



SAFERWORLD

PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT. BUILDING SAFER LIVES

Community Security handbook



April 2014

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Acknowledgements

This report is dedicated to the memory of Ramesh Nidhi Bista.

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Foreword

SAFERWORLD BELIEVES PEOPLE SHOULD ALWAYS BE AT THE CENTRE of inter-linked peace, security and development interventions. Unfortunately, security is still often considered as primarily a state issue. This misses the truth that insecurity is a personal experience characterised by absence: absence of protection; of paths to redress grievance; of fair access to resources; and of rights. These insecurities are barriers to development and contribute to cycles of violence that prevent people leading safe, fulfilling and dignified lives.

In this handbook, we introduce an approach to responding to these insecurities. We refer to this approach as ‘Community Security’. Community Security is a powerful approach that builds human security and contributes to wider peace and development goals. If the peace and development community are to make good on our commitments to strengthen relations between states and societies and improve people’s experiences of security, Community Security should become a principal tool shaping the policies and programmes of international actors.

The approach presented here begins to provide a theoretical and practical framework through which donors, international actors and programme managers can support more constructive relationships between local citizens and security providers in order to improve service delivery.¹

Community Security identifies and responds to local perceptions of security by working through both formal and informal systems – often acting as a bridge between them. Evidence suggests that skipping straight to a model in which the state is the only authority sanctioned to rule, while other, informal authorities are bypassed, is impractical. Instead, what is needed are investments in transitional interventions that build upon existing capacities and sources of legitimacy, which are rooted not in legal or territorial rules alone, but in local perceptions and priorities.

Community Security affirms the need for institutional and technical reforms, but rejects the idea that security is the sole preserve of the state. The public is engaged as having both the right and the opportunity to articulate security priorities and to be a part of planning and implementing responses. The focus of reforms, meanwhile, should be redirected towards supporting inclusive, fair, responsive and accountable service delivery mechanisms that build upon local capacities for change.

This requires a shift away from investments in either the state or society and toward efforts to increase interactions and trust between them. It necessitates investments in existing informal arrangements for service delivery and decision-making, as well as a

¹ UNDP (2009) ‘Community security and social cohesion’, p.2 www.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf

far more nuanced appreciation of the myriad interests and incentives that drive local populations and national elites.²

This handbook attempts to outline some logical steps behind these processes, recognising that Community Security is a flexible approach and there is no one template to fit all contexts. Saferworld regards negotiation and debate as central constituent components of legitimacy, rather than as dangerous or destabilising. It is vital to involve communities in debates about their own security provision lest they feel excluded.



Paul Murphy
Executive Director

² IDS (2010) 'An upside down view of governance'.

1

Introduction and purpose of the handbook

This handbook attempts to:

- Draw on Saferworld's experience and research to provide clear explanation of the benefits of Community Security approaches across the security and development field
- Describe key characteristics and processes that underpin Community Security programming, whilst taking into full consideration the complexity and context specific nature of the work
- Discuss how to measure changes and impacts attributable to Community Security interventions
- Identify gaps in knowledge where more research is needed

Security is a universal entitlement and a core part of human well-being. Where people cannot enjoy security, poverty and injustice are prevalent in other forms. Many major reports and policy initiatives in recent years have not only built strong evidence to underpin these claims, but they have also affirmed the need to foster a concept of security which puts people at its centre.³ When Saferworld has consulted people on what security means to them in different countries, the answer is always unique, and specific to the context in question.

"Lack of jobs makes me feel insecure. Regardless of how hard I tried I just could not get a job. So I went through Ivory Coast to become part of any group looking for a potential fighter."

Former combatant, Sierra Leone

"In earlier days even small earnings were sufficient for a living, but now, the price for everything has escalated and it's difficult to save anything. I feel that I may die of hunger. This makes me feel insecure."

Kewat woman, Morang district, Nepal

"Competition over water and grazing land is one of the causes of persistent insecurity."

Participant, Warrup state, South Sudan

"Personally, the safety of my children while I'm at work is what worries me most."

Participant, Kamrangirchar, Bangladesh

People consider security to relate to many different issues – economic, social, environmental, cultural, political, and so on. However, at the same time, people we work with share a common enthusiasm: for their views on how to solve security challenges to be heard and understood and for their potential to work with authorities, businesses,

³ See: World Bank (2011) *World Development Report*; UNDP (1994) *Human Development Report*; International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011) 'New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States'; High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2013) 'A New Global Partnership'; Narayan D et al, World Bank, December 1999 'Can anyone hear us?'; CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (November 2012) 'Time to Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid'.

and development actors to achieve security on their terms while being supported and enabled.

In this handbook, we introduce an approach to responding to these views and potentials. We refer to this approach as 'Community Security'. Community Security is a powerful approach that builds human security and contributes to wider peace and development goals. Whilst many agencies have a number of years' experience in designing and delivering community-oriented approaches to security provision, for some it represents a new way of thinking. The main strength of Community Security as an approach is that it is flexible and allows for a range of interventions, as relevant to the context. However, this same flexibility sometimes means that agencies may have different definitions and guidance on how to promote it effectively.

Saferworld has been using Community Security approaches in diverse contexts affected by conflict and insecurity for more than ten years. We have developed and honed our programme design in that time, using evaluations and lessons learned to improve our methodologies and results as we go.

The main purpose of this handbook is to explain the principles underpinning Community Security interventions, and suggest practical approaches to implementing them, drawing on the work of Saferworld and a select number of other agencies. It is aimed at practitioners – particularly programme managers – and aims to help them work through the steps involved in planning, implementing, evaluating and improving Community Security interventions. It sets out the objectives of Saferworld's Community Security work, explains why we see it as important, and draws together a significant body of learning and experience. Where appropriate it references additional tools and guidance covering related areas of intervention including advocacy, capacity-building and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

This handbook also places Saferworld's work within a broader context, drawing policy links between Community Security and aspects of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development, and providing examples of similar or complementary approaches used by other actors and agencies.

However this is not a one-size-fits-all handbook. Instead, because every context is complex and rapidly changing, it encourages context specific and flexible approaches to Community Security interventions. Community Security approaches need to respond in the most appropriate way to the inevitable and unforeseen challenges of building security. Only deep, ongoing conflict and context analyses in each location will show exactly what these responses might be. This guide highlights some of the decisions policymakers and practitioners will have to make, and suggests some tools to help make them, using case studies to illustrate key learning points throughout.

2

What is Community Security and why is it important?

- Community Security is a people-centred approach to tackle issues causing insecurity, whether they emerge from peace, security or development deficits
- It explicitly aims to improve the relationships between and behaviours of communities, authorities and institutions by providing opportunities for actors to identify their security concerns, plan and implement collective responses
- An end-state of Community Security is reached when the mechanisms to ensure communities can articulate their security needs exist in conjunction with the local and institutional capacity and willingness to respond to them
- It is context specific and value driven, placing a premium on full community inclusivity and participation to design and implement activities that reflect people's actual needs
- It empowers communities to hold to account those who should be delivering their security

At the policy level, Community Security was described as one of the seven dimensions of human security highlighted in the 1994 Human Development Report (HDR).⁴ The HDR called for a redefinition of security with people at its centre. Consensus grew about this developmental, people-focused approach to security challenges in subsequent years. For example, at the 2005 World Summit UN Member States recognised that “development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.”⁵ Through such documents, as well as through practical initiatives on the ground, developmental approaches to promoting security at community level have evolved to become a key element of both local and international efforts to promote security, stability and more responsive institutions.

Despite this, ‘Community Security’ is not yet a commonly used or widely understood phrase. Community Security, community safety, community based security, community policing and other phrases are often used interchangeably. There is also uncertainty as to how Community Security fits in with efforts to prevent conflict and build peace and security. Is it an end-state or a process? Does it simply address security problems, or also their diverse causes? And does it aim to transform behaviours and relationships or is it more geared towards institutional reform?

⁴ *Human Development Report* (1994) p.34. The report defines community security as primarily addressing protection against the breakdown of communities (such as clubs, tribes or extended families) that provide members with a reassuring sense of identity and a shared value system. The HDR saw the protection of ethnic minorities and indigenous groups as a central focus.

⁵ UN General Assembly (2005) *World Summit Outcome*, p.2.

In our view, Community Security has the potential to cover all of these things depending on how it is used. Our working definition is therefore that:

Community Security is a people-centred approach to addressing insecurity that integrates human security, development and statebuilding paradigms. It works by bringing together a wide range of state and civil society actors from the security demand and supply sides to identify root causes of insecurity collectively and develop coordinated responses to them. The approach builds the capacity and willingness of communities, local authorities and security providers to address their own sources of insecurity. It creates an enabling environment for wider reforms and more people focused policies at the sub-national and national levels.

By bringing together a wide range of actors, Community Security creates working partnerships between communities and service providers in the pursuit of mutually beneficial security improvements. Because they are community-defined, these improvements might encompass anything from the development of viable livelihoods to better policing, improved infrastructure, or more cooperative relationships. The shape and outcomes of a Community Security process thus depend on the needs and resources available in each context, and the overall safety and security situation experienced within communities.

Grace, a Turkana Elder, discusses security issues with women in Emeret village, close to Isiolo town, Kenya.

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The contribution of Community Security to development, security and peace-building

“The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy... It has related more to nation-states than to people [...] Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world. This should not surprise us. The founders of the United Nations had always given equal importance to people’s security and to territorial security.”

UNDP, Human Development Report, (1994), p.22

International policy frameworks and agreements recognise the importance of focusing on state–society relations in order to improve people’s experience of peace and security. The 2011 World Development Report urged the restoration of citizens’ confidence in the institutions charged with providing security, justice and economic growth. The OECD’s third Fragile State Principle, endorsed in April 2007, affirms the need to support the development of positive state-society relations through building the legitimacy,

accountability and capability of states. The Dili Declaration, signed three years later by representatives of developing countries, bilateral and multilateral partners and civil society, similarly recognises the centrality of state-society relations in supporting the development of capable, accountable and responsive states. State-society relations also hold prominent places within the UK's Department for International Development (DfID), European Union (EU), and United States' (US) peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies.⁶

Despite the recognition that efforts need to focus on achieving lasting changes in state-society relations, international support for security and justice sector development has continued to focus on technical and institutional reforms at the central government level. Whereas policies have recognised the importance of fostering legitimate institutions,⁷ the prevailing logic underpinning programmes has yet to catch up. Security and justice programmes typically seek to build the capacity of official security and justice providers, fostering more effective and responsive service delivery. While it is often hoped that such programmes will contribute to the legitimacy of the state and thus to the stability of countries as a whole, in practice many programmes have failed to consider the role of society in maintaining commitment to reforms.

Programmes that go beyond the technical approach to security and justice institutions – and that support longer term, more arduous and politically complex processes in which communities are encouraged to shape the security and justice institutions that they want and need – have been considerably more rare. Moreover, the idea that only the state can or should exercise authority over security and justice obscures contexts in which authority is contested and fragmented and in which multiple sources of legitimacy compete with one another.⁸ Community Security therefore has a potentially important gap to fill: it contributes to both immediate and long-term solutions to security deficits; but crucially, it does so in a way that seriously engages with the long-term objectives of achieving legitimacy, public confidence and improved state-society relations. Development is severely undermined in areas of ongoing insecurity and social fracture. Beneath the security challenges that frustrate development can be a complex range of factors that might encompass almost anything that makes people feel insecure. These concerns can be as diverse as social exclusion, poverty, unemployment, crime, poor infrastructure or competition for resources, each of which are barriers to development and have the potential to drive violent conflict.⁹ Secure communities with functioning, trusting relationships between their members and local security actors are better equipped to identify such potential drivers of conflict upstream, and manage and mitigate them.

