



Chief of Army's Reading List

CHIEF OF ARMY'S READING LIST

Land Warfare Studies Centre
Canberra
2012

© Commonwealth of Australia 2012

This work is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of study, research, criticism or review (as permitted under the *Copyright Act 1968*), and with standard source credit included, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission.

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-In-Publication Entry

Title: Chief of Army reading list / edited by Jeffrey Grey.

Edition: Revised and updated ed.

ISBN: 9780642297655 (pbk.)

Series: Study paper (Land Warfare Studies Centre (Australia)) ; no. 323.

Subjects: Australia. Army--Bibliography.

Australia. Army--History--Bibliography.

Armed Forces--Bibliography.

Armies--Bibliography.

Military art and science--Australia--Bibliography.

Other Authors/Contributors:

Grey, Jeffrey, 1959-

Land Warfare Studies Centre (Australia)

Dewey Number: 016.3560994

Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Papers

ISSN 1442-8547

Study papers produced by the Land Warfare Studies Centre are vehicles for progressing professional discussion and debate concerning military strategy, particularly the application of land warfare concepts and capabilities to the security of Australia and its interests. Study papers are intended to provide comprehensive treatment of their subject matter at the time of publication.

Series Editor: Michelle Lovi

Land Warfare Studies Centre

The Australian Army established the LWSC in July 1997 through the amalgamation of several existing staffs and research elements.

The charter of the LWSC is to promote the wider understanding and appreciation of land warfare; provide an institutional focus for applied research into the use of land power by the Australian Army; and raise the level of professional and intellectual debate within the Army. The LWSC fulfils these roles through a range of internal reports and external publications; a program of conferences, seminars and debates; and contributions to a variety of professional, academic and community forums. Additional information on the centre may be found on the Internet at <<http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/>>.

Comment on this paper is welcome and should be forwarded in writing to:

The Director, Land Warfare Studies Centre
Ian Campell Road, Duntroon ACT 2600
AUSTRALIA

Telephone: (02) 6265 9890

Facsimile: (02) 6265 9888

Email: <lwsc.publications@defence.gov.au>

Disclaimer

The views expressed are the author's and not necessarily those of the Australian Army or the Department of Defence. The Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise for any statement made in this publication.

Contents

Preface	1
Jeffrey Grey	
Introduction	3
Lieutenant General David Morrison, AO, Chief of Army	
The study of military history	5
Colonel EG Keogh, MBE, ED	
The relevance of history to the military profession: an American Marine's view	21
Paul K Van Riper	
Philosophers of war	45
The character of land warfare	47
Culture and conflict	50
Military organisational culture and behaviours	52
Strategy and doctrine	55
Logistics	58
Command and leadership	60
Intelligence	66
Professional ethics	68
Military innovation and adaptation	71
Amphibious warfare	74
Memoirs	78
Thinking creatively	81

Contemporary security contexts	83
Military history—general and contemporary	86
Australian Army History	88
Recent conflicts	95
Military and other fiction	99
Important journals, both professional and historic	108
Influential websites	110
Feature films and documentaries	112
Land Warfare Studies Centre Publications	121

Preface

Jeffrey Grey

There is no excuse for any literate person to be less than three-thousand years old in his mind.

BH Liddell Hart

Throughout history, successful soldiers have schooled their minds as well as their bodies, and have examined the challenges faced and experience gained by earlier generations through education and the widest possible reading. A soldier's most flexible and most effective weapon is her or his brain.

Many of the books listed here deal with the history of war (for war knows no nationality), and of Australians at war and of the Australian Army. History provides us with an understanding of where we have come from as individuals and institutions, and offers intellectual tools to help us analyse and understand the issues and problems of our own time within their context. The study of history also helps soldiers understand the shape and nature of war; the great Prussian theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, observed that 'war changes far less frequently and significantly than most people appreciate ... because the material culture of war, which tends to be the focus of attention, is less important than its social, cultural and political contexts and enablers'. The attainment of professional mastery lies in understanding and appreciating war in all its manifestations and dimensions.

Literature also plays an important part in the development of creative thinking. The fiction on this list shares a common focus on military themes and subject matter, but fulfils a wider purpose in posing important ethical and moral questions while serving to entertain as well as stimulate. Likewise, feature film can address broader truths even when it gets the basic military details 'wrong' in the interests of telling the story.

Reading lists of this kind do not provide immediate answers to short-term problems—there are other mechanisms and sources available for that purpose. Rather, in the spirit of the great nineteenth century German historian, Jacob Burckhardt, the books suggested here are not intended merely to make us smarter for next time, but wiser forever. One of Australia's greatest soldiers, John Monash, possessed a personal library of more than 4000 volumes with an emphasis on literature, science and, above all, history. Napoleon's great adversary, the Austrian Archduke Charles, thought that great soldiers were formed 'by long experience and intense study'. You will acquire the first by dint of your service; this reading list is a jumping-off point for the second.

(Dr) Jeffrey Grey

Editor

July 2012

Introduction

Lieutenant General David Morrison, AO, Chief of Army

As Chief of Army my first priority is to ensure the Army's soldiers are fully prepared to meet the challenges presented by current and future operations. This is best achieved through appropriate force structures, equipment and maintaining our combat skills through robust training in foundation warfighting. This requires physical strength and fitness. Just as important, a capacity to engage in a dialogue about the future operating environment and the future of Army is also essential; this is intellectual fitness.

Intellectual fitness may be achieved in a number of ways including participation in robust debate, being open to new ideas, being creative, thinking critically and having a desire to challenge the status quo. We must question our assumptions and form opinions that will stand up to rigorous scrutiny. This is enabled by a knowledge base built on experience and study.

This reading list has been designed to provide all ranks with a guide to publications relevant to the study of the profession of arms. Many of the publications listed are historical in nature, the study of history being important in broadening perspectives and in providing a start point to understand and shape the future. As in previous reading lists this edition is divided into themes varying from culture and conflict to strategy and doctrine. A novel addition is a feature films section.

This list provides a tool to help meet the challenging needs of our profession. Take time to read, enjoy it while you are doing so, and take pride in the fact that you are improving yourself as a member of our noble profession.

David Morrison
Chief of Army
July 2012

The Study Of Military History¹

Colonel EG Keogh, MBE, ED²

How do you study military history? How often have I been asked that question, and how often have I found that all the enquirer wanted to learn was how to pass an examination? If that is all you want to do don't bother to read any further, for I am afraid that I don't know any short cuts, I don't know of any substitute for work. But if you want to enrich your mind with the military experience of the ages, if you want to broaden your professional knowledge and enhance your capacity to command, if you want to really understand the nature and climate of war, the following paragraphs may be of some interest to you.

There are, of course, plenty of people who can see no value in history—any sort of history. Well, one of the outstanding characteristics of most of the great men [sic] of our age is their awareness of the historical context in which they stand. Would Winston Churchill have reached the pinnacle on which he stood without this awareness? Would Charles de Gaulle have been able to set France once more on the road to power and influence without it?

We cannot escape our past. Our whole culture—the way we think, the way we look at ourselves and others, our institutions, are the product of our national experience.

Military history is the story of the profession of arms, of the influence that profession has had on the general course of events, of the contribution it has made to our national life. We need to know something of the history of our army, of its exploits, for that history conditions our professional outlook. It explains why we find

1 This article was first published in the *Australian Army Journal* in January 1965 and again in 1976. It is again reprinted because of its continuing relevance as a guide to all those who undertake a study of military history.

2 Colonel EG Keogh (b. 1899, d. 1981), Royal Australian Infantry (Retd), was the founding Editor of the *Australian Army Journal* in 1948. He is also the author of numerous articles and books, including *Suez to Aleppo* and *The River in the Desert*.

it best to do things in our own particular way, and it constitutes the basis of our form of discipline.

Military Experience

So far we have talked in general terms. Can military history do more for us than that? To begin with, let us forget the expression *military history* and think in terms of *military experience*.

Now the knowledge that every professional person has is not built up entirely from his own experience. Far from it. Law, particularly Common Law, is a code which has been built up from centuries of experience of many men. Medical knowledge is a compendium of the things that have been found out about human anatomy by all the doctors of all the ages. Doctors don't wait to find out everything from their own experiences. When a doctor, or a group of doctors, engaged in research make a discovery they usually publish the result. All other good doctors accept this finding and apply it to their patients.

In other words, the doctors are learning from the experience of others. Should the soldier do less? As a rule a bad doctor kills only one patient at a time, but a bad soldier can get a great many men killed for nothing.

So let us think of military history as *the study of military experience*.

Actually, whether we know it or not we are continually using this experience. If we did not use it our ideas on many things would never advance.

For example, before and during the First World War British doctrine held night attacks to be more or less impossible. It was held that control was too difficult and direction too hard to maintain. Few night attacks were undertaken by the British on the Western Front. After the war this doctrine was maintained.

Then when the war histories came out an officer named Liddell Hart noticed the frequency with which the early stages at least of the most successful attacks had taken place in fog. Liddell Hart pursued this idea, and found that nearly all the big and successful British and French attacks had taken place under foggy conditions. On the German side the phenomenon was even more striking. Of their six attempts to effect a major breakthrough in 1918, only three were successful and they were shrouded in fog.

Liddell Hart then asked, 'If the most successful attacks were those which took place in fog, an accident of the weather which had not been planned for, would not night attacks be equally successful?'

The War Office nibbled at the idea cautiously and more attention began to be paid to night operations.

When Brigadier Pile (later General Sir Frederick Pile), who was at that time commanding the troops in the Canal Zone in Egypt, heard about Liddell Hart's

finding he said, 'If troops can attack in dense fog when they are *not* expecting it, they ought to be able to attack at night when they *are* expecting darkness.' He then proceeded to prove that it was all a matter of thorough training, and night attacks became accepted.

This change in tactical doctrine resulted directly from the study of experience in the First World War.

But the results did not stop there. If night operations became fairly general, there would be plenty of occasions on which one would want some light, perhaps temporarily. Perhaps one would want darkness up to a certain moment and then have the light switched on.

The tacticians stated their requirement and the engineers turned up with the answer—artificial moonlight.

So, from a study of the experiences of the First World War there evolved two things—a new tactical concept and artificial moonlight.

That, I think, is a fair example of the practical application of military history. Of course, those are not the only things we can learn from the First World War. The students picked out a few other useful tactical ideas, and they learned a lot about administering very large armies in the field.

We need to look at the failures as well as the successes. We need to find out the real cause of all the useless butchery, the real cause of all the shockingly bad generalship that characterized most of the operations on the Western Front.

Why were most of the generals such poor, pedestrian soldiers? What had happened to the heirs of Wellington, Frederick, Napoleon? Was it their training or the lack of it? Was it the prevailing professional outlook? Was it because too much emphasis was placed on the wrong values? For example, was there too much emphasis on sport and social activities and not enough on serious work and study? Or was it because they had failed to learn from military experience?

It was probably a combination of all these things, but it is at least certain that they had failed to read correctly the lessons of the American Civil War and the South African War.

They were still seeking victory in terms of the Napoleonic concept as expounded by Clausewitz. This formula postulated the massive assault as the essential ingredient in the recipe for victory. But they failed to take into account the principal lessons of the American Civil War, namely:

- The breech-loading rifle and the spade, used in combination, had made the defence too strong to be overthrown by Napoleonic methods.
- And since the American Civil War the machine-gun had enormously increased the strength of the defence.

- They ascribed the American failure to employ cavalry in shock action to amateur leadership instead of to the real causes—the breech-loading rifle and the carbine, and *trenches*.

The result of this failure to learn from the experience of the employment of these new weapons and methods was the terrible battles on the Somme and in Flanders. The effects on Great Britain's man-power and national economy were enormous and far-reaching. It was on these stricken fields that Britain's decline as a front-rank world power began, though the full effects were not felt until later.

And all this because her officer corps had failed to read the lessons of recent wars and to see therein the changes demanded by the introduction of new weapons. They did not have to speculate. The things experience had demonstrated had actually happened. Actual experience had demonstrated what would certainly happen in the future unless counter-measures were devised.

Let us take an Australian example of the misreading of experience. In the Palestine campaign of the First World War the Australian Light Horse Regiments were mounted infantry armed with the rifle and bayonet. They were not armed with the sword or lance. They were not trained or armed for the mounted charge. But at Beersheba one brigade did undertake a most successful mounted charge. And at a couple of other places the British Yeomanry, who were armed with the sword, successfully charged the enemy.

After the war, on the strength of these isolated actions, we arrived at the conclusion that despite the fire-power of modern weapons, trenches and barbed wire, the mounted charge was still a feasible proposition. The argument that led to this conclusion violated the rules of simple logic because:

- It failed to take into account the special conditions obtaining at the time of the successful charges.
- It failed to take into account the negative side of the question—all those occasions when a mounted charge would certainly have failed, and even the occasions when charges actually did fail.

This superficial examination of the available evidence, plus unsound logic, led us to arm our Light Horse Regiments with the sword. They were still carrying the things right up to the outbreak of the Second World War. Worse still, they were thinking about trying to use them.

From these examples it follows that close study of experience in the sphere of weapons and devices—new weapons, new machines, new means of transport, etc.—can help us very much in the development of tactical doctrine, organization and administrative methods.

What about the art of war, of strategy, of tactical insight, of leadership? It is in these fields, perhaps, that we can extract the most value from military history. It is in these fields that we really do need experience, and it is just these fields that first hand experience is so hard to get in peace. We can get this experience only by the study of military history.

If we become involved in a great war the army is going to expand very rapidly. Promotion is going to be correspondingly rapid. Some of our officers are going to find themselves in positions of great responsibility in the field, or writing staff papers which may influence governmental decisions. We need not find ourselves in those positions entirely devoid of experience. By the constant study of military history we can acquire the experience which we shall need very badly.

I hope to show presently that the acquisition of this experience need not be all hard work, in fact a good deal of it can be a recreational pursuit.

How Do We Study Military History?

Now, how do we study military history? Two things are essential, namely:

1. The wise choice of study material. I should like to leave that till later and go on to the second essential.
2. The development of a critical approach.

When you begin any piece of serious study, as distinct from the recreational reading which I shall mention presently, first think yourself into a highly critical frame of mind. Challenge everything; accept nothing without thinking about it.

For example, an Official History says something like this—‘The Divisional Commander ordered—etc., etc.’ Before you go any further think about that order. Think it out for yourself. Was it a sound plan? Did it take all the essentials of the situation into account? If you had been in his place, what plan would you have worked out?

Another example of challenge, of the refusal to accept statements at their face value, is to be found in the Australian offensives on Bougainville and in the Aitape-Wewak area. The necessity of these offensives was queried in Parliament, and one of the arguments put forward to justify them was: ‘To commit any troops to a passive role of defence ... is to destroy quickly their morale, create discontent, and decrease their resistance to sickness and disease.’ From this are we to assume that troops committed to an arduous offensive under severe climatic conditions are bound to have a higher morale and to be healthier than troops engaged in defence? It is true, as a generalization, that the offensive generates higher morale than the defensive. But is it

true in particular cases? And do you have to mount a full-scale offensive to maintain morale, or would a modified form of the offensive be sufficient? The formation on New Britain did not undertake a big offensive; it seems to have successfully maintained morale and the offensive spirit by aggressive patrolling.

Morale is an attitude of mind. In defence the correct attitude can be fostered by means short of full-scale attack. Take the 9th Australian Division for example. Besieged in Tobruk, the division maintained morale and the offensive spirit by 'giving away' the deep and commodious Italian dugout in favour of fighting trenches, by deep patrolling, and by establishing their dominance over no-man's-land—'Our front line is the enemy's wire, no-man's-land belongs to us.' After being shut up in the fortress for months on inadequate rations, the troops might have been a bit on the lean side, but they were still full of fight. And their health was surprisingly good—until, on relief, they got in amongst the fleshpots of Egypt.

Beware of generalizations. Ask yourself, always, is this statement true of this particular situation, of these particular conditions? Unless you cultivate the habit of asking yourself these questions you will degenerate into a mere mechanic, and a bad one at that.

In the beginning this takes up a fair amount of time. But as you gain in experience you will find that you do it almost subconsciously. One side of your mind is taking in the written facts, the other side is working on the problems. And that is just the sort of mind that successful commanders have and that all officers need.

Don't forget to apply the same critical approach to the administrative side of war.

Learn to read between the lines, particularly the lines of the official histories. Official historians expect their professional readers to be able to read between the lines. For example in speaking of Singapore, the War Office history says, 'Many stragglers were collected in the town and sent back to their units.'

What does this statement suggest?

In an advance stragglers are to be expected. Men become detached from their units for quite legitimate reasons. We provide for them by establishing stragglers' posts to collect them and direct them back towards their units.

But when we get large numbers of stragglers behind a defensive position, and a long way back at that, it suggests that units have been broken up or that there has been a breakdown of discipline somewhere. And that in turn suggests that the general situation had reached the stage when a lot of people had lost confidence, when morale was at least beginning to break down.

Once you have started to develop this critical, challenging approach you will be on your way to acquiring the habit of sorting out fact from fiction. Our history is full of great military myths, most of which we thoughtlessly accept at their face value.

Take, for example, the story of Dunkirk. This episode has so captured public

imagination that authors are still making money writing about it. It has come to be generally regarded as a glorious page in our military history. And so it is so far as courage, fortitude and discipline are concerned. But is this picture good enough for the professional soldier? Ought he not to see Dunkirk as a military operation stripped of all the glory? Looked at with the cold eye of the critical student, Dunkirk is seen to be what it actually was—a shocking military defeat which came within a hair's breadth of bringing Britain to her knees.

At the time Dunkirk was represented to be a glorious feat. This was fair enough because in it the British people found the spiritual strength to carry on the war. To that extent the soldier was justified in supporting the myth. But privately he needs to have a good hard look at the generalship—on both sides of course—which brought about this terrible disaster to British arms.

Each year in Australia we celebrate Anzac Day. How many of us look beyond the bands and the flags, and analyse the operations? If you want to ascertain how not to mount an amphibious operation, or any operation at all for that matter, you will find all you want to know in the real story of Gallipoli.

Sometimes these myths grow after the event. Sometimes they are deliberately created at the time and ever afterwards are accepted as truth, too often even by soldiers.

Take for instance the myth of the 'Spanish Ulcer'. Wellington's campaign in Spain was imposing a tremendous strain on the British people. The Government explained that the campaign was imposing a still greater strain on Napoleon, that the 'Spanish Ulcer' was 'bleeding him white'.

In actual fact the campaign was having far more damaging effects on Britain than it was on France. It is extremely doubtful if Britain could have continued the war much longer for the long-suffering public had very nearly had enough when Napoleon abdicated and retired temporarily to Elba.

We are often advised that the best way to study military history is to test the decisions, plans and actions by applying to them the principles of war. In my opinion this is a bad line of approach for the following reasons:

- It restricts the scope of our inquiries from the very beginning.
- It channels our thoughts along pre-determined lines, which is the thing to be avoided at all costs.
- In the world today there are several lists of principles, lists which differ from each other in substance and in emphasis. Which one do we take? Our own has been changed at least twice in my lifetime.

Suppose we reverse the process. Suppose we set out to test the validity of our list in the light of experience. I think that would be slightly better because it will at least half

open our minds to some original thinking. However, the object of our study is not to test the validity of this or that principle, it is to cultivate our minds, to fill them with the wisdom of experience. I suggest that the best way to do this is to set out to discover some principles, some constantly recurring patterns for ourselves.

We know that throughout nature similar causes always produce similar effects. If we can discover in the military sphere some recurring chains of cause and effect, some constantly recurring patterns, we will have learned much from experience. We will also be struck by the frequency with which the rules or principles established by these recurring patterns are violated. And we will be struck by the fallacious arguments put forward in support of each violation.

One of the clearest patterns that emerges from military history is the one which demonstrates the evils of failure to concentrate upon the attainment of the aim. Time after time, war after war, large forces are sent on missions which cannot possibly further the attainment of the aim. At the worst they jeopardize, or even prevent, the attainment of the aim because they weaken the main effort. At the best they are a wanton waste of human life. This pattern seems to apply at all levels of activity. In the field of strategy there is the example of the Mesopotamian Campaign in the First World War. Closer to home we have our own Solomons and Aitape-Wewak campaigns in the later stages of the Second World War. The real war against Japan had moved 1000 miles to the north. The Japanese forces left behind in these areas were isolated and helpless. They could do absolutely nothing. Why on earth did we engage in costly offensive operations to clean them up when they could have been safely left to wither on the vine? We could have collected the lot with scarcely a battle casualty when the main Allied forces brought about the collapse of the Japanese main forces.

