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Seventy-first year****Comprehensive review of the whole question of
peacekeeping operations in all their aspects****Identical letters dated 22 September 2016 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the
President of the Security Council**

The African Union is the key regional partner of the United Nations in confronting challenges to international peace and security. More than half of the United Nations peacekeeping missions currently deployed are in Africa. Those missions alone account for 83 per cent of all uniformed personnel deployed by the United Nations and 86 per cent of the financial resources approved for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The United Nations also provides considerable support to the African Union Mission in Somalia, through the United Nations Support Office in Somalia. In fact, the United Nations has provided support to most of the operations mandated or authorized by the African Union since its establishment in 2002. Four of those missions subsequently transitioned to United Nations peacekeeping missions.

African Union missions have long suffered from a lack of predictable and sustainable support, including in the area of financing. This was identified as a key challenge in recent transitions, prompting my proposal to undertake, jointly with the African Union, a review and assessment of available mechanisms to finance and support African Union peace operations mandated by the Security Council. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union welcomed that proposal in its communiqué of 26 September 2015. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly indicated, through the statement by the President of the Security Council of 25 November 2015 ([S/PRST/2015/22](#)) and General Assembly resolution [70/268](#) of 14 June 2016, that they looked forward to receiving the results of the review.

The review examined external support provided to the 12 peace support operations mandated or authorized by the African Union to date. It also examined related considerations of doctrine, capability, safety and security, human rights and accountability. I would be grateful if the report could be brought to the attention of Member States in order to inform decision-making on issues related to support to



African Union peace support operations and the broader partnership between the two organizations in the area of peace and security. The report has also been brought to the attention of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission.

(Signed) **BAN** Ki-moon

Report of the joint African Union-United Nations review of available mechanisms to finance and support African Union peace support operations authorized by the United Nations Security Council

I. Introduction

1. The African Union, the United Nations and the wider international community have long recognized that partnerships remain the most effective way to respond to the multiple threats to peace and security in Africa. Over the past decade, this resulted in a growing number of mechanisms reinforcing collaboration between the two organizations and building on their respective comparative advantages in the area of peace and security.¹ In 2014, the United Nations Security Council stressed the importance of “further strengthening cooperation and developing effective partnership with the African Union Peace and Security Council consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, to address common collective security challenges in Africa”.² Similarly, the African Union Peace and Security Council has stated that “the African Union and United Nations are mutually dependent and have a shared strategic interest in establishing a close working partnership”.³

2. The changing character of armed conflict on the continent has increasingly led the African Union and the United Nations to adapt their peace operations to meet new and evolving challenges and threats. The principal drivers of Africa’s recent armed conflicts include contested government transitions, violent extremism and inter-State contestation. The resulting conflicts have often been fought between factionalized parties and characterized by large-scale violence against civilian populations, including grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law; a rise in the number of actors using asymmetric tactics, including targeting peacekeepers; the growing influence of transnational organized criminal activity; and the complex interrelationships between some State-based wars and various non-State armed conflicts.

3. Since 2003, as part of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the African Union has led or authorized a dozen peace support operations in response to some of those armed conflicts. While those operations showed the African Union’s political willingness to tackle major threats to peace and security, they also suffered from a number of recurrent capacity gaps and challenges, arising partly from the Union’s limited finances. The United Nations, together with other external partners, has provided support to most African Union peace support operations. That support, however, has always been ad hoc and, in the case of support provided by the United Nations, authorized on a case-by-case basis by the United Nations Security Council. The African Union has therefore repeatedly called for flexible, predictable and sustainable funding for peace support operations, including through the utilization of both African Union and United Nations assessed contributions. Following a high-level open debate on the relationship between the United Nations and regional

¹ [S/PRST/2010/21](#).

² [S/PRST/2014/27](#), fourth paragraph.

³ Common African Position on the United Nations Review of Peace Operations (PSC/PR/2(DII)).

organizations, the Security Council, in its resolution [1809 \(2008\)](#), recognized the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organizations when they undertook peacekeeping under a United Nations mandate. In subsequent years, the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed that view numerous times.

4. The joint review's principal purpose is to assess the available mechanisms to finance and support peace support operations mandated or authorized by the African Union to facilitate a common understanding of how the African Union-United Nations partnership on peace operations has evolved along these dimensions and identify and build on best practices. The Secretary-General originally proposed the joint review in January 2015, following a lessons learned study of the transitions in the Central African Republic and Mali (see [S/2015/3](#)). The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, in its report ([A/70/95-S/2015/446](#)), supported that proposal, noting that the joint exercise was an opportunity to advance the goal of improving the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union peace operations. The Secretary-General indicated that he intended to proceed with the review in his report on the future of United Nations peace operations ([A/70/357-S/2015/682](#)), and this was subsequently endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in September 2015,⁴ the United Nations Security Council in November 2015⁵ and the United Nations General Assembly in June 2016.⁶

5. The present report begins with an overview of the African Union-United Nations partnership on peace support operations. It then provides a survey and assessment of past and present support provided to African Union peace support operations. It subsequently offers an analysis of doctrinal considerations, the African Union's ongoing efforts to develop its capabilities, the safety and security of peacekeepers, and human rights and accountability issues relevant to discussions on support.

II. Evolution of the African Union-United Nations partnership on peace support operations

6. At its heart, the African Union-United Nations partnership on peace support operations is a political relationship that reflects the spirit of Chapter VIII of the Charter. It is founded on the shared desire of both organizations to maintain international peace and security in Africa by developing timely solutions to crises. When the Security Council authorizes the African Union's peace support operations to help to maintain international peace and security on its behalf, it sends a powerful signal that the two organizations are working collaboratively to achieve shared objectives. The partnership is essential, evolving, innovative and increasingly successful.

⁴ PSC/AHG/COMM/2(DXLVII).

⁵ [S/PRST/2015/22](#).

⁶ General Assembly resolution [70/268](#).

An essential partnership

7. The African Union-United Nations partnership on peace support operations is an essential part of meeting some of the most serious threats facing Africa's States and its peoples, as neither organization alone can address the challenges posed by Africa's multiple armed conflicts and political crises. Peacekeepers have been in extremely high demand in Africa, with both the United Nations and the African Union consistently deploying record numbers since mid-2007. Today, the United Nations deploys more than 80 per cent of its peacekeepers to missions in Africa and, over the past decade, afforded African issues more time in Security Council discussions than any other region of the world. At the same time, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union has authorized more than 80,000 uniformed and civilian personnel in peace support operations. As at July 2016, African States represented 20 of the top 30 contributors of uniformed personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations. It has been common for the African Union and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms to act as first responders before transitioning to United Nations peacekeeping operations, as has occurred in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone.

An evolving partnership

8. The African Union-United Nations partnership on peace support operations continues to evolve. In the early 1990s the partnership involved attempts to ensure coordination and cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, the predecessor to the African Union, "should the latter decide to launch a peacekeeping operation".⁷ With the establishment of the new African Union, the partnership deepened, and in 2006 the United Nations embarked on its largest and most sustained capacity-building programme for a regional organization, the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme, which included enhancing the African Union's ability to conduct peace support operations. In 2010, the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) was established to deepen the level of practical cooperation between the two organizations. Today, the African Union and the United Nations work together in a strategic partnership based on regular joint endeavours at headquarters and in the field to improve the effectiveness of the delivery of peace support operations on the continent.

An innovative partnership

9. The African Union-United Nations partnership on peace support operations has been confronted with a range of unprecedented challenges, particularly the crises in Somalia and the Sudan, leading the two organizations to pioneer new and innovative mechanisms for cooperation. In January 2007, the Security Council authorized the deployment of support packages funded through assessed contributions, to augment the capabilities of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) in preparation for its transition to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In the same year, the United Nations established the African Union Peacekeeping Support Team in Addis Ababa, at the request of the then Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Alpha Konare, to support the

⁷ General Assembly resolution [47/148](#), para. 5.

African Union in building its capacity for peacekeeping operations.⁸ UNOAU was established in 2010 through the merger of the Team with the United Nations Liaison Office and the United Nations planning team for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).⁹ In 2009, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) to provide a logistical support package to AMISOM. That support was expanded in 2012 to include reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment, the only time to date that funding has been provided directly to meet costs in a non-hybrid African Union mission.

10. The difficulties involved in sustaining AMISOM generated a series of calls at the United Nations to enhance the African Union's capacity to conduct peace support operations.¹⁰ In 2008, the United Nations established a panel, chaired by the former Prime Minister of Italy, Romano Prodi, to consider the modalities of how to support African Union peace operations.¹¹ Among other things, the panel, in its report (A/63/666-S/2008/813), recommended "the use of United Nations-assessed funding to support United Nations-authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period of no longer than six months" and that "to qualify for such support ... the following two conditions should be met: (a) a case-by-case approval by the Security Council and General Assembly; and (b) an agreement between the African Union and the United Nations that the mission would transition to United Nations management within six months" (ibid., para. 11). Neither the United Nations Security Council nor the General Assembly took concrete action on the recommendations in the report.

