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AFRICA SUMMARY


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2021 Dated Information

The expeditionary environment countries in **Africa** are those that are shaded in gray on the accompanying map. Many countries can be characterized by government instability, frequent violence, economic underdevelopment, and acute poverty. The crisis-torn west **African** country of **Liberia** is an example of an ongoing conflict with poor prospects for resolution in the immediate future. To protect U.S. interests, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) has been committed in this country to conduct Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and maintain order around the U.S. Embassy. In **Ethiopia**, civil war and starvation continue to prevail, while a corrupt and unstable Marxist regime struggles to remain in power. As the **South African** Government continues to support its policy of apartheid and black **African** groups fight among themselves, there is potential for serious consequences in this country. A number of other volatile conditions in the region make it very likely that there will be further commitment of Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) to **African** countries in the future. **African** countries are primarily involved as transit points for heroin, cocaine, and marijuana enroute to **Europe** and the **U.S.** The drug trade will probably expand in this region during the 1990s. Terrorism in **Africa** is mainly carried out by insurgent groups. The **South African** National Congress has reportedly used terrorist tactics while operating in **Namibia**. A number of **African** countries such as **Angola**, **Algeria**, **Somalia**, **South Africa**, and **Uganda** are buyers of illicit weapons. When considering the three areas of drug trafficking, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, **Africa** was the region with the lowest overall threat. Most countries in **Africa** were found to have moderate size Orders of Battle (OOBs). Countries with the most significant capabilities were **South Africa**, **Ethiopia**, **Algeria**, and **Angola**. **Ethiopia** had the region's largest ground OOB, while **South Africa** registered the biggest air and naval OOBs. Although the forces of most **African** countries are somewhat modest compared to those of other regions, MAGTFs should be prepared to meet some strong opposition, including non-Soviet systems obtained from countries allied or nominally friendly to the **U.S.** The non-Soviet systems will complicate MAGTF electronic warfare planning, signals intelligence, and communications because the shared frequency spectrum could lead to jamming of friendly units as well as the enemy. In the region, only **South Africa** is reliably known to possess chemical weapons and is attempting to develop nuclear weapons. As these weapons proliferate, there is the possibility they may be used by terrorist and insurgent groups. Overall in **Africa**, **Algeria** and **South Africa** emerged as most representative of general conditions in the geographic region.

Many **African** countries have a mix of cultures that are heavily influenced by **America** and **Europe**. Often times, native languages and tribal religions are present along with frequently spoken **English**, **French**, and **German**, and the Christian religion. The Arabic language and Islamic religion predominate in the northern and north-eastern **African** nations. The cultures of **Africa** are quite different from that of the **U.S.** In assessing the climates of the region, it was found that there were a variety of conditions, including some of the most challenging. In **Liberia**, **Madagascar**, and **Zaire** the weather is wet and hot, while in **Angola**, **Djibouti**, **Somalia**, and the **Sudan** it is mainly dry and hot. **South Africa** and **Namibia** have the best conditions, dry and warm, with the rest of the region's countries having mixed conditions. Over half the countries (8) had mainly desert terrain, while four were mountainous, and three were largely jungle. The region was almost evenly split between those countries suited for cross-country vehicular movement (6), and those that were not (7). Two countries were partially suited. Nine of the 15 countries assessed had poor intervisibility which restricts the exploitation of line of sight weapons designed for engagements at 2,000 to 3,000 meters. All of the countries, except for **Uganda** and **Zimbabwe** which are landlocked and some distance from the coast, had hydrographic conditions which permit NGF platforms to adequately support operations ashore. However, when evaluating NGF capabilities versus the coastal threat, six countries were found to have coastal defense weapons that could out-range the standard 5-inch guns on most NGF platforms. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy is a serious concern in this region. Eight countries, including **Ethiopia**, **Liberia**, and **South Africa**, have only partial coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps while seven nations, such as **Angola**, **Namibia**, and **Uganda**, have none at all. MAGTFs operating in these latter countries would have to rely heavily on Multispectral Imagery. In assessing strategic mobility, 60 percent of the countries have one or more airfields capable of receiving C-5 aircraft. Conversely, over half the countries have ports with less than adequate capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift. Key installations in **South Africa** may include facilities for the development and storage of nuclear and chemical weapons. **Algeria**, **Angola**, and **Tunisia** all have oil fields. When assessing the response times of sea-based Marine forces, it was determined that only **Algeria** and **Tunisia** could be reached in less than two days. An ARG could arrive at **Djibouti** in two to four days, and **Kenya**, **Madagascar**, and **Somalia** could be reached in four to six days. The remaining countries would require sea-based deployment times in excess of six days. NEO would be highly difficult for a MEU to execute in about two-thirds of the countries due to the large number of evacuees and the lengthy over land distances to the likely evacuation sites. The MEU's CH-46 helicopter with its limited range and lift capabilities, would have a difficult time supporting the NEO requirement. Overall, **Africa** emerged as a likely environment for employment of expeditionary forces in the 1990s. The region is generally a mid-level mix of threats and conditions where a number of unforeseen events could occur that would require a response by MAGTFs.

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AFRICA

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AFRICA

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TAB</u>
ALGERIA	1
ANGOLA	2
DJIBOUTI	3
ETHIOPIA	4
KENYA	5
LIBERIA	6
MADAGASCAR	7
NAMIBIA	8
SOMALIA	9
SOUTH AFRICA	10
SUDAN	11
TUNISIA	12
UGANDA	13
ZAIRE	14
ZIMBABWE	15

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ALGERIA

MEF G-2:	CG II MEF//G-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 484-8095
Theater J-2:	USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 430-8003
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-4377
Embassy Defense Attache:	USDAO ALGIERS AG//DATT//
Telephone:	(00213) 2601186/2601225, EXT 7032/7035




SUMMARY

Algeria is the second largest nation in **Africa** and has a coastline stretching 620 miles. Its foreign policy is one of independence and nonalignment and is frequently a leading proponent of the Third World viewpoint in international affairs. In recent years **U.S.** relations with **Algeria** have significantly improved. The **U.S.** and **Algeria** are trading partners and the **U.S.** imports some **Algerian** petroleum products. Over 300 **U.S.** citizens live in the country. In the region, **Algeria** has the largest air OOB and second largest ground and naval OOBs. Most of the military equipment is furnished by the **Soviet Union** and, **Soviet** advisors assist with operational training. The armed forces are oriented primarily toward its borders with **Morocco** and **Libya**. Over the past several years, defense related expenditures have amounted to between six and almost 10 percent of its total budget.

The **Algerian** culture is different from that of the **U.S.** The topography consists of three zones parallel to the **Mediterranean Sea** and separated by mountain ranges. There is a fertile plain along the coast backed by the **Tellian Atlas Mountains**. In the central region there is a high plateau followed to the south by the **Saharan Atlas Mountains**. In the south there is mainly desert. Generally, the summers are hot and dry with rain in the winter. Dust and sandstorms frequently occur between February and May. About two-thirds of **Algeria** is suitable for cross-country movement of vehicles. Average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) usually exceeds 2,000 meters except when limited by weather conditions. NGF ships can approach the coast to provide support for operations ashore, but would be severely out-gunned by coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to coastal areas around **Algiers**, **Mostaganem**, and **Tlemcen**. Airfields are numerous but cannot accommodate C-5 aircraft. There are excellent port facilities to receive strategic sealift. Key installations include a number of oil fields. The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **Algeria** in less than two days. With over 300 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would not be difficult.

ALGERIA - THREAT SUMMARY




Algeria - 1

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ALGERIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Algeria

- A leading proponent of the Third World viewpoint.
- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

This country is the second largest state in **Africa** and has a **Mediterranean** coastline of 620 miles. **Algeria** defines its foreign policy as one of independence and nonalignment. It is frequently a leading proponent of the Third World viewpoint in international affairs. In recent years, **U.S.** relations with **Algeria** have improved and can now be characterized as good. The **U.S.** and **Algeria** are trading partners and the **U.S.** imports primarily hydrocarbons, consisting of crude oil, gas condensates, and refined products. Over 300 **U.S.** citizens live there.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	426	2,144	-	2,570	316	4 1	5	Medium

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General Ground OOB

- Second largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-72	Bloc	120	8	228	E

Ground OOB consists of 120,000 troops of which 70,000 are conscripts. There is a military college for officers and a technical school for NCOs at **Blida**. **Soviet** advisors assist with operational training. Tanks: PT-76, T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62, T-72; Artillery: D-30, D-44, FROG SSM, ISU-152, M-30, M-1931, M-1937, M-1938, M-1942, M-1974.

General Air OOB

- Air OOB is the largest in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	12	8	150	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25; Close Air: Il-28, Magister, Mi-24, Su-7, Su-20; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, and SA-13 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- Second largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	7	8	145	E

Ships: 3 Frigates and 4 Corvettes with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: SS-N-2A; Patrol Craft: 9 Fast Attack Craft (Ex-Soviet) with SSMs, guns, and radars; 9 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 1 Coastal Patrol Craft (Ex-Soviet).

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Berber, French)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a significant cultural difference between **Algeria** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
39-82	61	30	Mixed

Algeria's weather is irregular from year to year, but in the north, the summers are usually hot with little rainfall. Winter rains begin in the north in October. Frost and snow are rare except on the highest slopes of the **Tellian Atlas Mountains**. Dust and sandstorms occur most frequently between February and May.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

The terrain consists of three zones roughly parallel to the **Mediterranean Sea** and divided by mountain ranges. The first is a relatively fertile coastal plain backed by the **Tellian Atlas Mountains**. Second there is a high plateau region backed by the **Saharan Atlas Mountains**. The third zone is desert. About 80 percent of the land is desert, wasteland, and mountains.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Algeria** is generally well suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Approximately two-thirds of **Algeria**, primarily the desert region, is suitable for both wheeled and tracked movement. Elsewhere most tracked movement would be precluded by mountains, steep slopes, rough surfaces, and rugged hills.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum, with line of sight distances normally exceeding 2,000 meters in at least half the country.

In about 50 percent of **Algeria**, mainly the desert region, line of sight distances would exceed 2,000 meters. Other parts of the country would be more limited in visibility due to mountains, rugged hills, and other rough terrain.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
52069	1,000	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
FROG SSM	70,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail.	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is limited to the coastal areas surrounding **Algiers, Mostaganem, and Tlemcen.**

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-141B aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
11	10 C-141B 1 C-130	4/7	>5/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Ain Oussera	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Bechar (Leger)	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.
El Mellah (Annaba)	C-141B, C-130	-
Hovari/Boumediene (Algiers)	C-141B, C-130	-
Laghovet	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Noumerate (Ghardaia)	C-141B, C-130	-
Ouargla	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Reggani	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Tafaraoui (Oran)	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Tamanrasset	C-141B, C-130	-
Tindouf	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

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Ports

- Good port facilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Annaba	Medium	36-40/66-70	31-35	Yes
Skikda	Small	Over 76/Over 76	46-50	Yes
Bejaia	Small	41-45/31-35	41-45	Yes
Alger	Large	71-75/46-50	31-35	Yes
Mostaganem	Small	26-30/46-50	26-30	Yes
Arzew	Small	31-35/46-50	31-35	Yes
Oran	Large	Over 76/36-40	41-45	Yes

Key Installations

Oil fields are located in the area of **Hassi Messaoud-Haoud el Hamra** in the northeastern part of the **Sahara** and along the **Libyan** border at **Zarzaitine** and **Edjeleh** in the **Palignac** basin. Other smaller fields are found at **Nezla**, **Houad Beraocii**, **Ouargla**, **Messdar**, **El Borma**, **Hassi Keskessa**, and **Guellala**. The newest fields are located at **Touat** in **Adrar**, **Moukhag El Kebach** in **El Hadjira**, and at **Rhourd Chegga**, northeast of the **Hassi Messaoud** field.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Tunis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Telecomm is above African average - 22 Radio stations - 14 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations 	17,700 km	2,115 km	3	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas 	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic** ARG with its embarked MEU, which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea**, could reach **Algeria** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.


NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Algeria** would not be exceptionally difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
38	316	2 (Algiers)	E

Note: In **Algeria**, the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

ANGOLAMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
STU-III AV 243-4377Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597SUMMARY

Angola has, in recent years, been characterized by intensification of the civil war, its involvement in regional conflicts, and turmoil within the government. Although the regime in power maintains close links with **Cuba** and the **Soviet Union**, it has begun to seek better relations with the **U.S.** and the moderate **African** states. However, conflict continues on a sporadic basis primarily with insurgent forces. The **U.S.** has supported the insurgents against the communist Government in **Luanda** but believes that **Angola** must solve its problems without external interference. Although **Angola** is the third largest trading partner of the **U.S.** in sub-Saharan Africa, overall **U.S.** equity is low. Main **U.S.** interests involve **Angolan** petroleum. **Angola** provides a support base for an insurgent group, the **African National Congress**, which operates in **South Africa** and uses terrorist tactics against civilians and government officials. Within the region, **Angola** maintains the third largest air force, and the fourth largest army and navy. Most military equipment is obtained from the **Soviet Union**. Technical military training and assistance has been provided by **Cuban**, **Soviet**, and **German** advisors.


Located on the southwest coast of **Africa**, **Angola** is about twice the size of **Texas**. It consists of a narrow coastal plain which joins plateau and highland regions. There is a large desert in the south and significant jungle surrounding the enclave of **Cabinda** on the northwest coast. Other than on the coastal plains, **Angola** is poorly suited for cross-country movement of vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters in about two-thirds of the country. While **NGF** ships are able to approach the coast to provide support for operations ashore they would be out-ranged by **Angolan** coastal defense weapons. Coverage of the country by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available. Although port facilities are quite satisfactory there are no airfields that can receive **C-5** aircraft. Key installations include oil fields. The **Atlantic ARG** operating in the **Mediterranean** would require in excess of six days to reach **Angola**.

ANGOLA - THREAT SUMMARY



Angola - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Marxist regime backed by **Cuba**.
- Ongoing civil war with UNITA rebels and Cabinda dissidents.

This former **Portuguese** colony continues to wage its own civil war with the National Union for the Total Independence of **Angola** (UNITA) rebel group and some remaining dissidents in its oil-rich **Cabinda** Province. A Marxist regime with backing from **Cuba** controls the capital, **Luanda**. There has been progress between **South Africa** and **Angola** to settle matters in **Namibia** and possibly **Cabinda** but probably not in **Angola** itself, for the antigovernment UNITA movement seems well entrenched, with the country virtually partitioned.

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U.S. Equities in Angola

- Overall U.S. equity is high.

Although the **Angolan** Government maintains close links with the **Soviet Union** and the **Eastern** bloc, in recent years it has sought better relations with the **West** and the moderate **African** states. However, conflict continues with **South Africa** over independence for **Namibia** and internally with insurgent forces. The **U.S.** supports the insurgents against the Communist Government but believes **Angola** must solve its problems without outside interference. **Angola** is the third largest trading partner of the **U.S.** in sub-Saharan **Africa**. The primary **U.S.** import from **Angola** is petroleum. **U.S.** investment in **Angola** is centered on the petroleum sector.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
251	87	729	-	1,067	-	3 0	3	Low

Terrorism

- **Angola** provides a support base for insurgents employing terrorist tactics in **South Africa**.

Angola provides a support base and installations for the **African National Congress (ANC)** which carries out guerrilla operations against **South Africa**. While chiefly a political and insurgent organization, in recent years it has turned to urban terrorism. The **ANC** has reportedly bombed energy and transportation targets, government officials, security targets, and recently civilians.

Angola - 3

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General Ground OOB

- Fourth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-62	Bloc	50	6	186	D

Ground OOB consists of 36,000 personnel of which 24,000 are conscripts. There is an acute shortage of personnel with technical training. Training assistance is provided by **Cuban, Soviet, and East German** advisors. Tanks: PT-76, T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62; Artillery: 122 mm, 130 mm, 152 mm, SU-100 SP.

General Air OOB

- Third largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	2	6	138	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, MiG-23; Close Air: Mi-24, Su-22; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, SA-13, SA-14, and SA-16 SAMs and AA guns, plus supporting air surveillance radars and command and control facilities. Over 20 radars are reported operational in **Angola**. These sites use a variety of **Soviet** surveillance and search radars including Tall King, Spoon Rest, Bar Lock, Flat Face, Squat Eye, and Side Net systems. The sites reportedly provide integrated coverage up to 20,000 feet.

General Naval OOB

- Fourth largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	Bloc	Bloc	2	6	118	D

Ships: none; SSMs: SS-N-2B; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-**Soviet**) with SSMs, guns, and radars; 4 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Ex-**Soviet**); 4 Large Patrol Craft (Ex-**Portuguese**); 11 Coastal Patrol Craft (5 Ex-**Soviet**, 6 Ex-**Portuguese**).

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Portuguese (Bantu)
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a moderate cultural difference between **Angola** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
71-81	77	13	Dry/Hot

Angola's climate is diverse. The southern regions and the coastal plain up to **Luanda** are semiarid, particularly the desert in the southwest. The north has two seasons; from May to October it is dry and cool; during the November to April rainy season, it is extremely hot and humid.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

Angola consists of a plateau and upland regions with elevations to about 6,000 feet rising from a narrow coastal strip. There is also a desert in the south and a tropical rain forest covering the enclave of **Cabinda** on the northwest coast.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Angola is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Conditions for tracked and wheeled movement are best on the coastal plains and in areas of moderate relief and low vegetation. Approximately two-thirds of Angola offers poor to unsuitable terrain for the movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles. In these areas, movement is restricted by escarpments, forest areas, and savanna.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances normally limited to less than 1,000 meters in about two-thirds of the country.

About two-thirds of Angola presents terrain conditions which limit line of sight distances to less than 1,000 meters. These areas are characterized by escarpments, forest areas, and savanna. Only on the coastal plains and in areas of moderate relief and low vegetation would direct visibility exceed 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
57260/57262	1,500	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
130 mm M-46	27,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage for **Angola** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
11	4 C-141B 6 C-130 1 Inactive C-130	1/10	>5/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Benguela	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Cabinda	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Cuito Cuanavale	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Huambo	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Luanda/4 de Fevereiro	C-141B, C-130	-
Luena (Luso)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Malanje	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Menvague East	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Negage	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Saurimo	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Wako Kungo	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Inactive.

Ports

- Good port facilities to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Luanda	Small	Over 76/Over 76	31-35	Yes
Lobito	Small	Over 76/Over 76	31-35	Yes
Mocamedes	Small	Over 76/31-35	51-55	Yes

Key Installations

Oil fields are found in the **Cuanza River** basin, and along the coast at **Tobias** (about 120 kilometers south of **Luanda** and in the **Cabinda** Enclave.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Fair telecomm - 2 Satellite stations - 29 Radio stations - 2 TV stations	73,828 km	3,075 km	3	11	- Crude oil	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked **MEU** which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** would require in excess of six days to reach **Angola**. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Angola** would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	2 (Luanda)	A

Note: In **Angola**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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DJIBOUTI

MEF G-2:	CG II MEF//G-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 484-8095
Theater J-2:	USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 430-8003
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-4377
Embassy Defense Attache:	USDAO SANAA YE//DATT//
Telephone:	967-2-271-950 THRU 958, EXT 218/219




NOTE: DATT FOR YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC IS ACCREDITED TO THE REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI.

SUMMARY

The Republic of **Djibouti** is located in northeast **Africa** on the **Gulf of Aden**. The **Djiboutian** Government generally adapts positions consistent with **U.S.** and Western interests. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Djibouti** is low. The **U.S.** provides the country about \$3 million in economic assistance annually and **Djibouti** has permitted the **U.S.** Navy access to its seaport and airport. The **Djiboutian** army is very small with about 2,870 volunteers and its air force and navy are practically negligible. A **French** garrison is based at **Djibouti** and provides the country's primary defense as well as training for the small military force.

With the Arabic language and Islamic religion, the culture of **Djibouti** is much different from that of the **U.S.** The climate is hot and humid with little rainfall. The country's topography is divided into three regions: the coastal plain; mountains further inland; and a plateau behind the mountains. Most of the terrain is bare, dry, and desolate, marked by sharp cliffs, deep ravines, burning desert sands, and thorny shrubs. About two-thirds of the country is suitable for cross-country movement of vehicles. In over one-half of **Djibouti** the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would normally be greater than 2,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions would not constrain NGF support and the 5 inch gun employed by most **U.S.** Navy platforms would have the range advantage over **Djiboutian** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to the northern-most corner of **Djibouti**. There is one airfield available which can receive C-141B aircraft and one major port with moderate capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift. **Djibouti** has no industrial facilities and few key installations outside the port and airfield. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **Djibouti** in between two to four days. With few potential evacuees and the probable evacuation site (**Djibouti** city) on the coast, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in this country would not be difficult.

DJIBOUTI - THREAT SUMMARY




Djibouti - 1

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DJIBOUTI - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Djibouti

- Overall U.S. equity is high.

The **Djiboutian** Government generally adapts positions in consonant with **U.S.** and Western interests. The **U.S.** provides **Djibouti** about \$3 million in economic support annually. **Djibouti** has permitted the **U.S.** Navy access to its seaport and airport, and with increased **U.S.** naval presence in the **Indian Ocean**, that access has become even more important.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	3	3	15	1 1	2	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	None	Mortars	3	1	54	A

Ground OOB consists of 2,870 volunteers. A **French** garrison is based in **Djibouti** and provides the country's primary defense as well as training for the small force structure. Tanks: none; Artillery: 81 mm mortars.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	None	None	Negligible	1	11	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Sm Gun Boats	Negligible	1	31	A

Ships: none; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 3 Small Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Somali, Afar, French)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a significant cultural difference between **Djibouti** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
77-95	75	5	Dry/Hot

The climate of **Djibouti** is torrid, and rainfall is sparse and erratic. From May to October during the monsoon temperatures can reach 113 degrees Fahrenheit. Humidity is high all year and the area is prone to earthquakes.

Djibouti - 3

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II-51

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

Djibouti is situated in northeast **Africa** on the **Gulf of Aden**. The country has three regions: the coastal plain; mountains further inland; and a plateau behind the mountains. The land is bare, dry, and desolate, marked by sharp cliffs, deep ravines, burning sands, and thorny shrubs.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Djibouti** is generally suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles in about two-thirds of the country.

In approximately two-thirds of **Djibouti** cross-country movement is feasible. Over the remaining third of the country, tracked and wheeled movement would be severely restricted due to steep slopes, steep-sided valleys, and seasonal flooding.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum, with line of sight distances normally exceeding 2,000 meters in over half the country.

Over half of **Djibouti** is bare, dry, and desolate and suitable to accommodate line of sight distances exceeding 2,000 meters. Other areas of the country are more limited by mountain slopes, and steep-sided valleys.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62093/62094	1,830	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
81 mm Mortar	4,595	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

Just the northern-most corner of **Djibouti** on the coast has coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-141B aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-141B	1/0	1/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Djibouti/Amboali	C-141B, C-130	-

Ports

- One major port with moderate capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Djibouti	Small	36-40/51-55	31-35	Yes

Key Installations

Djibouti has no industry and few modern facilities. **Djibouti's** railroad links the country's harbor area with **Addis Ababa, Ethiopia**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Djibouti	- Fair urban telecomm - 3 Radio stations - 2 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	2,800 km	97 km	1	1	None	None	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach **Djibouti** in two to four days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Djibouti** would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
22	15	2 (Djibouti)	B

Note: In **Djibouti**, the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
Terrorism
OOB (Ground, Air, Naval)
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

ETHIOPIAMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
STU-III AV 243-4377Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597SUMMARY

Located on the **Horn of Africa**, **Ethiopia** is bordered in the northeast by the **Red Sea**. About ten insurgent movements are active within the country ranging from separatists to royalists. The Eritrean guerrillas in the north have been the most active. In recent years drought has caused wide spread starvation and death. Overall U.S. equity in **Ethiopia** is low. While in the past the U.S. has provided **Ethiopia** with significant amounts of humanitarian aid, relations between the two countries has been poor due to differences over **Ethiopian** foreign policies and human rights. **Ethiopia** has one of the largest armed forces on the **African** Continent. Since the war with **Somalia** in 1977 and 1978, the army has grown to about 250,000 troops. The U.S. was **Ethiopia's** major arms supplier until 1977 when the country began receiving massive arms shipments from the **Soviet Union**, and incurred a debt estimated at over \$3.5 billion. The **Ethiopian** military has been engaged recently on two fronts: in the north against the Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgent groups and in the east and southeast against ethnic **Somali** guerrillas.


