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Feature Report

Economy of Force: Training U.S. Partner Militaries

In Era of Small Wars, U.S. Army Must Embrace Training Mission
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IN ERA OF SMALL WARS, U.S. MUST EMBRACE TRAINING MISSION

BY JOHN A. NAGL

> From the standpoint of America's national security, the most important assignment in your military career may not necessarily be commanding U.S. soldiers, but advising or mentoring the troops of other nationals as they battle the forces of terror and the instability within their own borders.
>
> - Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, West Point, April 21, 2008 (.pdf)

Historically, Western armies have struggled with the task of training, advising and assisting host-nation security forces to defeat irregular adversaries. This is part and parcel of their broader problem with irregular conflict. Conventional military forces are designed for combat against counterpart forces of other states, and they have often been unable to adapt to the demands of irregular warfare when their opponents refused to obligingly fight them in the manner they had prepared for. Perhaps in no area of warfare have Western armies been less able to adapt than in the area of training and advising indigenous forces -- and in no area has that lack of adaptability been more costly.

Although the U.S. Army was the planet's most successful land power in conventional war in the 20th century, it has struggled with the challenge of irregular warfare from Vietnam through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For a host of reasons, ranging from America's conventional military superiority to globalization and resource depletion, the wars we will actually fight in this century are likely to look more like the small wars in which we have struggled than like those, such as Desert Storm, in which we have prevailed comparatively easily. And the most important way the U.S. Army can prevent as many of these wars as possible, and prevail in the ones that it must actually fight, is by developing the capability to train host-nation security forces.

Such advisory efforts are an extremely valuable force multiplier, allowing intervening forces to leverage relatively small numbers of their own soldiers to dramatically increase the effectiveness of indigenous forces while simultaneously enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government. However, despite the demonstrated importance of well-trained, highly qualified and motivated advisers in irregular conflicts, the Army has seldom provided them in sufficient quality and quantity for large-scale efforts, and it has rarely rewarded advisers in a manner commensurate with the impact they have on the course of irregular warfare campaigns.

Local forces have many potential advantages in any irregular warfare campaign. They know the terrain, both physical and human, and generally speak the language. They understand the social networks that make up the society and how they are interrelated. In a war in which finding the enemy is often harder than killing the enemy, local forces have the potential to be enormously powerful warfighters. But they also often suffer from disadvantages, including poor training, illiteracy, low wages, a tendency to engage in indiscriminate use of force and a lack of the "combat multipliers" that make Western armies so successful in conventional war, namely air and artillery support, medical evacuation and treatment, sophisticated staff techniques and planning tools and, of course, vast funds.

Squaring this circle is the job of advisers, who in the best circumstances bring combat multipliers and an unblinking eye with which to watch over their local-force brethren. However, this is an uneasy marriage, often beset by cultural and linguistic misconnections, which are inevitable, and by institutional neglect and indifference, which are not. In Vietnam, the United States waited too long before it put significant effort into the advisory mission, by which point the American people had already lost faith in the war. The American advisory effort in Iraq was in many ways even less successful than the one in Vietnam. Both experiences offer lessons for the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan, where the Army has slowly and somewhat grudgingly come to realize the importance of the advisory effort but continues to settle for suboptimal solutions. Unless it makes significant changes across its doctrine, organization, training and force structure, the Army will continue to be poorly prepared for the most likely security challenges of the 21st century.

This historical survey will attempt to tease out lasting principles of success for this most difficult and most important part of irregular warfare before deriving lessons learned to help the United States more efficiently and effectively apply strategic leverage through effective, responsive advisers to indigenous forces.

THE AMERICAN ADVISORY EFFORT IN VIETNAM

> In the years following the Vietnam War, the Army relegated unconventional war to the margins of training, doctrine and budget priorities. . . . [This] left the service unprepared to deal with the operations that followed: Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans and more recently Afghanistan and Iraq -- the consequences and costs of which we are still struggling with today.
>
> - Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Oct. 10, 2007

Direct U.S. military involvement in Vietnam began with advisers: a four-man Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to the French army, created by the Army on Aug. 1, 1950. By the fall of Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954, the size of the MAAG had increased to 342 advisers. The MAAG focused on creating a conventional military for South Vietnam. Rather than a counterguerrilla force dedicated to providing local security, the American advisers sought to build a Vietnamese force that mirrored the American Army, trained to fight an air-mobile and mechanized war under the cover of lavish amounts of firepower.

In the northernmost part of South Vietnam, designated I Corps, the U.S. Marine Corps also initially focused on advisory efforts to Vietnamese forces. Maj. Gen. Lew Walt, who took command of the III Marine Amphibious Force in mid-1965, integrated Marine rifle squads into Vietnamese Regional Forces platoons. These "Combined Action Platoons" (CAPs) lived in the villages of I Corps and focused on pacification while regular Marine battalions divided their time between platoon-sized patrols and civic programs. Army Gen. William Westmoreland disagreed with this adviser-based counterinsurgency strategy, arguing that "the Marines should have been trying to find the enemy's main forces and bring them to battle, thereby putting them on the run and reducing the threat they posed to the population." He ultimately disbanded the CAP effort.

Westmoreland was replaced by Gen. Creighton Abrams on July 1, 1968. As the United States began its withdrawal from Vietnam, President Richard Nixon made the primary mission of American troops enabling the South Vietnamese to assume full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. The Nixon administration's policy of turning over fighting responsibilities to the South Vietnamese while the United States continued to supply material and financial assistance, including air support for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), was dubbed "Vietnamization." As a result of the initiative, Saigon rapidly increased the size of its regular and paramilitary forces. The ARVN was given improved equipment and better training, but deficiencies remained in officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. The quality of the ARVN's leadership was not helped by the fact that the American advisory effort was being scaled down even as the need for

U.S. advisers increased. Ultimately, South Vietnam was unable to defend itself without American advisers and the combat multipliers they brought to the battlefield.

