-5	2/0	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Norman Manley International (Kingston)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Sangster International (Montego Bay)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

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Ports

Jamaica has two moderate size ports which can receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Port Royal	Small	36-40/41-45	26-30	-
Kingston	Medlum	36-40/41-45	41-45	Yes

Key Installations

Communications, transportation, and industrial facilities in Jamaica are relatively modern and improving. Almost all main roads are paved, but due to the mountainous conditions, they are often narrow and winding, with uneven surfaces.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Kingston	- Fully automatic telecomm - 2 Satellite ground stations - 25 Radio stations - 8 TV stations	18,200 km	370 km	2	2	- Refined products	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to Jamaica is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Jamaica would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (4,873).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
70	4,803	0 (Kingston)	F

Note: In Jamaica the following factors are of little significance:

- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC

MEXICO

MEF G-2: CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
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Telephone: STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache: USDAO MEXICO CITY MEX//DATT//
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


SUMMARY

Mexico has strategic importance due to its location on the southern border with the **U.S.** **Mexico** and the **U.S.** maintain close and cordial relations. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Mexico** is high with over 322,000 **U.S.** citizens residing there. Despite a program by the Government to stop drug trafficking, **Mexico** is a leading producer of heroin and marijuana. It also acts as a major transit point for cocaine entering the **U.S.** Terrorist groups such as the **Salvadoran FMLN** and the **Guatemalan URNG** are permitted to maintain offices in **Mexico City** where they can arrange and coordinate the acquisition of illicit weapons. Through its involvement in narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms transfers, **Mexico** constitutes a very serious concern to **U.S.** interests. With an army of 105,000 regular troops, **Mexico** has the third largest ground OOB in **Latin America**. The **Mexican** air force and navy are significantly smaller than the army. Training and morale in the armed forces are below average and most regulars are rural mestizos or Indians who have failed to find work elsewhere.


The climate of **Mexico** is mixed and ranges from tropical to desert. The geographic conditions vary considerably from low desert plains and jungle-like coastal regions to high plateaus and rugged mountains. **Mexico City**, with a population of about 20 million, is estimated to have the largest urban concentration in the world. About two-thirds of **Mexico** is generally suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally varies between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. A major shortfall for military operations in this country is the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields and ports in **Mexico** are satisfactory to accommodate most strategic lift requirements. Key installations include oil fields and nuclear power plants under construction. Depending on the destination in **Mexico** (north, central, or south) the time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east or west coast to embark on ships and arrive could range from between two days to more than six. Because of the numerous **U.S.** citizens in **Mexico**, NEO by a joint **U.S.** force, including a MEU, would be a major endeavor.

MEXICO- THREAT SUMMARY



Mexico - 1

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U.S. Equities in Mexico

- **Mexico** has a strategic location on the southern border with the **U.S.**
- Overall **U.S.** equity in **Mexico** is high.

For many years, **Mexico** and the **U.S.** have maintained close and friendly relations. The **U.S.** is **Mexico's** number one trading partner, and **Mexico** is the fourth most important trading partner of the **U.S.** The discovery of extensive oil fields in the coastal regions along the **Gulf of Mexico** enabled **Mexico** to become self-sufficient in crude oil and to export significant amounts of petroleum. Over 322,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Mexico**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
4,997	8,532	11,826	540	25,895	322,250	6 6	12	High

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Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

- Large source of heroin.
- Second largest source of marijuana.
- Major transit point for cocaine.

Mexico remains the largest single source for heroin, the second largest source for marijuana, and leading transit point for cocaine. Newly elected President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has made antinarcotics programs a national priority for his new Government. However, U.S. officials are concerned about the inhibiting effects of corruption throughout the programs. U.S. enforcement agencies continue to monitor instances of drug-related corruption within **Mexico**.

Terrorism

- **Mexico** provides safe haven for terrorist groups.

Despite **Mexico's** official policy of nonintervention in the affairs of other nations, the **Salvadoran** FMLN and **Guatemalan** URNG are permitted to maintain offices or headquarters in **Mexico City**.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Mexico has been a transit point for arms shipments from private organizations in the **U.S.** to the **Nicaraguan** Contras. Insurgent groups such as **El Salvador's** FMLN are permitted to maintain offices in **Mexico City** where they can arrange and coordinate the acquisition of weapons.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Mexico** constitutes a very serious threat due to its involvement in narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

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General Ground OOB

- **Mexico** has the third largest ground OOB in **Latin America**.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	105	3	178	D

Ground OOB consists of a 105,000 person regular voluntary force. Most regulars are rural mestizos or Indians who have failed to find work elsewhere. Recruits are trained in their units or at several specialized schools. Training for officers occurs largely at the military academy at **Chapultepec, Mexico City**, or special arms or staff training schools. Tanks: M-3; Artillery: 120 mm coastal defense guns, M-8 75 mm SP, M-101, M-116.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Day Jet Atk	Early AAA	6	3	69	C

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E/F; Close Air: AT-6G, AT-28D, AT-33A, PC-7; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	None	Lg Gun Boats	27	3	90	D

Ships: 3 Destroyers with antisubmarine ASROC missiles, antisurface and antiaircraft guns, and ASW torpedoes; 6 Frigates with guns; 37 Patrol Ships with guns; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 36 Large Patrol Craft; 6 Coastal Patrol Craft; 11 River Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Mexico** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
49-89	39-80	6-66	Mixed

The climate of **Mexico** varies from tropical to desert.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