11. In the light of this, in January 2012, the African Union reiterated its call to the United Nations to address in a systematic manner the issue of the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of the funding of African Union peace support operations undertaken with the consent of the Security Council, through the use of United Nations assessed contributions.¹² The African Union has concomitantly explored how to increase its own sources of finance for the organization, including its peace support operations. In this respect, the Summit of the African Union decided in 2015 to contribute 25 per cent of the cost of its peace and security efforts, including African Union-led peace support operations, by 2020.¹³ In January 2016, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission appointed a High Representative for the Peace Fund, and on the basis of his report, the African Union Assembly took a historic decision in July 2016 to institute a levy of 0.2 per cent on eligible imports into the African continent in order to finance the Union, including its peace and security activities, to enter into effect from 2017.

An increasingly effective partnership

12. Despite the many challenges, the African Union-United Nations partnership has already made significant progress in several areas. In a little over a decade, strong cooperation between the two organizations on planning and supporting peace

⁸ General Assembly resolution [60/268](#).

⁹ General Assembly resolution [64/288](#).

¹⁰ [S/PRST/2007/7](#) and General Assembly resolution [61/296](#).

¹¹ Security Council resolution [1809 \(2008\)](#).

¹² PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCVII), para. 18.

¹³ Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXIV) and Assembly/AU/Dec.577 (XXV).

operations has become the norm, although there is still considerable need for further improvement. Most fundamentally, however, the partnership has strengthened the collective security system on which the Charter of the United Nations is based. The developing cooperative mechanisms, the capacity-building, and increasingly joint forms of analysis have facilitated a unity of effort across the African Union and United Nations, maximizing their comparative advantages, and in so doing increasing the likelihood that aligned global and regional responses to crises will also become the norm.

13. Stronger partnerships between regional organizations and the United Nations improve the prospects for quick, coherent and more decisive collective action to prevent and address conflicts. There is already recognition that joint early analysis, information sharing and common understanding between the African Union and the United Nations have led to joint early actions, which have averted conflicts or prevented them from escalating, including in Burkina Faso, the Comoros and Madagascar. Where preventive efforts failed, the two organizations have effectively worked together to deploy peace support operations, including in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and Darfur. There have also been discussions on how the two organizations could cooperate on South Sudan. Although their distinct yet complementary doctrines towards peace operations raise challenges of coherence, coordination and interoperability, they also offer opportunities based on each organization's comparative advantages.

III. Survey of support to African peace support operations

A. Typology of African peace support operations

14. African Union peace support operations can broadly be categorized as African Union-mandated operations and African Union-authorized operations (see table 1). For the former, the African Union is responsible for resource mobilization, accountability, oversight and management. The exception is UNAMID, a joint United Nations-African Union mission that is governed on the basis of political cooperation between both organizations but funded through United Nations assessed contributions and managed under United Nations administrative regulations and rules. For the latter, troop- and police-contributing countries bear the primary responsibility for meeting operational requirements.

Table 1
Peace support operations authorized or mandated by the African Union

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Years active</i>
African Union-mandated missions		
African Union Mission in Burundi	Burundi	2003-2004
African Union Mission in the Sudan	Sudan	2004-2007
African Union Observer Mission in the Comoros	Comoros	2004

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Years active</i>
African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros	Comoros	2006
African Union Mission in Somalia	Somalia	2007-present
African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros	Comoros	2007-2008
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Sudan	2008-present
African-led International Support Mission in Mali	Mali	2012-2013
African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic	Central African Republic	2013-2014
African Union-authorized missions		
Operation Democracy in the Comoros	Comoros	2008
Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army	Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Uganda	2011-present
Multinational Joint Task Force	Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria	2015-present

15. African Union peace support operations vary considerably, based on the scope of their mandates and the permissiveness of the security environments in which they are deployed. The subsequent categories are important for disaggregating the benefits and challenges associated with external support in each case. Five of the missions were mandated to carry out enforcement tasks that went well beyond those traditionally undertaken by United Nations peacekeeping operations and were deployed in much less permissive security environments than most United Nations missions.

Table 2
Mandates and operating context of peace support operations

		Scope of mandate	
		Peacekeeping tasks	Counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency/offensive combat operations
Permissiveness of operating environment	High threat ^a	MISCA	<p>AMISOM Conduct offensive operations against Al-Shabaab, restoration of State authority, ensure security of electoral process, secure key supply routes</p> <p>AFISMA Build capacity of Malian defence and security forces, restoration of State authority and reducing threat from terrorist organizations, stabilization, human rights, protection of civilians, create conditions for humanitarian assistance</p> <p>MNJTF Neutralize the Boko Haram terrorist group</p>
	Low/medium threat	<p>AMIB</p> <p>AMIS</p> <p>MIOC</p> <p>AMISEC</p> <p>MAES</p> <p>UNAMID</p>	<p>RCI-LRA/AU-RTF Build capacity of affected countries, stabilize affected areas, create conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, capturing/neutralizing LRA combatants</p> <p>Operation Democracy Restore the authority of the Comoros Government</p>

Abbreviations: AU-RTF, African Union Regional Task Force; AFISMA, African-led International Support Mission in Mali; AMIB, African Union Mission in Burundi; AMIS, African Union Mission in the Sudan; AMISEC, African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros; AMISOM, African Union Mission in Somalia; LRA, Lord’s Resistance Army; MAES, African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros; MIOC, African Union Observer Mission in the Comoros; MISCA, African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic; MNJTF, Multinational Joint Task Force; RCI-LRA, Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army; UNAMID, African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

^a A high-threat environment corresponds to situations with active fighting, high risk from mines/improvised explosive devices/unexploded ordnance, targeted attack against international forces, etc.

B. Recurrent capability gaps

16. Although the African Union has been willing to undertake more challenging tasks and deploy in higher-risk environments compared with most United Nations peacekeeping operations, the effectiveness of its peace support operations has been undermined by several recurrent capability gaps. They include limited staffing, deficiencies in equipment, inadequate logistics and financial constraints. The African Union's limited ability to finance its own operations has been a persistent challenge. This has led to reliance on external sources of finance that lack predictability and often come with caveats on how the funds can be spent. This, in turn, reduces the African Union's flexibility. As a result, the timing of transitions has sometimes been dictated by resource and capability gaps in addition to political imperatives, instead of progress in implementing mission mandates.

17. The African Union Commission's Peace Support Operations Division, which is responsible for the planning, deployment, management and liquidation of peace support operations, currently has only 79 of the 207 staff proposed by a United Nations study team in 2008, of which only 1 is on a regular contract. The rest are a combination of staff on short-term contracts and seconded officers. Only two are police and seven are civilian staff; the remainder are military staff. Limited headquarters capacity reduces the African Union's ability to provide and exercise strategic direction over its missions. The regional planning elements that are expected to support the African Union, especially during mission start-ups, are likewise understaffed. There were also persistent challenges in identifying, recruiting and deploying civilians in African missions, although those are being addressed through recent changes in the recruitment process.

18. One of the most profound challenges faced by African Union peace support operations remains the capacity gaps of some troop- and police-contributing countries. The African Union has been more willing than the United Nations to deploy forces to situations of ongoing high-intensity conflict, including in non-permissive environments. However, their military and police contingents sometimes do not deploy with the requisite training or the major equipment and self-sustainment capabilities expected and required to deliver on their mandates.

19. The African Union's limited access to strategic lift capabilities has also hampered its ability to deploy peacekeepers in a timely manner. Although some Member States are able to transport their troops into the theatre of operation, the African Union has usually relied on external partners to fill the gap. In many cases, missions also lack required mission-level assets, such as information and communications systems or key enablers such as engineering, aviation, medical and intelligence capabilities required for the type of high-tempo operations that the African Union has increasingly undertaken. Without those, African missions lack sufficient coordination, mobility and responsiveness to deliver on their mandates. Sometimes, this has undermined the credibility of missions.

20. Particularly in the case of AMISOM, offensive operations have given rise to challenges of command and control. In part, this stems from limited capacity in multinational force headquarters, but such challenges do not arise from capability gaps alone. Lack of unified command and control undermines the ability of force commanders to utilize the forces at their disposal efficiently, since they do not have

the flexibility to employ the forces in a manner that allows for quick, decisive actions that exploit the enemy's vulnerabilities and prevent the escalation of crises, provide deterrence and consolidate gains. Weak command and control also limits the ability of force commanders to effectively ensure discipline and accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. This is of particular concern, as offensive operations involve greater risk of violations of international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law.