The advisory effort in Vietnam has been widely criticized as "the other war." Military analysts and former Army officers Peter Dawkins and Andrew Krepinevich have described the often-poor quality of Army advisers in Vietnam and the rather slapdash nature of their predeployment training. Lt. Col. Dennis "Buzz" Bruzina, twice an adviser in Vietnam, confirmed the analysts' assessment of the low priority the Army gave to the adviser mission in a personal statement to this author: "In terms of promotions, in terms of assignments, they would be considered at a second level -- the quality would be second-tier quality as opposed to people in divisions. On the other hand, the advisers had a better understanding of the people, of what was required to win."

The American advisory effort in Vietnam can be summed up in the bitter words of an Army officer who served in that lost effort: "Our military institution seems to be prevented by its own doctrinal rigidity from understanding the nature of this war and from making the necessary modifications to apply its power more intelligently, more economically, and above all, more relevantly."

FROM VIETNAM TO AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

> The Department [of Defense] has recognized that stability operations, including developing indigenous security forces such as the Iraqi Security Forces, are a core U.S. military mission. However, the services lack sufficient standing military advisory capacity to meet current, and potential future, requirements for that mission."
>
> - "Stand Up and Be Counted" (.pdf), House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, 2007

After Vietnam, the mission of training and advising indigenous security forces was generally assigned to Special Forces soldiers. They had perhaps their most successful Foreign Internal Defense mission in El Salvador in the 1980s, when Congress placed limitations on the number of American advisers that could be deployed to support the government in its fight against insurgents. But advisory lessons from El Salvador and elsewhere were not absorbed by the conventional Army, which instead focused on preparing for conventional warfare even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union removed the primary cause for an exclusive focus on that kind of war.

This institutional neglect left the Army and the Marine Corps unprepared for irregular campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps in no area has the institutional neglect been more damaging than in the advisory area, where the services have made many of the same mistakes they made in Vietnam. With demand for advisers to the Iraqi and Afghan security forces far exceeding the ability of the Special Forces to meet it, the Army began to create "transition teams" modeled on Special Forces A-Teams.

Military Transition Teams, as they were initially called, were composed of individuals selected from National Guard, Army Reserve and active-duty units on an ad hoc basis; for the first several years, their training was conducted on several different Army posts and varied widely in quality. Doctrine for general-purpose forces assigned to the adviser mission was lacking. As a result, the teams' size and composition was inconsistent, with most teams for Afghanistan consisting of 16 soldiers and no medic, while teams for Iraq comprised 11 soldiers including a medic. Internal and external studies repeatedly concluded that the teams were too small for the tasks assigned; many teams consequently were augmented in-theater by additional security forces, again on an ad hoc basis.

In 2006, the Army centralized training for transition teams at Fort Riley, Kansas, initially giving the training mission to two cadre heavy brigade combat teams, and later consolidating responsibility with the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division. This unit created a 60-day training program that included both advisory and combat-survival skills. Unfortunately, very few of the cadre mem-

bers had been advisers themselves, while the training battalions' rank structure hindered optimal training, as junior sergeants were often assigned to mentor teams composed of senior sergeants and officers.

This institutional neglect occurred despite the fact that the Army itself agreed that the need for well-trained, professional combat advisers was unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future. Numerous national leaders, from the president on down, highlighted the importance of the adviser teams; then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey stated on a 2007 visit to the Fort Riley Training Mission, "We will not succeed in our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan without the Iraqi and Afghan security forces being able to secure themselves. So these missions for the transition teams are absolutely essential for our long-term success."

Iraq absorbed the lion's share of the national effort. By comparison, the war in Afghanistan was underresourced. In no area was the lack of priority more apparent or more damaging than in the advisory effort to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). According to reports from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the ANA advisory effort was manned below 50 percent of required advisers in April 2008. The ANP was even worse, with fewer than one in four police units having some form of adviser support, even as U.S. strategy recognized that the police remained the key interface between the Afghan people and their government. The majority of the advisers serving in Afghanistan, as well as at the brigade headquarters overseeing their tactical employment, were for many years National Guard soldiers.

The shortage of forces on the ground necessitated breaking up teams designed and trained to serve in 16-soldier units into smaller, ad hoc cells. Sometimes just two or three soldiers were assigned to mentor an ANA or ANP battalion. U.S. Navy and Air Force personnel filled positions that in Iraq were filled by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Teams operated far from American logistical and intelligence support, and inadequate support limited their utility in advising Afghan forces, as the primary focus of some teams became their ability to provision themselves and provide for their own security (.pdf). In a country with few roads, where a mule train or a helicopter can be the only way to supply a distant police outpost, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, the headquarters responsible for the overall adviser mission, possessed not a single dedicated helicopter during a November 2008 visit by the author.

Even the training for Afghanistan-bound teams suffered from that theater's second-class billing. While U.S. Marine Corps adviser teams on their way to Afghanistan trained for mountain warfare in Hawthorne, Nev., to prepare for Afghanistan's difficult terrain, in 2008 there was not a single hour of mountain warfare training in the curriculum for Afghanistan-bound advisers from the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force. Advisers deploying to Afghanistan's Pashtun areas received Dari training, though Dari is not spoken in those areas. Written orders to U.S. Army personnel training for the Afghan adviser mission asked advisers to access an online Arabic language program, despite the fact that Arabic is not one of Afghanistan's languages. As one widely read sarcastic letter from an adviser described the situation, "You will now be sent to the plains of Fort Riley to train as teams for deployment to the mountains of Afghanistan. We will accomplish this by training you to function in Iraq."