The topography of **Mexico** ranges from low desert plains and jungle-like coastal strips to high plateaus and rugged mountains. With a population of 20 million, **Mexico City** is estimated to have the largest urban concentration in the world.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Mexico** is generally suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be possible during most of the year in about two-thirds of **Mexico**. In the remaining third of the country, tracked movement would be precluded by steep slopes in most places, as well as by limited areas of dense forests, swamps, and marshes.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Line of sight distances will normally fall between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

With terrain that varies from low, flat desert regions and jungle-like coastal plains to high plateaus and rugged mountains, it is estimated that line of sight distances between 1,000 and 2,000 meters would be found in over 50 percent of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
28320/28321	1,610	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
120 mm Coastal Defense Gun	15,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
25	5 C-5 19 C-141B 1 C-130	22/3	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Cancun International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Cuidad Obregon	C-141, C-130	-
Cozumel International	C-141, C-130	-
Don Miguel Hidalgo International (Guadalajara)	C-141, C-130	-
Durango	C-141, C-130	-
General Heriberto Jara International	C-141, C-130	-
General Ignacio P. Garcia International (Hermosillo)	C-141, C-130	-
General Jose Maria Yanez International (Guaymas)	C-141, C-130	-
General Juan N. Alvarez International (Acapulco)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
General Manuel Marq de Leon (La Paz)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
General Mariano Escobedo International	C-141B, C-130	-
General Rafael Buelna International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
General Rodolfo Sanchez International	C-141B, C-130	-
La Manga International	C-141B, C-130	-
Lic Benito Juarez International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Lic Gustavo Diaz Ordaz	C-141B, C-130	-
Loreto	C-141B, C-130	-
Merida	C-141B, C-130	-
Minatitlan	C-130	-
Playa de Oro International (Guadalajara)	C-141B, C-130	-
Quetzalcoatl International	C-141B, C-130	-
Santa Lucia	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Torreón	C-141B, C-130	-
Zacatecas	C-141B, C-130	The C-141B is limited to runway operations only. Daylight only.
Zapopan	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- Mexico has several ports that can readily accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Tampico	Medium	36-40/36-40	26-30	Yes
Veracruz	Medium	31-35/41-45	26-30	Yes
Pajaritus	Small	36-40/41-45	26-30	-
Coatzacoalcos	Small	36-40/-	31-35	No
Acapulco	Small	Over 76/ Over 76	36-40	Yes
Manzanillo	Small	-/36-40	36-40	Yes
Mazatlan	Small	31-35/over 76	31-35	Yes
Santa Rosalia	Small	26-30/46-50	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

In **Central Mexico**, oil fields are located in the **Tampico-Misantla** basin, and the **Chicontepepec** basin in the state of **Veracruz**. In **South Mexico**, oil fields are found in the **Macuspana** basin, the offshore **Tabasco-Campeche** basin, the **Tabasco-Chlapas** area, the continental shelf of the **Bahia de Campeche**, and the offshore **Reforma** fields that include the **Isthmus of Saline** basin. In **North Mexico**, oil fields are found in the **Sabinas** basin and the **Burgos** basin. **Mexico** has two nuclear powered reactors under construction. Its land transportation network is one of the most extensive in **Latin America**. It has a well developed telecommunications system, with its own satellites and hundreds of television and radio stations.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Mexico City	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Highly developed telecomm - Microwave connection - 679 Radio stations - 246 TV stations - 120 Satellite terminals - 2 Satellite ground stations 	210,000 km	20,680 km	8	25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas 	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

Depending on the destination in **Mexico** (north, central or south), the time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to this country could range between two to more than six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.


NEO

- Due to the large number of **U.S.** citizens in **Mexico** (322,250) it is unlikely that a MEU would be the only force conducting NEO in this country. NEO of this magnitude conducted by a joint force with MEU participation would require detailed planning and execution.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
750	322,250	148 (Mexico City)	F

Note: In **Mexico**, the NBC factor is of little significance.

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Recent conflict between **U.S.** backed rebels and the former Communist Sandinista Government.
- Sandinistas strongly supported by the **Soviet Union** and **Cuba**.

The insurgents were a mixture of former Somozan troops and disillusioned Sandinista rebels who ran the gamut from ultra-rightists to ultra-leftists, plus a sizable dissatisfied Indian population which would probably be in arms against whoever was in power. These groups did not coalesce into a unified front. But they had a serious effect on the stability of **Nicaragua** while operating both internally and from secure bases in **Honduras** and **Costa Rica**, with **American** blessings even though Congress became increasingly reluctant to continue funding covert activities there. The insurgency was regarded with great concern by the former **Nicaraguan** revolutionary Government, supported by the **Soviets** and **Cubans**, which made conciliatory gestures toward the rebels and, more particularly, **U.S.** opinion. The situation stabilized somewhat in 1990 when the Sandinista Government was voted out of power.

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U.S. Equities in Nicaragua

- Continuing **U.S.** efforts to promote democratic ideals and reduce communist influence.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is low.

While stating a policy of nonalignment, the former Sandinista Government of **Nicaragua** moved this country into the **Soviet** camp. The **U.S.** encouraged severance of **Nicaraguan** ties to **Cuba** and the **Soviet** bloc, and increased diplomatic efforts to solve the problems in this country. Efforts are being made by the **U.S.** to assist the newly elected democratic Government.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
80	-	-	-	80	1,800	1 3	4	Low

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
	X			X

- **Nicaragua** is a suspected cocaine transit point.
- Government officials have reportedly been engaged in trafficking.