21. The African Union has learned valuable lessons from its peace support operations and has been developing its doctrines, policies and processes to improve its capabilities in this area. To improve the efficiency of its peace support operations and in order to ensure smooth transitions to United Nations peacekeeping missions when they occur, the African Union has developed various policies and standard operating procedures for the civilian, police and military components of its missions that are closely aligned with those of the United Nations. They are intended to promote standardization, interoperability, professionalism and accountability at the African Union Commission, as well as in its field missions. In addition, significant efforts are under way to strengthen the administrative, procurement and financial practices of the African Union and to align them with global best practices.

22. In order to enable peace support operations to function more effectively, adjustments have been made to allow for faster recruitment processes to ensure that the required personnel are recruited and deployed into missions in a timely manner. In addition, the new African Standby Capacity roster (created in 2015) offers the opportunity to identify, pre-screen and prepare civilians for deployment to missions in a timely manner. With regard to the police component, the African Union has embarked on a new process of pre-certifying formed police units to ensure that they possess the requisite capabilities. There has also been an increase in the financial contributions made by African Union member States to peace and security, which have enabled them to pay for 53 per cent of the salaries of the staff of the Peace and Security Department.

C. Survey of support to peace support operations

African Union Mission in Burundi

23. The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the first African Union peace support operation, was launched in April 2003 and was deployed for just under a year before it was replaced by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) on 1 June 2004. South Africa, the lead troop-contributing country, was able to sustain its own deployment and shoulder the majority of the support requirements for AMIB, although the other troop-contributing countries benefited from assistance from outside partners to deploy. The European Union provided funding to cover the operational costs of troops and provide allowances for military observers, while the World Bank provided assistance to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts. Non-African Union partner countries also provided financial support. The United Nations provided limited support to AMIB in the form of experts deployed to assist in the development of concepts of operations and assist in the areas of public information, headquarters administration and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

African Union Mission in the Sudan

24. The African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) was launched in May 2004 to monitor the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in Darfur. However, its focus soon shifted to protecting civilians, supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Many shortfalls became evident early in the deployment of the mission, requiring considerable external assistance to overcome them. To address mission-level logistics shortfalls, partner countries engaged third-party logistics providers to build and maintain camps, maintain AMIS vehicles and communications equipment, supply water and rations, provide laundry services and rent fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The European Union used its African Peace Facility to fund allowances for military observers, stipends for troops, salaries for civilian staff and rations and fuel. The United Nations supported AMIS through an assistance cell established in Addis Ababa, which facilitated the deployment of technical experts in the areas of planning, logistics, communications and transport. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) supported AMIS in the development of military and police concepts of operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also facilitated the training of 184 African Union officers in strategic and operational-level planning and supported the establishment of the AMIS Joint Operations Centre.

25. Significant assistance was also required to support the deployment of AMIS contingents, many of which lacked the necessary equipment or self-sustainment. Partner countries donated vehicles, armoured personnel carriers and communications equipment to meet critical equipment shortfalls, and NATO, in its first deployment in Africa, provided strategic airlift, transporting approximately 31,500 troops between June 2005 and December 2007.

26. By 2006, it was clear that AMIS was struggling to implement its mandate and to protect civilians in Darfur owing to capacity constraints. On 15 May, shortly after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the African Union Peace and Security Council decided that concrete steps needed to be taken to transition AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Although the Government of the Sudan accepted the need to enhance the capabilities on the ground, it did not accept the deployment of a large multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping mission. Ultimately, a compromise was reached in late 2006 whereby the United Nations would sequentially deploy a “light support package” and a “heavy support package” to support AMIS prior to the deployment of a follow-on mission, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The costs of the light and heavy packages were covered through the UNMIS budget for the 2006/07 financial period.

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

27. UNAMID, the first ever and only hybrid African Union-United Nations operation, was established on 31 July 2007 and took over from AMIS on 1 January 2008. The United Nations took the leading operational role in its day-to-day management. During the start-up of UNAMID, donors provided some support for its initial deployment, mainly through the provision of equipment and training of

former AMIS contingents, coordinated through the Friends of UNAMID mechanism.

28. The mission's average annual requirements, which are met through United Nations assessed contributions, amount to approximately \$1.4 billion. The mandate of UNAMID is derived from both the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council, and selection of the senior mission leadership is done jointly by the Commission and the Secretariat, in compliance with the guidance that the mission "should have a predominantly African character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries".¹⁴ The mandate of UNAMID has not changed significantly since the mission's inception owing in part to the consultative nature of the Hybrid Operation.

29. The Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism, based in Addis Ababa, was created to assist with day-to-day working-level coordination with the African Union, and is now co-located with the Peace and Security Department in support of the joint operational and strategic oversight of UNAMID. In addition, the Tripartite Mechanism was established at the onset of UNAMID to facilitate its deployment, focused mainly on operational and support issues, including access restrictions, issuance of visas, and customs clearance between the United Nations, the African Union and the Government of the Sudan. The Mechanism has met for technical-level meetings in Khartoum and strategic-level meetings attended by senior officials in Khartoum, Addis Ababa and New York. Since January 2016, the agenda of the Tripartite Mechanism has also included the mission's exit strategy.

African Union Mission in Somalia

30. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union mandated the deployment of AMISOM on 19 January 2007. Its mandate was subsequently endorsed by the United Nations Security Council in its resolution [1744 \(2007\)](#). A small United Nations planning team was established in Addis Ababa, initially with 10 planners, to support the African Union Commission. Under its most recent mandate, AMISOM is responsible for a number of combat-related tasks including conducting offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and securing key supply routes.

31. AMISOM has benefited from an array of support provided by the United Nations, ranging from technical assistance to a logistical support package. Since 2013, the United Nations Security Council has requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical, management and expert advice to the African Union in the planning and deployment of AMISOM through UNOAU, including on the implementation of the AMISOM strategic concept and the AMISOM concept of operations. UNSOA was established in 2009 to deliver a logistical support package to AMISOM. UNSOA support was originally limited to the provision of equipment and services such as accommodation, rations, water, fuel, armoured vehicles, helicopters, vehicle maintenance, communications, some enhancement of key logistics facilities, medical treatment and evacuation services. As the mandate of AMISOM expanded, so did the support provided through UNSOA. Starting in 2010, it also provided public information assistance and, in 2011, catering equipment and training, sanitation and cleaning materials, furniture and stationery and counter-

¹⁴ Security Council resolution [1769 \(2007\)](#), seventh preambular paragraph.

improvised explosive device and explosive ordnance disposal activities. Initially, UNSOA support specifically excluded the provision of direct payments to the African Union or AMISOM troop-contributing countries, but in 2012, UNSOA support was expanded to include reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment, with some caveats.¹⁵ Following a strategic review in 2015, UNSOA was replaced by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and its support to AMISOM expanded to include maintenance of equipment and provision of self-sustainment reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries. In addition, the United Nations has provided human rights training and technical assistance to AMISOM and its contingents from the earliest days of the mission.

32. As the responsibilities of the United Nations in support of AMISOM increased, so did the financial requirements. Partners provided considerable amounts of assistance to AMISOM, either bilaterally or through the United Nations trust fund established pursuant to resolution [1863 \(2009\)](#). The European Union provided substantial financial support through its African Peace Facility, primarily to pay for troop and police allowances, salaries for civilian staff and the operational costs of AMISOM offices in Nairobi and Mogadishu. Numerous donors provided funds to the AMISOM trust fund, although in the early days of the mission most of the funds were earmarked for non-lethal assistance. Before the deployment of UNSOA, logistical support was provided by a third-party provider contracted by a partner country. To meet equipment gaps in AMISOM contingents, a number of partner countries have donated or lent equipment, whether to AMISOM or to individual troop-contributing countries. Partners also provided predeployment training to some AMISOM contingents, and one, the United States of America, implemented a support programme that provided counter-terrorism training and personal protective equipment to enhance the ability of AMISOM troops to fight Al-Shabaab. In addition, advisers have been provided by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States to AMISOM in such areas as intelligence, communications and infrastructure since 2010 and 2011, respectively.

33. A senior leadership coordination forum has been established to ensure that senior leaders in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and AMISOM agree on common strategic priorities, which can be translated into coordinated operational-level planning, supported by UNSOS. This is intended to allow the prioritization of the support provided by UNSOS to AMISOM and UNSOM, which will be measured against quantifiable performance indicators, as well as wider coordination between AMISOM and UNSOM in their respective activities.

