

Fusion Centres – Lessons Learned

A study of coordination functions for intelligence and security services

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Title: Fusion Centres – Lessons Learned
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Preface

“Fusion Centres – Lessons Learned” was the working title for the project theme on the intelligence area 2011-2012 conducted under the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency’s research support for CATS. The author of the report is Gudrun Persson (now Swedish Defence Research Agency), supported by Bertil Höckerdahl, former head of the Swedish National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment and now working at CATS. Trainee Linnéa Arnevall has been supporting with background research.

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Fusion Centres – Lessons Learned

Summary

This study of various countries' experiences of so-called fusion centres – created to bring together a range of government agencies, their information and intelligence, in order to better understand and address critical threats to the nation, especially terrorism – identifies a number of common issues.

- Perhaps the most important finding of this study is that there must be an accepted and established concept of the centre's purpose. Anchoring and acceptance of a fusion centre's task must exist at all levels in order for the centre to be able to fulfil the desired role in each respective country's intelligence and security structure.
- Trust is critical and decisive for operations. There must be trust and confidence between the fusion centre and customers, as well as between the centre and those providing information. Even within the centre, all of the participating agencies must be able to trust one another. In addition, it is critical that those receiving the report trust the centre's assessments, that the report is relevant, and that the customers have access to the centre's services. Trust between the centre and the other parts of the intelligence and security structure is critical for the centre's information management.
- The countries in this study differ in many respects and therefore they have developed their own solutions for creating a fusion centre to counter terrorism. There is no universal solution that will work for every country, because each country has its own unique conditions and needs.
- All of the centres in this study emphasized that it is important to have a close relationship with the customers, the government, government offices, and various agencies as well as with those agencies which are included in the fusion centre.
- Many of the fusion centres pointed out the danger of falling into a so-called "information bubble" dominated by short-term, narrow, and uncritical assessments. This could easily lead to the risk that certain trends and new threats are overlooked. There must always be resources available to make predictions, assess trends, and outline alternative developments. Close contact with the academic world as well as with other parts of the community and other services/centres are important for increasing the scope, depth, and quality of assessments. According to most centres, staff with significant experience and expertise is an important factor in avoiding an "information bubble".
- The elements that were integrated/merged in the countries studied included - to varying degrees – units within government offices, intelligence and security services, national police, border police, immigration agencies, agencies responsible for critical infrastructure and critical functions, and the agencies responsible for community management as well as regional security forces and the police. In most cases, it is both people and information that need to be integrated. Some centres address many different kinds of threats, but most of them focus on terrorism.

- According to most of the centres, having the right staff located at the same place (co-location) is the main advantage of the integration. The countries in this study located their fusion centres either at a separate location, within a government department, or within security services.
- The actual organization of the fusion centres also varied. Most of the centres have staff members who rotate between the centre and their respective home organization. Others have their own permanent staff members or a combination of permanent and rotating staff members.
- In addition to personnel, the availability of information is the most important resource for the centres. How information is handled - in particular personal data –is often governed by laws which vary from one country to another.
- The Cold War intelligence and security structure was not designed to deal with the post-World War II situation. Today's threats are multifaceted: terrorism, new types of extremism, organized crime, proliferation, cyber attacks, the fight for energy resources, collapsing states, and climate change. Not only states can pose a threat. Even individuals, terrorists, criminal groups, insurgents, resistance movements, and private companies can be threatening actors. All countries, even small ones, are now more globally dependent. The need for international cooperation will continue to grow, and tomorrow's intelligence and security structures are likely to become more dependent on multilateral international cooperation.
- The coupling of the new global threats also means that the boundary between internal and external becomes fuzzy. Domestic and foreign intelligence services can no longer optimize their work based on their own needs; instead, their work has to be coordinated based on a consideration of national needs. The trend shows the increasing imperative of a coordinated national approach to intelligence and security.
- Major terrorist attacks require broad national crisis management, and serious terrorist threats require decisions and actions from many different agencies. More agencies and sections within the government offices must have similar situation awareness and a common target.
- The need for flexibility is increasing both within agencies/services and the intelligence and security structure. Increased integration and the creation of different types of fusion centres can contribute to increasing the flexibility of the intelligence and security structure so that it can fairly quickly respond to emerging needs.

1. Background, purpose, and presentation of the problem

The aim of the project was to analyze through comparative study different countries' experiences of so-called fusion centres. Another aim was to use the analysis to identify key lessons from the establishment of fusion centres – centres designed to put together information and intelligence from a variety of sources to understand and anticipate threats to the nation, terrorism usually foremost among them. . The project only examined fusion centres on the national level. Study visits were made to various fusion centres - as well as ministries, government agencies, universities, and think tanks with relevant knowledge of the intelligence community in Australia, New Zealand, USA, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Furthermore, the head of the JTAC (The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre) provided valuable information about the British experience at a workshop in Stockholm. In addition, published articles and books in the field were used, and these sources are found in Chapter 8, "List of References."

In order to compare the various national fusion centres, a number of questions were generated based on the following discussion points:

- Relations between the fusion centres and the rest of the intelligence community.
- The development of methods between the fusion centre and other intelligence organizations.
- Focus on an all-hazards approach vs only counterterrorism.
- Involvement with preventive measures (e.g., PREVENT). Comparisons with the British CONTEST strategy.
- Various forms of academic and community outreach programmes.

Based on these general discussion points, a number of common problems expressed by the centres emerged. Those common problems defined the outline of this report. By remaining on a general level - without revealing any specific details – the issue of confidentiality was avoided. In addition, this approach enabled an open discussion in the intelligence and security community on experiences and lessons learned.

The report has been structured into chapters that represent each of the common problems expressed by the centres. Since the purpose of the study is to extract lessons learned, it is therefore useful to structure the report around these problems.

The introductory chapter deals with the questions of why and how the fusion centres were created, and why the variation between them is so great. The following chapter addresses the issue of trust building, which turned out to be one of the most important factors for the centre's effectiveness. Chapter five discusses the centre's relationship with the surrounding world, and chapter six examines the question of how information was integrated. The concluding chapter touches upon some of the lessons that the centres should take to heart and work toward in the future. Annex 1 provides a summary of the fusion centres, which was compiled with information from open sources.

2. Definition

First, the term fusion centre should be defined. A fusion centre is an entity where different units within the intelligence and security community and other agencies work together on one or more threats. This study only includes fusion centres at the national level. Consequently, centres in the USA located at the state level or lower are not included. The reason for that is the fact that regional centres often include a completely different set of problem areas in their work than those addressed in this study.¹

After the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 in the USA,² there was a dramatic boost in the number of fusions centres that were established. This can be explained, in part, by the increased need for cooperation between various intelligence and security services in order to meet the threat of terrorism which was perceived as increasingly acute. In 2003, Britain established the JTAC, and thereafter, several European countries followed suit.

3. Introduction – Why were fusion centres established?

In many countries, it has been increasingly difficult to meet the demands of modern threats, not the least terrorism, with their national intelligence and security structures.³ In addition, governments, agencies, and organizations have had different demands regarding terrorism. Needs and requirements have also differed between the government and the agencies, but even between different agencies.