Nicaragua continues to be mentioned by informants and traffickers as a cocaine transit point. In 1986, there were accusations that top Government officials engaged in trafficking. **Nicaragua** is now cooperating with **Costa Rica** on drug matters.

Terrorism

- Has sponsored terrorist groups in **Latin America**.

Like **Cuba**, **Nicaragua** has provided training and safe haven to **Latin American** terrorist and guerrilla groups. The Sandinistas supported the FMLN in **El Salvador** despite their commitment to end such assistance. In addition to dealing with individual groups, **Nicaragua** has occasionally acted as a coordinator for **Latin American** insurgents, including hosting meetings between **Central** and **South American** subversives.

Consolidated Threat

Within the region, **Nicaragua** constitutes a threat to **U.S.** interests because of its involvement in narcotics trafficking and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

- Largest ground OOB in **Central America**.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	T-54	Bloc	80	11	201	E

Ground OOB consists of 80,000 troops of which 20,000 are conscripts and 35,000 reservists. **Nicaragua** has the largest military force in **Central America**. Training for enlisted men is accomplished at the National Guard Training School at **Managua**. Officers attend the **Nicaraguan National Military Academy** or the **Chilean Military School**. The Sandinistas continue to control the **Nicaraguan Army** and supply the **Salvadoran FMLN** and other Latin insurgencies with training, facilities, political guidance, and weapons. Tanks: PT-76, T-54, T-55; Artillery: D-20, D-30. (Note: the recently elected Chamorro Government is reportedly reducing the size of the army by one-third.)

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	Bloc	2	11	103	D

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: AT-28, AT-33A (light attack), Mi-24; Air Defense: SA-7, SA-9, and SA-14 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Bloc	1	11	72	C

Ships: none; SSMs: none; Patrol Craft: 4 Inshore Minehunters with guns and radars (Ex-Soviet); 4 Minesweeping Boats with guns (Ex-Soviet); 16 Small Gun Boats (8 Ex-Soviet, 2 Ex-North Korean, 2 Ex-U.S., 2 Ex-Israeli, 2 Ex-French).

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish (English and Indian Dialects)
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Nicaragua** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
68-86	62-84	45-100	Wet/Hot

Nicaragua's climate is tropical. Rainfall is heavy year-round and is greater on the **Caribbean** coast than on the **Pacific**. Some sections of the country have as much as 300 inches of rain annually.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

The largest of the **Central American** republics, **Nicaragua** borders **Costa Rica** to the south and **Honduras** to the north. **El Salvador** is across the narrow **Gulf of Fonseca**. **Lake Managua** and **Lake Nicaragua**, the region's largest bodies of water, are in the west; north of them, the coastal plain gradually rises toward rugged mountains. Beyond the mountains lies a sparsely inhabited area of forested plains and hills. The swampy eastern coastal plain extends 64-80 kilometers (40-50 mi.) inland.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Nicaragua** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be precluded in about 75 percent of **Nicaragua**, mainly in steep hills and mountains, dense forests, and swamps. In the remaining parts of the country, movement would be difficult for part of the year.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances of less than 1,000 meters should be expected in about 75 percent of **Nicaragua**. This is due to the steep hills and mountains, dense ground cover, and heavy rainfall which would obscure visibility.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
28120	2,415	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
152 mm GH	24,000	U.S. NGF and Threat Equal

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

Eastern **Nicaragua** is lacking in 1:50,000 scale map coverage except for areas such as **Puerto Cabezas** and **Bluefields** on the east coast.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
8	1 C-5 1 C-141B 3 C-130 3 None	1/7	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Augusto Cesar Sandino (Managua)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Cortezal	None	-
El Terrero	None	-
La Paz	C-130	Daylight VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Los Dos Montes	None	-
Montelimar (Masachapa)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Oscar Garcia	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Punta Huete	C-141B, C-130	The C-141B operations are limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- One small port is available with limited capability to handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Corinto (Pacific coast)	Small	26-30/26-30	26-30	-

Key Installations

Due to **Nicaragua's** economic difficulties the country's communications and transportation facilities are in poor condition and are likely to remain so for the immediate future. The country is traversed from north to south by the Inter-American Highway and from west to east by rivers, by a road to **Puerto Cabazas**, and by a road and river to **Bluefields**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Managua	- Low-capacity telcomm - Microwave connection - 45 Radio stations - 7 TV stations - Satellite ground station	25,000 km	373 km	1	8	- Crude oil	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Nicaragua** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Nicaragua** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,800).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
40	1,800	26 (Managua)	F

Note: In **Nicaragua**, the following factors are of little significance:

- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC

PANAMA

MEF G-2: CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 282-3209

DIA DB Desk Code: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone: STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache: USDAO PANAMA CITY PN//DATT//
Telephone: (507) 27-1777 EXT 2310/2311;
DIRECT: (507) 27-2717; KY-3: 4741; KY-7:
04450-507-27-2717




SUMMARY

Due to instability and disorder in **Panama** caused by **Panamanian** strongman General Manuel Noriega, U.S. forces were dispatched in late 1989 to take action against Noriega and protect **American** interests. U.S. forces quickly gained control and captured Noriega who presently awaits legal action in the U.S. **Panama** is important for its strategic location on the isthmus which connects **North** and **South America** and for having the **Panama Canal** which runs between the **Pacific** and **Atlantic Oceans**. The U.S. has high overall equity in **Panama** and seeks to promote its economic, political, and social development. Over 11,000 U.S. citizens live in **Panama**. In recent years, **Panama** has been a principal money-laundering center for the **South American** cocaine trade and transit site for cocaine and precursor chemical shipments. **Panama**, and particularly General Noriega, has been implicated in the furnishing of illegal arms to terrorist groups in **El Salvador** and **Colombia**. Due to its involvement in drug trafficking; terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, **Panama** constitutes a serious threat to U.S. interests. **Panama** has a small army of 6,000 volunteers and its air force and navy are practically negligible.