My own reading over the last few years leads me to believe that we ought to have another principle of war in our list—the Principle of Command. It seems clear enough that the organization and maintenance at all times of a proper system of command is vital. By system of command I mean not only the commander, but the means, staff, signals, etc., to enable him to exercise command. At any rate the evidence demonstrates that neglect or failure to organize a proper system of command has frequently been the primary cause of failure at all levels. We are all familiar with the arguments about the organization of the high command. It is astonishing how often we come across failures to adhere to this principle further down the scale. In the Second World War in the Middle East alone there were at least four major failures of this kind. The chaos which prevailed in the later stages of the withdrawal from Greece, and probably the loss of several thousand men, was directly caused by the failure of GHQ to establish a proper command in the Peloponnese. And they had available the means of doing it. In all probability the real cause of the loss of Crete was the failure to provide the commander with the means of exercising command. Here again the means were

readily available. A corps headquarters was actually on the island. It was taken off and sent to Palestine where it remained unemployed while Crete was being lost for want of some good staff work. It remained unemployed while the first phase of the Syrian operations degenerated into a fiasco caused by a patently imperfect organization of command. After the battle of Gazala the whole structure of command in the Eighth Army was broken up, and remained broken up until Montgomery came along and promptly put it together again.

Throughout history we find time and time again a commander winning through the exploitation of the 'Line of Least Expectation'. That is to say, he found and used a line of approach which the defender had neglected to guard because he thought it to be an impossible one. We could produce a long list of examples of this. What would we learn from such a list? I think it suggests that we ought always to make sure that the impossible is in fact impossible—and then keep an eye on it.

Methods of Study

Methods of studying military history will vary to some extent with each individual, but I suggest that in all cases there are two essential requirements for success.

1. A critical, challenging approach.
2. A mind alert to discern recurring patterns, recurring chains of cause and effect.

Although method will vary with the individual, I think the following preliminary steps are necessary whatever method we pursue.

1. Be quite clear about the political aim of the war.
2. Be quite clear about the national strategy by means of which the political aim is to be secured.
3. Be quite clear about the aim of the campaign you are about to study:
 - (a) How does it fit into the national strategy for the winning of the war as a whole?
 - (b) How does it contribute to the overall aim?
4. Study the features of the theatre of operations, particularly:
 - (a) The terrain.
 - (b) The weather.
 - (c) The people (friendly, hostile, or neutral).

- (d) The communications.
- (e) Resources, including foodstuffs, skilled and unskilled labour, etc.
- (f) Climate for effects on health.

These four points constitute a firm base for our study of the campaign.

Now the actual method of study. Each individual must find the method that suits him best. One method I would suggest is to set about it as though you were preparing a series of lectures on the campaign. Actually write the lectures, remembering that each lecture has a time limit. This limit forces you to concentrate on essentials, to discard the irrelevant detail. When you have written a series of lectures which give an intelligible account of the campaign, and a running commentary, you will have learned a lot about it.

Now all this sounds like hard work and so it is. Unfortunately there is no substitute for work. However, there is another very important side of military history—the study of the human factor in war—which need not be so frightening.

The basic material which the soldier uses in his profession is human nature—men and women. He must know how people react to the stresses of war, and how they react to danger and adversity, to triumph and disaster.

Where Do We Find the Material?

Where do we find the material for the study of the human factor in war, of the actions, emotions and thoughts of ordinary men and women and of the art of leadership? Fortunately this part of our study need not be hard work. It can indeed be a recreation. Nearly everyone reads for recreation. Why not systematise this recreation and turn it to good account by reading for pleasure books with a direct or indirect bearing on the subject?

What sort of books should we read to give us an insight into the human factor? Well, we can read the heavy tomes with the psychological slant but we can hardly call them recreational. I think we will get on far better, we will acquire a deeper and more lasting knowledge of human beings at war if, with our minds always alert to pick out the lessons, we read:

- Biographies.
- Appropriate novels.

It is unnecessary to labour the value of biographies, but it is desirable to add a word of caution. The author is sometimes apt to be carried away by his admiration of the person he is writing about, to make out he was always right, to make him into too

much of a paragon of all the virtues. And the autobiographies, the books written by the actors themselves, very often suffer from the same defect. They seldom admit they were wrong and, writing from hindsight, they are usually able to prove that they were right. So read these books with a critical eye. Don't let yourself be carried away by the author's plausibility or eloquence. With this proviso these books are a very valuable source of information, and are generally quite easy to read.

Historical and War Novels

Now the novels. Don't despise the novelist, but make a distinction between the author who writes merely to spin a good yarn and the author, the serious novelist, who writes because he has something to say, some important comments to make. It is probably true to say that the novelist and the dramatist have done more to directly influence the development of thought and ideas than all the philosophers. While it is true that the philosophers and the thinkers produce the basic idea, it is the novelist and the dramatist who 'put it across' by translating it into terms which ordinary folk can understand and appreciate, into terms of universally experienced human emotions—love and hate, courage and cowardice, hope and despair. Consider, for instance, the tremendous influence of the novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. Up to the time of its publication there was a chance that the issues which divided the Northern and Southern States of America could have been settled by wise statesmanship and public forbearance. Its publication made the Civil War virtually inevitable. It focused all the issues upon a single point—slavery. It enraged the South and it inflamed the North. In far away Europe, particularly in England and France, it created a public opinion which compelled the governments to drastically modify their policies of active sympathy towards the Southern cause.

The First World War produced a crop of novels which profoundly influenced the course of events over the two following decades. With few exceptions all these books expressed the violent revulsion of the common man against the stupidity and futility of the dreadful blood-baths to which they had been subjected on the Western Front. You can learn all about the strategy and the tactics of the Western Front in half a dozen printed pages, for there was precious little of either to write about. But if you really want to understand, if you want to find out what the war was like from the point of view of the fighting man, read novels like *All Quiet on the Western Front*, *Not So Quiet*, *Her Privates We*, *War by ex-Private X*, *Covenant With Death*, etc. Read the poetry of Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen, and plays like *Journey's End*. Above all, read CE Montague's *Disenchantment*. Every officer ought to have this little volume of beautifully-written essays. He ought to keep it by his bedside and read a few pages every night. That will keep his feet on the ground and his head out of the clouds.

From these books you will learn more about the real nature of the First World War than from all the learned volumes of strategy and tactics put together. You will learn about the incredible imbecility of the worst vintage generals in all history, of the shocking staff work, of the sheer ineptitude of military leadership all the way down the chain of command. You will understand why the people who make and unmake governments in democratic countries cried out in revulsion ‘To hell with brass hats and red tabs, to hell with generals, we shall have no more of that nonsense’. And when you have understood that you will understand the motive force behind the policies of disarmament and appeasement which led step by step to the Second World War.

In Service circles it is fashionable to blame the politicians for this disastrous disarmament policy. Anyone who has given thoughtful attention to the literature of The First World War would know that this view fails to trace the chain of cause and effect back to its origin. The politicians were simply reflecting public opinion. That public opinion had been created by the war itself. It had been expressed, focused and consolidated by the literature of the war. Some of the writers, CE Montague for instance, went right to the heart of the matter—the downright ineptitude of the military leadership and the reasons for it—others saw only the result. If the soldiers had conducted their business more efficiently, as they did in the Second World War, the literature would have had quite a different tone. In the ultimate analysis of cause and effect the soldiers were responsible for the wave of pacifism which swept the democratic world after the war, not the writers or the politicians. They only expressed the public opinion which the soldier had created.

The novels of the Second World War reflect a totally different feeling because the field leadership at any rate was infinitely better. The value of these books lies in the presentation of the cold facts in a way which enables us to grasp the ‘feel’ of the thing in a very vivid manner. For example, we may read that the Allies sent to Russia by the Arctic route so many tanks, aeroplanes, trucks, so many millions of tons of shell, that so many ships were sunk, so many lives lost. All good stuff for a planner to know, but it leaves you stone cold, it raises no feeling at all. But if you read *HMS Ulysses* you will have a very good idea of what the cold statistics meant to the Allies in terms of human values—in terms of human courage, resolution and suffering. And if you read David Forrest’s *The Last Blue Sea* you will learn more about the impact of the jungle on young troops than all the text books can give you. If in the pursuit of your profession in peace or war you forget those human values, all the rest of your knowledge will go for naught. Those values are your indispensable tools of trade.

The Documentary

There is another, though rarer, type of book which presents both the technical and the human aspects of war in an easily digested form. I don't know the literary term for this kind of work. It resembles a documentary film which presents the dry facts of some particular aspects of life, or some particular persons or events, by clothing them with human values, reactions and emotions without passing into the realm of true fiction. The characters, instead of being creatures of the writer's imagination, are real people, people who have actually lived and whose actions have influenced the course of history. Instead of simply giving us the bare, and often unimpressive facts, the writer brings them back to life, recreates the scenes and the actions he wants to present to us. Treated in this way by a skilful writer, the facts we are seeking become more vividly impressive, more easily remembered and more easily read.

This form of literary expression has been brought to near perfection by a school of American writers. In the sphere of military history perhaps the leading exponent is Bruce Catton, whose magnificent works on the American Civil War vividly depict its strategy and tactics, the personalities, and the varying degrees of abilities of its leaders, the reactions of the troops to the ebb and flow of victory and defeat. All the great lessons are there, timeless as time itself—the results of half measures, of indecisiveness, of bad staff work, the influence of selfishness and personal ambition, the little things that go wrong and cause great disasters, the over-riding importance of the human factor with all its strength and frailty. These things always have been and probably always will be, the factors which determine the issue of victory or defeat.

In his book *A Stillness at Appomattox*, Catton gives us an almost exact representation of one of the major problems of the atomic battlefield—the exploitation of the hole punched in the enemy's defences by a nuclear explosion. The Union army faced the Confederates in strongly fortified lines at Petersburg. When several assaults had failed a Union engineer suggested driving a tunnel under a vital point in the Confederate works and blowing it up. That part of the programme was an immense success—what was probably the biggest explosion in any war up to that time blew a huge gap in the Confederate line. The rest was a pitiable fiasco. Through the neglect of elementary principles, through the failure to do simple things which could reasonably be expected of a junior subaltern, experienced generals failed completely to exploit the opportunity. It is remarkable how monotonously disasters occur through the failure to do simple, elementary things. History may not repeat itself, but by Heavens, the mistakes of history do. Are some of us going to make the same mistakes on an atomic battlefield?

Recently an Australian author, Raymond Paull, made a very creditable attempt to give us in this documentary form the story of the early stages of the war on our own northern approaches. His *Retreat From Kokoda* is, I think, the first military classic this country has produced. Despite certain attempts to discredit this book, it is chock full

of lessons which are of the utmost importance to the Australian Army. More recently an Englishman has given us the story of the destruction of the Normandie Dock at St Nazaire in *The Greatest Raid of All*. While this book lacks something of the power and sweep of the other works referred to, it could almost be regarded as a text book on the organization and conduct of an amphibious raid.

Some years ago, during a wet spell on a holiday, I picked up a book with the unpromising title *Prepare Them for Caesar*. Up till then Julius Caesar had been for me a shadowy, academic figure. In the book he came alive, a very human figure. Reading it I found what Wavell tells us to seek. I began to understand why men followed Caesar, why his soldiers stuck to him when his cause seemed hopelessly lost.

The great merit of these books—the novels and the documentaries—lies in the fact that they do not require hard study, they are truly recreational. Nevertheless every one you read adds a little more to your knowledge of war. Subconsciously your trained mind will be at work criticising, evaluating, picking out the lessons great and small, lessons which are more likely to stick because they are expressed by living, human characters instead of cold, inanimate print in a text book. Subconsciously the climate of war, the vision of men and women in action from the cabinet room to the forward area, seeps into your soul and becomes a part of your being. A sympathetic understanding of human nature will be created in your mind, an appreciation of its grandeur and its frailty, its varying motives, its hopes and ambitions and fears, its cruelty and its compassion. It is not sufficient for the soldier to be aware academically of the various facets of human nature. He must have a far deeper awareness than that. The best way to acquire that essential awareness is to read the works of good writers whose talent enables them to present human beings in a way which touches our hearts as well as our minds.

Conclusion

The officer who studies military history along the lines of recreational reading and analytical research will benefit in three ways:

First, he will develop a mind rich in the experience of war in all its aspects. The climate of war will become an integral part of his subconscious being. Without consciously thinking about it he will have a cultivated awareness of the pitfalls which strew the path of the commander and the staff officer, and he will be able to see the possibilities and the dangers of any situation or any course of action.

Secondly, he will develop the power of analysis—the power of breaking up the problem into its component parts, balancing one against the other, and arriving at a sound solution.

Thirdly, it will fill his mind with knowledge of human beings in combat, and that is essential knowledge for the soldier.

I have recommended two types of literature. Each type complements the other. The official histories give you the bare facts, the skeleton. The biographies, novels and the documentaries clothe the bare bones with the flesh of human beings in action.

Finally, remember that unless your critical analysis of fact is not tempered with sympathy and compassion you will never learn anything about humanity.

The relevance of history to the military profession: an American Marine's view¹

Paul K Van Riper

When I enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1956, the American military placed little emphasis on nontechnical professional education. The well developed curricula—much of it based on the study of history—that served World War II's leaders so well no longer existed. In their place stood courses dominated by political science and management philosophies. Fortunately for the United States, the situation altered considerably over the next forty years, although only at great cost. Advancing from private to lieutenant general during those four decades, I found myself initially a victim and later a beneficiary of military schooling.

The weak and uninspiring education system I first encountered might have survived far longer had it not been for the tragedy of the Vietnam War. That conflict and its aftermath provided the catalyst for much-needed change. At the center of the transformation lay a renewed interest in the study of military history. The American military's performance in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm and the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as its recent accomplishments in Afghanistan, offer compelling evidence of the value of the improvements made in the American armed forces between 1974 and 1991, none more so than the fundamental alterations in professional education.

In the following pages—after briefly outlining how the American military education system progressed over a century and a quarter only to lose its way in the

1 Paul K. Van Riper, 'The relevance of history to the military profession: an American Marine's view' in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession*, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Reprinted with permission.

early Cold War years—I have chronicled my own professional education and its importance to my development as a leader. I close with a cautionary note expressing concern that the gains of the past twenty years may be slipping away in a manner reminiscent of that earlier era.

The American military, along with many European militaries, evidenced a disdain for overt intellectual activities by its officers for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To most officers, such interests fell short in reflecting the manliness expected of those in uniform. Hard fighting, hard riding, and hard drinking elicited far more appreciation from an officer's peers than the perusal of books. Commenting on a recent study of the nation's military profession, one present-day commentator notes, "[w]e glimpse in finely wrought microcosm the current of anti-intellectualism that has coursed through American arms from its earliest beginnings to the present day."² Seeds of this anti-intellectualism remain, despite the efforts of several generations of reformers dedicated to improving professional military education.

Emory Upton, a U.S. Army officer who spent his adult life urging reform of the American military, laid the foundations of officer professional military education in the United States. Others in the early part of the nineteenth century, such as Stephen B. Luce, Tasker Bliss, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Elihu Root, built on Upton's initial efforts in their own attempts to further the professional development of officers. All met resistance in their time, but by the mid-1920s their ideas guided the study of war in most service academies, staff schools, and war colleges. History formed the core of much of the instruction in such institutions, especially in those courses focused on operations and strategy. During the 1920s and 1930s, Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Admirals Chester W. Nimitz and Raymond A. Spruance, and a host of other World War II leaders attended classes enriched with military history. Many later attested to the importance of that historically grounded education. In his autobiography, Eisenhower described his time at the Army's Command and General Staff School—from which he graduated first in the class of 1926—as "a watershed in my life."³

2 Lloyd J. Matthews, "The Unified Intellectual and His Place in American Arms," *Army Magazine*, July 2002, p. 1. The book he references is William Skelton, *The American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861*.

3 Dwight D. Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* (Garden City, NY, 1967), p. 200. For a detailed description of Eisenhower's experience at Command and General Staff School (now called a "College"), see Mark C. Bender, *Watershed at Leavenworth: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Command and General Staff School* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990). Ronald Spector, maintaining that the Naval War College curriculum was too narrow and technically focused, calls into question claims of senior World War II navy

Victory in 1945 seemingly validated the content of prewar professional military education; therefore, major changes appeared unlikely. However, a number of defense authorities concluded that the advent of atomic weapons negated any value to be gained from studying the past. In the ensuing years, even some prominent military historians questioned the relevance of their field. In 1961, Walter Millis wrote: “It is the belief of the present writer that military history has largely lost its function.... [I]t is not immediately apparent why the strategy and tactics of Nelson, Lee or even Bradley or Montgomery should be taught to the young men who are being trained to manage the unmanageable military colossi of today....”⁴

Through both design and neglect, those in positions of influence contributed to the virtual elimination of history from the core curricula of nearly every American professional military institution throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. In its place, they inserted courses not only on nuclear war, but also on systems engineering, operations analysis, and management. Senior officers clearly deemed the emerging quantitative methods as far more relevant to the new demands of command in the nuclear age. The shortsightedness of these post–World War II leaders meant that the Vietnam generation of military officers—of which I am one—learned its early professional lessons in programs largely devoid of history. America paid a high price for such myopic views, and the resulting undue emphasis on the science of war to the detriment of the art of war.

An Early Interest in Military History

My first exposure to military history came in the late 1950s as a squad leader in a Marine Corps reserve unit. Enrolled in a college program with a history-centered curriculum, I found study of the past enjoyable. At the same time, knowledge of history appeared as if it might prove useful if I earned the officer’s commission I sought. Not surprisingly, whenever I came across an advertisement for an inexpensive book on military history, I usually invested in a copy. Of the several books I bought during this period, two made notable and long-lasting impressions. The first, S.L.A. Marshall’s *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Command in Future War*, cost only \$1.35

leaders that their War College education proved invaluable to prosecuting that conflict. See Ronald Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport, RI, 1977), pp. 149 and 150. My own interpretation is that war games provided strength to the college’s curriculum during this period, although these games focused on refighting past battles, especially Jutland.

4 Walter Millis, *Military History* (Washington, DC, 1961), pp. 16–18.

in paperback.⁵ I eagerly read and heavily annotated Marshall's analytical history of recent battles. I discovered much that seemed intuitively correct although not always obvious. In field exercises, I routinely tried to take into account Marshall's insights into leadership and small unit tactics.

The second influential book, T.R. Fehrenbach's *This Kind of War*, graphically detailed the penalties paid by poorly prepared U.S. Army units early in the Korean War. It made an indelible imprint on my mind in regard to the absolute necessity for challenging training and strict discipline in military organizations. The reputation I acquired as a hard-nosed leader found its start not only in the stern lessons taught by my drill instructors at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, but equally in those I drew from this book. I copied many passages from *This Kind of War* and returned to them for inspiration. My favorite was and remains: "In 1950 a Marine Corps officer was still an officer, and a sergeant behaved the way good sergeants had behaved since the time of Caesar, expecting no nonsense, allowing none. And Marine leaders had never lost sight of their primary—their only—mission, which was to fight."⁶

As a newly commissioned second lieutenant and student at the Marine Corps officers' basic course in early 1964, I encountered history only as a means of reinforcing the customs and traditions of the Marine Corps. This instruction involved little more than story telling—often inaccurate when it came to details, as I discovered afterward when I read that the red stripes along the trouser seams of officers' and noncommissioned officers' uniforms, usually referred to as "blood stripes," were not awarded in recognition of the high casualties Marine leaders suffered at the Battle of Chapultepec in the Mexican-American War. Apparently, the stripes served simply as a decorative flourish to officers' uniforms. Fundamentally, these classes offered a narrowly focused review of the organization's heritage—"drum-and-trumpet" military history at its finest—useful for its purpose, but not professionally enlightening.

Arriving at my first operational unit—a 2nd Marine Division infantry battalion—in late summer 1964, I found minimal interest in military history. Those officers who read of past battles and campaigns seldom advertised the fact. They judged it, I imagine, more an avocation than the heart of professional learning. Some bright

5 Although initially troubled by allegations concerning Marshall's research raised in several venues in the 1980s, as well as the subsequent controversy, I regained my former confidence when Dr. Roger J. Spiller, who questioned many of Marshall's research methods in the winter 1988 issue of the *RUSI Journal*, said he did not doubt the combat historian's conclusions stating, "Forty years later, as the quest for universal laws of combat continues unabated, Marshall is still right." (Quoted in a review of *Men Against Fire* in the July 1989 edition of *Military Review*, pp. 99 and 100.)