Each country developed its own solution for establishing a centre for counterterrorism. These differences can be explained by the diversity among the countries regarding law and order, legislation, intelligence and security structures, history, size, tradition, and so on. Terrorism is a common threat, but this threat looks different from one country to another, in part due to differing political, social, economic, ethnic, religious and cultural contexts.⁴

Consequently, no one country can provide the perfect solution that can be copied and implemented by the other countries because the conditions and needs of each country vary greatly. However, it is possible to discern a number of general common factors that proved to be important for the functioning of each fusion centre.

It has not been possible to emphasize one single factor or to rank them, since failures in one or a few can destroy the success of others. Key success factors are also significantly affected by the conditions prevailing at any given time.

¹ See in particular “Permanent Subcommittee on investigations, U.S. Senate. Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers,” 3 October 2012.

² It should be noted that already in 1984 France had created a sort of fusion center called UCLAT (*Unité de coordination de la lutte anti-terroriste*).

³ Walsh, James. “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions are not Enough,” *JCMS* 2006, Vol. 44, No 3, pp. 625-43.

⁴ The compilation of the following scripture is a clear example: Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee (ed.) *Fusion Centers Throughout Europe. All-Source Threat Assessments in the Fight Against Terrorism*, Intersentia: Antwerp-Oxford-Portland, 2010.

One of the most important findings of this study is that there must be an accepted and established idea of which role a fusion centre should have and that this role can/should change or develop in light of international developments. This role must be anchored both at the national level (government, parliament) and among the relevant agencies.

What should be achieved? Whose needs should be met? How will the findings be used? Whose needs should be given priority? Which gaps in the intelligence and security structure should be filled and what should be developed? What needs to be coordinated or integrated? What should be included in a centre? The answers to these questions can be very different depending on whether they are answered from the inside or the outside the intelligence and security structure; consequently, this places different demands on how to achieve an accepted and well-established approach.

The issue of an all-hazards (or rather most-hazards) approach versus a strictly counterterrorism approach is significant here. Most centres are working on terrorism issues. Some exceptions exist, but rather these can be attributed to organizational decisions and are not the result of a changing threat.

In those cases where an accepted and well-established vision of a centre has been reached in a country, experience indicates that the fusion centre has worked well.

The physical location of the centres examined in this study varied. Some are located in a ministry, others are an independent agency, and some are part of another agency, most likely within secret services. There are advantages and disadvantages to all these solutions. Those located outside of the intelligence and security agencies may find it difficult to get access to all the information. Centres that are part of the intelligence and security agencies may find it difficult to take an independent position; for example, a strategic threat assessment may compete with operational considerations.

One distinct finding is that centres that do not have a proper location, where their participating organizations can work together, do not work as effectively as others - regardless if the centre is located in a separate building, within the government, or within security services. In some cases, the various agencies convene to write a joint report, which has been proven to take a lot of time and which is not particularly effective.

Those responsible for taking the initiative to form a fusion centre have varied from country to country. Many variations exist, ranging from an initiative from an individual agency to a parliament or government decision. The variation is in part due to differences in the various countries' governance, laws, traditions, and threat perceptions. It is important that someone takes the initiative and has the strength to push through the idea. When fusion centres are initiated from below, there must be acceptance and trust created at the government level (or the equivalent of that). If such initiatives have triggered the need for legislative changes, the process becomes more difficult if the initiative came from below. In cases where the centres are the result of decisions made by the government or parliament, problems with cooperation can appear between the different agencies and thus require extensive work.

The timing is also of great significance when making a decision on the establishment of a fusion centre. When there are changes in global development or when an extreme event (such as a major terrorist attack) has occurred, governments and agencies are expected to take adequate measures. During such times, it is often easier to reach a consensus on a centre's mandate.

4. "It takes time to create trust"

Trust is a crucial prerequisite for the proper functioning of any organization.⁵ When activities are classified as confidential or secret, trust is even more important.⁶ The majority of the centres that were studied for this report are located within their country's intelligence and security structure. Those centres that are not within intelligence and security structures still usually have access to information from their respective country's intelligence and security services. And therefore they can base their own assessments.

Trust between the centres and the customers is largely dependent on the customers' trust in the centres' assessments. Vital here is the relevance of the intelligence. Both require a close dialogue between the individual fusion centre and the customers; in turn, this increases the centre's knowledge of the unique needs of the customers as well as provides the customers with better access to the centre.

The fusion centres must know who needs what, when, how, and why in order to be able to provide relevant intelligence. A close dialogue increases the customers' awareness of the centre and its reporting. This leads to increased knowledge and understanding of how intelligence should be read and interpreted. Several centres believe that a combination of written and oral reporting increases the relevance of the reporting. The opportunity for questions, discussion, and feedback provides the customers with more opportunities to get answers to their questions and give them a better chance to understand the degree of certainty or uncertainty in the intelligence report.

This dialogue between those delivering intelligence and the decision makers can be a double-edged sword. The closer the dialogue, the more the risk of politicization increases. Politicization is not a new phenomenon, but it is full of nuances. This received much attention after the 2003 Iraq War. Greg Treverton⁷ made a distinction between five aspects of this phenomenon:

- Direct pressure
- "Cherry picking" - when decision makers pick their favorite analysis among several alternatives.
- The issue of questioning - that is, when the question itself determines the answer.
- "House line" - when a particular view on a question is completely dominant in the intelligence organization so that everything else is ignored.
- Shared mindset - usually self-imposed rather than forced from outside.

Nevertheless, awareness of this risk was high among all of the fusion centres in this study. There are several ways to protect against this risk, such as writing in an independent clause in the regulations to

⁵ There is a major scientific discussion on the subject of trust that is beyond the scope of this study. As an introduction, the following article is recommended: Marsh, Stephen, "Trust in Distributed Artificial Intelligence." In Cristiano Castelfranchi and Eric Werner, *Artificial Social Systems - Lecture Notes in Computer Science* (Berlin: Springer, 1994), 94-112.

⁶ Omand, David. *Securing the State* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), 300-302. See also: The Henry L. Stimson Center, *New Information and Intelligence Needs in the 21st Century Threat Environment* (Washington, 2008), 42-44; Betts, Richard K., *Enemies of Intelligence*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 74-103; Rovner, Joshua, *Fixing the Facts* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 185-209.

⁷ Treverton, Gregory F., *Intelligence for an Age of Terror*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 173-175.

the centre where it is stated that the customers are forbidden to ask the centre to make changes in their intelligence reports.

Trust between the centres and the countries' intelligence and security agencies is critical to information management and – for most of the centres other types of support as well (such as manpower). Information coming from intelligence and security agencies is usually confidential and sensitive in relation to other nations and in terms of protecting sources. Several of the centres studied mentioned that it is of great importance that the centre's staff members have a good knowledge of, a deep understanding for, and the ability to handle sensitive intelligence information.

Trust must also exist within the fusion centre - as well as in the other organizations. The only centres that indicated that this could be a problem were those that had staff members who had temporary postings from other agencies. Some of these centres reported that there is a risk when someone is, or is perceived to be, more loyal to their home organization than the fusion centre. These centres reported that they constantly have to work to get their staff members to feel a sense of belonging to the fusion centre so that there is no risk of mistrust between the centre's staff members. In addition, regular contact with their home organizations is very important for making expertise available.