Panama's topography is mostly mountainous and hilly with dense tropical forests in the eastern regions. The climate is tropical with heavy rainfall, particularly on the **Atlantic** side. Because of the terrain conditions, cross-country movement by vehicle would be infeasible. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the broken terrain, heavy ground cover and frequent heavy rainfall. There is 1:50,000 scale map coverage for most of **Panama** except for portions along the **Atlantic** side. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to handle strategic lift. The time required for a MEU to arrive from the U.S. east or west coasts would be in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to over 11,000 potential evacuees.


PANAMA - THREAT SUMMARY



Panama - 1

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PANAMA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Corrupt, unstable military dictatorship (Noriega) became a threat to **U.S.** interests.
- Operation Just Cause conducted by the **U.S.** to protect **American** interests.

On December 15, 1989, the **Panamanian** strongman General Manuel Noriega declared that his country was at war with the **U.S.** The next day **Panamanian** Defense Force (PDF) troops shot and killed an unarmed Marine Corps officer and detained a **U.S.** naval officer and his wife. On December 20, 1989, **U.S.** forces were dispatched to **Panama** on Operation Just Cause to take action against Noriega and protect **American** interests. These forces quickly seized control of the PDF headquarters and secured the **Panama Canal** and **American** installations. **U.S.** strategy in the assault was to seize Noriega because, besides being indicted in the **U.S.** on drug trafficking charges, he was becoming so belligerent that the danger to **American** lives in **Panama** was unacceptable. Although Noriega was able to avoid capture for a few days by seeking refuge in the **Vatican** Embassy in **Panama**, he was finally forced to turn himself in to **U.S.** authorities.

U.S. Equities in Panama

- Strategic location and the **Panama Canal**.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is high.

This country has a strategic location on the eastern end of the isthmus forming the land bridge connecting **North** and **South America**. It controls the **Panama Canal** that links the **North Atlantic Ocean** via the **Caribbean Sea** with the **North Pacific Ocean**. The **U.S.** supports the **Panamanian** Government in promoting economic, political, and social development. As a trading partner with **Panama**, the **U.S.** is a major buyer of **Panamanian** exports and supplies much of its imports. Over 11,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Panama**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
4,780	712	402	10	5,904	11,300	5 6	11	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
		X	X	X

- Principal money laundering center.
- Transit site for cocaine and precursor chemicals.

Panama was denounced in 1988, following the indictments of **General Noriega** by two **U.S.** grand juries on charges of narcotics trafficking. Since then, **Panama** has continued to be a principal money-laundering center for the **South American** cocaine trade and a transit site for cocaine and precursor chemical shipments. With the dispatch of **U.S.** troops to **Panama** on December 20, 1989 for Operation Just Cause, it is highly probable that **General Noriega** will be brought to justice for his crimes, and drug trafficking in this country will be on the decline.

Terrorism

- Major transit point for terrorists.
- Banking facility for M-19 and other terrorist groups.
- Major source of weapons and explosives acquired illegally.

Panama's geographical position and role as a trade and banking center make it a crossroads for the travel and transactions of various terrorist and insurgent groups. Some of this activity is facilitated by the **Cuban** and **Nicaraguan** Embassies and the **Libyan** People's Bureau in **Panama City**. This activity is transient in nature, not normally involving direct participation by the **Panamanian** Government. Congressional testimony and published accounts, however, implicate some **Panamanian** officials, including **General Noriega**, in the shipment of arms to such groups as **El Salvador's FMLN** and **Colombia's M-19**. The existence of a prior relationship between **Noriega** and **M-19** was, in part, confirmed in July 1988 when **M-19** asked **Noriega** to intercede with the **Colombian** Government regarding the kidnapping of the **Conservative Party's** president, **Alvaro Gomez Hurtado**, whom **M-19** held hostage.

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Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

- Provided arms and explosives to **Colombian** terrorists.

Congressional testimony and published accounts implicate **Panamanian** officials in the shipment of arms to such insurgent groups as **El Salvador's FMLN** and **Colombia's M-19**.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Panama** constitutes a serious threat to **U.S.** interests due to its involvement in narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	None	Mortars	6	1	67	B

Ground OOB consists of 6,000 troops. The army is voluntary but conscription is authorized if needed. There is also a paramilitary force (police and national guard) of 12,300. Recruits attend a three-month course in military and police matters. Officers attend foreign military academies or the **U.S. Army School of the Americas** at **Fort Benning, Georgia**. Tanks: none; Artillery: 60 mm and 81 mm mortars.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	None	None	Negligible	1	11	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	1	1	42	B

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 2 Large Patrol Craft; 6 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Panama** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-87	87	70-130	Wet/Hot

