



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF SECURITY REVIEW
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



May 22, 2009
Ref: 09-S-1692

Mr. Robert Steele
Post Office Box 369
Oakton, Virginia 22124-0369

Dear Mr. Steele:

This responds to your e-mail of April 20, 2009, that requested security review of your manuscript entitled:

- *Human Intelligence (HUMINT): All Humans, All Minds, All the Time*

The Department of Defense (DoD) has completed its review and has no objection to the public release of this manuscript subject to an amendment. On page 36 remove the words "covert and" from the first sentence of the second paragraph. By law DoD is not allowed to carry out covert action. We also recommend two changes on page 18: In the last paragraph remove the two names and substitute their titles. These are the only two persons highlighted in your manuscript who are currently serving in their positions.

Our review was for DoD equities only. Review of your manuscript by the CIA Publication Review Board is required to obtain final clearance for public release.

Copies of the cover page and pages 18 and 36 of your manuscript are enclosed. Please direct any questions regarding this case to Mr. David Daley at (703) 696-4724 or e-mail at David.Daley@WHS.mil.

Sincerely,

Darrell W. Walker
Acting Chief

Enclosures:
As stated

Human Intelligence (HUMINT): *All Humans, All Minds, All the Time*

Robert David STEELE Vivas

HUMAN Intelligence (HUMINT) has been moribund in the United States of America (USA) since the 1970's if not earlier, as the USA rushed to substitute technology for thinking (intelligence producers) and partisanship for discourse (intelligence consumers). Counterintelligence (CI), Security, Analysts, and Consumers are included in my definition of HUMINT. Over the course of several decades we have destroyed covert or clandestine HUMINT, while also neglecting CI and Security, depreciating Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)¹—which comprises 80%² of the harvestable foundation for HUMINT—and ignoring the educational needs of our soldiers,³ analysts, and our consumers.

Today it can reasonably be argued that only the President of the USA receives decision-support (mediocre at best) from a \$65 billion a year U.S. Intelligence Community (US IC), while Cabinet officials and Congressional Committees receive none at all. Defense officials receive 4%, "at best"⁴ of what they need to know from secret sources and methods, little of that useful to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) or other Whole of Government planning.

The author reviews the information-intelligence landscape, the known deficiencies in US IC access to all information in all languages all the time, and the obstacles that data pathologies represent for national and defense decision-making. HUMINT is defined as thirteen distinct sub-disciplinary specializations, all of which must be managed as a whole in order to enable cross-fertilization among overt, covert, and clandestine sources and methods.

The author concludes that in light of the lack of a Whole of Government decision-support architecture, and the clear and present danger associated with the ten high-level threats to humanity, eight of which are non-military, that the Department of Defense (DoD) is the only element of the U.S. Government (USG) able to fund and create a 21st Century HUMINT capability.

Robert David STEELE Vivas is a 30-year US intelligence veteran who has led the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) endeavor since 1988. He is CEO of OSS.Net, Inc. and founder as well as funder of Earth Intelligence Network, a 501c3 Public Charity committed to creating public intelligence in the public interest.

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AS AMENDED p. 36

RECOMMENDED p. 18

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Office of Security Review
Department of Defense

09-5-1692

Department of Defense (DoD) HUMINT

There is a sufficiency of open information on CIA's clandestine HUMINT as well as its Open Source Center (OSC), the latter an organization best known for classifying its OSINT and not providing useful support to those in need of unclassified OSINT (as the founder of the modern OSINT movement I consider "classified OSINT" to be an oxymoron, but CIA declines to agree).

Modern Defense HUMINT (DH) can be traced back to the "Plan for the Consolidation of Defense HUMINT" that was secret and has since been declassified, less a few blocks of redacted text. Initiated in June 1993 it followed from the defense intelligence review led by then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD C3I) Dwayne Andrews, in the 1991-1992 timeframe. I participated in that review.

The intent was to consolidate the disparate overt and covert HUMINT programs of the four military services. No mention is made of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which I would like very much to see integrated into the existing DH program, perhaps even taking the lead on HUMINT with respect to transnational crime syndicates and brown water interdiction opportunities.⁷⁸

At the same time that HUMINT funded by the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) was consolidated, new overt HUMINT elements were created within the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) aggregation. As best I can tell, TIARA HUMINT has not been integrated into DH and probably should be, if the US Army's efforts to define and orchestrate its own OSINT elements are representative of how scattered TIARA HUMINT has become.⁷⁹

In July 2008, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) restructured to strengthen HUMINT and CI synchronization while aligning other core functions. The two key changes were the naming of Deputy Undersecretary [Larry Burgess] as the overseer of HUMINT, CI, and Security; and the creation of a two-star flag officer position in charge of the new defense HUMINT and counterintelligence center.⁸⁰ The latter reports to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (D/DIA), today LtGen [Ron Burgess] USA, who brings to the job both experience as the J-2 of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and as Chief of Staff to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). He is, in other words, very well-qualified to both integrate Combatant Command intelligence civilians as DIA has been doing for the past year; and very well qualified to avoid conflict with those things the US IC does well, while directing the creation of HUMINT and all-source analytic capabilities he knows cannot be obtained by DoD from CIA.⁸¹

RECOMMENDED

RECOMMENDED

Clandestine HUMINT

From where I sit, CIA has become useless. It refuses to abandon official cover and it has proven incapable of scaling up non-official cover despite spending tens of millions if not more on up to 21 "pseudo-companies," 20 of which had to be shut down recently.¹⁶¹ At the same time, CIA's young case officers (C/O) and analysts (the majority of the CIA analytic population now has less than five years employment at CIA) deprive CIA of any claim to special competence in HUMINT or all-source intelligence.¹⁶²

AS AMENDED

DoD has until recently been unwilling to challenge CIA, and kept most of its covert and clandestine activities in "hip-pocket" mode, as best I can tell from open sources. Now I believe that DoD recognizes that if it wants to achieve world-class intelligence capabilities across the board, it must create them for itself, and I write this article in part to help DoD get it right.

In clandestine HUMINT, something I care deeply about, one needs to nurture leaders with open minds, and ideally leaders with very strong backgrounds in unconventional and irregular operations. Nothing handicaps clandestine HUMINT more than conventional mind-sets (i.e. uniformed leaders lacking clandestine experience), combined with lawyers afraid of their own shadow.¹⁶³

I helped think about the clandestine service of the future, and saw clever recommendations ignored by a succession of CIA leaders. Here are the five slices of clandestine HUMINT that I would like to help create completely apart from CIA, which I would convert into a single Classified Technical Intelligence Agency (CTIA), with one floor for each of the technical disciplines. The existing D/CIA could become the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Technical Collection Management, while the D/DIA becomes the Deputy Director for Human and Open Source Collection Management, as well as All-Source Analysis.¹⁶⁴

- 1/5: Exceptionally talented entry-level citizens to serve as lifers
- 1/5: Mid-career US citizens who have created their cover & access
- 1/5: Mid-career foreign nationals who have created cover & access
- 1/5 Mid-career case officers from other countries on rotation
- 1/5 "It's just business" one time business deals with no further ado

Although CIA counter-terrorism managers have done some very good hiring—I love the quote, "The college degree can come later" when hiring a foreigner with access as a GS-15—on balance we need a new non-official service.¹⁶⁵