In recognition of some of the shortcomings of its previous approach to the problem, in 2009 the Army decided to change the way it sourced advisers for both Iraq and Afghanistan. It modified standard brigade combat teams, providing additional field-grade officers and specialized training to create "advisory and assistance brigades." These brigades had the advantage of being built upon the base of a fully formed unit, providing additional unity of command. Their development and training marks an important step in the evolution of the Army's ability to train and advise host-nation security forces. Also in 2009, the Army finally produced a doctrinal manual for general-purpose forces assigned to conduct the foreign internal defense mission: Field Manual 3-07.1, "Security Force Assistance." (.pdf)

Although the execution of the adviser mission has improved over the past several years, because of its importance to U.S. success in current and future conflicts, there is still more to be done. This author has suggested the creation (.pdf) of a permanent Army force structure to perform the adviser mission more efficiently and effectively. Under this proposal, a permanent, 20,000-member Adviser Corps would develop doctrine and oversee the training and deployment of 750 advisory teams of 25 soldiers each, organized into three 250-team divisions. Each division would be commanded by a major general who would deploy with the teams on their yearlong advisory tours. Service members would be transferred to the Adviser Corps for a standard three-year Army tour of duty, during which they should expect to deploy for one year and then hand off the mission to the next advisory division, facilitating the consolidation of lessons learned. Upon the end of their combat tours, some advisers could remain at the Adviser Corps as trainers and doctrine writers, while others could return to the conventional Army sporting their new "Combat Adviser" tab, which should give them a competitive advantage for promotion as the advisory mission becomes the Army's main effort.

Failing the creation of standing advisory forces, the Army at the very least could establish a U.S. Army adviser command led by a lieutenant general with responsibility for improving performance in all areas of the advisory mission. The lieutenant general leading the adviser command would have overall responsibility for all combat adviser training and employment in the U.S. Army -- a Title 10 "force provider" role. He would command a staff and school that would develop doctrine for combat advisers and train them for operational employment. He would also have an advisory role to combatant commanders employing his combat advisers, and could conceivably deploy into theater to serve as the senior adviser to a foreign ministry of defense. Most important, he or she would be the advocate (.pdf) for all aspects of the adviser mission within the institutional Army.

The idea of forming standing advisory forces was endorsed by both Sen. John McCain and then-Sen. Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential campaign, although it has not yet been fully implemented.

In an attempt to at least partially meet these demands, in 2012 Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno attempted to optimize four of the Army National Guard's 28 brigade combat teams for the advisory mission. The idea was rejected by the seven affected state adjutants general, who noted that the plan "does not appear to be a realistic option" because it would create a mismatch between the active-duty Army and the Guard. "'Advise and assist' is a mission that is and has been conducted by [brigade combat teams], not a viable force structure," they wrote.

If the mission is important enough to structure, organize and train National Guard brigades for it, the adjutants general sensibly suggest, the regular Army should build units for that purpose, and the Guard would then follow its lead. It is particularly remarkable that the Army has still not built dedicated units for this mission given that the entire Army mission in Afghanistan will likely shift to an advise and assist one by 2014.

THE WAY AHEAD

> The conventional forces of the United States Army will have an enduring requirement to build the security forces and security ministries of other countries. This requirement is consequently not an aberration, unique to Iraq and Afghanistan. Planning, training, doctrine and acquisition must take account of this mission and support it.
>
> - Retired Lt. Gen. James Dubik

Of the six logical lines of operations for a counterinsurgency enumerated in the Army's counterinsurgency field manual, only "Developing Host Nation Security Forces" has its own chapter. This demonstrates both the extreme importance of developing host-nation security forces in a counterinsurgency campaign and the lack of doctrine for and understanding of this mission in the

Army and Marine Corps at the time the manual was published in 2006. Developing and advising host-nation forces is both a campaign in itself and a component of the broader irregular warfare campaign plan. Its success largely determines at what point the main effort of the intervening power can shift from doing the fighting itself to assisting the host-nation forces in doing so. The exit strategy in any irregular warfare campaign is a government able to stand largely on its own, with its security forces able to defeat internal threats.

The continuing requirement for advisers in Afghanistan after the end of the American combat mission there in 2014 as well as the other important security-cooperation efforts encompassed in the long war against radical extremism will continue to outstrip the capacity of the Special Forces to meet demand for security forces assistance. It will thus remain necessary for conventional-purpose forces to be organized, trained, equipped and employed as advisers for as long as the United States remains engaged in this fight.

Other than deterring conventional war, training host-nation security forces is likely to be the Army's most important mission. We need to do it better if we want to win. □

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Photo: A Navy mechanic supervises a generator reassembly by members of Afghanistan's National Army, Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan, July 10, 2011 (U.S. Navy photo by Spc. 1st Class Russell Stewart).

CAPACITY-BUILDING KEY TO AFRICOM'S MISSION



BY LESLEY ANNE WARNER

Across the globe, partner capacity-building through steady-state theater security cooperation (.pdf) plays an increasingly important role in the forward defense posture of the United States. The Defense Department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (.pdf) identifies building the security capacity of partner states as a key mission, while the 2010 National Security Strategy (.pdf) argues that the United States can advance its national security by enabling partner states to prevent, deter and respond to transnational security challenges before they pose a threat to U.S. citizens, interests or the homeland. Moreover, at a time of budgetary constraints, partner capacity-building through theater security cooperation can be a means for sharing the cost and responsibility of responding to global security challenges, thus reducing the burden on U.S. resources and military personnel.

Throughout an area of responsibility that includes 53 countries, theater security cooperation is a core function for U.S. Africa Command (Africom). With an emphasis on promoting military professionalism, improving operational capabilities and facilitating regional cooperation, Africom seeks to build the capacity of African militaries to prevent conflict as well as lead military responses to emerging crises if necessary, thus preventing transnational threats from transcending the African continent. Theater security cooperation also increases the likelihood that partner nations will allow U.S. forces peacetime and contingency access, which can be a critical enabler for missions such as the recent noncombatant evacuation operation from the U.S. Embassy in Bangui, Central African Republic, or countering piracy off the coast of Somalia.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

Several of Africom's security cooperation activities consist of training programs and joint military exercises. Funded and managed by the State Department, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program trains African peacekeepers on issues that include refugee management and convoy escort procedures, and provides equipment for deployments on peacekeeping missions, such as field medical equipment and mine detectors. ACOTA also has a "train the trainer" element intended to make the program more self-sustaining over time. Approximately 25,000 African peacekeepers are deployed in support of United Nations and African Union peacekeeping missions at any given time. Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Ghana are some of the leading African contributors (.pdf) to U.N. peacekeeping operations, participating in missions (.pdf) from Haiti to Lebanon to Côte d'Ivoire. In addition to preparing African militaries for such deployments, the ACOTA program also seeks to improve the readiness of African militaries to respond to crises on the continent.