The climate is tropical with rainfall heavy but seasonal. The **Atlantic** side has much higher precipitation and a less clearly defined dry season than the **Pacific** side.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Panama's topography is mostly mountainous and hilly; two mountain ranges form the backbone of the isthmus. The eastern regions are almost entirely covered by dense tropical forests.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Panama** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement would be infeasible for all vehicles in the majority of **Panama**. Any movement for tracked vehicles would be restricted to the grass, scrub, and cultivated areas in the lowlands in the south and southwest, and some plains along the canal zone.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Panama's terrain is mostly mountainous and hilly. The eastern regions are covered almost entirely by dense tropical forests. Rainfall is heavy and would frequently obscure visibility. Due to these conditions it is expected that line of sight visibility would be limited to under 500 meters except in the lowlands in the south and southwest, and some plains along the canal zone.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
21603/21605	5,490	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
81 mm Mortar	4,595	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is not available on the **Caribbean** side along the **Gulfo de los Mosquitos** and the **San Blas** district.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
8	2 C-5 4 C-130 2 None	2/6	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Albrook Air Force Base (Balboa) Calzada Larga	None C-130	- Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC. Runway operations only.
Enrique Adolfo Jimenez	C-130	Daylight only.
Enrique Malek International	C-130	Daylight only.
General Omar Torrijos International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Howard Air Force Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
La Joya	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC. Runway operations only.
Marcos A. Gelabert International	None	-

Ports

- Two ports with capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Laguna de Chiriqui	Small	71-75/71-75	-	Yes
Balboa	Medium	41-45/31-35	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

The primary key installation is the **Panama Canal**. There is also a trans-**Panama** pipeline designed to transport **Alaskan** North Slope oil, hydro-electric power facilities, and numerous communications systems. The **Inter-American** highway continues from **Costa Rica** to **Panama City** where it ends. **Panama City** and **Colon** are connected by both rail and road.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Panama City	- Well-developed telecomm - Microwave connection - 2 Satellite ground stations - 91 Radio stations - 14 TV stations	8,530 km	238 km	2	8	- Crude oil	None	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to Panama is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Panama would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (11,300).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
40	11,300	0 (Panama City)	F

Note: In Panama, NBC is of little significance.

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
PERU

MEF G-2: CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 282-3209

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Embassy Defense Attache: USDAO LIMA PE//DATT//
Telephone: DIRECT: 51-14-31-6595
EMB: 51-14-33-8000




SUMMARY

In **Peru**, the main sources of conflict are the insurgent groups, drug production and trafficking, foreign debt, and extensive poverty. Although the **Peruvian** Government has indicated support for democracy, reduced drug trafficking, and control of terrorism, progress in these areas remains slow. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Peru** is high. The **U.S.** is **Peru's** largest trading partner with recent exchange totaling about \$1.6 billion. Over 7,000 **U.S.** citizens live in **Peru**. It is the world's largest producer of coca with up to 124,000 metric tons in 1988, and provides the main supply of coca paste for **Colombian** cocaine refineries. The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is the primary insurgent group in **Peru**. This organization is believed to be allied with drug traffickers and uses terrorist tactics to spread disorder and accomplish its goals. **Peru** constitutes a serious concern because of its involvement in narco-terrorism. **Peru** has moderate size armed forces and has embarked on an arms modernization program. It has acquired tanks, artillery, surface to air missile systems, and helicopters from the **Soviet Union**. These acquisitions have made **Peru** a formidable force in **South America**, causing **Chile** and **Ecuador** some concern.

Peru is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the rugged **Andes Mountains** and thick jungle forests in the eastern lowlands. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally limited to less than 1,000 meters due to terrain and weather conditions. While NGF platforms can provide adequate support for operations ashore, they would be out-gunned by **Peruvian** coastal defense weapons. Coverage of **Peru** by 1:50,000 scale maps is generally lacking except for spotted areas along the coast. Airfields and ports are available to accommodate entry by strategic lift. Key installations include oil fields on the northern coast and the northern **Salva** area. It is expected that it would take in excess of six days for a MEU on the **U.S.** east or west coasts to reach **Peru**. Due to over 7,000 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU would be very difficult.


PERU - THREAT SUMMARY



Peru - 1

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PERU - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Maoist Shining Path terrorists battle Government.
- Extensive drug production and terrorism.

The primary sources of conflict in this country are the insurgent groups, cocaine, foreign debt, and extensive poverty. The primary insurgent group is Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), with Maoist ideology, whose brutal activities have included kidnapping, assassinations, and attacks on Government buildings and police posts. The atrocities committed by this group have been compared with those carried out by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Peru's problems with coca growers in the Upper Huallaga Valley continue to pose major difficulties for Peruvian authorities. Although much of the overall operations are thought to be run by Colombia's cocaine lords, profits from the drug trade have filled Lima banks and corrupted many officials. There is also the possibility that drug traffickers have allied themselves with Shining Path terrorists.

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U.S. Equities in Peru

- The **Peruvian** Government has indicated support for democracy, reduced drug trafficking, and control of terrorism.
- Overall **U.S.** equity in **Peru** is high.