6 T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York, 1963), p. 188.

spots existed. The *Marine Corps Gazette* offered military history books for sale at reduced prices and frequently presented articles examining past battles. A collection of *Gazette* articles appeared in an edited work entitled, *The Guerrilla – And How to Fight Him*, proving reasonably popular. Although more theoretical, Robert Osgood's *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* also attracted attention. The magazine even identified a set of “military history classics” for purchase in a suitably marked box. Several new books on World War II generated moderate interest among my contemporaries, including the first two volumes of the official *History of the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II* and Kenneth Davis's *Experience of War: The United States in World War II*. Although my own interest centered on reading and studying books dealing with irregular or small wars—because we seemed more likely to face such wars in the near future—I made efforts to at least peruse others. Perhaps most important, my career-long habit of always having professional reading near at hand as a guard against wasting unexpected free time began in this assignment.

When it came to small unit fighting, however, nothing surpassed the wisdom I found in *Men Against Fire*. After returning from my initial baptism of fire in spring 1965 in the Dominican Republic, I re-read Marshall's book and found my original evaluation reinforced. Over the succeeding thirty years, I made revisiting his book a habit after each combat episode I experienced. Always, I came to the same conclusion. This author-historian possessed an extraordinary understanding of the close fight and wrote about his insights as clearly and succinctly as anyone before or since.

Interest in reading military history increased among my fellow Marine officers as the war clouds over Vietnam grew darker. Reading about the French experience in Indochina and the British experience in Malaya became fashionable. Copies of Bernard Fall's *Street Without Joy* appeared on more than a few officers' desks. Still, many believed that sharpening their tactical and technical proficiency outweighed the potential of intellectually preparing for war. I confess to conflicted feelings at this point in my military life. Upon receiving orders assigning me to an advisory billet with an infantry battalion of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, I devoted more time to readying my personal equipment, boots, knife, map kit, and survival gear, and to improving my physical fitness than to professional reading. I did, however, re-read *Men Against Fire*.

A gunshot wound to the stomach shortened my tour in Vietnam by more than half and placed me in a series of military hospitals for several months. Thus, I was offered the opportunity to contemplate recent events. A growing desire to understand my wartime experience led to a renewed and intense interest in reading. I mentally created a more expansive and sophisticated menu of books than the one I had turned to prior to my departure from the United States the previous summer. I began with

a survey of the history of war with Lynn Montross's *War Through the Ages*. I then revisited the situation in Southeast Asia with Bernard Fall's *The Two Vietnams*; tried to understand the new type of war through David Rees's *Korea: The Limited War*; and looked at the larger issues of war in B.H. Liddell Hart's *Strategy* and Walter Goerlitz's *History of the German General Staff: 1657–1945*. I formed no agenda or reasoned plan for my reading. Instead, I simply tried to satisfy the gnawing feeling that I had known too little about war before going to Vietnam.

After convalescence, there followed an assignment as an instructor at The Basic School in Quantico, where all the Corps' lieutenants undergo training to become rifle platoon commanders, regardless of their future occupational specialties. Faced with pending postings to Vietnam, these young officers readily sought advice on how to prepare themselves. When they asked how long it took to get ready for combat, my most common response was, "At least 100 years!" I then explained that no one wants to risk his life and those he leads without taking every opportunity to acquire the necessary skill and knowledge to succeed. Thus, any allotted time is always too short. The most frequent follow-up question concerned what to do in the time available. Here, I invariably urged each lieutenant to read, making clear the logic and efficiency of tapping into the collective wisdom of generations upon generations of warriors. I often repeated a quote from Liddell Hart, "There is no excuse for any literate person to be less than three-thousand years old in his mind."⁷ By this point, I possessed my own list of recommended books to share, though, in hindsight it was weak in many respects, particularly regarding the nature and character of war.

I soon found myself in a position to follow my own advice, because after completing the instructor tour and attending the Amphibious Warfare School, I received orders returning me to Vietnam in summer 1968, on this occasion to serve as a rifle company commander.⁸ My free time before this second tour in Southeast Asia focused on specialized reading instead of overly preparing personal equipment and exercising my body to an extreme. I wanted to know more about what it meant to be a professional warrior, so I struggled through both Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* and Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, devoured Martin Russ's *The Last Parallel* to gain a better appreciation of infantry combat, and sought lessons on irregular war from Samuel B. Griffith's translation of *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla*

7 B.H. Liddell Hart, *Why We Don't Learn from History* (London, 1946), pp. 7–8.

8 The use of history by Amphibious Warfare School instructors during my time there as a student appeared selective and primarily designed to support a specific teaching point. I often recalled examples that ran counter to the ones being cited. Such biased use of military history in military schools occurred all too frequently in the 1960s and 1970s.

Warfare. I once again re-read *Men Against Fire* to great benefit. An article by then Captain Allan R. Millett—later to become a noted historian and a reserve “colonel of marines”—supported my notions about the importance of history, so much so that I clipped the piece, “Military History and the Professional Officer.” To this day, it remains in my files.⁹

History offers no “lessons” for military officers. It does, though, provide a rich context for understanding the terrible phenomenon that was, is, and will remain war. The vicarious experiences provided through study of the past enable practitioners of war to see familiar patterns of activity and to develop more quickly potential solutions to tactical and operational problems. My several years of professional reading, for example, gave me a sense of confidence on the battlefield that I did not have during my previous tour in Vietnam. To the degree that the word has meaning in such circumstances, I became *comfortable*, whether under enemy fire or pressed to make rapid tactical decisions. “Mike” Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, soon developed a division wide reputation for success in battle, as well as for its ability to handle unique problems. The Viet Cong continue to fire long-range rockets at the Da Nang Airfield: put Mike Company on it. Need to stop North Vietnamese infiltrators: send for Mike Company. Only the inevitable casualties made command less than ideal. I could never identify a direct cause and effect relationship between the orders I gave in combat and the books I had previously read, but clearly a symbiotic connection existed. The secondhand wisdom gained from reading thousands of pages of military history synthesized over time in my mind and eventually merged with the experiences of previous firefights in the Dominican Republic and during my first tour in Vietnam. This combination of real and vicarious learning provided the ability to make well-informed judgments despite the inherent stresses of war.

Finding a Wider World of Professional Study

Eight years of varied postings after my second tour in Vietnam—instructor at the U.S. Army’s Institute for Military Assistance, staff officer at Headquarters Marine Corps, battalion and regimental operations officer, and battalion executive officer in the 8th Marines—allowed sufficient free time to continue reading military history. Although I never doubted the value of my ongoing efforts, my methodology never seemed sufficiently organized. Selection and assignment to the Naval War College’s naval command and staff course in summer 1977 soon eliminated this problem. Admiral Stansfield Turner had recognized the harm done to professional military

9 Allan R. Millett, “Military History and the Professional Officer,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 1967, p. 51.

education in the pre-Vietnam era, and upon assuming presidency of the college in 1972, he had completely revamped the curriculum. History became the mainstay of all war-related instruction. At the start of the academic year, students read Thucydides's *Peloponnesian War* from cover to cover with the expectation that they would understand the significance of this ancient text and its relevance to the present day. The admiral believed in the value of the humanities and demanded students cover a minimum of 900 pages of assigned reading each week. His insistence on academic excellence proved intoxicating to those of us who previously had studied in relative isolation. He tossed us into the "briar patch," and individuals who arrived at the college with an appreciation of history loved every minute of it.¹⁰ Nonetheless, some disappointment surfaced within this group when the next major assignment turned out to be the Napoleonic Wars because we leapt over some 2,000 years of history with only a nod to its existence. However, when a school needs to cover the sweep of history in a single trimester, major compromises inevitably occur.

Personally, I resolved in the months ahead not only to work my way through the missing two millennia of military history, but also to return to the classical period of the Greek and Roman world and read in far greater depth. With a growing family and the associated expenses, I welcomed the advantage of soft cover books such as Penguin Books' translations of Xenophon's *The Persian Expedition*, Arian's *The Campaigns of Alexander*, and Livy's *The War with Hannibal*. My endeavor nearly floundered at the outset, when curiosity and an insatiable appetite caused me to expand my horizon even further in attempts to better understand the Greek and Roman civilizations, and then their art and architecture. Tempting as these new venues proved, I soon returned to the "main attack," an effort that continues to the present.

Admiral Turner's introduction of the works of the classical strategists, most particularly Clausewitz's *On War*, proved as important to Naval War College students as his revitalization of historically based instruction. For nearly a quarter-century after World War II, America's military schools failed to ground their students in the fundamental philosophies of war. Few understood the nature of war, much less its underlying theories. Without a basic knowledge of concepts and devoid of any historical context, there is little wonder that the mid-twentieth century officer corps led America into the Vietnam quagmire. Military leaders in the 1950s and

10 I always sensed that officers with a specialty that potentially brings them closer to an actual fight—infantrymen, pilots, artillerymen, etc.—most appreciate the study of history. A study done by a fellow student at the Army War College in 1982 that found combat arms officers "most likely to view military history as highly valuable" supports this thesis. See David W. Hazen, "The Army War College and the Study of Military History," U.S. Army War College, April 19, 1982, p. 22.

1960s proved quite adept in the science of war—mobilization, logistics, personnel management, and other peripheral activities—but demonstrated an almost complete lack of awareness of the art of war.

Turner insisted on a rebalancing of the equation. Michael Howard and Peter Paret's 1976 translation of *On War* greatly aided the study of Clausewitz's masterpiece, and thus, war itself. No more complete and enduring theory of the subject exists than the one contained in this volume. Clausewitz's complex style of writing means the knowledge enclosed in his tome is extremely difficult to comprehend with simple reading. It requires close reading, aided by an adept teacher. Above all, Turner assembled a first-class faculty, which over time led the American military back to solid intellectual ground. The course of instruction provided me the basis for even more advanced study. Equally important, it prepared me for high-level command.

My next assignment to the United Nations (UN) Truce Supervision in Palestine promised the possibility of again seeing conflict, although as an observer trying to prevent renewed war. In preparation, I refocused my reading from the theoretical to the practical. More knowledgeable now about the wealth of military literature available, I turned to an earlier military-scholar, Ardant du Picq, whose *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle* in many ways closely paralleled S.L.A. Marshall's book. I had secured this volume earlier as part of the *Marine Corps Gazette's* collections of "classics." However, I had never felt inclined to read it—a huge mistake. Du Picq's observations on the moral effects on men in battle and the importance of cohesion seem in retrospect self-evident, but it took his book to make them so for the soldiers of his time.¹¹ Marshall carried forward this form of military research and writing, although without the extensive research he claimed. But the close examination of war's sharp end truly came into its own with publication of John Keegan's *The Face of Battle* in 1976. A genre of similar books soon followed, including Paddy Griffith's *Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam* (and a revised edition entitled *Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future*) and the works of other lecturers in War Studies at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.

I learned an important lesson reading Keegan's book: not to downplay the ability of those without active military service or actual combat experience to write meaningfully about battle. I nearly went no further than the first sentence in *The Face of Battle*, in which Keegan states, "I have not been in a battle; not near one, nor heard one from afar, nor seen the aftermath." I again thought of closing the book two pages later when the author revealed he had never served in uniform. Luckily, I chose

11 Azar Gat provides a valuable critique of du Picq in "Ardant du Picq's Scientism, Teaching and Influence," *War & Society*, October 1990, pp. 1–16.

to ignore my prejudices and pressed on. As a result, I learned much from this now-famous military historian, not the least being that it is possible to become schooled in the profession through vicarious means, and in some cases, even more so than those who spend an unreflective lifetime in military attire.

Overall, duty in the Middle East supported my continuing professional reading and opened up a new vista, battlefield studies, or using today's more common term, staff rides. I discovered such a plethora of sites in this region that selecting which to visit presented a huge challenge. Meggido, the location of the first recorded battle of history, won by the Egyptian Pharaoh Thutmose III in 1469 BC, lay at one end of the time spectrum, while at the other lay the various battlegrounds of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Second Battle of Meggido, fought by General Allenby in September 1918, offered another possibility for study at both the original position and over the surrounding area traversed by the likes of Lawrence of Arabia. At the time I visited in 1979, one could imagine the possibility of a future battle between the Soviet Union and the United States at this same spot with the Soviet backers of Syria moving down from the Golan Heights to meet Americans assisting in the defense of Israel. It was certainly an eerie thought at the time because *Har* (hill) Meggido is the location of the biblical Armageddon.

The earlier wars between the Arabs and Israelis—in 1948–9, 1956, and 1967—offered numerous additional battlefields for examination. Bookstores in the region carried many publications on these wars that imparted viewpoints not elsewhere available. A few of these remain in my personal library. Among those I found most useful were Chaim Herzog's *The War of Atonement* and Mohamed Heikel's *The Road to Ramadan*. Such readings were reinforced by the opportunity to study the campaigns of 1941 and 1942, especially El Alamein. Good map reading skills aided my travels over these positions because the desert looks much the same from horizon to horizon in this part of North Africa.

No nation tends to its overseas battlefield burial sites as well as the United Kingdom. Walking through the El Alamein cemetery along row upon row of gravestones—each inscribed with a message from loved ones at home—invariably caused me to reflect deeply on the terrible costs of war and the immense responsibilities borne by those who practice the profession of arms. No words affected me more than the simple ones from a young son to his departed father: “Goodnight Daddy – Wee John.” Such a loss cannot be measured in the normal calculus of war. The safety of one's nation and the sacrifices many pay—some the ultimate—*must* motivate every officer to master his or her profession.

For nearly a year, the United Nations schedule of a week of duty followed by a week off allowed me much time for staff rides accompanied by a handful of equally

interested officers from a variety of nations. The chance to explore old battlefields also arose occasionally in the normal course of conducting patrols. I always tried to precede these events with detailed reading of works on the battle of interest. In the first half of my tour I worked out of Cairo, Egypt, where a preponderance of the Soviet observers also served. This meant that normally two out of three patrols I participated in included a Soviet partner.

The arrangement provided a unique opportunity to talk freely with members of a potential enemy nation, while driving over desert routes or relaxing in our small encampments. The subjects ranged from politics and religion to areas of mutual professional interest. The Soviet officers—all from the Army—often gave us copies of history books as gifts, some in Russian, others English translations. Apparently, their government made these available for free. Although a few consisted of pure propaganda, most contained credible material on the past performance of Soviet forces. The chance to discuss professional military matters with these officers offered a perspective on past and future operations unavailable anywhere else in the world at the time. The course at the Naval War College had prepared me well and allowed me to hold my own in some great debates. When patrols brought us to the scene of a 1973 battle, we usually stopped and walked over it, examining destroyed Soviet equipment and an occasional American tank, always attempting to understand how the particular engagement was likely to have unfolded. On several occasions, our accompanying Egyptian liaison officer described his own wartime experience at or near the site and suggested English translations of books related to the action.

The second half of my tour with the UN took me to southern Lebanon, where ongoing hostilities between various guerrilla factions and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) often made the work of an observer difficult. I never became comfortable under fire or near small but deadly engagements while unarmed. Nonetheless, professional rewards abounded. Observers normally alternated duty at positions near or colocated with units from the IDF and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Again, circumstances often allowed professional discussions with the two antagonists. Somewhat surprisingly, I never felt any hostility directed against me from members of the PLO, despite the official American attitude toward that group. Militarily related conversations in these surroundings naturally tended toward various aspects of irregular warfare. As had the Soviet officers, members of the PLO often gave us free literature, usually pamphlets. Approximately 75 percent turned out to be pure propaganda of an incendiary nature; the remainder were well-written features on the history of the region.

The insecure countryside and the reluctance of both sides to venture beyond fixed posts limited opportunities to see old battlefields. Instead, our responsibilities took us

to sites of conflicts only minutes or hours old, with the object of separating the warring parties and investigating the circumstances of the action. A few PLO positions located on or near Crusader castles and in the ancient city of Tyre allowed some limited study, however. I left the Middle East with a much-enhanced understanding of warfare over the ages and of the many similarities between armies around the world. The Naval War College experience, coupled with that of a UN observer, served as an unsurpassed professional school that provided an exceptional education.

Formalizing My Study Efforts

When I returned to the States, I assumed command of a Marine Barracks near Jacksonville, Florida. No Marine duty is undemanding when one is the commanding officer; yet, regular hours and no requirement to spend days away on field exercises provided more time for professional study than I had found in earlier assignments. A combination of formal schooling, overseas travel, and four tours in combat zones over the preceding twenty-four years had widened my reading interests immensely. To continue my tactical education along with my understanding of combat leadership, I turned to the newly published (in 1979) translation of Erwin Rommel's *Attacks* and a reprint of the U.S. Army Infantry Journal's landmark *Infantry in Battle*, originally published in 1934 under the signature of George C. Marshall. These seminal works provided me with a wealth of new and important knowledge. To expand my understanding of strategic thought, I probed Edward Mead Earle's *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* and Michael Howard's *The Theory and Practice of War*.

In summer 1981, I reported to the Army War College. After a quick review of the program of instruction, I ascertained that this institution at the time failed to offer much of a test for any serious student. There appeared to be little opportunity for the study of *war* at this *war* college. To illustrate, World War I and World War II studies each consumed approximately eight academic hours, whereas instruction in U.S. immigration policy took up nearly twenty hours. Furthermore, reincorporating history into the curriculum remained an ongoing effort with little evidence of any significant impact. I found no surprise in one scholar's earlier observation that, "Perhaps the most conspicuous shortcoming of the lectures offered [in an elective course on military history] is that too few of them deal with conflict."¹²

Finally, the 1981–2 academic year saw the first introduction of Clausewitz's *On War*, a text I felt comfortable with after the rigors of the Naval War College. Determining how to best fill the many hours the college scheduled for personal

12 Russell F. Weigley, *New Dimensions in Military History* (San Rafael, CA, 1975), p. 11.

study—hours obviously not required to meet the limited demands of work outside the classroom—became my immediate mission. Visits to the campus library and bookstore promptly revealed the best way to accomplish this task, and the upcoming months looked considerably brighter as I contemplated the possibilities for personal reading and research. In a few days, I established two goals for my year at the Army War College: first, determine how best to approach the professional study of military history, an issue raised after Vietnam by critics both in and out of uniform; second, create a self-directed study program that could guide officers in their own continuing professional education, a responsibility too few seemed to recognize rested on their own shoulders.

Michael Howard's highly regarded 1961 article, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," looked like a good place to start my research on the role of military history in professional education.¹³ I found a treasure trove of advice in this piece beginning with Sir Michael's counsel to study in width, depth, and context. The U.S. Army Center of Military History's *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* proved equally valuable.¹⁴ It offered everything from specifics on how a student might approach military history to bibliographic guides on great military writers and military history in specific periods. This became one of the most well-worn books in my library. I uncovered several additional aids to studying history: "timeless verities of combat," "recurring themes," and "threads of continuity." These conceptual schemes help an officer understand a specific aspect or a unique instance of war through the perspective of time. Trevor N. Dupuy explained the use of the timeless verities of combat in *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare*. The Naval War College and the U.S. Military Academy organized their military history study around recurring themes and threads of continuity, at least in 1982. My research enabled me to write a short paper describing the techniques a student might use to better direct his or her study of history. I shared the ideas in this paper with other officers for the remainder of my career.

At the outset of my studies at the Army War College, a letter to the school's professional journal, *Parameters*, caught my attention. Retired Army Major General David W. Gray suggested "that each officer should set forth the guidelines which he intended to follow throughout his career. These guidelines would encompass principles of conduct as well as skills essential to professional fitness, including not

13 Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *Royal United Service Institute Journal*, February 1962, pp. 4–8.

14 The Army intended this guide, published in 1979, to serve as a tool for the self-education of officers. However, little evidence existed in 1981 of it accomplishing that purpose. Although the Army War College gave a copy to each student, I never heard it referenced during my time there as a student.

only those of a purely physical or technical nature but also those designed to train and discipline the mind. Presumably these skills would be modified or expanded as the officer progressed in rank.¹⁵ I set out to review studies made of officer education in the recent past, talked with numerous authorities on officer education, and surveyed a variety of literature on the subject. From this endeavor, I concluded it best to divide my proposed self-directed program into three parts, the humanities in general, military history specifically, and communications, that is, reading, writing, speaking, and listening. Broadening the program allowed me to consider the “whole man,” while centering on the military characteristics. Over the next months, I wrote a paper describing the importance of each of these categories to an officer’s self-education: how he or she might go about studying subjects within these categories. As an unexpected benefit, my paper met the requirements of the college for an individual research essay; thus, it performed double duty.¹⁶ More important, it guided my own professional development efforts over the next fifteen years and informed my later work directed at improving professional military education in the Marine Corps.