According to an old saying, it takes a long time to build trust but it can quickly be destroyed. Well-established trust should be able to withstand one mistake if it is jointly and respectfully sorted out so that similar mistakes in the future can be avoided. Many centres stressed the importance of quickly addressing problems related to trust. If time is not allocated to resolve problems regarding trust when they are small, they quickly tend to become large problems that are difficult to manage.

Many fusion centres have felt a pressing need to provide their customers with a fast account of current events. They believe it is important to be able to respond and to be perceived as service minded. But constantly responding to current issues often competes with the centre's main tasks. Several centres have developed methods so with little effort they can provide at least a short account (crypto-phone) or dismiss the matter without jeopardizing mutual trust.

Reporting must be able to adapt to the current situation. A report must reach the customers in a timely manner and respond to what is relevant at that point in time. In most situations, the customers are usually pressed for time and do not have time to make use of extensive background descriptions. In other situations, background information is exactly what the customers need. Many centres have developed their activities in a way to increase their relevance to the customers. For example, one measure is labeling the reports as "Urgent", "Warning", "Threat assessment", or "Description" in order to help clarify the character of the report for the customers.

Several centres are focusing on developing better ways to convey clear assessments and to design report templates so that senior managers can benefit very quickly and directly from these estimates. Sometimes a well-worded headline can express the essence of the message.

In order to ensure that a report is received by the customers at the right time during an acute situation, it is often orally communicated (e.g., crypto-phone). Such oral reports can often be followed by a written report to confirm and, if necessary, extend the oral notification. Several interlocutors pointed to the need to be familiar with how a communication is structured in order to determine how long it will take a report to reach the correct destination. It is not uncommon that a written report can take days to reach the correct person if special precautions are not taken. The trust felt by a customer is tested during critical events (such as a terrorist attack in the country) or when the country's interests

are threatened. Whether the centre has sent out a warning or not, is crucial in maintaining the confidence of the customers.

The above experiences emerged, although in varying degrees, from all of the studied fusion centres. There was also a large variation between the centres in terms of how proximate the customers were, depending on whether the centre was inside or outside the country's intelligence and security structure.

Centres that are located within or near the customers (e.g., a ministry) provide greater availability. Centres within the country's intelligence and security structure often need to take special measures in order to be accessible and close at hand. Such measures include special cooperation bodies/individuals, regular meetings between the centres and the customers as well as placing greater emphasis and more time into establishing and maintaining good relations with the customers.

Some of the centres that are not within the intelligence and security structures suggested that they may not always have access to all of the information because the intelligence and security agencies do not have confidence in their ability to handle sensitive information. In some of the studied countries, this problem could be minimized by implementing government directives regarding informing the fusion centres. Often this was not enough and the centres have had to work hard to win the confidence of the intelligence and security agencies. Another measure has been to equip the centres with experienced and trusted staff members from the intelligence and security agencies.

Centres located within the intelligence and security structures usually do not have such problems with information management. Some centres, especially the larger ones, suggested that the intelligence and security agencies can experience a competitive relationship towards the centre or vice versa. This risk is greatest when knowledge is poor regarding the difference between the centre's and the agencies' tasks. According to several centres, information about what the centres and the other intelligence and security agencies are doing is an important and ongoing activity. Staff members, who have experience of the fusion centre and of the intelligence and security structure, help to reduce the risk of perceived competition. Others mentioned that close cooperation on various matters is another way to increase knowledge and understanding of each other's tasks.

5. The threat of the “information bubble”

Within all intelligence services - as in many other activities - it can happen that tomorrow's assessments will be identical to those of today and yesterday. This also applies to fusion centres. The next attack will be assumed to be similar to past attacks. It is easy to fall into a so-called information bubble with short-term, narrow, and uncritical assessments. As a result, new trends and new threats are sometimes overlooked and consequently the alarm clock function is lost. Here there is no clear pattern on how the various fusion centres have been organized or established. Yet, the experiences from the studied fusion centres suggest a number of factors that can reduce the risk of falling into an information bubble.

A very common risk is the current news trap.⁸ Here, an organization only has time to deal with the current issues of the day, and is forced to respond to the media headlines. There are several ways to prevent this. One way is to dare to say no. Another way is just to devote very little time to those issues that do not relate to the centre's core tasks and that do not change an existing threat assessment. Another way is to ensure that certain staff members focus primarily on the long-term perspective by making predictions, assessing trends, and considering alternative developments. Large fusion centres often have an organizational element that serves this purpose. In smaller fusion centres, there may be one or more analysts who are encouraged to be free thinkers, to ask the question "what are we missing," and to challenge assumptions.

Some centres suggested that extensive production plans may be one reason why they end up in an information bubble. Meanwhile, event-driven work must also be addressed. Overall, there is a risk that you do not dare to reconsider the production plans in the light of international developments, and this can result in the fact that important warnings and predictions are missed.

Although no one knows what the future will look like, most Western countries' intelligence and security services and fusion centres' assessments are strikingly homogenous. Paradoxically, this is the result of extensive international cooperation. In itself, this cooperation has brought a lot of quality to this kind of work, but it can limit innovative thinking, perhaps particularly in smaller nations. One way to try to avoid this is to not present only a single alternative, but several alternative trends or scenarios. Fusion centres should also have their own assessments and critically examine the assessments they receive from others. This means that even smaller countries can display more independence and objectivity on key issues. In turn, this can result in smaller countries making a valuable contribution to international cooperation.

One of the factors that was examined more closely in the study was the issue of academic and community outreach.

Close contacts with the academic community and other parts of society are of great importance in increasing the breadth, depth, and quality of fusion centres' assessments. It is necessary to know who has the highest competence on certain issues and current topics. Most often, these competencies are located at universities and colleges, government agencies, or organizations, but there may even be some individuals with unique skills. For the larger fusion centres, this type of cooperation is a natural part of their work. Some of the smaller fusion centres may have some elements of this type of outreach, but often not on the same scale or scope. As a result, smaller fusion centres are often more dependent on utilizing the connections of others (e.g., home agencies) in academic and community outreach.

Perhaps the most decisive factor for avoiding the information bubble is to have staff members with a lot of experience and good skills. Likewise, analysts should dare to share and maintain an independent opinion, yet at the same time be able to listen to others and be willing to acquire new skills and experiences. Fusion centres that have people with different skills and experiences, and perhaps even different cultural and social backgrounds, are able to increase the breadth and depth of their work. This is much easier to realize in larger fusion centres than in smaller ones. Nonetheless, all of the centres studied stressed the significance of having skilled and competent staff members. It is also important

⁸ At the same time, the ability to respond rapidly is important for maintaining the confidence of a center's customers. See Chapter 4.

that fusion centres ensure an appropriate mix of personnel between those with vast experience and young talent.

Competence requirements should, to a large extent, even apply to the managers of these types of activities. Managers play a crucial role in internal and external relations. They do not need to be the best analysts, but instead they should be the ones who form a common vision, provide direction, and create healthy working conditions so that the fusion centres' staff members can do a good job.