The **U.S.** and **Peru** share the goals of supporting democracy, curbing the narcotics trade, and controlling terrorism. Cooperation in these areas as well as substantial **U.S.** development assistance to **Peru** have allowed the two nations to retain a working relationship. The **U.S.** is **Peru's** largest trading partner. **Peru** receives about 29 percent of its imports from the **U.S.**, while the **U.S.** in turn receives about 35 percent of **Peru's** exports. Total trade in recent years between the **U.S.** and **Peru** has equaled about \$1.6 billion. Current book value of **U.S.** investment in the country is about \$3 billion. The largest single **U.S.** investors are Occidental Petroleum and Southern Peru Copper Corporation.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
3,000	696	875	62	4,633	7,265	4 5	9	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X	X			

- World's largest producer of coca.
 - 1988 produced 97,000 - 124,000 metric tons
 - 1987 produced 98,000 - 121,000 metric tons
 - 1986 produced 95,000 - 120,000 metric tons
 - 1985 produced 95,200 metric tons
- Major supplier of coca paste for **Colombian** cocaine refiners.

Peru remains the largest cultivator of coca, at more than 115,630 hectares, but is primarily a supplier of coca paste for **Colombian** cocaine refiners. Enforcement in the **Upper Huallaga Valley**, the major growing zone, remains quite hazardous.

Terrorism

- Shining Path fanatical guerrilla movement.

The Sendero Liminoso or Shining Path is a highly active and violent terrorist/insurgent group that claims a neo-Marxist orientation. Particularly gruesome assassinations are the hallmark of the Shining Path. Victims are often ritually mutilated and the corpses left on public display. The principal targets of Shining Path assassination teams are civilian technicians of government-sponsored civic action projects and local political leaders.

Consolidated Threat

Within the **Western Hemisphere**, **Peru** constitutes a major concern because of its involvement in drugs and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-54	Howitzers	80	4	124	C

Ground OOB consists of 80,000 troops of which 55,000 are conscripts. **Peru** has a formidable armored force composed primarily of **Soviet** tanks. Officers receive extensive training at an army academy and a joint service war college. Tanks: AMX-13, T-54, T-55; Artillery: D-30, M-46, M-56, M-101, M-114.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	Bloc	15	4	129	D

Fighter Aircraft: Mirage 5, Mirage 2000; Close Air: Camberra, Cessna A-37B, Su-22 Fitter, MB 339; Air Defense: SA-7 SAMs and **Soviet**, **U.S.**, and **Swedish** AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	25	4	109	D

Ships: 2 Cruisers with SSMS and SAMs; 6 Destroyers; 4 Frigates; SSM: Exocet, Otomat; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missiles with Exocet SSMS, guns, fire control, and radars; 4 River Gun Boats; 4 River Patrol Craft; 3 Lake Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish (Quechua)
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Peru** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
40-75	29-75	1-32	Dry/Warm

The climate of **Peru** ranges from arid and mild along the coast, temperate to frigid in the **Andes Mountains**, and tropically warm and humid in the eastern lowlands.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
				X	

The topography of **Peru** consists of western coastal plains, the central rugged **Andes Mountains**, and eastern lowlands with tropical jungle forests. The population is mainly centered in urban areas.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Peru** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Conditions are unsuited for cross-country tracked movement at all times in about 90 percent of **Peru** due to steep slopes, deep gorges, heavy forest, and generally rough terrain.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The eastern jungle (the selva) accounts for more than half of **Peru's** land area. The **Andes Mountains** (the sierra) occupy an additional 27 percent. A low-hanging fog is prevalent particularly in the vicinity of **Lima** during the months of May to November. These conditions would limit line of sight distances to well under 1,000 meters during most of the year.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
22170/22172	2,415	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
130 mm M-46	27,000	Threat Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is absent for most of **Peru** except for spotted areas along the coast. Coverage is not available for **Lima**.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
14	1 C-5 11 C-141B 2 None	5/9	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Capitan J. A. Quinones Gonzales	C-141B, C-130	-
Capitan Carlos Martinez	C-141B, C-130	-
Capitan Concha	C-141B, C-130	-
Capitan Montes	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Collique	None	-
Coronel Fap Carlos Civian	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Coronel Franciso Secada	C-141B, C-130	-
Ilo	None	-
Jorge Chavez International (Lima Callao)	C-141B, C-130	Narrow taxiway for C-5. Suitable for C-5 only as emergency alternate airfield.
Las Palmas (Lima)	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Pisco	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Rodriguez Ballon-Chachani	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Ten Fap J. A. Mont Morales	C-141B, C-130	Runway less than 6,000 feet.
Valazco Asteti	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.

Ports

- Two ports with capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Matarani	Small	41-45/over 76	46-50	-
Callao	Medium	36-40/26-30	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

Oil fields are located at **Talara** (north coast) and the northern **Salva** area. Recent oil discoveries have been made in the eastern jungle and on the northern part of the continental shelf. Communications and land transportation facilities are fairly adequate. A railroad connects **Lima** with the central highlands of the **Peruvian Andes**. A more extensive railroad in the south links **Mollendo** on the coast with the inland cities of **Arequipa**, **Cusco**, and **Puno**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Lima	- Fairly adequate telecomm - 417 Radio stations - 140 TV stations 2 Satellite stations	56,645 km	1,876 km	2	14	- Crude oil - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Peru** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Peru** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (7,265).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
742	7,265	0 (Lima)	F

Note: In **Peru** the following factors are of little significance:

- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC

7102 201-0

SURINAM

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG I MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 365-9103
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2// STU-III AV 282-3209
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C// STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO PARAMARIBO NS//DATT// 011-597-71229/72900




SUMMARY

Surinam occupies an important position on the South American mainland near Brazil and adjacent to oil tanker routes from South America. The U.S. maintains cordial relations with Surinam and is Surinam's largest trading partner. Due to human rights violations in 1982, when the Government executed several prominent opposition leaders without trial, the U.S. suspended economic and military assistance. The Government subsequently came under democratic leadership in 1988. Surinam has a very small army of 2,700 troops, no air force, and a negligible sized navy. Training is provided to the army by up to 200 Libyan military advisors. Brazil also provides some military assistance and training.