Classes with Harry G. Summers, author of *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*, certainly counted among the few highlights of my time at the Army War College. In both his book and classroom, he correctly refocused responsibility for failures in Vietnam from the liberal media and antiwar protestors to the real problems: a lack of strategic thinking and realistic understanding of the nature of war. Along with Admiral Turner, Summers forced thoughtful military officers to revisit their own deficient professional educations. General Robert Barrow, who served as Commandant of the Marine Corps during the year I attended the Army War College, also provided a beacon of light during this period with his scholarly manners. A man of exceptional physical stature and presence, he evidenced an extraordinary intellect. As a serious student of history, he frequently employed historical examples in talks and speeches. In his annual visit to the college, he opened his remarks with a spellbinding story of Admiral Nelson at Trafalgar. In a telephone call the following weekend to my twin brother, a student at the Naval War College, I mentioned the favorable reaction Barrow had received during his visit. My brother indicated that the general’s visit to Newport that same week elicited a similar response. I asked about the effect of his historical example, and my brother answered that it clearly motivated the students. We continued our conversation for some minutes, with my assuming that it centered on the same example—Nelson at Trafalgar—only to realize eventually that to the

15 David W. Gray, Letter to the Editor, *Parameters*, September 1981, p. 93.

16 Paul K. Van Riper, “A Self-Directed Officer Study Program,” student research paper, U.S. Army War College, April 19, 1982.

Naval War College audience, Barrow had spoken of Wellington at Waterloo. Unique among senior leaders, the commandant provided a navy example for an army school and an army example for a navy school.

Putting My Ideas to the Test

Following the Army War College, I returned to the operating forces for six years, first as the executive officer of the 7th Marines and then as commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Marines. From there I went to Okinawa, Japan, and assumed command of the 4th Marine Regiment. Duties as the operations officer and chief of staff of the 3rd Marine Division came afterward. Each of these billets offered the chance to implement my self-directed study program. Among the many books I read during this period, none proved more influential than Martin van Creveld's *Command in War*. In the first chapter, he offered an enlightened view of command and control as practiced over the ages. In the following chapters, he expanded on his ideas with clear historical illustrations. From the outset, van Creveld recognized the inherent uncertainty of the modern battlefield. That fact, virtually unacknowledged elsewhere, supplied the underpinning for my own approach to modernizing the command and control of every unit I served in during these and subsequent assignments. I insisted subordinate commanders and staff read the book and held my own command-level workshops to review van Creveld's ideas. In my mind, *Command in War* reached the status of classic almost upon publication. Surprisingly, when I asked Martin van Creveld at a conference in 1989 how he evaluated his many writings, he did not place that book at the top but stated that his then yet to be published *The Transformation of War* would likely hold that honor in the future.

An obscure pamphlet filled with historical illustrations in its first chapter, *Combat Operations C3I Fundamentals and Interactions*, written by Air Force Major George E. Orr, also influenced my thinking on command and control in the mid-1980s. The only other officer I ever encountered in this period who demonstrated familiarity with this little booklet, General Al Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time, enjoyed a reputation as a prolific reader. One of my fondest memories remains discussing the merits of Orr's book with General Gray, while escorting him through a display of 3rd Marine Division command posts in 1987, as the officers in trail looked on with puzzled expressions. John Keegan's *The Mask of Command*, an analysis of generalship over the ages, became another of my "must read" books on command and control during this time, mainly for the way it dealt with the issue every commander faces in combat—how far forward to go.¹⁷

17 The commander of the 1st Marine Division provided a traditional answer to this question

By this point in my career, I had organized my reading to ensure I regularly covered the three levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic. At the tactical level, a number of worthwhile books appeared in the mid- to late 1980s. John A. English's *On Infantry* and a reprint of E.D. Swinton's 1907 edition of *The Defense of Duffer's Drift* serve as excellent examples. English addressed the infantry arm in a scholarly way and to a depth not previously matched.¹⁸ Swinton used a literary technique whereby a young officer in a series of dreams refights the same battle several times – improving the performance of his unit on each occasion until he finally masters the mission.

Although substantial interest in the operational level of war and operational art arose throughout the American armed forces during the 1980s and generated numerous articles, few books on the subject appeared. The opposite occurred with strategy. Peter Paret's edited *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* and Edward N. Luttwak's *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* gained much attention throughout the defense community. Andrew F. Krepinevich's *The Army and Vietnam* led the way for a more introspective series of works on the Vietnam War. Reprints of Lord Moran's *Anatomy of Courage* and John Baynes's *Morale: A Study of Men and Courage* expanded the available literature on the human element in war. They stood solidly alongside the works of du Picq and S.L.A. Marshall. All became part of my expanding library, and I urged peers and subordinates alike to read them.

Two studies materially aided those seeking guidance on what to read, Roger H. Nye's *The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence* and Robert H. Berlin's bibliography, *Military Classics*, the latter published by the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute. A little pamphlet retitled *Literature in the Education of the Military Professional*, edited by two members of the U.S. Air Force Academy's English Department, encouraged me to venture again into areas and subjects not

during operations in Iraq in March and April 2003: "At a time of increasing reliance on sophisticated sensor and communications technologies to paint a 'picture of the battle space' to top generals far from the war front, a key Marine Corps commander last spring opted to lead his troops in Iraq the old-fashioned way: He went there. 'In two minutes at the front edge of the combat zone, you know if the troops feel confident, if the battle's going the way they want it to, [or if] they need something,' said Maj. Gen. James Mattis, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division. 'You can sense it. And you can apply something.'" Quoted from Elaine M. Grossman, "Marine General: Leading from Iraqi Battlefield Informed Key Decisions," *Inside The Pentagon*, Washington, DC, October 2003, 20, p. 1.

- 18 English's style of writing and his organization of material made *On Infantry* difficult reading for many. A revised edition in 1994 with Bruce I. Gudmundsson proved to be an easier read, although it discarded much useful material.

directly related to war. In his foreword to this booklet, Vice Admiral James Stockdale urged military professionals to study the humanities: “From such study, and from the lifetime highminded reading habit it frequently spawns, come raw material for reflective thought in times of quietude, sixth-sense inspiration in the heat of battle, and a clearer vision of the big picture in peace or war from a philosophic and historical plane high above the buzz-word filled bureaucratic smog layer which can be counted on to contaminate the atmosphere of the nether regions.”¹⁹

Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Marine Corps University

Despite my protest—as far as a serving officer can protest orders—General Gray denied an extension of my tour in Okinawa, and in summer 1988, directed me to report as Director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia. In the midst of his Corpwide effort to enhance professional military education, he made clear his purpose from my first day of duty. He said simply, “This school needs changing. My intent is for it to become the premier institution of its kind in the world. You cannot achieve that goal in the time I expect you to be here, but you will have time to lay a foundation that allows it to happen.” I received no more guidance, except a pointed edict to base all instruction on history and the concepts of maneuver warfare. General Gray wanted no separate classes on military history—he insisted on weaving history into all the instructions on operations and tactics. The same admonition followed for “maneuverist’s thinking,” with a strong suggestion that I ensure the infusion of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu into the course. Basically, he wanted the entire course to rest on military history and established ideas of strategy.

Turning to the faculty, I sought to understand the existing curriculum. Years of tinkering with the course of instruction made attempts to explain it confusing at best. Three bodies of thought crystallized concerning corrective actions. One group thought the commandant wrong and argued against change. A second group recognized and supported the requirement to revamp the curriculum, but argued that instruction be halted for at least a year, and perhaps two, to accomplish such a large task. A third, smaller faction wanted to press ahead. I elected to take my counsel from Timothy Lupfer’s *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*. I reasoned that if the German Army in a matter of two months in the winter of 1917–18 could completely alter its tactical doctrine in the midst of combat, certainly the U.S. Marine Corps was capable of changing a program

19 Donald Ahern and Robert Shenk, eds., *Literature in the Education of the Military Professional* (Colorado Springs, CO, 1982), p. vii.

of instruction while teaching it. Thus, in fall 1988, we set out to revise the program of instruction completely while presenting it. For inspiration, I turned to the example Admiral Turner had established fifteen years earlier. For new content, I looked to my own work at the Army War College, the Naval War College curriculum, the critiques of outside observers and military historians such as Williamson Murray, and the thorough study of professional military education commissioned by Representative Ike Skelton, member of Congress from the state of Missouri.

To support professional education within Marine Corps schools as well as throughout the Corps, General Gray tasked the doctrine writers at Quantico to prepare a new “capstone” manual that captured the essentials of warfare. Although many of my contemporaries—experienced colonels—hoped for assignment to the project, a young captain, John Schmitt, received the mission. In short order, Schmidt gained an understanding of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu worthy of any war college graduate and transposed their weighty ideas to simple prose. Drafts of his manual circulated among Command and Staff College instructors, informing them even as they critiqued the material. The final document—*Warfighting*—dramatically influenced education throughout the Marine Corps and in other organizations in the Department of Defense. Moreover, translations appeared in Spanish, Japanese, and Korean within a few years of its publication.

Part way through the year, General Gray announced he wanted a reading program developed for Marine Corps officers. The task eventually found its way to my desk. The mission seemed simple because my self-directed officer study program created at the Army War College already contained a list of recommended readings for officers. I spent several weeks updating and adding to this list, querying other institutions such as the service academies, the other command and staff colleges, the war colleges, and civilian universities. Much to my surprise, the fifteen copies of the initial draft list elicited twenty-one responses. Clearly, some who learned of the list felt compelled to offer their thoughts, although not officially asked. Some respondents wanted every book written by a particular author on the list, while others demanded we include none from the same author. Other equally strong suggestions materialized. Plainly, recommended reading lists bring out deep-seated emotions and prejudices. I sensed in this deep interest a pent-up desire for a Corpswide reading program. Relying on the wisdom contained in the Center of Military History’s *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History*, Nye’s *The Challenge of Command*, and Berlin’s *Military Classics*, I pressed ahead to produce a list approved by General Gray.

In the midst of the curriculum change and the construction of a professional reading list, General Gray sent out another task: Draw up plans for establishment of a Marine Corps University. Again, primary responsibility for this undertaking fell on the Command and Staff College. Once more, I looked to history. A review

of Scharnhorst's efforts to establish the *Kriegsakemie*, Upton's labors to create the schools at Fort Leavenworth, Commodore Stephen Luce's work to establish the Naval War College, and others gave me the grounding for this new endeavor. The work of a dedicated staff created the new organization, and in 1990, I assumed the position as the first President of the Marine Corps University. My assignment at Quantico ended in summer 1991, with orders to report as the commanding general of the 2nd Marine Division. The work to overhaul professional military education continued under the sure hands of others and reached its culmination before the end of the decade. Perhaps no better manifestation of the results the commandant anticipated exists than the performance of the senior Marine commanders, Lieutenant General Jim Conway and Major Generals Jim Mattis and Jim Amos, during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Bringing Things to Fruition as a Senior Commander

Senior officers influence subordinates through a combination of direction and example. As a division commander, I was in the position to order and inspire 18,000 marines to make history part of their professional development. As a first step, I added an hour of professional reading to my own official schedule, promulgated daily throughout the division. I reasoned that if subordinates saw the division commander setting aside an hour each day for reading, others might follow. I also issued a memorandum that stated in part: "The professional reading program is a key part of the continuous professional education that is necessary to develop the minds of our Marines. It is most valuable for developing the sound military judgment that is essential for practicing the maneuver warfare doctrine contained in [the *Warfighting* manual]. Just as we expect them to maintain their mental fitness, so should we expect them to maintain their mental fitness through a career-long professional reading program."

In addition, I directed the purchase of more than 6,000 books for unit libraries, ordered the establishment of a historical reading room and the conduct of monthly seminars, required the division's regiments and battalions to sponsor reading groups and hold regular discussions of selected books, sponsored staff rides to Civil War battlefields for the division staff, and asked my units to carry out their own series of staff rides. The closing sentence of my memorandum stated, "Marines fight better when they fight smarter, and a systematic and progressive professional reading program contributes directly to that end." The proof of the value of reading is not straightforward. Performance on the battlefield provides the final test. I have no doubt marines from the division later fought smarter and therefore better because of the wisdom they gained from these various programs.

After an assignment at Headquarters Marine Corps—one that not only allowed me to read more, but also to attend several college-level history and defense-

related courses—I received orders to take command of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico. That organization is responsible for all Marine Corps training and education, creation of operating concepts, and writing of doctrine. Thus, it possesses considerable ability to affect professional development across the entire Marine Corps. Again, I employed a combination of direction and example to advance the education of marines everywhere. Early on, I took action to ensure history provided the basis for all doctrinal development and the curricula for all schools. I invited noted historians to speak not only to students in formal schools, but also at professional gatherings. Monthly, I hosted a reading group – comprised of officers from lieutenant to major general – at my quarters for dinner and a follow-on discussion. Often, we were fortunate enough to persuade the author or the subject of the book under discussion to join us. Admiral Sandy Woodward, author of *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander* and former Army Major Dick Winters, commander of the airborne company featured in Stephen Ambrose’s *Band of Brothers*, honored our reading group in this manner. When visiting units or conducting inspections at the various commands around the Marine Corps that fell under my cognizance, I made it a habit to ask questions about publications on the Commandant’s Reading List and gave away copies of books to those answering correctly.

I often noted in my two years at Quantico that the primary “weapon” that officers possess remains their minds. I followed with the observation that books provide the “ammunition” for this weapon. Always I cautioned against looking for answers in reading, especially history. Rather, I urged officers to read with the goal of absorbing the material as part of their being. To underscore my meaning, I referenced a scene from the movie *Patton* where the general, in a near trancelike mood, observes an ancient battlefield and replays in his mind how he trod this ground during the original battle. Most viewers, I believe, concluded Patton to be either some sort of mystic or perhaps a little deranged, while I supposed his many years of reading and study gave him the sense of having been there previously. I wanted to impart a simple lesson: a properly schooled officer never arrives on a battlefield for the first time, even if he has never actually trod the ground, if that officer has read wisely to acquire the wisdom of those who have experienced war in times past. My thought was far from original, for Clausewitz observed, “Continual change and the need to respond to it compels the commander to carry the whole intellectual apparatus of his knowledge within. He must always be ready to bring forth the appropriate decision. By total assimilation with his mind and life, the commander’s knowledge must be transferred into a genuine capability.”²⁰

20 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1976), p. 147.

A Loss of Momentum

Six years into retirement, my worry grows that the erroneous ideas on military education held by post–World War II military leaders are again creeping back into the system. Evidence of such an unsatisfactory situation appears regularly. The promise of information technology and the rewards that it seemingly offers in terms of automated command and control, surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision-guided munitions holds a place in the minds of many defense leaders similar to the technological advantage allegedly provided by systems analysis, nuclear weapons, and computers in the 1950s and 1960s. Methodical planning techniques like those currently promised by advocates of “effects-based operations” and “operational net assessment” stand in for Robert McNamara’s systems engineering of military decision making. Having been a victim—along with an entire generation of American military officers—of such shallow thinking, I find myself habitually warning those who will listen of the potential for repeating the tragic mistakes of the 1950s and 1960s.

The value of military history to the professional military officer remains incontestable. Those who might urge its reduction or elimination from military schools and colleges are woefully uninformed at best or completely ignorant of the basic underpinnings of their supposed profession at worst. The American military cannot afford to lose a second battle to keep history at the core of professional military education.

‘We studied everything we could get our hands on. You start working hard right from the first. You can’t say later in life I will start studying. You have got to start in the beginning.’

General Omar Bradley

Philosophers of war

Most writing on war deals with the techniques and forms of war—it is really about *warfare*, not *war* as a phenomenon. Much ‘theoretical’ writing on war is, similarly, intensely practical and utilitarian in its concerns. As Clausewitz observes, war has a nature and characteristics; the former does not change while the character of war changes constantly.

On War

Carl von Clausewitz

On War is one of the classic theoretical works on the nature of war, arguably the greatest. Clausewitz, a Prussian general of the Napoleonic Wars era, sought to understand both the internal dynamics of his calling and the function of war as an instrument of policy. Clausewitz also established the critical concepts of friction and chance and their limiting effects on command. *On War* is essential reading for officers desiring high command. It should not be read in a single sitting but thoughtfully considered over the course of a career.

There are various editions of Clausewitz available; the best and most highly-regarded of these is the version edited and translated by Michael Howard, Peter Paret and Bernard Brodie (2nd edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984). Those with an interest in the development of his ideas should consult Carl von Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings*, edited and translated by Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992). The literature on Clausewitz and his military thought is vast; the most accessible recent guide is Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography*.

The Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Perhaps the earliest extant example of the participant-history, Thucydides charts the fortunes of the great conflict in the last quarter of the fifth century BC that wrecked the Classical Greek world and brought down the Athenian Empire. Thucydides is often regarded as the father of the realist school of international relations. He wrote consciously for posterity, telling us that his work was ‘not an essay which is to win applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time’ and he sought to provide ‘an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it’. The best modern version is *The Landmark Thucydides*, edited by Robert B Strassler, containing lots of material to help those who don’t know a lot about the ancient world. The foremost modern interpreter of Thucydides is Donald W Kagan, whose various writings on the Peloponnesian War can be read with profit.

The character of land warfare

Writing on the character of war is usually ‘stove-piped’ by either environment (land, sea, air, space) or service (army, navy, air force). The great majority of it is concerned with the conduct of operations and often has limited currency when rendered ‘out-of-date’ by subsequent events or developments. Much of it is also ‘platform-centric’ and overly determined by technology.

The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World

Rupert Smith

This contentious look at modern strategy begins with a blunt statement: ‘War no longer exists’. The author—who rose to the position of NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe and before that held senior command in a number of major international theatres—explains this extraordinary statement by assessing the use of force in the modern era of conflict. His thesis is that it is no longer the battlefield but ‘amongst the people’ that wars are fought and decided. The purpose of this book is as a call to arms for modern strategists to move beyond past attitudes about the use of military force and to understand that resolution is unlikely to come by military defeat of an enemy alone.

Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle

Stephen Biddle

This is a very valuable analytical work by one of the most insightful civilian commentators writing in the realm of contemporary military affairs. Biddle analyses the emergence from the carnage of the Western Front in 1917 of what he terms ‘the modern system’ of combined arms warfare. Most Australian officers, familiar with the

Battle of Hamel and the operations of the First AIF in 1917, intuitively understand the imperative of applying Monash's orchestration to the close battle. Biddle produces compelling statistical evidence to analyse success in battle since 1917 and concludes that the close collaboration of infantry, armour and fire support with all arms and services is indispensable to survival and victory on the modern battlefield. This is a salutary reminder that there is no technical panacea to solve the problem of the last one hundred metres, nor has precision technology eliminated close combat from war. That being the case, a thorough grasp of the modern system of combined arms fighting is a core element of professional mastery.

Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma

Alice Hills

As the title of this book suggests, Alice Hills discusses the moral and legal constraints on the use of force that the armies of liberal states must face when fighting in urban areas. Hill examines the experiences of the Russians in Grozny, the Americans in Hue and Baghdad, and the British in Northern Ireland among others. Hills concludes that the best approach for Western forces facing the daunting task of urban operations is to resort to well trained and well led infantry—an approach that commanders have followed throughout the ages when faced with the strategic conundrum of their time.

Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare

Colin S Gray

One of the foremost strategic analysts in the Anglo-American security community demonstrates that war is both dynamic and timeless; it possesses both an unchanging nature and an evolving character. Distrustful of strategic prediction, he argues for an understanding of the likely future directions in warfare through a close study of the long-term patterns and influences on warfare, and concludes that, in the future, as in the past, the key determinants on warfare will be policy and strategy. Clearly written and endlessly interesting, the book distils thirty years of Gray's thinking and writing in the field; it might equally have been subtitled 'back to the future'.

War: The Lethal Custom

Gwynne Dwyer

While there can never be one definitive volume on a topic as vast and varied as ‘war’, Gwynne Dwyer has done an admirable job of writing a book about the custom of war, placing it within historical and cultural contexts. This is a large book, brimming with information, not all of which will be absorbed on first reading. It is well worth the effort, however, being one of the best books on the subject that is currently available. This book reminds the reader that war is a natural condition of human beings. Dwyer explains why this is so, and goes a long way to explaining how war has evolved.

Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle

Ardant du Picq

An officer with nearly thirty years experience in the Crimea, Syria and Algeria, du Picq was killed leading his men against the Prussians in 1870. This French classic examines the moral force and psychological endurance of soldiers in battle, demonstrating that the human elements of war are eternal factors in defeat and victory. *Battle Studies* advocates the importance of unit discipline and cohesion, especially important to du Picq as he experienced and analysed first-hand the increasing lethality of battlefield firepower.