There are more than 40 different ethnic groups within **Ethiopia** and the culture is vastly different than that of the U.S. **Ethiopia's** terrain consists of a high central plateau mixed with mountains. Elevations are highest just before the **Great Rift Valley** which splits the plateau diagonally. The plateau has a number of rivers crossing it and slopes to the lowlands of the **Sudan** in the west and the **Somali** plains in the southeast. The climate is temperate in the highlands and hot in the lowlands. Over half of **Ethiopia** is suited for the cross-country movement of vehicles and average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) exceeds 2,000 meters in large portions of the country. Hydrographic conditions permit NGF ships to approach the coast and support operations ashore but would be out-gunned by **Ethiopian** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to **Addis Ababa**, and the port cities of **Missawa** and **Aseb**. Adequate airfields and ports are available but there are few other key installations. The **Pacific ARG** would require in excess of six days to reach **Ethiopia**. Due to the over 700 evacuees, and the 356 nautical miles distance to **Addis Ababa**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

ETHIOPIA - THREAT SUMMARY



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ETHIOPIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- About 10 insurgent groups in existence. Eritrean guerrillas are most active.
- War with **Somalia** ended in 1988.
- Drought has caused starvation and death.

Approximately ten insurgent movements exist within **Ethiopia**, ranging from separatists in **Tigre** and **Gojjam**, to royalists, to separatists in **Eritrea** and **Ogaden**. The Government has been torn by bloody coups and tribal uprisings in part aided by the **Sudan** and **Somalia**. Ties with the **U.S.**, once a major arms and aid source deteriorated, while cooperation accords were signed with the **Soviets** in 1977. In 1978, **Soviet** advisors and **Cuban** troops helped defeat **Somalian** forces. **Ethiopia** and **Somalia** signed a peace agreement in 1988. A worldwide relief effort began in 1984 as an extended drought caused millions of **Ethiopians** to face starvation and death. In 1988, victories by **Eritrean** guerrillas forced the curtailment of the relief efforts by foreign aid workers in the drought-stricken regions.

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U.S. Equities in Ethiopia

- Overall **U.S.** equity is low.
- Occupies a strategic geopolitical location.
- About 700 **U.S.** citizens reside there.

Ethiopia occupies a strategic geopolitical position along the world's busiest shipping lanes and close to Arabian oil fields. Conflict and instability in this country have been due in large part to the presence of more than 40 different ethnic groups. **Ethiopia** is strongly backed by the **Soviet Union** and has one of the largest armed forces on the **African** continent with more than 250,000 troops.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
1	-	-	-	1	700	1 2	3	Low

Ethiopia - 3

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General Ground OOB

- Largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	250	8	398	E

Ground OOB consists of 250,000 conscripts. All citizens 18 to 50 perform six months training. There are reports of ethnic tensions in the army. Primary training is conducted by **Soviet** and **Cuban** advisors. Civil war is waged in many areas of the country. Tanks: T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62, T-72; Artillery: D-20, M-46, M-109, M-116.

General Air OOB

- Fourth largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Props	Bloc	4	8	132	D

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-17, MiG-21, MiG-23; Close Air: AT-28, Canberra B52, Mi-24; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- Third largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	2	8	140	E

Ships: 2 Frigates (Ex-**Soviet**) with guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine mortars, depth charges, mines, countermeasures, and radars; 1 Patrol Ship with SSMS, guns, and radars; SSMS: SS-N-12, SS-N-2A; Patrol Craft: 7 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-**Soviet**) with SSMS, guns, and radar; 2 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Ex-**Soviet**); 1 Fast Attack Craft-Hydrofoil (Ex-**Soviet**); 3 Large Patrol Craft (2 Ex-**Soviet**); 6 Coastal Patrol Craft (2 Ex-**Soviet**).

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Amharic (Gallenija, Tingrinya, Arabic)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Ethiopia** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
47-88	36-47	4-80	Mixed

The climate in **Ethiopia** is temperate in the highlands and hot in the lowlands. Rain occurs during February and April and again from June to September.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

Ethiopia is located on the **Horn of Africa** and is bordered on the northeast by the **Red Sea**. The country has a high central plateau with some mountains. Elevations are highest just before the **Great Rift Valley** which splits the plateau diagonally. A number of rivers cross the plateau. The plateau gradually slopes to the lowlands of the **Sudan** in the west and the **Somali** plains to the southeast.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Over half of **Ethiopia** is generally suited to cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Over half of **Ethiopia**--the eastern and southern plains--is suitable for tracked vehicles, given the predominance of firm, open, dry surfaces. Restricted areas within this region can generally be bypassed. The central highlands offer poor conditions for cross-country tracked movement.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum, with line of sight distances greater than 2,000 meters in much of the country.

Approximately half of **Ethiopia** consists of flat and open surface which would accommodate line of sight visibility beyond 2,000 meters. The remaining parts of the country, such as the central highlands, present intermittently broken terrain which would reduce these distances substantially.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62110	8,050	Good

Ethiopia - 5

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
130 mm M-46	27,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for **Addis Ababa**, **Missawa** on the **Red Sea**, and **Aseb** on the **Red Sea** near **Djibouti**.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
5	2 C-5 1 C-141B 2 C-130	2/3	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Aba Tenna Dejazmatah Yilm (Dire Dawa)	C-130	Taxiway narrow. Daylight only.
Bole International (Addis Ababa)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Harar Meda	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Makale	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Yohannes IV International (Asmara)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

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Ports

- Two major ports with moderate capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Aseb	Small	36-40/41-45	31-35	Yes
Mitsiwa	Small	31-35/36-40	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

There are few key installations in **Ethiopia** other than the ports and airfields. There is lack of good roads particularly in the highlands and those roads available are in poor condition. A railroad connects **Addis Ababa** with the port of **Djibouti** on the coast.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Addis Ababa	- Adequate telecomm for government use - 4 Radio stations - 1 TV station - 1 Satellite station	44,300 km	992 km	2	5	None	None (oil refinery)	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Ethiopia**. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the over 700 potential evacuees and the 356 nautical miles distance to the probable evacuation site (**Addis Ababa**), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
33	700	356 (Addis Ababa)	F

Note: In **Ethiopia**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

Ethiopia - 7

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TAB 5

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KENYA

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095

Theater J-2:
Telephone:


USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
STU-III AV 243-4377

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597




SUMMARY

Kenya is bounded by Somalia, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, and the Indian Ocean. The U.S. and Kenya maintain cordial relations, and overall U.S. equity is moderate. More than 140 U.S. firms are represented in Kenya and U.S. business interests amount to about \$350 million. Over 9,000 U.S. citizens reside in the country. Kenya has become a transit point for southwest Asian heroin enroute to west Africa, Europe, and the U.S. Use of heroin in Kenya is growing and small amounts of marijuana are grown and consumed locally. The military services are small, with a total strength of about 16,000 members. The army is the dominant service with about 13,000 personnel, followed by the air force, and navy. Although the Kenyan military has strong ties to the United Kingdom, Kenya also looks to the U.S., Canada, Israel, France, Germany, India, and Pakistan for military equipment and technical training.

Kenya's population is quite varied. Traditional herders, Arab Muslims, and cosmopolitan residents of Nairobi all contribute to the culture, which is different from that of the U.S. Kenya has a striking topographical diversity. In the west there is the Great Rift Valley, significant mountains such as Mount Kenya (17,040 feet), and high, sweeping plateaus. The northern three-fifths is arid, consisting mainly of semidesert. About 85 percent of the population and almost all of the economic activity is found in the southern two-fifths of the country. The climate on the coast and immediate interior is tropical, but becomes more temperate at the higher elevations. Much of Kenya is generally suited for cross-country movement of vehicles and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. NGF platforms are limited by the hydrography in their ability to approach the coast and deliver support. A shortfall for ground operations is the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage. A major port and four airfields are available and key installations are situated in and around the principal cities. The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require four to six days to reach Kenya. Due to the over 9,000 potential evacuees, and the 235 nautical miles distance to Nairobi, NEO conducted by a MEU would be difficult.

KENYA - THREAT SUMMARY




Kenya - 1

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KENYA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Kenya

- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.
- Over 9,000 U.S. citizens reside in Kenya.

The U.S. and Kenya enjoy cordial relations. More than 140 U.S. firms are represented in this country and U.S. business interests totals roughly \$350 million, primarily in commerce, light manufacturing, and the tourist industry. U.S. annual assistance from all sources to Kenya has amounted to about \$53 million.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
350	-	-	53	403	9,115	1 5	6	Medium

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Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

Kenya is of increasing importance as a transit point for southwest **Asian** heroin enroute to west **Africa**, **Europe**, and the **U.S.** Local consumption of heroin is increasing. Small amounts of marijuana are cultivated and consumed locally.

Kenya - 3

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	13	6	89	B

Ground OOB consists of 13,000 regular troops. **Kenya** has a mutual training program with the **U.K.** Up to five British battalions train in **Kenya** each year and provide instruction to the **Kenyan** army. Some **Kenyan** officers attend schools in the **U.K.** Tanks: Vickers Mk 3; Artillery: M-109.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	Early AAA	3	6	59	B

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E/F; Close Air: Hawk, Strikemaster; Air Defense: AA guns. **Kenya** is reportedly developing an air defense system which will integrate data from 4 ground air surveillance radars. **Kenya** may also be in the process of acquiring the Rapier SAM system.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	Counter-measures	ASUW/Antiair	Negligible	6	96	D

Ships: none; SSMs: Otomat, Gabriel II; Patrol Craft: 3 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 5 Large Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Swahili (English, Arabic)
Primary religion - Protestant

There is a significant cultural difference between **Kenya** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
55-81	51	5-70	Mixed

On the coast and immediate interior, the climate is hot and humid. Elsewhere, due to the altitude, the weather is generally cool and invigorating. **Nairobi**, the capital, is temperate year round at an altitude of 5,400 feet. **Kenya** has two rainy seasons, from April to June, and from October to December.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

Kenya is a country of striking topographical variety. The northern three-fifths is arid, much of it semidesert, and inhabited only by nomadic tribes. About 85 percent of the population and almost all of the economic activity is located in the southern two-fifths of the country. In the west is the **Great Rift Valley**, joining significant mountains, and high, sweeping plateaus.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Most of **Kenya** is generally suited for cross-country vehicular movement.

Cross-country movement for tracked and wheeled vehicles is feasible throughout most of the country. In eastern **Kenya**, movement would be generally unrestricted and facilitate the movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles. In western and north central **Kenya**, vehicular movement would be limited due to isolated mountains, steep hills, and dissected areas.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Restricted, with line of sight distances ranging between 1,000 and 2,000 meters in over half of the country.

The northern part of **Kenya**, forming three-fifths of the country, is arid and of semidesert character. These conditions also apply in the southeast. The southwest consists of broken terrain and a high plateau where most of the population resides. The coastal regions have coconut trees, mangrove swamps, and rain forest while the vast hinterland has grass, low bushes, and scrub. It is estimated that line of sight visibility would range between 1,000 and 2,000 meters in over half of this country.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide limited support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
61210/61211	15,295	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-109	18,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage for **Kenya** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	2 C-5 2 C-141B	2/2	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Jomo Kenyatta International (Nairobi)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Laikipia Air Base (Nanyuki)	C-141B, C-130	- Daylight/VFR only.
Moi International (Port Reitz, Mombasa)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Nairobi/Eastleigh	C-141B, C-130	- Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- One major port with good capabilities is available to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Mombasa	Small	41-45/41-45	31-35	Yes

Key Installations

Kenya has some of the most well developed communication, transportation, and industrial facilities in Africa.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Nairobi	- One of the best telecomm systems in Africa - 15 Radio stations - 4 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	64,590 km	2,040 km	1	4	- Refined products	None (oil refining)	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach Kenya in between four to six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.


NEO

- Due to the over 9,000 potential evacuees, and the 235 nautical miles distance to the probable evacuation site (Nairobi), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
200	9,115	235 (Nairobi)	F

Note: In Kenya, the following factors are of little significance:


Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

LIBERIAMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
STU-III AV 243-4377Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO MONROVIA LI//DATT//
222991/5 EXT 240/241/243SUMMARY

The commitment of **U.S. Marines** to the crisis torn west **African** country of **Liberia** continues on with poor prospects for peace or stability in the foreseeable future. On August 5, 1990, after a long period afloat off the capital city of **Monrovia**, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) established a security force ashore at the **American** Embassy compound and nearby communications facilities and assisted in the evacuation of 1705 **Americans** and foreign nationals. The 22nd MEU was later relieved by the 26th MEU. President Samuel Doe's death on September 10 and the failure of the five-nation west **African** peacekeeping force to ameliorate the situation has caused chaos and disorder to continue. The civil war shows no promise of quick resolution, with reports of starvation in **Monrovia** and rebel leaders Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor both claiming to be president. **U.S. equity** in **Liberia** is moderate. For many years, the **U.S.** has been **Liberia's** primary trading partner and has provided the country with significant amounts of economic and military assistance. Until recently, up to 4,000 **U.S.** citizens resided in **Liberia**. The country has a small ground OOB, with about 5,300 troops and air and naval OOBs that are practically negligible. Most military equipment and training has been obtained from the **U.S.** The army services are all engaged in fighting the rebel groups in and around **Monrovia**.


The population of **Liberia** includes at least 16 distinct ethnic groups and descendents of emancipated slaves from the **U.S.** Ethnic unrest is a major cause of the present disorder. The culture of **Liberia** is quite different from that of the **U.S.** **Liberia** lies within the tropical rain forest and the climate is hot and humid year-round. The terrain consists of a coastal plain, rising to a rolling plateau and low mountains near the inland borders. The country is generally unsuited for tracked movement due to the dense vegetation and broken terrain. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters mainly because of the ground cover and frequent heavy rainfall. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the coastal area extending from **Monrovia** to **Buchanan**. Airfields and ports are available to receive strategic lift and other key installations include **U.S.** telecommunications facilities. The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Liberia**.

LIBERIA - THREAT SUMMARY



Liberia - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

The commitment of U.S. Marines to the crisis-torn west African country of Liberia continues on with poor prospects for peace or stability in the immediate future. On August 5, 1990, after a long period afloat off the capital city of Monrovia, the 22nd MEU established a security force ashore at the American Embassy compound and nearby communications facilities. A total of 1,705 Americans and foreign nationals were evacuated. Later in August MARG 2-90 (22nd MEU) was relieved on station by MARG 3-90 (with 26th MEU embarked). President Samuel Doe's death on September 10 and the failure of the five-nation west African peacekeeping force to protect him has caused the civil war to continue. The situation shows no promise of quick resolution, with reports of starvation in Monrovia and rebel force leaders Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor each claiming to be president. Marine helicopters most recently have been used to transport members of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) to the city to assist in humanitarian aid.

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U.S. Equities in Liberia

- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

The U.S. has provided substantial and longstanding support through AID, Peace Corps, and military assistance programs in Liberia. Additional U.S. support has come from private business, missionary, and educational organizations. The U.S. for many years has been Liberia's preeminent trading partner. Liberia is the site of important U.S. telecommunications facilities.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	70	101	23	194	* 4,000	1 4	5	Medium

* Reduced considerably due to the civil war.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	None	Howitzers	5	1	66	B

Ground OOB consists of 5,300 troops which are primarily volunteers with some conscripts. Training is generally poor. Tanks: none; Artillery: 75 mm pack howitzers, 105 mm.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
DC-3/Props	None	None	Negligible	1	11	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Sm Gun Boats	Negligible	1	31	A

Ships: none; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 6 Small Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - English (Tribal)

Primary religion - Traditional

The population of **Liberia** includes at least 16 distinct ethnic groups and descendents of emancipated slaves from the **U.S.** The present civil war is increasingly driven by ethnic hostilities. There is a fairly significant cultural difference between **Liberia** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-84	81	140	Wet/Hot

Liberia lies within the tropical rain forest belt and has distinct wet and dry seasons. Rainfall occurs mainly between April and November. The climate is generally hot and humid year-round.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Liberia's terrain consists of a coastal plain rising to a rolling plateau, and low mountains near the inland borders.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Liberia is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The entire country is generally ill-suited for tracked movement due to lagoons, tidal creeks, and marshes along the coast and broken terrain, rivers, and thick ground cover inland.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances normally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances in Liberia would be substantially less than 1,000 meters due to dense vegetation, low mountains, steep hills, and frequent heavy rainfall.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
51641/51642	3,220	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-101	11,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for the coastal area from **Monrovia** to **Buchanan**.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
2	1 C-5 1 C-130	1/1	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Monrovia/Roberts International Monrovia/Spriggs Payne	C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-130	Low runway WBC.

Ports

- Two major ports capable of accommodating strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Monrovia Buchanan	Small Small	36-40/36-40 41-45/41-45	36-40 41-45	Yes Yes

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Key Installations

Important **U.S.** telecommunications facilities are located in **Liberia**. Voice of **America** transmitters, which broadcast to the entire **African** Continent, and an Omega navigational station (one of seven such in the world) are situated near **Monrovia**. The 427-meter transmission tower is the tallest structure in **Africa**. There is a hydroelectric dam at **Mount Coffee** near **Monrovia** and a National Medical Center in the city which includes a 271-bed hospital.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Monrovia	- Radio relay network centered at Monrovia - 7 Radio stations - 5 TV stations - 1 Satellite station	7,764 km	480 km	2	2	None	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** would require in excess of six days to reach **Liberia**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (4,000) in **Liberia**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would present numerous difficulties. (A total of 1,705 were recently evacuated successfully.)

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
136	4,000	2 (Monrovia)	F

Note: In **Liberia**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
OOB (Air, Naval)
NBC

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MADAGASCAR

MEF G-2:	CG II MEF//G-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 484-8095
Theater J-2:	USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 430-8003
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-4377
Embassy Defense Attache:	USDAO ANTANANARIVO MA//DATT//
Telephone:	21257 AND 20956, EXT 245/246/247




SUMMARY

Madagascar, the world's fourth largest island, is located 250 miles off the southeast coast of **Africa**. U.S. equity in this country is low. Relations between the two suffered during the 1970's but have improved since then. The U.S. is **Madagascar's** second largest market and fifth major supplier. The country has potentially large oil deposits and U.S. oil companies have undertaken extensive exploratory drilling efforts. The Popular Armed Forces of **Madagascar** number about 22,000 personnel. A portion of the ground OOB has been designated the Intervention Force with the mission to deploy rapidly to areas of internal and external threat. Currently **Madagascar** relies heavily on the **Soviet Union** for military equipment and training. **North Korea**, **France**, and the **U.S.** also have military assistance programs with **Madagascar**. Reports indicate there have been **Cuban** trainers in the country.


Madagascar's population is predominantly of mixed **Asian** and **African** origin. The **Malagasy** language of **Malayo-Polynesian** origin is understood throughout the island. **French** is also spoken. Most people practice a form of animism combined with ancestor worship as their religion. The culture of **Madagascar** differs significantly from that of the **U.S.** The climate of the coastal region is hot and humid throughout the year while it is more temperate in the central highlands. The island's interior consists of a high plateau averaging about 6,000 feet above sea level. The highlands descend gradually to the coast in the west but the transition is more abrupt in the east. The coastal plains are suitable for cross-country vehicular movement while this kind of mobility is precluded in the central highlands. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the rough terrain and significant ground cover. While the hydrography permits NGF ships to approach the coast and provide limited support for operations ashore, their 5-inch guns would be out-ranged by **Malagasy** coastal defense weapons. A serious shortfall for ground combat operations in **Madagascar** is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields are available to accommodate C-141B aircraft, but the one major port has poor capability to receive strategic sealift. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require four to six days to reach **Madagascar**.

MADAGASCAR - THREAT SUMMARY



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U.S. Equities in Madagascar

- Overall U.S. equity is low.

U.S. relations with **Madagascar** were troubled during the 1970's but have improved since then. The U.S. is this country's second largest market and fifth major supplier. Significant amounts of humanitarian aid have been provided by the U.S.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	23	64	17	104	160	1 1	2	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	LAV	Bloc	20	1	91	C

Ground OOB numbers 20,000 troops which are all conscripts. The **Soviets** have provided some technical training. Reports also indicate there have been small **Cuban** and **North Korean** training staffs in **Madagascar**. Arms are purchased mainly from the **U.S.S.R.** Tanks: PT-76; Artillery: D-30, M-46, ZIS-3.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	None	Bloc	1	1	102	D

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-17, MiG-21; Close Air: none; Air Defense: SA-9 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	1	1	42	B

Ships: none; SSMs: none; Patrol Craft: 1 Large Patrol Craft; 5 Small Patrol Boats.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Malagasy (French)

Primary religion - Animists

There is a significant cultural difference between **Madagascar** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
55-80		55-112	Wet/Hot

The coastal region of **Madagascar** is tropical with a hot, humid climate throughout the year. The east coast receives heavier rainfall due to the trade winds and monsoons. There are periodic cyclones along the coasts. Southern **Madagascar** is arid but the climate in the central highlands is more temperate.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

Madagascar, the world's fourth largest island, is located 250 miles off the southeast coast of **Africa**. The interior contains a high plateau averaging about 6,000 feet above sea level. The highlands descend gradually to the coast in the west but the transition is more abrupt in the east.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Some parts of **Madagascar** are suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked and vehicular movement is generally precluded due to the rugged terrain of the dominating central plateau. Movement is possible in the low lying areas spanning the east coast and throughout the broad coastal plains of the western plateau.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The terrain of **Madagascar** is generally described as a plateau, rising sharply from a narrow plain of the east coast and descending in a series of steps to the strip of rocks along the west coast. There is some evergreen forest on the eastern edge of the plateau. Most of the country is covered with savanna. Due to the rough terrain and ground cover, it is expected that line of sight distances would not exceed 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide limited support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
61420/61430	14,500	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
130 mm M-46	27,000	Threat Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage of **Madagascar** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-141B aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
6	6 C-141B	2/4	>5/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Antananarivo/Arivonimano	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Antananarivo/Ivato	C-141B, C-130	-
Antseranana/Andrakaka	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Mahajanga/Ambarovy	C-141B, C-130	-
Nosy-be/Fascene	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Toamasina	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- One port with poor capability to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Tamatave	Small	31-35/36-40	36-40	Yes

Madagascar - 5

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Key Installations

Madagascar has an underdeveloped infrastructure. Some parts of the country can be covered by rail. The road network is badly deteriorated and many areas are not accessible by ground vehicle.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Antananarivo	- Fair telecomm; above average in Africa - 11 Radio stations - 6 TV stations - 1 Satellite station	27,500 km	884 km	1	6	None	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **Madagascar** in between four to six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Madagascar** would not be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
33	160	87 (Antananarivo)	C

Note: In **Madagascar**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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NAMIBIA

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095

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Telephone:


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STU-III AV 430-8003

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
STU-III AV 243-4377

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597




SUMMARY

Namibia, formerly known as **South West Africa**, was administered by **South Africa** for a number of years. When other **African** nations charged **South Africa** with exploiting **Namibia**, fighting broke out primarily between **South African** forces and the Marxist **South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)** supported by **Angola** and **Cuba**. In 1988, a U.S. mediated plan was agreed upon by **South Africa**, **Angola**, and **Cuba** which called for withdrawal of **Cuban** troops from **Angola** and black majority rule in **Namibia**. After free elections in 1989, **Namibia** became an independent nation in early 1990. Its president is the SWAPO guerrilla leader Sam Nujoma who apparently has dropped his Marxist rhetoric in favor of democratic ideals. The U.S. presently maintains no permanent diplomatic or consular representation in **Namibia** but U.S. Embassy officials in **South Africa** monitor developments in the country. **Namibia's** economy depends heavily on mining and ranching, with these resources concentrated in the hands of foreigners and the white minority. **Namibia** has no armed services, although now that it is independent it may soon establish some military capability.

With indigenous **Africans** of diverse ethnic origins and a minority white population, primarily **South African**, **British**, and **German**, the culture of **Namibia** is quite different from that of the U.S. The climate is mainly hot and dry. Periods of excessive winter drought alternate with short periods of heavy summer rainfall. Most of the country consists of a high plateau averaging about 3,600 feet above sea level. There is significant desert in both the coastal and inland regions. **Namibia** is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement due to the broken terrain of the high plateau. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters in over 50 percent of the country. A problem for the conduct of ground operations in **Namibia** is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. One airfield is available at **Windhoek** to receive C-5 aircraft but the one major port at **Walvis Bay** has poor capability to accommodate strategic sealift. The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Namibia**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in would be difficult due to the 142 nautical miles distance from the coast to **Windhoek**.