African-led International Support Mission in Mali

34. When the African Union deployed the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in Mali in 2013, it requested a logistical support package along the lines of UNSOA, a request that was rejected by the Security Council. The Council, however, in its resolution [2085 \(2012\)](#), requested the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund to support AFISMA. That resolution also established the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) to provide, inter alia,

¹⁵ Security Council resolution [2036 \(2012\)](#).

“support to the planning, deployment and operations of AFISMA”. A small planning element was deployed as part of UNOM. UNOAU and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) provided planning support to AFISMA within the framework of the Mali Integrated Task Force. OHCHR also provided technical assistance and training. Monies from the trust fund were intended to be utilized to provide critical equipment to AFISMA troops and police, although long procurement lead times resulted in the arrival of most of the equipment after AFISMA had already transitioned to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The trust fund was also used to implement a humanitarian mine action project in coordination with AFISMA.

35. During the deployment of AFISMA, several countries provided bilateral assistance, either to AFISMA or to its troop-contributing countries. Several partners provided planning officers to AFISMA headquarters and liaison officers to AFISMA units. Support was also provided for the development of the harmonized joint concept of operations. Partner countries helped to address critical gaps in strategic lift, equipment and self-sustainment capabilities among AFISMA troop-contributing countries. The French Operation Serval (January 2013-July 2014) was critical not only in supporting AFISMA contingents in northern Mali but also in providing a security umbrella that facilitated the delivery of international assistance. In general, bilateral partners were more interested and able to provide “one-off” assistance, as opposed to taking on ongoing support commitments.

36. AFISMA benefited from considerable external financial assistance. The European Union used its African Peace Facility to provide funds for troop allowances and to strengthen the capacity of the Economic Community of West African States. Notably, some African countries pledged \$50 million to support both AFISMA and the Malian national security forces, although an estimated \$10 million was received by the time AFISMA transitioned into MINUSMA in July 2013. Partners from outside Africa also provided funds to the AFISMA trust fund.

African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic

37. The African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) was established in October 2013 and had similar requirements as AFISMA. The United Nations, through UNOAU, provided technical expertise for the pre-planning assessment missions to the Central African Republic and the strategic-level planning for MISCA. The United Nations also participated in African Union-led assessment missions starting in April 2013 and joint transition planning missions from February 2014. Following the presentation to the Security Council of detailed options for international support to MISCA on 15 November 2013, the United Nations deployed a support team to provide technical assistance to the Mission. After the Council authorized the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in April 2014, the support team served as the nucleus of the transition team. Much of the United Nations support was delivered through the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, which was already on the ground and was subsumed into MINUSCA. The United Nations also helped to strengthen the capacity of MISCA to effectively fulfil its protection of civilians

mandate by helping to set up information-sharing mechanisms, shaping the MISCA operational response to identified protection issues and occasionally undertaking joint protection actions.

38. A trust fund was established in December 2013, and the funds received were used primarily for communications and information technology requirements, although some were also used to procure catering and kitchen equipment. Much of the equipment came from the United Nations strategic deployment stocks in the United Nations Global Service Centre in Brindisi, Italy, although some of the equipment did not arrive until after MINUSCA had deployed.

39. Partners deployed military and civilian experts to support MISCA, primarily in the areas of command and control, mission administration and information and communications technology. The MISCA strategic concept was developed jointly by the African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States with support from experts provided by other partners. The European Union provided funds for troop and police allowances, salaries for civilian personnel and operational costs such as facilities and infrastructure, transport and medical services through its African Peace Facility. Considerable assistance was required from various partners to meet critical equipment and self-sustainment capability shortfalls among MISCA troop-contributing countries. The French Operation Sangaris provided medical assistance, including access to a level II field hospital and medical evacuation support, and tactical airlift.

40. During the transition period but before the rehatting and transfer of authority from MISCA to MINUSCA in September 2014, MINUSCA provided training to MISCA personnel in the areas of human rights, child protection, sexual and gender-based violence, safe disposal of unexploded ordnance, and weapons and ammunition management. It also trained 30 new staff officers deployed to MISCA headquarters. In parallel, African Union human rights observers who were deployed in the Central African Republic received United Nations training on human rights standards and methodologies, as well as technical support for their monitoring and reporting activities.

Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army

41. The United Nations also provides support to the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army established in late 2011, which includes the African Union Regional Task Force, a multinational military force mandated to neutralize the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the affected areas. While the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa is mandated to coordinate the implementation of the regional strategy to address the threat and impact of LRA, UNOAU provided support in such areas as planning and public information. Other United Nations missions in the region also provide assistance, including support to the establishment of the Initiative's joint operations centre, information sharing and providing logistical support within their existing mandates and resources. The Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat provided financial support for meetings of the Initiative's Joint Coordination Mechanism.

42. The United States supports the Initiative through the contribution of special forces and military advisers and in such areas as logistics, intelligence, training, equipment and tactical airlift. It also provides bilateral assistance to United Nations missions in the region to strengthen efforts in LRA-affected areas. The European Union provides funds for the Joint Coordination Mechanism secretariat, the organization of meetings and the payment of staff allowances.

Multinational Joint Task Force

43. The Multinational Joint Task Force was established by members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin in 2015 and mandated to, inter alia, neutralize Boko Haram. The United Nations Secretariat facilitated access by the African Union Commission to vendors on the same terms and conditions available to existing United Nations systems contracts for the acquisition of vehicles, communications equipment, personal protective equipment and medical equipment. UNOAU provides technical support through expertise to the African Union in its efforts to fully operationalize the headquarters of the Task Force. At the request of the African Union, OHCHR temporarily deployed a human rights adviser to support the African Union's Task Force start-up team.

44. To date, most of the costs associated with the deployment of Task Force troops have been borne by its troop-contributing countries. Additional funds are being provided by the European Union, through its African Peace Facility, to support the Task Force strategic and sector headquarters, including payment for costs related to stipends for staff officers, command and control systems, communications, intelligence and medical support. Other partners provide bilateral assistance through training, equipment and logistical support to the Task Force troop-contributing countries; assign advisers to the Task Force cooperation and liaison cell; as well as support the operation through information sharing. The United States also provided strategic lift for communications equipment transferred to the Task Force after the closure of MISCA.

African Union missions in the Comoros

45. The four African Union missions in the Comoros, namely the African Union Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC, 2004), African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC, 2006), African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros (MAES, 2007-2008) and Operation Democracy (2008), are notable in that no support was requested of or required from the United Nations. Many of the troop-contributing countries for each of those missions, most notably South Africa, which was the main contributor to AMISEC and MAES, bore most of the costs of their own deployments or were supported by other African countries. For example, Libya supported the deployment of Sudanese troops to Operation Democracy. The European Union provided funds to support the deployment of troops by meeting costs related to allowances, rations, medical support and insurance for MAES. External partners also provided support to Operation Democracy in the form of logistical support and sealift to the Tanzanian contingent.

D. Assessment of different types of support provided

Technical assistance

46. Planning capacity for African Union peace support operations, both at the headquarters level and in the field, has routinely required external support. Technical assistance from both the United Nations and other partners, particularly in the form of planning support, was provided to the African Union in the planning for AMIS through the Integrated Task Force on Darfur. Partners provided technical expertise for mission planning as part of the African Union's integrated task forces for most of the subsequent African peace support operations. That support usually helped to develop plans and concepts of operations and improve mission administration and command and control systems.

47. Technical assistance, however, was not without its own challenges. Frequently, external planners provided by the United Nations and other bilateral partners significantly outnumbered African Union planners, undermining African ownership of planning processes. Nor were external planners always well sighted on the problems facing missions. At times, competing demands also undermined the effectiveness of United Nations technical support. In the Central African Republic, the same team that assisted MISCA also later formed the core of the MINUSCA planning team. While this was an efficient means of using limited resources, it nevertheless diluted the team's ability to focus on meeting African Union requirements effectively during the transition phase. Initially, joint assessment and planning processes in UNAMID were found to be time-consuming exercises that undermined the rapid deployment of the Mission. However, this improved in subsequent missions. The lessons learned exercise following the Central African Republic and Mali transitions emphasized the importance of early engagement by the two organizations in joint assessments and planning. Joint assessment teams have also been regularly used in Somalia for the planning and development of concepts of operations.

48. Technical expertise for planning, deployment and operationalization of protection mandates has required support from the United Nations at both the headquarters and field levels. To date, however, overall support to the African Union in the area of human rights and humanitarian protection has been somewhat ad hoc and limited, despite joint identification of existing gaps. In many cases, support was provided sporadically and late and integrated only as an afterthought, as opposed to being built into the early stages of the planning and deployment of African Union operations. At times, that lack of coordination created tension due to differing expectations, which could have been avoided had a joint planning and preventive approach been adopted. In many cases, technical support on human rights was provided thanks to extrabudgetary contributions or the use of existing resources. That approach has proved unsustainable. It has allowed for neither predictable support in those areas nor the development of an adequate joint strategy to systematically address human rights-related gaps in the African Union and its peace support operations.