Culture and conflict

The current argument about ‘war and culture’ was started with the publication of Victor Davis Hanson’s *Carnage and Culture* (2001) in which he posited the historical dominance of a ‘Western way of war’. The books that follow take his arguments as a start point, though they usually disagree with him and develop the thinking on this issue well beyond the parameters of his original argument.

Battle: A History of Combat and Culture

John A Lynn

Consciously fashioned in part as a refutation of arguments advanced by Victor Davis Hanson, Lynn agrees with the latter on the key importance of culture in shaping the ways nations fight, and on little else. In a series of case studies ranging from Classical Greece to the Egyptian assault on the Bar Lev line during the Yom Kippur War, he discusses the ways in which culture and warfare interact in different societies through the ages. He also argues that many societies have maintained a discourse or representation of war and military activity that is at variance with the realities of war in their time.

Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes

Patrick Porter

The recent emphasis on ‘culture’ as an explanation for differences in the ways that armies, nations and peoples fight is subjected to critical scrutiny and found wanting, at least in the more simplistic ways in which ‘culture’ has been offered as a key factor in the changing character of war. Porter argues that ‘culture matters’, but that it must be used carefully like any other complex analytical tool if it is not to mislead.

War and the Cultural Turn

Jeremy Black

Another volume from the highly prolific pen of Jeremy Black, this book examines the cultural dynamics of warfare. He argues that culture, like any other variable, is a changeable and not a constant force in military activity and that cultural ‘explanations’ for military behaviour and outcomes need to be used with discrimination and an awareness of the dangers of simplification. He warns that ‘culture’ is in danger of taking the place of ‘technology’ as a ‘grab-all’ explanation that may not, in fact, explain that which it seeks to describe. He makes his case with a series of case studies drawn from the Renaissance to the immediate present.

Military organisational culture and behaviours

Organisational culture is the equivalent of an individual's personality, and it has unwritten rules, customary procedures, traditions, structures and histories. Institutional culture can be both a strength and a weakness depending on the context. The eighteenth century French military thinker and soldier, de Saxe, summed it up succinctly: 'few men occupy themselves with the higher problems of war ... When they arrive at the command of armies they are truly ignorant, and in default of knowing what should be done, they do what they know'.

Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War

Eliot Cohen and John Gooch

The authors address one of the most intriguing questions of warfighting—how do well trained, professional and technologically advanced armies sometimes fail against a lesser opponent? Relying on a number of case studies, Cohen and Gooch highlight the effects of bureaucratic malaise and institutional culture on a force's ability to anticipate, react and learn. The capacity to fail, they conclude, lurks within even the best military organisations.

Black Hawk Down

Mark Bowden

This book has become the most well known account of the US involvement in Somalia, and articulates many of the reasons why the mission was not a success. In a step-by-step manner the author takes the reader through the battle from start to finish. He pays great attention to the tactical decisions, both good and bad. At the same time, he

considers the strategic environment, giving a well rounded account of all the relevant factors. The great strength of this book is how the author pays attention to tactics and military reality in the pursuit of personal drama.

Red Coat Green Machine: Continuity and Change in the British Army 1700 to 2000

Charles Kirke

Using the methods of social anthropology, this book looks at the ways in which the British Army functions as an organisation by considering the ideas, attitudes, and conventions of behaviour displayed by its members in order to understand its 'organisational culture'. It is not a history of the British Army in any conventional sense, and there is interesting discussion of the ways in which formal, informal and functional structures exist side-by-side within the organisation. The book also has some interesting things to say about relations between officers and other ranks in earlier, pre-twentieth century periods.

Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the US Army 1989–2005

John Sloan Brown

A lengthy and detailed 'insider' account of the wide-ranging changes in the US Army, written by a former brigadier general whose last assignment was as Chief of Military History. Acknowledging that an institution as vast as the US Army sometimes appears impervious to change, the book examines the ways in which successive chiefs of staff and senior officers drove major institutional and organisational change from the 'tectonic shift' of the end of the Cold War through attendant social and financial pressures, the technological challenges unveiled in DESERT STORM, the attacks of 11 September 2001, and the subsequent tests of a transformed organisation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book includes discussion of the evolution of force structure and a lengthy account of the developments in family support structures in an all-volunteer military.

The Long Gray Line: The American Journey of West Point's Class of 1966

Rick Atkinson

This West Point class straddled a fault line in history. Their class suffered more deaths in Vietnam than any other and they served during a turbulent period in the development of the US Army. This is a superb and atmospheric narrative history that inevitably captures the unique spirit of this revered American institution. But it also sets the personal experiences of a group of young officers in the context of the anarchic 1960s. It is military sociology at its best, while also offering insights into the human factors that contribute to effective leadership and team identity in combat.

The Guns of August

Barbara Tuchman

This Pulitzer prize-winning classic deals with the opening weeks of the Great War on the Western and Eastern fronts as these emerged from the early rounds of fighting. The book is essentially a thought-provoking study of what the author sees as a succession of mistakes, miscalculations and misconceptions that led to a protracted and highly destructive conflict, including the 'short war' delusion, the belief that economic interdependence would prove a limitation on willingness to declare war, the disconnect between politics and war making, and the reliance on the cult of the offensive.

Strategy and doctrine

The British military thinker, Basil Liddell Hart, defined strategy as ‘the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy’. The relationship between ‘ends’ and ‘means’ has become of acute interest once again in the aftermath of the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular.

The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War

Williamson Murray, Alvin Bernstein and MacGregor Knox

This book’s objective is to provide the reader with an understanding of the varied factors that influence the formulation and outcome of national strategies. It offers a *tour de force* of historical examples, ranging from the origins of strategy under the Athenians to the intricacies of the nuclear age. It is comprehensive, inclusive and written by leading scholars.

Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace

Edward N Luttwak

The author of more than a dozen books, Luttwak is an internationally recognised scholar in the area of military strategy. In this breakthrough work he addresses the idea of strategy at all of its levels. Luttwak’s most important insights are that strategy follows a paradoxical non-linear logic and the need to avoid being defeated by the extent of your own success.

Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age

Peter Paret

This collection of essays is an updated edition of the 1943 classic of the same name. While complementing the original volume, it contains twenty-two new essays and brings the study up to the contemporary age. The included authors are outstanding and many are regarded as the expert in their respective fields. The book's focus is on the strategic ideas of all major theorists over the past 500 years. Moreover, each essay succeeds in placing its topic into its political, social and economic context.

Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical Approach

Archer Jones

The focus is American, but Jones uses US historical experience from the early conflict with Native Americans through the Second World War, the Gulf and Vietnam to illustrate developments and continuities in strategic and operational theory and practice. The book is an excellent example of the intersection of good history with serious consideration of strategic art.

Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy

Steven Metz

Developments in Iraq and their impact on the US military and national strategy are the book's primary focus, but it sets these in the context of evolving US national strategy in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and with additional emphasis on counterterrorism and the growth in thinking about counterinsurgency. Metz is highly critical of American inability to deal with opponents whose cultural contexts and worldview differ from their own, and has some highly pertinent things to say about dealing with the enemy you face rather than the one you expect or have prepared to meet.

Military Strategy: The Politics and Technique of War

John Stone

Concentrating on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and with particular emphasis on strategic practice in Western democracies from the Second World War to the 'War

on Terror', Stone examines the function of strategy (defined as 'the instrumental link between military means and political ends'), and argues that effective strategy reflects the political context in which it is derived. Like Clausewitz, he sees politics as the key determinant and argues that an overemphasis on techniques and technologies frequently leads to failure.

The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present

Beatrice Heuser

This is a big, thick book that grapples with the history of strategic thought and its implications for current and recent practice. It is not an easy read, but repays the effort. The first chapter, which examines the ways in which the concept of 'strategy' has been understood across time is worth the price of admission by itself.

The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy and War

Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich and James Lacey

Just as happened after the Vietnam War, when the US military turned to Clausewitz to make sense of its defeat, the US military has renewed its interest in the study of strategy—the relationship and interaction of ways, means and ends—informed by recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. This collection takes as its first premise that grand strategy is the prerogative of great states 'and great states alone'. A series of historical case studies explores the implications of grand strategy. Great states may practice it, but smaller and medium states frequently feel the consequences of its employment.

'An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession'

Harold R Winton

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2011.583389>

Winton argues that theory should be 'studied assiduously but used with caution.' He uses several US case studies to underpin his argument and provides assessments of the ongoing utility of both Clausewitz and Jomini to the military profession.

Logistics

Much popular military history is written without any awareness of the logistic factors that enable operations and keep armies fighting in the field. Field Marshal Lord Wavell wrote in 1941 that ‘a real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader’s plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors, and battles are won by taking risks’.

Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict

Julian Thompson

Julian Thompson, a British brigade commander during the Falklands War, provides a sweeping overview of the principles of operational logistics. Thompson starts his study with an examination of the logistics of the Assyrians, although most of this case study deals with warfare in the twentieth century. Through his analysis Thompson identifies the essential elements of successful logistics, and highlights the consequences when support fails.

Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War

William G Pagonis

Lieutenant General William G Pagonis served as commander of 22 Support Command, the organisation during the First Gulf War responsible for maintaining US forces in the Middle East. In his outline of the logistic lesson of the war Pagonis writes for both the military and business communities. This is a personal account, but one that places the US Army’s logistic requirements into the broader context of the campaign.

Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation

George C Thorpe

Thorpe's minor classic, *Pure Logistics*, was written while he was a student and instructor at the US Naval War College. Although first published in 1917, Thorpe was well ahead of his time in his perception of the place of logistics in development and projection of military power. Thorpe identified logistics as a distinctive branch of warfare—one of equal importance to strategy and tactics—and understood the need to address logistics at the national defence level.

Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present

John A Lynn (ed)

This volume brings together short accessible chapters on logistic issues across 1500 years of experience. Lynn notes that 'Mars must be fed', and that while logistic needs have changed across time (though not as much as might be supposed), logistics has always been a key determinant of both strategy and operations.

Command and leadership

The Army's current doctrine states that 'command is the authority invested in an individual; it is a uniquely human activity. Control, however, encompasses the protocols, processes and equipment (ways and means) that a commander uses to exercise that authority.' Leadership is something else again.

Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

Eliot A Cohen

Using four historical case studies drawn from the 19th and 20th centuries, Cohen analyses the relationship between the highest levels of military command and political leadership at the civil-military interface. This is set against a discussion of the 'normal' theory of civil-military relations advanced in Samuel Huntington's famous *The Soldier and the State*, which Cohen substantially revises.

Honorable Warrior: General Harold K Johnson and the Ethics of Command

Lewis J Sorley

Sorley presents a wide-ranging and thoroughly researched biography of the Chief of Staff of the US Army during the worst years of US involvement in Vietnam, 1964–68. Johnson survived the Bataan Death March in 1942 and was a deeply moral, highly intelligent and compassionate soldier. He fundamentally disagreed with the US Administration's conduct of the war, and wrestled with the idea of 'resignation in protest' that, towards the end of his life, he came to believe he should have done.

The book charts the dilemmas of senior command in an unpopular, losing war and investigates the moral and ethical challenges this offers.

Crisis in Command: Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat, 1941–1943

David Horner

A classic account that subjects the interwar and wartime rivalries within the Australian Army to cold-eyed analysis. Horner dissects the tensions between regular and militia officers, and within both these commissioning streams, and examines the interplay between these and the series of reverses and crises in Papua in 1942 that led to several celebrated sackings of senior officers and further poisoned the well of internal relations between senior ranks.

Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War

Garth Pratten

This is an outstanding analysis of infantry battalion command in the Australian Army that strips away popular stereotypes and considers the reality. Pratten shows that soldiers had most faith in commanding officers in whose professional competence they could trust and rely, regardless of whether they conformed to populist ideas of what a commanding officer should be. The book concludes that commanding officers as individuals and the Army as an organisation had to adapt to the changing demands of the war, and that the wartime profile of battalion commanders changed not only by the war's end, but by its middle years as well.

Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander

Gary W Gallagher (ed)

Commander of the artillery in Longstreet's Corps at Gettysburg at the advanced age of twenty-eight, Alexander was an engineer, artilleryman and staff officer whose lengthy recollections provide a rich and varied account of virtually all the major engagements in the Eastern theatre of the Civil War, in nearly all of which he was personally

involved. His closeness to the senior figures of the Army of Northern Virginia and his discussion of operations and personalities with candour and clarity make this an unrivalled Confederate perspective on the Civil War and ranks it as one of the key participant memoirs to emerge from that conflict.

Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American

Basil H Liddell Hart

William Tecumseh Sherman is sometimes regarded as ‘the quintessential American soldier’. Liddell Hart was drawn by the parallels in trench warfare between Virginia 1864–65 and his own experiences on the Western Front. In this study Sherman becomes a vehicle for the development of Liddell Hart’s ideas about the strategy of the indirect approach and the revival of mobility in warfare that was a significant strand in Liddell Hart’s thinking and advocacy between the two World Wars. The treatment of Grant is overly critical and Liddell Hart perhaps misses the fact that Grant and Sherman were engaged in pursuing complementary and not rival strategies, but the book remains an important example of the maturing of Liddell Hart’s strategic thinking. *Sherman* should perhaps be read alongside Brian Bond, *Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought*.

War Diaries 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke

Alex Danchev and Dan Todman (eds)

These diaries caused enormous consternation in Britain when partially published in the 1950s, since they presented an unflattering picture of Churchill as a strategist and of the command process at its very highest levels. This much fuller edition includes much more of the original diaries and should be read with the understanding that Brooke, one of the ablest heads of the British Army in the twentieth century, was under enormous pressure for most of the war and used his diaries as an outlet for his frustrations. They provide a nuanced picture of the complexities of the highest direction of the British war effort and should be read alongside Eliot Cohen’s *Supreme Command*.

Strategic Commander: General Sir John Wilton and Australia's Asian Wars

David Horner

General Sir John Wilton was one of the most significant senior officers that the Australian Army has produced, his career spanning more than forty years. It began before the Second World War as a graduate from the RMC and ended with command of Australian forces during the Vietnam War. As Horner outlines, Wilton's story provides lessons on a number of levels—staff officer and tactician, institutional manager and innovator, and strategic operator. Wilton's career also provides a case study on civil-military relations. As Chief of the General Staff (now Chief of Army) and Chairman of the Chief of Staff's Committee (now Chief of the Defence Force) Wilton was responsive to a series of prime ministers and Defence ministers.

Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam

HR McMaster

The author, who at time of writing the book was a serving member of the US military and has recently been cleared for promotion to two-star rank, has compiled a well researched history of the actions of President Johnson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the lead-up to the Vietnam War. Dense with recollections of actual correspondence and conversations, this gives an exhaustive—and damning—account of the slide into disaster. It leads the reader to consider what level of responsibility is held by both military and civilian leaders when it comes to the planning of military intervention and conflict, and at what stage a campaign gains its own momentum and becomes 'inevitable'.

Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era

Robert Buzzanco

An account of dissent within the US military over policy regarding the Vietnam War, this book has enjoyed a resurgence of interest following the frustration of US policy in Iraq. The focus is resolutely on civil-military relations and high politics, and tends to tail-off in its discussion of the period after 1968. It provides an important revisionist

perspective on policy formulation and relations between the highest levels of the US military and successive administrations, and is extensively documented.

Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam

Lewis Sorley

This book argues that Westmoreland occupied a crucial command in the critical years of the American war in Vietnam that was, in fact, beyond his abilities or understanding. In part it offers an indictment of the postwar culture of the US Army, showing that Westmoreland's energy, effective self-promotion, and capacity to 'work the system' led to a command in Vietnam that needed more than unbounded ambition and energy to create success. Sorley sees one of Westmoreland's basic failings as his avoiding attendance at any of the US Army's major military education institutions; he was, as a result, an *uneducated* soldier: 'doing it by the book, even though he hadn't read the book or studied at any of the Army's great schools.'

Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War

Ron Milam

The author served as an advisor to Montagnard units late in the American war, and in this book takes issue with the popular notions that US Army officers were generally poorly trained and unmotivated and that the best and ablest avoided service in Vietnam. More than 4000 junior officers were killed in-theatre, and Milam seeks to restore their reputations through exhaustive research and wide-ranging analysis. There are very few books that dissect the experience of command in war at more junior levels, and this one makes an important contribution to the field.

All Day Long the Noise of Battle

Gerard Windsor

Windsor takes a single Australian rifle company from 7RAR in early 1968 and examines it inside-out as it fought its gruelling way through an enemy bunker system over a three-day period of the Australian war. Along with a great many sharply

observed comments about the nature of combat and the relationships forged between soldiers caught up in it, he offers compelling and beautifully written analyses of the stresses and challenges of command in an Australian infantry battalion at every level from the section corporals to the unit commanding officer. If you read only one book on Australia's war in Vietnam, this should be it.

Command Culture: Officer Education in the US Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901–1940

Jorg Muth

This is an important (though intemperate) study of the relationship between officer education and the evolution of command culture culminating in the Second World War. Muth is highly critical of the training that US officers received at the tactical level, while equally faulting German officers' moral failure and performance at the operational and strategic levels. He is especially good (i.e., highly critical) on the weaknesses of the US system at the institutional level.

Not Mentioned in Despatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green

Spencer Fitz-Gibbon

Written with the cooperation of the Ministry of Defence and based on extensive interviews with those involved supported by the operational records from the campaign, this book provides a hard-hitting critique of command style and failure. In particular it examines the system of 'restrictive control' as practiced by Lieutenant Colonel 'H' Jones and contrasts it unfavourably with 'directive command'.

Intelligence

The key to successful intelligence utilisation is recognition of the importance of both comparative and long-term perspectives. The history of intelligence over the last hundred years or so reinforces two important observations: that too much intelligence may cause as many problems as too little, and that it is just as important to know what capabilities the enemy does *not* have.

Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War

Martin S Alexander (ed)

The Intelligence Revolution: An Historical Perspective

Lieutenant Colonel Walter T Hitchcock (ed)

Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History

Keith Neilson and BJC McKercher (eds)

These three edited collections deal with intelligence functions at the national strategic and operational levels. The chapters range widely across time and national case studies, and discuss intelligence activities against common enemies, cooperation and competition in intelligence matters between allies, and the gathering of intelligence on partners within national coalitions.

Forewarned Forearmed: Australian Specialist Intelligence Support in South Vietnam, 1966–1971

Blair Tidey

This is a clear and detailed account of the specialist intelligence work performed within 1st Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy province. It touches on signals intelligence in its various guises, intelligence interpretation and prisoner of war intelligence functions amongst other topics in order to provide a concise analysis of the strengths and effectiveness of these activities in support of Australian efforts.

Professional ethics

‘Ethics are standards by which one should act based on values. Values are core beliefs such as duty, honor, and integrity that motivate attitudes and actions. Not all values are ethical values (integrity is; happiness is not). Ethical values relate to what is right and wrong and thus take precedence over non-ethical values when making ethical decisions.’ (*Code of Federal Regulations*) Contemporary operations promote complex and difficult ethical environments, and Western militaries are devoting increasing levels of resources to help train and prepare soldiers to deal with these successfully.

Just and Unjust Wars

Michael Walzer

The classic book on just war theory, originally published in 1977. Now a little dated, since each new edition only includes an updated preface which discusses an issue of concern at the time (4th Edition preface discusses regime change and just war, 3rd Edition preface discusses humanitarian intervention, 2nd Edition discusses the 1991 Gulf War). Later editions do not include the prefaces to previous editions, so the 4th Edition only has the original preface plus the one discussing regime change.

The Morality of War

Brian Orend

A discussion of how just war theory has changed through history and how it might apply in the modern world. It includes discussion of problems of terrorism and preemptive self-defence as well as discussion of the main alternatives to just war theory: realism and pacifism.

Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict

Michael L Gross

As the subtitle suggests, this book examines some contentious issues in modern warfare, including limitations on the use of both lethal and non-lethal weapons, assassination and targeted killing, terrorism and counterterrorism, and humanitarian military intervention.

New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World

Paolo Tripodi and Jessica Wolfendale (eds)

An edited collection of papers discussing modern interpretations of just war theory, problems in humanitarian intervention, new technologies in the battlefield, private contractors, combat training and psychological problems for combatants.

Ethics, Law and Military Operations

David Whetham (ed)

Aimed at mid-ranking officers, this book provides a discussion of the ethical and legal problems faced at the operational planning level.

The Code of the Warrior

Shannon French

An examination of warrior codes through history, from ancient times through to modern terrorists. The central questions examined are: ‘Why do warriors need codes of behaviour, why were such codes important in the past, and are such codes still relevant today?’