NAMIBIA - THREAT SUMMARY




Namibia - 1

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NAMIBIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

This country has had a long struggle for independence from **South Africa**. It also suffers from turmoil between internal political groups. Since 1984, **South African** forces in **Namibia** have battled with the **South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)**. SWAPO is communist-backed and has stated its goal is to establish a people's republic in **Namibia**, then move on to overthrow **South Africa**. Negotiations sponsored by interested Western powers took place in 1988 between **Angola**, **Cuba**, and **South Africa** to secure peace in the area. Late that year, it was agreed that **Cuban** troops should withdraw from **Angola** and **South African** troops from **Namibia** by April 1989.

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U.S. Equities in Indonesia

- Overall **U.S.** equity is low.

The **U.S.** maintains no permanent diplomatic or consular representation in **Namibia**. **U.S.** Embassy officials in **South Africa** monitor developments in the country. **Namibia** currently depends on mining and ranching, with economic power concentrated in the hands of whites and foreigners. The country's new constitution forbids nationalization without fair compensation.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
						0 0	0	Low

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Namibia has no army, tanks, or artillery.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Ships: none; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: none.

Namibia - 3

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Afrikaans (English, German)

Primary religion - Christian

There is a significant cultural difference between **Namibia** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
55-73	60	1-16	Dry/Warm

Namibia has a subtropical climate which is mainly hot and dry. Periods of excessive winter drought alternate with heavy summer rainfall.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Most of **Namibia** consists of a high plateau averaging about 3,600 feet above sea level. A coastal desert strip extends from the **Orange River** in the south to the **Kunene River** in the north. This area is mainly uninhabited. The eastern part of the country is also primarily desert but provides some grazing ground.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Namibia** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Conditions for the cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles are poor to unsuited throughout most of **Namibia** primarily due to extensive desert areas and high plateau.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The topography of **Namibia** varies from coastal desert to semiarid high plateaus. Line of sight distances would be generally limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the broken terrain in over 50 percent of this country.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
57380/57381	5,000	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
	0	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage of **Namibia** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
5	1 C-5 2 C-141B 2 C-130	2/3	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Grootfontein J. G. H. Van der Wath (Keetmanshoop) J. G. Strijdom (Windhoek) Mpacha Ondangwa	C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-130 C-130	Daylight/VFR only. - - Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.

Namibia - 5

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Ports

- One port with poor capability to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Walvis Bay	Small	31-35/26-30	31-35	Yes

Key Installations

Relative to the size of its population, **Namibia** may have the most highly developed infrastructure in **Africa**. It has a fairly substantial road system of which about 10 percent is paved. Railroads connect major economic and population centers with the **South African** rail system.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Good urban/air rural telecomm - Radio relay connects major towns; wire extends elsewhere - 15 Radio stations - 3 TV stations	54,500 km	2,340 km	1	5	None	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic** ARG with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Namibia**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Namibia** would be difficult due to the 142 nautical miles distance to the probable evacuation site (**Windhoek**).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	142 (Windhoek)	C

Note: In **Namibia**, the following factors are of little significance:

- Drugs
- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- OOB (Ground, Air, Naval)
- NBC

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SOMALIA

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG II MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 484-8095
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2// STU-III AV 430-8003
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D// STU-III AV 243-4377
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO MOGADISHU SO//DATT// EMBASSY: 20812/3/4/5/6, EXT 204/206




SUMMARY

Somalia is strategically located on the **Horn of Africa**, along the southern approaches to the **Red Sea** and the **Suez Canal**. **U.S.-Somalia** relations are currently excellent and **U.S.** equity is low. The **U.S.** Agency for International Development conducts a program of assistance within the country. The **U.S.** also provides relief to the numerous refugees in **Somalia** who are fleeing **Ethiopian** oppression in the **Ogaden** territory. Through a mutual agreement, **U.S.** forces are allowed access to **Somali** ports and airfields. **Somalia** has a modest size army of 61,300 troops and a small air force and navy. Most **Somali** military equipment was obtained from the **Soviet Union** between 1972 and 1977, half of which was lost during the 1977 **Ogaden War**, and much of the remainder is rapidly deteriorating. The **Somali** Government has turned to Western countries for new and modern weapon systems. Western aid has centered on small deliveries of defensive arms, training, and improved maintenance. The **P.R.C.**, **Egypt**, **Italy**, **Saudi Arabia**, and the **U.S.** have provided most of **Somalia's** recent military assistance. The **Somali** military has been faced with challenges from two separate insurgent groups which attack government facilities and benefit from foreign support.

Somalia's culture is quite different from that of the **U.S.** **Somalia** has a year-round hot climate, monsoon winds, and irregular rainfall with recurring droughts. **Somalia's** coast extends 1700 miles along the **Gulf of Aden** in the north and the **Indian Ocean** in the east. Northern **Somalia** is hilly, while the central, and southern areas are flat. **Somalia** is well suited for cross-country vehicular movement, and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally exceeds 2,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions allow NGF platforms to approach the coast within range of targets ashore, but these platforms would be out-gunned by coastal defense weapons. A shortfall for combat operations in this country is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. More than one airfield is available to receive C-5 aircraft, but there are no ports capable of accommodating strategic sealift. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach **Somalia**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would pose some difficulties due to the over 150 potential evacuees.

SOMALIA - THREAT SUMMARY




Somalia - 1

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SOMALIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Somalia

- Strategic location on the **Horn of Africa**.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is high.

The country has a strategic location on the **Horn of Africa** along the southern approaches to **Bab el Mandeb** and the route through the **Red Sea** and **Suez Canal**. **U.S.-Somali** relations are excellent. The **U.S.** Agency for International Development conducts a program of assistance in **Somalia**. The **U.S.** also provides relief to the over 600,000 refugees in this country who are fleeing **Ethiopean** oppression in the **Ogaden**. **Somalia** allows **U.S.** forces access to its port and airfield facilities. About 150 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	62	-	65	127	150	1 1	2	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-54	Bloc	61	2	173	D

Ground OOB consists of 61,300 troops of which 30,000 are conscripts. Training is considered poor. Past training assistance has been provided by the **Soviets**, **Cubans**, and the **Chinese**. The **U.S.** has provided some aid but most Western and Arab nations have shown restraint. Tanks: Centurion, M-47, T-34, T-54, T-55; Artillery: D-44, M-198, M-1938, M-1942, M-1944, S23.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	Bloc	3	2	95	C

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-17, MiG-21; Close Air: MiG-17; Air Defense: Redeye, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- Fifth largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	Bloc	Bloc	1	2	113	D

Ships: none; SSMs: SS-N-2 Styx; Patrol Craft: Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-Soviet) with SSMs, guns, and radars; Fast Patrol Craft-Torpedo and Patrol (Ex-Soviet); Large Patrol Craft (Ex-Soviet).

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Somali (Arabic)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Somalia** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
75-88	78	11	Dry/Hot

Somalia has a year-round hot climate, seasonal monsoon winds, and irregular rainfall with recurring droughts. The monsoon seasons are during October-November and March-May with the periods in between being hot and humid.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

The coast of **Somalia** extends for 1,700 miles along the **Gulf of Aden** and the **Indian Ocean**. The northern part of the country is hilly, while the central and southern areas are flat. Two rivers flow from **Ethiopia** south across the country to the ocean.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Somalia** is well suited for cross-country vehicular movement.

The lowlands of **Somalia**--along the **Indian Ocean**-- are favorable for tracked movement. The remainder of the country, particularly the highlands along the coast of the **Gulf of Aden**, would limit tracked movement due to the rugged hills and dissected plains.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum, with line of sight distances exceeding 2,000 meters in over one-half of the country.

The northern part of **Somalia** is hilly, while the central and southern regions are flat with sparse vegetation. Line of sight distances exceeding 2,000 meters would be feasible in over half of this country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
61240	1,800	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
180 mm S23	30,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage of **Somalia** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	2 C-5 2 C-141B	0/4	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Baledogle	C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.
Berbera	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway narrow for C-5s. Daylight/VFR only.
Kisimayu	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Mogadishu	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- No major ports are available with capabilities to receive strategic sealift.

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Key Installations

With the help of foreign aid, small industries such as textiles are being developed. There are no railroads in **Somalia**. The road network (about 21,600 km) includes 2,400 km of paved roads.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Mogadishu	- Minimal telecomm - 2 Radio stations - 1 TV station - 1 Satellite station	21,600km	None	0	4	- Crude oil	None (oil refining)	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach **Somalia**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the over 150 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Somalia** would present some difficulties.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
144	150	2 (Mogadishu)	D

Note: In **Somalia**, the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

SOUTH AFRICAMEF G-2:
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STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
STU-III AV 243-4377Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO PRETORIA SF//DATT//
011-27-12-284-266, EXT 251/2/3SUMMARY


South Africa's policy is to deny political rights and equal economic opportunity to the black majority which is a major cause of instability in the country. If South Africa's policies remain unchanged, racial confrontation and conflict can be expected. U.S.-South African relations have suffered due to South Africa's position on racial issues. To demonstrate its opposition to apartheid, the U.S., in conjunction with the United Nations, has embargoed arms sales to South Africa. The U.S. supplies 15 percent of South Africa's imports and buys about 8 percent of its exports. Over 9,000 U.S. citizens live in South Africa. South Africa has its own clandestine program for weapons sales to Third World countries and allegedly has received illicit nuclear technology from Israel. South Africa has one of the largest armed forces in the region. The armed forces are capable of conducting counterinsurgency and conventional operations within South Africa and neighboring states. The country is thought to possess chemical weapons and reportedly used these weapons in Angola. South Africa may be trying hard to develop nuclear weapons.

South Africa lies at the southern tip of the African Continent and has a 2,700 mile coastline. The independent Kingdom of Lesotho is situated within the east-central part of South Africa. The terrain consists of a narrow coastal zone and an extensive interior plateau and mountainous region. The climate is generally moderate with sunny days and cool nights. Due to broken terrain, the country is mainly unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be normally limited to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to Capetown, Port Elizabeth, Durban, and Maseru in the enclave of Lesotho. Airfields and ports are adequate to accommodate strategic lift. Key installations may include facilities for nuclear and chemical weapons. The Atlantic and Pacific ARGs would both require in excess of six days to reach South Africa. Due to over 9,000 potential evacuees, and the distance to Pretoria, the probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be extremely difficult.

SOUTH AFRICA - THREAT SUMMARY



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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Internal conflict caused by racism, ideology, colonialism, and tribalism.
- Street demonstrations, guerrilla action and Western dislike for apartheid may lead to reforms.

Conflicts in this country are caused primarily by racism, ideology, and a troubled history of colonialism and tribalism. Through a system of apartheid, black tribes are kept out of the political and economic structures. Conversely, black Africa is notably undemocratic and its tribes murder one another with little concern. However, street demonstrations, guerrilla action, and Western dislike for apartheid are putting pressure on white South Africa to change its policies. Some analysts feel it may be too late for political compromise in this country.

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U.S. Equities In South Africa

- Overall U.S. equity is high.
- Policy of apartheid causes instability and potential conflict.

The present policy of **South Africa** to deny political rights and equal economic opportunity to the black majority is a major cause of instability in present-day **Africa**. If **South Africa's** policies are unaltered, progressively more violent racial confrontation and conflict in the region can be expected. **U.S.-South African** relations over recent years have been affected increasingly by **South Africa's** racial policies which are contrary to the **U.S.** commitment to racial justice and human rights. To demonstrate opposition to apartheid, arms sales to **South Africa** have been embargoed since 1963. In the area of trade, the **U.S.** supplies 15 percent of **South Africa's** imports and is a market for 8 percent of its exports. Over 9,000 **U.S.** citizens live in this country.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
893	1,281	1,399	6	3,579	9,400	4 5	9	High

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

South Africa is known to have a clandestine program for weapons sales and may have recently been the recipient of nuclear technology transfer from **Israel**.

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General Ground OOB

- Third largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	LAV	Howitzers/SP	75	42	197	D

Ground OOB consists mainly of conscripts and 19,900 regulars. **South African** forces are well trained in military and technical schools within the country. There are also reported ties with the **Israeli** defense establishment which have influenced training and tactical developments. Tanks: Centurion, Olifant; Artillery: 127 mm MRS, G-2 140 mm, G-5 155 mm, G-6 155 mm SP.

General Air OOB

- Second largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	10	42	142	E

Fighter Aircraft: Mirage IICZ/EZ, Mirage F1CZ, Cheetah; Close Air: Buccaneer, Camberra B12, Impala II, Mirage F1AZ; Air Defense: Crotale SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- Largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	8	42	160	E

Ships: 2 Frigates with guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine mortars, countermeasures, and radars; SSMs: Skerpioen (Gabriel II built under license in **South Africa**); Patrol Craft: 9 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, and radars.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Reliably known to have possessed chemical weapons.
- Reportedly used chemical weapons against SWAPO.
- Suspected of having nuclear weapons.

South Africa is reliably known to have possessed chemical weapons in the past. In May 1978, it reportedly used chemical weapons in a raid against the **Southwest Africa** People's Organization (SWAPO) at **Kassinga, Angola**. **South Africa** operates two nuclear power reactors. Accusations have been made repeatedly in the United Nations that **South Africa** has clandestinely manufactured and tested a nuclear weapon. The suspicion is compounded by **South Africa's** refusal to allow inspection of its uranium facility which can produce weapons-grade uranium. The attitude of **South Africa** toward the nuclear proliferation treaty has been ambivalent.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - English (Africans, Tribal)
Primary religion - Christian

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **South Africa** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
45-71	60	18	Dry/Warm

South Africa's climate is generally moderate with sunny days and cool nights. Rainfall is greatest on the east coast.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

The **Republic of South Africa** lies at the southern tip of the **African** Continent. The independent **Kingdom of Lesotho** is located within the east-central part of **South Africa**. The country has a narrow coastal zone and an extensive interior plateau and mountainous region. The coastline is about 2,700 miles long.

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General Cross-Country Mobility

- **South Africa** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The dominating mountains of **South Africa** severely preclude the inland movement of both tracked and wheeled vehicles. The varying surfaces of the central plateau offer occasional opportunities for cross-country movement throughout the inner region.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The extensive mountains, rough terrain, and diversified vegetation of **South Africa** would restrict line of sight distances to under 1,000 meters throughout most of the country. Only in certain areas of the central plateau could visibility be expected to be greater.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
57472/61060/61061	2,745	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
127 mm MRS	22,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for **Capetown**, **Port Elizabeth**, **Durban**, and **Maseru** in **Lesotho**.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
17	1 C-5 13 C-141B 3 C-130	9/8	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
B. J. Vorster (Kimberley)	C-141B, C-130	-
Ben Schoeman (East London)	C-141B, C-130	-
D. F. Malan (Cape Town)	C-141B, C-130	-
H. F. Verwoerd (Port Elizabeth)	C-141B, C-130	-
Hoedspruit	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
J. B. M. Hertzog (Bloemfontein)	C-141B, C-130	-
Jan Smuts (Johannesburg)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Lanseria	C-130	-
Louis Botha (Durban)	C-141B, C-130	-
P. W. Botha (George)	C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Pietersburg	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Swartkop	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Uppington	C-141B, C-130	-
Walvis Bay/Rooikop	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Waterkloof	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Wonderboom	C-130	Low runway WBC.
Ysterplaat	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- Numerous ports with good capabilities to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Saldanha Bay	Medium	66-70/71-75	66-70	Yes
Cape Town	Medium	41-45/36-40	41-45	Yes
Mosselbaai	Small	Over 76/66-70	16-20	Yes
Port Elizabeth	Medium	36-40/51-55	31-35	Yes
East London	Medium	36-40/51-55	31-35	Yes
Durban	Large	36-40/71-75	41-45	Yes
Richards Bay	Large	61-65/61-65	56-60	Yes

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Key Installations

Facilities are reportedly available for the production and storage of chemical and nuclear weapons. **South Africa** operates two nuclear powered reactors. Communications and transportation facilities are quite well developed.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Pretoria	- Good telecomm - 17 Radio stations - 1 TV station - 1 Satellite station	66,176 km	1,868 km	7	17	- Crude oil - Refined products	None (oil refining)	NC

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic** and **Pacific** ARGs with their embarked MEUs would both require in excess of six days to reach **South Africa**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the over 9,000 potential evacuees, and the 271 nautical miles distance to the capital **Pretoria**, the most likely evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **South Africa** would be exceptionally difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
95	9,400	271 (Pretoria)	F

Note: In **South Africa**, the drug threat is of little significance.

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SUDAN

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095

Theater J-2:
Telephone:


USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
STU-III AV 243-4377

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

USDAO KHARTOUM SO//DATT//
74700/74611, EXT 215




SUMMARY

Sudan is situated to influence both the **Arab** and **African** communities. There has been protracted civil war between Government forces and Insurgents backed by **Ethiopia** and **Libya**. The **U.S.** has overall low equity in **Sudan**, and bilateral relations are good. The **U.S.** and **Saudi Arabia** provide a large amount of **Sudan's** economic assistance. Investment by **U.S.** companies is about \$187 million. The present drought threatens to cause severe famine and death. **Sudan** has a 54,000-member army supported by a small air force and navy. The military is hampered by old, poorly maintained equipment left over from **Soviet** assistance. A **U.S.** assistance mission is working to upgrade equipment and logistics. **Sudan** also receives military assistance from **Arab** and **European** countries and **China**. **Sudan** has a mutual defense treaty with **Egypt**.

Sudan's population is composed of two cultures, Arab and black **African**, and effective association between them poses a primary internal problem. Both cultures are different from that of the **U.S.** **Sudan's** climate varies from hot and dry in the desert regions of the north to tropical in the south. From south to north, **Sudan** has three primary zones: tropical forest and savanna; vast swampland, open semitropical savanna, and scrublands; and sandy, arid hills lying between the **Red Sea** and the **Libyan** and **Sahara Deserts**. In the north and central desert areas, cross-country vehicular movement is feasible while the remainder of the country is unsuited. Average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters in over half the country due to tropical jungle and covered swampland in the south and the broken terrain in the northeast. NGF platforms can approach the coast within range of targets ashore, but would be out-gunned by **Sudanese** coastal defense weapons. A shortfall for combat operations is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. There are several airfields and one major port with marginal capabilities to accommodate strategic air and sealift. The **Pacific ARG** would require in excess of six days to reach **Sudan**. Due to the over 700 potential evacuees, and the 330 nautical miles distance to **Khartoum**, the probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be quite difficult.


SUDAN - THREAT SUMMARY



Sudan - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Strategic location in the Arab-African arena.
- Protracted civil war between Government forces and the SPLA insurgents based in Ethiopia.

The important location of this country bordered by Libya, Ethiopia, Chad, and Egypt make it a pawn in the inter-Arab and Arab-African strategic arenas. There is also protracted civil war between Government forces, supported by Egypt and the U.S., and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) backed by Ethiopia and to a lesser extent Libya. Between 1983 and 1989, the SPLA has made major military advances throughout southern Sudan from its headquarters inside Ethiopia.

U.S. Equities in Sudan

- Overall U.S. equity is low.

Despite acute instability in the **Sudanese** Government, relations between the U.S. and Sudan have remained cordial. The U.S., along with **Germany**, and **Saudi Arabia** provide most of Sudan's economic assistance. Current investment by U.S. companies is about \$187 million and growing. **Sudan's** primary resources are agricultural, but extensive petroleum exploration has begun. The present dry conditions and poor crop production threaten, severe starvation and death in the **Sudan**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
187	152	23	101	463	740	1 2	3	Low

General Ground OOB

- Fifth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	M-60	Bloc	54	4	178	D

Ground OOB consists of 54,000 volunteers. Some training for officers is accomplished at schools within the country. In the past the **British** and **Soviets** have at various times provided training. Presently, **Egyptian** training assistance is predominant. Tanks: M-60A3, T-54, T-55, Type 60; Artillery D-30, D-44, M-46, M-101, M-1944, Sakr MRS.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	Bloc	3	4	97	C

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E/F, MiG-21, Shenyang J-4; Close Air: MiG-17; Air Defense: Redeye, SA-2, and SA-7 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	1	4	45	B

Ships: none; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 3 Large Patrol Craft; 3 Coastal Patrol Craft; 4 Small Patrol Craft.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Tribal)
Primary religion - Islam

In the north the population is composed mainly of Arabs while in the south, black Africans prevail. The culture of the Sudan is much different from that of the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
71-99	21-57	4-47	Dry/Hot

The climate varies from the hot, dry desert in the north to tropical in the south. Khartoum, situated at the juncture of the White and Blue Nile Rivers, has a desert climate.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

From south to north, Sudan has three primary zones: tropical forests and savanna; vast swampland, open semitropical savanna, and scrublands; and sandy, arid hills lying between the Red Sea and the Libyan and Sahara Deserts.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Parts of Sudan are suitable for cross-country vehicular movement, except during the rainy season.

Cross-country tracked movement in the northeastern uplands--along the maritime approaches of the Red Sea--would be extremely difficult, and in some areas precluded, due to the rugged terrain of the Red Sea Hills. Tracked movement in the remainder of the country is generally feasible except during the wet season (April or May to October).

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

With tropical forests in the south, broken terrain in the northeast uplands, and covered swampland and semitropical savanna elsewhere, line of sight distances would be limited to less than 1,000 meters in over half the country.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62142	1,000	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
Saka MRS	32,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage of **Sudan** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
11	2 C-5 2 C-141B 7 C-130	1/10	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Damazini	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
El Odeid	C-130	Daylight only.
Geneina	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Juba	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.
Kassala	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Khartoum	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Malakal	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Nyala	C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Port Sudan	C-130	Low runway WBC.
Wadi Seidna	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Wau	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- One major port with marginal capabilities to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Port Sudan	Medium	Over 76/36-40	31-35	Yes

Key Installations

Sudan has an inadequate transportation system. The only paved highways run from **Port Sudan** to **Khartoum**. There is one single-track railroad with a feeder line, supplemented by river steamers. There are limited light industrial facilities in **Khartoum**. Hydroelectric power is provided by the **Roseires Dam** on the **Blue Nile** grid.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Khartoum	- Barely adequate and poorly maintained telecomm - 16 Satellite stations - 5 Radio stations - 2 TV stations	20,000 km	5,516 km	1	11	- Refined products	None (oil refining)	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Sudan**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the over 700 potential evacuees, and the 330 nautical miles distance to the capital **Khartoum**, the most likely evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Sudan** would be quite difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
89	740	330 (Khartoum)	F

Note: In **Sudan**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

Sudan - 7

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TUNISIA

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CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095

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Telephone:

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STU-III AV 430-8003

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
STU-III AV 243-4377

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

USDAO TUNIS TS//DATT//
011-216-1-782566




SUMMARY

Tunisia is the smallest of the North **African** countries and has a 1,000 mile coastline on the **Mediterranean Sea**. **U.S.-Tunisian** relations in recent years have generally been good. The only temporary setback occurred in 1985 when **Tunisia** mistakenly perceived that the **U.S.** supported an **Israeli** raid on the PLO headquarters outside of **Tunis**. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Tunisia** is low. As the country's fourth ranking trade partner, the **U.S.** buys 6.6 percent of **Tunisia's** exports and provides 5.8 percent of its imports. About 675 **U.S.** citizens live there. **Tunisia** has relatively small armed forces with a combined strength of about 38,000 personnel and has looked mainly to the **U.S.** and **France** for military assistance. With the military aid it received, **Tunisia** has acquired a squadron of F-5 aircraft, M-60 tanks, assorted surface-to-air missiles, and extensive military training (primarily in the **U.S.**) for its personnel.

While most **Tunisians** are Muslim, there is a small Jewish population and roughly 50,000 **Europeans** in residence. The majority of the people live along the coast or in the major cities. **Tunis**, the capital, industrial center, principal port, and largest city, has just under 20 percent of the population. The culture of **Tunisia** is much different, from that of the **U.S.** Northern and central **Tunisia** have mild, rainy winters and hot, dry summers while in the south it is hot and dry year-round. The country's topography consists of a well-watered and fertile northern area, a central coastal plain, and primarily desert in the south. Several mountain ranges extend into **Tunisia** from neighboring **Algeria**. Conditions are generally suited for cross-country vehicular movement and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. Coverage of the country by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to the northern area down to about the **Gulf of Gabes**. Airfields are available to accommodate C-141B aircraft and there are three major ports with moderate capabilities to receive strategic sealift. Key installations include at least eleven oil fields. The **Atlantic ARG** operating in the **Mediterranean** could reach **Tunisia** in less than two days. Due to the presence of about 675 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Tunisia** would present a number of difficulties.