United Nations-provided support packages

49. A United Nations “support package” is a broad term used to describe the mandated deployment of a United Nations presence on the ground to provide a range of United Nations planning and mission support capabilities to fill critical gaps in an African Union peace support operation. The term was originally used in the AMIS context for the light and heavy support packages and subsequently in the context of support provided to AMISOM by UNSOA and UNSOS. Support packages, primarily in the form of equipment, were also provided to AFISMA and MISCA through trust funds. Support packages have proved to be a flexible framework through which different types of mission support services are delivered. Historically, United Nations peacekeeping operations have served as the benchmark against which such services are delivered. Support packages also facilitate the application of United Nations accountability and reporting mechanisms so that the African Union Commission has needed to have only minimal capacity to manage those tasks. Importantly, support packages have evolved significantly over time, incorporating a high level of innovation in uniquely non-permissive environments. The Security Council has recognized the positive contributions of UNSOA to supporting the gains made by AMISOM and has underscored that such contributions reflect a deepened partnership between the United Nations, the African Union and Member States.

50. However, support packages often struggle to meet requirements significantly different from those of most United Nations peacekeeping missions. In such cases, the assumptions underpinning mission support to United Nations peacekeeping operations do not reflect the requirements of some African Union missions. In situations where missions are engaged in combat operations, security risks are higher and equipment suffers much greater wear and tear than in more static peacekeeping operations. The consumption rate by such missions of consumables, ranging from ammunition to medical supplies, is also significantly higher than in United Nations peacekeeping operations. In non-permissive operating environments, third-party logistics support providers are often able to deliver flexible and responsive solutions. In fact, the United Nations also relies heavily on third-party contracted logistics providers in Somalia to deliver support to AMISOM, as the security environment precludes the deployment of United Nations civilian staff close to the front line.

51. Missions undertaking kinetic operations, particularly in non-permissive environments, also generally suffer much higher casualties than most peacekeeping missions. In Somalia, for example, the casualties sustained by AMISOM have on several occasions overwhelmed not only the capacity of the Mission and UNSOA but also many of the intensive care units throughout the region. Currently, the United Nations also faces related challenges in Mali, where it struggles to ensure timely medical evacuations, suggesting that current support models are insufficient to meet the requirements of even its own peacekeeping operations.

Hybrid model

52. The hybrid model, as applied in the Darfur context, takes advantage of the respective roles of the African Union and the United Nations with respect to the Sudan. The African Union spearheads the political process in support of peace in

Darfur and the Two Areas, through the engagement of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan and South Sudan and the Peace and Security Council. The United Nations supports the operations of UNAMID, which is focused on the protection of civilians, mitigation of intercommunal violence, and dialogue and reconciliation on the ground. Notwithstanding challenges related to the management and oversight of the Mission by two organizations, the model has brought together the resources of both entities in response to the significant obstacles that remain in Darfur, including continued fighting and violence, lack of freedom of movement, and other impediments.

Partner-provided logistical support

53. For a number of African Union peace support operations, logistical support was provided by partners, either directly by their military forces or by companies contracted by them. This included strategic lift to contingents, logistics support, medical support and the contracting of third-party logistics providers for AMIS and AMISOM. In many cases, such support was able to capitalize on existing arrangements established by partners to support their own military activities in Africa, therefore allowing them to respond rapidly to requirements from African Union missions.

54. In general, partners were more willing to directly provide one-off support, such as strategic lift and equipment procurement for military and police contingents. For ongoing requirements, partners preferred to contract third-party companies. The logistical support provided by those companies has proved to be very flexible and responsive; in AMIS, for example, the contractor in question was originally responsible only for handling camp construction and management for AMIS, but when the need arose it was able to very quickly expand the range of services provided to include medical support and the rental and operation of fixed-wing aircraft for the mission.

Training and equipment support

55. A common feature of all African Union peace support operations is the capability gaps within their uniformed components. Nearly every African Union operation has suffered from a shortage of enablers such as engineers, medical and military aviation units and intelligence capabilities. More fundamentally, the troops deployed were often poorly trained and ill equipped. A joint inspection of AMIS conducted in September 2007 found that its units lacked the expected equipment and were reliant on donor-contracted support. Such shortfalls persisted under UNAMID. Similarly, most MISCA and AFISMA military and police contingents did not meet basic equipment standards, and despite the granting of grace periods of six and four months, respectively, most units in both the Central African Republic and Mali still had equipment, operational and self-sustainment capabilities below the minimum essential requirements long after they were rehatted. Some AMISOM contingents also suffered from similar problems. In both UNAMID and AFISMA, many of the troops deployed did not have the expertise or equipment required to operate in the desert environments that formed the majority of their areas of responsibility.

56. Efforts to enhance the capabilities of units once they are already deployed in a mission area have been extremely labour- and resource-intensive for mission support components. Their effectiveness in ensuring that units are actually able to undertake and sustain the tasks expected of them has been limited. Partners spend a considerable amount of money to provide equipment to help to address shortfalls. However, the donation of equipment often brings beneficiary units up to equipment standards only on paper. In the Central African Republic, Mali and Darfur, contingents were often unfamiliar with how to operate, let alone maintain and repair, donated equipment.

57. Indeed, many of the equipment and training shortfalls faced by some African troop-contributing countries are recurrent in nature and cannot be effectively remedied once a unit has deployed to the mission area. Training provided by troop- and police-contributing countries is often tailored to national requirements and does not encompass the full spectrum of skills required in contemporary peace support operations. However, some peacekeeping training centres in Africa have signed memorandums of understanding with the African Union to support it in improving the training of troops and individuals deploying to peace support operations. Some bilateral partners also provide predeployment training to African units, although there is often a lack of visibility as to whether the units trained or equipment donated are subsequently deployed to peace operations. Some partners recognize those shortcomings and currently focus on developing institutional capacity in such areas as logistics. The United Nations has also provided training to troops, including those slated to be rehatted into United Nations peacekeeping operations. In the Central African Republic, for example, the United Nations provided training in such areas as human rights, child protection and sexual and gender-based violence, although it was of limited effectiveness.

Financing

58. The following mechanisms have been used in the past to finance African Union peace support operations: (a) African Union assessed contributions; (b) the bearing of costs by African Union troop- and police-contributing countries; (c) voluntary contributions; (d) support packages financed through United Nations assessed contributions; and (e) a combination of the above.

59. To date, however, African Union peace support operations have relied heavily on voluntary contributions. Voluntary contributions have included direct bilateral contributions, such as the extensive support provided by the European Union through its African Peace Facility, as well as through contributions provided to trust funds. While donor financing through trust funds may not always be predictable or sustainable and has not been able to cover all requirements of peace support operations in the past, trust funds have been a flexible means of meeting targeted requirements, particularly when used to supplement other types of support. Many of the delays experienced in the past with providing support through United Nations trust funds have less to do with the management of the trust fund and more with the lengthy United Nations procurement lead times. Donor coordination can also be challenging, and effective use of trust funds requires a strong donor coordination capacity.

60. Reliance on externally provided funding undermines ownership by the African Union and poses risks to missions, especially where mission design might be constrained by financial considerations. Most fundamentally, where missions are entirely reliant on external funding, the withdrawal of that funding can cripple them. In the case of AMISOM, where the European Union provides assistance in funding troop stipends, the African Union Commission has reported that delays in the dispersal of funds, as well as the reallocation of funds to support other activities, have affected the morale of AMISOM troops. In a number of cases, funds provided to trust funds managed by the United Nations were not used to address priority areas identified by the African Union. In many cases, this was due to earmarks and caveats applied by partners, many of which reflected the political priorities of partners, while others stemmed from the need to meet national fiduciary controls. Some of the issues related to expectations management and prioritization could be addressed if funds were to be provided to African Union-managed trust funds instead of United Nations-managed trust funds, as this would give the African Union greater control over the funds and visibility of any caveats imposed. To do so, however, the African Union would need to improve its financial governance structures and procurement systems.

IV. Related considerations

A. Mandates and doctrine

61. African Union and United Nations missions have sometimes carried out different types of mandated tasks. Specifically, the African Union has proved willing to engage in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations that the United Nations remains reluctant to undertake as part of its peacekeeping operations. Those differences have provided opportunities to share burdens and develop pragmatic responses to crises based on each organization's comparative advantages.