Many centres have quality control processes in some form. These often have great value in improving the quality of assessments. Some centres, however, mentioned that these processes may be the cause of missing perhaps the most important thing for an intelligence function: to warn and to predict major trends. Quality control processes can sometimes have a tendency to wash away unconventional information, or in other cases they can seek to reinforce messages to such an extent that they diverge too much from the original sources. In other cases, such processes can take such a long time that warning comes too late or that the response to customers' questions or concerns no longer interests them.

6. How does fusion work? The importance of integration

Integration of personnel and information has occurred in different ways in the studied countries. Exactly what is integrated has varied among the different centres. The scope of integration is largely influenced by the tasks that the centres must perform.

In the countries studied, the units that are integrated/merged are - to varying degrees - parts of governments, intelligence services, security services, national police, border police, immigration agencies, agencies responsible for critical infrastructure and critical functions, and the agencies responsible for community management as well as the regional security services and the police. In most cases, both staff and information are integrated, yet some centres have their own staff so the foremost task is integrating information from the different agencies.

The responsibility for coordinating terminology, methods, techniques, and regulations has often been delegated to the fusion centres. Some centres work with an all-hazards approach, but most of the centres focus on terrorism. Basically, all of the centres in some way work with issues regarding terrorism, although the definition of what constitutes terrorism differs from one country to another. Some of the centres make strategic threat assessments while others work with operational assessments.

One factor affecting integration is the fact that various threats are perceived differently in most countries, depending on the political, social, economic, ethnic, religious and cultural contexts. Likewise, social order, legislation, intelligence and security structures, economics, history, and traditions also affect what, where, how, and why things are integrated. Sometimes legislation prevents integration. The most common limitation is how information can be handled.

Almost all of the centres in this study have staff from various agencies co-located at particular locations. . According to all of the centres, joint staff locations are very important for ensuring good quality work. Furthermore all of the centres agreed that technology cannot replace personal contacts. Technical solutions alone are not enough for integrating information. One must also have good knowledge about the source of the information, who originally provided the information, and how the

information was collected in order to be able to assess the credibility of the information. This requires people who understand how the intelligence and security services obtain their information.

It is also important to be able to assess what is not known. By integrating staff from various intelligence and security services, who can then explain how information is collected, the quality of common assessments can be increased.

Where fusion centres are placed in each country varies. Typically fusion centres have their own location or are placed within a ministry or security services. In general, only the very large fusion centres are independent agencies located in their own building. The reason for this is that it is deemed they should be able to exercise some independence from the other agencies and they simply or naturally do not fit within any other agency. Centres where mostly intelligence and security services are integrated are usually located within the country's security agency. Centres that are a part of a ministry or department are usually located on the premises of the government office. A joint location facilitates cooperation and confidence-building, yet there is the risk that the centre is not perceived as independent.

How integration works in practice varies too. Most centres have staff members who rotate between the centre and the agencies included in the fusion centre. Some of the centres, foremost the larger ones, have their own permanent staff or a combination of a permanent staff with some staff members who rotate. The centres' experiences indicate that a permanent staff provides greater continuity and better expertise in the centre's area of responsibility, while a rotating staff means that the centre must spend time and resources on introductory courses. Simultaneously, a rotating staff means there is a continuous inflow of new ideas and better connections with the home agencies. Several centres with rotating staff suggested that they try to extend staff appointments in order to increase continuity.

In addition to the staff, access to information is one of the most important resources for the fusion centres. Yet in most centres, there are often some limitations. How information and, in particular, personal data may be handled are governed by laws that are different in each country. In some centres, staff members only have access to their home agency's information, and then it is up to the home agency to determine what gets communicated to the other organizations within the centre.

Most centres were set up as a result of central decisions: in some cases after an extensive investigation that led to parliamentary decisions and in other cases after government decisions.

After central decisions have been made, the government's and government office's intelligence needs and threat assessments become clearer. Likewise, changes in laws, regulations, and directives can also be simplified and implemented faster. Yet decisions made centrally can be perceived by those who should be integrated as forced integration. Those who feel that they have something to lose as a result of integration may not be willing to do their utmost so that the centre succeeds. The advantage of a model based on free-will is that cooperation is less resisted from within. On the other hand, such a model requires extensive work in order to anchor the idea on the government office level.

Why is integration necessary? Many of the centres pointed to the fact that the intelligence and security structures in their countries are based on the post-World War II situation. The changes in international development after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the rise of global terrorism in the form of al-Qaeda, the risk of pandemics, and so on require action in intelligence and security structures. Governments and other agencies now need answers to other intelligence issues. The need for threat assessments

regarding terrorism increased. National terrorist problems usually have an international component, yet many countries have separate agencies for domestic and foreign intelligence.

A terrorist attack affects not only the police and security services but also requires the attention of the government and various other agencies. These actions must be coordinated and based on a common situational awareness. Today, even a bomb in a village somewhere in a secluded part of the world can in just a few minutes become a government issue and can quickly require the attention of several agencies. Detailed information from many different agencies is now a prerequisite for making assessments at the strategic level. In several countries, the threat of terrorism has increased so that it is not just an issue for the country's police and security services, but also an issue for crisis management agencies.

7. Future challenges for fusion centres

Are fusion centres an example of the future model of a modern intelligence and security structure? Can they meet future challenges, or are they an example of Cold War structures that have seen their best days? In several of the countries studied, the emergence of fusion centres has been a quick and relatively simple solution.

Are more centres needed, or is it enough with just one centre that is responsible for all threats? Are fusion centres an indicator that the Cold War structure no longer corresponds to today's needs and that instead a new intelligence and security structure is needed? Should the legacy of World War II sooner or later be abandoned?

The Cold War intelligence and security structures were designed to deal with the situation after World War II. The old threats consisted mainly of the risk of a major military conflict between the two blocs, the East and the West. Security threats were also linked to this; for example, espionage and political extremism on the Right and the Left.

Today all countries are more globally dependent on politics, economics, trade, communication, crisis management, and so forth. Global problems affect everyone today – even small countries. The old intelligence and security structures are national, and international cooperation mainly occurs bilaterally. The need for international cooperation will continue to grow in importance, perhaps foremost for smaller countries which do not have a global capability. Tomorrow's intelligence and security structure will be, most likely, even more dependent on multilateral international cooperation.

Confidence and trust in sharing sensitive information in the long term must also even exist in multilateral bodies and not just in bilateral cooperation, as is the case today.⁹ The need for international cooperation is increasing, and countries must have a structure and an approach that not only allow participation but also contribute to the ability to receive international cooperation.

In the old intelligence and security world, the results of international cooperation stayed within one agency. Today – and even more in the future – the benefits of one agency's international cooperation need to be shared across the national intelligence and security structure in order to be able to better

⁹ Walsh, James. *Intelligence-Sharing*, op.cit.

meet current and future threats. Qualitative intelligence and security assessments, which provide support to governments and a wide range of agencies, must be based on all national – and international – information that is available and relevant.

There are a number of other threats that also must be addressed in the intelligence and security structure: terrorism, new types of extremism, organized crime, proliferation, cyber attacks, the fight for energy resources, deteriorating states, climate change, and so on. States are no longer alone in posing threats. Even individuals, terrorists, criminal groups, insurgents, resistance movements, networks, and businesses can be threatening players.