TUNISIA - THREAT SUMMARY




Tunisia - 1

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TUNISIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Tunisia

- Overall **U.S.** equity is low.

The **U.S.** and **Tunisia** maintain good relations. The **U.S.** buys 6.6 percent of **Tunisia's** exports and provides 5.8 percent of its imports. **France** is **Tunisia's** largest trading partner, followed by **Italy**, **Germany** and the **U.S.** About 675 **U.S.** citizens live in **Tunisia**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
4	119	73	-	196	675	1 2	3	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	M-60	Howitzers/SP	31	4	85	B

Ground OOB consists of 31,000 personnel of which 25,000 are conscripts. There are some schools for army personnel within the country. Officers are sent to **France** and the **U.S.** for advanced training. Tanks: AMX-13, M-41, M-48, M-60A3; Artillery: M-101A2, M-108, M-109, M-114A1.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	EW Radar	2	4	76	C

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E/F; Close Air: Aermacchi MB-326B (light attack jet trainer); Air Defense: RBS-70 with Giraffe radars and Chaparral SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	HE	ASUW/Antiair	5	4	89	C

Ships: 1 Frigate (Ex-U.S.) with guns, torpedoes, fire control, and radars; SSMS: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 3 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMS, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 4 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 2 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol; 4 Large Patrol Craft; 14 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (French)
Primary religion - Islam

About 99 percent of the population is Muslim. There is a small Jewish community, and roughly 50,000 **Europeans** live there. The culture of **Tunisia** is much different from that of the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
43-91	56	8-59	Mixed

Northern and central **Tunisia** has a **Mediterranean** climate, with mild, rainy winters and hot, dry summers. The period of greatest rain is from December until March. In the south, the climate is hot and dry year-round.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Topographically, **Tunisia** is subdivided into a well-watered and fertile northern area, the source of most of the country's agricultural production; a central coastal plain, noted for pasture and olive groves; and a semiarid central steppe area gradually blending into the **Sahara**. The third region accounts for more than one-third of the country and lacks sufficient rainfall to support more than sparse grazing and seminomadic peoples.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Tunisia** is generally suited for cross-country vehicular movement.

Throughout northern **Tunisia**, tracked movement is possible on the plains and in the valleys except during the rainy season when flooding may occur. Movement may be hindered in some parts of the southern region due to rocky desert surfaces, sand dunes, and steep-sided erdis.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Line of sight distances are restricted to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters in most of **Tunisia**.

The northern region of **Tunisia** has extensive cork forests and fertile grasslands which would limit visibility. The southern region contains a central plateau and desert area which merges into the **Sahara**. More than one-fourth of the country is covered with esparto grass which is the characteristic vegetation of the steppe region. It is expected that line of sight distances would range between 1,000 and 2,000 meters in the southern half of this country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
52186	1,370	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-109	18,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for northern Tunisia.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-141B aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	4 C-141B	3/1	2-4/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Bigerte/Sidi Ahmed	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Habib Bourguiba	C-141B, C-130	-
Tunis/Carthage	C-141B, C-130	-
Zarzis	C-141B, C-130	-

Ports

- Three major ports with moderate capabilities to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Susah	Small	31-35/26-30	36-40	Yes
Halq Al Wadi	Small	26-30/31-35	26-30	Yes
Banzart	Medium	36-40/36-40	31-35	Yes

Tunisia - 5

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Key Installations

Oil fields are located at **El Borma, Ashtart, Ad Douleb, Tamesmida, Sidi Litayem, Didon, Miska, Isis, Tazerka, Birsia, and Halk el Manzel.**

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Tunis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Telecomm is above African average - 22 Radio stations - 14 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations 	17,700 km	2,115 km	3	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas 	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** could reach **Tunisia** in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the 675 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Tunisia** would present numerous difficulties.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
100	675	8 (Tunis)	F

Note: In **Tunisia**, the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

UGANDAMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
STU-III AV 243-4377Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597SUMMARY

Uganda lies astride the equator in the center of **Africa**, bounded by **Kenya**, **Tanzania**, **Rwanda**, **Zaire**, and **Sudan**. Since the removal of Idi Amin in 1978, U.S. relations with **Uganda** have remained cordial. In recent years, **Uganda** has improved its human rights record, and the U.S. has provided modest humanitarian aid. Despite **Uganda's** many natural resources and great potential for development, chronic political and economic instability have combined to produce a continuing economic decline that has left the country among the world's poorest. **Uganda** has a small army of about 20,000 troops and an air force that is practically negligible. It is an inland country with no navy. Discipline and training in the armed forces are poor and deserters provide recruits for insurgent groups. At various times **Cuba**, **North Korea**, **Libya**, and the **Soviet Union** have all provided military aid to **Uganda**.

Uganda's population is predominately rural, and its density is highest in the southern regions. With **English** widely spoken and a predominate Christian faith, the culture of **Uganda** is not greatly different from that of the U.S. **Uganda** has a moderate climate which is pleasant most of the year. A large part of **Uganda** is plateau ranging from about 3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level, and thick jungles frequently prevail. Approximately 18 percent of the country is covered by water, swamp, and mountains. Much of northern **Uganda** is well suited for tracked movement. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters in all but parts of the northern region. A shortfall to combat operations in **Uganda** is the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage. There are three airfields available which can receive C-141B aircraft. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach **Kenya** and then need to move overland more than 500 miles to enter **Uganda**. Total deployment is estimated at more than six days. Likewise, with about 400 potential evacuees, and a distance of about 521 nautical miles from the coast off **Kenya** to **Kampala**, the probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.


UGANDA - THREAT SUMMARY



Uganda - 1

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UGANDA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Uganda

- Overall U.S. equity is low.

Since the removal of the corrupt ruler Idi Amin in 1978, U.S. relations with Uganda have remained cordial. In recent years, Uganda has improved its human rights record, and the U.S. has provided the country with a modest amount of humanitarian aid. Uganda's economy has great potential through development of its many natural resources. However, chronic political instability and economic mismanagement have combined to produce a persistent economic decline that has left Uganda among the world's poorest and least-developed countries.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	95	15	110	400	1 1	2	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-54	Bloc	20	2	132	D

Ground OOB consists of 20,000 troops which are volunteers. Overall discipline and training are both very poor. Deserters provide recruits to the insurgent groups. **Cuba, U.S.S.R, Libya, and North Korea** have at various times provided training. Tanks: T-34, T-54, T-55; Artillery: 76 mm, 120 mm, 122 mm.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	None	Bloc	Negligible	2	62	B

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: SA-7 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: none.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - English (Luganda, Swahili)

Primary religion - Christian

The culture of **Uganda**, based on the primary language and religion, is not greatly different from that of the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
63-80	64	27-64	Mixed

Despite its equatorial location; **Uganda** has a moderate climate which is pleasant for most of the year. Rainfall varies and is less in the semiarid northeast than in the south and west. The dry seasons are usually from December to February and in June and July; the rest of the year is wet.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

Most of **Uganda** is a plateau ranging from about 3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level. Approximately 18 percent of the country is covered by water and swamp. The largest body of water is **Lake Victoria**, the source of the **White Nile River**. Mountains form part of the **Ugandan** border with **Zaire**. **Uganda** has three national parks inhabited by a wide variety of jungle wildlife.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Parts of **Uganda** are suitable for cross-country vehicular movement.

Much of the northern part of **Uganda** is well suited for tracked movement. The southern plains, however, have generally poor conditions for tracked movement due to extensive marshes, lakes, and periods (from March to May and August to November) of flooding and soft soil.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Uganda is characterized by mountains along the western border with **Zaire** and the dissected terrain of the **Rift Valley**, which runs from north to south through the country. In southern **Uganda** there are many cultivated plots and scattered patches of thick forest and elephant grass. The western highlands contain long grass and forest. In the north, short grasses appear and there are areas of open woodland. The broken terrain and vegetation would restrict line of sight distances to less than 1,000 meters in all but parts of the northern region.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- **Uganda** is an inland country. NGF support is not feasible.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
		Unsatisfactory

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- **Uganda** is an inland country and does not have a requirement for coastal defense.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
N/A	N/A	N/A

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage of **Uganda** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-141B aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
3	3 C-141B	2/1	2-4/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Entebbe Gulu Soroti	C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130	- Daylight/VFR only. -

Ports

- **Uganda** is an inland country with no ports to receive strategic sealift.

Key Installations

During the civil strife of the late 1970s and 1980s much of the country's infrastructure was damaged or destroyed. The country has about 26,000 kilometers of road, of which some 6,400 kilometers are paved. A railroad originating at **Mombassa, Kenya** connects with **Kampala** and several other cities in **Uganda**.

U S Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Kampala	- Fair telecomm - 9 Radio stations - 9 TV stations - 1 Satellite system	26,200 km	1,300 km	0	3	None	None	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach **Kenya** and then need to move over 500 miles by tactical lift to arrive at the inland country of **Uganda**. This deployment is expected to require in excess of six days.

NEO

- With about 400 potential evacuees, and a distance of 521 nautical miles from the coast to **Kampala**, the probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Uganda** would very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
28	400	521 (Kampala)	E

Note: In **Uganda**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
Naval OOB
NBC


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ZAIREMEF G-2:
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STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8D//
STU-III AV 243-4377Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO KINSHASA CG//DATT//
011-243-12-25881/2/3/4/5, EXT 2225/2279SUMMARY

Zaire is located in the heart of the **African** continent and pursues a policy of nonalignment. It is a underdeveloped country with more than 200 different ethnic groups. The **U.S.** has maintained close relations with the President Joseph Mobutu despite his reputation for extreme repression and widespread corruption. **Zaire** is presently facing an increasing insurgency problem. **Cuban-trained secessionists** have been active since the late 1970s and have proven to be a serious threat. Mobutu plans to increase his armed forces to 100,000 personnel to counter this threat. The armed forces consist of an army of 22,000 troops and a small air force and navy. Conditions and morale are poor, and soldiers receive little training at a few schools within the country but a small amount of foreign training has been obtained from the **U.S., U.K., France, Belgium, Italy, and Morocco.**

French is the primary language but 700 local languages and dialects are spoken. Based on language and religion, the culture of **Zaire** is considered to be moderately different from that of the **U.S.** The climate is hot and humid with much rainfall in the north and west. Conditions in the south central and eastern areas are cooler with less rainfall. Central **Zaire** is a basin-shaped plateau sloping to the west and covered by tropical rain forest. This area is surrounded by mountainous terraces in the west; plateaus merging into savannas in the south and southwest; and dense grasslands extending beyond the **Zaire River** in the north. High mountains are found in the extreme eastern region. **Zaire** is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions would restrict NGF platforms from approaching the coast to engage targets ashore. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is available only for the area around **Kinshasa**. Two airfields are available to receive C-5 aircraft, but the one major port has poor capability to accommodate strategic sealift. Key installations include oil fields. The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Zaire**. Due to the over 3,000 potential evacuees, and the 217 nautical miles distance from the coast to **Kinshasa**, the most probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.


ZAIRE - THREAT SUMMARY



Zaire - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Severely underdeveloped with over 200 ethnic groups.
- Government repressive and corrupt.
- **Cuban-trained** insurgent group based in **Angola** operates against Government forces.

This is a severely underdeveloped country with more than 200 different ethnic groups. It suffers from past colonialism which did not provide the national identity or the technical means to cope with independence. When independence was gained in 1960 there was much Government instability, violence, and unrest throughout the country, known then as the **Congo**. In 1965, General Joseph Mobutu was named president. The U.S. has maintained close relations with Mobutu despite his reputation for extreme repression and widespread corruption. **Zaire** is presently facing an increasing insurgency problem. **Cuban-trained** secessionists, operating out of **Angola**, have been active since the late 1970s and have proven to be a serious threat. Mobutu has announced his intention to increase his armed forces to 100,000 personnel to counter this threat.

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U.S. Equities in Zaire

- Overall **U.S.** equity is high.
- **Zaire** is strategically located in the heart of **Africa**.

Zaire is strategically located in the heart of the **African** continent and pursues a policy of nonalignment between East and West. As one of the larger markets in sub-**Saharan Africa**, **Zaire** is commercially important to the **U.S. American** private investment totals about \$141 million and is concentrated in petroleum and manufacturing. **Zaire** is one of the larger trading markets for the **U.S.** in sub-**Saharan Africa**. Over 3,000 **U.S.** citizens live in this country.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
141	104	321	109	675	3,166	2 4	6	Medium

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	22	1	93	C

Ground OOB consists of 22,000 volunteers. **Zaire** has recently maintained a pro-Western foreign policy. Conditions in the army are poor. There are a few schools within the country and foreign training has been obtained from the U.S., U.K., France, Belgium, Italy, and Morocco. Tanks: Type 62; Artillery: D-30, M-116.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	Early AAA	3	1	54	B

Fighter Aircraft: Mirage 5M/DM; Close Air: Aermacchi MB-326B (light attack); Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	2	1	43	B

Ships: none; SSMs: none; Patrol Craft: 4 Fast Attack Craft-Gun (Ex-Chinese); 6 Patrol Craft (Ex-U.S.); 29 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - French (Tribal)
Primary religion - Christian

The culture of **Zaire**, based on its primary language and religion is moderately different from that of the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
68-86	High	47-79	Wet/Hot

The climate of **Zaire** is equatorial, with hot and humid conditions in much of the north and west, and cooler and drier conditions in the south central area and the east.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

The terrain varies from tropical rain forest to mountainous terraces, plateau, savanna, dense grasslands, and mountains. The country's only outlet to the **Atlantic Ocean** is a narrow strip of land on the north bank of the **Zaire River**.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Zaire** is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement.

The western highlands of **Zaire**, along the maritime approaches of the **Atlantic Ocean**, would restrict tracked movement, due to steep-sided valleys and scattered areas of dense forest.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 500 meters.

The terrain of **Zaire** consists mainly of a series of plateaus which are covered with dense tropical forests and savanna. It is estimated that line of sight distances would be limited to less than 500 meters over the majority of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide limited support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
57240/57242	10,485	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
152 mm GH	17,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists only for the area around **Kinshasa**.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
5	2 C-5 3 C-141B	0/5	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Kamina Base Kinshasa/N Djili Kisangani/Ville	C-141B, C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Daylight only. Runway only for C-141B. Daylight/ VFR only.
Kitona Base Lubumbashi/Luano	C-141B, C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Taxiway narrow for C-5s. Daylight only. Low runway WBC.

Ports

- One major port with poor capability to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Matadi	Medium	26-30/26-30	26-30	Yes

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Key Installations

Zaire has oil fields at **Petrofina**, along the coast, and offshore at the same location. Diamond mines are in the two **Kasai** regions. There is a hydroelectric plant at **Inga** in the **Bas Zaire** region. Industrial facilities are concentrated in **Kinshasa** and **Lubumbashi**. There is a lack of adequate transportation facilities

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Kinshasa	- Barely adequate telecomm - 13 Radio stations - 17 TV stations - 14 Satellite stations	145,050 km	5,254 km	1	5	- Refined products	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic** ARG with its embarked MEU which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** would require in excess of six days to reach **Zaire**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the over 3,000 potential evacuees, and the 217 nautical miles distance from the coast to **Kinshasa**, the most probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Zaire** would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
126	3,166	217 (Kinshasa)	F

Note: In **Zaire**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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ZIMBABWE

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STU-III AV 243-4377

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

USDAO HARARE ZI//DATT//
011-263-4-794521, EXT 212




SUMMARY

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in south-central **Africa**, bordered by **Zambia**, **Mozambique**, **South Africa**, and **Botswana**. **Zimbabwe** became independent in 1980. Animosity between political factions and sabotage committed by former guerrilla fighters have posed the major threats to stability and security of **Zimbabwe**. Relations with **South Africa** are poor, yet **Zimbabwe** must depend on **South Africa** for communication links with the outside world. **Zimbabwe** is important to the West as it is the only major producer of high-quality chromium outside the **Soviet Union**. Although 2,450 U.S. citizens reside there, overall U.S. equity in **Zimbabwe** is low. The armed forces number 46,000 army troops and a small air force which recently purchased new jet fighters from **China** and transport helicopters from **Italy**. The U.S., U.K., **Pakistan**, **North Korea**, and **China** have all provided military training to **Zimbabwe**.

The population of **Zimbabwe** consists of about 8.8 million blacks, 100,000 whites, 20,000 persons of mixed race, and 10,000 **Asians**. Some blacks are Christian, although many practice traditional beliefs. The culture is considered to be moderately different from that of the U.S. Although the country lies within the tropics, its climate is subtropical and temperatures vary with altitude. A plateau of modest elevation covers the central region. It is crossed from southwest to northeast by a higher plateau called the "highveld". From the central plateau the land slopes north and south. There are mountains along the eastern border with **Mozambique**. Due to broken terrain and heavy ground cover, **Zimbabwe** is unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement and average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the cities of **Harare** and **Gutu**. One airfield can receive C-5 aircraft. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require about six days to reach the coast of **Mozambique**. From there, the MEU would need to move at least 200 nautical miles by tactical lift to enter **Zimbabwe**. Total deployment is estimated at between six and eight days. With over 2,000 potential evacuees, and a distance of 243 nautical miles from the **Mozambique** coast to **Harare**, the probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

ZIMBABWE - THREAT SUMMARY

DRUGS
TERRORISM
GRAY ARMS/
TECH TRANS
GROUND OOB
AIR OOB
NAVAL OOB
NBC




Zimbabwe - 1

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ZIMBABWE - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Political instability and strained relations with **South Africa**.
- Terrorist actions by both guerrillas and Government forces.

Animosity between political factions and acts of banditry and sabotage committed by former guerrilla fighters have posed the major threats to stability and security of post-independence **Zimbabwe**. There has been strong evidence of terrorist actions by guerrillas and massacres of civilians in raids by Government military forces. Relations with neighboring **South Africa** are poor, yet **Zimbabwe** must depend on **South Africa** for communication links with the outside world. **Zimbabwe** is important to the West as it is the only major producer of high-quality chromium outside the **Soviet Union**.

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U.S. Equities in Zimbabwe

- Overall U.S. equity is high.

U.S. relations with **Zimbabwe** have improved somewhat since 1986 when there were a continuing series of uncivil and undiplomatic statements and actions by the Government of **Zimbabwe**. The U.S. provides the country with a modest amount of aid and about 2,450 U.S. citizens reside there.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2	-	-	30	32	2,450	1 3	4	Low

Zimbabwe - 3

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-54	Bloc	46	6	122	C

Ground OOB consists of 46,000 troops all of which are conscripts. **Zimbabwe** has received military and technical training from the **U.K., France, Brazil, U.S.S.R, P.R.C., Cuba, and North Korea**. Overall training seems to be improving. Tanks: T-54, Type 59; Artillery: D-30, M-1942, Type 60.

General Air OOB

- Fifth largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Day Jet Atk	Bloc	1	6	127	D

Fighter Aircraft: Hunter, MiG-19, Shenyang F-6; Close Air: Camberra B2, Hawk; Air Defense: SA-7 SAMs and AA guns. This country uses **Soviet**-supplied radars and operates its own air defense system.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Ships: none; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: none.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - English (Shona, Ndebele)

Primary religion - Traditional

Zimbabwe's population is estimated to be 8.8 million blacks, 100,000 whites, 20,000 mixed race, and 10,000 **Asians**. More than 75 percent of the whites reside in urban areas. Based on language and religion, the culture of **Zimbabwe** is moderately different from that of the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
54-100	-	24-40	Mixed

Although **Zimbabwe** lies within the tropics, its climate is subtropical. Temperatures vary with altitude. The rainy season is from November to March. There is less rainfall in the south than in the central plateau.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in south-central **Africa**. A central plateau is crossed from southwest to northeast by a higher plateau. From the central plateau, the land slopes north to the **Zambezi River** and south to the **Limpopo River**. There are mountains along the eastern border with **Mozambique**.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Zimbabwe** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles is poor throughout most of **Zimbabwe** due to the vast areas of rolling plains, forests, and steep slopes. During the high-water period, movement becomes even more restricted due to miry ground and extensive flooding.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances in **Zimbabwe** would be limited to under 1,000 meters mainly due to the broken terrain. The country is also mostly covered with savanna and in the east with tropical evergreen and hardwood forests.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Inland country.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
-	-	Unsatisfactory

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Inland country.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
N/A	N/A	N/A

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists only for the areas around Harare and Gutu.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
3	1 C-5 2 C-141B	2/1	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Bulawayo (Woodvale)	C-141B, C-130	-
Harare International (Salisbury)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Victoria Falls	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only. Low runway WBC.

Ports

- Zimbabwe is an inland country and has no ports.

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Key Installations

Zimbabwe is the railroad hub of southern **Africa** and has an excellent road system. Communications facilities are poorly maintained.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Harare	- Poorly maintained telecomm - 23 Radio stations - 8 TV stations - 1 Satellite station	85,237 km	3,394 km	0	3	None	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require about six days to reach the coast of **Mozambique**. From there, the **MEU** would need to move overland at least 200 miles by tactical lift to enter **Zimbabwe**. The total deployment is estimated at between six to eight days.

NEO

- With over 2,000 potential evacuees, and a distance of 243 nautical miles from the coast off **Mozambique** to **Harare**, the probable evacuation site, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
56	2,450	243 (Harare)	F

Note: In **Zimbabwe**, the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
Naval OOB
NBC

ASIA/PACIFIC SUMMARY

The expeditionary environment countries in the **Asia/Pacific** region are those that are shaded in gray on the accompanying map. Many of these countries are confronted with the threat of drugs, terrorism, and external aggression which may cause them to seek U.S. military assistance. It is essential that the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) threat be considered in Marine Corps capabilities planning and programming. There are countries in the **Asia/Pacific** region, such as **North Korea**, that have stocks of chemical weapons, and other countries (the **People's Republic of China (PRC)**, **India**, and **Pakistan**) working to expand an already developed arsenal of nuclear weapons. Given the rate at which NBC weapons are proliferating, it is quite likely they will eventually fall into the hands of extremist or terrorist groups. Another threat of significant concern is that of drug trafficking. The "**Golden Triangle**" where **Burma**, **Thailand**, and **Laos** share a border, is the center of the heroin trade and this area should see an increase in joint military - law enforcement activity in the future. The most common form of assistance will be wide-area surveillance and interdiction. This challenge should severely tax Marine Corps reconnaissance, intelligence, and communications assets. The level of terrorist activity is rising, and the **Asia/Pacific** region has been the location of the greatest number of terrorist casualties. To deal with this threat in the 1990's, Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) may be tasked to conduct preemptive raids in support of counterterrorist operations. The conventional threat in the region is substantial. MAGTFs can expect to meet experienced troops and sophisticated weapons systems. The countries with the most powerful armed forces are the **PRC**, **India**, **North Korea**, **South Korea**, **Japan** and **Pakistan**. The **Philippines**, **India**, and **North Korea** emerged as being most representative of general conditions in the geographic region and would be good candidates for new and refined Marine Corps scenarios.