With significant cultural differences, a tropical climate with heavy rainfall, and dense jungle, U.S. military operations in Surinam would be quite difficult. The country is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement due to coastal swamps, thick forests, and wet conditions. The terrain and weather of Surinam would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. The hydrography adjacent to Surinam would prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast within range to provide support for operations ashore. A significant shortfall is the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage. Surinam lacks a major port to accommodate strategic sealift. However, one airfield is available which can handle C-5 aircraft. There are not many key installations in Surinam. Roads and bridges are few and austere and large parts of the country are accessible only by helicopter or foot. The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to Surinam would be in excess of six days.

SURINAM - THREAT SUMMARY



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SURINAM - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Surinam

- Important location on the **South American** mainland.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is low.

Surinam's location on the **South American** mainland near **Brazil** makes it strategically important. **Soviet** or **Cuban** penetration of the country would constitute a threat to **Brazil** as well as the oil tanker routes from **South America**. The **U.S.** is **Surinam's** largest trading partner, normally providing 30 percent of the country's imports and taking 40 percent or more of its exports. As a result of human rights concerns, **U.S.** economic and military assistance to **Surinam** was suspended in 1982. The Government came under democratic leadership in 1988.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	135	146	-	281	260	1 1	2	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	None	Mortars	3	0	53	A

Ground OOB consists of 2,700 troops who are all volunteers. Training is conducted by up to 200 **Libyan** military advisors. Officers receive military instruction in the **Netherlands**. Tanks: none; Artillery: 81 mm mortars.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	Negligible	0	40	A

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 3 Large Patrol Craft; 4 Coastal Patrol Craft; 3 River Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Dutch (English, Spanang Tongo)

Primary religion - Hindu

There is a significant cultural difference between **Surinam** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-87	74	91	Wet/Hot

Surinam's climate is tropical with heavy rainfall. Temperatures are high throughout the year with little seasonal change. The hottest month is **September**. Sudden wind twisters occasionally occur and have caused extensive damage in the jungle forests.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

The terrain varies from coastal swamps to dense forests with intermittent scattered savannas in the central region. The southern zone is hilly with thick jungle terrain.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Surinam is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The country is generally unsuited for cross-country tracked movement due to dense tropical forests, wet grounds, and extensive network of deep rivers, numerous swamps and marshes, and steep slopes in the hills and mountains.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distance limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The central and southern zones of Surinam consist of broken terrain and forests with scattered savannas. In the south, low mountains with heavy vegetation cover most of the land. Line of sight distances would be limited to under 1,000 meters throughout most of this country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are not able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
24370/24375	25,760	Unsatisfactory

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
81 mm Mortars	4,595	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-5	1/0	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Zanderij (Zandery)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

Ports

Surinam has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift.

Key Installations

Communication, transportation, and industrial facilities in **Surinam** are few and austere. There are few roads and bridges, and large parts of the country are accessible only by helicopter or on foot with fording equipment.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Paramaribo	- Good telecomm - 13 Radio stations - 6 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	8,300 km	166 km	0	1	None	None	None

File WH 16

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to Surinam is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Surinam could be accomplished without great difficulty.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
19	260	22 (Paramaribo)	D

Note: In Surinam, the following factors are of little significance:

- Drugs
- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- OOB (ground, air, naval)
- NBC

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VENEZUELA

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


SUMMARY

Venezuela occupies a strategic position on major sea and air routes between **North and South America**. The **U.S.** and **Venezuela** share common objectives of strengthening democratic institutions and overall **U.S.** equity in this country is high. **Venezuela** is a major trading partner with the **U.S.** and exports significant amounts of oil. The **U.S.** has about \$2.1 billion in direct investment in **Venezuela** and over 20,000 **U.S.** citizens live there. **Venezuela** is a transit point for precursor chemicals and cocaine moving to and from **South America**. It is also a producer of as much as 2,000 metric tons of marijuana. The terrorist group **Bondera Roja** operates in Eastern **Venezuela** to attack Government installations and spread disorder. This group also coordinates with **Colombian** insurgents to pursue terrorist goals throughout the region. Because of its involvement in both drugs and terrorism, **Venezuela** deserves special attention by military planners. **Venezuela** has moderate size armed forces which has developed into one of the most modern and professional among **Latin American** countries.

The topography of **Venezuela** ranges from the **Andes Mountains** in the northwest, to plains extending south and east, to high plateaus, and rolling hills in the far south and east. The climate varies from tropical along the coast and inland river valleys, to temperate at the higher elevations. About 80 percent of the population lives in cities and towns along the coast and in the **Andes**. Over half of the country, mainly in the coastal and plain regions, is suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) generally ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 meters. While hydrographic conditions would permit **NGF** platforms to approach the coast and provide adequate support for operations ashore, they would be out-gunned by **Venezuelan** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to portions of the **Caribbean** coastal area. Airfields and ports are quite satisfactory to handle strategic lift. Key installations include oil fields as well as numerous modern and expanding communications, transportation, and industrial facilities. The time required for a **MEU** to move to **Venezuela** from the **U.S.** east coast is estimated to be in excess of six days. **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Venezuela** would be very difficult due to over 20,000 potential evacuees.