The new global coupling of threats also means that the boundary between domestic and foreign threats has become unclear. The boundary between the intelligence and security services become more and more difficult to discern. Security services spend more effort and resources into intelligence and also within a broader perspective in order to be able to put security threats into a context. Today, intelligence services spend a lot of time and work on the old classic security threats.

In both military and civilian international operations, it is usually security threats that are the dominant threats. It is not possible to make qualitative assessments based solely on external conditions, but an assessment must also take into account the information and conditions provided by domestic and foreign intelligence services. For this reason, the need for cooperation and collaboration between the intelligence services and security services is increased.

This also means that domestic and foreign intelligence services not only can optimize their work according to their own needs. Both their efforts need to be coordinated from a national needs perspective. Yet, it is not enough to increase cooperation on the government level. Governments and government offices must ensure that the focus and information to the intelligence and security agencies are coordinated in order to serve the country's overall needs, and they must also balance national vs international needs. The trend indicates the increasing need for a coordinated national approach to intelligence and security. At the same time, there is the development of a growing need for information sharing between intelligence and security services.

These new threats are not the only threat to national security. There is a need for broader crisis management in society. David Omand has called this a paradigm shift: from the secret government to the protective state. Consequently, this increases the need and ability of several stakeholders to manage intelligence. Everything from agencies to companies will have to be able solve their own tasks as well as ensure that society functions safely and as normal. More people must have the ability to receive classified intelligence. In turn, this will put demands on technology, personnel, and training.

Major terrorist attacks require broad national crisis management, and serious terrorist threats require decisions and actions from many different instances. Several agencies and the government offices must have the same understanding of situation awareness and a common vision.

The agencies that provide security and protect against new threats must have access to the intelligence within their area of responsibility in order to be able to take adequate measures. Operational issues have in most cases both a national and international coupling. Likewise, a single operational event can quickly become a strategic national and international issue. Strategic and operational intelligence and security services will become even more dependent on each other in the future.

The requirements for source protection and operational security must be balanced against society's most important task - to protect the public and society's important functions. The importance of being

able to make this trade-off is likely to increase in the future. The government offices and other agencies must be notified and receive intelligence in a safe manner.

All this highlights the importance that personnel in the intelligence and security structure have good knowledge of the government and government offices, other agencies, and society's most important functions. It is necessary to make relevant assessments of the new threats. There must be a greater understanding of the consequences of threats in order to better determine who needs to have certain intelligence assessments and why they need it. Good knowledge and experience in a country's intelligence and security structure is no longer enough; the international perspective must also be considered.

The technology that can be used in intelligence and security is evolving and is becoming more and more advanced. Yet at the same time, costs are increasing. Countries, in particular smaller ones, will probably need to focus on joint use of advanced systems or resources in order to be able to afford using the most modern technology in intelligence and security.

Almost all new threats have a global coupling, which subsequently has led to a great need for language skills. Both intelligence and security services have growing demands for expertise in several languages. At the same time, the availability of staff who have both the necessary language skills and required security classification is limited. As a result, this requires a better pooling of personnel within the intelligence and security structure, in particular in smaller countries.

In recent years, the pace of intelligence and security assessments has increased significantly. Customers of the intelligence and security want faster answers to their questions. It is a future challenge for intelligence and security services, together with the customers, to try to break this trend. Otherwise the risk is that the quality of assessments eventually becomes so low that no one has a need of them.

A large part of the customers' need for quick answers often can be attributed to the lack of dialogue and poor planning in collaboration with the intelligence and security services. Many activities are known well in advance, and therefore, it should be possible to require or anticipate what documentation is needed from the intelligence and security services.

One reason for the need for quick assessments is related to the fact that events are often unpredictable. Intelligence and security services need to help their customers with this so that assessments are still of relevance for the customers. However, it should be possible to develop methods and processes so that this work does not take too much time away from long-term predictions and assessments and lose relevance.

During the Cold War, the need for intelligence and security was relatively static. This meant that many parts of the intelligence and security structure dealt with the same issues decade after decade. Today, intelligence and security structures must quickly deal with new demands from their customers. September 11th, the Arab Spring, and the events in Syria, among other things, has meant that in the past years most intelligence and security services have had to reprioritize in response to their customers' new demands.

The increased need for flexibility and the constant change of priorities are likely to persist. The need for flexibility is increasing both within agencies/services and throughout the intelligence and security structure. Increased integration and the creation of different types of fusion centres can be one way to

increase flexibility and to respond relatively quickly to emerging needs. This assumes that fusion centres are phased out when certain issues no longer have the same timeliness or priority.

These problems and challenges have no universal solutions. Every country has its unique needs. Every country will continue to have its own unique social systems, management models, history, traditions, and legislation which in turn will affect proposed solutions. Intelligence and security structures must become more flexible and must constantly be current and relevant. They must also be able to meet the growing need for national and international coordination and that more customers will need to be included. The need to share information within the intelligence and security structure will not diminish in the future.

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Fusion centres – open source information

Here is a summary of the fusion centres visited as well as those European centres that are relevant for this study. Europe comes first and then the rest of the world. The compilation is based on information from each respective fusion centre's website or from other public sources.

Denmark

Background

The Center for Terror Analysis (Center for Terror Analyse, CTA) was established in the Danish Security and Intelligence Service on 1 January 2007. CTA was a result of the work carried out by a working group which was set up by the Danish Government in 2005 with the purpose of assessing the preparedness of Danish society against terrorism.

Accountability

CTA is a formal part of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, PET). PET is accountable to the Ministry of Justice.

Mission

Through analyses of the threat picture against Denmark and Danish nationals abroad, CTA contributes to the Danish government's overall efforts to counter terrorism.

CTA's contribution is to provide a tactical and strategic basis for decisions through assessments of e.g. terror related networks in Denmark and abroad that may be of significance to the terror threat against Denmark. This contribution supports relevant government agencies in taking the necessary measures to investigate and prevent terror threats as early as possible. Furthermore, CTA contributes to the national emergency management planning.

Organisation

CTA consists of 16 staff members from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Danish Emergency Management Agency.

The basic principle is that staff members from agencies crucial to the Danish counter terror effort are placed at the CTA on a rotation basis.

Products/Output

The products range from short assessments of specific threats to more extensive reports on terror related phenomena or trends. The CTA prepares the following types of analyses:

A. Threat assessments

- General threat assessments, including “Assessment of the Terror Threat against Denmark” which determines the national threat level. This assessment is updated on a regular basis.
- Assessments of specific threats – e.g. threats made on the Internet.
- Assessments of terror related networks in Denmark and their possible relations abroad.
- Assessments of threats made against specific events, locations, persons, or organisations – e.g. threats against VIPs, royal events etc.
- Assessments of the threat against critical infrastructure – both public and private.
- Assessments of terrorist groups and threats abroad.
- Analyses of terrorist groups and networks abroad that might have an impact on the security situation in Denmark.

B. Terror threat assessments that may be included in the travel advice issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and used as a basis for advising Danish nationals on the terror threat abroad.

C. Trend analyses

- Analyses of modus operandi and developing trends, both nationally and internationally.
- Gathering and processing national and international investigational experience in order to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts.
- Analyses of topics such as radicalization, recruitment for terrorism and ideology in order to, among other things, strengthen the preventive effort against terrorism in Denmark.