Most **Asia/Pacific** countries have a native language such as **Chinese**, **Japanese**, and **Korean** and religions ranging from Islam to Christianity. MAGTFs will be presented with a challenge to adopt to the diverse cultures and communicate adequately with the people. For operations in **Asia/Pacific**, MAGTFs should be prepared for wet and hot conditions as over 60 percent of the countries were in this climatic category. Almost half the countries had mainly jungle terrain, while about 40 percent were classified as mountainous. Of 18 countries, 13 were found to be generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles, four were partially suited, and only one, **India**, was suited. Sixteen of 18 countries have poor intervisibility which restricts the exploitation of line of sight weapons designed for engagements at 2,000 to 3,000 meters. In **Asia/Pacific**, seven countries have hydrographic conditions which do not limit NGF support. Five countries have fair or poor hydrographic conditions where NGF platforms can approach the coast, but are restricted from providing optimum support for operations ashore. Four countries (**Bangladesh**, **Burma**, **North Korea**, and the **PRC**) have hydrographic conditions which would preclude NGF support and one country, **Afghanistan**, has an inland location. However, when considering NGF capabilities versus the coastal threat, it was found that seven of the countries had coastal defense weapons that could out-range the standard 5-inch guns on most NGF platforms. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy is a serious problem area for forces operating in **Asia/Pacific**. Only two countries (**North and South Korea**) have full coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps. There were eight countries, such as **Afghanistan** and the **Philippines**, which have only partial 1:50,000 map coverage while eight countries, including **Burma**, **India**, and **Sri Lanka**, have none at all. MAGTFs operating in these latter countries would have to rely heavily on Multispectral Imagery. In the area of strategic airlift, 15 countries had one or more airfields capable of receiving C-5 aircraft. **Afghanistan** and **Burma** were the most limited in airfields and the **Sprattly Islands** had none. There were 11 countries which had adequate ports to handle strategic sealift. **North Korea**, **Burma**, **Pakistan**, and **Thailand** had less capable ports from the standpoint of channel and anchorage depths. **Afghanistan** (inland country), **Bangladesh**, and the **Sprattly Islands** had no major ports at all. In addressing key installations, it was found that 10 countries, including **India**, **Pakistan**, and **North Korea**, probably have facilities for production and storage of nuclear, or chemical weapons. When assessing the response times of the sea-based **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU, it was determined that only four countries (**India**, **Pakistan**, the **Philippines**, and the **Sprattly Islands**) could be reached in less than two days. Seven countries could be reached by the ARG in between two and four days, and five countries in between four and six days. Two countries, **Afghanistan**, and **North Korea**, would require deployment time by the ARG of more than six days. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) would be difficult for a MEU to execute in about 80 percent of the countries due to the large number of potential evacuees and/or the lengthy overland distance to the evacuation sites. For example, **India** has almost 5,000 U.S. citizens in residence and the distance from the coast to **New Delhi** is about 458 NM. The CH-46 helicopter with its limited range and lift capabilities would be hard pressed to support the NEO and other requirements of the expeditionary environment. Of the five regions considered by this study **Asia/Pacific** emerged as one of the most challenging and likely environments for the employment of expeditionary forces in the 1990s. This region includes the major threats of drugs and terrorism as well as a higher-level order of battle than found elsewhere. There is also a serious NBC threat. Asia offers the challenge of a greater mix of cultures, and two major terrain types: mountains and jungles. Close combat will be the norm. The forward deployed forces reduce the general sea-based response time to just over four days, but this could be improved.

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ASIA/PACIFIC

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ASIA/PACIFIC

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TAB</u>
AFGHANISTAN	1
BANGLADESH	2
BURMA	3
INDIA	4
INDONESIA	5
JAPAN	6
MALAYSIA	7
NORTH KOREA	8
PAKISTAN	9
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	10
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA	11
PHILIPPINES	12
SOUTH KOREA	13
SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS	14
SPRATLY ISLANDS	15
SRI LANKA	16
THAILAND	17
VIETNAM	18

AFGHANISTAN


MEF G-2:	CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 365-9103
Theater J-2:	USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 968-6265
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-2491
Embassy Defense Attache:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-3//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-0566

SUMMARY

Soviet forces occupied **Afghanistan** and battled **Afghan** rebels for nine years. A UN-mediated agreement was signed in 1988 providing for the withdrawal of **Soviet** troops, creation of a neutral **Afghan** state, and repatriation of millions of **Afghan** refugees. **Afghan** rebels rejected the agreement and vowed to continue the resistance while a **Soviet** backed government remained in control. The **U.S.** has never recognized the communist regime in **Kabul** and since the **Soviet** withdrawal has continued to assist the **Afghan** resistance and the displaced refugees. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Afghanistan** is low. This country is the largest producer of opium in **Southwest Asia** with an output of 700 to 800 metric tons in 1988 and remains a principal source for this drug in **European** and **U.S.** markets. The **Afghan** Government has sponsored violent terrorist attacks against **Afghan** refugees and other civilians in **Pakistan**. Because of its involvement in both opium production and terrorism, **Afghanistan** should be considered as a serious source of concern. The country has a moderate size army with about 50,000 troops, a small air force, and no navy. Most of its military equipment is provided by the **Soviet Union**. Training and morale in the armed forces is marginal.


Afghanistan is a landlocked country divided from southeast to northeast by towering mountain ranges. Small valleys intersperse the mountains and large desert areas. Due to the rugged and broken terrain, cross-country movement of tracked and heavy wheeled vehicles is not feasible in about two-thirds of the country. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters because of the geographic conditions. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the northern **Afghan** border area with the **Soviet Union**. While there are no airfields that can handle C-5 aircraft, two airfields are available that can accommodate C-141B aircraft. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Afghanistan**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Afghanistan** would be very difficult due to the 582 nautical miles distance to **Kabul**, the most likely evacuation point.

AFGHANISTAN - THREAT SUMMARY



Afghanistan - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- U.S. backed Mujahadeen rebels fight the **Soviets** for nine years.
- **Soviet** forces recently withdrawn but fighting continues.

Pro-**Soviet** leftists took power in a bloody 1978 coup and concluded an economic and military treaty with the **Soviet Union**. Late in 1979, the **Soviets** began a massive military airlift into **Kabul, Afghanistan**. This resulted in another coup and the installation of a more pro-**Soviet** leader. **Soviet** troops of up to 100,000 spread out over **Afghanistan** fighting the Mujahadeen rebels. Fighting continued for nine years as the **Soviets** found themselves engaged in a long, protracted guerrilla war. A U.N.-mediated agreement was signed in 1988 providing for the withdrawal of **Soviet** troops from **Afghanistan**, creation of a neutral **Afghan** state, and repatriation of millions of **Afghan** refugees. **Afghan** rebels rejected the pact and vowed to continue fighting while the **Soviets** and their puppets remained in **Afghanistan**.

U.S. Equities in Afghanistan

- Overall U.S. equity is low.
- U.S. provides support for **Afghan** refugees.

The U.S. has never recognized the **Soviet-backed Kabul** regime and, since the **Soviet** withdrawal from **Afghanistan**, has sought to assist the **Afghan** resistance and the displaced refugees which have poured into **Pakistan**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	29	29	23	1 1	2	Low

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				

- Largest producer of opium in **Southwest Asia**.
1988 produced 700 - 800 metric tons
1987 produced 400 - 800 metric tons
1986 produced 400 - 500 metric tons
1985 produced 400 - 500 metric tons
- Returning **Afghan** refugees may cause opium production to increase.

Afghanistan produced 700 to 800 metric tons of opium in 1988 and remains a principal but politically inaccessible source of opium/heroin for **European** and **U.S.** drug markets. Given the current instability in the wake of the **Soviet** withdrawal, there are no forecasts as to the time and circumstances under which a Government in **Kabul** will attempt to suppress cultivation and refining. The situation is complicated by the resettlement of **Afghan** refugees who may turn to opium as a cash crop, increasing the likelihood that production may increase.

Terrorism

Afghanistan's Ministry of State Security, WAD, has sponsored an increasingly violent terrorist bombing campaign in **Pakistan**, particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province. Over 200 **Afghan** refugees and **Pakistani** civilians have been killed and 1,200 wounded in over 100 attacks attributed to WAD in 1987 alone.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Asia/Pacific** region, **Afghanistan** should be a source of concern due to its involvement in both drug production and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-62	Bloc	50	6	186	D

Ground OOB consists of 50,000 troops which are predominantly conscripts. The army was plagued by desertion and weakened by purges under **Soviet** control, and the government has in the past resorted to kidnapping to fill the ranks. Present training for conscripts is marginal. There is normally an NCO corps, with its own school, and other technical schools in-country. In the 1960s, many **Afghan** officers were trained in the **Soviet Union** and the **Soviets** had more than 1,000 military advisors with the **Afghan Army**. Tanks: PT-76, T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62; Artillery: D-1, M-30, M-46, M-1944.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	7	6	143	3

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21; Close Air: Il-28, Mi-24, Su-7, Su-17, Su-22; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, and SA-7 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: None.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Pushtu (Persian or Dari, Turkic)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Afghanistan** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
32-100	30-65	11	Mixed

The climate is dry with cold winters and hot summers.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

Afghanistan is a landlocked country divided from southeast to northeast by towering mountain ranges. Small valleys intersperse the mountains and large desert areas.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Afghanistan** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Approximately two-thirds of **Afghanistan** precludes the cross-country movement of tracked and heavy wheeled vehicles due to a vast network of mountains, steep slopes, and rugged surfaces. Comprised mainly of desert and small valleys, the remaining third of the country is suitable for the cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Afghanistan is divided by the towering **Hindu Kush** and **Pamir** mountain ranges. In most of the country line of sight distances would be less than 1,000 meters due to the large networks of mountains and rugged surfaces. The part of **Afghanistan** composed mainly of flat desert terrain would have better visibility in many locations.

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is limited to the **Afghan** border with the **Soviet Union**.

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Airfields

- No airfields are available to handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
3	2 C-141B 1 None	1/2	2-4/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Faizabad Kabul International Kandahar International	None C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130	- - Daylight/VFR only.

Key Installations

Faryab and **Jowzjan** provinces contain oil reserves. Oil fields are located east of **Sheberghan** and south of **Mazar e Sharif**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Kabul	- Limited telecomm - 5 Radio stations - 1 TV station - 1 Satellite station	21,000 km	9.6 km	0	3	- Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Afghanistan**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU in **Afghanistan** under normal conditions would be very difficult due to the 582 nautical miles distance to **Kabul**, the most likely evacuation point.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	23	582 (Kabul)	E

Note: In **Afghanistan** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
Naval OOB
NBC
Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)
Hydrography (Coastal Threat)
Ports

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BANGLADESH

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:
Telephone:


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STU-III AV 968-6265

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C//
STU-III AV 243-2491

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

USDAO DHAKA BG//DATT//
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


SUMMARY

With a long history of turmoil, disorder, and frequent coups in the Government, **Bangladesh** was declared an Islamic Republic in 1988. Chronic destitution among the densely crowded population has been worsened by the decline of jute, a primary crop, as a major world commodity. **Bangladesh** remains one of the world's poorest countries. While recent **U.S.-Bangladesh** relations are cordial, overall **U.S.** equity in this country is low. The **U.S.** maintains a bilateral trade association with **Bangladesh** and provides the country about \$140 million a year in aid. Over 700 **U.S.** citizens reside there. The ground OOB consists of about 82,000 volunteers modeled and organized along **British** regimental lines. The majority of military equipment is acquired from the **Soviets** and **Chinese**. **Bangladesh** maintains a small air force with two fighter squadrons and one bomber squadron. The navy is limited to three frigates and several coastal patrol craft.

With a culture much different from the **U.S.**, a wet/hot climate, and largely jungle terrain, military operations in **Bangladesh** would be quite difficult. The region is generally unsuited for tracked vehicle movement due to the continually wet alluvial plains, cut by streams and swamps. The thick ground cover and frequent heavy rainfall would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions would prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast to provide support for operations ashore. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available for **Bangladesh**. Airfields are available to receive C-5 or C-141B aircraft, but there are no ports able to accommodate strategic sealift. There are few key installations in this country. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach **Bangladesh**. Due to the over 700 potential evacuees and the 135 nautical miles distance to the most likely evacuation site (**Dhaka**), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

BANGLADESH - THREAT SUMMARY




Bangladesh - 1

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BANGLADESH - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Bangladesh

- Overall U.S. equity is low.

U.S.-Bangladesh relations are warm and positive. U.S. policies have focused primarily on efforts to promote Bangladesh economic development and political stability. The U.S. maintains a bilateral trade association with Bangladesh and has averaged about \$140 million in aid to this country annually. About 700 U.S. citizens live there.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2	193	419	140	754	709	2 2	4	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-54	Howitzers	82	8	160	D

Ground OOB consists mainly of 81,800 volunteers. Most training takes place entirely within the country. China may provide some training assistance as a counter to India or Soviet expansion in this area. The army has gained some experience fighting insurgent guerrillas. Tanks: T-54, T-55, Type 59; Artillery: D-30, M-56 pack howitzer, M-101, Type 54.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Day Jet Atk	None	3	8	81	C

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, Shenyang J-6 (MiG-19); Close Air: Magister (light attack); Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	8	8	146	E

Ships: 3 Frigates (Ex-U.K.) with guns, antisubmarine mortars, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSMs: SS-N-2 Styx; Patrol Craft: 4 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Chinese) with SSMs, guns, and radars; Fast Attack Craft-Gun (Ex-Chinese); 4 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Chinese); 8 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol (Chinese); 7 Large Patrol Craft; 1 Coastal Patrol Craft; 5 River Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Bengali (English)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between Bangladesh and the U.S.

Bangladesh - 3

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
45-90	High	85	Wet/Hot

Located on the Tropic of Cancer, **Bangladesh** has a semitropical monsoonal climate, with one of the world's highest annual rainfalls.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

Bangladesh is a low-lying, riverine country with a marshy, jungle coastline. The land is mainly a flat alluvial plain, with hills in the north.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Bangladesh** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The region is generally unsuited for tracked movement due to the poor draining of the alluvial plains, cut by numerous streams and coastal swamps.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Bangladesh is a low-lying riverine country with a marshy, jungle coastline. The terrain for most of the year is covered with lush green vegetation dotted with palms and flowering trees. Although the terrain is predominately flat, line of sight distances throughout the country would be less than 1,000 meters due to the heavy ground cover.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Hydrographic conditions prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast to provide support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
63330	24,150	Unsatisfactory

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
122 mm D-30	15,300	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
5	1 C-5 2 C-141B 1 C-130 1 None	3/2	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Chittagong	C-141B, C-130	-
Dhaka/Tezgaon	C-141B, C-130	-
Jessore	C-130	Low runway WBC.
Osmany/Sylhet	None	-
Zia International/Dhaka	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

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Ports

- **Bangladesh** has no ports that can accommodate strategic sealift.

Key Installations

Communications and transportation facilities are adequate. Railroad service is limited. Road transport is crowded but available to most major cities. River transport is extensive.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Dhaka	- Adequate International/fair domestic telecomm - 15 Radio stations - 11 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	7,240 km	2,892 km	0	5	- Natural gas	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach **Bangladesh**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

Due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 700) and the 135 nautical miles distance to the most likely - evacuation site (**Dhaka**), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Bangladesh** would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
83	709	135 (Dhaka)	F

Note: In **Bangladesh** the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
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NBC

BURMAMEF G-2:
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STU-III AV 635-6910Theater J-2:
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Telephone:USDAO RANGOON BM//DATT//
82055, EXT 241/242/243SUMMARY


Insurgency in **Burma** is pursued by ethnic groups motivated by demands for secession or autonomy. Most insurgents depend largely on the narcotics trade for financial existence. The Mong Tai Revolutionary Army, an insurgent group that operates in the **Burmese-Thai** border region, extorts protection from heroin factories in order to finance its war against the **Rangoon** Government and rival insurgents, the **Burmese** Communist Party. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Burma** is low. Specific **U.S.** interests in this country include bilateral cooperation to suppress the illicit drug trade, assistance to **Burmese** economic development, commercial access, and cultural exchanges. About 150 **U.S.** citizens live there. **Burma** is the world's largest opium producing country with an output of 1,065 to 1,500 metric tons in 1988. Production reportedly increased in 1989 due to favorable climatic conditions and a decrease in government eradication efforts. **Burma** has an army of 170,000 volunteers plus a relatively small air force and navy. In addition to counterinsurgency, the mission of the armed forces include internal security, territorial defense, assistance to the national administration, and civic action. **Burma** purchases small amounts of military equipment and training from various countries including the **U.S.** and **Western Europe**. In the area of NBC, **Burma** is reportedly producing mustard gas for chemical weapons.

Burma has a significant cultural difference from the **U.S.**, a wet/hot tropical climate with heavy coastal rainfall, and geography that includes mountains in the north, east, and west and a dense jungle interior. About two-thirds of the country is not suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 500 meters due to the broken terrain, thick vegetation, and frequent rainfall. Hydrographic conditions off the coast would prevent NGF platforms from moving in close enough to provide support for operations ashore. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available for **Burma**. The three primary airfields and one major port would be constrained to handle strategic lift. Communications and ground transportation facilities are adequate at best. The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU would require between four and six days to reach **Burma**.

BURMA - THREAT SUMMARY



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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Heroin production finances **Burmese** guerrillas.
- Rebel forces fight the Government and other insurgents.

In the "**Golden Triangle**," where **Burma**, **Thailand**, and **Laos** share a border, opium is produced and refined into heroin. Much of this heroin is shipped via **Thailand** to drug dealers in the **U.S.** and **Europe**. The Mong Tai Revolutionary Army, an insurgent group that operates in the **Burmese-Thai** border region extorts protection money from heroin factories in order to finance its war against the **Rangoon** Government and rival insurgents, the **Burmese** Communist Party. Terrorist tactics, including bombings and assassinations, are employed by all these groups.

U.S. Equities In Burma

- Overall U.S. equity is low.

U.S. and Burma maintain friendly relations. Specific U.S. interests in this country include bilateral cooperation to suppress the illicit narcotics trade, assistance to Burmese economic development, commercial access, and improved cultural exchanges. U.S. aid has been provided to Burma for health and agricultural projects. About 150 U.S. citizens reside there.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	10	10	150	1 1	2	Low

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

- World's largest producer of opium.
 - 1988 produced 1,065 - 1500 metric tons
 - 1987 produced 925 - 1230 metric tons
 - 1986 produced 770 - 1100 metric tons
 - 1985 produced 490 metric tons
- Reports indicate production will increase.

Burma's political turmoil has grounded its large-scale aerial eradication program until an effective Government is seated in Rangoon. Traffickers capitalized on diminished enforcement efforts to smuggle large quantities of opium and heroin with little interference. The prospect for 1989 is grim; with highly favorable climatic conditions and the suspension of programs to destroy crops or seize shipments of drugs or precursor chemicals from China, Thailand, and India, traffickers may harvest and move as much as 1,400 metric tons of opium to heroin refiners in Southeast Asia.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	LAV	Howitzers	170	6	256	E

Ground OOB consists mainly of 170,000 volunteers. Recruits are trained in their units and NCOs are trained at their own school. Officers are trained at a four-year service academy or through an officer training school for college graduates. The army has gained experience fighting insurgents. Tanks: Comet; Artillery: M-101, M-1948.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	Props	Early AAA	9	6	45	B

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: AT-33, PC-7, SF260WB, Turbo-Trainer; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	None	Lg Gun Boats	7	6	73	C

Ships: 4 Corvettes with guns, antisubmarine mortars, depth charges, and radars; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 21 Gun Boats; 9 Coastal Patrol Craft; 36 River Patrol Craft.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

Burma is reported to be producing mustard gas using materials imported from Italy and West Germany. The delivery means of this chemical weapon are not known. No nuclear weapons are suspected.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Burmese (English)
Primary religion - Buddhist

There is a significant cultural difference between Burma and the U.S.

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
64-97	59	30-200	Wet/Hot

Burma has a tropical monsoon climate. Rainfall varies from an average of 300 inches annually on the coast to 30 inches in the central region.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

Burma is rimmed on the north, east, and west by mountain ranges. Rivers and thick, dense, jungle forests cover much of the coastal and inland areas.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Burma** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

In approximately two-thirds of **Burma**, conditions for cross-country movement are unsuited year round due to mountains, hills, swamps, and densely forested plains. Movement is feasible on the flat to rolling and dissected plains of the central interior.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.
- In most of **Burma**, line of sight distances would be less than 500 meters due to mountains, hills, swamps, and dense tropical forests.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Hydrographic conditions prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast to provide support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
63413	32,200	Unsatisfactory

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-101	11,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage of **Burma** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-141B aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
3	1 C-141B 2 C-130	1/2	2-4/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Hmawbi Mandalay Mingaladon (Rangoon)	C-130 C-130 C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC. -

Ports

- One major port with marginal capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Rangoon	Small	26-30/26-30	26-30	-

Key Installations

Facilities may be available for the production and storage of chemical weapons. Communications and transportation facilities are adequate at best. Telephone service is slow with frequent delays. Public transportation is inadequate, unsafe, and overcrowded. The **Irrawaddy River** is the country's economic lifeline and major transportation system connecting **Rangoon** with **Mandalay** in the central area.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Rangoon	- Fair telecomm - 2 Radio stations - 1 TV station - 1 Satellite station	27,000 km	4,353 km	1	3	None	None	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach **Burma**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

With 150 potential evacuees and a distance of 61 nautical miles to the probable evacuation site (**Rangoon**), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Burma** would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
65	150	61 (Rangoon)	C

Note: In **Burma** the following factors are of little significance:

Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

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Telephone:CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C//
STU-III AV 243-2491Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO NEW DELHI IN//DATT//
600651, EXT: 2691/2692/2693
UNCLASS FAX: 91-11-689-2391SUMMARY

India is located adjacent to important **Indian Ocean** trade routes. The U.S. is India's largest trading partner and an important source of foreign economic assistance. Almost 5,000 U.S. citizens reside in India. Opium is produced for legal purposes but there is concern that it is being diverted to illegal trafficking. India is involved in money laundering and acts as a transit point for **Pakistani** and **Burmese** heroin and precursor chemicals enroute to refineries. Sikh terrorism has been on the rise with attacks against government and civilian targets. India has begun to develop weapons systems and is expected to become an arms exporter in the future. Due to involvement in drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, India deserves attention by military planners. India has the second largest ground, air, and naval OOBs in the region. Military equipment is obtained from the U.S.S.R., U.K., France, and Italy. India may have chemical weapons with means of delivery and may be developing nuclear weapons.

India has a climate that varies from tropical in the south to temperate in the north. The topography ranges from a mountainous northern border, to northern plains, desert in the northwest, rolling hills in the northeast, and a southern peninsula with moderate elevation. India has a culture much different from the U.S. It is generally well suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions permit NGF ships to provide some support for operations ashore, but would be out-gunned by coastal defense weapons. A major shortfall for military operations in this country is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields and ports are quite sufficient to handle strategic lift. Key installations for military planning include oil fields. It is estimated that the Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require two to four days to reach India. Due to about 5,000 potential evacuees, and the 458 nautical miles distance to the probable evacuation site (New Delhi), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in India would be very difficult.

INDIA - THREAT SUMMARY

DRUGS

TERRORISM


GRAY ARMS/
TECH TRANS

GROUND OOB

AIR OOB


NAVAL OOB

NBC



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INDIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in India

- India dominates the South Asian subcontinent.
- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

India dominates the South Asian subcontinent geographically and is near important Indian Ocean trade routes. It has common borders with the countries of Bangladesh, Burma, Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Bhatan. Sri Lanka lies beyond a narrow strait off India's southern tip. India also supports 15 percent of the world's population. Only China has a larger population. The U.S. is India's largest trading partner (\$4.1 billion in annual bilateral exchange) and has been an important source of foreign economic assistance. Almost 5,000 U.S. citizens reside in India. In recent years U.S. relations with India have been affected by differing perceptions on regional security issues and questions of international finance.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
466	1,463	2,725	48	4,702	4,945	4 4	8	Medium

India - 2

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Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X	X		X	X

India, the world's major producer of licit opium for processing into pharmaceuticals, is of increasing concern to U.S. officials as a transit route for **Pakistani** and **Burmese** heroin and for precursor chemicals used in manufacturing heroin. In the last two years, concern has grown over diversion from licit production. **India** has long had a sophisticated money laundering system which is but one element in a thriving underground economy.

Terrorism

In **India**, Sikh terrorism remains primarily domestic, but the Sikhs have demonstrated amply their ability to operate on an international scale. Sikh terrorist operations consist primarily of bombing, often against civilian targets and assassinations of government officials and moderate Sikhs. Sikh activity outside **India** was illustrated most dramatically by the 1985 bombing of an Air India flight over the **North Atlantic**. There has been, however, no comparable attack outside **India** since then.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

India presently builds complex systems such as the T-72 tank and MiG-25 jet fighter for the **Soviet Union** and is expected to become a major arms exporter in the 1990s.

Consolidated Threat

India deserves special attention by military planners because of its involvement in narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

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General Ground OOB

India has the second largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	T-72	Bloc	1,100	27	1,257	F

Ground OOB consists of a 1,100,00 force of regulars. Army recruits are generally trained in the training battalions of their regiments or in the training units of their corps. They also receive training at various technical and nontechnical schools throughout the country. Officers receive comprehensive training at several service academies. Advanced officer instruction is obtained at the National Defense College at **New Delhi**. Tanks: T-55, T-72, Vickers 37; Artillery: Abbot, M-46, M-1944, S23, **Yugoslavia** M-48.

General Air OOB

India has the second largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	113	27	290	F

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21FL/PFMA/MF, MiG-23MF, MiG-29B/UB; Close Air: Ajeet, Jaguar, MiG-23BN, Mirage 2000H; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, SA-11, SA-14, and Tigercat SAMs and AA guns. The existing Indian Air Defense Ground Environment System (IADGES) is installed along the northern and western borders and consists of radars obtained from the **U.K.**, **France**, **U.S.S.R.**, and **Italy** and a communications system provided by the **U.S.** A number of 3- dimensional radars are currently operational.