Primacy of politics

62. It is important to note that both organizations recognize what the High-level Panel on Peace Operations called the "primacy of politics": that it is political solutions that end conflicts and not simply the deployment of more peacekeepers ([A/70/95-S/2015/446](#), para. 43). Consequently, peace operations are effective when they are part of a clear and viable political strategy to resolve the crisis in question. It also means that support for African Union operations requires a frank dialogue between the two organizations, that is, the Secretariat, the Commission and the respective memberships, on the nature of the conflict, an integrated political response and the role of the peace operation. These are key aspects of the draft Joint Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security between the two organizations, which is in the process of being developed. The political leadership of the peace process may vary on a case-by-case basis, based on the comparative advantages of the stakeholders, but evolving arrangements for supporting African Union missions present an opportunity to strengthen political coordination and coherence, including more predictable and systematic engagement between the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council.

Comparing African Union and United Nations doctrines

63. The African Union and the United Nations have both taken steps to develop relevant peace operations doctrine. However, recent Security Council mandates have resulted in ambiguity and confusion as to the meaning of key concepts, such as impartiality and stabilization, and have generated debates over whether United Nations peacekeepers should undertake counter-terrorism activities and how they can counter asymmetric threats.

64. The African Union draft doctrine on peace support operations was developed around the six scenarios envisaged for the African Standby Force, which range from military advice to a political mission, and from small observer deployments to traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping missions, robust peacekeeping and military intervention to stop atrocity crimes. Scenarios 1 to 5 involve missions that largely conform to the basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping, whereas scenario 6 involves military intervention to stop atrocity crimes. While the doctrine defines African peace support operations as distinct from fighting war, in practice, African Union missions in Mali and Somalia have explicitly designated enemy groups. So too have the Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army and the Multinational Joint Task Force. Those operations fall outside the current scenarios but are in accordance with the Constitutive Act of the African Union and other normative and legal frameworks.

Table 3
Conflict and mission scenarios of the African Standby Force

<i>Scenario</i>	<i>Description</i>
1	African Union/regional military advice to a political mission
2	African Union/regional observer mission co-deployed with United Nations mission
3	Stand-alone African Union/regional observer mission
4	African Union/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventative deployment missions
5	African Union peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission
6	African Union intervention (e.g. genocide situations where international community does not act promptly)

65. In contrast, the 2008 “capstone doctrine” states, and United Nations Member States have repeatedly reaffirmed, that United Nations peacekeeping is based on three basic interrelated and mutually reinforcing principles: consent of the main parties to the conflict, including the host country Government; impartial implementation of mandates without favour or prejudice to any party; and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. United Nations

peacekeeping operations have for the most part deployed after a ceasefire or political agreement is established to assist in its implementation.

66. However, several recent United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa have stretched those basic principles. Several United Nations missions have engaged in offensive military operations, most notably the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,¹⁶ although the United Nations Security Council has emphasized the exceptional nature of such practices. In addition, the fact that United Nations peacekeepers have been mandated, in certain cases, to support government forces and to facilitate the extension of State authority in contested regions has meant that the Organization has moved beyond its traditional approach on impartiality. Moreover, the traditional practice of excluding troop- and police-contributing countries from neighbouring countries with potential interests in the conflict has been eroded. Such examples suggest that the mandating practices of the Council are no longer fully aligned with the capstone doctrine. As the High-level Panel on Peace Operations noted, while the basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping remain important for operations engaged in observing ceasefires and implementing peace agreements, they “should never be used as an excuse for failure to protect civilians or defend the mission proactively” (A/70/95-S/2015/446, para. 125).

Operational and legal considerations for supporting combat operations

67. Where the United Nations has provided various types of support to African missions undertaking combat operations, new considerations have arisen. There has been very little practice, and doctrinal issues are not fully resolved. It is possible that operations providing certain types of support to such operations could result in the United Nations peacekeeping operation being considered a party to an armed conflict, with possible consequences for the legal status of the operation and its members.

68. In accordance with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (A/67/775-S/2013/110, annex), United Nations support cannot be provided where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the recipient committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures. Given the difficulty of appropriately investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law in combat operations, significant investment should be made in measures and mechanisms to prevent such violations.

69. In addition, existing United Nations administrative frameworks struggle to meet the requirements of current United Nations peacekeeping missions. For the United Nations to effectively support African Union peace support operations, especially those engaged in peace enforcement or military counter-terrorism activities, significant changes to its existing administrative processes, policies and procedures are required. Moreover, supporting combat operations undertaken by multinational regional forces authorized by the African Union, such as the Regional

¹⁶ See Security Council resolution [2098 \(2013\)](#), para. 12 (b).

Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army and the Multinational Joint Task Force, may give rise to further challenges. In such missions, States can simultaneously be troop-contributing countries and host States. Supporting such regional operations would entail helping national security forces defeat designated enemies on their home territory, a clear break from some of the fundamental assumptions that underpin United Nations mission support. It would also break new ground if those regional forces operated without a unified system of command and control exercised from a designated multinational force headquarters. This would also raise a number of significant challenges to the effective implementation of the human rights due diligence policy.

70. Finally, where offensive military operations are necessary, debate continues over whether they are best conducted within or alongside an existing United Nations peacekeeping operation. To date, none of the peace support operations mandated or authorized by the African Union have been deployed alongside a United Nations peacekeeping operation except during brief transition periods, but there have been cases where African forces have deployed alongside a United Nations special political mission. The idea of deploying parallel United Nations and African regional forces has been discussed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2013), Mali (2015) and South Sudan (2014 and 2016). So far, proposals for parallel forces have either stalled or resulted in the additional personnel being integrated into the command and control structure of the existing United Nations peacekeeping operations, although there may be both advantages and disadvantages to deploying parallel operations in the same operational theatre.

B. Safety and security

71. Safety and security considerations related to the provision of support are particularly relevant, since the African Union regularly requests United Nations assistance for peace support operations deployed in non-permissive environments. In two recent examples, the Central African Republic and Mali, the number of hostile acts against United Nations peacekeepers immediately increased following the transfer of authority from African Union peace support operations to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Two factors that contributed to that spike were the inherent safety and security challenges in those missions and the lack of sufficient security infrastructure in place prior to the transfer of authority.

72. Safety and security are critical considerations for any organization, both for supporting the effective execution of mandates and in fulfilling its duty of care to its personnel. After the bombing of the Canal Hotel in Baghdad in August 2003, which resulted in the deaths of 22 United Nations personnel, the United Nations took steps to enhance its policies and procedures related to safety and security. The United Nations security management system, led by the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat and coordinated through the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, is intended to protect personnel while enabling operations. The African Union is not covered under the system and does not have an analogous system that defines how it addresses the safety and security of its civilian staff. However, with the support of UNOAU, the African Union started undertaking security assessments of its office and accommodation facilities as part of its mission start-up process in

the Central African Republic and Mali; established basic operating security standards, which are similar to the minimum operating security standards used by the United Nations; and is currently developing a security plan for AMISOM. UNOAU is currently facilitating discussions on a memorandum of understanding between the African Union and the Department on modalities for cooperation between the two entities in the areas of safety and security.

73. Two main factors affect the safety and security of United Nations personnel deployed in support of or alongside African Union peace support operations: the first, and more intuitive, is the general permissiveness of the operating environment. Areas where there is active fighting, asymmetric threats against the United Nations or a high level of criminality are inherently more dangerous for personnel. The second is the range of mandated tasks undertaken by a mission. Where a peace support operation is mandated to perform tasks that fall outside the basic principles underpinning United Nations peacekeeping missions, the safety and security of both the operation and any United Nations personnel supporting it may be affected.

74. The United Nations has measures in place to mitigate risks to allow it to “stay and deliver”. Through its programme criticality framework, it has a decision-making tool for determining the acceptable level of risk in undertaking different activities. A number of measures can be undertaken to mitigate some of the security risks of United Nations personnel deployed in support of African Union peace support operations. The first is ensuring that mission planning, including for mission support, is underpinned by a comprehensive understanding of the security situation. Similarly, a robust information collection and analysis capacity is required within missions to help them to monitor and counter threats to mission personnel and maintain situational awareness. The absence of a strong capability along those lines in AMIS and AMISOM, for example, reduced the ability of the missions to protect themselves and civilians. Equally important is the need to support the African Union in developing its own security management systems in line with global best practices to ensure that the safety and security risks to both African Union and United Nations personnel deployed in support of African Union missions are reduced.

75. Sufficient protection capabilities are also required. In a United Nations peacekeeping mission, most of the requirements for physical security are met by the military and police components of the mission. However, United Nations civilian personnel deployed in support of or alongside an African Union peace support operation may be unlikely to have their own force protection capacity and may have to rely on the African Union for protection. For their part, African Union troops may not always be sufficient to protect United Nations personnel in more challenging security situations. In Somalia, for example, UNSOA and UNSOM relied on private security inside the AMISOM protected area in Mogadishu to provide an additional layer of protection for its personnel prior to the deployment of a United Nations guard unit to UNSOM in 2014. Ultimately, measures such as private security companies are not a panacea for the safety and security challenges faced by the United Nations in supporting African Union peace support operations.