Soldier's Conscience: The Ethical Complexity of Vietnam Service

Peter Rose

A series of case studies examining ethical problems that actually arose for an Australian Engineering officer and his colleagues during their period of service in Vietnam.

Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry

PW Singer

An examination of the ethical problems that have arisen due to the rise of private military companies and contracted personnel in modern conflicts.

Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century

PW Singer

An examination of the ethical problems that have arisen out of the development of new military technologies. It includes discussion of remotely piloted and semi-autonomous vehicles, automation of weapons systems, developments in the area of non-lethal weapons, cyber warfare, and so on.

Military Ethics: An Introduction with Case Studies

Stephen Coleman

This book provides a practical introduction to the real-life ethical issues faced by those serving in modern military forces, and is of particular relevance to those serving in leadership positions at the cutting edge of military operations. It includes more than fifty specially selected case studies, many previously unpublished, which enable the reader to examine, in a real and understandable way, the ethical problems that military personnel face in modern operations, including professional military obligations, the problems of operations in irregular military environments, and the problem of responding to terrorist tactics.

Military innovation and adaptation

‘Adaptation’ and ‘innovation’ are different though related phenomena; innovation describes institutional change that occurs in peacetime while adaptation occurs under the pressure of war and with the enemy also adapting at the same time, heightening the challenges posed.

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050

MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray

Spanning 700 years, this collection of essays considers a series of military revolutions that have altered the basic context of waging war. The authors take a broad approach to their subject, addressing the social, political, technological and institutional change that shaped the evolution of the Western way of war. *The Dynamics of Military Revolution* is an important introduction to the subject of military innovation.

Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military

Stephen Peter Rosen

Winner of the 1992 National Security Book Award, *Winning the Next War* provides a critical analysis of the process of military innovation. Relying on case studies, Rosen compares the efficiencies of innovation in wartime and peacetime, and the effect of technological advances on the need and pace of adaptation. *Winning the Next War*'s primary contribution, however, is its understanding of the innovation process and the identification of the factors that shape the direction of military change.

Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941

Harold R Winton and David R Mets (eds)

The Challenge of Change presents a series of essays that focus on military change during the interwar period, an era whose technological advances rival the complexity of the present information revolution. The contributors examine how US and European military institutions attempted to meet the demands of emerging strategic, political and technological realities.

A History of Innovation: US Army Adaptation in War and Peace

Jon T Hoffman (ed)

A series of short focused articles that examine innovation not only in equipment and technological applications, as one might expect in the US military, but also in doctrine and training. The chapter on ‘the Benning revolution’ dealing with changes in the training of infantry officers in the interwar period is especially suggestive.

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period

Williamson Murray and Allan R Millett (eds)

The volume brings together a series of comparative studies of British, German and American experience in adaptation and innovation between the two world wars. Subjects include developments in armoured warfare and mechanisation, surface and sub-surface war at sea and developments in maritime aviation, and the exploitation of the electro-magnetic sphere through developments in radio and radar. The book concludes with several deeply insightful chapters on the patterns of military innovation and the difficulties of innovation in peacetime.

Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change

Williamson Murray

Murray is one of the most important US scholars dealing with the issues of innovation, adaptation, technology and military organisations. Along with a valuable essay on the historical framework of adaptation, Murray here provides case studies across the twentieth century on land, sea and air culminating with the 1973 *Yom Kippur* War. He concludes that a capacity to adapt successfully at the strategic, technological, operational and tactical levels simultaneously is the hallmark of an advanced and highly professionally-educated military culture.

Amphibious warfare

The acquisition of the LHDs and Army's embrace of the amphibious role that comes with them are both part of Army's effective incorporation into the emerging maritime strategy and the development of Force 2030. Amphibious operations are more than usually challenging and the Australian Army has not engaged in them since 1945, nor owned and operated ships since the Vietnam War. The readings in this section provide an entry point to a large and complicated subject matter.

Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare, 1945–1991

JH Alexander and ML Bartlett

Written by two noted Marine Corps historians (and former Marines), this is an operational study of the postwar period, heavily slanted to American experience. It provides scattered comment on Soviet practice and includes good chapters on the Falklands campaign and the evolution of US maritime doctrine in the 1980s.

Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare

ML Bartlett (ed)

This collection of essays (some by leading scholars, others by military officers) examines case studies in amphibious operations from ancient Greece to the Falklands War, ranging across the globe and including East Asian, Spanish Atlantic, British colonial and Soviet studies, as well as many from the Napoleonic, First and Second World Wars and the Cold War era.

The Changing Face of Maritime Power

A Dorman, ML Smith and MRH Uttley (eds)

This collection of essays by leading naval and defence scholars addresses aspects of maritime power at the advent of the new century, including a useful piece by Geoffrey Till on the relevance of Julian Corbett's ideas and his concepts of power projection ashore.

Amphibious Warfare 1000–1700

M Fissel and D Trim (eds)

This collection of essays by noted early modern naval and military historians considers amphibious warfare in a wider historical context—economic, political and global, as well as operational, and focuses on the European powers during the era of the military revolution and the coming of gunpowder.

Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from the Sea. From Gallipoli to the Gulf—A Definitive Analysis

T Lovering (ed)

Edited by a British officer with both Army and Navy service experience and a background in amphibious warfare education, this excellent collection of concise operational case studies, many by leading scholars, ranges across the twentieth century from Gallipoli to the Iraq War and identifies operational lessons at the end of each chapter with focused bibliographies.

The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy 1945–56

Ian Speller

An academic study of the relationship between British amphibious capability and defence policy during the onset of the Cold War, this book argues that the relative neglect of expeditionary forces in favour of a continental European focus left capability deficient at the time of the Suez crisis. This is a useful case study of the intersecting dimensions—political, financial, strategic, historical and force structural—which together influence the making of defence policy.

Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics. The Theory and Practice of Amphibious Operations in the 20th Century

Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck

Despite its illustrated coffee table format, this primer by two British defence academics analyses the step by step preparation and execution of amphibious operations and has valuable chapters on logistics and equipment.

Strength Through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation Stabilise

David Stevens

This paper examines the contribution of multinational sea power during the crisis intervention in East Timor in 1999–2000 with emphasis on the maritime logistical dimension which enabled INTERFET to function effectively.

Charting the Pathway to OMFTS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present

Carter Malkasian

<http://www.cna.org/research/2002/charting-pathway-omfts-historical-assessment>>

This paper is an academic analysis of the US Marine Corps' concept for amphibious warfare, operational manoeuvre from the sea (OMFTS), examining the history of amphibious warfare from 1941 to the present and arguing that OMFTS is an incomplete concept, neglecting historical constraints and demands on amphibious warfare, and needs refinement. There is a useful bibliography.

'Manoeuvring in the littoral: prospects for the Australian Army's future role' in Projecting Force: The Australian Army and Maritime Strategy

Albert Palazzo et al (ed)

This essay by Anthony Trentini, part of a collection examining the new role of the Army in the maritime strategy outlined in the recent Defence White Paper *Force 2030*, examines how the major build-up of naval force structure will enable the Army to achieve an operational decisiveness arguably not possible today. The essay examines combat against state-based opponents in the future period of 2020 and beyond.

Memoirs

Memoirs, like the related field of biography, have the capacity to take complex issues and diverse experiences and humanise them through the lens provided by a single life or perspective. Memoirs have the added benefit of conveying a sense of immediacy and individual authority, of enabling the reader to ‘get inside the head’ of the subject and view things from their point of departure.

Not as a Duty Only: An Infantry Man’s War

HB ‘Jo’ Gullett

A classic of Australian war writing, Gullett’s book deals with his experiences in the Middle East and New Guinea firstly as a sergeant and then after receiving his commission. His account of the battle of Bardia and his company’s successful assault on Post 11, in which he was badly wounded, is justly famous, while his descriptions of the functioning of an Australian infantry battalion at war is widely quoted. At times almost meditative in style, this remains the most profound memoir of war service ever written by an Australian soldier.

With a Machine Gun to Cambrai: The Tale of a Young Tommy in Kitchener’s Army, 1914–1918

George Coppard

This compelling view of service in the Great War is from the perspective of ‘a common private of the uneducated classes,’ as the author styles himself. Enlisting in the 6th Battalion, Queen’s Royal West Surrey Regiment, he later transferred to the Machine Gun Corps and fought through many of the major engagements on the Western Front from his arrival there in June 1915 till the end of the war in 1918. His account is

valuable both because he was not an officer nor from the middle class (members of which authored the overwhelming majority of trench memoirs), and because, as he observes, ordinary soldiers endured the horrors of trench warfare through a sense of duty and self-respect; this was even more pronounced among those who had volunteered.

Defeat into Victory

Field Marshal Sir William Slim

A memoir of the war in Burma and India by the XIVth Army's commander, who led British and Indian forces from early defeats at Japanese hands through to the final victorious advances of 1945 and the re-conquest of Rangoon. Slim hoped, in part, to 'give, to those who have not experienced it, some impression of what it feels like to shoulder a commander's responsibilities in war'. His modest and deeply human memoirs succeed in this admirably, and it remains one of the best books about the challenges and pressures of command in modern war to emerge from the Second World War.

Fear Drive My Feet

Peter Ryan

This classic Australian memoir of the Second World War has lost none of its power and emotion since its first publication in 1959. Ryan spent much of 1942 and 1943 patrolling forward of friendly lines in Japanese controlled territory around Lae in New Guinea. Often working only in the company of a handful of indigenous police and porters and under arduous and dangerous conditions, Ryan maintained his coolness and resourcefulness as he kept watch on the Japanese. *Fear Drive My Feet* highlights the enduring soldierly virtues of courage, initiative and resilience to which every Australian soldier should aspire.

A Rumor of War

Philip Caputo

Caputo served as a Marine officer in Vietnam in 1965–66, and the book contains autobiographical elements. The novel's protagonist is accused of war crimes, and the book deals intelligently with the effects of a poorly-understood insurgent conflict on a conventional military force. Caputo went on to become an award-winning correspondent, and covered the fall of Saigon in 1975 for the *Chicago Tribune*.

Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S Grant

Ulysses S Grant

Written while he was dying of throat cancer after a controversial second term as President and a financially disastrous business venture, the *Memoirs* were intended to provide for Grant's wife and family. They focus overwhelmingly on his military career in the Mexican War and the US Civil War. With a clear and concise style not always found in military memoirs, the book was both a critical and financial success, and remains one of the key contemporary texts for understanding the Union conduct of the Civil War, especially in its second half.

Thinking creatively

Soldiers train hard to fight and to be fit to fight. It is just as important to be mentally fit and resilient as it is to be physically fit and resilient. Thinking logically and creatively enhances our capacity to deal with complexity and with the stresses and pressures that soldiering regularly presents us.

The Meditations

Marcus Aurelius

These ruminations are truly the definition of ‘timeless classics’—the thoughts of this great Roman general are, on the whole, still relevant today. Marcus Aurelius was not only a general, but also became a Roman emperor. These meditations are an insight into the mind of a great thinker who applied his philosophy to how he carried out his tasks in life, and modern military professionals would do well to do the same. Occasionally there are references to people or ideas that may not be clear to anyone but scholars of the era, but most copies will have notes to explain the more obscure ideas.

Zeno and the Tortoise: How to Think Like a Philosopher

Nicholas Fearn

This book provides a short and accessible guide to the major elements of philosophical thought in the Western tradition from the Socratic method to deconstructionism. Intended as an introductory text, it is clear, amusing and avoids the pitfalls inherent in many such ‘guides’—becoming bogged down in arcane or highly theoretical discussion.

Serious Creativity

Edward De Bono

Military problems are usually multifaceted and without a ‘right answer’, more especially in today’s world of complex environments characterised by uncertainty. Soldiers need to know how to think under pressure and with little—or too much—information. Creative thinking can be taught, and this is a ‘how-to’ guide, full of exercises and activities to free up lateral thinking and spark creativity, including the well known ‘Six Thinking Hats’.

A Whack on the Side of the Head—How you can be more creative

Roger von Oech

Critical and creative thinking are the hallmarks of military genius, and this book provides simple exercises and explanations to help people break free of constrained thinking patterns.

The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession

Williamson Murray and Richard Sinnreich

A collection of essays from writers important in the field of military studies, this anthology explores the significance of history to the military profession. The first section of the book includes essays on the general theme of historical learning and military practice, whereas the second section focuses on specific historical events and their applicability to modern day military action. This book presents lucid and well written arguments explaining why and how history should be studied and used. In this world of rapid change and future focus, the importance of military history can often be overlooked; by examining and learning from the past, soldiers can build the knowledge and insight that is required for the tasks they may face in the future.

Contemporary security contexts

Much publication in this area is necessarily ephemeral and dates very quickly. Some of the professional journals and websites listed later in this reading list will provide good coverage of the short-term literature. More substantial works with a longer shelf life might include the following.

Deliver us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict

William Shawcross

A critique of United Nations' peacekeeping missions during the 1990s, the author explains how the United Nations is often hamstrung by its own member states and their inability to act, rather than the organisation of the United Nations itself. Based mainly on his own high-level access to world leaders and bureaucrats, Shawcross gives an in-depth analysis not only of the missions the United Nations endeavours to carry out, but also the *Realpolitik* basis for why these missions usually fail to realise their objectives.

Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace

Edward N Luttwak

The author of more than a dozen books, Luttwak is an internationally recognised scholar in the area of military strategy. In this breakthrough work he addresses the idea of strategy at all of its levels. Luttwak's most important insights are that strategy follows a paradoxical non-linear logic and the need to avoid being defeated by the extent of your own success.

The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History

Phillip Bobbit

This is a work of panoramic scope that examines the interplay of technological and social change, warfare and shifts in epochal constitutional orders. Bobbitt applies Clausewitz's insight as to the intimate connection between politics and warfare and examines the evolution of the liberal democratic constitutional order that prevails in much of the West today.

Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies

Jared Diamond

The purpose of this book is to describe how the current world came into being. Diamond explains that it is geographic features that have shaped the current economic, social and political world in which we live. Geography, unequal distributions of flora and fauna, the advantages gained through early food production, population density, and dissemination of ideas and germs gave some cultures huge advantages over others. Full of interesting facts as well as thought-provoking hypotheses, this book would be of interest to anyone looking for answers as to why the world turned out the way it did.

A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East

David Fromkin

This is an important book whose appearance substantially predates current events in the former territories of the defunct Ottoman Empire. It examines the ways in which the destruction of Ottoman rule laid the foundations for the modern Middle East and created or exacerbated the fault lines that have plagued international relations in the region in more recent decades.

Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam

Gilles Kepel

In this book the author explains the recent ascendance of militant Islam to a Western audience and argues that the terrorism we see today stems from the failure of Islamic fundamentalism, not its success. This book covers the growth and struggle of political Islam throughout the world and places events such as 11 September 2001 in a historical and socio-political context.

Military history—general and contemporary

‘**T**he study of history provides no clear, certain path for understanding the future. At best, its lessons are uncertain and ambiguous.’ [Williamson Murray] History remains the best, most detailed and perhaps only sure guide to understanding the possible futures we face.

The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500–2000

Fred Anderson and Andrew Clayton

An ambitious analysis spanning five hundred years, it shows the means by which war and conflict shaped the United States, often in ways unintended by those who initiated them. Using nine individuals as their focus, the authors move US ‘minor’ wars—such as the War of 1812 or the Mexican War—to the centre of our attention. Overall, the book emphasises the imperial elements of US history and argues that the long-term patterns of US development look broadly similar to those of other large, successful states. It constitutes a sustained argument against the notion of American exceptionalism.

The British Way in Counter-insurgency 1945–1967

David French

French shows that popular ideas about a British ‘model’ for counterinsurgency are frequently wrong, and that the concepts of ‘minimum force’ and ‘hearts and minds’ were not the defining characteristics of British practice in the wars of decolonisation after 1945. Rather, British practice used coercion far more than is often credited, British

operations often displayed weaknesses in understanding effective counterinsurgency principles, and ‘nasty, not nice’ is a more consistent and accurate description of the subject. This book is an important corrective to much that has been written on the subject over the last decade.

Zombie Myths of Australian Military History

Craig Stockings (ed)

This collection subjects ten popular myths about Australian military history to cold-eyed scrutiny and shows that some cherished beliefs about our military past have no basis in fact or are simply wrong. It also demonstrates that the truth is often more complex and interesting than the myth.

Australian Army History

The Australian Army is fortunate to have available an extensive and well developed historiography. Provided below is a representative list of only a small part of the works that are available to those seeking a deeper knowledge of the Army's history, corps, formations and units.

Shaping History: A Bibliography of Australian Army History Units

Syd Trigellis-Smith, Sergio Zampatti and Max Parsons

A Military History of Australia

Jeffrey Grey

The Australian Army: A History

Jeffrey Grey

The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation, 1901–2001

Albert Palazzo

The Forgotten War: Australia and the Boer War

Laurie Field

The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788–1838

John Connor

Making the Australian Defence Force

David Horner

An Atlas of Australia's Wars

John Coates

Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics

Joan Beaumont

The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War

Bill Gammage

Game to the Last: The 11th Australian Infantry Battalion at Gallipoli

James Hurst

Quinn's Post: ANZAC, Gallipoli

Peter Stanley

At the Front Line: Experiences of Australian Soldiers in World War II

Mark Johnston

Alamein: The Australian Story

Mark Johnston and Peter Stanley

Bravery Above Blunder: the 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg and Sio

John Coates

On Shaggy Ridge: The Australian Seventh Division in the Ramu Valley from Kaiapit to the Finisterres

Phillip Bradley

The Once and Future Army: A History of the Citizen Military Forces, 1947–1974

Dayton McCarthy

A Different Sort of War: Australians in Korea, 1950–1953

Richard Trembath

Conscripts and Regulars with the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam

Michael O'Brien

An Inch of Bravery: 3RAR in the Malayan Emergency, 1957–59

Colin Bannister

The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations During World War I

EM Andrews

Green Armour

Osmar White

Other People's Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping

Peter Londey

Arms and Schools

Signals: A History of the Royal Australian Corps of Signals, 1788–1947

Theo Barker

Craftsmen of the Australian Army: The Story of RAEME

Theo Barker

Guns and Brooches: Australian Army Nursing from the Boer War to the Gulf War

Jan Bassett

Signals Swift and Sure: A History of the Royal Australian Corps of Signals, 1947–1972

John Blaxland

Soldiers of the Queen: Women in the Australian Army

Janette Bomford

Australia's Military Map-Makers: The Royal Australian Survey Corps, 1915–1996

Chris Couthard-Clark

Australian Armour: A History of the RAAC, 1927–1972

RNL Hopkins

The Gunners: A History of Australian Artillery

David Horner

Duty First: The Royal Australian Regiment in War and Peace

David Horner

Equal to the Task

Neville Lindsay

Loyalty and Service: The Officer Cadet School, Portsea

Neville Lindsay

The Royal Australian Engineers, 1835–1902: The Colonial Engineers

RR McNicol

The Royal Australian Engineers, 1902–1919: Making and Breaking

RR McNicol

The Royal Australian Engineers, 1919–1945: Teeth to Tail

RR McNicol

The Royal Australian Engineers, 1945–1972: Paving the Way

PJ Greville

Duntroon: A History of the Royal Military College of Australia, 1911–2001

Darren Moore

The Royal Australian Corps of Transport, 1973–2000

Albert Palazzo

A History of the Australian Military Postal Services, 1914–1950

Edward B Proud

To the Warrior His Arms: A History of the Ordnance Services in the Australian Army

John D Tillbrook

Little by Little: A Centenary History of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps

Michael Tyquin

The Other Enemy: Australian Soldiers and the Military Police

Glenn Wablert

Formations

The White Gurkhas: The 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade at Krithia, Gallipoli
Ron Austin

The Silent 7th: An Illustrated History of the 7th Australian Division
Mark Johnson

The Magnificent 9th: An Illustrated History of the 9th Australian Division, 1940–46
Mark Johnson

Defenders of Australia: The Third Australian Division
Albert Palazzo

Units

Forward Undeterred: The History of the 23rd Battalion, 1915–1919
Ron Austin

To Kokoda and Beyond: The Story of the 39th Battalion, 1941–1943
Victor Austin

Our Secret War: The 4th Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment, Defending Malaysia Against Indonesian Confrontation, 1965–1967
Brian Avery

An Inch of Bravery: 3RAR in the Malayan Emergency
Colin Bannister

Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity, 1941–1945
Joan Beaumont

The Thunder of the Guns: A History of the 2/3 Australian Field Regiment
Les Bishop

First to Fight: Australian Diggers, NZ Kiwis and US Paratroopers in Vietnam, 1965–1966

Bob Breen

The Blue & White Diamond: The History of the 28th Battalion, 1915–1919

Neville Browning

Nothing Over Us: The Story of the 2/6th Australian Infantry Battalion

David Hay

The Long Carry: A History of the 2/1st Australian Machine Gun Battalion, 1939–1946

Philip Hocking

SAS, Phantoms of the Jungle: A History of the Australian Special Air Service

David Horner

War Book of the Third Pioneer Battalion

MBB Keating

Bushmen's Rifles: A History of the 22nd Battalion The RVR

Neil Leckie

Militia Battalion at War: The History of the 58/59th Australian Infantry Battalion in the Second World War

Russell Mathews

The Team: Australian Advisers in Vietnam, 1962–1972

Ian McNeill

Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1966–1967

Robert J O'Neill

Purple Patches: A Tale of the Sappers

TH Prince

Men of Beersheba: A History of the 4th Light Horse Regiment, 1914–1919

NC Smith

Forward: The History of the 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment

Joan Starr and Christopher Sweeney

Nulli Secundus: A History of the Second Battalion, AIF, 1914–1919

FW Taylor and TA Cusack

Australian Army Campaign Series

Albert Palazzo and Glenn Wahlert

The Australian Army Campaign Series offers short, well illustrated introductions to the history of the Australian Army. Each volume focuses on leadership, command, strategy, tactics, lessons and the personal experience of war.