Each year, Africom also holds more than a dozen military exercises across the continent, using real-time, simulated operations to build operational capacity, enhance regional cooperation and increase interoperability. One such exercise is Obangame Express, a multinational naval exercise that focuses on improving the capacity of Gulf of Guinea maritime security forces to counter piracy and other illicit maritime activity. Another exercise, Flintlock, is held in North and West Africa and seeks to build small-unit special forces and counterterrorism capacity. Africom also conducts exercises to improve medical capabilities and readiness, as in Med Accord South in Botswana, and to improve disaster-response planning and preparedness for complex humanitarian emergencies, as in the Pandemic Disaster

Response Tabletop Exercises in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and elsewhere on the continent.

Equally important to building the operational capacity of African militaries are programs that focus on military professionalism and technical training. Through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET programs, African military and civilian personnel can attend Professional Military Education institutions in the United States such as the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval Postgraduate School. These programs also cover officer and enlisted professional development and leadership; technical training on maintenance, logistics and engineering; and the deployment of mobile training teams to African countries to cover topics such as anti-terrorism and force protection, military justice and small-boat operations and tactics. On both personal and institutional levels, these educational and training opportunities are integral to U.S. efforts to foster long-term relationships with individuals who may later assume leadership positions in African defense sectors. More importantly, such training exposes African participants to U.S. norms and democratic principles, such as respect for human rights and the subordination of the military to civilian authority.

Africom's efforts to promote military professionalism extend to defense sector reform in post-conflict countries. Part of Africom's engagement in these countries entails mentoring and advising defense ministries that tend to be either nascent institutions, as in South Sudan, or ones that have been weakened by conflict, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia. Institutional reform in these countries is directed toward addressing capacity gaps in areas like budgeting and human resource management to ensure that defense ministries are capable of managing, sustaining and employing the countries' armed forces. Such engagement also seeks to increase the accountability of the armed forces to civilian authority and make it more likely that Africom's investments in security cooperation are eventually supported by sound institutions in the long term.

Until the current fiscal year, Africom's service component commands -- U.S. Marine Forces Africa, U.S. Army Africa, U.S. Navy Africa and U.S. Air Force Africa -- had no assigned forces. Requests for forces for theater security cooperation engagements were thus made through the Global Force Management process, and had to compete with requests from other combatant commands. The absence of a reliable source of manpower was a constraint to Africom's efforts to foster strong military-to-military relationships in Africa and expand partner capacity-building activities. In fiscal year 2013, however, U.S. Army Africa has been assigned a regionally aligned brigade that will deploy to the continent in small teams to conduct 96 security cooperation engagements in 35 countries. This new concept of operations for security cooperation in Africom's area of responsibility is consistent with the Department of Defense's vision articulated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (.pdf) to build partner military capabilities through low-cost, small-footprint approaches that rely on rotational presence and bilateral or multilateral training exercises.

CHALLENGES TO THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

Most of the challenges that Africom's security cooperation efforts face are a function of broader planning and execution challenges within the U.S. government. As a result, few are unique to Africom in particular.

Among the most prominent of these are the complex dynamics of coordinating U.S. government engagement across multiple agencies and funding streams. There are more than 30 U.S. government agencies, programs and initiatives that can play a role in U.S. engagement with Africa. The Defense Department supports and at times is supported by various other U.S. government agencies on the continent. While not all interagency engagement in Africa concerns security, some non-Defense Department activities overlap with Africom's theater security cooperation activities. For example, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Department of Justice and the Defense Department all have a role to play in countering narcotics trafficking through West Africa and the Sahel, from vetting, training and equipping partner nation counternarcotics forces to assisting with justice system reform. Another example is the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration's work with

fisheries ministries in the Gulf of Guinea on fisheries management and enforcement in partnership with the U.S. Navy as part of the Africa Partnership Station program.

Non-Defense Department agencies bring niche subject matter expertise, nonmilitary resources and existing relationships with African counterparts. Yet, in spite of these examples of convergent security-related interests in Africa, each agency that operates on the continent has its own objectives, planning cycles, allocation of resources and preferred methods of bilateral or regional engagement, which can result in a multiagency, rather than an interagency approach. Consequently, the U.S. government continues to pursue reforms (.pdf) to improve security cooperation planning and coordination within the interagency process.

The complex patchwork of funding authorities (.pdf) and the legal, regulatory and fiscal constraints that accompany them further hamper security-cooperation planning and execution in Africa. The process of determining what kind of funding can be used for particular security cooperation activities can be complicated. Theater security cooperation in Africom's area of responsibility uses a mix of funding authorities, primarily under Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) and Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code. The former is overseen by the State Department, and includes funds for the International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement programs. (Though these funds are supervised and directed by the State Department, they may be turned over to the Defense Department for execution.) The latter is overseen by the Defense Department, but requires State Department concurrence, and includes funds for the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund and the Counter-Narco-Terrorism and Combating Terrorism Fellowship programs. Other temporary albeit renewable authorities used in Africom's area of responsibility include Section 1206 (.pdf) (Global Train and Equip) and the now-expired Section 1207 (.pdf) (Security and Stabilization Assistance) of the fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. These different funding authorities have resource allocation and congressional approval timelines of up to two years and require congressional approval for allocated funds to be moved from one country to another, or from one theater security cooperation activity to another.

Further complicating matters, in order to carry out a given theater security cooperation activity, Africom may need to procure funding from multiple sources with different time horizons during which the funds can be used. In addition, under certain authorities, there may be restrictions on the types of activities that can be funded. For example, for Africa Partnership Station, some authorities cover the participation of U.S. Navy forces and assets, while others cover training and equipping African maritime security forces. There may also be restrictions on the types of security institutions that can be engaged within the partner nation, despite what Africom or the partner nation believe to be most appropriate in light of their objectives. These types of challenges constrain Africom's ability to conduct long-term planning and to sustain programs, as well as its ability to align its activities with the priorities of partner nations and interagency stakeholders. They also make it difficult for Africom to respond to changing conditions within its area of responsibility and capitalize on opportunities for engagement that arise outside of established funding cycles.