By identifying and addressing a wide range of possible sources of insecurity, Community Security thus links together security, peace and development as mutually strengthening strands of a coherent, flexible approach. It demonstrates how the vision of achieving greater security for people can be taken forward in practice through a developmental, empowering approach.

In sum, Community Security provides a methodology that is important for peace, security and development progress, because it allows communities to define and implement interventions tailored to their exact needs and priorities, and in this way helps communities find creative, collaborative and preventative solutions to security challenges, including:

⁶ Stabilisation Unit (2014), *Policing the Context – Principles and guidance to inform international policing assistance*, http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/44111/682626/file/Stabilisation%20Unit_Policing%20the%20Context%20What%20Works-%20March%202014.pdf

⁷ For example, the World Development Report (2011) points out that "Government capacity is central, but technical competence alone is insufficient: institutions and programs must be accountable to their citizens if they are to acquire legitimacy."

⁸ OECD (2010) *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity*

⁹ Collier P, et al (2003) *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Oxford University Press, World Bank: Washington, DC)

- Weak/poor state–citizen relations
- Overly state-centric models and views of security
- Lack of institutional resources and capacity
- Challenges in fostering genuine accountability and political incentives for security and justice reform
- Lack of active citizenship and public engagement on issues related to security and justice
- Tensions within and between communities, particularly involving marginalised groups
- Lack of effective models for providing security, including poor rule of law and access to justice at the local level
- Lack of decent opportunities for income generation and better livelihoods
- Gender inequality and its potential to feed into gender-based violence and gender-related conflict dynamics
- The need to reintegrate former combatants into communities
- The need to decentralise, or extend the reach of, security and justice provision whilst maintaining values and accountability
- The need to anticipate tensions and security challenges and work on them preventatively and constructively.

2.1 Community Security as a process

Community Security is a process focused on promoting a community driven approach to understanding and providing security. It has a clear focus on improving the relationships between and behaviours of communities, authorities and institutions. The process uses participatory assessments and planning and seeks to contribute to a full range of security and development improvements as decided by communities themselves. The process may lead to anything from better service delivery, to reduced social exclusion, enhanced relations between social groups, or strengthened democratic governance.¹⁰ The key is that the problems addressed, the process behind it, and the results achieved, contribute to a more secure environment.

2.2 Community Security as an end-state

Security is, as much as anything else, something we experience. Therefore Community Security can also be seen as an end-state whereby people *feel* protected and valued as members of society. This end-state is achieved when the processes behind Community Security are functioning, or rather, the mechanisms to ensure communities can articulate their security needs exist in conjunction with the local and institutional capacity and willingness to respond to them.

2.3 Achieving change at all levels

Community Security approaches attempt to link local improvements up to sub-national and national levels through advocacy and the inclusion of higher level actors in consultation and decision-making processes. It thus aims to ensure that the gains made at the local level are replicated both in other geographical locations in the same country and at the policy level. Community Security is not, in this sense, a ‘bottom-up’ approach, which only activates the grassroots level. Instead, it is a vehicle for wider cooperation, which seeks to harness joint capacities to address obstacles at all levels.

¹⁰ UNDP (2009) *Community Security and Social Cohesion*
www.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf p. 17.

2.4 Core approaches and values behind Community Security

Community Security approaches are: cooperative; forward thinking; flexible; complementing existing security mechanisms; conflict and gender sensitive; and work on multiple levels. The values underpinning these approaches are: inclusivity; accountability; empowerment; transparency; human rights; justice; capacity building; resilience; and trust.

Collectively these values support the overall perspective that sustainable improvements in people's experiences of security cannot be brought about through technical and institutional reforms alone. They must also involve transformations of the key relationships and behaviours that drive insecurity and undermine security provision efforts. This necessitates working partnerships between security providers and the community.

Forming these partnerships is not easy. Security providers and the community are often estranged, and definitions of 'security', let alone ways to improve it, are difficult to agree on. Community Security approaches work impartially to foster common ground between different actors, and are sensitive to the fact that harder security concerns such as crime and violence are intimately linked to broader human security issues related to, for example, people's health, education and livelihoods. As such, both narrow and broad definitions of security can be employed in Community Security initiatives, depending on the context.

Community Security should build on existing community capacities and resources for peace, and be inclusive. Every member of a community is considered an active agent with valuable assets to contribute to the planning and implementation of joined-up security responses.

The premium placed on values and approaches rather than predetermined outcomes means Community Security is flexible enough to address a wide spectrum of conflict and development challenges depending on each community's needs and resources.

Conflict sensitivity and community security¹¹

Conflict sensitivity is the ability of an organisation to:

- Understand the context in which it operates
- Understand the interaction between its intervention and the context
- Act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts

Why is conflict sensitivity important?

Conflict sensitivity is important because it provides a way for development, humanitarian and peacebuilding actors to:

- Ensure that interventions do not exacerbate underlying tensions, thereby potentially doing more harm than good
- Contribute to peace and help make development work more successful
- Help to make programmes more sustainable and effectively implemented
- Reduce risk of having to close offices and projects because of conflict/violence
- Reduce danger to staff and beneficiaries
- Focus on addressing the root causes of conflict to reduce violence

¹¹ Saferworld et al, (2004) *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack* www.conflictsensitivity.org/node/8

Gender sensitivity and community security¹²

Practising gender sensitivity is an integral part of doing no harm and promoting peace and security by ensuring that the security needs of people of all genders are met.

Approaches to Community Security should be based on a solid understanding of gender norms in a local context. However, gender norms should not be taken as fixed, rather as something that can – and often should – be challenged. Like conflict sensitivity, gender sensitivity can be understood in a minimal or a maximal sense. At a minimum, gender sensitivity requires all necessary steps to be taken avoid entrenching or exacerbating existing gender inequalities at every stage of the programme cycle. Wherever possible, Community Security projects should go further by actively promoting gender equality in their approach. In practice, Community Security approaches that do not challenge gender norms may tacitly reinforce them; therefore it will usually be necessary to take a maximal approach to promote gender equality actively during the course of the programme.

Being gender sensitive means:

- Facilitating the equal participation of people of all genders from a range of backgrounds at all stages of the process, and addressing specific gendered barriers to participation
- Ensuring that women's, men's and gender minorities' security issues are identified and given equal consideration
- Aiming to create a safe environment in which people of all genders feel able to raise sensitive issues, including those relating to cultural taboos around gender
- Analysing and addressing how attitudes and behaviours relating to gender may undermine or improve people's security
- Encouraging respectful and productive relationships between local authorities, security providers and community members of all genders

Suggestions on how to ensure gender sensitivity at every stage of the Community Security cycle are integrated throughout this document. However, there is no one-size-fits-all approach: project plans should be designed based on gender analysis of the local context conducted at the outset of the project and updated as necessary.

Human rights based approach¹³

Community Security programmes should be grounded in the norms provided by human rights – and contribute to their fulfilment in practical ways. However, while Community Security programmes should contribute to rights fulfilment, the decision about whether to refer explicitly to human rights instruments depends on the impact this would have on stakeholders in the context: where explicit reference to human rights would prove divisive or counter-productive, human rights objectives can be pursued using alternative language and concepts that foster consensus in the context. A human rights based approach consists of the following elements:

1. Using international human rights standards
2. Empowering target groups
3. Encouraging participation
4. Ensuring non-discrimination
5. Holding stakeholders accountable to fundamental rights

Core approaches to community security¹⁴

1. Including as many local stakeholders as practicably possible throughout the participatory planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes to ensure local relevance and ownership
2. Ensuring each intervention is context specific. This requires a flexible, transparent and consultative approach throughout the Community Security process, but starts with a thorough context and conflict analysis at the start of the programme cycle to develop integrated local, sub-national and national identification of and responses to insecurity
3. Paying equal attention to both providing the mechanisms for community members to share their security concerns and increasing the capacity of the security providers to meet their stated needs

¹² Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (2012) *Conflict Sensitivity: How To Guide*
www.conflictsensitivity.org/sites/default/files/1/6602_HowToGuide_CSF_WEB_3.pdf

¹³ www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf

¹⁴ Adapted in part from Saferworld (2004) *Police Reform through Community Based Policing, Philosophy and guidelines for implementation* p.9.

4. Working with existing structures including, especially, building the capacity and social capital of civil society organisations
5. Maintaining gender and conflict sensitivity at every stage of the programme cycle
6. Working to ensure Community Security integrates with broader efforts to provide human security. This may include security sector reform or judicial reforms, as well as seeking synergies with other initiatives
7. The programme needs to be realistic, long-term, and supported by adequate resources

2.5 Working with security providers

Working with the police and other security providers can be challenging, but lasting improvements to security cannot be achieved without doing so. In some instances communities may even see their behaviour as a barrier to security. There could also be sensitivity over the use of the word 'security', as occasionally security providers feel it encroaches on their area of work. Furthermore, the word is synonymous with protecting the state, which leads to security being imposed rather than safety being provided. In these incidences, using a more neutral term such as *Community Safety* or approaching the same issue from a different entry point, for instance through Community Based Policing (CBP) can circumvent the delicacy of the term security and encourage buy-in. This does not mean CBP is the same as Community Security, but it is an approach to providing security informed by very similar values to those of Community Security (both CBP and Community Security put communities at the centre, and promote partnerships in enhancing security and safety).

By carefully entering into partnerships on sensitive issues, and including security providers (formal or informal) in Community Security processes, community members can directly voice their concerns and begin to work together to influence the strategy and behaviour of police and other security actors. Engaging with police, other security providers who may be present, and local authorities at an early stage is also important to ensure they do not become alienated from the process and stand in the way of success.¹⁵

Changing security providers' behaviour requires sustained action at three levels: individual, institutional, and societal,¹⁶ because even as the changes happen at the individual level, an appropriate structure capable of embedding these values must be created as well. Similarly, changing the practice of the police and other security actors is not enough. When the behaviour of the security providers justifies it, the process must aim to transform the community's trust in them. It requires a mutual leap of faith based on reciprocal trust and respect that goes beyond the notion that the police are the sole public service responsible for ensuring security and maintaining order. Instead, Community Security approaches aim to balance people's right to institutional security provision with their own civic responsibility to contribute to public safety. Community Security reinforces a contract between security providers and the public that upholding security is their shared duty.

Often Community Security approaches provide the first opportunity for the public to meet with their police officers and other stakeholders in security provision (which may also include homeguards, militias, armies, armed groups, border guards, neighbourhood watch associations, and so on). Long-term changes aside, the simple act of talking with security providers can begin to build the cooperation necessary for fear-free societies typified by responsive and accountable security services working in partnership with citizens.

¹⁵ Tilley N (1992) *Safer Cities and Community Safety Strategies* Crime Prevention Unit Paper 38, London, Home Office.

¹⁶ Lindholt, De Mesquita Neto, Titus and Alemika (2003) *Human Rights and the Police in Transitional Countries* p.22.

Partnering with security providers in Nepal

Research from Nepal shows that Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), violence against women and girls (VAWG), and domestic violence (DV) are considered to be some of the main insecurity issues for women, with more than 80 per cent of women in rural areas facing recurring DV. Yet crimes go largely unreported and unpunished because women are hesitant to go to the police. There are few female officers to handle cases and, furthermore, the conflict in Nepal has left a legacy of distrust between some communities and the police.

Saferworld help to address this by using Community Security meetings to bring police and communities together to discuss VAWG and plan how women could gain access to security and justice. The police agreed to recruit more female officers to handle domestic and gender-based violence cases. Community members agreed to educate people about their rights and what constitutes legal and illegal behaviour with regards to VAWG. These improvements on both the supply and demand sides of security have resulted in more women trusting police enough to report crimes, and women attesting to less violent behaviour amongst some men in the community (forthcoming report, Saferworld and International Alert, 2014).