- 1 **Battle of Crete**, *Albert Palazzo*
- 2 **The Western Desert Campaign, 1940–41**, *Glenn Wahlert*
- 3 **Australian Military Operations in Vietnam**, *Albert Palazzo*
- 4 **Exploring Gallipoli**, *Glenn Wahlert*
- 5 **Malaya, 1942**, *Brian Farrell and Garth Pratten*
- 6 **Wau, 1942–1943**, *Phillip Bradley*
- 7 **Australia and the Palestine Campaign 1916–1918**, *Jean Bou*
- 8 **Fromelles**, *Roger Lee*
- 9 **Bardia**, *Craig Stockings*
- 10 **August Offensive 1915**, *David Cameron*

The Australian Military History Series has a focus on issues and deployments relevant to the Army. The series will feature personal recollections and reflections and thus differs in its perspective from the *Campaign Series*.

- 1 **Rwanda: UNAMIR 1994/95**, *Kevin O'Halloran*

Recent conflicts

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shaped both the US and Australian military to a considerable extent and their effects will be felt, and reflected upon, institutionally for some years to come.

We Were One: Shoulder to Shoulder with the Marines Who Took Fallujah

Patrick O'Donnell

We Were One's focus is on the tactical level of operations in Iraq. Patrick O'Donnell was embedded with a company of Marines who helped take Fallujah. The result is a turbo-charged depiction of combat in the urban environment that is not for the faint-hearted. In an age of asymmetric warfare, O'Donnell shows that there will always be a need for soldiers capable of closing with and killing the enemy.

Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq

Thomas E Ricks

Fiasco is an exploration of the decision-making behind the plans to invade Iraq and the actions, both on the ground and in Washington, once the invasion had begun. From the first sentence, this book is a denouncement of the whole Iraq 'adventure', which the author argues was based on bad premises and deceptions. Such misdirected reasoning led to forces on the ground that were never aware of the real nature of their mission, and muddled strategy that has led to unnecessary deaths and a country on the brink of civil war. This book, dense with information and analysis, will probably become the 'go-to' book for future readers looking for information about the Iraq conflict, with its ability to lead the reader through the various aspects of a complicated and ill-begotten military fiasco.

The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006–2008

Thomas E Ricks

The Gamble provides the second instalment in Ricks' deeply researched and informed study of the US war in Iraq. The author shows how the US military adapted in the face of the complexities of the operational contexts they faced, and provides interesting discussions both of individual developments and the broader institutional and systemic challenges faced by both Americans and Iraqis.

The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq

George Packer

Among the vast number of books on the recent war in Iraq, *The Assassin's Gate* stands out as one of the best. This book's style is more literary than those that focus on combat operations, but Packer provides a broader interpretation of the sources and consequences of the conflict. Moreover, Packer is familiar enough with his subject to view the conflict from the perspective of the ordinary Iraqi.

Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone

Rajiv Chandrasekaran

A depressing but powerful account of the Coalition Provisional Authority's attempts—and self-delusion—to develop a new society in Iraq. Led by hubris and arrogance rather than knowledge or compassion, a group of people were recruited based more on their political affiliations than any knowledge or experience of Middle Eastern affairs, Arabic, reconstruction or often even the issues upon which they were meant to be working. They then attempted to rebuild a nation in the image they preferred, ignoring the realities on the ground or the day-to-day needs of Iraq, preferring to micro-manage and attempt to implement a privatised capitalist system on what had been for years a socialist society. This book reads as a how-not-to for anyone involved in the tasks of reconstruction.

Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power

Max Boot

This book deals exclusively with US ‘small wars’, such as the Indian Wars, the war in Nicaragua, or the counterinsurgency fight in the Philippines. Boot casts his eye from these early battles throughout the twentieth century, up to contemporary small wars such as those in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, arguing that they all fit into a common, unifying theme—the spread of US power. The author identifies these wars as demonstrations of the resolve of the United States, or as punishments for transgressions against the United States, and explores how they furthered US foreign policy. Boot argues that these small wars form a corpus of experience from which many lessons for today’s operations can be learned.

Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy

James Corum

This is a damning view of the US method of fighting an insurgency. Corum, a retired US Army officer with nearly thirty years experience and now a highly regarded scholar and Dean of the Baltic Defence College, outlines what the United States has done wrong in the conduct of the Global War on Terror and highlights what it needs to do in order to save the situation. Corum offers more hope than other recent literature on Iraq, but he does not recoil from the depth of reform the US Department of Defense must undertake if it is to succeed.

Revolt on the Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq

Mark Hetherington

Written by a former British Army officer, who served as provincial governor of Wasit Province in south-central Iraq in 2003–04, this revealing book explains much of what went wrong with the Coalition Provisional Authority’s initial attempts to re-make Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The author was one of the few non-Americans placed in a position of any authority, and his observations and obvious feeling for the Iraqis are an excellent addition to the better-known ‘big picture’ accounts of the post-hostilities period.

Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay Garner, and the ORHA Story

Gordon W Rudd

Rudd provides an exhaustive and highly critical account of the way in which the US-led Coalition victory over Saddam Hussein was thrown away through inadequate preparation and multiple poor decisions concerning the rebuilding and rehabilitation of Iraq. The extensive planning of the war with Iraq was not matched by similar concern for the 'Phase IV' that would follow. The book provides timely warnings about end-states and the means used to achieve them, and concludes that 'regime removal solves nothing without effective regime replacement'.

Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–1989

Rodric Braithwaite

Various parallels are frequently drawn with earlier foreign incursions into Afghanistan, many of them ahistorical where not simply wrong. Braithwaite served as the last British ambassador to the Soviet Union and his unrivalled contacts and deep knowledge of the Soviet system provide a detailed, human and intensely readable account of the Soviet war that overturns some common assumptions and beliefs. He is also very strong on the tumultuous internal politics of Afghanistan communism.

Military and other fiction

Military *literature* encompasses fiction as well as history and works in the social sciences. Fiction comes in a variety of forms and genres, and good fiction can deal with profound truths in ways that even good history sometimes struggles to convey. The works below are a sample of historical, science and creative fiction that informs, entertains and, at its best, grapples with important issues of ethics, morality, judgment, courage and the human condition.

The Killer Angels

Michael Shaara

Michael Shaara's work portrays the Battle of Gettysburg, the turning point in the American Civil War, and examines the conflict on many levels. The author explores the motivations of the leaders and their soldiers, and contrasts the fortunes of the poorly supplied but buoyant Confederacy, and the superbly equipped but demoralised Union. At the end of the battle, it is the professional Union commanders who have won—fighting a battle that maximised the value of the terrain and firepower. The idealists and romantics of the book, like the Confederate General Lee, succeed only in wasting away their own forces by 'following their hearts'.

Starship Troopers

Robert A Heinlein

Heinlein graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1928 and continued his involvement with the military right through the Second World War. His award-winning book explores profound territory—what makes a citizen and what is the military's responsibility to the state that supports it? A simple tale of a young man

joining up and going to war with an alien race, ‘the Bugs’, hides layers of deep and complex moral and political philosophy, the core of which is the notion that social responsibility requires individual sacrifice.

Ender’s Game

Orson Scott Card

Ender Wiggin is six years old when he is taken from his family and sent to Battle School, where he is taught the art and science of war. Ender’s advantage is his creativity, and he rises to command of all of the Earth’s military but at the expense of his physical and mental health. The book investigates the use of simulation and networked forces to select leaders and manage combat, and has a subtext about the burden of leadership and the importance in commanders of both compassion and ruthlessness.

The Red Badge of Courage

Stephen Crane

When published in 1895, Stephen Crane’s *The Red Badge of Courage* was an international bestseller, went into numerous reprints, and has remained widely available ever since. It is the story of the psychological component of combat, and one young warrior’s struggle—in this case an ordinary private—to contain his fear and fulfil his duty. In the course of this brief novel Crane captures the realism of the personal view of war. When it first appeared *The Red Badge of Courage* was immediately seen as a masterpiece of war literature, a recognition that it continues to hold to the present.

Catch-22

Joseph Heller

Heller joined the US Army Air Force in 1942 and flew sixty combat missions. In 1961 he published this masterpiece of satirical fiction about the murderous insanity of war. Yossarian, a B-25 bombardier in the Second World War, can be sent home if he is crazy and if he asks to go, but asking to go home proves he is sane; the binding logic of military and bureaucratic paradox—expressed as ‘Catch-22’—has now entered the

public lexicon to mean a ‘no-win situation’ or absurdity in choice. This novel is funny and touching, outrageous in its cynicism and honest with its portrayal of men at arms trapped in a system where the big questions are unimportant and the trivial is crucial.

Fields of Fire

James Webb

The author is a 1968 US Naval Academy graduate and retired Marine Corps officer who was badly wounded and highly decorated for service in Vietnam. Widely praised for its unromantic and graphic depictions of infantry combat and life in a Marine platoon in the field, it was one of the earliest novels to emerge from that war, and remains one of the best. Having served as the youngest ever Secretary of the Navy during Ronald Reagan’s second term in office, Webb is now the junior Senator for Virginia in the United States Congress.

The Good Soldier

Ford Maddox Ford

Set on the brink of the Great War, this elegant story is a touching lament about the nature of self-deceit and flawed character. It examines the ways in which people deny who they are and strive for unrealistic ideals, and around them the old world of Europe crumbles beneath pretence and artifice while the American Century unfolds.

Years of Rice and Salt

Kim Stanley Robinson

The award-winning science fiction writer imagines a world in which the European population died of the plague in the fourteenth century and in which China, India and the Islamic world come to dominate. Essentially an alternate history and a novel of ideas, this is a challenging book that rewards the reader on a number of levels.

Paths of Glory

Humphrey Cobb

A soldier in the Canadian Army during the First World War, Cobb produced one of the best anti-war books of all time. Based on true events—the execution of innocent French soldiers for cowardice—this is a tale of privates and generals, of ordering men into battle and the difference between ‘command’ and ‘leadership’.

The Centurions

Jean Larteguy

This is the first of two novels (the second was *The Praetorians*) dealing with the French war in Algeria, a highly contentious subject at the time of publication. Larteguy, a pseudonym, had served with the Free French during the Second World War and had been decorated several times. After the war he served as a foreign correspondent and witnessed the collapse of the French colonial empire first-hand. His novel reflects the dilemmas faced by French soldiers in Algeria following their defeat in Indochina, and also deals with the gradual process of demoralisation and loss of faith among men who feel themselves to be holding the lines of ‘civilisation’ against ‘barbarism’.

The Winds of War / War and Remembrance

Herman Wouk

A grand historical melodrama that views the Second World war through the eyes of an American family; the first volume begins in mid-1939 and ends with the US poised on the brink of Pearl Harbor, the second takes them to the war’s end. Through various plot devices and intermarriage Wouk manages to encapsulate the major themes of the war—the aero-naval combat in the Pacific, the critical role of the Soviet Union and the Red Army, and the unfolding holocaust of European Jewry—into the experiences of his central characters. The novels were made into a pair of hugely successful television mini-series in 1983 and 1988.

The Thin Red Line

James Jones

A fictionalisation of the Guadalcanal campaign in the Second World War, this book is based on the author's experience in the US 25th Infantry Division. The theme is that war, despite being a mass human occurrence, is a very personal and lonely experience each individual suffers alone. With depictions of violence and murder, dread fear and frustration, this oft-confronting book is renowned for its realism.

Lords of Discipline

Pat Conroy

In the 1960s in Charleston, South Carolina, a young outsider attends a military academy steeped in history and tradition, and struggles to cope with the physical and emotional brutality of cadet life. When he is ordered to mentor the first black cadet as an upper-classman, his morals are tested. A gripping coming-of-age story, this book explores themes of loyalty, shared experience and courage in the face of greater and lesser evil.

Fatherland

Robert Harris

Twenty years after the victory of the Nazis in the Second World War, President Kennedy is due to visit Germany. Berlin is preparing for celebrations to mark the seventy-fifth birthday of Adolf Hitler when a body washes up on the shore of a river in an area near the homes of high ranking Nazi officials. The detective on the case, Xavier March, has his own personal dilemmas to grapple with while uncovering the horrific hidden secrets of the Nazi regime. A well written thriller, this is also one of the best examples of the alternative history fiction genre, allowing the reader to imagine what the world would have been like if the Nazis had not been defeated.

The Regeneration Trilogy

Pat Barker

Based on real historical events and characters, Barker's books deal with the emotional and mental trauma suffered by those who served in the First World War, an often overlooked element of the war experience. The novels are based on meetings between the psychologist WH Rivers and the poets Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen, and they explore the development of ideas around 'shell shock' as a medical condition, and the burgeoning science of psychology. These books also paint a believable portrait of British society during the Great War, looking at some of the less-investigated issues such as attitudes towards homosexuality, pacifism and the dissonance between conditions on the frontlines and how they were presented at home. Each book comes with historical notes and recommended further reading about the people involved.

The Matthew Hervey series

Allan Mallinson

This series of novels follows the life and career of a fictional cavalry officer, Matthew Hervey, in an equally fictitious regiment, the 6th Light Dragoons, from service in the Peninsular War and at Waterloo through early nineteenth century campaigns in Canada, India and southern Africa. Mallinson himself commanded the Light Dragoons and retired from the British Army as a brigadier. His novels examine the challenges of command at increasing rank levels, and display an excellent feel for the interior life of a cavalry regiment, and for the British Army and society of the day more generally. Highly enjoyable reading that wears its learning very lightly.

Slaughterhouse Five

Kurt Vonnegut

Billy Pilgrim has become unstuck in time—he keeps re-living his experiences in the Second World War, as well as jumping ahead in time to where he is kept by aliens in a zoo. Vonnegut, a prisoner of war held in Dresden, lived through the awful Allied firebombing, and this incident forms the core of Billy Pilgrim's character. Funny, tragic and often irreverent, the book explores fate and fatalism as well as post-traumatic stress and the appalling impact of war on people and societies.

Bomber

Len Deighton

Deighton weaves a masterly tale of a Lancaster crew's final raid over Germany during the Second World War. While a novel, his meticulous research gives the book a documentary feel, which serves to heighten the foreboding sense of approaching death, destruction and terror that was strategic bombing. The themes that Deighton explores are central attributes of warfare and include the effect of acute stress on capability, the value of teamwork, and the unexpected emergence of courage—Deighton also captures Clausewitz's idea of friction. Despite its detailed planning the mission slowly goes wrong, culminating in the obliteration of the wrong target.

The Sharpe Books

Bernard Cornwall

Cornwell is a prolific historical novelist best known for his Sharpe series, which deals with the exploits of a British soldier in Wellington's army. Mostly set during the Napoleonic Wars in the Peninsula, Sharpe is a former ranker commissioned after saving the Duke's life. His various exploits have been made into a series of telemovies, themselves often loosely based on the novels. The broad history is correct, although twentieth century attitudes and sensibilities are sometimes allowed to intrude for entertainment's sake.

Brave New World

Aldous Huxley

Along with *1984*, *Brave New World* is the masthead of dystopian fiction, worlds created to explore what makes a good social order and how best to achieve it. Depicting an ideal society full of happy and fulfilled citizens, where sex and drugs and music are hedonistic tools to pacify the population, Huxley illustrates the dangers of rampant technology and the elegant beauty of human frailties. Military personnel, defending a nation and its interests, must develop a sense of what they serve and why, and this book will prompt many such examinations.

Eagle in the Snow

Wallace Bream

This novel is a panoramic story about the barbarian invasions of Western Europe at the beginning of the fifth century through the eyes of a legion's commander, Maximus. The knowledge and understanding of the workings of a legion in late Roman times is unparalleled, while the study of the stress of command in the face of imminent disaster is sketched against the background of a dying civilisation about to collapse in blood and ruin.

Things Fall Apart

Chinua Achebe

Published in 1958, this is the seminal African novel written in English. Often viewed as a reaction against Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, which treated African cultures as if undifferentiated and 'primitive', Achebe presents the beauty and complexity of Ibo culture and tradition. The benefit for the soldier in today's globalised world lies in the exploration of how other societies can view external influence as 'colonialism'.

Bugles and a Tiger

John Masters

This memoir of the twilight days of the British Empire in India serves as the background to a young subaltern's transformation into a professional soldier. Although Master's descriptions are Kipling-esque in tone, this work has a serious side—the development of leadership skills. *Bugles and a Tiger* recounts Master's experiences in India up to the outbreak of the Second World War. A sequel, *The Road Past Mandalay*, covers his part in the Burma Campaign against the Japanese.

The Field Marshal's Memoirs

John Masters

Masters graduated from Sandhurst in 1933 and served with the Gurkhas and in the Chindits in Burma during the Second World War. He understood the British Army well and commanded at brigade level in action. A noted author of novels dealing with the British in India, *The Field Marshal's Memoirs* was something of a departure from his main concerns. It investigates the difference between official accounts of wartime events and the complex and often messy reality that lies behind them, considered through a fictitious senior officer's planned memoirs of the Second World War that threaten to upset a great many reputations and received wisdoms.

Matterhorn

Karl Marlantes

Written by a former Marine officer and set in 1969, the novel deals with a Marine company as it builds, abandons and then painfully retakes a hilltop firebase near the Laotian border. The accounts of combat are extended and unsparing, but the book is about war and its absurdities, less about combat and its terrors. It is especially direct in its treatment of racial tensions and indiscipline in the context of that time and place.

Important journals, both professional and historic

Journals are an important source of professional literature and there is a wide range of relevant titles available. Many journals have a presence on the Internet, and increasingly publish in both print and electronic form or, in some cases, in electronic format exclusively.

There is a vast range of significant professional journals, and a full list would run to many pages. The obvious professional journals are

Australian Army Journal

Joint Force Quarterly (US)

Military Review (US)

Parameters (US)

Prism (Center for Complex Operations) (US)

Armed Forces Journal (US)

British Army Review (UK)

Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (UK)

Defence Studies (UK)

There is a range of corps and branch-specific publications also. There exists in addition an array of journals in the social sciences and humanities that deal with military subjects in contemporary and historical contexts. These include (but are not restricted to)

Journal of Strategic Studies

Journal of Military History

War in History

War & Society

Small Wars and Insurgencies

Intelligence and National Security

Armed Forces and Society

Comparative Strategy

Journal of Intervention and State-Building

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Journal of Military Ethics

Security Studies

Many journals, in both categories, are available online. Many academic journals are now published commercially in this manner, and access is on a fee-paying basis. There are a handful of large companies in this game: Taylor & Francis, Sage, Maney, Elsevier are examples. Other materials from dissertations to newspapers are available through online providers such as ProQuest. The Defence Library Service holds subscriptions for many of the relevant publications and Defence personnel have access to all DLS resources via the DRN as well as access to selected resources on the Internet via logins. Proquest and T&F can both be accessed via password on the Internet in this manner. Note as well that many of the US professional service publications are available online and, if published directly by the US armed forces then access is free.

Influential websites

Many websites are transient, and many are unreliable in terms of subject matter and argument. In the professional as in the personal realm, caution should be exercised where reliance is placed on material gleaned from the Internet. As with so much else, if it seems too good to be true, or too greatly at variance from every other source of information, it probably shouldn't be relied upon.

The most useful function of many websites is as a means of accessing publications not otherwise readily available. The US armed services are extensive publishing houses in their own right and many valuable documents, pamphlets and discussion papers are to be found there, free of charge.

