Phi Beta Iota Summary: Where should NATO go on out-of-area expeditionary operations? How does NATO define security & stability? How does NATO achieve balance between territorial defense and expeditionary operations, and between the voice of the big nations and the small nations? What is defense? What is 360 degree defense in a complex world? How should NATO address a complex world? Is over-simplification a threat of its own? Is NATO predominantly a forum for dialog about collective intelligence? Does NATO really need to get into global anti-missile defense?
Context: Long, long, ago in a land far far away, Frank Carlucci spoke to a group of CIA analysts at a hotel near the White House, and his observation has stayed with us to this date. Paraphrasing from memory, he said that in the Reagan Administration, the perfect intelligence briefing would be a five minute video tailored to the President’s next hour, that could be viewed five minutes before the hour began. We have never forgotten that, it is probably influenced our own concept of just enough, just in time intelligence, and our diamond paradigm, where the acme of skill of an analyst is not in developing an answer, but as Stevan Dedijer said at OSS ’92, “knowing who knows” and connecting the customer with exactly the right person who can create tailored intelligence on the spot through interaction with the customer (recorded and retained for the intelligence archives).