General Naval OOB

India has the second largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
F/N Carrier	Bloc	Bloc	52	27	219	F

Ships: 2 Fixed Wing Aircraft Carriers (Ex-**U.K.**), 5 Destroyers, 21 Frigates, and 6 Corvettes with SSMS, SAMs (SA-N-1), guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine mortars, countermeasures, and radars; SSMS: SS-N-2C Styx; Patrol Craft: 5 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-**Soviet**) with SSMS, guns, and radars; 14 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Known to be a past possessor of chemical weapons.
- Suspected to have chemical weapons delivery systems.
- Strong indications of a nuclear weapons capability and a substantial means of delivery.

India is known to be a past possessor or repository of chemical weapons. Reports have been made that **Indian** chemical weapons possession were common knowledge and not considered unusual. It is suspected that **India** has delivery systems for chemical weapons. Evidence has also accumulated in the past few years that **India** possesses all the essential elements for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. **India** tested a nuclear device in 1974 and today it is estimated to be able to produce about 15 nuclear weapons per year. Its nuclear weapons delivery capability far exceeds that of **Pakistan**, its rival neighbor.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Hindi (English, Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu)

Primary religion - Hindu

There is a significant cultural difference between **India** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
5-120	59-82	5-450	Mixed

The climate in **India** varies from tropical in the south to temperate in the north.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

The topography includes the **Himalaya Mountains** extending along much of the northern border, a well-watered and fertile plain in the north, northwestern desert, northeastern hills, and the southern peninsula with moderate elevation. Most of the population lives in cities, towns, and villages.

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General Cross-Country Mobility

- India is generally well suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The majority of India--the southern plains--is well-suited for tracked movement. The region is characterized by rolling, cultivated, or scrub-covered plains.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Line of sight distances are generally restricted to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

The terrain of India is characterized by the **Himalaya Mountains** and its associated ranges, the rocky surfaces of the Peninsula, and an alluvial plain of the **Ganges-Brahmaputra Lowland**. Almost one-fourth of the land is covered with forest. It is estimated that about 50 percent of India would present line of sight distances of between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide limited support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
63102	9,150	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
180 mm S23	30,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,00 scale map coverage for India is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

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Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
12	2 C-5 10 C-141B	8/4	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Agra	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Ambala	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Bangalore	C-141B, C-130	-
Bombay	C-141B, C-130	-
Calcutta	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Dundigal	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Gauhati	C-141B, C-130	-
Indira Gandhi International (Delhi)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Lucknow (Amausi)	C-141B, C-130	-
Madras	C-141B, C-130	-
Nagpur	C-141B, C-130	-
Srinagar	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- Several major ports are available to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Okha	Small	46-50/46-50	26-30	Yes
New Mangalore	Small	26-30/56-60	26-30	-
Cochin	Medium	31-35/36-40	26-30	Yes
Alleppee	Small	26-30/over 76	-	-
Nagappattinam	Small	26-30/26-30	61-65	Yes
Apendicherry	Small	36-40/26-30	6-10	-
Madras	Medium	31-35/61-65	31-35	Yes
Vishakhapatnam	Medium	31-35/31-35	31-35	Yes
Paradip	Small	36-40/36-40	41-45	-
Calcutta	Large	26-30/26-30	26-30	Yes

India - 7

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TAB A/P 5

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Key Installations

Facilities may be available for the production and storage of chemical and nuclear weapons. Oil fields are located at **Assam, Gujarat, and Bombay**. Communications services tend to be unreliable. A network of railroads runs throughout the country. Roads are adequate during the dry season but many are narrow and may be impassable during the monsoon.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
New Delhi	- Poor telecomm - 170 Radio stations - 14 TV stations - Domestic satellite system	1,633,300 km	61,850 km	10	12	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	NC

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach **India**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (about 5,000) and the 458 nautical miles distance to the most likely evacuation site (**New Delhi**), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **India** would be very difficult.


Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
267	4,945	458 (New Delhi)	F

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Telephone:CG III MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 635-6910Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2//
STU-III AV 477-7323DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C//
STU-III AV 243-2491Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO JAKARTA ID//DATT//
011-62-21-360360, EXT 2190SUMMARY

Indonesia is an archipelago of more than 13,500 islands extending 3,000 miles along the equator from mainland **Southeast Asia** to **Australia**. The archipelago forms a natural barrier between the **Indian** and **Pacific Oceans**, making the straits between the islands strategically and commercially important. Little known conflict continues on the **Indonesian** island of **Timor** between insurgents and Government forces. Reports indicate that in 14 years of fighting, one-third of the population of **East Timor** Province has died due to civil war and famine. Overall U.S. equity in **Indonesia** is high. Total trade amounts to about \$4.5 billion annually with the U.S. importing some of **Indonesia's** oil. Over 12,000 U.S. citizens reside there. **Indonesia** is a transit point for heroin, opium, hashish, and precursor chemicals, and there have been reports of increased drug trafficking in the resort area of **Ball**. Besides an army of 216,000 regulars, **Indonesia** maintains the fourth largest naval capability in the region. The air force is also well equipped with a recently upgraded air defense network. There have been allegations that **Indonesian** forces used chemical weapons against the insurgents in **East Timor**.

The larger **Indonesian** islands consist largely of coastal plains, mountainous interiors, and heavy jungle vegetation. The country has an equatorial climate with more temperate heat and humidity in the upland areas. The **Indonesian** culture is much different from that of the U.S. The islands are generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the thick jungle and mountainous conditions. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (Intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters because of the broken terrain, jungle, and frequent heavy rainfall. Coverage of **Indonesia** by 1:50,000 scale maps is absent except for the area around **Jakarta**. Airfields and ports are numerous and capable of receiving strategic lift. Key installations in the country include oil fields. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach **Indonesia**. Due to the over 12,000 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Indonesia** would be very difficult.


INDONESIA - THREAT SUMMARY



Indonesia - 1

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INDONESIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Insurgents fight Government forces on the island of **Timor**.
- In recent years, one-third of the population of **East Timor Province** has died due to war and famine.

Muslim **Indonesia** invaded the Catholic province of **East Timor** in 1975, and a stubborn insurgency has continued since then. In 14 years of fighting, war and famine have claimed nearly a third of the population; but little is known of the violence because **Indonesia** has effectively sealed the borders. Although the **Indonesian** Government claims the insurgent group called Fritilin has all but disappeared, closer observations indicate the rebels are still fighting and causing casualties to government troops.

U.S. Equities in Indonesia

- Overall U.S. equity is high.

U.S. relations with **Indonesia** have been close and cordial and the **U.S.** supports the **Indonesian** Government's plans for economic development. Recent annual **U.S.-Indonesian** trade totaled about \$4.5 billion. U.S. imports consisted mostly of oil, rubber, coffee, tin, spices, tea, plywood, and textiles. U.S. exports include many agricultural products. U.S. direct investment in the country is about \$4 billion and a number of **American** banks have branches in **Jakarta**. Over 12,000 U.S. citizens reside in **Indonesia**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
3,929	763	3,719	-	8,411	12,270	5 6	11	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
		X		X

- Transit site for heroin, opium, hashish, and precursor chemicals.
- Increased trafficking in **Ball**.

Indonesia is a transit site for heroin, opium, hashish, and precursor chemicals. Heroin is exported to **Australia**, **New Zealand**, and **Western Europe**; the amounts reaching U.S. markets are not considered significant. New interest focuses on **Ball**; **Western Europeans** are heavily involved in the increasing traffic from this major resort area, which is augmented by the high number of international flights.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	LAV	Howitzers	216	10	306	E

Ground OOB consists of 216,000 regulars. Recruits are trained at regimental centers before going on to specialist schools. NCOs are promoted on the basis of length of service or skill, and not leadership ability. Officers attend a service academy and technical schools. As a rule, **Indonesia** prefers an active role in society for its military personnel at the expense of military training. The army performed poorly against a small number of insurgents in **East Timor**. Tanks: AMX-13, PT-76; Artillery: D-30, M-48, M-101.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	25	10	125	D

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E/F; Close Air: A-4E, TA-4H; Air Defense: RBS-70 (Rapier on order) SAMs and AA guns. During the 1980s, **Indonesia** upgraded its air defense network by adding air surveillance radars and control centers.

General Naval OOB

- **Indonesia** has the fifth largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	42	10	162	F

Ships: 14 Frigates with SSMs, SAMs (Seacat), guns, torpedoes, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSM: Harpoon, Exocet; Patrol Craft: 4 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, and radars; 8 Fast Attack Craft-Gun and Torpedo; 12 Large Patrol Craft; 8 Coastal Patrol Craft; 11 Boeing Jetfoils.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

Reports have been made that **Indonesian** troops used chemical weapons against insurgents in **East Timor**.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Indonesian (English)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Indonesia** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
79	82	70-370	Wet/Hot

Although **Indonesia** has an equatorial climate, the upland areas on the principal islands provide a temperate contrast to the constant heat of the lowlands. The rainy season lasts from November to April.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Indonesia consists of more than 13,500 islands. The larger ones have coastal plains, mountainous interiors, and heavy jungle ground cover.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Indonesia** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Conditions are unfavorable for cross-country tracked movement throughout most of the islands due to dense forest, steep slopes, soft water-logged ground, and vast intractable swamps.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances in most of **Indonesia** would be less than 1,000 meters due to extensive mountains and plateaus on the main islands, dense jungle, and frequent heavy rainfall.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
73072/73081	1,000	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
122 mm D-30	15,300	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage is limited to the area around Jakarta.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
17	3 C-5 9 C-141B 4 C-130 1 None	9/8	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Abdul Rachman Saleh	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Achmad Yani	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Adi Sumarmo Wiryokusmo	C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-141Bs. Daylight/VFR only.
Adisucipto	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Bali International (Den Pasar)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Baucau	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Frans Kaisiepo	C-141B, C-130	-
Halim Perdanakusuma (Jakarta)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Iswahyudi (Maduim)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Juanda	C-141B, C-130	-
Kemayoran International	None	-
Pekanbaru	C-130	-
Polonia	C-141B, C-130	-
Sentani	C-141B, C-130	Runway less than 6,000 feet. Daylight/VFR only.
Sepinggan	C-130	-
Talangbetutu	C-141B, C-130	-
Ujung Pandang	C-141B, C-130	-

Ports

- Several major ports are available and able to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Tanjunguban	Small	over 76/over 76	-	-
Sambu	Small	61-65/66-70	41-45	Yes
Tanjungpriok	Large	31-35/31-35	31-35	Yes
Ardjung	Small	over 76/over 76	-	-
Banyuwangi	Small	66-70/66-70	36-40	-

Key Installations

Oil fields are located at **Minas** in central **Sumatra**, offshore northwest of **Java**, north of **Samarinda** on **Kallimantan**, near the **Natuna Islands** in the **South China Sea**, and on **Irian Jaya**. Facilities may also be available for the storage of chemical weapons. Local communications service is unreliable although long distance satellite connection to the **U.S.** is generally good. Ground transportation facilities on most of the islands is marginal.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Jakarta	- Fair telecomm - 656 Radio stations - 9 TV stations - Domestic satellite system - 1 International satellite ground station	119,500 km	6,964 km	5	17	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	C

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach Indonesia. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.


NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 12,000) NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Indonesia would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
212	12,270	2 (Jakarta)	F

Note: In Indonesia the following factors are of little significance:


Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

JAPANMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG III MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 635-6910Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2//
STU-III AV 477-7323DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C//
STU-III AV 243-2491Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO TOKYO JA//DATT//
COMMERCIAL: 81-3-224-5375
AUTOVON: 224-5375/5376SUMMARY

Due to its economic power and international role, **Japan** has become one of the most important countries in the world community. The close relationship with **Japan** is the cornerstone of U.S. policy in **Asia**. **Japan** is the U.S.'s largest trading partner after **Canada**. Concerns are growing about the U.S. trade deficit with **Japan** caused by **Japanese** market restrictions. U.S. equity in **Japan** remains high and almost 42,000 U.S. citizens reside there. Terrorism has continued at a generally low level in **Japan** with periodic attacks by radical leftist groups. In 1987, the **Soviets** obtained technology from a **Japanese** firm which was used to produce quieter submarine propellers. Due to its involvement in terrorism and illicit technology transfer, **Japan** deserves attention by military planners. **Japan** has an army of 156,000 volunteers, and the third largest air force and navy in the region. **Japan** is suspected of having chemical weapons.

Four-fifths of **Japan** is mountainous and is one of the most densely populated nations in the world. **Japan's** climate ranges from subtropical on **Okinawa** to cool on the island of **Hokkaido**. **Japanese** culture is quite different from that of the U.S. About three-fourths of **Japan** is unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the mountains, hills, and forests. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. NGF platforms can approach the coast within range to support operations ashore, but would be out gunned by **Japanese** coastal defense weapons. There is complete coverage of **Japan** by older 1:50,000 scale maps, but some may be outdated. There are airfields and ports capable of receiving strategic airlift and sealift. Key installations include communications, transportation, and industrial facilities as well as possible storage sites for chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARF** with its embarked MEU would require between four and six days to reach southern **Japan** and more than six days to arrive at northern **Japan**. NEO conducted by a MEU would be very difficult due to over 40,000 potential evacuees.


JAPAN - THREAT SUMMARY



Japan - 1

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JAPAN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Japan

- Japan is a strong economic power with a growing international role.
- Overall U.S. equity is high.

Due to its economic power and growing international role, Japan clearly has become one of the most important countries to the U.S. The U.S. and Japan together account for 35 percent of the world's gross national product and 50 percent of free-world's gross national product. The close and cooperative relationship with Japan is the cornerstone of U.S. policy in Asia. Japan provides bases and facilities to support about 55,000 U.S. military personnel located there.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
12,568	29,325	80,104	-	121,997	41,700	6 6	12	High

Terrorism

Terrorism in **Japan** has continued at a generally low level, with the Chukaku-Ha, a radical leftist group, launching periodic incendiary and rocket attacks at **Japanese** and **U.S.** facilities. The international terrorist group **Japanese Red Army**, responsible for the 1973 Lod airport massacre in **Israel**, has conducted terrorist operations in **Europe** and **Asia** as well as in the **Middle East**. The recent reemergence of this group after a hiatus of several years is particularly troublesome.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

In the spring of 1987, the **Soviets** acquired embargoed machine-tool technology from a **Japanese** company, Toshiba Machine Tools. It is suspected that this technology was used by the **Soviets** to make quieter submarine propellers.

Consolidated Threat

Because of its involvement with both terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer, **Japan** deserves attention by military planners.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers/SP	156	37	263	E

Ground OOB consists of 156,000 volunteers. Ground Self Defense Force Army recruits are trained first in training brigades and then with their units. Officers are trained in a four-year course at a tri-service defense academy near Tokyo. Further career and staff training is given in branch schools. There is also a staff college and national defense college at Tokyo. Tanks: Type 61, Type 74; Artillery: FH70, M-101, M-110A2, M-115.

General Air OOB

Japan has the third largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	NT/AW	3d Gen SAMs	44	37	211	F

Fighter Aircraft: F-4E/J, F-15CJ; Close Air: F-1; Air Defense: HAWK, Nike Hercules (to be replaced by Patriot), Stinger, Type 81 Tan-SAM SSMs and AA guns. Japan uses the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system, which is integrated and automated, to provide protection against air attack. BADGE sites extend from the northern tip of Hokkaido to the southern tip of Okinawa. Japan is presently upgrading BADGE to include the purchase of advanced technology Over-the-Horizon (OTH) systems from the U.S.

General Naval OOB

Japan has the third largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	46	37	193	F

Ships: 43 Destroyers and 21 Frigates with SSMs, SAMs (Sea Sparrow), antisubmarine ASROC missiles, guns, torpedoes, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSM: Harpoon; Patrol Craft: 5 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo with guns, torpedoes, and radars; 9 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

Japan is known to have been a past possessor or repository of chemical weapons and may currently have some in stock. Delivery systems for chemical weapons are not known. Japan has 36 nuclear powered reactors in operation and 12 reactors are under construction. No nuclear weapons are suspected.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Japanese
Primary religion - Buddhist

There is a significant cultural difference between **Japan** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
48-63	58-71	40-120	Wet/Warm

Japan's climate ranges from sub-tropical on **Okinawa** to cool on **Hokkaido**. Most of the country is dominated by the **Asiatic** monsoon, which brings a pronounced summer rainy season and mild, sunny winters.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

With a chain of rugged islands, about four-fifths of **Japan** is mountainous, including many dormant and a few active volcanos. It is one of the most densely populated nations in the world with about 823 persons per square mile.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Japan** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Approximately 75 percent of **Japan** is perennially unsuited for the movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles due to mountains, hills, and forests. The remaining area offers fair to poor conditions for vehicular movement and is comprised of small plains and valley floors.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Most of **Japan** is mountainous with significant ground cover in many regions. Line of sight distances in this country would mainly be under 1,000 meters.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
97120	6,000	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm FH 70	30,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
34	17 C-5 12 C-141B 3 C-130 1 Emergency Alternate 1 None	19/15	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Asahikawa	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only. Low runway WBC.
Ashiya Air Base	C-130	VFR only.
Atsugi Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	C-5s emergency only.
Chitose Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Fukuoka	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Futenma Marine Corps Air Station (Okinawa)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles.
Gifu	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Hachinohe	C-141B, C-130	-
Hakodate	C-141B, C-130	-
Hofu	None	-
Hyakuri	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Emergency alternate only.
Ie Shima Auxiliary Air Base	C-130	Daylight/VFR.
Iruma	C-141B, C-130	-
Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Iwo Jima	C-141B, C-130	-
Kadena Air Base (Okinawa)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Kagoshima	C-141B, C-130	-
Kanoya	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s. Daylight only. Low runway WBC.
Komatsu	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Kumamoto	C-141B, C-130	-
Kushiro	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway less than 6,000 feet. Low runway WBC.
Misawa Naval Air Facility	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles.
Nagasaki	C-141B, C-130	-
Nagoya	C-5, C-141B, C-130	C-5 emergency alternate only.
Naha (Okinawa)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
New Tokyo International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Nyutabaru	C-141B, C-130	-
Obihiro	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Osaka International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Sendai	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Tokyo International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Tsuiki	C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Yamagata	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s/C-141Bs.
Yokota Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

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Ports

Numerous major ports capable of accommodating strategic seallft.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Hakodate	Medium	41-45/51-55	26-30	Yes
Otaru	Medium	46-50/41-45	31-35	Yes
Katunan	Medium	Over 76/Over 76	26-30	-
Tokyo	Large	31-35/41-45	31-35	Yes
Kawasaki	Large	36-40/56-60	36-40	Yes
Yokohama	Large	41-45/56-60	51-55	Yes
Yokosuka	Medium	41-45/26-30	41-45	Yes
Shimizu	Medium	Over 76/Over 76	31-35	Yes
Nagoya	Medium	46-50/61-65	36-40	Yes
Yakkoichi	Medium	36-40/36-40	56-60	Yes
Osaka	Large	31-35/31-35	36-40	Yes
Kobe	Large	36-40/36-40	41-45	Yes
Mizushima	Medium	51-55/46-50	51-55	Yes
Fukuyama	Medium	41-45/51-55	56-60	Yes
Kure	Medium	41-45/Over 76	46-50	Yes
Iwakuni	Medium	36-40/Over 76	36-40	Yes
Shimmoseki	Large	31-35/31-35	31-35	Yes
Maizura Wan	Medium	31-35/41-45	31-35	Yes
Nigata	Medium	36-40/41-45	31-35	Yes
Wakomatu	Medium	31-35/31-35	26-30	Yes
Moji Ko	Large	41-45/31-35	31-35	Yes
Kagoshima	Medium	71-75/61-65	36-40	Yes
Nagasaki	Large	Over 76/41-45	36-40	Yes
Sasebo	Medium	36-40/Over 76	31-35	Yes
Hakata	Medium	31-35/26-30	31-35	Yes
Kin Wan	Medium	Over 76/Over 76	Over 76	-

Key Installations

Facilities may be available for the storage of chemical weapons. There are 36 nuclear reactors in operation and 12 more under construction. Communication, transportation, and industrial facilities are numerous and quite modern.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Tokyo	- Excellent telecomm - 376 Radio stations - 12,350 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	1,127,406 km	26,821 km	28	34	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	None	C

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between four and six days to reach southern Japan and in excess of six days to arrive at northern Japan. The AAF/ACB can deploy within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Japan would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 40,000).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
557	41,700	5 (Tokyo)	F

Note: In Japan the drug threat is of little significance.

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MALAYSIA

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG III MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 635-6910
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2// STU-III AV 477-7323
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C// STU-III AV 243-2491
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO KUALA LUMPUR MY//DATT// 011-60-3-248-9011, EXT 234




SUMMARY

In **Malaysia**, the possibility of a revived communist insurgency along the border with **Thailand** is viewed with great seriousness. The **U.S.** supports **Malaysia** through cooperation in the areas of narcotics enforcement and military assistance programs. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Malaysia** is moderate. In bilateral trade, the **U.S.** receives about 14 percent of **Malaysia's** exports and provides 26 percent of its imports. Over 2,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. **Malaysia** is an important heroin processing center and transit site, exporting drugs primarily to **Europe** and **Australia**. The country has moderate size armed forces which have been mainly directed at containing the communist insurgency. Recently, a major program has been initiated to expand and modernize the military to meet both internal and external threats. The army in particular is being reorganized and its equipment upgraded. **Malaysia** is a member of the Five-Power Defense Arrangement with the **U.K.**, **Australia**, **New Zealand**, and **Singapore**. Under the arrangement, small **Australian** air units are stationed in **Malaysia**.


Malaysia has a culture significantly different from that of the **U.S.** The climate is mainly hot and humid with large amounts of rainfall. The country is basically broken into two regions, the **Malay Peninsula** which borders with **Thailand**, and **East Malaysia** which occupies the northern part of the island of **Borneo**. On the peninsula, a range of forested mountains runs north and south and is flanked on the east and west by coastal plains. **East Malaysia** is composed of a broad, swampy coastal plain, drained by wide rivers which merge into hills and mountains of the interiors. Most of **Malaysia** is covered with dense jungle. Due to these conditions, at least two-thirds of **Malaysia** is unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be less than 500 meters due to the adverse terrain and frequent heavy rainfall. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available for **Malaysia**. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to handle strategic lift entering the country. Key installations include oil fields on both the **Malay Peninsula** and **East Malaysia**. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require between two and four days to reach **Malaysia**. Due to the over 2,000 potential evacuees, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Malaysia** would be very difficult.

MALAYSIA- THREAT SUMMARY



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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Revived communist insurgency active along the **Malaysian** border with **Thailand**.

Although no longer representing the major threat to **Malaysian** stability that it did from 1948 to 1960, the revived communist insurgency in this country is being viewed with great seriousness by the Federation of **Malaysia**, which has cooperated with **Thailand** to coordinate operations against the rebels across their mutual border.

U.S. Equities in Malaysia

- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

The U.S. and Malaysia maintain cordial relations. As trading partners, the U.S. receives about 14 percent of Malaysia's exports and provides 26 percent of its imports. U.S. direct investment is over \$1 billion, most of which goes to petroleum development and integrated circuit production. Over 2,000 U.S. citizens live in Malaysia.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
1,111	1,897	3,053	-	6,061	2,390	5 3	8	Medium

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
	X			X

Malaysia is an important heroin conversion and transit center, exporting primarily to Europe and Australia. A strong domestic enforcement program which drove heroin seizures up by 700 percent seems to have reduced drug availability in 1988, and a new property forfeiture act provides a vital new weapon, but the expected bounty of opium coming from the Golden Triangle in the future will put the country's forces to a test.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	90	11	171	D

Ground OOB consists of 90,000 volunteers. Army recruits receive basic training at a training center with further training carried out in the units to which they are assigned. In addition, there are specialist schools in such areas as administration and transport. Most officer training is accomplished at the Federal Royal Military College. Some cadets attend **British** and **Commonwealth** schools. Tanks: Scorpion; Artillery: M-56 pack howitzer, M-102A1.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	11	11	112	D

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E; Close Air: A-4M; Air Defense: AA guns. Late in 1988 the U.K. agreed to provide **Malaysia** with a wide range of equipment including Rapier and Javelin SAMs plus Marine Martello radars. The **Malaysian** Air Defense Ground Environment (MADGE) system is operational and provides air surveillance and control services for civil and military aircraft in **Malaysian** airspace.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	13	11	104	D

Ships: 2 Frigates and 2 Corvettes with SSMs, guns, antisubmarine mortars, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSMs: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 8 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 6 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 21 Large Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Malay (English, Chinese, Tamil)
Primary religion - Eastern

There is a significant cultural difference between **Malaysia** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-88 -	High	100	Wet/Hot

Malaysia has a tropical climate with hot, humid conditions. At higher elevations temperatures are lower and more variable. Annual rainfall is heavy although it varies considerably in different locations.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

A range of forested mountains runs north and south along the center of the **Malay Peninsula** flanked on the east and west by coastal plains. About 50 percent of this area is covered by tropical jungle and the rest by extensive rubber or palm oil estates. **East Malaysia** (northern part of the island of **Borneo**) consists of a broad, frequently swampy coastal plain, drained by wide rivers, which merges into the jungle-covered hills and mountains of the interior.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Malaysia** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

In approximately two-thirds of **Malaysia**, conditions for cross-country movement are unsuitable year round due to mountains, hills, and dense forests. Movement is somewhat feasible on the flat to rolling and dissected plains of the coastal lowlands.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 500 meters.