Land Warfare Studies Centre

<http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/DARA/LWSC>

Australian Army History Unit

<http://www.army.gov.au/Our-history/Army-History-Unit>

Australian Defence College

<http://www.defence.gov.au/adc>

Strategic Studies Institute (US Army War College)

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil>

Combat Studies Institute (US Army Command and General Staff College)

<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CSI>

US Army Center of Military History

<http://www.history.army.mil>

US Army Heritage and Education Center (formerly Military History Institute)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ahec>

Maneuver Center of Excellence Libraries (Infantry and Armor Schools, Fort Benning)

<http://www.benning.army.mil/library/content/Virtual/Bayonet/index.htm>

US Marine Corps Historical Division

<http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/HD/General/Publications.htm>

National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan

<http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/e2011.html>

Center for Strategic and International Studies

<http://csis.org>

International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

<http://www.iiss-routledgepublications.com>

Insurgency Research Group (UK)

<http://insurgencyresearchgroup.wordpress.com>

National Defense University

<http://www.ndu.edu>

Foreign Military Studies Office

<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil>

RAND Corporation

<http://www.rand.org>

Feature films and documentaries

Like fiction, film can provide vivid insights into issues of wartime leadership, military cultures and the realities of combat and answer ‘big questions’ through the medium of entertainment. Documentary film can also help us to ‘see’ what situations were like with new eyes or renewed clarity. It is important to remember that feature films are made to make money and to entertain their audience—they are not seminars or pams converted to the screen and the ‘history’ portrayed is often wildly wrong. Documentary makers are constrained in various ways—if there is no visual image of an event it will not receive treatment no matter how significant because film of either kind is first and foremost a visual medium. Film is a powerful and evocative art form, but even the best documentary makers must live with the reality that an hour of screen time represents about twenty pages of script/text in total. As in fiction, taste in film is an individual thing—what works for you may well do nothing for me, and vice versa.

FEATURE FILM

Historical

The Duellists (1977)

Director, Ridley Scott

Scott’s debut feature film is based on a short story by Joseph Conrad and deals with notions of honour and obsession. The cinematography is lush and the attention to period detail (including early nineteenth century fencing styles) is exemplary.

Saving Private Ryan (1998)

Director, Steven Spielberg

Set in the first few days after the successful D-Day landings in Normandy, Spielberg's award-winning film offers some intensely realistic depictions of late-Second World War combat, especially in the opening half hour sequence devoted to the Rangers' landing at Omaha Beach. Loosely based on real events, the film has proven highly influential in shaping popular cultural views of American participation in the war and 'the greatest generation' who fought it.

Hamburger Hill (1987)

Director, John Irvin

The film deals with the US assaults on Ap Bia mountain (or Hill 937) in May 1969 in which US forces made successive costly assaults and seized the feature only to abandon it soon after. The focus is on a single platoon in a single, specific operation, which allows consideration of the tensions within the sub-unit between veterans and replacements, across racial and rank lines, and between Americans and the local people. Not a great film, but a very good one.

Arn the Templar (2007)

Director, Peter Flinth

A recent Swedish epic playing to the revival in cinematic interest in the Middle Ages, this one is more careful than most with the period detail. While the story is essentially fictional the broader context in which it unfolds is not, and the recreations of monastic life and service in the military religious orders in the Holy Land is well above average.

Capitaine Conan (1996)

Director, Bertrand Tavernier

Set in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, the film follows the activities of a French infantry company serving in Bulgaria. Long exposure to grinding combat has brutalised the soldiers and Conan discovers that his war service has left him unsuited

to peacetime. Tavernier reflects on the martial values that have made his characters effective soldiers but leave them with nowhere to go in the absence of war. The film's climax returns the company to battle against Bolsheviks along the Soviet border but the contradictions explored in the film remain.

Days of Glory (2006)

Director, Rachid Bouchareb

Released with the title *Indigènes* ('Natives') in French, the film looks at the experiences of North African men recruited into the French Army to fight for France through the eyes of an Algerian unit sent to take part in the liberation of France in 1944–45. The injustices and inequalities that come their way from the French military system even as they are fighting and dying for a country not their own are subtly handled; the climactic fight with a German company in a village in which the remnants of the Algerian unit has taken shelter is one of the best in recent cinema. About two-thirds of the Free French Forces in 1944–45 were North Africans and black colonial soldiers who, following the war, had their Army pensions frozen by successive French governments; this injustice was partially reversed after the release of this film raised the question of their treatment for a new generation.

Intimate Enemies (2007)

Director, Florent Emilio Siri

This is another intense recent French film that explores the stresses and contradictions inherent in France's attempt to hold on to Algeria against a vicious and successful insurgency. The film faces the issues of torture, atrocities, and conflict within the French forces over 'ends and means' squarely and without sentimentality. The 'war without a name' (1954–62) was largely off-limits as a subject in France for many years and this film was an important part of a move to re-open consideration of a controversial chapter in recent French history.

Alatriste (2006)

Director, Agustin Diaz Yanes

The film is based on a series of novels by Arturo Perez-Reverte (available in English translation) and stars Viggo Mortensen (Aragorn in *The Lord of the Rings*) as a mercenary captain in Spanish service in the first half of the seventeenth century. A visually lush production, it ends with the climactic battle of Rocroi (1643) and the presumed death of the central character as the Spanish army is overwhelmed by their French adversaries.

Beneath Hill 60 (2010)

Director, Jeremy Sims

Drawing on the activities of the 1st Australian Tunnelling Company on the Western Front, this recent Australian film won generally positive accolades for its depictions of the war underground and the stresses and dangers of the tunnellers' war. Although it plays to the apparent need in Australian films to caricature British officers, the general presentation of the realities of war on the Western Front is plausible and convincing.

Zulu (1964)

Director, Cy Endfield

A classic film and highly influential on other filmmakers, this account of the defence of Rorke's Drift by a company of the 24th Regiment in the Zulu War of 1879 is unlikely to be bettered. Dramatic and compelling, it is nonetheless a good example of the liberties that feature film takes with historical events in order to improve a good story.

Apocalypse Now (1979)

Director, Francis Ford Coppola

Based on Joseph Conrad's novel *Heart of Darkness*, a young Army captain is sent on a mission to eliminate a 'rogue' colonel waging his own war in-country. Filled with memorable lines and scenes ('I love the smell of napalm in the morning ... smells like victory', 'terminate, with extreme prejudice', 'Charlie don't surf'), the film is more

philosophical than strictly historical in its meditations on truth, corruption and the brutalising effects of war.

Gettysburg (1993)

Director, Ron Maxwell

Based on Michael Shaara's novel *The Killer Angels* (1974), the film offers an epic treatment of the three-day Battle of Gettysburg in 1863. More than four hours long, it concentrates on three key events in the battle, one for each day: the initial defence of Gettysburg by Buford's Union cavalry and Reynold's infantry corps as an encounter battle; the desperate defence of Little Round Top by Joshua Chamberlain and the 20th Maine; and 'Pickett's charge' and the 'highwater mark of the Confederacy' on the afternoon of the third day. Made with thousands of re-enactors as extras and a galaxy of heavy weight names in the major roles, the film takes pains with the history while respecting the need to tell a good story.

The Frontline (2011)

Director, Hun Jang

The official Korean entry for best foreign film at the 2012 Academy Awards, it deals with a battle fought by a unit of the ROK Army on the eastern end of the fighting line in the days and hours before the 1953 ceasefire is due to come into effect. 'Soldiers live and die by orders' says one of the characters, and the film asks questions about the purpose and sometimes futility of fighting for little obvious gain, set against a visually compelling recreation of the vicious positional warfare that characterised the second half of the Korean War.

The Wind that Shakes the Barley (2006)

Director, Ken Loach

A prize-winning film by the left-wing filmmaker, Ken Loach, treats the Irish Civil War in a microcosm through the experiences of two brothers and their friends. Both more graphic and more historically sensitive than *Michael Collins* (1996), it offers an unblinking view of Black and Tan atrocities, inter-communal violence and the unravelling of the Irish fight for independence in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish War.

Contemporary

Battle for Haditha (2007)

Director, Nick Broomfield

Uses a documentary style and a largely unknown cast to recreate events surrounding the killing of civilians at Haditha in Al Anbar, Iraq in late 2005. The film plays no favourites and shows how events can quickly get out of hand and that the stresses soldiers face in a counterinsurgent environment can lead to disastrous outcomes.

Blood Diamond (2006)

Director, Edward Zwick

Offers a graphic portrayal of the civil war in Sierra Leone in 1992–2002, and raises a range of moral and ethical issues around the diamond trade (and specifically the trade in ‘conflict diamonds’), external intervention, mercenary activity and the use of child soldiers.

World Trade Center (2006)

Director, Oliver Stone

Uncharacteristically restrained, Stone tells the story of two Port Authority police officers trapped beneath the collapse of the South Tower on 11 September 2001.

United 93 (2006)

Director, Paul Greengrass

The film deals with the last hours of the fourth plane hijacked on 11 September 2001, and in particular the fight-back by the passengers to regain control that led to the aircraft’s crash in the Pennsylvania countryside with the loss of all on board. Made with a largely-unknown cast, the film is an intense experience.

The Hurt Locker (2009)

Director, Kathryn Bigelow

An award-winning and highly acclaimed account of a bomb disposal team operating in Iraq in the early stages of the insurgency, the film seeks 'to immerse the audience' in the experience of combat in Iraq. While generally regarded as the best of the Iraq War movies thus far, it has been criticised by some US veterans for technical inaccuracies.

Restrepo (2010)

Directors, Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington

Another award-winning film, this time a documentary on the war in Afghanistan that follows the deployment of a platoon of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the Korengal Valley. The directors were embedded with the unit during its 15-month tour.

Three Kings (1999)

Director, David O Russell

A satirical film with a serious edge, this one is set in the aftermath of the first Gulf War and the anti-Saddam uprising that was encouraged and then abandoned by the US. A fictional gold heist offered various opportunities to highlight the absurdity of war and the military, while the film sympathetically portrays the plight of Iraqi civilians attempting to escape the vengeance of the Saddam regime.

The Kingdom (2007)

Director, Peter Berg

Taking its inspiration from the terrorist bombings of Western compounds in Saudi Arabia, the film deals with an FBI team sent to investigate the bombing of a foreign worker compound in that country. The film attracted some hostile reviews for an alleged anti-Arab, Islamophobic bias, but it can equally be read as a serious attempt to portray profound cultural and political difference while offering sympathetic portraits of some of the Saudi characters.

Body of Lies (2008)

Director, Ridley Scott

Another film set against the ‘war on terror’ and dealing with issues of cultural difference between Arab and Western societies, this one is essentially a sophisticated spy movie with some graphic treatment of terrorist bombings and torture. Like other films dealing with the war with Islamist extremism it received mixed reviews but it has some useful things to say about the importance of the human element and the limitations of advanced technology.

DOCUMENTARIES

The Civil War (1990)

Ken Burns’ magnificent and incredibly influential take on the American Civil War. The ‘Ken Burns effect’, involving panning and zooming with still images, is widely imitated and has become an ‘industry standard’.

The War (2007)

Burn’s treatment of the impact and experience of the Second World War on the United States through treatment of four otherwise unremarkable American towns. The intent is made clear in the voice introduction to each episode: ‘The Second World War was fought in thousands of places, too many for any one accounting. This is the story of four American towns and how their citizens experienced that war.’

The Great War (1964)

A classic 26-part series produced by the BBC for the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of war, containing numerous interviews with participants who were then in their sixties and seventies and who speak cogently and at length of their experiences. John Terraine was the major influence on the interpretations offered.

The World at War (1973)

In its day the most expensive program commissioned for British television, and making innovative use of early colour footage, this 26-part series also included extensive interviews with a wide range of key participants.

The First World War (2003)

Charting the war across ten episodes and based on the bestselling book by Oxford Historian Hew Strachan, this series drew on more recent concerns with the social, economic and cultural dimensions of the war while giving even-handed and extensive treatment to areas other than the Western Front.

Culloden (1964)

Another pioneering work, this time a ‘docudrama’ written by Peter Watkins for BBC and dealing with the defeat of the Jacobites by the British Army in 1746. It was made in black-and-white with an amateur cast and extensive use of hand-held camera technique. Controversial in its time for stressing the brutality of the battle and its aftermath and for a sympathetic, non-romanticised depiction of the destruction of the clan army.

Australians at War (2001)

An eight-part series dealing with the Australian experience of war from the South African War onwards. Extensive use of interviews and a willingness to deal with ‘hard’ issues, such as killing of enemy wounded. The full suite of interviews—more than 2000 individuals and over 10,000 hours—plus transcripts are available online at <<http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/>>

The Sorrow and the Pity (Le chagrin et la pitié) (1969)

Powerful French documentary that punctures the myth that most Frenchmen hated the Germans and worked against the occupation between 1940–44. It makes extensive use of interviews and contemporary footage, and was banned in France until the 1980s.

Land Warfare Studies Centre

Publications

The General Sir Brudenell White Monograph Series

Schmidtchen, David, *The Rise of the Strategic Private: Technology, Control and Change in a Network-Enabled Military*, 2006.

Study Papers

- 301 Evans, Michael, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972–Present*, August 1999.
- 302 Ryan, Alan, *From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-Pacific and the ‘New Age’ Coalition Operations*, January 2000.
- 303 Evans, Michael, *Developing Australia’s Maritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942*, April 2000.
- 304 Ryan, Alan, *‘Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks’: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor*, November 2000.
- 305 Evans, Michael, *The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present and Future of Land Power*, June 2004.
- 306 Evans, Michael, *The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War, 1901–2005*, February 2005.
- 307 Morrison, James C, *Mechanising an Army: Mechanisation and the Conversion of the Light Horse, 1920–1943*, June 2006.
- 308 Hopkins, Scott (ed), *Asymmetry and Complexity: Selected Papers from the 2005 Rowell Seminar and the 2005 Chief of Army’s Conference*, February 2007.
- 309 Hopkins, Scott (ed), *2006 Chief of Army’s Exercise Proceedings*, March 2007.

- 310 Wegener, Andrew, *A Complex and Changing Dynamic: Afghan Responses to Foreign Intervention, 1878–2006*, April 2007.
- 311 Stockings, Craig, *The Making and Breaking of the Post-Federation Australian Army, 1901–09*, July 2007.
- 312 Keating, Gavin, *A Tale of Three Battalions: Combat Morale and Battle Fatigue in the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, Bougainville, 1944–45*, September 2007.
- 313 *Chief of Army's Reading List*, December 2007.
- 314 Breen, Bob and Greg McCauley, *The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor*, August 2008.
- 315 Palazzo, Albert, *Moltke to bin Laden: The Relevance of Doctrine in the Contemporary Military Environment*, September 2008.
- 316 Hoskin, Rupert, *The Ghost in the Machine: Better Application of Human Factors to Enhance the Military Appreciation Process*, March 2009.
- 317 Palazzo, Albert, Antony Trentini, Jonathan Hawkins and Malcolm Brailey, *Projecting Force: The Australian Army and Maritime Strategy*, June 2010.
- 318 Smith, Christopher, *Network Centric Warfare, Command, and the Nature of War*, February 2010.
- 319 Scott, Trent, *The Lost Operational Art: Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force*, February 2011.
- 320 Smith, Christopher, *Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century*, April 2011.
- 321 Connolly, Peter, *Counterinsurgency in Uruzgan 2009*, August 2011.

Working Papers

- 101 Evans, Michael, *The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy*, September 1998.
- 102 Dunn, Martin, *Redefining Strategic Strike: The Strike Role and the Australian Army into the 21st Century*, April 1999.
- 103 Evans, Michael, *Conventional Deterrence in the Australian Strategic Context*, May 1999.

- 104 de Somer, Greg, *The Implications of the United States Army's Army-After-Next Concepts for the Australian Army*, June 1999.
- 105 Ryan, Alan, *The Way Ahead? Alternative Approaches to Integrating the Reserves in 'Total Force' Planning*, July 1999.
- 106 de Somer, Greg, *The Capacity of the Australian Army to Conduct and Sustain Land Force Operations*, August 1999, reprinted October 1999.
- 107 de Somer, Greg and David Schmidtchen, *Professional Mastery: The Human Dimension of Warfighting Capability for the Army-After-Next*, October 1999.
- 108 Zhou, Bo, *South Asia: The Prospect of Nuclear Disarmament After the 1998 Nuclear Tests in India and Pakistan*, November 1999.
- 109 Ryan, Michael and Michael Frater, *A Tactical Communications System for Future Land Warfare*, March 2000.
- 110 Evans, Michael, *From Legend to Learning: Gallipoli and the Military Revolution of World War I*, April 2000.
- 111 Wing, Ian, *Refocusing Concepts of Security: The Convergence of Military and Non-military Tasks*, November 2000.
- 112 Ryan, Michael and Michael Frater, *The Utility of a Tactical Airborne Communications Subsystem in Support of Future Land Warfare*, April 2001.
- 113 Evans, Michael, *From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century*, June 2001.
- 114 Ryan, Alan, *Thinking Across Time: Concurrent Historical Analysis on Military Operations*, July 2001.
- 115 Evans, Michael, *Australia and the Revolution in Military Affairs*, August 2001.
- 116 Frater, Michael and Michael Ryan, *Communications Electronic Warfare and the Digitised Battlefield*, October 2001.
- 117 Parkin, Russell, *A Capability of First Resort: Amphibious Operations and the Australian Defence Policy, 1901–2001*, May 2002.
- 118 Blaxland, John, *Information-era Manoeuvre: The Australian-led Mission to East Timor*, June 2002.
- 119 Connery, David, *GBAeD 2030: A Concept for Ground-based Aerospace Defence in the Army-After-Next*, July 2002.

- 120 Beasley, Kent, *Information Operations during Operation Stabilise in East Timor*, August 2002.
- 121 Ryan, Alan, *Australian Army Cooperation with the Land Forces of the United States: Problems of the Junior Partner*, January 2003.
- 122 Evans, Michael and Alan Ryan (eds), *From Breitenfeld to Baghdad: Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare*, January 2003.
- 123 Hoare, Mark, *The Prospects for Australian and Japanese Security Cooperation in a More Uncertain Asia-Pacific*, July 2003.
- 124 Ryan, Alan, 'Putting Your Young Men in the Mud': *Change, Continuity and the Australian Infantry Battalion*, September 2003.
- 125 Schmidtchen, David, *Network-Centric Warfare: The Problem of Social Order*, July 2005.
- 126 Watson, James, *A Model Pacific Solution? A Study of the Development of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, October 2005.
- 127 Brailey, Malcolm, *The Transformation of Special Operations Forces in Contemporary Conflict: Strategy, Missions, Organisation and Tactics*, November 2005.
- 128 Stevenson, Robert C, *Not-so Friendly Fire: An Australian Taxonomy for Fratricide*, April 2006.
- 129 Schmidtchen, David, *Eyes Wide Open: Stability, Change and Network-Enabling Technology*, May 2006.
- 130 Stevenson, Robert C, *The Human Dimension of the Hardened and Networked Army: The Lessons of Friendly Fire*, June 2006.
- 131 Blaxland, John, *Revisiting Counterinsurgency: a Manoeuvrist Response to the War on Terror for the Australian Army*, July 2006. Thai translation published in 2008.
- 132 Krause, Michael, *Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt*, June 2007.
- 133 Croser, Caroline, *Organising Complexity: Modes of Behaviour in a Networked Battlespace*, November 2007.
- 134 Kelly, Justin and Mike Brennan, *Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics*, June 2009.

- 135 Grey, Jeffrey (ed), *The Australian Army Counterinsurgency and Small Wars Reading Guide*, September 2009.
- 136 Field, Chris, *Asymmetric Warfare and Australian National Asymmetric Advantages: Taking the Fight to the Enemy*, November 2009.
- 137 Barrett, Richard, *Contesting the Neutral Space: A Thematic Analysis of Military Humanitarianism*, April 2010.
- 138 Wing, Ian, *Private Military Companies and Military Operations*, October 2010.

Books

- Evans, Michael (ed), *Changing the Army: The Roles of Doctrine, Development and Training*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon, 2000.
- Evans, Michael and Alan Ryan (eds), *The Human Face of Warfare: Killing, Fear and Chaos in Battle*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000.
- Evans, Michael, Russell Parkin and Alan Ryan (eds), *Future Armies, Future Challenges: Land Warfare in the Information Age*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2004.
- Parkin, Russell (ed), *Warfighting and Ethics: Selected papers from the 2003 and 2004 Rowell Seminars*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon, July 2005.