76. Mitigation measures may facilitate the deployment of a United Nations civilian presence in an inherently non-permissive environment where security threats are general and not directly aimed at the United Nations. However, recent

experience in Somalia and elsewhere demonstrates that there are practical limits to the support that a United Nations presence can provide when the United Nations itself is targeted owing to its support for a weak host Government or a regional mission with a counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism mandate.

C. Accountability

77. As part of its call for the United Nations to forge a vision for a stronger global and regional partnership for peace and security, the High-level Panel on Peace Operations envisioned a framework for partnership that would include “modalities for capacity enhancement and burden-sharing, as well as mechanisms for monitoring and accountability” (A/70/95-S/2015/446, para. 61 (c)). For both the African Union and the United Nations, the trust and buy-in of member States and partners depends on accountability mechanisms that ensure compliance with governing legal norms and principles and the proper use of resources towards the implementation of the mandate. Whereas those mechanisms have been developed in the United Nations over multiple decades, the African Union has not yet established systematic accountability mechanisms for its peace support operations, beyond financial management issues.

78. In the area of finance and administration, United Nations peacekeeping operations are governed by extremely detailed financial and staffing regulations and rules (ST/SGB/2013/4 and ST/SGB/2016/1, respectively). Moreover, the budgetary committees of the General Assembly play a key role in shaping the mission, closely scrutinizing proposed budgets and holding missions to account for their implementation. Historically, African Union rules have been less stringent and the level of scrutiny significantly lower. However, the African Union has recently taken steps to improve accountability and transparency through revisions to its staffing and financial rules, including through the introduction of programme audits and budget performance reports. The European Union and the World Bank are currently supporting those efforts to bring African Union financial and procurement systems up to international standards.

79. In the area of operational readiness, the United Nations has mechanisms for holding troop- and police-contributing countries to account for the performance of contingents, including an operational readiness assurance framework and the contingent-owned equipment and personnel reimbursement systems. The latter currently includes elements related to on-the-ground performance and capability. By contrast, standardization of troop preparation and training or “fit for purpose” criteria for equipment and enablers have yet to be designed in the African Union.

80. In the area of command and control, United Nations policy outlines the roles of the Security Council, Secretariat departments and the civilian and military leadership in theatre, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, including the control of military enabling units, responsibility for safety and security and reporting. However, the United Nations has also experienced many challenges in ensuring compliance with command and control arrangements or preventing troop-contributing countries from placing caveats on their operations. Moreover, it is no surprise that troop-contributing countries are particularly reluctant to relinquish

operational control over their contingents in the non-permissive environments in which the African Union often deploys.

81. In the area of international human rights and humanitarian law, the African Union, like the United Nations, is obliged to comply with international human rights and humanitarian standards, including in relation to sexual exploitation and abuse and other serious international crimes. Where violations of international human rights or humanitarian law amount to crimes under domestic or international law, the individual criminal responsibility of the alleged perpetrators must be investigated and established, including on the basis of command or superior responsibility. Impunity cannot be tolerated. As in the case of United Nations peace operations, there has been a general lack of accountability for serious crimes and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law committed by peacekeepers in African Union operations. The United Nations is currently developing policies and mechanisms and cooperating with national and international judicial bodies to improve accountability in its operations. African Union operations have yet to develop such policies and mechanisms.

82. Regarding the conduct of personnel, there have been significant failures in both African Union and United Nations operations with respect to high numbers of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Recognizing the complications arising from the different responsibilities of mission leadership and national contingents, the Security Council adopted resolution [2272 \(2016\)](#), focusing on the responsibility of contributing countries to investigate allegations and hold their personnel accountable. In that resolution, the Council also urged all non-United Nations forces authorized under a Council mandate to take adequate measures to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse. The Secretary-General has developed operational guidance that includes standards for force generation in relation to conduct and human rights. He has indicated his intention to reflect expectations in relation to his zero tolerance policy in cooperation agreements with the African Union ([A/70/729](#), para. 82) and has started to issue public reports to tackle the issue. The African Union has made some progress in this regard, including in the development of policies and the hiring of a chief ethics officer, but has limited dedicated capacity in this area.

83. Inevitably, the aforementioned issues have affected the performance and conduct of African Union operations and hence the level of confidence of African Union member States, contributing countries and partners therein. Improvements in accountability are therefore needed irrespective of the modalities for financing African Union peace support operations.

Reporting and oversight

84. In the case of operations funded by the United Nations, accountability mechanisms are not merely good practice; such operations have an obligation to comply with specific United Nations resolutions, regulations, rules and ethical standards and international human rights and humanitarian standards. With respect to financial and administrative rules, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the General Assembly review budget implementation for United Nations operations through the consideration of budget performance reports and reports of the Board of Auditors. To date, the use of assessed contributions for

African Union operations has applied only to the model of a hybrid operation (UNAMID) or “support package” (AMIS, AMISOM) in which United Nations accountability and reporting mechanisms automatically applied to the activities undertaken by United Nations personnel. Such an arrangement has obviated the need for the African Union Commission to build its capacity to manage budgets and report on spending or to go through the United Nations budgetary process. In the case of an African Union operation benefiting from financial support without a strong United Nations presence in theatre, the African Union would need to undergo a significant strengthening of its capacity to undertake the United Nations budgetary process.

85. However, it is also important to acknowledge a key tension between two different forms of accountability: accountability for mandate delivery and accountability for compliance with United Nations administrative and financial procedures. As numerous reviews since the Brahimi report have noted, United Nations rules and systems are out of sync with the complex and fast-paced nature of contemporary field operations. Despite the unpredictability and urgency of most peacekeeping environments, United Nations peacekeeping budgets are developed a year in advance and missions have limited ability to redeploy resources. Civilian recruitment and procurement processes regularly take between 6 and 12 months to complete. In response to the report of the High-level Panel on Peace Operations, the Secretary-General has initiated a multi-year review of administrative processes, policies and procedures with a view to making them fit for purpose for the field. Implementing such reforms will require political will on the part of Member States. This is especially the case for African Union operations, given that the African Union has been more willing to deploy at a much faster pace than the United Nations and often in more difficult environments.

86. For United Nations operations, the Secretary-General must also submit to the Security Council substantive reports encompassing all aspects of the mandate and evolution of the situation. In many cases where the Council has authorized non-United Nations forces, such as those undertaken by the European Union and NATO, there has also been a practice of regular reporting. The inconsistent record of reporting on AMISOM has been a source of frustration in this regard and reflects a gap that needs to be addressed. All the more so, since reporting and monitoring are not only matters of accountability but also essential for encouraging a constructive dialogue between the African Union and United Nations.

D. Human rights due diligence policy

87. The nature of African Union peace support operations, especially of high-intensity ones, has often posed challenges in terms of planning and conducting them in compliance with international human rights, humanitarian and refugee standards. The African Union has little capacity at its headquarters to devise and implement effective measures and mechanisms to reduce the risk of and address human rights violations in its peace support operations.

88. There is a higher risk of human rights and international humanitarian law violations in the context of counter-terrorism or peace enforcement operations. The consequences of such violations may be even more damaging to the ultimate

success of such operations than for peacekeeping operations. This is particularly true for counter-terrorism activities, as collateral damage is likely to promote and encourage resentment towards security forces and increase sympathy for, and possibly recruitment by, terrorist groups, therefore increasing the overall threat to the mission.

89. Support by United Nations entities to non-United Nations security forces must be consistent with the Organization's purposes and principles, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, and with its obligations under international law to respect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. Consistent with those obligations, United Nations support cannot be provided where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures. This is reflected in the human rights due diligence policy, promulgated by the Secretary-General in 2011 and welcomed by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

90. The United Nations experience in implementing the human rights due diligence policy when supporting African Union missions has so far been limited to AFISMA, MISCA and AMISOM. In the case of AFISMA and MISCA, the policy was only partially implemented, owing to the time sensitivity of support to the two missions and their relatively short duration. With regard to AMISOM, mechanisms under the policy are currently in place and cover, inter alia, training, selection and screening of troops, monitoring and accountability. On monitoring, the AMISOM Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell, primarily a preventive internal monitoring tool, has yielded improvements but has yet to be fully staffed.

91. The United Nations system has been approached to provide support to the Multinational Joint Task Force, which raises the challenge of application of the human rights due diligence policy in the context of multinational forces. Although the African Union authorized the Task Force, it has limited control over its operations, and hence institutionalized African Union-United Nations partnership arrangements are of limited utility. The lack of relevant United Nations field presence in the specific theatre of operations is also an important obstacle because it does not allow for a proper human rights monitoring and reporting mechanism as required under the policy.