Community based policing

Like Community Security, Community Based Policing (CBP) is both a philosophy and strategy that allows police to work with the community to tackle insecurity. It rests on establishing relationships with the community and changing police methods and practices. Community Security action plans might decide to work explicitly towards these changes by including security providers in their working groups (for more on action plans, see section 5).

The Fundamental Principles of CBP are:

1. Policing by consent, not coercion
2. The police as part of the community, not apart from it
3. The police and community working together to identify communities' needs
4. The police, community and other agencies working together in partnership
5. Tailoring policing to meet community needs

Achieving these principles requires coherent action at individual, institutional and societal levels.

3

Programme design and planning

Issues to consider:

- Detailed conflict analysis is the first step in Community Security programming. It is necessary to identify the underlying causes of conflict and to inform the design of appropriate responses, one of which may be community security programming. It is an iterative process that will guide subsequent steps in programming, to ensure interventions remain relevant to changing conflict and security dynamics.
- A conflict analysis will inform overarching theories of change that provide a rationale for Community Security interventions and testable assumptions of the kind of changes programmes might contribute towards, as well as methods of working which are appropriate to the context.

Saferworld has been using Community Security approaches in diverse contexts affected by conflict and insecurity for over ten years.

We have developed and honed our programme design in that time, using evaluations and lessons learned to improve our methodologies and results as we go. At present we use a five-step approach to Community Security that has both short- and long-term applicability.

Figure 1. Saferworld's Community Security Programme Cycle



The programme cycle emphasises that, to achieve a fundamental change in how security is perceived and provided, improvements in Community Security require on-going engagement over several years. It requires long-term investment of time and resources, and this cycle will be repeated several times, until it becomes embedded in how police and other security actors function and engage with communities. Each step is designed to mitigate the risk of doing harm and ensure interventions are accountable to and in the best interests of the communities they serve.

This cycle is focused at the community level, but is supported by additional activities that link to district and national levels. Advocacy and engagement with local, sub-national and national actors is crucial to work to scale and embed Community Security approaches in wider policy (see section 6). Equally, alongside this basic cycle, Community Security requires on-going capacity development of local civil society organisations (CSOs) (and others like police, authorities, and international agencies active in the area) to ensure sustainability of the approach (see section 4.2).

Saferworld believes that each of the five stages is essential. However, the methodologies used within each of them are not fixed. Instead, they can be varied according to context,¹⁷ provided that:

1. Design, implementation and evaluation are devolved to the community as much as possible. The programme implementers' role is to provide technical support and build capacity so partners and communities can analyse changing conflict contexts and adapt to them as needed.
2. Each stage contributes to an overall theory of change (expanded upon in section 3.2) by encouraging joined-up work between communities and security providers as a contribution to better overall security, trust-building and access to quality services.

3.1 Conflict and context analyses

Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the context, causes, actors, and dynamics behind a conflict, and the linkages between them (see figure 2). Collectively, information from the analysis will provide a contextual overview for a potential programme. It is a prerequisite for doing no harm and ensuring programmes remain conflict and gender sensitive. For example, a conflict analysis helps ascertain whether Community Security is even the right kind of programming for a given context – it may not be relevant everywhere.

Conflict analysis is an iterative process. The exercise of understanding conflict dynamics within the area of operation remains important throughout the project cycle: at the planning stage, conflict analysis informs decisions around entry points for programmes as decided by the Community Security Working Groups (CSWGs) that are in place (see section 4.3); during the implementation of action plans, it will guide the relevance of the interventions underway (see section 5); and at the MEL stage, it will inform the direction of future action plans (see section 7).

The conflict analysis should also be used to identify a limited set of key dynamics that can be continually monitored within the M&E framework – it is thus the basis for being able to track potential impacts of the Community Security intervention on the conflict and security dynamics. At each stage, a conflict analysis should ascertain what impact conflict has had on people's experiences of safety and security, and whether certain chronic or sudden threats have exacerbated underlying conflict dynamics.

¹⁷ Since Saferworld's initial work in Kosovo, we have implemented unique Community Security programmes in varied contexts including Bangladesh, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Caucasus, among others. The following case studies outline some of methodological specificities of each programme:
www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/741-community-based-approaches-to-safety-and-security
www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/562-creating-safer-communities-in-bangladesh
www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/776-community-security-in-shida-kartli
www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/733-empowering-conflict-affected-communities-to-respond-to-security-problems-in-south-ossetia


There are different methods for conducting conflict analysis. Before beginning, it is important to develop a clear sense of your programme's information needs. For example:

- What causes crime and violence in a particular district?
- Is there any difference in access to key resources for different ethnic or caste groups?
- Are women able to participate in local decision-making? Or report crimes?
- Between which actors or groups are there tensions?
- Are there 'connecting' issues where rival groups find grounds for cooperation?

Only when all members of your team have a shared understanding of your information needs can you choose methods that will meet these needs. A conflict analysis typically includes:

- **Situation** analysis (overview of the conflict context including historical, political, economic, social, security, cultural, demographic and environmental factors, including gender norms and other social inequalities which may have security implications)
- **Causal** analysis (identification of the issues that drive, or have the potential to drive, conflict; these are often categorised as root causes, intermediate causes, and triggers, primarily to ensure that the analysis goes deeper than the most immediately visible, obvious factors)
- **Stakeholder or actor** analysis (analysis of the interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships of those engaged in or being affected by conflict; this is particularly important for identifying which actors have the most significant influence on peace and security, which relationships may need to be transformed, and what capacities to foster peace and security exist in the society)
- **Conflict dynamics** analysis (the interaction between the situation context, causal analysis and the actors, including identifying drivers of change and potential opportunities and structures for peacebuilding; this can often include mapping of scenarios, in order to help anticipate how dynamics may evolve and what contingency plans should be put in place)¹⁸
- **Security structures** (who/what structures currently provide security and how; who are the main decision makers; do people have equal access to security and why/not; what are peoples' major security concerns; are these being met by current security provision; is Community Security an appropriate approach).

Figure 2. Conflict analysis can be carried out at various levels (e.g. local, sub-national, national, etc.) and seeks to establish the linkages between these levels



¹⁸ Adapted from UNPBSO www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/PBF-Note-on-conflict-analysis-FINAL.pdf


A mixture of tools such as literature reviews, surveys, focus groups, interviews, observations, and mapping exercises can be used to gather information and triangulate findings. It will take time but should be prioritised before any further programmatic or policy decisions are made, because fully understanding conflict dynamics will better inform decisions about where to implement Community Security programming, as well as guide more responsible interventions that can meet the actual needs of the community. The more detailed the analysis, the better the programmatic theories of change you will be able to make. Please refer to the guidance document on conflict analysis in the conflict sensitivity resource pack for more detailed information.¹⁹

Example conflict analysis methods and tools

This is by no means exhaustive, but some suggested methods and tools include:

Methods	Tools
<p>Semi-structured/key informant interviews: These are qualitative in-depth, frank interviews with key actors who have first-hand knowledge about security issues in their community. These community experts, with their particular knowledge and understanding, can provide insight on the nature of security problems and give recommendations for solutions.</p> <p>Literature reviews: These are often missed out in the analysis stage; however a review of books, press, police reports, NGO/think-tank reports, academic journals can make the historical, relational and structural drivers of conflict and insecurity easier to discern. Done well, it prevents work duplicating other interventions and/or failing to identify the most relevant conflict dynamics within each particular context. Carrying out a thorough literature review before undertaking field research can significantly increase the quality and depth of your findings.</p> <p>Surveys and focus groups: These help gather the views of a balanced cross-section of society to provide as wide a snapshot of the conflict and security environment as possible. Talking about insecurity can be an emotive experience and conflict sensitivity is paramount. In contexts where groups cannot openly and directly discuss problems together, a focus group should consist of a homogeneous group so that attendees feel comfortable to explore a topic candidly. When sensitivity is very high, individual interviews may offer deeper and more reliable insights.</p>	<p>Problem/solution trees: Problem tree (or indeed solution tree) analysis maps the causes and effects behind insecurity. It helps identify both root and proximate causes in order to understand the issue, prioritise factors, and help focus programme objectives. Problem tree analysis is best carried out in small focus groups where people are able to share and discuss security issues freely (see figure 3 for an example).</p> <p>Force field analysis: This is a tool to help list, discuss, and evaluate the various forces for and against a proposed change. Force field analysis helps you look at the big picture by analysing all of the forces affecting the change and weighing the pros and cons, allowing you to develop strategies to reduce the impact of the opposing forces and strengthen the supporting forces. Forces that help you achieve the change are called 'driving forces'. Forces that work against the change are called "restraining forces."</p> <p>Actor, issue and geographic mapping: 'Mapping' is a technique for visualising the relations between actors, or the connections between issues, in the programme context. Community Security practitioners even sometimes draw visual maps of the community, highlighting security flashpoints and capacities. Mapping is particularly useful to help a group to develop a shared understanding of the structures, issues and actors at the root of insecurity. In this preparation stage, it can elucidate entry points for Community Security programming and provide an idea of who would ideally be involved in the programme.</p>

¹⁹ Saferworld, *Conflict Analysis chapter in Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding* www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/chapter_2__266.pdf

Figure 3. Example Problem and Solution Tree produced by FIQ, Kosovo²⁰

3.2 Developing programme level theories of change

Saferworld's approach to Community Security is based on an overarching theory of change applicable across countries and programmes:

If we use context specific Community Security approaches to build trust, cooperation and collaborative actions between community members and security providers at the local and national levels, then there will be better access to and provision of human security, justice and development. This is because Community Security programmes will provide the space for communities to identify common sources of insecurity and injustice, and plan responses in conjunction with local and national security providers that best fit their mutual needs and resources. This will serve to create safer, more just societies conducive to development.

Beneath this theory, each Community Security programme develops its own specific theory of change.

How to create a theory of change

Theories of change are short statements that summarise planned activities and assume what changes will happen as a result, and why. Developing a theory of change challenges programme designers to be clear about the purpose of their work and the rationale

²⁰ The Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) is a non-governmental organisation with a focus on the rule of law that works to increase citizen participation in decision-making processes for a peaceful and developed Balkans.

behind it. It stimulates important thinking about what is achievable, and how. Once formulated, a theory can be monitored and evaluated over time to see whether it stands up in practice. Saferworld uses this template to create our theories of change:

If... (we do these types of activities)

Then... (we will see these types of changes)

This is because... (the reason(s) *why* these types of activities will lead to the changes you expect)

Small projects and large programmes can have theories of change, and approaches to achieving both small and large scale change can be captured and refined using this same kind of formulation. Often organisations use theories of change as a way of creating accessible statements that explain clearly how the work they plan to do links to their wider goals and objectives.

It is important to connect theories to conflict analysis: theories of change for Community Security programmes should articulate how a programme can realistically respond to drivers of conflict and security as prioritised by communities. Theories of change that take a set of predetermined activities as the starting point, rather than the priorities identified through conflict analysis, are unlikely to offer a useful foundation for an effective Community Security programme.

Some top-level examples of theories of change adapted from Saferworld programmes can be found in the text box, and further resources on formulating and using theories of change are in the footnotes.²¹

Example theories of change		
If...	Then...	This is because...
We use Community Security meetings to facilitate dialogue between the community and the police so the community can share their security concerns and identify where more resources are needed...	There will be less insecurity in the community...	Police will be more aware of the communities' needs and can allocate resources to address them more effectively
We build the capacity of community-owned CSWGs to identify and resolve security issues in partnership with government authorities, especially the security services...	We will see an increase in public safety...	There will be an increase in trust and understanding between government organs and the community of each other's roles and responsibilities, and security issues and problems can then be resolved jointly
We work with police and local authorities to educate people about the growing levels of gender based violence in our community...	There will be less violence against women...	People will understand the illegality of gender based violence and so social behaviour norms will gradually improve

²¹ This paper has links to a number of resources discussing best practices behind theories of change: www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/JSRP/downloads/JSRP1_SteinValtersPN.pdf
CDA/DFID: Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in conflict, security and justice programming: www.cdacollaborative.org/publications/reflecting-on-peace-practice/rpp-guidance-materials/practicalapproaches-to-theories-of-change-in-conflict,-security-and-justice-programmes-part-i/

4

Starting up a Community Security programme

Issues to consider:

- This section involves identifying appropriate and conducive communities to work with, including finding local civil society organisations through which to deliver and support Community Security programmes; establishing Community Security Working Groups (CSWGs); and building relationships with key stakeholders
- Identifying communities to work with requires a thorough, conflict-sensitive process to avoid potential conflict risks
- Similarly, creating CSWGs can be a sensitive experience that potentially reopens old wounds in divided communities – CSWGs may be required to do some work on intra-community relationships before engaging in a Community Security programme
- There will be some useful cross-over from the earlier conflict analysis. Use it to triangulate findings, identify entry points for programmes and think through the best composition for the CSWGs
- Ensure CSWGs represent the full diversity within a community, including the most vulnerable
- Find the right point to ensure authorities play a full part in the process, but at the same time ensure that the process remains genuinely community-led

4.1 Deciding where to work: identifying appropriate communities and environments

When deciding where to work, it can be important to show that clear values, objectives and criteria have been used when selecting communities, that the selection process has not been unduly influenced by any particular actor's interest, and that the fairness of the process is underpinned by transparency.

Short-listing and detailed profiling of communities, including their make-up, key actors, resources, causes of conflict and insecurity, and likely attitude towards external engagement (albeit through local partners), is essential before starting a programme. In particular, the conflict analysis should help highlight the implications of working with one community or another, and it may be necessary to have safeguards to ensure that those most in need are not excluded. These safeguards may even require holding democratic community selection meetings where stakeholders decide amongst themselves where programmes will operate.

This decision should not be rushed. Inequalities between groups and areas can lead to and reinforce tension and insecurity. As with any intervention, Community Security programmes can either exacerbate or mitigate these tensions. Fully consulting with partners and conducting detailed analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities

and threats of working with a given community will lead to appropriate interventions that are more likely to be conflict-sensitive and effective. In Saferworld's experience – developing and supporting Community Security programmes across a range of conflict contexts – there are a number of factors that can fundamentally impact the success or failure of an intervention. These must be taken into account and addressed where appropriate during the scoping and programme design phases and monitored throughout the action. As noted, every context is different. However, some important lessons shown to offer Community Security approaches a higher chance of success include working in communities where:

- community members themselves want change
- it is unlikely that Community Security plans can be manipulated by any particular actor's interest
- there are no obstacles powerful enough to stop the project, and those with the potential to act as barriers can be involved in the programme in appropriate ways
- neighbouring communities are strong enough to cope with the effects of any potential crime displacement and are kept informed about the process, including through observation of CSWG activities where appropriate
- there are common issues that could unite citizens
- there is scope for change – and sensitively calling for change will not place partners and the public in significant danger
- a significant number of community members are not hostile to outsiders
- expectations can be managed to allow space for slow progress or even failure during initial Community Security efforts
- there are strong local partners to work through/with
- there are seeds for building confidence and trust both within the community and between the community and the authorities
- a sufficient proportion of local power-holders approve of the project and actively engage
- progress can be achieved with the available resources or with minimal seed funding
- the community has demonstrated commitment and motivation during other security and development projects
- the community has problems that are within the project team's expertise
- there are opportunities for coordination with other programmes
- the project team has already had some contact and profile within the community
- there are opportunities for 'quick wins'.

What is a community?

The definition of the term 'community' can be problematic. Broadly, it is something that one is a member of through shared geographical proximity. However, it just as commonly refers to groups of people with shared values, history or identity. As such a community can be quite a divisive structure, and not inherently a vehicle for universal good if sections of society are excluded. Conflict sensitivity remains paramount when defining a 'community' as selecting where the project operates can have a direct influence on a conflict context.

One way to mitigate the risks of exacerbating tensions is to remember that 'community' does not just refer to individual community members, but refers to all actors, groups and institutions within a specific space. This necessarily includes civil society organisations, the police and other security and justice actors, and the local authorities that are responsible for delivering security and other services in that area. An inclusive approach is the first step towards fostering cooperation and building social capital.

It is worth remembering that the choice of where to locate your programme activities, and how large an area to focus on, can facilitate or discourage participation: people are more likely to participate in activities that are conducted on neutral soil, where their participation is not likely to be construed as giving support for one political, ethnic or religious group over another.

4.2 Identifying partners and building local capacity to use Community Security approaches

CSOs and other local associations or structures are critical to the success of Community Security programmes. The right partners can provide the consistency of engagement and contextual understanding that external actors might lack. They also confer legitimacy, and their presence in the locality can help ensure value for money and the sustainability of any changes resulting from an intervention.

Working through partners can also help Community Security programmes achieve results at a greater scale. Effective partnerships maximise resources and actions to be as effective as possible on a scale that is both manageable and sustainable. Partners with a large footprint and extensive contacts have helped significantly multiply the impact of Saferworld's work, ensuring that Community Security processes involve more people at multiple levels. For example, Saferworld's national team in Bangladesh have partnered with BRAC in order to increase significantly the number of people benefitting from Community Security interventions. Saferworld provides technical support and expertise to BRAC's security and development programmes in 16 wards across 5 districts. Working in partnership has increased the efficacy and conflict sensitivity of BRAC's work by adding a security element to their development programmes and built the capacity of their staff to replicate and deliver Community Security programming at scale elsewhere.

Participants discuss images at the photography workshop in Jessore, Bangladesh. Saferworld's photography project is part of our wider community security work. Here, participants are recording personal perspectives of 'what makes them feel safe' as part of the community security project.

© THOMAS MARTIN/SAFERWORLD



When entering a community context and considering who to partner with, it is important not to assume that each and every local CSO, association or entity is likely to prove to be a good partner. Transparent, impartial, accountable and representative partners are of course desirable – but are frequently in short supply. The role played by your prospective partners in conflict dynamics may not be positive and could be controversial for some groups. Sometimes non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and CSOs are purely technical instruments designed to deliver services, and at other times they serve to advance particular interests.²² Some donors, such as the US and the EU, require checks on individuals and groups to ensure they are not on a list of proscribed actors and therefore disqualified from participating in their funded programmes. In addition to considering the role of prospective partners in local conflict dynamics, their capacities to conduct independent research and analysis, facilitate workshops and trainings, and document results can vary greatly, as can levels of understanding of conflict sensitivity and gender sensitivity.

²² Tocci N (2011) 'EU, Conflict Transformation and Civil Society: Promoting Peace from the Bottom Up?' *Microcon Conference 2011*

Selecting CSO partners is therefore a process that should be informed by the conflict/context analysis, in addition to an assessment of capacities and organisational values and processes. Partners suitable for Community Security approaches must be able to maintain sufficient independence from political authorities and be prepared to support communities in potentially sensitive engagement with those authorities. They must also devolve decision-making powers to the community and be able to provide technical support to particular areas of work.

To respond to these challenges, in Saferworld's experience, before trying to identify partners, it can be important to consider the approach to partnership your programme will take. Key considerations here are as follows:

- Where there are significant doubts about the representativeness, transparency, accountability and/or impartiality of existing local organisations/entities, it may be necessary to consider alternatives to working with and through existing organisations.
- One solution may be to remember that you can work through a combination of partners to accomplish different purposes. Working with multiple organisations can improve the understanding of the links between local and national conflict dynamics, and at the same time draw upon the established trust networks the organisations may already have. Roles of partners may include: conducting scoping, conflict analysis, and Community Security assessment; facilitation of the Community Security process, including participatory design, M&E; mobilisation of the community, confidence and capacity building; advocacy; direct implementation of activities; and so on.
- Another alternative may be to create a new local entity to take the Community Security process forward. Choosing this option can put the sustainability of your programme at risk, and should not be considered if it is feasible to strengthen existing organisations' accountability, transparency and representativeness through working in partnership.

The key partnership for a Community Security programme is likely to be with a partner that has the capacity to bring together legitimate security providers, authorities, CSOs and community members. This may mean that partners themselves reflect the diversity of the community in order that they can comfortably engage with men and women from all social groups within the community.

When the right partners are hard to find

In some contexts, such as Kenya, relatively functional peace committees have been set up with which Saferworld has been able to engage effectively. But in other contexts, especially when tensions are running high, finding the right partners for community security – or even development processes can be challenging. For example, in Sri Lanka, many of the more conflict sensitive community based programmes Saferworld evaluated in 2008–2009, towards the end of the civil war, had identified through conflict analysis that pre-existing community-level entities (such as farmers' associations) were exclusionary of the most marginalised, or politically compromised in other ways. Therefore many INGOs opted to create new stakeholder groups to take their initiatives forward in an inclusive and impartial way – and worked hard to ensure their sustainability. Likewise, when Saferworld first set up a community security process in Torit, South Sudan, there was no local entity that could function as a partner at all, and therefore our efforts to strengthen Community Security and encourage improved policing had to be taken forward with a less formal group of interested and relevant stakeholders.

Even though Saferworld almost always works with and through local partners, in practice, we have often found it necessary to initiate new entities – which we call 'Community Security Working Groups' (CSWGs) – to convene and facilitate Community Security processes at local level. CSWGs are made up of a cross-section of society, can include representatives from existing local organisations and entities, and are as representative as possible. Through these groups, the community can collectively identify and address their own security and development needs (see section 4.3).

Saferworld continually builds the capacity of its implementing partners and CSWGs so that they can uphold the values and approaches behind Community Security when working through the five preparatory, analysis, planning, implementation and learning steps of the Community Security cycle.

When partner selection has been completed, it is vital to include in your programme a period of capacity-building and awareness raising with partners to ensure there is a shared understanding of the Community Security rationale, approach and anticipated results.

4.3 Establishing Community Security Working Groups

Having identified an appropriate environment in which to develop Community Security programming, in contexts where local peacebuilding initiatives are non-existent or ineffective, it is often necessary to initiate²³ through which communities identify and prioritise their security concerns and plan and implement responses. In other contexts, Saferworld seeks to revitalise, build on, and support existing local initiatives where appropriate. In either case, it is important that these groups are made up of diverse members that represent the community as a whole and are formulated through consultation with local partners, community members, and further informed by ongoing conflict analysis. Encouraging communities to vote for their representatives can ensure the legitimacy of the group and encourage community buy-in from the outset, but it may not be necessary or beneficial in every context.

The act of forming and convening a CSWG is as important as the subsequent actions it carries out. Groups must actively work to identify and transform conflict dynamics by providing a neutral space for dialogue between potentially estranged sections of the community and between the community and security providers. The more diverse the linkages made through the CSWGs, the more potential they have to build functioning, trusting relationships between different actors. This contributes to peace in its own right, especially when relationships begin to include members from other sections of the community.²⁴ However, care must be taken to avoid exacerbating existing tensions or introducing new ones. A sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the local context and the role of different actors is vital to inform decisions about the design of the intervention and the make-up of any community groups. It can be prudent to have two or more parallel groups at first if working together is problematic, and to spend time building the relationships within the group before initiating any joint work. As noted above, although there can be challenges inherent to working with security providers, including them in CSWGs significantly helps build trust and capacities for meaningful and sustainable responses. Including marginalised section of the community in CSWGs can be particularly difficult: for example, in many contexts there is strong resistance to women's participation in decision-making, particularly on security issues. In such cases it is necessary to examine gender-specific barriers to participation and find ways to overcome them. For example, this could mean providing gender sensitisation training to community members to challenge discriminatory attitudes, ensuring meetings are held at times when both women and men can attend, or making childcare arrangements to free up women's time.

When forming CSWG, it is important that:

- The question of who is participating has been carefully considered and adheres to the guiding approaches and values behind Community Security, in particular conflict and gender sensitivity

²³ At times alternately called Community Action Committees; Community Action Groups; Community Security Working Groups; Community Representation Groups; Community Safety Groups; Reconstruction Groups; Reference Groups, etc. The name each community chooses always takes into consideration local sensitivities and needs.

²⁴ Putnam R (1993) *Bowling Alone* (New York: Simon & Schuster)

- Inappropriate forms of security sector participation are not inadvertently encouraged that create obstacles to the inclusion of other important actors
- A focus remains on inclusivity and creating links between different sections of a community, and between the community and security providers
- Space is created where communities – and subgroups within them – can have confidence in articulating their priorities, concerns and potentials
- Security providers do not act as spoilers and value the opportunities Community Security can offer.

You may wish to include some of the actors in this list on your Community Security programmes. The relevance of each actor and their appropriateness for the CSWGs will change according to each context:

- **All social groups within the community**, including marginalised groups who can use it to address their safety and security concerns²⁵
- **The police service** (or other security providers, such as the military, homeguards, border guards, neighbourhood watch groups, and so on) who can use it to understand community concerns and plan collective ways to address them
- **Local governments** who can support it as part of broader strategies to improve security in the area, for example incorporating it into local crime prevention strategies
- **Civil society** who can help deliver programmes, provide access to communities, and promote Community Security to a broader audience
- **Community leaders** who are very influential and can help ensure the buy-in of community members
- **Central governments**, especially the Ministries of Interior and Ministries of Local Government, who can integrate support for Community Security initiatives into their broader security provision strategies
- **Donors** who can support Community Security initiatives as a cost-efficient way of improving human security, as well as improving the accountability and responsiveness of local government and security agencies, helping to develop civil society, and supporting conflict prevention or post-conflict reconciliation.²⁶

Creating legitimate representative groups in Georgia

The Saferworld Community Security project covers 20 of the most conflict affected communities in Shida Kartli. It aims to increase understanding of what makes communities feel insecure, and to identify locally appropriate responses to the causes of insecurity.

Each community chose their Community Security Working Group representatives through consultation with the local implementing partner and other organisations that had previously worked in the community, and then voted on the final make up.

This process ensured the legitimacy of the CSWG and encouraged communities to have more confidence in using it as a platform to work through their insecurities.

Being seen as legitimate meant that as the project continued the community became increasingly enthusiastic about their participation in the group. Participants appreciate the inclusive process, which means they are able to raise concerns on behalf of their local communities and take initiatives to act as ambassadors for their communities.

²⁵ Where armed groups or gangs are present, they are likely to have a significant role in security and conflict dynamics. Thus it may be necessary to engage with them to have a realistic chance of improving security. It may not be realistic to seek to include them in CSWGs but, as long as it is conflict sensitive and safe to do so, trying to develop some mechanism for dialogue and outreach with these actors could be important.

²⁶ Adapted from Saferworld (2006) *Creating Safer Communities: lessons from Eastern Europe* p.8 www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Creating_safer_communities_Dec06_%20English.pdf

Saferworld South Ossetia – agreed roles of the community security working group

The community agreed that the group will:

- Act as a contact point on Community Security issues: between the community and the programme partners; between individual community members; and between the community and security service providers
- Be the primary focus for the support offered by the programme: the programme seeks to strengthen community capacity to work on security issues through the CSWG, by providing training, support and advice
- Help to organise (and possibly lead) engagement meetings with security providers
- Review, compile and contribute to information regarding Community Security
- Represent the concerns and priorities of all groups within a community, including vulnerable or excluded groups
- Facilitate the Community Security process, including the conflict analysis, prioritisation, action planning and evaluation phases
- Monitoring implementation of the plans and evaluating success
- Sharing lessons learned with other communities or CSWGs.

4.4 Developing relationships with key stakeholders

Developing relations with key stakeholders is essential if a Community Security approach is to achieve the buy-in needed to change relationships and behaviours and generate the cooperation needed to achieve shared results. The phrase ‘key stakeholders’ does not just refer to the more powerful members of society: vulnerable sections of the community are equally important.

A common weakness of community-level development initiatives is that they sometimes succeed in involving only or primarily the ‘community gatekeepers’ and those who already wield power and influence, rather than encouraging genuine participation of a broader cross-section of society. In many communities, the same set of influential people is invited to attend and participate in all of the workshops and initiatives that are conducted in their locality. Such people tend to be more educated, speak foreign languages, have command of the rhetoric that appeals to development practitioners, or perhaps have previous experience with similar initiatives. Such actors can be an invaluable asset to a Community Security process, and help outside actors to learn more about the community and build actor relationships. Indeed, they should be involved from the outset, because they may create obstacles if they come to feel excluded. But it is important to bear in mind that domination of the process by any individual or small group risks the exclusion of other actors, and that it should never be assumed that any one person has the right to speak on behalf of the community as a whole.

Encouraging broad and deep participation begins by clearly articulating to key stakeholders how Community Security activities correspond to their individual security interests, and how their participation can contribute to more equitable human security for all members of a community. In theory this should be a common goal shared by all stakeholders, but in practice this involves working to change the perspectives of and relationships between the various actors, as well as the balance of power and resources between them – so therefore it is a sensitive process in which challenges and resistance may be encountered.

Developing relationships with key stakeholders at an early stage can help overcome resistance. It should be communicated that:

- Community Security works to provide mutual security founded upon cooperation that transcends social divisions – all have a role to play, and all share in the benefits of success

- It is a preventative approach to conflict and a vehicle for wider peace, security and development
- As such, it is a powerful tool that key stakeholders at sub-national and national levels benefit from just as much as people at the grassroots.

Balancing the demand and supply sides of security

Improved relations between communities and security providers in Northern Ireland

The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) takes a human rights approach to its Community Security work. As part of the process of improving policing to contribute to the wider peace process, it was recognised that people had a right to be free from fear, but at the same time that people had a civic responsibility to contribute to their own security by working with security providers to deliver a better service.

Communities and the PSNI met to identify areas for collaboration. These meetings improved relations and built mutual trust between them, resulting in improved capacity to provide a service that more directly addressed people's needs.

Evaluations revealed that "underpinning any successful Community Security process were clear, concise, continuous, and unambiguous lines of communication between the public and the security service providers". Both the communities and the PSNI identified key stakeholders who acted as focal points to communicate and facilitate improvements. The stakeholders had buy-in from their peers, conveyed legitimacy, and could keep the process ticking along.

Social capital

Social capital is the invisible glue that keeps a society together even in difficult times. Strengthening social capital can include:

- Supporting social networks that connect groups together
- Developing a common sense of belonging, a shared future vision and a focus on what different social groups have in common
- Encouraging participation and active engagement by people from different backgrounds
- Building trust – people trusting one another and trusting local institutions to act fairly
- Fostering respect – developing an understanding of others and recognition of the value of diversity
- Increasing the responsiveness of a state to its citizenry.

Within Community Security programmes, as in peacebuilding more generally, the creation of links between actors and groups that are typically divided from or actively hostile to each other is particularly valuable.

An example of the power of such social capital is offered by the work of the Papua New Guinean civil society organisation, Kup Women for Peace. Originating in an area in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea deeply affected by violence, Kup Women for Peace began as an initiative of women who created bridges between women belonging to different warring tribes, and used these to intervene in and stop the escalation of violence between their communities on the battlefield.

5

Action planning

Issues to consider:

- Do everything possible to build fully representative, local ownership of the action plan
- Plan for the long term and strategically, but consider a 'quick win' to secure local enthusiasm for Community Security approaches
- Manage community expectations to ensure enthusiasm does not wane
- Have a clear theory of change behind the action plan
- Prioritising security needs can be divisive. Someone/some groups will necessarily have to miss out – and others may feel that a particular course of action threatens their interests. This poses a significant challenge to remaining conflict sensitive. Consider prioritising a neutral security threat that is apolitical and mutually agreeable
- Ensure the priorities of the same social groups are not repeatedly deprioritised, particularly those who are already marginalised
- Consider who to partner with to ensure interventions work to scale
- Remain gender and conflict sensitive when allocating responsibilities within the Community Security Working Group

5.1 Identifying and prioritising communities' security problems and needs

Supporting a community led analysis builds on the earlier conflict analysis and helps communities identify and prioritise their own security concerns and determine what actions they can take. This is crucial if the procedure is to be democratic and reflective of actual community needs. The assessment should help community members to identify and prioritise their own security concerns and determine what actions they can take to address them. CSWG members, wider community members and key stakeholders, including security service providers, should all be involved in a process to identify the underlying sources of insecurity. This can be done collectively or in subgroups focusing on the perspectives of different stakeholders if it is difficult for all groups to make their voices heard in a collective setting.

The exact components of the assessment process should, as with conflict analysis, depend on the nature of the programme and the context. For example, it may be more relevant to go into detail around issues related to access to water and irrigation, the role of the court system, dynamics across a border or boundary line, election-related insecurity or environmental threats, depending on the context. Similarly, the type of assessment that is conducted and the questions and tools that are used will depend on the level of education of the local people and other stakeholders: a one-size-fits-all approach is certainly not an option. However, elements that you may wish to include in your assessment are as follows. Each element has some guiding research questions that you should be able to answer, at least in part, by the end of the assessment process:

■ **Profile of the context:**

What are the historical, political, economic, social, security, cultural, demographic and environmental issues that define the overall context?

■ **Identification of security problems:**

What crime, violence and security threats have people experienced?

How do these differ for different groups? (e.g. men, women, youth, marginalised, etc.)

What has been the timeline of security problems experienced in the community?

Where and when have security problems occurred?

What weapons have been used and where do they come from?

What types of crime/violence are most prevalent?

Who has been involved (which age, social groups, etc.)?

Which groups are most vulnerable and what makes different groups feel insecure?

■ **Analysis of the causes of security problems:**

What were the immediate triggers?

What were the deeper root causes?

What are the root causes of insecurity at different levels (local, national and international)?

■ **Analysis of (formal and informal) security and justice provision:**

What are the key security and justice needs at the local level? How do these differ for different groups?

Who are the formal security providers and what capacities are in place for them to provide security and justice? What are the gaps?

How accessible are security and justice providers for different groups?

What non-state groups/mechanisms are providing security and justice, and how effective are they?

Do justice providers treat people differently according to their age, gender, ethnicity, economic background, etc.?

What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of security and justice provision?

What links, if any, exist between the public and security and justice providers?

■ **Stakeholder analysis:**

What are the interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships of those engaged in or being affected by conflict or insecurity?

What role can be identified for each stakeholder in improving security in the community?

■ **Conflict dynamics analysis:**

What is the interaction between the situation context, causal analysis and the actors, including identifying drivers of change?

What are the potential opportunities for peacebuilding?

■ **Gender analysis:**

What role do gender dynamics play in Community Security?

Do women, men, girls and boys experience insecurity/conflict differently?

Do they play different roles in security provision?

Do police and other security providers ensure equal access to both women and men, and respond to women's and men's distinct security and justice concerns adequately?

Is violence against women and girls taken seriously by the community and security and justice providers?

Do women play a full role in security and justice provision?²⁷

Community members watch a street drama about substance abuse and its effects on domestic violence organised by the community security working group of Binauna VDC, Banke District.

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Collectively discussing these areas lets community members share security concerns meaningfully with each other and their security providers. It lets communities understand the root causes behind their insecurity and not just think about how problems manifest themselves on the surface. This can be a delicate process that can slip into one group blaming another if it is not managed sensitively.

Having identified problems, communities should try to prioritise their most pressing needs. These should reflect common interests that bridge between sections of the community and security providers. Again, this is sensitive, and very often different groups disagree over priorities and needs. When this happens, the prioritisation process can reinforce existing negative sentiments and even entrench the vulnerability of excluded groups. Therefore this must be carefully facilitated, primarily by emphasising shared interests between participants. This can set a healthy precedent for future Community Security decision-making processes.

Sequencing matters. As you embark on the process of building buy-in and confidence in a new community, it can be beneficial for action plans to prioritise less sensitive security challenges, which can be addressed quickly and relatively easily in order to garner trust and ownership amongst stakeholders.²⁸ These 'quick wins' can be used to pave the way for addressing the more challenging underlying causes of insecurity later on. Considered prioritisation and sequencing can also help to keep expectations realistic.

Finally, in Saferworld's Community Security programmes, it has been usual for prioritisation to be led by community members and for authorities to be included later in the action planning. This has proven essential for ensuring the process focuses on and responds to the priorities as communities see them and to minimise the potential for authorities to unduly influence decisions.

²⁷ UNPBSO www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/PBF-Note-on-conflict-analysis-FINAL.pdf

²⁸ See the case study on Saferworld's *Community Security response in Fergana Valley* for an excellent example of this, where common ground was found on issues surrounding road safety. A video in English, Russian, and Tajik can be found here www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/news-article/628

Identifying common security concerns in the Fergana Valley

Communities in the southern region of Kyrgyzstan are divided along ethnic lines. The region was affected by the inter-ethnic violence in 2010, and since that time levels of trust between the two ethnic groups and the authorities had remained very low.

The situation was tense, but Saferworld's community security working groups in the region identified traffic safety in the areas close to schools as a common security concern. People had been killed crossing the road. Local authorities had previously tried to improve safety by installing speed bumps in front of schools, but due to the lack of consultation with the community and the police, the bumps were deemed illegal and removed. With the situation unresolved, the traffic issue continued to strain the relationship between the local authorities, the police and the communities. In response, the CSWG developed an action plan in conjunction with the police, community members from different ethnicities, school parents and local authorities.

It provided a breakthrough. It may have seemed like a trivial problem compared to the more obvious tensions in the ethnically mixed community in Jalalabad district, but road safety was something both ethnic groups could agree was a dangerous issue, including the police and local authorities. It cut across ethno-national divides and provided a common goal everyone felt was a priority. By prioritising and solving this first problem together using Community Security, it started the process of reconciliation and dialogue between communities and the police that opened the door to tackle more protracted sources of insecurity.

The joint community initiative was promoted by the police and school administrations as a successful case study to other communities and schools facing similar problems.

5.2 Analysing problems and planning responses: developing an action plan

Action planning is the process by which community members, local authorities and security/justice providers articulate their objectives, activities, roles and responsibilities for addressing the safety and security concerns they have prioritised. It may take more than one meeting, or even require focus groups ahead of a larger plenary planning session.

Action planning is an extension of the prioritisation phase and should involve the CSWG members, security providers and other key actors identified as having influence over people's security. Together, it is their responsibility to develop a plan that clearly outlines a roadmap for activities that is realistic and achievable and will yield visible results. Communities should define their own criteria for what successful changes will look like. The plan is owned by and accountable to the community, and should build upon existing capacities and resources.

In articulating a community's shared understanding of its members' security needs, priorities and shared responsibilities for making progress, action plans should be designed in a way that is understandable and accessible to the stakeholders involved. Stakeholders should agree on a clear vision of the types of changes they want to achieve. This does not have to be complicated, and visions may be agreed verbally or put in writing as more formal theories of change.²⁹ What is important is that action plans and activities work towards common visions that benefit the community as a whole.

The core component of action plans should be a clear statement of workable, time-bound actions that stakeholders will implement – with a clear allocation of responsibility for progress. Whether or not a theory of change is included, it is important to ensure that the contribution of the agreed steps towards fulfilment of the overall objective is clear. There is almost no limit on the actions that can be included, as long as they are achievable within the capacities and resources available to the stakeholders and their networks. Advocacy, dialogue, CBP, events, activism, training, or infrastructural work are just a small selection of the possible options.

²⁹ A statement of belief that **if** a particular action is undertaken, **then** it will result in certain changes **because** of the transformative effects of the action. See section 3.2 for some example theories of change and information on how to formulate them.

Capacity is perhaps the biggest consideration. Regardless of the operational environment, expectations have to be managed, and planning has to be realistically matched to the capacity of the CSWGs.

Designing action plans that focus on delivering quite slow, incremental improvements can mitigate this risk, but can also have a sapping effect on people's enthusiasm for Community Security. In these instances, quick impact projects ('quick wins') can keep people motivated before moving to address more intractable security challenges in subsequent action planning sessions.³⁰ However, even in contexts where capacities are very weak, a focus on what communities and local, informal security, justice and conflict resolution mechanisms can achieve through collective action can achieve worthwhile results.

The most effective action plans set a higher level of ambition by drawing on the diverse strengths, networks and capacities of the CSWG's members and other key stakeholders.³¹ For example, they enlist other NGOs, community groups, and CSOs to help address the different factors that underlie insecurity, as a way to ensure that the Community Security programme maximises its potential (see section 4.2).

Action planning also marks the beginning of the M&E process. Within a community's action plan, all stakeholders should agree on criteria for success and set some specific indicators to be monitored over time. Information gathered during the conflict analysis and security assessment about how insecurity is manifested, and the factors and actor relationships underlying it, can be a good place to start thinking about issues that can be monitored to give an indication of progress. Such information can also provide valuable baselines against which to measure changes at regular review dates.

Saferworld community security action plans

A Community Security action plan is formulated by a community in response to a security or public safety problem affecting its members. At a minimum, such plans should include:

- A clear statement of the problem
- The agreed steps to address the problem
- The allocation of tasks to individual working group members
- Objectives and indicators of progress
- Regular review dates

Some Community Security action plans may specify simple solutions to problems, for example fitting locks to common doors in apartment blocks. Others, such as installing new street lights, or running regular consultations for police officers to meet local residents for confidential discussions about crime, may require significant time investment. What is common to all is that in order to be successful, institutions, communities and individuals must all work together towards agreed objectives.

To do this in the Balkans, Saferworld used a two-stage 'Action Planning Workshop' format across four programmes. During stage one, community representatives gave a summary of the security issues identified in their focus group discussions to people from relevant local institutions. After a facilitated discussion, the participants agreed upon joint priorities. During stage two, action plans were drawn up and working groups were created to undertake the required tasks.

Saferworld (2006), *Creating Safer Communities: Lessons from South Eastern Europe*

³⁰ Danish Demining Group, *Community Safety in Somaliland, 2008–10, an evaluation: Lesson Learned and Improvements for Future Programming*.

³¹ Oxfam (2010) *Engaging with communities – the next challenge for peacekeeping* (briefing paper 141, Nov.).

Using photography projects to inform joint action plans with security providers in Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, Saferworld facilitated pioneering cooperation between the police and the community representatives that saw the police redirect resources to where the community had identified capacity gaps. CSWGs showed photographs they had taken of areas and issues they felt were under-policed to security providers in the Community Security sessions. Participants said the photography project was empowering. Police said it was informative and creative. The result was a joint action plan devised by the CSWG and the police to address issues highlighted by the photographs. The action plan also had built-in indicators and monitoring schedules to keep the plan on track, accountable and relevant.

5.3 Implementing the action plan

The action plan provides a roadmap for the programme and serves as a contract that commits a community and their security providers to working together. The roadmap involves small steps that incrementally lead to more significant improvements to people's experience of community.

Roles and responsibilities behind each action will have been decided upon during the action planning. However, moving from planning to action can be challenging for communities, especially at first: stakeholders can take time to adjust to the unfamiliar situation where they have taken on a share of the collective responsibility for improving security.

The role of partners who have played a role in the development of the action plan in ensuring its implementation is particularly important. Continuous engagement by partners and regular monitoring of activities and results can help generate and maintain the momentum for implementation.

Partners can provide the support required by other stakeholders in the community to develop the confidence and capacity they need to assume greater ownership and leadership over time. Partners can confer legitimacy onto CSWGs, and attract the support of networks that increase the scale of their work.

In addition, Saferworld has sometimes formed influential advisor groups, made up of more experienced actors, to help guide CSWGs. Such wider involvement can help CSWGs to remain motivated and implement more effective responses.

Maintaining transparency by publicly sharing action plans, results and financial records can contribute towards building broader public and institutional trust behind CSWG programmes.

Participatory approaches that track implementation can help communities monitor conflict dynamics better. It is Saferworld's experience that Community Security programmes develop in different directions according to these dynamics, which shape changes in levels of security and the way it is experienced. The action plans approach needs to be flexible, adjusting and adapting in relation to:

- Changes to the implementation context – in particular conflict dynamics and/or new and emerging security threats
- The way the Community Security activities are affecting the local context
- Changes in the stated needs and resources of the beneficiary communities.³²

³² www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Conflict-Sensitivity%20Assessment%20Sri%20Lanka.pdf

Implementing action plans with the police in Abkhazia

In 2012, community representatives, local administrators and police in Abkhazia implemented a joint action plan to improve people's security.

It focused on increasing police capacity to respond to high levels of criminality. The action plan began by establishing an alarm system linking up four centrally located houses to the police point in the village 3km away. In the event of an attack, a house could raise the alarm and the police would immediately be alerted.

The action was part of a longer-term plan to improve trust between communities and security providers by providing clear lines of communication. Police would often not respond to calls for help because they were afraid of being ambushed. Implementing a joined up action plan allayed these fears and made it clear to the police when calls for assistance were genuine.

Prior to the action plan people had to run 3km to the police station to get help, giving ample time for criminals to escape. There were frequent incidents of violent crime.

As a result of the plan, community members have a quick and effective means of contacting the police, and the police have better intelligence and warning when crimes are taking place. This has contributed to more mutually trusting relationships, and improved security overall.

Factors contributing to success

An evaluation of the World Bank's **Community Driven Development** programmes found that some factors contributing to success included:

- Establishing a more participatory and inclusive model of service delivery, which allows communities to identify the poorest and their own development needs
- The provision of high quality and adequate facilitation and technical assistance
- Including capacity building for communities
- Utilisation of poverty maps to target resources to poor areas
- Flexibility in project design and implementation with an approach of 'growth in learning' over the medium and longer term.

World Bank, World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development, (2011), 'What Have Been the Impacts of Community-Driven Development Programs?' p.4

Dvani community security action plan in South Ossetia: renovating a community drinking water source situated along the administrative boundary line

Dvani's source of potable water is a water collector in which several springs gather before feeding a pipe to the village. It is situated 50 metres from the administrative boundary line (ABL) and South Ossetian/Russian armed personnel. Approaching it is dangerous and might cause troops to open fire. A light makeshift tin board, which could be easily dislodged, was all that covered the collector, and communities were worried that it could lead to water pollution. In response, the community created a vision and an action plan in collaboration with security providers:

Vision: Villagers are able to access clean drinking water and are not afraid to maintain the water source.

Objectives:

1. The drinking water source is clean and its quality is controlled periodically.
2. A permanent cover is constructed for the drinking water source.
3. The villagers' security is guaranteed during construction work by security actors on both sides of the ABL.

Action plan steps:

1. The quality of drinking water is examined in a laboratory: a) before construction of the cover; and b) after two months.
2. The reservoir is disinfected with solid chloride on the same day the cover is constructed.
3. Community members buy materials for the cover, transport it to the site and build the cover in situ.
4. Russian/South Ossetian forces are warned in advance, so that they do not misinterpret the process.
5. Representatives from the police and EU Monitoring Mission attend the construction process.

6

Working at multiple levels and advocating for broader changes

Issues to consider:

- The Community Security approach has relevance at the local, sub-national and national levels
- It can inform administrative policies by communicating the actual needs of the citizenry to those in power at each of these levels
- It can improve the delivery of security, justice and other services by working in conjunction with service providers to more efficiently direct resources and monitor impacts
- It can build relationships between the community, security service providers and local authorities that contribute to improved state–society bonds

6.1 Influencing national level policy and practice

Alongside local level engagement it is necessary to increase the capacity and political will of sub-national and national authorities to provide the services that people need. Aside from capacity gaps, further barriers to this may include discriminatory norms and laws, non-compliance with human rights standards, hybrid formal and non-formal security and justice providers and procedures, and a lack of accountability across security and justice institutions. Community Security approaches attempt to address insecurity holistically through a combination of action at different levels. These activities are mutually reinforcing but require different skills at different times and involve a range of research, analysis, community engagement, training, technical support, M&E, and advocacy techniques.


- **Community level** – This is the grassroots level at which the effectiveness of Community Security approaches is largely directed towards the establishment of communication and cooperation between the local authorities and the community. Ensuring participation in all phases of the development and implementation of action plans builds support for Community Security and familiarises local security providers with the approach.
- **Sub-national level** – Ensuring local authorities have the desire, permission and capacity to engage effectively with and implement Community Security action plans in accordance with communities’ priorities can embed the approaches within their work. Including local authorities in decision-making processes, sharing results and communicating security and resource needs can expedite the process.

- **National level** – Creating an enabling environment at the national level can contribute to wider reaching Community Security initiatives. This may involve strengthening the capacity of a government institution, working with individuals with national influence or mobilising public demand for more transparent, accountable and effective institutions. In the longer term, developing a supportive policy and legislative framework for Community Security work helps embed the approach in national practice and can improve its scale, sustainability and impact.

In practice, it can be challenging to link local and national approaches to security to create a mutually reinforcing system influenced by and responsive to both community and state security needs. Policymakers at the national level may focus on ‘hard’ security issues, particularly in conflict-prone contexts, and security is often seen as the preserve of the state and powerful elites. This is sometimes made worse by donor-driven national security agendas in instances where there is a focus on state-to-state capacity building for counter-terrorism, stabilisation and statebuilding purposes. In such instances, people-focused security and justice can become relegated to a secondary consideration. In addressing security priorities at the local level, Community Security can offer people-centred solutions to wider security problems, but this is not always apparent to those in power. Transforming or broadening narrow concepts of security held by national elites to embrace human security is a long-term, political process that requires ongoing concerted advocacy and flexible engagement at all levels.

A way of approaching it can be seen in this diagram. It rests on the belief that interventions at the local level can influence sub-national and national policy and practice (and vice versa) if approached systematically and strategically:

Figure 4. How Community Security can lead to interconnected changes at multiple levels



Changes in national policy on community security, small arms and light weapons control, and police reform in Kosovo^{33, 34}

In Kosovo, Community Security programmes advocated the need to link broader reform processes to people's security needs and concerns. As a result of contributions at all levels, national policies such as the Law on Arms (2009), National Strategy and Action Plan on Community Safety (2011), Community Policing Strategy (2012), Small Arms and Light Weapons Control and Collection Strategy (2013), and most recently the School Safety Strategy (2014) have incorporated feedback from a wide consultation process (at all levels) facilitated by Saferworld and partners, as well as including Saferworld's technical input.

Saferworld's projects in Kosovo have also inspired neighbouring communities and other bodies to do similar work. For example, UNDP's Safer Communities project in Croatia is partly inspired by the success of Saferworld's work in the region.

6.2 Advocacy

Advocacy is a strategic process to influence and improve the policies and practices that affect people's lives – in this case, their experience of security. Sharing evidence of success from Community Security programmes with targeted individuals, groups and institutions can influence them to adopt more people-focused approaches to security. Successful advocacy can accelerate the uptake and multiply the impacts of Community Security approaches, ensuring that the direction of change is towards better human security provision at the local, sub-national and national levels.

There are many different types of advocacy activity ranging from public campaigns, lobby meetings to seminars, workshops and report launches. A particularly useful option can be 'go-and-see' visits – where officials or political leaders are invited to see Community Security programmes in action in the field. Which activity is used should be determined by the likelihood of achieving impact. In the context of Community Security work, Saferworld's advocacy activities primarily focus on bringing communities together to articulate their needs and concerns to decisionmakers and engaging directly with government officials and institutions to promote responsive approaches.

Successful advocacy is planned, strategic, and persistent. It is a process rather than an event and as such requires creativity, flexibility and regular monitoring of progress. Advocacy is an integral component of Community Security programming and implementation, and a key factor in taking Community Security approaches to scale. The text boxes in this section offer examples of how advocacy by communities has influenced decisionmakers in Kosovo and Nepal.

Identifying advocacy targets³⁵

A variety of individuals, groups and institutions may be interested in or directly affected by the promotion of Community Security approaches. Some may be supportive, while others might oppose it or choose not to engage at all. It is therefore important to understand who the target stakeholders are and their positions on Community Security approaches in order to identify allies, as well as those that might need to be influenced.

This is done through a process of identifying stakeholders, categorising them based on their support or opposition, mapping them according to their level of influence in implementing Community Security approaches, and prioritising targets and the means to influence them.

When prioritising targets, consider:

- Policy positions
- Political ideology
- Their capacity to influence change
- Their willingness to influence change
- Their availability and approachability.

³³ Saferworld (2006) *Creating Safer Communities. Lessons from South Eastern Europe* www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Creating_safer_communities_Dec06_%20English.pdf

³⁴ UNDP (2008) *Safe Communities Croatia* www.undp.hr/show.jsp?page=86238

³⁵ Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2011) 'Advocacy capacity building: a training toolkit'.

Devising an advocacy strategy³⁶

The process set out below is designed to ensure advocacy strategies are relevant and focused in terms of objectives, targets and activities, allowing for limited resources to be used effectively.

Step 1: Assessing the situation. It is important to understand the context and factors that may affect chances of success.

Step 2: Establishing the goals. By mapping and clarifying the problems that need addressing, it is possible to prioritise solutions and thereby the advocacy objectives.

Step 3: Developing an influencing strategy. An influencing strategy should capture the changes sought, who will make the changes happen, and how to influence them to do so.

Step 4: Planning your activity. Activities should be tailored to the target to best influence their decision-making, and be based on a sound theory of change.

Step 5: Implementation. An advocacy strategy needs timelines, clarity on responsibilities and indicators to track progress.

Step 6: Monitoring and evaluation. As well as monitoring the progress of advocacy activity, it is important to determine the impact of the work, whether it has benefited the right people and was the best use of resources.

Increased focus by local government on community security issues in Nepal

Village District Committees (VDCs) in Nepal are government structures with a significant role in organising local security, peace and development initiatives.

Following early Community Security successes in Nepal, a VDC in the Eastern Terai was approached by the community security working group to support more ambitious work – a new project to build a police post in a remote village. Community members and security providers both advocated for the project, citing common security concerns around the difficulty police have in responding to crime in the remote area. The VDC saw the value of the initiative and donated land in the village. The community then provided furniture, and the police guaranteed a permanent officer presence.

Owing to this successful advocacy, the VDC worked more closely with the CSWG to fund other Community Security projects, including a women's programme aimed at providing vocational skills training.

³⁶ Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2011) 'Advocacy capacity building: a training toolkit'.

7

Monitoring, evaluation and learning: understanding and measuring change

Issues to consider:

- Regular participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning helps ensure accountability and is a key component of Community Security
- A Community Security programme not only needs to know when it is making a positive difference but also has to ensure that there are no unintended consequences that may even be increasing the likelihood of violence
- Monitoring for conflict sensitivity means understanding the changing context, and the interaction between the context and the programme

Very often, the processes of M&E are met with resistance and perceived to be burdens imposed by donors and external facilitators. Resistance to evaluation is often strongest when stakeholders and beneficiaries are not invited to set the targets and methodologies themselves.

A participatory approach to M&E can help mitigate these challenges. It involves bringing communities together to discuss the impacts, challenges, and future direction of their Community Security programmes. It also gives the broader community greater ownership of the projects and ensures they determine success according to their own criteria and understanding of the context.

Having clear theories of change at the outset and collecting outcomes throughout the programme cycle enables more informed MEL – making it clear to any external evaluator what types of change they are looking for and providing them with evidence against which theories can start to be tested.

Throughout, monitoring the essentials on a regular basis means that the dangers of doing harm, or inadvertently entrenching poor practice, are avoided. These essentials include, for instance, tracking meaningful levels of participation by those normally excluded, monitoring that communities are not at risk of abuse, or ensuring Community Security in one community is not negatively affecting neighbouring ones.

7.1 Measuring change at different levels

Given that one of the central hallmarks of a holistic Community Security approach is to address insecurity at three levels (community or local level, sub-national or district level, and national level), a programme needs to find ways to understand and measure the changes occurring at each of them, given the combination of mutually reinforcing action required for each – research, analysis, community engagement, training, technical support, and advocacy.

Community/Local level

Regular participatory monitoring and evaluation of change, and learning about what works, is a central feature of Community Security at the local level. This level is where the community takes a lead. During the course of working through the process of developing CSWGs, identifying security concerns, prioritising them and creating action plans, it is important to make space for deciding how they will monitor their progress and measure their success. Integrating this into the planning process, rather than thinking about this as a separate exercise in ‘M&E’ to be completed later, is essential if the community is to retain the same level of agency and leadership that the rest of the process is intended to stimulate.

As we know from the cycle, communities work with CSO partners to determine their own priorities for one or more action plans, and set the vision, the objectives, and the changes they want to achieve. At the same time, CSO partners should help communities to find straightforward ways to decide whether this has been a success.

A young man in traditional Kyrgyz ‘kalpak’ hat enjoys the opening of Tash-Bulak’s tolerance festival.

©KAREN WYKURZ



Change at the community level is made up of a number of interlocking processes and results. Understanding and measuring these changes means considering several important areas:

- The immediate changes that they plan for, through the concrete ‘thing’ that they are hoping to alter. This might be the establishment of a local police post, access to shared resources, such as water, traffic improvements, more effective patrols or the installation of the community alarm system. This is the tangible and visible output of the action plan. The community are well placed to determine how such a success can be measured.
- The changes in the way the community feels about itself and its agency, its confidence, and capacity, and their willingness to tackle increasingly sensitive areas of concern.

- The inclusion of new or previously excluded voices, such as young women, ex-combatants, the older generation, or people from marginalised ethnicities.
- The changes in relevant relationships – these could be: within the community; between conflicting communities; and between communities and local authorities or service providers that serve them. These relationships are core to sustaining progress and ensuring that the community security approach is appropriated by all stakeholders and not seen as an external intervention. Measuring how these relationships have changed is critical for understanding what both progress made and the potential for institutionalising that change. This is especially important given that Community Security reinforces a contract between security providers and the public that upholding security is their shared duty.
- The changes in the behaviour, and practice, of both the communities and the security providers or wider local authorities.
- Changes in the general sense and perception of the communities and the authorities about the context they live in: Do people feel safer? Do they report more crimes? Do they see a reduction in crimes? Do they trust their authorities more to respond to their needs and concerns? Can both the communities and their authorities see the seeds of a working partnership between them developing?
- Changes in gender-related issues, and the creation of safer environments to raise sensitive issues.

Sub-national and national level

Community Security attempts to link local improvements up to sub-national and national levels through research and advocacy toward higher-level actors. This aims to ensure that the gains made at the local level are replicated both in other geographical locations in the same country and through policy and practice changes by institutions.

At these levels it is necessary to increase the capacity and political will of sub-national and national authorities to provide the services that people need. This where we can see if the approach itself has the potential to be incorporated or integrated into the practice of mechanisms, institutions, either through the leadership of individuals in those institutions, or in changes in the way they consult, engage, and respond to communities. Here a programme would be looking to measure the level of change in institutionalising consultation processes or mechanisms with the community, the timeliness of consultation, the change in the way budgets are defined and used, progress toward greater transparency and information-sharing, and changes in operational guidelines. We would also look for changes in capacities by communities or civil society to undertake research and advocacy for policy-level change, the quality of evidence used, and the capacity of CSOs to do that work.

More effective and responsive security provision in Nepal

Community Security meetings in the Eastern Terai revealed that people felt the police were slow to respond to criminality and were not contactable or visible enough on the street. The police admitted in consultations that they would like to do more but did not have the vehicles, communication equipment, or decentralised police stations necessary to patrol or respond quickly.

To address this, the Community Security Working Group agreed to provide the police station with bicycles, mobile phones, sim-cards, flashlights, and even land for a new police post in a remote area.

The result has been increased police presence, more trusting and cooperative relations with the community, and ultimately better security owing to more responsive and community focused police work. Police have better mobility and connectivity and people feel safer. More crimes are responded to and solved in quicker time. Because of the improved trust and cooperation, senior police felt that the project had created an 'enabling environment' for their forces.

"The public are the community", said one officer, "we will never have their level of information. We need to work with them and use their knowledge. Improved integration and interaction with the public has improved the service of the police."

Examples of areas that can be measured to show evidence of change (indicators)

Behaviour of security providers towards communities:

- number of attacks by security providers on individuals and/or communities
- attitude and behaviour of security providers in handling sensitive cases, including gender-based violence, and violence against children
- willingness to visit communities
- adherence to proper protocols and procedures by security providers when dealing with communities
- the extent to which security providers see themselves as a service to the community, rather than a force for control

Community behaviour towards security providers:

- number of attacks by communities on security providers
- number of meetings with security providers requested by communities
- willingness to report crime or security issues to relevant authorities
- willingness of community to handover suspects/culprits

Relationships between the community and security providers:

- quality of interaction between security providers and communities in meetings
- number of meetings held
- level of attendance at meetings, from community and police staff (rank, seniority, relevant community representatives)
- level of own resources community willing to invest in solutions
- space given to security providers to exercise their roles
- level of continued reliance by communities on non-state, informal security providers

Feelings of safety/security:

- the proportion of women who feel confident of walking in the community after dark
- people's perceptions of security and safety and trust in authorities to deliver responsive and accountable services
- effectiveness and capacities of consultation mechanisms

Sub-national and national level:

- the quality and delivery of services to marginalised groups
- the number of reported cases of domestic violence and gender based violence and the responses to these
- people's trust in sub-national and national authorities to deliver responsive and accountable services
- the number of people or institutions at local or national government level acting to support Community Security processes
- policy changes

7.2 Tools for monitoring and measuring change

Saferworld harvests outcomes on an ongoing basis through semi-structured CSWG meetings and reviews in addition to annual evaluation meetings to measure progress. During the action planning, Saferworld encourages communities to think clearly about what changes they want to measure (indicators), what information they can collect, where they will find it, and who will be responsible for it. Communities' unique understanding of the conflict context makes the CSWGs well placed to know what is feasible.

In Nepal, Saferworld's Ramesh Nidhi Bista worked with the communities to develop a 'fear free' chart, to track a number of issues that they thought important. By asking the questions in the grid at set points over time, communities could see which drivers of insecurity were becoming more or less prevalent. This let communities not only track improvements that their work contributed to but also see potential sources of violence

in advance and plan accordingly to address them. The communities themselves asked the questions to stakeholders (including security providers), which helped build stronger relationships at the same time as monitoring progress. It also put the communities in control of the information needed to make informed on-going programmatic decisions.

A community designed 'fear free' chart in Nepal

Questions	Significantly improving (1)	Improving (2)	Neither Improving nor getting worse (3)	Getting worse (4)	Getting significantly worse (5)
What do you think of the overall security situation in the community?					
What do you think of the situation regarding domestic violence?					
What do you think of the situation regarding violence against women?					
What do you think the situation regarding substance abuse among youth?					
What do you think of the community's relationship with the police?					

Community Security participatory evaluation sessions typically last a day and bring together relevant programme stakeholders and beneficiaries to capture information about changes caused by the programme. It gathers information on transformations in the relationships and behaviours behind insecurity, and looks to understand how those changes have affected people's experience of security. Evaluations attempt to understand wider impacts as well as outcomes amongst direct beneficiaries. It will also capture information about other factors that may have contributed to any changes, or unexpected changes (positive and negative), that may have happened as a result of the Community Security programme.

Example questions for participatory evaluations

- What do people consider the most significant changes over the last year, and why?
- What has caused these changes?
- Were there any changes that were unexpected, or negative?
- Are the changes sustainable?
- Are we working with the right people at the right level in the most resourceful way?
- How can the programme improve next year?

Saferworld has used a number of data-gathering instruments to assess changes in context and perceptions. Some programmes use annual Community Security assessments, which provide knowledge and data to the communities about the nature of security in limited geographical areas, and can track specific security issues, the availability of services, and the feelings of safety of the communities. Some have used short messaging services (SMS) to complement the work of the CSWGs, enabling them to make more effective use of their improving relationships with security providers.

Using community security working groups to monitor changes in security in Georgia

During the Action Planning, the CSWG members bring communities together to map their security issues and needs. They then represent their communities in discussions about what initiatives could be taken forward and decide how they will monitor progress.

In Shida Kartli, CSWGs implemented a specially built SMS monitoring system designed in partnership with United Nations Development Programme and Elva. The system let them use SMS surveys to monitor changes in perceptions, experiences and levels of insecurity. Having this data let the group remain flexible and direct its resources towards issues and areas where the community identified a need. This kept the Community Security interventions continuously relevant and responsive.

However, using SMS monitoring is not a technological short-cut, and the process still requires full buy-in from the community for it to be useful. Underpinning it all was trust in the process.

On Saferworld programmes in Kosovo, teams have run annual perceptions surveys – tracker surveys – backed up by focus group triangulation to determine, for example, broader changes over time in the population's trust in security providers. Such approaches can be useful, but need to be carefully designed, as these are snapshots in time, and the results can be easily distorted by contextual specifics (for instance, the effect that seasonal variations have on conflict is well-known in South Sudan).

Using tracker surveys in Kosovo

The Saferworld Kosovo tracker survey process was designed to be repeated at regular intervals in order to monitor trends in the public's changing perceptions and experiences of insecurity. Tracked categories included public opinion of security providers; access to security services; and people's overall feeling of security.

Results from the surveys informed the design and implementation of Community Security programmes and ensuring that community security working groups addressed the communities' most relevant security needs. Detailed analyses of public perceptions were also shared with policymakers to assist their decision-making processes.

Survey findings and recommendations were extremely helpful at the central level where they helped the respective government working groups develop security strategies around small arms and light weapons. This included influencing the National Strategy and Action Plan for Community Safety 2011–2016.

Survey reports were distributed widely to Kosovo-based and international organisations and institutions working on security. The reports were regularly shared with the media, which helped to publically communicate advocacy messages on peace, conflict and security issues.

Use of broad national-data can be a useful additional source of changing context. However, there are often large gaps, time-lags, and inconsistencies in national-level data and statistics in conflict-affected states, which can make it difficult and expensive to track trends over time.³⁷

³⁷ For an in-depth discussion about the challenges, see Scheye E, Chigas D (2009) *Development of a Basket of Conflict, Security and Justice Indicators*, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.

Example evaluation results from Saferworld programmes³⁸

Community Security:

- Encourages members of the community to be proactive in dealing with their security concerns
- Creates durable links between the community and local government and police structures
- Improves the responsiveness of those institutions to the needs of the citizens, helping them prevent rather than simply respond to incidents
- Enhances the ability of communities to withstand pressures that could lead to violent conflict in the future
- Strengthens the accountability of local government and police to the communities they serve
- Improves the safety and security situation of people in the community
- Proceeds from the bottom up, starting not from laws and policies, but from the views of residents who understand their situation best
- Can inform top-down initiatives (for example, through Community Based Policing strategies), because it provides a framework for the delivery of public services or strategies in line with local needs.

7.3 Learning and improving

The main purposes of evaluation are to improve future aid policy, programmes and projects through feedback of lessons learned; and to provide a basis for accountability. For these purposes to be met and for evaluations to be useful, results from M&E must be used.³⁹ That means communities, policymakers and operational staff actively learning from and improving the M&E process so that future Community Security activities will be more effective.

Lessons learned will inform a new programme cycle. Information from the evaluation will update the conflict analysis, reprioritise the communities' needs, and lead into another round of action planning. This ensures that the programme cycle continues, continually reinforcing itself and providing the basis for communities to improve on their efforts to identify and address causes of insecurity.

Figure 1. Saferworld's Community Security Programme Cycle



³⁸ *Creating Safer Communities: Lessons from Eastern Europe* p.7
www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Creating_safer_communities_Dec06_%20English.pdf

³⁹ DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance (2010) p.7
www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdndep/41612905.pdf

ANNEX A: Areas requiring further research

Saferworld suggests some future areas for more in-depth study in order to fully understand the potential of and limitations to Community Security approaches:

Investigate the linkages between Community Security work and wider reform processes:

- How can interventions link more directly to wider reforms?
- What is the right blend of advocacy and programming?
- How can Community Security help CSOs more meaningfully engage in national peace and statebuilding debates?
- What is the exact role of non-state actors in security provision, and how can they be incorporated into Community Security processes?
- How can Community Security mechanisms link with the provision of justice?

Implementing Community Security effectively:

- What approaches to Community Security work in different conflict contexts?
- Is there a limit in scale to effective Community Security interventions?

Integrating women and gender:

- How can gender sensitivity increase the peacebuilding and statebuilding aims of Community Security interventions?
- How do we ensure gender transformative approaches run through Community Security approaches?

Influencing international policy:

- To what extent does Community Security feature in the mandate, policies and operational practice of international peace and security actors?
- How might other NGOs better integrate Community Security into their approaches, and what could be the impact on national and regional peace and security provision?
- What changes to the current donor funding patterns would be helpful to increase the impact of Community Security work?

ANNEX B: Additional resources and bibliography

Some of the following provide a selection of conflict analysis frameworks and tools adopted by international organisations, donor agencies and non-governmental organisations. Find one most suited to a particular need or situation and further adapt it, rather than viewing them as rigid frameworks:

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Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with local people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe that everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from insecurity and violent conflict.

COVER PHOTO: Portrait of a local woman in Kotalipara, Gopalgang. Saferworld is working with Bangladeshi NGO BRAC on a four-year community security project across 16 sites in South West Bangladesh. © THOMAS MARTIN/SAFERWORLD



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