VENEZUELA - THREAT SUMMARY



Venezuela - 1

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VENEZUELA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Venezuela

- Important location on major sea and air routes between North and South America.
- Overall U.S. equity is high.

Venezuela is one of the U.S.'s most important Latin American trading partners and a major supplier of oil and petroleum products to the U.S. With \$2.1 billion in direct investment, **Venezuela** ranks fifth after **Brazil**, **Mexico**, **Panama**, and **Argentina** in the amount of U.S. investment in the region. Over 20,000 U.S. citizens reside in **Venezuela**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2,124	650	7,000	-	9,774	20,600	5 6	11	High

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2021 Dated Information

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

- Transit point for precursor chemicals and cocaine.
- Suspected large quantities of marijuana are produced and sent to **Colombia**.

Venezuela is an important point for the transit of precursor chemicals and cocaine. Marijuana is cultivated along the border with **Colombia**, apparently by **Colombian** traffickers; as much as 3,000 metric tons of cannabis may be grown in **Venezuela** and exported via **Colombia**.

Terrorism

The Bandera Roja (Red Flag - GBR) operates in eastern **Venezuela** and along the **Venezuela-Colombia** border. It engages in kidnappings and hijackings as well as raids on small towns. The Red Flag sometimes coordinates with the **Colombia** group M-19 and the National Liberation Army.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Venezuela** constitutes a serious concern due to its involvement in narcotics trafficking and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	LAV	Howitzers/SP	34	4	78	B

Ground OOB consists of 34,000 troops. Conscripts from the rural and urban poor areas form the majority of the army strength. Officers and NCOs are all regulars. Training for enlisted men is accomplished in the infantry battalions. Officers attend various **Venezuelan** military schools, the **U.S. Army School of the Americas**, and the **Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D. C.** Tanks: AMX-13, AMX-30, M-18; Artillery: 160 mm MRS, M-56, M-101, M-109, M-114.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	5	4	99	C

Fighter Aircraft: CF-5A, F-5E/F, F-16A, F-86K, Mirage III/IV; Close Air: Canberra B82/88, Mirage 5, OV-10E, T-2D; Air Defense: Roland and RBS-70 SAMs; 18 Signal Flycatcher radars form the Guardian air defense system. It is reported that **Venezuela** has acquired other long-range air defense radars such as the AN/TPS-43. There are **Italian** and **Swedish** AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	11	4	95	D

Ships: 8 Frigates with SSMs, SAMs, guns, and torpedoes; SSM: Otomat; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missile and Gun with Otomat SSMs, guns, fire control, and radars.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Venezuela** and the **U.S.**

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2021 Dated Information

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
60-92	62	23-71	Mixed

The climate varies from tropical to temperate depending on the elevation.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

The topography of **Venezuela** is varied. The **Andes Mountains** and adjacent hill country are in the northwest. There is a coastal zone north of the mountains bordering **Lake Maracaibo** and the **Caribbean Sea**. The plains or "llanos" extend from the mountains south and east to the **Orinico River**. The **Guyana Highlands**, a vast area of high plateaus and rolling plains, extend south and east of the **Orinico River**. Eighty percent of the population lives in cities and towns.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Venezuela** is generally suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be possible in about half of **Venezuela**. In the remaining portions of the country, tracked movement would be difficult due to the rough terrain and greatly restricted in direction in many places by deep, unfordable streams.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Restricted, with line of sight distances generally ranging between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

Line of sight distances of from 1,000 to 2,000 meters are considered feasible in about half of **Venezuela** primarily in the coastal zone bordering **Lake Maracaibo** and the plains in the south and east. In the regions of the **Andes Mountains** and **Guyana Highlands**, line of sight visibility would be limited to under 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
24452	500	Good

101-235

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
160 mm MRS	30,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is limited to portions of the coastal area bordering the Caribbean Sea.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
8	3 C-5 3 C-141B 1 C-130 1 None	3/5	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Barquisimeto	C-130	-
Del Caribe International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
El Libertador	C-141B, C-130	VFR only.
General Francisco de Miranda	None	-
Josefa Camejo	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
La Chinita	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s.
La Fria	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Simon Bolivar International (Caracas)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

Ports

- Several moderate size ports which can accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Maracaibo	Small	36-40/31-35	21-25	Yes
La Salina	Small	41-45/36-40	-	-
Punto de Palmas	Small	41-45/-	-	-
Puerto Miranda	Small	36-40/31-35	41-45	-
La Estacada	Small	41-45/-	-	-
Amuay	Small	46-50/36-40	41-45	Yes
El Palito	Small	36-40/-	-	-
Puerto Cabello	Small	41-45/36-40	26-30	Yes
La Guaira	Medium	36-40/46-50	36-40	Yes
Puerto de Hierro	Small	-/over 76	41-45	Yes

Key Installations

Oil fields are found in the **Maracaibo** basin (along and under the northeast part of **Lake Maracaibo** and the **Maracaibo** and **Mara** districts, northwest of the lake), the **Orinoco** basin (numerous widely scattered fields south of **Puerto La Cruz**), and the **Barinas** basin.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Caracas	- Modern and expanding telecomm - 204 Radio stations - 59 TV stations - 4 Satellite stations	77,785 km	439 km	10	8	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Venezuela** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Venezuela** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (20,600).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
608	20,600	10 (Caracas)	F

Note: In **Venezuela** the following factors are of little significance:

- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC

