

5 MAY 02

## Commander's Summary of Operations OEF-P

1. The following is a summary of major events, activities, and operations the FOB 11 and subordinate elements participated in or conducted leading up to and during Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P).
2. Planning for this operation began immediately after 9-11 though the roots of the advisory assistance mission began during the Light Reaction Company MTT that took place from March through July 2001. During this time 1-1 personnel recognized that the LRC could not be effectively employed because there was no command and control structure designed to employ and support it. Plans were made at CINCPAC, SOCPAC, and 1<sup>st</sup> SFG(A) to conduct an assessment for follow-on training requirements to allow for effective employment of the LRC and other AFP forces in operations against terrorist organizations and in particular the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). When 9-11 occurred planning for this assessment was actually taking place in Hawaii. An initial visit to Zamboanga by the FOB 11 Cdr and an ODA Cdr (who trained the LRC) was scheduled for 12 SEP 01 but was postponed and subsequently held on 19 SEP 01. This visit provided initial insights into employment of the LRC and operations conducted between JUL and SEP. Following the Burnham hostage taking on 27 May 02 1-1 provided intel support and LRC subject matter experts (SME) to the CINC's SOCPAC lead Pacific Situational Awareness Team (PSAT) located at the US Embassy in Manila. (Note: This later evolved into the Counter-terrorism LNO cell). 1-1 personnel have continually providing manning for this cell since May 01.
3. FOB 11 deployed two planners/LNOs to SOCPAC HQ during the week of 9-11. One planner would remain at SOCPAC for the duration of the planning effort through JAN 02. He subsequently deployed to OEF-P as an assistant detachment commander for ODA 134 advising the LRC. These planners allowed SOCPAC to have immediate advice and input on 1-1 capabilities to allow the SOCPAC planners to plan with the most current information. They also provided information back to 1-1 to allow training plans to be adjusted and forces to be tasked to best support the operation.
4. In OCT-NOV 01, the FOB 11 Cdr and ODA 134 participated as members of the CINCPAC directed, 1<sup>st</sup> SFG(A) led Terrorism Coordination Assistance Visit (TCAV). Members included subject matter experts from 1<sup>st</sup> SFG(A), SOCPAC J2, NSWTU-PAC, 353d SOG. The TCAV conducted meetings and discussions from the national level in Manila to the SOUTHCOM HQ in Zamboanga to the JTF Comet staff and tactical units on Basilan. This assessment provided the foundation for development of the plan for employment of Special Operations Forces in Basilan.
5. The TCAV results were briefed to the CINC in NOV and a CINCPAC plan was developed in December. Phase I of the plan was approved in JAN 02. In the

meantime SOCPAC deployed an intel fusion cell to SOUTHCOM HQ in Zamboanga in DEC 01. 1-1 personnel included one 18E communications sergeant and one 18D medical sergeant. These two personnel had trained the LRC, had deployed on the TCAV and would later advise the LRC as members of ODA 134.

6. While planning for OEF-P continued, the FOB conducted ODB and ODA training focused on preparing for the mission. Due to 9-11, force protection issues, as well as a loss of airlift support, Exercise White Tiger, scheduled for OCT-NOV in Korea was cancelled. Instead Exercise White Dragon was conducted on Okinawa with a focus on UW operations, combat skills, infiltration and exfiltration including use of E/160<sup>th</sup> MH-47Es and ASOT skills. This training was conducted in the jungle environments of the Northern Training Area on Okinawa.

7. Upon approval of Phase I, Ft Lewis personnel and operational detachments deployed to Torii Station, Okinawa to establish the ARSOF intermediate staging base (ISB) and to conduct mission preparation. The task organization for FOB 11 included AOB 150 and ODAs 143, 153, and 163; AOB 180 and ODAs 183, 184, and 186, and AOB 120 with ODAs 114, 125, and 125. ODA 112 was CHOPPED to the ARSOTF to advise and assist TF Zamboanga, and ODA 134 was OPCON to FOB 11 advising the LRC. FOB 11's organic SOT-A supported the ARSOTF MID and subsequently deployed with FOB 11 to Basilan. It was determined at this time that a personal security detachment was required for CJTF 510 so a split team of ODA 132 was deployed to execute this mission. The approved mission statement for FOB 11 was:

**On order, FOB 11 conducts Unconventional Warfare Operations in the Southern Philippines through, by, and with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to assist the Government of the Philippines in the destruction of terrorist organizations and the separation of the population from the terrorist organizations.**

8. During mission preparation at Torii Station, Ft Lewis ODBs and ODAs integrated with FOB 11 and training focused on combat skills, communications, and ROE training as well as intensive Public Affairs training. Due to delays in host nation approval (approval of a terms of reference (TOR)) the time at the ISB was extended from the planned 14 day preparation to nearly 4 weeks. Initially deployment of 1-1 ADVON personnel (including ODA 112 and ODA 134 as well as the FOB S4 occurred in January; however, they were not allowed to spend more than a few hours on Basilan to prepare for arrival of the main body. JTF and ARSOTF deployed during this January to establish the conditions for deployment of forces to Basilan.

9. On 16 FEB the initial deployment of FOB 11 personnel began. The

deployment was via military air from Kadena to Edwin Andrews Air Base (EAAB). The deployment was phased with key leaders from the FOB, AOBs, and ODAs with follow-on serials with the remainder of the force over a week. While at Zamboanga all personnel were required to attend "cultural sensitivity training." This was a requirement based on an agreement made during negotiations for the TOR. The training consisted of a seminar with various local officials, muslim clerics, and academics. Initial seminars were heavily observed by the press. The seminar was topical in nature and although some information was new, the SF soldiers deploying were already well prepared to deal with the culture on Basilan.

10. The initial deployment to Basilan occurred via MH-47 in daylight into LZ X-Ray at Camp Tabiawan, HQ for the AFP 103d Infantry Brigade (TG Thunder). Two days prior ODAs 134 and 112 deployed and surveyed routes to each AOB location and provided initial LZ security and convoy escorts for movement from X-Ray to their AOB locations. Unfortunately following the deployment of the last main body SF element an MH-47E crashed enroute back to its base at Mactan.

11. Elements began deploying to initial locations. FOB 11 (Alaska) was established at Camp Tabiawan. AOB 150 (Florida) deployed to Campo Uno approximately 9 KM south of Lamitan at the 18<sup>th</sup> Infantry Bn HQ. Co-located there was ODA 143 (Tampa) which was responsible for CAFGU training, ODA 163 (Orlando) which advised the 18<sup>th</sup> IB Cdr. ODA 153 (Miami) deployed to Tipotipo to advise the 32d IB. AOB 120 (Texas) deployed to Maluso to advise the 2d Phil Marine Bde (TG Tornado commanded by the infamous COL Miranda). ODA 114 (Austin) deployed to Geon to advise the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Bn Landing Team (MBLT) while ODA 125 (Dallas) deployed to Upper Mahayhay to advise the 5<sup>th</sup> MBLT and ODA 126 (Houston) deployed to Lower Mahayhay to advise the Marine Force Recon Battalion (FRBN). AOB 180 remained at Camp Tabiawan to advise the 103d Inf Bde (TG Thunder commanded by COL Aleo) while ODA 183 (Seattle) deployed to advise the 1<sup>st</sup> Scout Ranger Bn, ODA 184 (Spokane) deployed to advise the 10<sup>th</sup> IB, and ODA 186 (Tacoma) deployed to advise the 55<sup>th</sup> IB. ODA 134 (Kodiak) deployed to advise the LRC in Tabuk (Isabela). The TF Comet J3 was semi-permanently located at Camp Tabiawan and became the de facto FOB 11 counterpart.

12. Initial actions by all elements were to immediately establish rapport both with military counterparts and in the local communities. The reception by the citizens on Basilan was generally excellent. Although at first very apprehensive and wary, the local citizens quickly warmed to the presence of US forces. All elements began immediately coordinating and contracting for local support and services for meals, laundry, local area construction, and other goods and services necessary for long term operations. Some units were able to occupy previously constructed facilities but the majority of personnel had no billets or areas in which to establish operations and communications centers. This was quickly solved for most by negotiations with the local units who were very willing to accommodate US needs

temporarily until structures could be completed. Many soldiers slept in poncho hooches and on hammocks for about the first month of the deployment. Reception by AFP units was generally very good though there was some friction in the Marine areas at the higher levels. Because of the force cap there were some significant limitations on personnel. No CA or PSYOP personnel deployed to Basilan until mid-April. FOB and AOB HQ were limited to 11-14 personnel initially. A key to communications success was the deployment of the 112<sup>th</sup> Signal Bn detachment of 10 personnel who provided the DSN phone access and SIPRNET and NIPRNET connectivity. FOB 11 operated a "paperless" FOB using an organic TACLAN that linked together the FOB staff via secure LAN with the SIGCEN and all deployed elements using SATCOM PDC via PSC 5 radios. This provided an excellent means to communicate with all AOBs and when necessary ODAs at their base camps.

13. Immediately upon arrival all units began interaction with the local governments (from provincial to Baranguay). Many municipalities including the Basilan Provincial Council passed unanimous resolutions supporting the deployment of US troops under the auspices of Exercise Balikatan. Many SF personnel were able to speak at various democratic forums to answer questions about the US mission and intentions. These meetings were instrumental in putting the local government officials as well as the local citizens at ease and turned their opposition or apprehension to support.

14. Also upon arrival, all units began developing US facilities to reduce the burden on the local military infrastructure. Billet areas, latrine facilities, in some cases water pumps, power generation were some of the areas that US personnel worked hard to improve. In nearly all case local contractors and vendors were used in order to put money into the local economy. Vehicle support was provided by Dynacorp which contracted Mitsubishi vehicles from Thailand rather locally produced Ford Rangers. Vehicle support was not ready in time for deployment so ground transportation was initially lacking. Also the vehicles were not properly equipped with all terrain tires, winches, and tinted windows. ARSOF logistics personnel located the vendors locally to correct these deficiencies.

15. After the first week as US forces were becoming integrated with their AFP counterparts continuing ongoing facilities and base camp defense improvements the ARSOF Commander and DCO deployed to Basilan and briefed all ODA and AOB commanders at each AOB location. The teams were provided with a detailed assessment plan to conduct assessments of a representative sample of Baranguays (local villages). There are 263 Baranguays on Basilan and 30 were selected for assessment. 28 were completed in the time allowed. This provided the ODAs with a great deal of access to the local communities and provided them with a tremendous understanding of the unique problems at the grass roots level. The information gathered provided the ARSOF with a data base that was used for the development of follow-on Phase II Civic Action plans and led to the deployment of an Engineering Task Force to conduct infrastructure

improvement to support deployed ODAs, AFP units and military operations with the secondary benefit of improving local community infrastructure in the areas of roads, bridges, port facilities, and water sources.

16. The Barangay assessments were not completed because the AFP embarked on a series of operations known as Operation Liberty. These operations lasted through most of March and into April and were concentrated initially in the Maluso, northern Sumisip areas and then later in the Lantawan municipalities. Because the operation was in Phase I ODA advisors could only deploy to Battalion TAC CPs to provide advice and assistance to the Battalion Commander and his staff. No operations below battalion level were authorized and although the LRC deployed on a number of operations in the Maluso and Lantawan areas no US advisors were authorized to accompany them to advise and assist because it is only a company sized unit.

17. Operation Liberty consisted of a number of operations by Army and Marine units that were focused on reacting to HUMINT (usually local informants whose information was generally uncorroborated and not timely). Units would conduct operations generally known as “scouring.” Multiple companies would deploy into an operational area (using given as something like a 9 km square box using the actual map grid lines as boundaries). During these operations ODAs provided advice and assistance, communications support, medevac support, and medical assistance at casualty collection points at the Bn TAC CPs. In addition to providing advice and assistance these operations gave ODAs an opportunity to assess Bn level operations and in close coordination with the Bn Cdr design unit specific training programs to focus on developing the tactical capabilities necessary for successful operations against the ASG. Over the month and a half of operations ODAs and ODBs had the following impact on AFP operations: initial use of reconnaissance, implementation of control measures and use of boundaries based on identifiable terrain features rather than grid lines, lateral coordination and communication (though mostly through ODA to ODA coordination), rehearsals for tactical actions.

18. There were other significant operations conducted as well that were not considered part of Operation Liberty. These included the raid on the Mayor of Tuberon’s house who was allegedly harboring Abu Sabayyah in Lamitan, the Dassilon Island raid, the movement to contact against Amir Mingkong in Tipo – Tipo and most significantly the exfiltration of 19 ASG surrenderees (1 via air and 18 via sea). The raid on the Mayor’s house did not accomplish its specific objective of apprehending Abu Sabayyah (most likely because of mission compromise when the AFP obtained the warrant through the civil justice system). They did receive a number of weapons that are believed to be tied to a previous operation in which 21 AFP Marines were killed. However, the raid was characterized by good tactical planning and most importantly rehearsals which was a result of the influence of the ODA advisors. Also, there were friendly and 1 enemy casualty in the action who were treated by US personnel, and this

demonstrated to the opposition the positive influence US forces had on the AFP. Gov Akbar himself stated had it not been for US forces the AFP would not have treated the injured person (who had to be a relative of the Mayor). The Dassilon Island raid was conducted by the 2d Marine Brigade was a hastily planned and executed operation involving Philippine Marines and Philippine Navy personnel. Three possible ASG were killed when the AFP Navy destroyed the boat in which they were traveling after it apparently took evasive maneuvers in response to AFP Navy warnings and warning shots. The Marines did recover weapons on the island though this has proved to be controversial as they apparently belonged to CAFGU who are support by AFP SF (37<sup>th</sup> SF Riverine Company). As it turns out the Marines were reacting to HUMINT reports but Dassilon Island was in the 103d Bde (Army) area of responsibility. No US forces were involved in the Amir Mingkong operation as he is an MILF Bn Cdr and US forces are prohibited from supporting operations against MILF. However, Mingkong is a known ASG supporter. This operation was ill-conceived and resulted in a stand-off between the AFP and the defending forces leading to the AFP using unobserved artillery fire. The only known casualty from this was the informant/guide who led the AFP forces to the suspected location of Amir Mingkong. The final significant support to operations provided by SF was to the exfiltration of ASG surrenderees. An initial surrenderee who turned out to be a "test case" wanted to surrender to US personnel but agreed to surrender to AFP personnel in return for a guarantee that he would not be turned over to civilian authorities on Basilan. The night air exfiltration via MH-47E resulted in a coordinated operation taking the surrenderee from the LZ in Sumisip (Tumerhobong) to Zamboanga (EAAB) and then via MC-130 to Manila and turned over to AFP authorities there. The surrenderee was secured by US SF personnel through handover in Manila. Following this, 18 additional ASG members turned themselves in to the same Marine unit and were subsequently exfiltrated over the beach to AFP Navy craft for evacuation to Zamboanga. The stated reason the surrenderees wanted to be evacuated from Basilan was because they feared the Governor of Basilan would do them harm if they were jailed on the island.

19. All ODAs initiated aggressive training programs for their battalions while they awaited Phase II approval. The most important training conducted was the development of reconnaissance capabilities. This was initiated at all ODA locations and is one of the single most significant shortfalls in the AFP. The AFP relies too heavily on informants and agents as they search for the elusive tip that will bring them the location of hostages or ASG leadership. There has been a complete lack of emphasis on military reconnaissance and small unit patrolling. However, all ODAs are working to remedy this. All ODAs have conducted aggressive medical training to provide adequate self and buddy aid capabilities as well as developing medics capable of providing medical care in combat. During one of the medevac's conducted by US aircraft at night it was an AFP medic who stabilized the patient and got him back to the Bn TAC CP for treatment by the SF Medic prior to evacuation. The AFP medic had recently completed a training course run by the ODA and is credited with saving the AFP

soldier's life. The teams have also worked hard on the tactical decision making process with particular emphasis on intelligence preparation of the battlefield and predictive intelligence. The goal is always to fuse operations with good intelligence and develop plans to anticipate enemy actions rather than react to spotty, unreliable HUMINT. Another key aspect of training has been marksmanship combined with maintenance of weapons. The AFP provided training ammunition which turned out to be of generally poor quality. Also, the state of weapons repair is perhaps fair at best and in many cases there were weapons that were no longer serviceable. It was recommended that all weapons be replaced and that is currently being coordinated. One of the highlights of training was the LRC full mission profile (2d iteration) that involved a raid on a suspected and simulated ASG meeting in a remote area, live fire actions on the objective, casevac via HH-60 of three casualties, an air assault by a scout ranger via MH-47Es company to secure a PZ and an exfiltration of the sniper observers at daylight by PAF UH-1s. The entire operation was viewed real time in the JOC via P3 and UAV imagery.

20. All ODAs undertook numerous local small scale civic action projects. These took many forms. Examples included repairing a Mosque, repairing schools, repairing small bridges, establishing a water supply. ODAs worked with the main NGO on the island the Christian Children's Fund (CCF – head by Ms Lisa Del Puerto who is known as the "Mother of Basilan.") All the ODA's attended the school graduations in March with many SF soldiers serving as key note speakers. One of the most rewarding and beneficial CMO projects was participation in MEDCAPs. All ODAs, ODBs, and the FOB held daily sick calls for the AFP and their dependents. In addition many people from the local Baranguays showed up seeking help. Together with AFP doctors and medics US SF medics, physician's assistant, and doctors treated literally thousands of patients throughout the island. As an example, a 2 day MEDCAP held ICW NGOs, Philippine civilian doctors, and US SF and AFP medical personnel treated 1920 patients during the Isabela anniversary celebration. There were numerous heart wrenching medical problems ranging from severe skin infections, diabetes requiring limb amputations, cancer (various types), glaucoma, gunshot and knife wounds and such. The medical programs were vital in gaining the confidence of local people as well as enhancing force protection as the local residents would often provide information about potentially dangerous areas.

21. Engineers Arrival. The Naval Construction Task Group conducted an initial survey in March and confirmed much of what the ODAs were reporting as infrastructure problems. The engineers came away with a plan, briefed it and then returned with a 340 man task group and heavy equipment. SF and the engineers established an excellent working relationship and worked hard to support each other's efforts. The work that the Engineers will conduct will significantly improve military capabilities in terms of road mobility (roads and bridges) logistics support (Port Holland and Basilan Airfield), as well as day to day operations with improved water sources. Virtually all projects will benefit the

local civilian communities as well. An important aspect of supporting this operation is the employment of ARSOF CA personnel to interface with the local governments and the community. The CA personnel have been instrumental in getting local support.

21. The Unconventional Warfare skills found in Advanced Special Operations Techniques (ASOT) have been instrumental in the conduct of this mission. Every ODA and ODB has had to employ ASOT techniques. Through routine contact with a wide variety of local personnel a tremendous amount of information was received much of it that surely benefits higher level commands and other government agencies.


22. A number of Distinguished Persons visited various locations on Basilan. MG Lambert, CG, USASFC spent a day in March at FOB 11, AOB 120 and ODA 125 and 126; AOB 150 with ODAs 143 and 163, and AOB 180, with ODAs 183, 184, and 186. CINCPAC and the US Ambassador spent an afternoon in April at FOB 11 and ODA 125 and 126. CJSC and the US Ambassador (again) visited FOB 11 in April. In addition, the US Embassy Pol-Mil officer, the DOS CT officer, and the DEP Chief of JUSMAG spent 2 days at FOB 11 visiting local officials such as the Governor and mayors of Isabelala and Maluso and the vice Mayor of Lamitan. They also met the former governor of Basilan, Louis Alano.

23. The local governments and citizens of Basilan have embraced the US presence. They have passed unanimous resolutions initially supporting US forces presence and then later requesting extension of the presence past the original 6 months in the terms of reference. Many officials and citizens describe how peace and order has returned to most areas. Evidence can be seen in such events as the return of civilians to Upper and Lower Mahayhay (a usual ASG stronghold), the return of 1000 displaced civilians in the Sumisip area, and the conduct of celebrations such as the 28<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Basilan and the First Anniversary of Isabelala as an incorporated city. Numerous outdoor events supposedly could not have been conducted just months ago but now are conducted with confidence. School graduation ceremonies in Sumisip had been suspended for 5 years but were held again this March with AFP and US presence. These are indicators that the combined US and AFP presence is improving the lives of the citizens of Basilan.

24. Future Operations: Phase II must be executed as soon as possible. One reason is that rapport with the AFP is going to wane because there is a perception that the US forces are not willing to commit to advising and assisting to the lowest levels. Furthermore, until US SF conducts advisory operations at the lowest tactical levels, AFP operations will never be sufficiently improved to get the job done. The focus of future operations needs to be in 4 areas: denial of ASG sanctuary and operational support bases in remote areas, denial of ASG movement routes, denial of ASG support from the population and designated Barangays, and Civil-military operations to continue to effort to separate the

population from the ASG. Operations in these areas can lead to location and rescue of the hostages and destruction of the ASG. CMO can lay the foundation for socio-economic changes that will aid in preventing the rise of future terrorist, insurgency, or separatist organizations.

# **Overview of Special Forces Operations in Operation Enduring Philippines**



## Fuego Fuego Beach



## Basilan Airfield



## Existing Roads



# Port Holland Pier





## **FOB 11 Mission Statement**

**On order, FOB 11 conducts UW operations in the Southern Philippines through, by, and with the AFP to assist the GOP in the destruction of terrorist organizations and the separation of the population from the terrorist organizations.**

## FOB 11 Intent

**Purpose: Enhance AFP counter-terrorism abilities and assist in the destruction of terrorist activities within the SOUTHCOM AOR.**

## FOB 11 Intent

### **Key Tasks:**

- 1. Deploy forces to serve as combat advisors to train, advise, and assist designated AFP forces in the destruction of terrorist organizations.**
- 2. Provide Ground Truth on activities on Basilan**
- 3. Deploy combat advisors to the LRC to advise and assist in CT operations**

## **FOB 11 Intent**

### **Key Tasks (continued):**

- 4. Deploy required ODAs to initiate training of two *additional* AFP LRCs.**
- 5. Participate with AFP in integration of Civil Military Operations and assist in separating the RP population from terrorist organizations.**

## **FOB 11 Intent**

**Endstate: The capability of designated AFP SOUTHCOM units to combat terrorism is enhanced. Training of follow-on AFP Light Reaction Companies (LRC) initiated. Training area established to train designated AFP forces. The ability of the AFP to prevent future terrorist activities is improved.**

# **Significant Activities**

## ***Operations***

- **Operation Liberty Series**
- **MEDEVACs**
- **Secure Communications**
- **ASG Surrender**
- **Ground Truth to Battalion Level**

# **Significant Activities**

## ***Training***

- **Tailored for each battalion's unique situation**
- **Tactical Decision Making/Planning**
- **Marksmanship**
- **Reconnaissance**
- **IPB/Predictive Intelligence/NAIs**
- **Medical (combat lifesaver)**
- **Full Mission Profile LFXs**


# Significant Activities

## *Assessments*

- Ground truth to Battalion Level
- Assessments
  - Civil – Baranguays
  - Military – AFP strengths/challenges
  - Assessment updates







## **Significant Activities** *Civil Military Operations*

- **Civil Military Operations**
  - Support to Gentle Wind/Operation Blessing
  - Local community civic events
  - Peace and Order Council
  - Graduation Speakers
  - Schools
  - English Classes
  - Integration of ODAs into Brgy Council meetings
  - Sporting Events
- **Engineer Task Force Integration**



## **Significant Activities**

### *Medical*

- **Daily Camp Sick Call**
  - Skin disorders
  - Cancer
  - Diabetes
  - Hypertension
- **MEDCAPs**
  - Dental
  - Circumcisions
  - See hundreds of patients each MEDCAP





## Assessments

- **Baranguay Assessments**
  - Assessed Areas Representing over 60,000 (sample) of Basilan's 350,000 Residents
  - Used to develop Phase II modules to address identified socio-economic trends and military needs
- **AFP Assessment**
  - Initial on the ground assessments with Combat Advisors, conducted during AFP operations, confirmed results of the Terrorism Coordination Assistance Visit
  - Used to develop long-term military training strategy to correct identified shortcomings
- **Combination of Baranguay and AFP assessments used to identify required fixes**

# How We Assisted

- **Trained, Advised and Assisted**
  - Military Decision Making Process
  - Combined Joint Planning and Execution
  - Intel/Ops Fusion
  - Current Operations
  - Future Operations
  - Emerging Operations
  - Future Plans
- **Enhancing the Fundamentals**
  - Decentralized training on what units need
    - » Military Decision Making Process
    - » Combined Joint Planning and Execution
    - » Small Unit Tactics
    - » Map Reading and Land Navigation
    - » Basic Riflemanship
    - » Combat Lifesaver

# The Long-Term Focus

- **Population engagement**
  - Socio-economic programs that improve living conditions for all Basilan populace
  - Correct disparity (actual and perceived) of living conditions and basic necessities of life between Christians and Muslims on Basilan
- **Enhance a credible force**
  - Basilan populace believes
    - » Credible RP Government
    - » AFP credibility, then enhance capability
- **Not an “equipment-centric” solution**
  - Joint Doctrine/Operation
  - Intel/Ops Fusion and distribution
  - USSF’s role: Continue to train, advise, and assist

# Enhancing the Fundamentals

Troop Leading

Land Navigation



Small Unit Tactics

Medical



## Marksmanship

- AFP ammunition
- On-going based on a four-week Program of Instruction
- Weapons Zero / Familiarization
- Combat Marksmanship
- Maneuver Live Fire



# Training Accomplishments

- **Training Conducted without Ammunition**
- **C2 (Military Decision Making Process, Ops and Intel Fusion)**
  - 86 training sessions
  - **Focus: Train, Advise and Assist the AFP in Prep for Operations**
    - » Military Decision Making Process
    - » Ops/Intel Fusion
    - » C2
- **Small Unit Tactics**
  - 138 training sessions
  - **Focus of Training**
    - » Reconnaissance Techniques
    - » Search and Attack
    - » Movement to Contact
    - » Patrolling





# Training Accomplishments (Cont'd)

- **Medical**
  - 52 training sessions
  - **Focus of Training**
    - » **Combat Lifesaver**
    - » **CASEVAC**
      - 4 AFP Real-World CASEVAC Assists
- **Training Conducted with AFP Ammunition**
  - Marksmanship**
    - 60 training sessions
    - **Focus of Training**
      - » **Zeroing and Familiarization**
      - » **Qualification**
      - » **Maneuver Live Fire**
      - » **Sniper**





## Operational Advice and Assistance

- **JTF Comet**
  - **Advised and Assisted in monitoring Operation Liberty I - IV**
    - » Presented observations during the conduct of Operation Liberty I
      - Execution was not Joint
      - C2, JTF Comet had no direct input for the conduct of operations
      - No contingency planning (what-ifs)
    - » Plans were adjusted based on our advice
- **Task Group and Battalion Level Operations**
  - 10 separate Combat Advisor and Assist Missions
  - 132 assist and advisory sessions
  - Focus on advising and assisting the AFP in the execution of Operations at the JTF, Task Groups and Battalion levels

# AFP New Capabilities

- **Joint Mission Planning & Execution**
- **Intel and Ops Fusion**
- **Basic Recon Skills & Marksmanship TNG**
- **Medical Training**
- **NCO Leader Skills**
- **Basic Land Navigation & Map Reading**
- **Small Unit Tactics**

# Keys to Success

- **Training/Operational focus – AFP must be influenced to accomplish these key tasks**
  - ★ **Deny ASG sanctuaries**
  - ★ **Deny ASG movement routes**
  - ★ **Deny ASG support from Barangays**
  - ★ **Conduct CMO to separate popular support from ASG**
- **Key to successful AFP operations**
  - **Aggressive long term patrolling and military reconnaissance to accomplish the above tasks**