Home page

<https://www.pet.dk/English/CenterforTerrorAnalysisCTA.aspx>

France

Background

The Co-ordination Unit of the Fight Against Terrorism (Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terrorism, UCLAT) was created in 1984.

Mission

UCLAT's mission is to coordinate the efforts of all departments who are involved in counter-terrorism. UCLAT is also involved in taking preventive measures.

Organisation

UCLAT has approximately 80 employees and cooperates closely with the Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence, the Directorate General of External Security, the National Gendarmerie and the General Directorate of Customs.

Products/Output

No information.

Germany

Background

As a result of the 9/11 attacks and the fact that several of the hijackers had lived and studied in Germany, a new fusion centre, the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (Das Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum, GTAZ), was created in December 2004.

Accountability

GTAZ is accountable to the Ministry of Interior.

Mission

GTAZ mission is to counter terrorism.

Organisation

GTAZ consists of two separate assessment- and analysis centres: 1) the intelligence and information analysis centre (der Nachrichtendienstlichen Informations- und Analysestelle, NIAS), and 2) the police information and analysis centre (der Polizeilichen Informations- und Analysestelle, PIAS).

GTAZ has approximately 220 employees from a total of 40 state and federal law enforcement and both civil and military intelligence agencies. They are:

- Bundeskriminalamt
- Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
- Bundesnachrichtendienst

- Bundespolizei
- Zollkriminalamt
- Militärischer Abschirmdienst
- Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge
- Vertreter des Generalbundesanwaltes
- 16 Landeskriminalämter
- 16 Landesämter für Verfassungsschutz

The work of GTAZ is organized in nine different working groups where specialists from the various agencies participate. The working groups are the following:

- Daily situation reports, an exchange between the police and intelligence agencies.
- Threat assessments.
- Operational information exchange with regard to operational measures.
- Case evaluation, for instance false identification papers, weapons and explosives in order to find counter measures.
- Strategic analyses of international terrorism.
- Investigating the Islamic terrorism individuals, compare intelligence on suspects.
- Judicial status and measures with regard to individual foreigners or asylum cases.
- De-radicalization.
- Transnational aspects of Islamic terrorism.

Products/Output

GTAZ produces both tactical and strategic assessments.

Home page

<http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Standardartikel/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/Terrorismus/GTAZ.html>

Great Britain

Background

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) was created as the UK's centre for the analysis and assessment of international terrorism. It was established in June 2003 and is based in the Security Service's headquarters at Thames House in London.

Accountability

The Head of JTAC is responsible for JTAC's output, and thus for the setting of the national threat levels. The Head of JTAC is accountable to the Director General of the Security Service, who in turn reports to the Government's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) on JTAC's activities. An Oversight Board, chaired by the Cabinet Office ensures that JTAC meets customer requirements by monitoring the effectiveness of JTAC's systems for engaging with customer departments.

Head of JTAC takes responsibility for the other reporting that comes out of JTAC. The JIC itself only issues occasional strategic assessments on terrorism, most analysis is issued by JTAC on their own authority direct to customers in Whitehall, the police, overseas liaisons etc.

Mission

JTAC analyses and assesses all intelligence relating to international terrorism, at home and overseas. It sets threat levels and issues warnings of threats and other terrorist-related subjects for customers from a wide range of government departments and agencies, as well as producing more in-depth reports on trends, terrorist networks and capabilities.

The establishment of JTAC brought together counter-terrorist expertise from the police, key government departments and agencies. Collaborating in this way ensures that information is analysed and processed on a shared basis, with the involvement and consensus of all relevant departments. Existing departmental roles and responsibilities are unaffected.

Within the Security Service JTAC works especially closely with the International Counter Terrorism branch, which conducts investigations into terrorist activity in the UK. This enables it to assess the nature and extent of the threat in this country.

Organisation

JTAC operates as a self-standing organisation comprised of representatives from sixteen government departments and agencies. It forms a key element of the National Intelligence Machinery. Each agency pays for its personnel seconded to JTAC.

Product/output

JTAC's responsibility for assessing the level and nature of the threat from international terrorism was described in "Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare – The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism", a document published by the Government in March 2009.

For a brief summary of current threats, see their page on the threat to the UK from international terrorism (<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism/international-terrorism/international->

terrorism-and-the-uk.html). See also their page on the UK's threat level system (<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism/threat-levels.html>).

Home page

<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/organisation/joint-terrorism-analysis-centre.html>

The Netherlands

Background

The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTb) was created in 2005.

The new Office of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) was officially launched on 1 October 2012 to increase the effectiveness of the government's efforts to combat terrorism. Its tasks concern national security, crisis management, counter-terrorism and cyber security. NCTV is responsible for:

- Analysing intelligence and other information.
- Policy development.
- Coordinating anti-terrorist security measures.

Accountability

The NCTV is accountable to the Minister of Security and Justice.

Mission

The task of NCTV is to minimize the risk and fear of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands and to take prior measures to limit the potential impact of terrorist acts. The NCTV is responsible for the central coordination of counter-terrorism efforts and ensures that cooperation between the parties involved is and remains of a high standard.

Organisation

Approximately twenty agencies and consultative bodies are involved in combating terrorism. NCTV was appointed to coordinate their combined efforts in every area of counter-terrorism in order to systematically improve the effectiveness of their cooperation. NCTV consists of:

- The Strategy and Operational Management Department
- The Cyber Security Department
- The Surveillance, Protection and Civil Aviation Security Department

- The Resilience Department
- The Threat and Risk Analysis Department
- The National Crisis Centre

The NCTV's core tasks are:

- The NCTV collates, analyses and integrates the information provided by intelligence services, the scientific community, government and other sources so that integrated analyses, threat assessments and other knowledge products pertaining to terrorism and radicalisation can be generated and used as resources for developing policy.
- The NCTV develops clear, cohesive and unambiguous counter-terrorism policy, including and strategic and international policy.
- The NCTV coordinates the collaborative efforts of the organisations involved in counter-terrorism. This applies to both systematic and incidental cooperation.
- The NCTV is responsible for managing the communication strategy, which includes providing information about terrorism to the public and the media.
- The NCTV is responsible for maintaining, implementing and modernising the national surveillance and protection system.
- The NCTV is responsible for the civil aviation security.
- The NCTV monitors the civil aviation security.

Civil aviation security and the surveillance and protection system are not concerned exclusively with terrorist threats but also with other sources of danger such as violent demonstrators and confused individuals.

Products/Output

The NCTV collects analyses and integrates the information provided by intelligence services, the scientific community, government and other sources so that integrated analyses, threat assessments and other knowledge products pertaining to terrorism and radicalization can be generated and used as resources for developing policy.

The NCTV develops clear, cohesive and unambiguous counter-terrorism policy, including and strategic and international policy.

Home page

<http://english.nctv.nl/>

Spain

Background

After the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004 the so-called 3/11 Commission discovered a number of problems related coordination and cooperation between the Interior Ministry and the National Intelligence Centre (CNI). As a consequence of this, the National Anti-terrorism Coordination Centre was created (Centro Nacional de Coordinación Antiterrorista, CNCA) later in 2004.

Accountability

The CNCA is accountable to the Minister of Interior.

Mission

CNCA's mission is to provide analysis of intelligence and information. The CNCA is also involved in taking preventive measures.

CNCA is to provide an integrated approach to counter-terrorism through the coordinated treatment of terrorism-related strategic information pertaining to both domestic and international terrorist threats.

CNCA's purpose is twofold: 1) to serve as a forum for the reception, processing and assessment of strategic information in order to provide risk-assessments and plan operational responses to all terrorist threats facing Spain, and 2) to act as a coordinating body for sharing and use of operational information collected during the course of counter-terrorism investigations carried out by the state law enforcement bodies, the National Police Corps and the Civil Guard.

Organisation

CNCA is staffed mainly by people from the national police and the civil guard, but also has personnel from ministries and the military.

Products/Output

Through reception, analysis and assessment of the available terrorist-related information, the CNCA is responsible for:

- Providing ongoing assessments of the terrorist threat.
- Maintaining the initiative in the fight against terrorism.
- Identifying possible opportunities for interventions to tackle terrorist threats.
- Planning the response to terrorist threats and/or attacks.

- Coordinating collected operational information to avoid duplication and/or overlap in anti-terrorist investigations.

The final results are intelligence products of various kinds such as assessment reports, draft reports on specific events or periods of time, and/or periodic reports. CNCA may also issue warnings if it receives indications of an increase in the level of terrorist threat of specific terrorist actions.

Sweden

Background

The National Centre for Terrorism Assessment (Nationellt centrum för terrorhotbedömning, NCT) was created in 2008 as a fusion centre consisting of staff from the Security Police (Säkerhetspolisen, SÄPO), military intelligence (Militära Underrättelse- och Säkerhetstjänsten, MUST) and the signals intelligence agency (Försvarets radioanstalt, FRA).

Accountability

NCT is accountable to an advisory board with the Directors of the Security Police, military intelligence and the signal intelligence agency.

Mission

NCT's mission is to produce strategic assessments of terrorism in both a short and long term perspective that is, or can become, a threat against Swedish interests.

Organisation

The work of NCT is lead by a Director, and each participating agency provides staff on rotation. Each agency pays for their staff.

Products/Output

The NCT produces long- and short-term strategic assessments of the terrorist threat against Sweden and Swedish interests. The NCT is also tasked with producing strategic analyses of incidents, trends and international developments with a bearing on terrorism that may affect Sweden and Swedish interest today or in the future.

The NCT sets the terrorist threat level for which the Director General of the Swedish Security Police is accountable.

Home page

<http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/terrorism/samverkansradetmotterrorism/nationelltcentrumforterrorhotbedomning.4.5f87e9a91332c201d7e8000331.html>

Australia

Background

The National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) was created in May 2004 in order to bring together various Australian government agencies.

Accountability

NTAC is a section (“a Centre”) of the Australian National Security Service (ANSS). ANSS briefs the Attorney-General on all major issues affecting security and he/she is also informed of operations when considering granting warrants enabling its special investigative powers. Furthermore, the Attorney-General issues guidelines with respect to the conduct of investigations relating to politically motivated violence and its functions of obtaining intelligence relevant to security.

Mission

NTAC has “a role in” collecting, monitoring, collating and analysing all threat intelligence available to the Australian government.

Organisation

NTAC is located in Australia's National Security Intelligence Services (ASIO) Central Office in Canberra and includes attached officers from the:

- Australian Federal Police
- Australian Secret Intelligence Service
- Defence Intelligence Organisation
- Defence Signals Directorate
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- Department of Transport and Regional Services
- Office of National Assessments

Attached officers have online access to their own agency's communications systems and databases.

This allows for connectivity and coordination between agencies and provides greater assurance that all relevant information available to the Australian government is assessed and reflected in threat

assessment advice. NTAC's 24/7 threat assessment capability has enhanced ASIO's capability to disseminate advice in response to developments in the security environment in Australia and internationally.

Threat Assessments

No official policy on threat assessments.

Home page

<http://www.asio.gov.au/ASIO-and-National-Security/Units/NTAC.html>

Canada

Background

The Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) has been operational since 15 October 2004. ITAC was previously called Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, but was renamed in June 2011.

Accountability

ITAC is a functional part of the Canadian security service (CSIS) and is therefore a subject to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service ACT, i.e. it is likely that ITAC also reports directly to the “Minister” (http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_199611_27_e_5058.html).

Mission

ITAC's primary objective is to produce comprehensive threat assessments, which are distributed within the intelligence community and to first-line responders, such as law enforcement, on a timely basis. Its assessments, based on intelligence and trend analysis, evaluate both the probability and potential consequences of threats. Such assessments allow the Government of Canada to coordinate activities in response to specific threats in order to prevent or mitigate risks to public safety.

Organisation

With a budget of 30 million dollars over five years, ITAC is a functional component of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). It is housed within CSIS headquarters in Ottawa, and supported 24/7 by the CSIS Threat Management Centre.

ITAC works closely with the National Security Advisor (NSA) who, in consultation with the Director of CSIS, appoints ITAC's Director. Twice a year, the NSA chairs ITAC's Management Board meeting, attended by deputy ministers from participating organisations, to review ITAC's performance. An

Assessment Management Committee, composed of assistant deputy ministers from participating organisations, provides advice to the Management Board on the focus, effectiveness and efficiency of ITAC activities. This committee and the NSA assist the ITAC Director in establishing threat assessment priorities. ITAC is required to submit an annual report to Cabinet.

ITAC is a community-wide resource. It is staffed by representatives of the following organisations, who are usually seconded to ITAC for a period of two years:

- Public Safety Canada
- Canadian Security Intelligence Service
- Canada Border Service Agency
- Communications Security Establishment
- Department of National Defence
- Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
- Privy Council Office
- Transport Canada
- Correctional Service Canada
- Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- Ontario Provincial Police
- Sûreté du Québec

These representatives bring the information and expertise of their respective organisations to ITAC. When required, ITAC can also draw upon the specialized knowledge of other federal government agencies, such as Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Health Canada, Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada.

Canadian security will increasingly depend on the country's ability to contribute to international security. Accordingly, the Government of Canada, through ITAC, is promoting a more integrated international intelligence community by cooperating with foreign integrated threat assessment centres, including the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, in Britain; the National Counterterrorism Center, in the United States; the National Threat Assessment Centre, in Australia; and the Combined Threat Assessment Group, in New Zealand.

Threat Assessments

Threat assessments produced by ITAC are related to possible terrorist attacks, terrorist trends and special events taking place in Canada and globally. ITAC assessments are also used in the development of international travel advisories and in the development of threat and risk assessments

for Canadian missions, interests, and persons abroad. CSIS publish number of reports on this matter (<http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/index-eng.asp>).

Home page

<http://www.itac.gc.ca/index-eng.asp>

<http://www.csis.gc.ca/nwsrm/bckgrndrs/bckgrndr13-eng.asp>

New Zealand

Background

While the terrorist threat to New Zealand is currently assessed as low, terrorism is a growing international problem. This means that New Zealand needs to take the threat seriously. There are individuals and groups in New Zealand with links to overseas organisations that are committed to acts of terrorism, violence and intimidation. There are extremists who advocate using violence to impress their own political, ethnic or religious viewpoint on others.

Counter-terrorism is an important part of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) work. NZSIS collects intelligence related to terrorist activity and, through its links with other security and intelligence organisations overseas, it monitors as closely as possible the movements of known terrorists around the world. Also located and hosted within NZSIS is an interdepartmental group, called the Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) that was created in 2004.

In New Zealand the Police Commissioner is accountable for the operational response to threats to national security, including terrorism, and has a key role through The Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC).ODESC is made up of different government and non-government agencies which work together to manage New Zealand's wider counter-terrorism efforts.

The Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 provides for a list of terrorist entities to be established and maintained in New Zealand. Police are responsible for coordinating requests to the Prime Minister for designation as a terrorist entity.

Accountability

CTAG appear to be a part of the intelligence service. The Service's Chief Executive, the Director of Security, is appointed by the Governor-General. The Director is responsible to the Minister in Charge (usually the Prime Minister).

Mission

CTAG's mission is to inform government's risk management processes by providing timely and accurate assessment of terrorist and criminal threats of physical harm to New Zealanders and New Zealand interests.

Organisation

NZSIS is represented within CTAG, as are other agencies. These include:

- New Zealand Police
- Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB)
- New Zealand Defence Force
- Maritime New Zealand, and
- New Zealand Customs Service.

Threat Assessments

No official policy on threat assessments. However, there is a "Security and Risk Group" (SRG) that may or may not be of interest. SRG appears to be focused on strategic issues (<http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dess>).

Home page

<http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/work/terrorism.html>

<http://www.police.govt.nz/service/counterterrorism>

USA

Background

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established by Presidential Executive Order 13354 in August 2004, and codified by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). NCTC implements a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission: "Breaking the older mold of national government organizations, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies."

Accountability

The Director of NCTC is a Deputy Secretary-equivalent with a unique, dual line of reporting: (1) to the President regarding Executive branch-wide counter-terrorism planning, and (2) to the Director of

National Intelligence (DNI) regarding intelligence matters. NCTC follows the policy direction of the President, and National and Homeland Security Councils.

Mission

NCTC's core missions are derived primarily from IRTPA, as supplemented by other statutes, Executive Orders, and Intelligence Community Directives. NCTC's mission statement succinctly summarizes its key responsibilities and value-added contributions: "Lead our nation's effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort."

Organisation

NCTC is staffed by more than 500 personnel from more than 16 departments and agencies (approximately 60 percent of whom are detailed to NCTC). NCTC is organisationally part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

Threat Assessments

By law, NCTC serves as the primary organisation in the United States Government (USG) for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to counter-terrorism (except for information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism).

NCTC integrates foreign and domestic analysis from across the Intelligence Community (IC) and produces a wide-range of detailed assessments designed to support senior policymakers and other members of the policy, intelligence, law enforcement, defence, homeland security, and foreign affairs communities. Prime examples of NCTC analytic products include items for the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and the daily National Terrorism Bulletin (NTB). NCTC is also the central player in the ODNI's Homeland Threat Task Force, which orchestrates interagency collaboration and keeps senior policymakers informed about threats to the Homeland via a weekly update.

NCTC leads the IC in providing expertise and analysis of key terrorism-related issues, with immediate and far-reaching impact. For example, NCTC's Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group leads the IC's efforts on radicalization issues. NCTC's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Counterterrorism Group pools scarce analytical, subject matter, and scientific expertise from NCTC and CIA on these critical issues.

NCTC also evaluates the quality of CT analytic production, the training of analysts working CT, and the strengths and weaknesses of the CT analytic workforce. NCTC created the Analytic Framework for Counterterrorism, aimed at reducing redundancy of effort by delineating the roles of the IC's

various CT analytic components. NCTC also created a working group for alternative analysis to help improve the overall rigor and quality of CT analysis.

By law, NCTC serves as the USG's central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups. NCTC also provides USG agencies with the terrorism intelligence analysis and other information they need to fulfill their missions. NCTC collocates more than 30 intelligence, military, law enforcement and homeland security networks under one roof to facilitate robust information sharing. NCTC is a model of interagency information sharing.

Through the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), NCTC maintains a consolidated repository of information on international terrorist identities and provides the authoritative database supporting the Terrorist Screening Center and the USG's watch listing system. NCTC also produces NCTC Online (NOL) and NCTC Online CURRENT, classified websites that make CT products and articles available to users across approximately 75 USG agencies, departments, military services and major commands. NCTC's Interagency Threat Analysis and Coordination Group (ITACG) facilitates information sharing between the IC and State, Local, Tribal, and Private partners – in coordination with DHS, FBI, and other members of the ITACG Advisory Council.

NCTC also provides the CT community with 24/7 situational awareness, terrorism threat reporting, and incident information tracking. NCTC hosts three daily secure video teleconferences (SVTC) and maintains constant voice and electronic contact with major Intelligence and CT Community players and foreign partners.

By law, NCTC conducts strategic operational planning for CT activities across the USG, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement to ensure unity of effort. NCTC ensures effective integration of CT plans and synchronization of operations across more than 20 government departments and agencies engaged in the War on Terror, through a single and truly joint planning process.

NCTC's planning efforts include broad, strategic plans such as the landmark National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP). First approved by the President in June 2006 and then again in September 2008, the NIP is the USG's comprehensive and evolving strategic plan to implement national CT priorities into concerted interagency action.

NCTC also prepares far more granular, targeted action plans to ensure integration, coordination, and synchronization on key issues, such as countering violent extremism, terrorist use of the internet, terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, and counter-options (after an attack). NCTC also leads Interagency Task Forces designed to analyse, monitor, and disrupt potential terrorist attacks.

NCTC assigns roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies as part of its strategic planning duties, but NCTC does not direct the execution of any resulting operations.

NCTC monitors the alignment of all CT resources against the NIP and provides advice and recommendations to policy officials to enhance mission success.

The Director of NCTC is also the CT Mission Manager for the IC, per DNI directive. Thus implementing a key recommendation of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. In that role, NCTC leads the CT community in identifying critical intelligence problems, key knowledge gaps, and major resource constraints. NCTC also created the CT Intelligence Plan (CTIP) to translate the NIP and the National Intelligence Strategy into a common set of priority activities for the IC, and to establish procedures for assessing how the IC is performing against those objectives.

NCTC, in partnership with NSC and HSC, is leading reform of CT policy architecture to streamline policymaking and clarify missions.

Home page

<http://www.nctc.gov/>

Fusion Centres – Lessons Learned

After the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 in the USA, it became apparent to many countries that coordination functions between intelligence and security services must be strengthened. There was a dramatic boost in the number of fusions centres. This can be explained by the increased need for cooperation between various intelligence and security services in order to meet the threat of terrorism which was perceived as increasingly acute. In 2003, Britain established the JTAC, and thereafter, several European countries followed suit. The traditional legal boundaries since the Cold War between foreign intelligence services and domestic security services needed to be reviewed in the light of the increased terrorist threat where the distinctions became increasingly obsolete.

This study examines different solutions to this challenge. It deals with fusion centres at the national level, and examines future ambitions.



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