A particular challenge for security cooperation in Africa is that, since its inception, Africom has been an "economy of force" combatant command and has had to compete with major theater operations in other parts of the world for resources. Since Africom reached full operational capability in October 2008, resource constraints have impeded planning and execution and contributed to ad hoc, episodic security cooperation engagements. This problem may be mitigated by the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and by the U.S. Army's regionally aligned brigades concept, which is being launched as a pilot program in Africom's area of responsibility this year and will eventually be expanded to cover all six regional combatant commands.

IMPROVING THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

There are many areas for improvement to Africom's security cooperation activities on the continent. Yet since Africom is not a policymaking entity, most of these recommendations fall under the purview

of civilian institutions such as the State Department and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

All combatant commands would benefit from U.S. government efforts to streamline the cumbersome authorities for security cooperation funding and develop more flexible multiyear authorities. The Global Security Contingency Fund (.pdf) (GSCF) established by Congress under Section 1207 of the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act represents a recent attempt to do so for State and Defense Department funding authorities for security assistance. Jointly administered and funded by the State and Defense Departments, this program came about in response to then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates' proposal to remodel security assistance authorities (.pdf) to improve interagency coordination on the funding and execution of theater security cooperation activities. GSCF is a four-year pilot project that is designed to be responsive to unforeseen contingencies. While there remains no parallel mechanism for non-crisis engagements, GSCF could serve as a model for improving interagency coordination for steady-state theater security cooperation.

The availability of a regionally aligned brigade for theater security cooperation is meant to make training engagements less episodic and provide opportunities for more sustained and reliable partnerships with African militaries. These forces also provide an opportunity for Africom to take advantage of opportunities for engagement that may not have been possible without assigned forces. While this is a step forward for Africom's theater security cooperation planning and execution, these forces both support, and are supported by, other U.S. government engagement on the continent. Accordingly, the Defense Department and other U.S. government agencies should capitalize on this opportunity to better integrate interagency and partner nation interests into theater security cooperation activities for a more holistic approach to addressing security challenges in Africa.

Another area for improvement is that of matching funding with regional priorities. If Africom's priority regions are indeed the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and Nigeria, as stated, funding for capacity-building should reflect this. Instead, funding allocations, at least from the State Department's Title 22 funds, favor Morocco and Tunisia. For example, in fiscal year 2011 (.pdf), the bulk of the $45 million in loans or grants provided to Africom partner militaries to acquire training from the U.S. military and purchase U.S.-manufactured military equipment went to those two countries, with $17 million going to Tunisia and $9 million to Morocco. Other major recipients were Liberia ($7 million), Djibouti ($2 million) and Nigeria ($1 million), leaving only $9 million -- a mere 20 percent of Foreign Military Financing funding -- to be allocated to the 40-plus remaining countries in Africom's area of responsibility.

Although it is not within the purview of Africom's security cooperation activities, the U.S. government needs to place a greater priority on police reform in Africa (.pdf). By and large, African police forces tend to be underpaid, poorly trained and insufficiently resourced, which contributes to their lack of professionalism and heavy-handed rules of engagement. Furthermore, many are staffed by those deemed unfit for military service. Using Kenya (.pdf) and Nigeria (.pdf) as examples, police forces tend to be the most frequent perpetrators of domestic human rights violations, with the military being implicated in such abuses mainly when it has been called in to address matters of internal security that the police have proved unable address.

Training foreign law enforcement personnel is restricted by Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Thus, any U.S. involvement in training African police forces would have to be done under a waiver. Much like Africom's security cooperation, police reform touches on the missions of multiple agencies and programs, such as the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and its International Law Enforcement Academies in Botswana and Ghana, as well as the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. Left unaddressed, U.S. restrictions on funding police reform will be a gaping hole in U.S. interagency efforts to build partner security capacity in Africa.

Under the Leahy Amendment, foreign military personnel receiving U.S. training must be vetted for past human rights abuses, and Africom is required by law to comply with this policy. While an

emphasis on human rights is infused into security cooperation activities, it should be mandatory for all military personnel receiving U.S. training to go through a stand-alone human rights training module. Anything less runs the risk of sending the message that respect for human rights is an optional or altogether unimportant part of U.S. military engagement on the continent. That said, while it is impossible to predict what actions trained personnel will take in the future, mandatory human rights training is at the very least in the spirit of "doing no harm."

The U.S. government should also increase efforts to strengthen institutions in Africa, both within and outside of the security sector, and the current crisis in Mali serves as an illustration of why this is imperative. Mali and its neighbors had been part of the U.S. government's Pan-Sahel Initiative and its successor, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, for more than a decade. The leader of the coup that overturned Mali's civilian government in March 2012, Capt. Amadou Sanogo, had been the beneficiary of multiple Defense Department training and professionalization programs in the United States, and Africom had been conducting counterterrorism capacity building in Mali through Operation Enduring Freedom -- Trans-Sahara.

This military-to-military engagement notwithstanding, last spring's coup in Mali demonstrates more than a failure of military training programs. Indeed, U.S.-trained coup-makers were just one example of ineffective U.S. government engagement with the country. Despite the fact that Mali had weak institutions and little more than the formal trappings of democracy, the U.S. government approached Mali as if it were a functional democracy committed to good governance. In 2006, for instance, it was awarded a five-year $461 million Millennium Challenge Corporation compact to catalyze economic growth and reduce poverty. Nevertheless, present-day Mali has little to show in terms of good governance, rule of law or the subordination of the military to civilian authority.