The terrain of **Malaysia** is generally characterized by narrow coastal plains which give way to mountainous and jungle covered interior. Heavy rainfall which averages about 100 inches yearly, would frequently limit visibility. Due to these conditions, line of sight distances would not exceed 500 meters over most of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
71270/71271	9,000	Fair

Malaysia - 5

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat..

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-102	11,500	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Coverage of **Malaysia** by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
9	2 C-5 7 C-141B	7/2	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Butterworth (Prai)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Kota Kinabalu	C-141B, C-130	-
Kuantan	C-141B, C-130	-
Kuching	C-141B, C-130	-
Labuan Aero	C-141B, C-130	-
Penang	C-141B, C-130	-
Simpang	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Subang/Kuala Lumpur	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Sultan Ismail	C-141B, C-130	-

Ports

- Ports are available that can accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Pelabuhan	Medium	26-30/36-40	31-35	Yes
Miri	Small	41-45/41-45	6-10	-
Lutong	Small	41-45/36-40	11-15	-

Key Installations

Oil production is roughly equally divided between the offshore fields of **East Malaysia** and **Peninsular Malaysia**. Specifically, oil fields are located off the west coast of **Sarawak** at **Bintulu** and **Miri**, off the west coast of **Sabah**, and offshore to the east of **Kuala Terengganu**. Exploration is underway in the south **China Sea**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Kuala Lumpur	- Good telecomm - 31 Radio stations - 33 TV stations - 5 Satellite stations	29,026 km	1,801 km	3	9	- Crude oil - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require between two to four days to reach **Malaysia**. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

Due to the over 2,000 potential evacuees, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Malaysia** would be very difficult.


Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
74	2,390	26 (Kuala Lumpur)	F

Note: In **Malaysia**, the following factors are of little significance:

- Terrorism
- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- NBC

NORTH KOREA


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Theater J-2:	USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 477-7323
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-2491
Embassy Defense Attache:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-3//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-0566

SUMMARY

Since 1950, **North Korea** has maintained a large, well-equipped armed force. Overall **U.S.** equity in **North Korea** is low. The **U.S.** maintains no diplomatic representation and conducts no trade with this country. Terrorist attacks by **North Korea** are evidenced by the 1987 bombing of a **South Korean** airliner and the 1983 assassination of **South Korean** officials in **Burma**. **North Korea** has provided training and support to international terrorist groups. It is suspected that **North Korea** supplies large quantities of major weapons to **Iran** as well as other Third World countries. **North Korea** illegally acquired **U.S.**-made Hughes helicopters in order to improve its military posture. The **North Koreans** have one of the largest armed forces in the **Asia/Pacific** region. They reportedly possess stocks of chemical weapons and the means of delivery. **North Korea** rates particular attention by military planners due to its involvement in terrorism, gray arms/technology, chemical weapons development, and its large ground, air, and naval OOBs.


North Korea's culture is different from that of the **U.S.** Mountains and hills cover nearly all of the country, with narrow valleys and small plains in between. The climate is temperate with July and August the warmest months. In the winter, snowfall is generally light, but the ground is covered for long periods. Conditions are poor for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (Intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters because of the broken terrain, forested areas, and cultivated plains. Hydrographic conditions at some locations along the coast would prevent NGF platforms from providing support for operations ashore. **North Korean** coastal defense weapons would be able to out-gun the standard **U.S.** NGF weapon (5"/54 cal). Mapping is available for the country by older 1:50,000 scale maps, but they may be outdated. More than one airfield and port are considered capable of receiving strategic lift. Key installations may include facilities for the production and storage of chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **North Korea**.

NORTH KOREA- THREAT SUMMARY



North Korea - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

The 1950 war was never officially ended; only a ceasefire and an armistice were agreed to in 1953. Despite some desire on both sides (**North and South Korea**) for reunification, each maintains a large, well-equipped armed force. **North Korea** wages a terrorist war against **South Korea**, including assassination of Government officials. If full-scale war occurred, the **North Koreans** would most likely use chemical weapons and **South Koreans** might be inclined to respond in kind. The **North Koreans** realize that they would have to win the war quickly. Therefore, any future **Korean** war would probably be massive, bloody, and short unless the **Soviets** or **Chinese** intervene.

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U.S. Equities in North Korea

- Overall U.S. equity is low.

The U.S. maintains no representation and conducts no trade with **North Korea**. Financial and commercial transactions by persons or firms subject to U.S. jurisdiction are prohibited under U.S. law except through special license by the Secretary of the Treasury. The U.S. supports the objective of peaceful reunification of **North** and **South Korea**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	-	-	-	0 0	0	Low

Terrorism

North Korea practices terrorism on its own behalf against **South Korea**, as illustrated dramatically in November 1987 when two **North Korean** agents placed bombs aboard a **Korean Air** flight (KAL 858), causing the loss of the aircraft and all 115 passengers. Prior to that incident, **North Korean** terrorism had been directed principally against senior **South Korean** leaders, as evidenced in a 1983 bombing incident in **Rangoon** in which several **South Korean** Cabinet ministers died. **North Korea** also provided training to various international terrorist groups in the 1970s.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

North Korea continues to sell large quantities of major weapons to **Iran** as well as other Third World countries. It is widely thought that **North Korea** supplied the mines used by **Iran** against merchant vessels in 1987. **North Korea** secretly and illegally acquired 87 U.S.-made Hughes helicopters during 1983-84 in order to improve its military capabilities over **South Korea**. The U.S. views illegal acquisition of U.S. equipment and technology with concern. The 1983-84 diversion is the subject of an investigation by Federal authorities.

Consolidated Threat

North Korea rates special consideration by military planners due to its involvement in both terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer.

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General Ground OOB

North Korea has the fourth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-62	Bloc	750	15	855	F

Ground OOB consists of 750,000 troops which are mainly conscripts. Recruits enter the army with some basic military training obtained in the youth corps called the Red Militia. During active service they are trained with their units. Officers are either regular or short-service. The regulars receive a longer, more formal course of instruction at a military academy or war college. Advanced training is provided to higher ranking officers. Tanks: T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62; Artillery: D-20, D-30, D-74, M-46, M-1931, M-1937, M-1944, M-1974, M-1975, M-1977, M-1978, M-1981, M-1985, SCUD SSM.

General Air OOB

North Korea has the fourth largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	55	15	200	F

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, MiG-23; Close Air: A-5, MiG-17, MiG-19; Air Defense: HN-5A, SA-2, SA-5, and SA-7 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

North Korea has the fourth largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	35	15	180	F

Ships: 2 Frigates with SSMs, guns, antisubmarine mortars, depth charges, mines, and radars; SSMs: SS-N-2A; Patrol Craft: 28 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (18 Ex-Soviet) with SSMs and guns; 135 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 137 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo; 33 Large Patrol Craft (15 Soviet, 6 Ex-Chinese); 10 Coastal Patrol Craft (Soviet).

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

It has been alleged that **North Korea** has up to 250 agent tons of lethal offensive chemical weapons now stockpiled. Artillery, rocket, and aerial delivery means for these weapons are suspected. No nuclear weapons are suspected.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Korean
Primary religion - Eastern

There is a significant cultural difference between **North Korea** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
1-75	-	20-40	Mixed

The climate of **North Korea** is temperate with July and August the warmest months. Rainfall is concentrated in the summer months. January is the coldest month. Snowfall is generally light but the ground is covered for long periods.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

Mountains and hills cover nearly all the country, with narrow valleys and small plains in between. The northeast coast is the most rugged area.

General Cross-Country Mobility

-- **North Korea** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The country is poorly suited for tracked movement, which in the rugged hills and mountains is confined to the existing roads. Tracked vehicles could traverse rice fields when the ground is frozen. This is only possible from early January through mid-February.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

North Korea's terrain consists of numerous ranges of moderately high and partially forested mountains and hills separated by deep, narrow valleys and small cultivated plains. The most rugged area is along the northeast coast. These irregular terrain conditions would limit line of sight visibility to under 1,000 meters in most of the country.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Hydrographic conditions at some locations prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast to provide support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
95043	32,200	Unsatisfactory

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
SCUD SSM	80,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage of North Korea by old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Note: Contact with Headquarters, Military Airlift Command indicated North Korea was not addressed in the Airfield Suitability Report used as a basis for this document due to the classified nature of airfields in that country. However, it was determined that an assumption could be made that North Korea has more than one airfield that could accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Ports

- Moderate size ports are available to handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Namp O	Small	36-40/36-40	26-30	Yes
Wonsan	Small	41-45/36-40	21-25	-
Hungnam	Small	26-30/26-30	26-30	Yes
Kimchaek	Small	41-45/31-35	31-35	-
Chongjin	Small	31-35/31-35	26-30	Yes
Najin	Small	41-45/31-35	31-35	Yes
Unggi	Small	41-45/31-35	21-25	Yes

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Key Installations

Facilities may be in operation for the production and storage of chemical weapons. Efforts were made during the 1980s to upgrade the country's infrastructure, especially power plants and transportation facilities.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- 18 Radio stations - 11 TV stations - 1 Satellite station	20,280 km	4,535 km	7	20	- Crude oil	None	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **North Korea**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- It is unlikely that NEO would be conducted by a MEU in **North Korea** due to the lack of potential evacuees.


Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	59 (Pyongyang)	B

Note: In **North Korea** the drug threat is of little significance.

North Korea - 7

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
TAB A/P 9

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STU-III AV 365-9103Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C//
STU-III AV 243-2491Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO ISLAMABAD PK//DATT//
826161, EXT 2418/2419/2430SUMMARY

Recent conflict in **Pakistan** has included the **India - Pakistan War**, tribal and political insurgencies, and confrontations with the Government of **Afghanistan**. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Pakistan** is moderate. The two countries are major trading partners and the **U.S.** provides long-term military and economic aid. Over 2,800 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country. **Pakistan** is the third largest producer of opium in **Southwest Asia**. In 1988, there were 127 terrorist incidents in **Pakistan**, most of which were attributed to the **Afghan** Government. **Pakistan** has the sixth largest ground OOB in the **Asia/Pacific** region. Its air and naval OOBs are also of substantial size. **Pakistan** has military equipment from the **U.S.**, **Soviet Union**, **China**, the **U.K.** and **France**. Indications are that **Pakistan** possesses chemical weapons with delivery means and is developing nuclear weapons.


Pakistan's culture is different from that of the **U.S.** There are mountainous conditions along the western border with **Afghanistan**. The climate ranges from hot near the coast to temperate in the interior uplands. Conditions are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles only in the eastern plains, and valleys of the northern mountains. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) varies between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. NGF ships can approach the coast and provide some support for operations ashore, but would be out-gunned by **Pakistani** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to central **Pakistan**, including **Islamabad**, and the borders with **Afghanistan** and **India**. Airfields are adequate but ports have limited capabilities. Key installations are suspected to include facilities for production and storage of chemical and perhaps nuclear weapons. The **Pacific ARG** could reach **Pakistan** in less than two days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to the over 2,800 potential evacuees and the 616 nautical miles distance to the likely evacuation site (**Islamabad**).

PAKISTAN - THREAT SUMMARY



Pakistan - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Unrest in **Baluchistan** Province could erupt.
- The **India-Pakistan** War could resume.
- Three million **Afghan** refugees must be accommodated.

Since the war in **Afghanistan** began in 1979, over three million **Afghan** refugees are reported to have poured into **Pakistan**. Relations between **Pakistan** and the **Afghan** Communist Government have been tense over this situation and also the **Soviet** air attacks on the **Pakistan** border to cut off supply routes to the Mujahadeen. The **Pakistan** Government has been increasingly troubled by various tribal and political insurgencies in the country. **Baluchistan** is a particular focus of unrest. The **Pakistan-India** War remains low key. However, while **Pakistani** and **Indian** officials refer to it as a border dispute in international forums, in their own countries they call it "the war." **Jammu-Kashmir** is **India's** only Muslim state and the Muslims, all pro-**Pakistan**, are becoming more rebellious and organized.

U.S. Equities in Pakistan

- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

This country controls the **Khyber Pass** and **Malakand Pass**, traditional invasion routes between central **Asia** and the **Indian** subcontinent. Despite strains in the past, the **U.S.** and **Pakistan** currently maintain friendly relations. The two countries have agreed to a long term military and economic aid program aimed at helping **Pakistan** deal with the increasing threat to its security and economic development problems. The **U.S.** and **Japan** are the main trading-partners with **Pakistan**. Almost 3,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Pakistan**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
129	128	438	226	921	2,815	2 4	6	Medium

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				

- Third largest producer of opium in **Southwest Asia**.
1988 produced 190-220 metric tons
1987 produced 190-220 metric tons
1986 produced 140-160 metric tons
1985 produced 40-70 metric tons
- Major producer of hashish.

Pakistani opium production remained high in 1988 (190 to 220 metric tons), reflecting political instability in growing areas and the continued expansion of the country's domestic addict population.

Terrorism

In 1988, there were 127 terrorist incidents in **Pakistan**, most of which were attributed to **Afghanistan's** Ministry of State Security, WAD. Typically, the WAD attacks took place in transportation terminals with a high potential for civilian casualties. These attacks were apparently designed as a warning to the **Pakistani** Government not to support the **Afghan** resistance movement.

Consolidated Threat

Pakistan should be noted with special concern because of its involvement in both drug production and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Pakistan has the sixth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	M-48/T-54	Howitzers/SP	450	16	536	F

Ground OOB consists mainly of 450,000 volunteers. Army recruits are trained at training centers run by the unit to which they are assigned, with basic training lasting from four and a half to six months depending on the branch of service. There are also NCO schools for each branch of service. Officer training is accomplished via the **Pakistan** Military Academy which provides a two-and-a-half-year course or the Army Education Corps where college graduates are given a short course before commissioning. Tanks: M-47, M-48, T-54, T-55; Artillery: M-46, M-101, M-109A2, M-110A2, M-114, M-198.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	18	16	124	D

Fighter Aircraft: F-7, F-16A/B; Close Air: A-5, Mirage IIIE, Mirage 5A; Air Defense: Blowpipe, Crotale, HN-5A, HQ-2, RBS-70, and Stinger SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Pakistan has the fifth largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	16	16	162	F

Ships: 8 Destroyers (6 Ex-U.S., 2 Ex-U.K.) with SSMS, SAMs (Seacat), guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSMS: Harpoon, SS-N-2 Styx; Patrol Craft: 8 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-Chinese) with SSMS, guns, and radars; 12 Fast Attack Craft-Gun (Ex-Chinese); Fast Attack Hydrofoil-Torpedo (Ex-Chinese); 4 Large Patrol Craft (Ex-Chinese).

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Reported possessor of chemical weapons with a means of delivery.
- Believed to have developed a nuclear weapons capability.

Pakistan has been reported to be a possessor of chemical weapons and is suspected to have means of delivery. Based on accumulated evidence, it has also been established that **Pakistan** is producing weapons-grade uranium and is probably testing a nuclear device. Its production facilities are estimated to have the capacity to produce one to four nuclear weapons annually. Reports state that **Pakistan** is building an additional plant which will increase this capacity.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Urdu (English, Punjabi)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Pakistan** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
66-92	60-80	7-60	Dry/Hot

The climate ranges from hot near the coast to more temperate in the northeast uplands. Annual rainfall varies widely but generally averages less than 10 inches.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

Pakistan extends from the **Arabian Sea** 1,000 miles northward across the **Thar Desert** and eastern plains to the **Himalayan Mountains**.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Parts of **Pakistan** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Tracked vehicles can operate in the small valleys of the northern mountains and **Baluchistan** highlands, and generally throughout the **Baluchistan** basin. Tracked vehicles can also operate over most of the **Indus** plain, along the **Pakistan-Indian** border. Large parts of **Pakistan** however, are unsuited for tracked movement due to steep slopes and rugged terrain.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Line of sight distances are generally restricted to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

Pakistan consists of towering mountains, including the **Kindu Kush** in the west, a desert area in the east, the Punjab plains in the north, and an expanse of alluvial plains. Line of sight distances would be limited in the mountain areas but are expected to frequently range between 1,000 and 2,000 meters in the desert and plain regions.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide limited support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
63050/63053	14,640	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
203 mm M-110	29,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

Only parts of central **Pakistan**, including **Islamabad** and the borders with **Afghanistan** and **India**, have coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
10	3 C-5 6 C-141B 1 C-130	6/4	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Hyderabad (Begumpet)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Islamabad (Chahlala)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Karachi International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Lahore	C-141B, C-130	-
Masroor	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s.
Multan	C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Nawabshah	C-141B, C-130	-
Peshawar	C-141B, C-130	-
Quetta/Samingli	C-141B, C-130	-
Sargodha	C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-141B. Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- Two major ports with limited capabilities to handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Karachi	Medium	31-35/31-35	31-35	Yes
Port Muhammad	Small	36-40/-	41-45	-

Key Installations

Key installations include facilities for possible production and storage of chemical and nuclear weapons. Others of military significance are pipelines for crude oil and natural gas. Communications and ground transportation facilities are marginal. Railroads are adequate but the road network is poorly developed.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Islamabad	- Poor domestic telecomm - 24 Radio stations - 16 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	101,315 km	10,097 km	2	10	- Crude oil - Natural gas - Refined products	None	NC

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach the coast of Pakistan in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 2,800) and the 616 nautical miles distance to the most likely evacuation site (Islamabad), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Pakistan would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
281	2,815	616 (Islamabad)	F


Note: In Pakistan, the factor of gray arms/technology transfer is of little significance.

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PAPUA NEW GUINEA

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG III MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 635-6910
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2// STU-III AV 477-7323
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C// STU-III AV 243-2491
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO CANBERRA AS//DATT// 011-061-62-705-000 (EMBASSY SWITCH) 011-061-62-705-807/8 (USDAO/ USCINCPACREP)




SUMMARY

Papua New Guinea is located in the southwest **Pacific** about 100 miles northeast of **Australia**. It consists of the eastern half of the island of **New Guinea**, the **Bismark Archipelago**, and several other islands. The U.S. and **Papua New Guinea** maintain friendly relations and overall U.S. equity in the country is moderate. The two nations are trading partners and the U.S. has about \$420 million in direct investments there. Over 3,500 U.S. citizens reside in **Papua New Guinea**. The country has a small ground OOB composed of 2,900 volunteer personnel. Both the air and naval OOBs are negligible. Most of the military support is provided by **Australia**.

The culture of **Papua New Guinea** is quite similar to that of the U.S., with English being the primary language and Protestant the main religion. The most predominate characteristic of this country is its wet/hot climate and mountainous, jungle covered terrain. The average annual rainfall in many areas is over 200 inches. The main island (eastern **New Guinea**) contains about 85 percent of the land area. In recent years there has been considerable urban drift toward **Port Moresby** and other major centers. Due to the severe terrain and climatic conditions, cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be restricted to the narrow coastal lowlands. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be limited to less than 500 meters due to the rough terrain, thick ground cover, and frequent heavy rainfall. Hydrographic conditions would somewhat limit the ability of NGF ships to approach the coast and provide support for operations ashore. Another significant shortfall for military operations is that map coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available. An airfield and a major port are able to receive strategic lift. There are few key installations in this country due mainly to the harsh geographic and climatic conditions which inhibit development, particularly in the interior. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach **Papua New Guinea**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in this country would be very difficult due to the over 3,500 potential evacuees.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA - THREAT SUMMARY




Papua New Guinea - 1

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PAPUA NEW GUINEA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Papua New Guinea

- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

Good relations between the U.S. and Papua New Guinea date back to World War II when more than a million U.S. military personnel served in the area. This country supports a vigorous democratic tradition, respect for human rights, and cooperation with its neighbors and the international community at large. The U.S. is a substantial trading partner with Papua New Guinea, and U.S. investment in the country is about \$420 million, second only to Australia. Over 3,500 U.S. citizens reside there.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
420	21	91	2	534	3,580	2 4	6	Medium

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	None	None	3	2	45	A

Ground OOB consists of a 2,900 person volunteer force. **Australia** provides considerable training for the **Papua New Guinea** Defense Force. Personnel needing technical training in particular have been sent to **Australia**. Officers undergo training at a joint service college in-country under a modified **Australian** curriculum. Tanks: none; Artillery: none.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	None	None	Negligible	2	12	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	Negligible	2	42	B

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 8 Large Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - English (Pidgin English, Tribal)

Primary religion - Protestant

There is very little cultural difference between **Papua New Guinea** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
81	80	40-300	Wet/Hot

This country lies totally within the tropics and its climate is monsoonal. Average rainfall is high with many areas receiving over 200 inches annually. Temperatures are not extreme for a tropical region. Lowland and coastal temperatures average about 80 degrees Fahrenheit while interior temperatures vary with elevation.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
				X	

Papua New Guinea is located in the southwest **Pacific** about 100 miles northeast of **Australia**. It includes the eastern half of the island of **New Guinea**, the **Bismark Archipelago**, and several other islands. Thickly forested mountains cover much of the interior areas with lowlands along the coasts. There has been a considerable urban drift in recent years towards **Port Moresby** and other major centers.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Papua New Guinea** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country vehicular movement is severely restricted to the narrow coastal lowlands and foothills. The dominating central mountain network and the swamps of the southwestern littoral deny cross-country movement throughout most of the nation.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distance limited to less than 500 meters.

The main island of **Papua New Guinea** is composed of a complex system of mountains which extend from east to west. Precipitous slopes, knife-sharp ridges, and great outcroppings characterize the terrain. On the smaller islands, mountains cover much of the area. Ground cover consists of tropical rain forest, and swamps occupy large areas of the country. Due to the rough terrain and thick vegetation, line of sight visibility would be generally less than 500 meters over 90 percent of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide limited support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
73580/73581/73582	9,660	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
None	0	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Coverage of **Papua New Guinea** by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
18	1 C-5 1 C-141B 14 C-130 2 None	2/16	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Buin	None	-
Buka	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Chimbu	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Goroka	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Hoskins	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Kavieng	C-130	-
Kieta	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Lae	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Madang	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Mendi	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Momote	C-130	Runway less than 6,000 feet. Daylight only. Low runway WBC.
Mount Hagen	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Nadzab	C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Port Moresby	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Rabaul	C-130	Daylight only. Low runway WBC.
Wapenamanda	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Wau	None	-
Wewak International	C-130	Daylight only. Low runway WBC.

Ports

One major port is available with satisfactory capabilities to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Rabaul	Small	41-45/41-45	26-30	Yes

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Key Installations

Due to the terrain and climatic conditions, establishment of adequate transport and communication facilities has been difficult. Particularly in the interior of the country, these conditions inhibit development efforts and have a negative impact on all social, political, and economic progress.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Port Moresby	- Adequate telecomm - 31 Radio stations	19,200 km	None	1	18	None	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach Papua New Guinea. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 3,500), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Papua New Guinea would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
12	3,580	4 (Port Moresby)	F

Note: In Papua New Guinea the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
OOB (Ground, Air, Naval)
NBC

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MEF G-2:
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Telephone:

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STU-III AV 477-7323

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C//
STU-III AV 243-2491

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

USDAO BEIJING CH//DATT//
011-(86)-1532-3831, EXT 600 (DATT),
616 (OPSCO), 602/603/604/605/609/
612/614/615 (ATTACKS); FAX
532-2106




SUMMARY

There is potential for renewed conflict between **Taiwan** and the **People's Republic of China (PRC)**. U.S. equity in the **PRC** is high. The two countries conduct bilateral trade and the **U.S.** is the **PRC's** third largest trading partner. With increased normalization, direct **U.S.** investment in the **PRC** has increased significantly. Over 2,500 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country. The **PRC** is a transit point for precursor chemicals and heroin moving to and from the **Golden Triangle**. The **PRC** provides illicit weapons to a number of Third World countries. The **PRC** rates special attention because of its involvement in both drug trafficking and gray arms trade. The **PRC** continues to maintain the largest army, navy, and air force in the **Asia/Pacific** region. Efforts are underway to make the military leaner, and better equipped in the 1990s. The **PRC** may have a chemical weapons production capability and may be expanding its stocks of nuclear weapons.

