


The Future of HUMINT

I was inspired by my 2010 interview as a candidate for DISL Senior HUMINT Expert for DIA/DH, and while not selected, was driven to think more deeply about HUMINT as a whole. This led to my drafting an original monograph on HUMINT, cleared for publication by both DoD and CIA, which can be found at <http://tinyurl.com/Steele-HUMINT>. Up front: **POTUS benefits directly and immediately** from an Open Source Agency producing OSINT that can be politically and economically powerful right here right now.

On this page and the next three pages are several graphics I would be glad to discuss at any time. I have devoted a lifetime to thinking about both the reinvention of intelligence and the reinvention of national security, and would like very much to put that knowledge to work at the Department level.




HUMINT is the premier discipline, if managed correctly, precisely because it can provide context, nuance, precision targeting, collection of non-digital close hold information including early warning, and “aha” experiences that are simply not available from the technical systems, most of which are known.

I imagine that there have been improvements since I developed a comprehensive and alarming evaluation in 2012 (shown on next page) but I would be remiss in applying for this position if I did not declare in advance my belief that we are in dire circumstances and need the equivalent of a HUMINT/OSINT “Manhattan Project” going forward, one that addresses both the vital contributions HUMINT can make to ALL mission areas as well as the technical collection disciplines, and the importance of all-source processing of which overt and covert HUMINT must become a much larger and more visible element, offering interactive near-real-time inter-disciplinary support, at all four levels of DoD performance and futures planning (strategic, operational, tactical, technical/acquisition).

USA HUMINT/OSINT 2012	Strategic	Operational	Tactical	Technical
01 HUMAN INTELLIGENCE Clandestine	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Red
02 HUMAN INTELLIGENCE Covert	Red	Red	Yellow	Red
03 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Offensive	Red	Red	Red	Red
04 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Defensive	Yellow	Red	Red	Red
05 Service Covert Hides, Coast Watchers, Picket Lines	Red	Red	Red	Red
06 Service Interrogator- Translator Teams (ITT)	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Red
07 Human Terrain Teams (HTT), Maritime Teams (MT)	Red	Red	Red	Red
08 Defense Attaches, MAG, Liaison, TDY	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Red
09 Overt Subject Matter Experts (SME)	Yellow	Red	Red	Yellow
10 Document Discovery & Exploitation	Yellow	Red	Red	Yellow
11 Close-In Observation & Listening Webcams/Audio	Red	Red	Yellow	Red
12 Service Inspector General (IG) / Red Team Exercises	Red	Red	Red	Red
13 Operational Test & Evaluation	Red	Red	Red	Red
14 Service Individual Eyes and Ears	Red	Red	Yellow	Red
15 Citizen/Foreign Volunteers & Walk-Ins	Red	Red	Red	Red

OMB has twice approved an Open Source Agency (OSA) at IOC \$125M FOC \$2B. USDI offered SOCOM executive agency at this level of funding a decade ago, and they turned it down (General Schoomaker and Adm Steffens had moved on by then) – SOCOM is still a good place to do out of the way HUMINT innovation hidden inside of OSINT innovation. Imagine an OSA with a million human sources many of them unwitting spotters, 100,000 of them trained assessors, 10,000 overt-covert human handlers, 10,000 or more covert human assets, and 1,000 human recruiters while meeting 95% of the decision-support needs of all levels of command across all mission areas, instead of 4% for major commanders and little for all others, with 80-90% overt HUMINT, 10-20% covert HUMINT.

“Do not send a spy where a schoolboy can go.” OSINT is HUMINT. If that is not understood, we will fail at HUMINT. It is a mistake to focus HUMINT (and OSINT) only on kinetic and cyber threats. NGIC had the right idea in the 1990’s with GRAND VIEW – we have to cover the whole, understanding all of the indicators of strength and weakness in any given country (or non-state actor), we have to cover all threats, all policies, all costs, to arrive at integrated appreciations. HUMINT is ready for a break-out.



Counterintelligence is “root” and an aspect of HUMINT that in my view is under-funded and not receiving the command emphasis it merits. I believe we should do more in this domain – if you don’t get counterintelligence right, then it is too easy to be deceived in each of the secret disciplines: HUMINT lies, SIGINT “talking rocks,” IMINT concealment and deception, MASINT farts, OSINT “fake news.” If I have learned one thing in the past forty years, it is that counterintelligence does not get enough respect.

HUMINT is not a substitute for the technical disciplines but HUMINT is “root” for all-source intelligence (not just collection but processing and presentation as well); for strategy; for force structure; for campaign planning; and for winning. If we are indeed providing only 4% of what a major commander needs (and little for everyone else), then what we collect, process, exploit, and report is out of whack. I have a very clear idea of how the HUMINT Division can be a catalyst for USDI progress on all fronts.


HUMINT – like the infantry – takes 80% of the casualties while getting 1% of the budget, notionally speaking. If there is one single point of intervention for USDI to go to the next level, it is HUMINT, both as its own discipline, and as a blended partner to all the other elements of USDI. Nothing would please me more than to come in from the cold and help the USDI power-up DoD HUMINT.

If selected for an interview, I offer for discussion a seven item staff package that proposes that USDI reactivate the previously considered Open Source Agency (OSA) approved by OMB twice and offered by USDI to SOCOM at IOC \$125M FOC \$2B. SOCOM declined. Instead of assigning the OSA to just one command, I recommend five nodes as listed below:

- National Defense University, with a focus on Whole of Government & Multinational IO
 - Advantage: close to WH, USDI, supports education, research, Whole of Government ops
- Allied Command Transformation, node to be located at Dam Neck near DEVGRU and NMITC
 - Advantage: supports transformation, multinational, acquisition, and DEVGRU/NMITC
- McDill under joint SOCOM-CENTCOM oversight with cells at each of the other strategic commands
 - Advantage: supports warfighting directly with particular attention to GWOT and OOTW
- A White House cell of six people, and a restricted program OSCAR SIERRA, are also recommended.

The benefits to clandestine and covert HUMINT can be discussed during an interview, if I am selected for an interview, or at a separate meeting completely outside the recruiting process if preferred.

The below graphic shows the explicit Presidential enabling and empowering aspects of an Open Source Agency that places into the White House a six person President’s Own decision-support unit controlled by USDI, along with, if approved, a Presidential Studio and a small truth channel social media ecology also controlled by USDI, that are pilot projects at the intersection of public education and national intelligence. I have had this vision for some time – the announcement of the position for which I am applying is fortuitous but I would stress that even if I am not interviewed or selected, I commend these ideas to USDI as they will **enable and empower the President** with OSINT that is politically and economically priceless precisely because it can be shared openly with the public, Congress, the media, and foreign allies. Clandestine and covert HUMINT, and both offensive and defensive counterintelligence, will all be made possible, faster, better, cheaper, with an OSA as a foundation.



All seven of the documents in my staffing package can be shared or downloaded for printing at <https://tinyurl.com/USDI-HUMINT> or <https://unrig.net/2001/09/11/dropbox/>
 Password OscarSierra