For Africom, the situation in Mali begs a broader question about its nonoperational security cooperation role, as efforts to professionalize partner militaries may be necessary but insufficient for stability. In fact, if outgoing commander Gen. Carter Ham's recent comments are any indication, Africom may be in the process of rethinking its approach to security cooperation. When asked about what went wrong with counterterrorism training in Mali, Ham responded that U.S. training focused almost exclusively on tactical and technical competence, and perhaps not enough on values, ethics and military ethos. Events in Mali demonstrate the potential merit in an increased focus on values and institutional capacity, even at the expense of more operationally focused security cooperation. Africom's efforts toward defense sector reform in postconflict countries are an example of this less kinetic approach, but it should be expanded to countries that are steady-state or at risk of violent conflict. The reality, however, is that these areas of focus have less tangible benefits than Africom's counterterrorism operations or its train-and-equip programs, and would only have a measureable impact over the long term. As a result, this may not be a long-lived period of introspection for Africom.

Since its creation five years ago, U.S. Africa Command has adapted to respond to the changing security environment as presented both by the African continent and U.S. national security priorities. While the African Union Mission in Somalia and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali demonstrate that Africom can be a facilitator of African solutions to African problems, incidents like the coup in Mali highlight the limits of building partner military capacity. Because of this complicated landscape, theater security cooperation in the Africom area of responsibility will continue to evolve as part of the United States' small-footprint, forward defense posture. □

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Photo: U.S.-Ghana navy training session, March 15, 2010, Sekondi, Ghana (U.S. Navy photo by Spc. 2nd Class John Stratton).

PARTNERSHIP, RESPECT GUIDE U.S. MILITARY ROLE IN PHILIPPINES

BY DAVID MAXWELL

As the United States military prepares to move beyond Iraq and Afghanistan and develop new strategies, operating concepts and organizations, policymakers are asking whether there are any useful lessons to be learned from the more than decade-long global war on terrorism. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) is an instructive case that can provide possible considerations for the future.

The U.S. military's experience in the Philippines is particularly relevant, as the December 2012 Army Capstone Concept guiding the service's future operations envisions regionally focused brigade combat teams with the ability to conduct security force assistance with host-nation forces. More importantly, the Capstone Concept recognizes the importance of conventional and special operations forces interdependence, which it defines as "the deliberate and mutual reliance by one force on another's inherent capabilities designed to provide complementary and reinforcing effects."

OEF-P and operations by U.S. special operations forces in the Philippines are best characterized by the definition of "special warfare" given in in the Army's August 2012 doctrinal publication "Special Operations":

> Special warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and non-lethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain or hostile environment.

Any successes OEF-P may have achieved rest on five pillars. First, a thorough strategic to tactical assessment that informed the strategy and campaign plan, as well as continued assessment throughout the duration of the mission. Second, a deep understanding of unconventional warfare, and the ability to counter it with what is known as "foreign internal defense." Third, established, long-term relationships and a sustained commitment over time by the U.S. military and U.S. country team. Fourth, respect for host-nation sovereignty and effective interagency collaboration. And fifth, support from conventional forces in key areas such as intelligence, communications, logistics, engineering, medical, aviation and additional personnel for individual staffs.

Many aspects of OEF-P have been described elsewhere, including the capture and killing of key leadership targets, a wide range of civic and humanitarian operations and major combat operations. This essay focuses instead on the five pillars of success outlined above.

BACKGROUND

The Philippines faces numerous threats from insurgent and terrorist organizations that have thrived in under- and ungoverned spaces. These include the Moro insurgencies -- the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front -- that have fought for autonomy and control of ancestral territory in Mindanao. In addition, terrorist organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Rajah Solaiman Movement and the Pentagon Gang, to name some of

the main ones, variously profess to be fighting to establish their own homeland or a pan-Islamic state in the region. More often than not, however, they mainly focus on kidnapping for ransom and other terrorist and criminal activities to gain recruits and resources to sustain their organizations. Finally, both the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People's Army seek to overthrow the Philippine government and pose an internal existential threat to the state. Some of these conflicts are decades old and continue to create significant problems for the government and people throughout the country.

It must be noted that OEF-P deployed under the terms of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force enacted by Congress in response to the 9/11 attacks. As a result, U.S. forces taking part in OEF-P could only advise and assist on operations against terrorist organizations linked to al-Qaida, which covered only the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah. Thus, while the Philippines was assisting the U.S. with its priority effort against al-Qaida-linked terrorist organizations, U.S. forces could not assist the Philippines against the existential threat posed by the communist groups.

Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. special operations forces had conducted routine training in the Philippines, allowing them to develop numerous personal and long-term relationships with members of the Philippine military. In the most significant example, in 2000, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), under the direction of the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Ambassador Michael Sheehan, established a program to organize, train and equip a national-level Philippine military counterterrorism force. Initially known as the Light Reaction Company, this force has since grown into the Light Reaction Battalion, with three companies that are now fully sustained by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The first company was established using U.S. Special Forces as trainers; the second was trained using a combination of U.S. and Philippine Special Forces cadres; and the third was completely trained by the Philippine military and continues to be sustained by it, with periodic exchange training with U.S. Special Forces.

It is within this complex environment, built upon years of combined training, that U.S. forces entered into the post-9/11 world in the Philippines.

OVERVIEW

Along with Plan Colombia and operations in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines is often regarded as an example of a successful anti-terror operation. In reality, though, OEF-P is not the only model for such operations, nor can it be considered a success for U.S. forces. There have been successful operations conducted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines with and without U.S. support. However, there have been no unilateral U.S. operations in the Philippines and, most importantly, U.S. forces in the Philippines play a supporting role. Credit for any and all successes against terrorists and insurgents in the Philippines must go to the Philippine armed forces and government. While some may argue that this is purely semantics, it illustrates one of the key principles that guide the operations of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) -- an understanding of and a respect for sovereignty. This concept is so important it was written into the mission statement:

> JSOTF-P, in coordination with the U.S. Country Team, builds capacity and strengthens the Republic of the Philippines security forces to defeat selected terrorist organizations in order to protect [the Republic of the Philippines] and U.S. citizens and interests from terrorist attack while preserving [Philippine] sovereignty.

In addition to highlighting the importance of preserving Philippine sovereignty, this mission statement also recognizes the need for effective interagency efforts coordinated with the U.S. country team, including the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, the legal attaché, the Regional Security Office and the U.S. intelligence community, among others. Thus, respect for sovereignty and effective interagency collaboration are two key aspects of OEF-P.

As mentioned, OEF-P is also not the only model for operations tied to the war on terrorism; it is one model that may have value in supporting friends, partners or allies in their fight against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency and terrorism. There is no template or "cookie-cutter" solution for these complex environments. Each approach must be built on thorough assessments that provide not just situational awareness, but also, more importantly, situational understanding.

ASSESSMENT

Special operations doctrine requires that forces conduct detailed area studies prior to deployment and that they follow up with area assessment throughout the duration of the operation. This doctrine and training served U.S. special operations forces well in OEF-P. Within 30 days of the Sept. 11 attacks, Special Operations Command Pacific deployed an assessment team led by then-Col. David Fridovich that consisted of hand-picked operators and planners, intelligence and logistics experts as well as a Special Forces A-Team, which had recently completed training the Philippines' Light Reaction Company. This team, in partnership with officers of the Philippine armed forces, conducted a joint assessment of Philippine security strategy beginning at the national command level and at the theater operational headquarters in Mindanao, and then of tactical units on the island of Basilan, where American hostages were being held by the Abu Sayyaf Group.

The assessment formed the basis of the OEF-P campaign plan. The initial plan was comprehensive, calling for advising and assisting the Philippine armed forces throughout Mindanao in order to provide a holistic approach to the complex problems the Philippine armed forces and government faced. However, for political reasons, U.S. support was limited to operations on Basilan, and it was not until 2005 that elements of the campaign developed in the fall of 2001 were implemented in other areas of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.

The assessment and campaign plan were not unprecedented for this type of situation, and Special Operations Command Pacific benefited from the prior experience of those conducting the assessment and planning. Fridovich, now a retired lieutenant general, had commanded a battalion in Haiti and the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Bosnia in addition to his long experience in the Philippines dating back to the 1980s. A number of the hand-picked members of the team had similar experience; all had deployed to the Philippines numerous times before. As another illustration of continuity of experience in the Philippines, from 2005 to 2007, then-Maj. Gen. Fridovich commanded SOCPAC with overall responsibility for OEF-P execution.

In addition to the initial assessment, once Special Forces teams deployed to Basilan, they conducted detailed local community assessments based on their area assessment doctrine and adapted for the Philippines. These assessments looked at 67 areas, from the local economy and security (police and military) to health, infrastructure and education, and were used to prioritize efforts across four broad categories that continue to be conducted today. First, to advise and assist Philippine security forces to create a secure and stable environment. Second, targeted civil-military operations, in which the U.S. supported Philippine-led civic action and humanitarian assistance to improve quality of life for the population, demonstrate government concern for citizens, reduce support to terrorist and insurgent organizations and provide access for security forces in contested areas. Third, information collection and sharing, involving the collection, fusion and dissemination of timely and accurate actionable intelligence to the right units and agencies. Finally, "influence operations," designed to enhance perceptions of government legitimacy by emphasizing the successes of the Philippine armed forces.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND COUNTER-UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

The U.S. military has spent the past decade trying to name complex threats and develop concepts to deal with them. This has resulted in the rediscovery of counterinsurgency and the reintroduction of irregular warfare and many other concepts such as Security Force Assistance (SFA), Building Partner Capacity (BPC), Train, Advise and Assist (TAA), and Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Advise (OTERA), just to name a few. Indeed, it appears that the military has spent more effort trying to name

threats and concepts than understanding the threats and applying proven concepts in response.

However, from a special operations perspective, it is useful to view the unconventional warfare threat as it is defined in doctrine, namely as "activities to enable an insurgency or resistance movement to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government through and with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area."

Though the unconventional actors in the Philippines did not adhere strictly to this definition, they did conduct underground and auxiliary operations as well as guerrilla actions in the form of subversion, sabotage and terrorist activities.

Because of their in-depth knowledge of unconventional warfare, U.S. Special Forces are well-suited to counter such operations and actions. It should also be noted that many of the threats the U.S. and its friends, partners and allies face today and in the future can be analyzed using unconventional warfare doctrine, and through this analysis an understanding can be gained of how opponents plan and conduct operations, execute strategy and use unconventional tactics, techniques and procedures. Such an understanding can in turn inform campaign plans to counter unconventional threats. Such plans can most appropriately be executed through the mission of foreign internal defense that is described in Joint Publication 3-22:

> Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government or in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other threats to their security. The focus of U.S. FID efforts is to support the host nation's internal defense and development, which can be described as the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from the security threats described above.

This definition describes the overall framework for OEF-P, the operations conducted by JSOTF-P in support of the Philippines and the collaboration with the U.S. country team. It should also be noted that OEF-P and JSOTF-P did not use the Army/Marine manual on counterinsurgency, which was not published until 2006, but rather relied on traditional Special Forces and special operations doctrine that has been practiced for more than five decades. This doctrinal foundation, combined with experience in the Philippines -- including many pre-existing personal relationships -- and the understanding of unconventional warfare, made special operations the appropriate force to plan and conduct OEF-P.

CONVENTIONAL-SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTERDEPENDENCE

Yet special operations forces cannot wage counter-unconventional warfare alone, and in fact OEF-P illustrates the Fifth SOF Truth, authored by retired Col. John M. Collins in 1987: "Most special operations require non-SOF assistance." While the U.S. Pacific Command assigned OEF-P to Special Operations Command Pacific for execution, Pacific Command also directed its service components to support the campaign plan.

For example, the U.S. Army Pacific in Hawaii provided logisticians as well as a rotating infantry platoon to provide security for Special Forces base camps. The Army also coordinated the logistics contracting that provided supplies and commercial communications as well as civilian-aviation support. Army intelligence in Hawaii provided analysts who were instrumental in furnishing actionable intelligence that led to the capture or killing of numerous high-value targets. The Army, Navy and Air Force provided fixed-wing aviation support on a rotating basis. Marine Forces Pacific provided security forces to secure the JSOTF-P headquarters, and elements of its radio battalion from Hawaii provided critical signals-intercept support.

The Army, Marines and Navy provided engineers and construction battalions to build roads and support other civic action projects that were critical to the civil-military operations effort. The

Navy provided a staging base aboard the USNS Stockholm along with surveillance drone and helicopter support. As part of its Pacific Partnership initiative, the Navy also deployed the USNS Mercy to provide medical treatment to the local population as well as a medical and engineer task force aboard the USS Peleliu to support JSOTF-P operations in Mindanao. The Army and the Marines also periodically deployed forces during their annual Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises to conduct short-duration combined training with Philippine Army and Marine ground combat forces. Finally, all four services provided individual staff to the JSOTF-P.

This snapshot of conventional force participation in OEF-P illustrates the effectiveness of conventional and special operations forces interdependence as envisioned in the Army Capstone Concept. Notably, OEF-P is also an example of the so-called light footprint, because the size of the task force averaged around 600 personnel over time while operating from more than 15 locations spread throughout Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, making it a very logistically challenging operation as well.

CHALLENGES

Operations in the Philippines were not without challenges and friction. The media environment was complex, as the local and national opposition press worked hard to discredit Philippine and U.S. military cooperation. Examples included allegations that the U.S. desired to re-establish permanent bases in the Philippines, and that the U.S. would open a "second front" to conduct operations in the Philippines along the lines of those in Afghanistan. Although effective diplomacy by the U.S. Country Team countered these allegations, it was only over time that demonstrated actions of the U.S. military eventually allayed these fears. Most important to proving to the local population that a second front would not be opened was that U.S. ground combat forces were never deployed to the operational area.

From a resourcing perspective, JSOTF-P has faced a number of challenges. During the initial deployment in 2002, no humanitarian funds were available for nearly six months, and creative workarounds had to be developed so that effective civil-military operations could be conducted. For instance, the completion of the Basilan circumferential road executed by the U.S. Navy SEABEEs, U.S. Marine and Philippine Army engineers was justified as a force-protection measure to support the movement of military forces, rather than as a farm-to-market road to improve the livelihoods of the local population.

Moreover, JSOTF-P was never authorized funds under the Commander's Emergency Response Program, as were provided for Iraq and Afghanistan operations. Instead JSOTF-P had to rely on peacetime humanitarian assistance processes, including contracting services that required competitive contracting awards. This led to businesses outside of Mindanao underbidding contracts and preventing local companies from benefiting from support to civic action projects. Creative workarounds had to be found for this so as not to cause local resistance to operations. However, this illustrates the need for peacetime processes and regulations to be adjusted during operations that require agile and flexible support.

Authorities were also a challenge, because a blending of authorities under U.S. Code Title 22 Security Assistance and Title 10 Military Operations caused friction in the way in which training advisory assistance to operations could be conducted. These were eventually overcome with clear execution orders delineating not only authorities but also processes and responsibilities. Still, many peacetime regulations persisted, resulting in lost opportunities for, among other things, the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

CONCLUSION

OEF-P continues to support the United States' longest-standing treaty ally in its fight against insurgency and terrorism. In developing strategy and supporting campaign plans, it is important that the right forces be tasked to conduct the right missions. OEF-P should be seen as an example of the kind of

operation where it is appropriate for special operations forces to lead by conducting operations based on its special warfare abilities, especially when the U.S. or its friends, partners and allies are faced with unconventional warfare threats. However, it is also an example of conventional and special operations forces interdependence, and future U.S. operations may require similar relationships.

In addition, what made special operations forces well-suited for OEF-P was their long experience working with Philippine counterparts and the resulting relationships they formed, which proved extremely beneficial after 9/11. The author himself, for example, was classmates in 1985 with the man who would later became the first commander of the Philippine army and then of the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines. This is just one example of the relationships between special operations and host-nation forces; there are many Special Forces noncommissioned officers with even deeper ties because of the amount of time they spent working in the Philippines. Similar relationships exist around the world among Special Forces and host-nation military personnel.

The ability to conduct a thorough assessment to inform the strategy and campaign plan also cannot be emphasized enough. While many operations are characterized by speed, special warfare often benefits from being slow and deliberate, particularly in designing a long-term strategy and campaign plan. When then-Col. Fridovich was asked by the commander of Pacific Command how long the Philippines mission would take, he replied that by advising and assisting the Philippines and not conducting operations for them, it would require at least a decade of sustained support. This prediction has been borne out, as this sustained support has contributed to significant improvements in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, improving local governance and the welfare of the population; a degradation of the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah, including significant leadership losses; successful and relatively peaceful local and national democratic elections in 2007 and 2010 on Jolo Island; and perhaps most importantly the signing of a peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front last year resulting in the framework for a political settlement to the insurgency. The initial and continuous assessments have been critical in developing and then adapting the campaign plan and allocating resources to support the Philippines.

Finally, the concept of supporting the Philippines versus the U.S. taking the lead is a critical component of OEF-P. Respect for sovereignty underpins all operations, and while there is some frustration among those who would like to be able to conduct U.S. unilateral operations to capture or kill high-value targets as in other theaters, U.S. forces in the Philippines understand how counterproductive such operations would be, both by violating sovereignty and perhaps more importantly by undermining the legitimacy of the Philippine armed forces and government. Special operations forces are used to conducting operations without being charged with the main effort, and that experience has served them well in the Philippines and other operations, as in Colombia.

In conclusion, OEF-P offers some examples for how to conduct special warfare to counter unconventional warfare threats. Special operations forces, given their doctrine, training, experience and relationships, have the capability to operate effectively in sovereign nations to advise and assist friends, partners and allies in their fight against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency and terrorism. Finally, to counter future unconventional warfare threats, conventional and special operations forces interdependence will be one of the ways to effectively apply the military instrument of power to achieve U.S. national security objectives. In this context, OEF-P provides valuable lessons to support that interdependence. □

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Photo: Members of the Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) participate in live-fire exercise while receiving training with the U. S. Army Special Forces, Zamboanga, Philippines, Mar. 21, 2003 (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Edward G. Martens).

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Cover image: Philippine Marine Battalion Landing Team members and U.S. Navy Riverine Squadron One Sailors carry a small boat to the beach, Inawangan, Philippines, July 3, 2011 (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Robert Clowney).