92. The experience of applying the human rights due diligence policy has generated important lessons for future support to African Union peace support operations. First, operations engaged in counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency tasks pose additional challenges for application of the policy, both because of weaknesses in command and control and the limited United Nations presence on the ground. Second, policy implementation provides a space to support the compliance of African Union peace operations with international human rights and humanitarian standards. However, this works best when the measures and mechanisms to ensure African Union missions' compliance with such standards are integrated as early as possible in the planning process, which requires a strong partnership between the African Union and the United Nations. In particular, information regarding the selection of contributing countries and other issues that may influence the human rights dimensions of operations needs to be communicated to the United Nations as

early as possible in the planning phase to ensure that potential constraints on United Nations support can be identified and addressed.

V. Concluding observations

93. The African Union-United Nations partnership on peace operations remains essential to responding to common challenges posed by armed conflicts in Africa. Faced with unprecedented threats to international peace and security on the continent, the partnership has evolved in innovative ways, with both organizations willing to develop pragmatic solutions to contemporary challenges. Over the past decade, the partnership produced a range of collaborative instruments to ensure joint analysis and planning and to facilitate the alignment of regional and global responses to crisis situations in Africa. This is crucial because peace operations are likely to be most effective when subregional, continental and global responses are part of a coherent political strategy aimed at defusing the crisis.

94. In almost all of the cases surveyed in the present report, the African Union and the United Nations shared similar strategic objectives and developed innovative solutions in order to better pursue their shared objectives. The African Union enjoys relative doctrinal flexibility and has deployed missions with a wide range of mandated tasks, including enforcement operations designed to defeat particular spoiler groups that pose a threat to the political process. However, the African Union's willingness to deploy a wide range of peace support operations has been undermined by a lack of capacity in key areas. At the strategic level, staffing levels in the African Union Commission have been grossly inadequate, in each case, for the effective management of most peace support operations. At the operational level, most African missions have suffered from inadequate staffing. In addition, significant capacity gaps have been apparent in some troop- and police-contributing countries, which sometimes deploy without the capabilities necessary to be operationally effective. The African Union was able to undertake a number of smaller-scale peace support operations characterized by clear mandates and clear objectives without significant levels of external support. However, more complex missions have relied heavily on external partners for support, weakening predictability and ownership. Consequently, it is clear that the African Union must continue to build its capacity to plan, finance, sustain and oversee its own missions, so that it can operate expeditiously and fulfil the expectations of its membership.

95. With regard to assistance provided by partners, the review noted that different partners provided different types of support to African missions. Bilateral partners were generally most interested in providing financial support and technical assistance to missions in such areas as planning, or one-off support to troop- and police-contributing countries in such areas as strategic airlift and equipment. While the amount of bilateral financial assistance was considerable (more than €1.6 billion provided through the European Union African Peace Facility alone until the end of 2015), it proved to be unpredictable and unsustainable over the long term. Moreover, reliance on external sources of funding undermined African ownership and created risks for missions, as the priorities of donors might not be aligned with those of the African Union. On the other hand, logistical support provided directly or contracted by partners proved flexible and responsive in AMIS and the early

stages of AMISOM, when no United Nations support was mandated. However, it is never ideal for a military operation to rely on external sources for its logistical requirements. Bilateral partners also frequently provided training and equipment to meet immediate capability gaps, although the review observed that such support was often ineffective at improving the capability of contingents once they had been deployed. In many cases, contingents were unable to effectively operate or maintain partner-provided equipment.

96. The review found that the United Nations had provided assistance to most African Union peace support operations. This ranged from technical assistance and various types of mission support tasks to, in the case of UNAMID, the overall management of a hybrid operation. The support provided by the United Nations was different for each mission and, in some cases, had undergone distinct phases. One model in particular, the logistical support package delivered by an in situ United Nations presence, proved to be a flexible and robust framework through which a range of mission support services could be provided by the United Nations, under United Nations regulations, rules and accountability systems. United Nations support systems were found to be best suited for meeting requirements that were most similar to those of peacekeeping operations. However, existing administrative processes, policies and procedures struggled to provide support to a new generation of United Nations peacekeeping missions and were inadequate to meet the requirements of kinetic operations deployed in non-permissive environments, as was the case with many African Union peace support operations.

97. Regarding financial support, the review noted that United Nations-managed trust funds proved useful when supplementing other sources of financing, but were not very successful as the primary means of meeting the costs of support to African Union operations, as they did not provide a reliable funding stream. By contrast, United Nations assessed contributions were an effective means of funding support requirements to African missions in the instances where they were provided. However, reliance on United Nations-managed funds, as with all external funding, carried risks for African Union ownership, which must be weighed by African Union member States. As at 30 June 2016, more than \$15 billion in United Nations assessed contributions had been used to finance the light and heavy support packages for AMIS and the budgets for UNAMID, UNSOA and UNSOS.

98. Throughout the review, such issues as safety and security, accountability systems and human rights repeatedly emerged as key considerations that were not always fully understood by stakeholders. In particular, United Nations-provided support could not be seen separately from human rights considerations. The kinetic peace operations conducted by the African Union generally involved greater risks of international humanitarian law and human rights violations. The protection of human rights needed to be integrated into their mandates at the early stages. They required stronger mechanisms to prevent and address international humanitarian law and human rights violations, as well as independent and effective monitoring mechanisms. The African Union had developed or was developing mechanisms to assess and mitigate the risks but still lacked the capacity and expertise, at both the headquarters and mission levels, to effectively implement them.

99. Six general observations have emerged from the findings of the review:

- Access to the United Nations assessed contributions has provided a reliable, predictable and sustainable means of financing the support requirements of African Union peace support operations. Moreover, the considerable innovation shown by the United Nations in supporting the African Union missions in Somalia and the Sudan through assessed contributions demonstrates the potential flexibility of this option.
- The African Union has often acted as an effective first responder to crises before the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. In such situations, ensuring smooth transitions is likely to remain a crucial part of stabilizing future crisis zones and requires the two organizations to engage in joint planning and analysis from the start. Such deployments, which are most similar to United Nations peacekeeping operations, offer the most straightforward scenario for the provision of support by the United Nations and can build upon the lessons already learned from the transitions in the Central African Republic and Mali.
- In recent years, both the African Union and the United Nations have increasingly deployed into environments that require greater levels of mobility, situational awareness and force protection. The United Nations must therefore revise its own internal administrative processes, policies and procedures to better support modern field operations, whether its own or those of the African Union.
- The African Union needs to strengthen its own administrative and operational frameworks, including by defining its own mission support model. This will in turn guide the United Nations in tailoring its support to African Union peace support operations.
- The Secretary-General has stated that the United Nations should not engage in counter-terrorism activities, and the High-level Panel on Peace Operations concluded that United Nations peacekeeping operations were not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations. However, the United Nations has been requested to provide support to African Union peace support operations undertaking counter-terrorism operations. Given the constraints of the existing policies and support mechanisms highlighted in the review, the United Nations must determine the extent to which it can support multinational operations authorized by the African Union engaged in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency activities and the structures and measures that must be in place to deliver such support.
- The broad range of tasks that African peace support operations have been authorized to undertake means that no single support model and no single actor can adequately deliver the full range of necessary capabilities. It is therefore important that multiple, complementary support options remain available to the African Union. As the case of Somalia demonstrates, if African Union peace support operations are required to conduct offensive operations, multiple support mechanisms that build on the comparative advantages of the United Nations, bilateral partners and the European Union will be required.

100. The joint review focused on the operational and financial support provided to African Union peace support operations. However, the African Union-United Nations partnership in peace and security is much broader and includes joint efforts on conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding. Further strengthening of African Union-United Nations capacities to develop these other components of the partnership will be essential in order to make it more effective.

101. The lessons learned from the past 13 years have demonstrated that more decisive and concrete actions are required by the international community to make full use of all the instruments at its disposal. The two organizations should be proud of the pragmatism and innovation that have guided their collaboration over the years. The African Union-United Nations partnership is essential, evolving, innovative and increasingly effective. A division of labour has emerged in which the African Union has increasingly taken on tasks that the United Nations has not been able or willing to undertake. However, the African Union is not yet able to tackle those tasks alone. It is encouraging that the African Union continues to take steps towards financing a greater proportion of its own operations, but it is also critical that African peace support operations authorized by the United Nations Security Council have the support required to effectively address increasingly complex mandates in increasingly challenging environments.

102. Finally, the benefits of collaboration are not merely operational but also political. Peace operations are effective when they are part of a clear political strategy and not only when they have the right support. Political solutions to peace and security challenges are most effective when global and regional responses are aligned. This is the ultimate objective of a strong African Union-United Nations partnership.