There is a cultural difference between the **PRC** and the **U.S.** The **PRC** is almost entirely in the temperate zone and has a mixed climate. Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is precluded in most of the country except for the northern desert plains. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally limited to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions prevent NGF ships from coming within range to provide support for operations ashore. When they are able to approach the shore, they would be out-gunned by **Chinese** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to scattered areas throughout the **PRC**. Key installations include facilities for the production and storage of nuclear and chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require between two to four days to reach the **Chinese** coast. **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be very difficult due to over 2,500 potential evacuees and the 124 nautical miles distance to **Beijing**, the most likely evacuation site.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA - THREAT SUMMARY




People's Republic of China - 1

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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Potential for renewed conflict between **Taiwan** and the mainland communists.
- **China** has disputes with **India**, the **Soviet Union**, and **Vietnam**.

The 50-year-old **Chinese** civil war is not finished, and both sides maintain significant armed forces. The communists occupy mainland **China**, while the nationalists hold the island of **Taiwan**. Neither side is strong enough to invade the other. However, a major disorder in the **PRC** could bring the nationalists back. The **PRC** also has longstanding disputes with **India**, the **Soviet Union**, and **Vietnam** which could easily erupt into conflict.

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U.S. Equities in the PRC

- Overall U.S. equity is high.

Since normalization occurred in 1979, the U.S. has worked toward improved relations with the PRC while maintaining informal links with Taiwan. The U.S. is the PRC's third largest trading partner after Japan and Hong Kong. The PRC is the U.S.'s 16th largest trading partner. U.S. controls on technology and equipment exports to the PRC have been gradually liberalized over the past several years and direct U.S. investment there has increased. Over 2,500 U.S. citizens live in the PRC.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
173	3,497	6,911	9	10,590	2,525	6 4	10	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
		X	X	X

- Transit center for **Golden Triangle** heroin.
- Traffic in precursor chemicals.
- **Hong Kong** is financial and money laundering center.

The PRC does not produce significant amounts of illicit narcotics, but U.S. officials are increasingly concerned about the transshipment of **Golden Triangle** heroin through the southern PRC to **Hong Kong** and traffic in precursor chemicals into the **Triangle**.

Hong Kong is both the financial and money laundering center of the **Far East** narcotics trade and an important transit center for **Golden Triangle** heroin destined for **Australia**, **Canada**, the **U.S.**, and **Europe**. **Hong Kong** police, who made record heroin seizures and arrested a number of key traffickers in 1988, believe that as much as half the heroin seized came overland through the PRC.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

- Provided arms to **Cambodia's** Khymer Rouge.
- Equipped **Afghanistan's** Mujahideen guerrillas.
- Sold high-technology missiles to **Saudi Arabia**.
- **Hong Kong** is an important transshipment point.

The PRC's emerging role as an aggressive arms dealer is a disturbing precedent. The PRC is the main provider of arms to **Cambodia's** Khymer Rouge and also equips **Afghanistan's** Mujahideen guerrillas. **Hong Kong** is a transshipment point for gray arms to various locations in **Asia**.

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Consolidated Threat

The **PRC** warrants special attention due to its involvement in drug trafficking and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

The **PRC** has the largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-54	Bloc	2,300	16	2,386	F

Ground OOB consists of 2,300,000 personnel of which 1,075,000 are conscripts. The training of regular soldiers places great emphasis on the political and psychological aspects of warfare. Soldiers are indoctrinated that political motivation and high morale can enable them to overcome enemies with superior firepower. Military training concentrates on the basic skills. Recruits do much weapons training with rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenades, and mines. Due to shortages of ammunition, live-fire exercises are rare. Physical fitness and personal mobility are stressed. Tactical training concentrates on fieldcraft and small-scale operations; in particular, ambushes, patrols, infiltration, and close assault at night. Map exercises and war games are used to train senior commanders. Tanks: IS-2, T-34, T-54, Type 59, Type 69, Type 69II; Artillery: A wide range of **Soviet** and **Chinese** weapons including HY-2 SSM.

General Air OOB

The **PRC** has the largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	400	16	546	F

Fighter Aircraft: **Chinese** versions of the MiG-17, MiG-19, and MiG-21, and Shenyang J-8; Close Air: Tu-16, Il-28, Shenyang J-6; Air Defense: FM-80, HQ-61, SA-2, SA-7 SAMs and AA guns with fire control radars. The **PRC** has a network of air defense radars which provides surveillance and control and an early warning system for the detection of hostile missiles. Despite some recent improvements, the overall air defense network has major deficiencies such as an outdated C3 system and lack of automation.

General Naval OOB

The **PRC** has the largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	340	16	486	F

Ships: 16 Destroyers and 35 Frigates with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: CSS-N-2, Hai Ying 2, C801 Ying-jì Eagle Strike; Patrol Craft: 224 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (**Soviet** and **Chinese**) with SSMs, guns, and radars; 343 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 260 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo; 61 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol; 20 Large Patrol Craft; 5 Coastal Patrol Craft; 80 River Patrol Craft.

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Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Believed to have chemical weapons and numerous delivery systems.
- Reported to be expanding an already large nuclear weapons capability.

The PRC is known to have been a possessor or repository of chemical weapons in the past and reportedly has a current production capability. This country is also suspected to have a variety of means to deliver these weapons, ranging from artillery and rockets to aircraft and missiles. The PRC, as a declared nuclear power, also proceeded with a number of nuclear weapons-related developments in 1988 that suggest no lack of interest in modernizing its nuclear forces. It has been predicted that by 1996 the PRC will have 600 to 700 nuclear warheads.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Chinese

Primary religion - Eastern

There is a significant cultural difference between the PRC and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
17-81	45-86	4-80	Mixed

The PRC is almost entirely in the temperate zone. Only portions of the southernmost area are within the tropics. The climate is heavily affected by the regional monsoon. Summers are hot and humid while winters are dry and unusually cold. In the summer heavy rains cause frequent floods.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

The PRC is the third largest country in the world in terms of total land area (after the Soviet Union and Canada). Two-thirds of the country is mountainous or semi-desert while only one-tenth is cultivated. Ninety percent of the people live on one-sixth of the land, mainly on the fertile plains and deltas of the east.

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General Cross-Country Mobility

- The **PRC** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The majority of the **PRC** is unsuitable for the cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles due to extensive mountain networks, steep slopes, and plateaus interrupted by deep depressions. Cross-country movement is feasible throughout a northern belt comprised of northern desert plains. Vehicular movement throughout the Central and Southern **PRC** is precluded by mountains, steep slopes, and severely dissected plains.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The greater part of the **PRC** is mountainous, and only in the lower reaches of the **Yellow** and **Yangtze Rivers** are there extensive lower plains. Line of sight distances throughout the central and southern **PRC** are limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the mountains and severely dissected plains. In the desert plains of the northern **PRC** visibilities beyond 1,000 meters would be encountered.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Hydrographic conditions would prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast to provide support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
94004	28,980	Unsatisfactory

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
HY-2 SSM	40,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for **Beijing** and the southeast coastal area including **Hong Kong**. There is only spotted coverage elsewhere.

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Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields -	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	2 C-5 2 C-141B	3/1	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Baiyun Beijing (Peking Capital) Beijing (Shenyang) Hongqiao	C-141B, C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130	- - Runway only for C-5s and C-141Bs. Daylight/VFR only. -

Ports

- Ports are available with capabilities to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Hsia Men	Small	41-45/41-45	21-25	Yes
Ching Tao	Medium	26-30/Over 76	31-35	Yes
Chin Huang Tao	Small	26-30/36-40	31-35	Yes
Hu Lu Tao	Small	26-30/26-30	26-30	Yes
Lu Ta	Medium	46-50/31-35	31-35	Yes

Key Installations

The **PRC** is suspected of having facilities for the production and storage of both chemical and nuclear weapons. The **PRC** is the world's sixth largest producer of oil and has several large oil fields. The country also has an offshore oil exploration program underway. Nuclear power plants are located at **Guangzhou** and **Quinshan** (south of **Shanghai**). A hydropower project has been started which involves plans for construction of the world's largest dam at the **Three Gorges** site on the **Yangtze River**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Beijing	- Fair urban telcomm - 274 Radio stations - 407 TV stations - 3 Domestic satellite systems - 2 International satellite stations	962,800 km	52,500 km	5	4	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	NC

People's Republic of China - 7

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach the PRC. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 2,500) and the 124 nautical miles distance to the most likely evacuation site (Beijing), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in the PRC would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
207	2,525	124 (Beijing)	F


Note: In the PRC, terrorism is of little significance.

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SOUTH KOREA

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG III MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 635-6910
Theater J-2: Telephone:	USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2// STU-III AV 477-7323
DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C// STU-III AV 243-2491
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO SEOUL KOR//DATT// DIR: 011-82-2-732-2601, EXT 4481/4184 AUTOVON: (315) 723-8484




SUMMARY

South Korea occupies a strategic location on the **Korean** peninsula among the **Chinese**, **Japanese**, and **Soviet** spheres of influence. **U.S.** equity in **South Korea** is high. This country has become the seventh largest trading partner of the **U.S.** About 39,000 military personnel are stationed in **South Korea** and over 10,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. **South Korea** has the fifth largest ground OOB in the region composed of about 520,000 troops. It also has a relatively large air force and navy, equipped with modern weapon systems. An air defense network is deployed along its northern border with **North Korea** and the coastal waters to the southwest. **South Korea** is thought to possess stocks of chemical weapons.

South Korea has a culture significantly different from that of the **U.S.** It has a temperate climate with hot, rainy summers and cold, dry, and windy winters. The terrain consists of partially forested mountain ranges separated by deep, narrow valleys. There are cultivated plains along the coasts, mainly in the west and south. Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is possible in the valleys and plains during certain parts of the year. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the dissected terrain, forests, and cultivated areas. Intervisibility would be particularly restricted in the rugged east coastal and central interior. NGF platforms can approach the coast and provide a limited degree of support for operations ashore but would be confronted by a significant **South Korean** coastal defense threat. Coverage of the country is available by old 1:50,000 scale maps, but are likely to be outdated. There are several airfields and ports to accommodate strategic lift. Key installations may include production and storage facilities for chemical weapons. The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach **South Korea**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be difficult due to over 10,000 potential evacuees.


SOUTH KOREA - THREAT SUMMARY



South Korea - 1

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U.S. Equities in South Korea

- Strategic location within **Chinese**, **Japanese**, and **Soviet** spheres of influence.
- Overall U.S. equity is high.

South Korea occupies a strategic location on the **Korean Peninsula** among the **Chinese**, **Japanese**, and **Soviet** spheres of influence. This country has become the seventh largest trading partner of the **U.S.** The **U.S.** maintains about 39,000 military personnel in **South Korea** and over 10,000 **U.S.** citizens live there.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
1,018	8,099	17,991	-	27,108	10,250	6 6	12	High

General Ground OOB

South Korea has the fifth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	M-60	Howitzers/SP	520	22	592	F

Ground OOB consists mainly of 520,000 conscripts. Initial training is done at recruit training centers with specialist training provided at various service schools. There are academies modeled after the U.S. to train regular officers. Conscripts and short-term officers receive training at a separate school. Tanks: M-47, M-48A5, M-60; Artillery: M-101, M-107, M-109A2, M-110, M-114, M-115.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	3d Gen SAMs	33	22	155	E

Fighter Aircraft: F-4D/E, F-16A/B, F-86D/F; Close Air: F-5E; Air Defense: HAWK, Javelin, Nike Hercules, and Stinger SAMs and AA guns. South Korea operates an air defense system which is primarily oriented along its northern border with North Korea and the coastal waters to the southwest. This system is being upgraded to include the AN/TPS-43 and AN/TPS-63 new technology radars.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	29	22	161	F

Ships: 11 Destroyers, 6 Frigates, and 16 Corvettes with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMS: Harpoon, Exocet, Standard ARM; Patrol Craft: 11 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMS, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radar; 68 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol; 2 Large Patrol Craft.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

South Korea has been alleged to possess chemical weapons. With a sophisticated chemical industry, it could probably produce significant quantities for use in chemical warfare with North Korea. It is unknown if South Korea has delivery means for its chemical weapons. South Korea has seven nuclear power reactors in operation and two reactors under construction. No nuclear weapons are suspected.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Korean

Primary religion - Eastern

There is a significant cultural difference between **South Korea** and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
23-81	-	30-50	Mixed

South Korea has a temperate climate which is hot and rainy in summer and cold, dry, and windy, with generally light snowfall in winter.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

South Korea has partially forested mountain ranges separated by deep, narrow valleys. There are cultivated plains along the coasts, particularly in the west and south.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Parts of **South Korea** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The region is poorly suited for tracked movement due to steep slopes, dense scrub, forests, and wet rice fields (mid-June through mid-October). Tracked movement is possible on the valley floors and plains between mid-October and mid-June when the rice fields are drained. The optimum conditions occur during early-December through March when the ground is frozen.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances mainly limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The line of sight distances in large parts of **South Korea** would generally be less than 1,000 meters due to the mountainous terrain, steep slopes, dense scrub, and forests. The most rugged areas of this country are found on the mountainous east coastal and central interior.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide limited support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
95060	17,000	Poor

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
HONEST JOHN SSM	37,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Coverage of **South Korea** is available by old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
28	13 C-5 1 C-141B 12 C-130 1 C-130 Emergency only 1 None	11/17	>1/C-5

South Korea - 5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
A-306 (Chunchon)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
A-511 (Chonam)	C-130	-
Busan Air Base	C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.
Chechon	None	-
Cheju International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s.
Chinhoe	C-130	Emergency only.
Chongju Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Hoengsong	C-130	-
Kangnung	C-141B, C-130	-
Kimhoe	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Kimpo International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Kunsan Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Kwang-ju	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Osan Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Pochon	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Pohang	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight only for C-5/C-141B.
Pyongtaek	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
R-217 (Pochon)	C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.
R-222 (Kanam ni)	C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.
R-407 (Sokcho)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Sachon	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Seoul Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Sasaek	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Suwon	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Taegu International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.
Taejon	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Ulsan	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Yechon	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

Ports

- Three major ports with good capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Inchon	Medium	36-40/36-40	26-30	Yes
Yosu	Small	71-75/46-50	51-55	Yes
Pusan	Large	36-40/31-35	36-40	Yes

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Key Installations

Facilities are suspected to be available for the production and storage of chemical weapons. Seven nuclear powered reactors are in operation and two are under construction.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Seoul	- Adequate telecomm - 125 Radio stations - 256 TV stations - 1 Satellite station	62,936 km	3,106 km	3	28	- Refined products	None	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach South Korea. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in South Korea would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 10,000).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
179	10,250	27 (Seoul)	F

Note: In South Korea, the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

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SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS (FIJI AND THE SOLOMON ISLANDS)

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Theater J-2:	USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 477-7323
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-2491
Embassy Defense Attache:	USDAO SUVA FJ//DATT//
Telephone:	FIJI AMEMBASSY 314-466




SUMMARY

For purposes of this examination, the **South Pacific Islands** include **Fiji** and the **Solomon Islands**. The **U.S.** maintains cordial relations with these island nations and **U.S.** equity is low. About 500 **U.S.** citizens reside on the islands. **Suva**, the capital city of **Fiji**, is the local headquarters for the **U.S.** Agency for International Development (**AID**) which administers assistance to the entire region. **Fiji** has a small ground **OOB** consisting of about 5,000 volunteers. Units have served with the **United Nations** forces in **Lebanon** and the multinational force in the **Sinai**. **Fiji's** contributions to peacekeeping in the **Middle East** and **Africa** are unique for a nation of its size. No military forces are maintained by the **Solomon Islands**; a police force of about 500 provides internal security. Prior to independence, the **Solomons** were administered by the **U.K.** as a protectorate and the **U.K.** continues to be responsible for the defense of these islands from outside attack.

The cultures of the **U.S.** and the **South Pacific Islands** are quite similar. The larger islands of both **Fiji** and the **Solomons** are mountainous with dense, tropical jungle. The climate is hot and humid with heavy annual rainfall. Collectively, these islands present terrain conditions not conducive to cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 500 meters due to the mountains, thick ground cover, and frequent heavy rainfall. A serious shortfall for military operations in these islands is the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage. While airfields and ports are adequate to receive strategic lift, there are few other key installations of military significance. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require between four to six days to reach the islands. Due to the over 500 potential evacuees, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Fiji** and the **Solomons** would pose some difficulties.

SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS - THREAT SUMMARY




South Pacific Islands - 1

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SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in the South Pacific Islands

- Overall U.S. equity is low.
- About 500 U.S. citizens reside on the South Pacific Islands.

The U.S. and Fiji maintain excellent relations. Suva is the headquarters for the U.S. AID serving the entire region. The economy relies on sugar production and tourism. Oil exploration has begun, but so far has been unsuccessful. The U.S. conducts diplomatic relations with the Solomon Islands through the U.S. Ambassador to Papua New Guinea. The U.S. assists the economic development of the Solomon Islands through the U.S.-South Pacific Regional Aid Program and Peace Corps. U.S. trade with the Solomons is small.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	2	-	22	24	500	1 2	3	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	None	Howitzers	5	0	65	A

The **Fiji** ground OOB consists mainly of 5,000 volunteers. Defense of **Kiribati** and the **Solomon Islands** is the responsibility of the **U.K.** In the past, **Fiji** enlisted personnel were trained in **New Zealand** and officers in the **U.K.** or **Australia**. These arrangements have been largely suspended following the coups of 1987. Tanks: none; Artillery: 25-pounder guns/howitzers, 81 mm mortars.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	None	None	Negligible	0	10	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	Negligible	0	40	A

Ships: none; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: Fiji: 3 Coastal Minesweepers; 2 Patrol Craft; Solomon Islands: 3 Small Patrol Craft; Vanuatu: 1 Large Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - English (French, Creole, Hindi, Urdu, Fijian, Hindustani, Gilbertese, Spanish)

Primary religion - Protestant

There is a very small cultural difference between the **South Pacific Islands** and the **U.S.**

South Pacific Islands - 3

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
77-90	80	40-120	Wet/Hot

The climate of **Fiji** is tropical maritime. Conditions are hot and humid with annual rainfall up to 120 inches. The climate in the **Solomon Islands** is tropical monsoon also with hot, humid conditions and heavy rainfall.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Fiji consists of 322 volcanic islands in the **South Pacific** of which about 100 are inhabited. The larger islands are mountainous and covered with dense, tropical forests on the southeastern side where rainfall is particularly heavy. The **Solomon Islands** form an archipelago in the **Southwest Pacific**. The six main islands have rain-forested mountain ranges, deep narrow valleys, and coastal belts lined with coconut palms and ringed by reefs. The smaller islands are atolls and raised coral reefs.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- The **South Pacific Islands** are generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Collectively, the islands of the **South Pacific** present terrain not conducive to the cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles. Mountainous rugged terrain, excessive coralline formations, and insufficient surface area deny cross-country movement throughout these island nations.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 500 meters.

The islands of the **South Pacific** are mostly mountainous with dense tropical rain forest covering up to 90 percent of the land area. These conditions and the frequently heavy rainfall would generally limit line of sight visibility to under 500 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
82015/82374/83574	8,050	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
81 mm Mortar	4,595	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage for the **South Pacific Islands** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
8	1 C-5 1 C-141B 3 C-130 1 Emergency only 2 None	3/5	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Lambasa (Fiji)	None	-
Matei (Fiji)	None	-
Nadi International (Fiji)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Nausori International (Fiji)	C-130	-
Canton (Kiribati)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Emergency only.
Christmas Island (Kiribati)	C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Tarawa (Kiribati)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Port Vila (Vanuatu)	C-130	-

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Ports

- Ports are available with capability to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Suva (Fiji)	Small	Over 76/41-45	41-45	Yes
Lavuka (Fiji)	Small	61-65/61-65	31-35	-
Segond Channel (Vanuatu)	Small	41-45/41-45	31-35	Yes

Key Installations

On Fiji, facilities include several small factories and a satellite communications station. Improvements are being made to roads and telecommunications systems. There are few key installations in the Solomon and other South Pacific Islands and development is proceeding slowly.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Suva (Fiji)	- Modern local, interisland telecomm - 9 Radio stations - 1 Satellite station	2,960 km	644 km	2	4	None	None	None
None (Kiribati)	- 1 Radio station - 1,400 Telephones	483 km	None	0	2	None	None	None
None (New Caledonia)	- 5 Radio stations - 7 TV stations - 1 Satellite station - 23,000 Telephones	5,448 km	None	1	1	None	None	None
Honiara (U.S. Consulate) (Solomon IS)	- 4 Radio stations - 1 Satellite ground station - 2,000 Telephones	834 km	None	0	0	None	None	None
None (Vanuatu)	- 2 Radio stations - 1 Satellite ground station - 2,400 Telephones	240 km	None	1	1	None	None	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach the South Pacific Islands. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 500), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in the South Pacific Islands would be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
27	500	4 (Suva, Fiji) 6 (Honiara, Solomon Is)	E

Note: In the South Pacific Islands, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
OOB (Ground, Air, Naval)
NBC

South Pacific Islands - 7

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TAB A/P 15

SPRATLY ISLANDS


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DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-2C//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-2491
Embassy Defense Attache:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-3//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-0566

SUMMARY

The **Spratly Islands**, located in the **South China Sea**, are the center of a multinational dispute. These islands are significant because they occupy locations in important sea lanes and are believed to contain valuable oil and gas resources. **China**, **Vietnam**, **Malaysia**, the **Philippines**, and **Taiwan** all claimed sovereignty to some of the islands in this complex. In 1987, **Chinese** and **Vietnamese** warships operating in the area opened fire on each other with considerable damage and casualties. These countries continue to maintain warships in the vicinity of the **Spratlys**. **Malaysia** claims possession of the southern **Spratlys**, and has been conducting naval operations in the islands for at least nine years. The **Philippines** claim the northern **Spratlys** which it calls the **Kalayaan Islands**. **Taiwan** occupies **Itu-aba** island, the largest of the **Spratlys**, maintaining a weather station and a contingent of marines there. The islands are of little interest to the **U.S.** other than for their strategic location in the **South China Sea**. They have no indigenous population and no armed forces.

The **Spratlys** consist of numerous small islands. Some of the larger ones contain jungle growth and scrub vegetation. Most, however are small flat and desolate, with coral outcrops. They are unsuitable for cross-country vehicular movement and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be less than 1,000 meters. Coverage of the **Spratlys** by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available. There are no airfields, ports or key installations. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** could reach the **Spratlys** in less than two days.


SPRATLY ISLANDS - THREAT SUMMARY



Spratly Islands - 1

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SPRATLY ISLANDS - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

The **Spratly Islands** and **Paracel Islands** are the center of a multination dispute in the **South China Sea**. These islands are significant because they lie in important sea lanes in the area and are believed to contain valuable oil and gas resources. **China**, **Vietnam**, **Malaysia**, the **Philippines**, and **Taiwan** all claim sovereignty to some of the 200 islands in this complex. In 1987, **Chinese** and **Vietnamese** warships operating in the area opened fire on each other with considerable damage and casualties. In June 1988, **China** had 22 warships in the **Spratlys** region while **Vietnam** had about 39. **Malaysia** claims possession of the southern **Spratlys**, and has been conducting naval operations in the islands for at least nine years. The **Philippines** claim the northern **Spratlys** which it calls the **Kalayaan Islands**. The **Republic of China (Taiwan)** occupies **Itu-aba**, the largest of the **Spratlys**, maintaining a weather station and a contingent of marines there. Of the other islands, nine are occupied by the **Philippines** and three by **Malaysia**.

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U.S. Equities in the Spratly Islands

- Overall U.S. equity is low.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	-	-	-	0 0	0	Low

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	None	0	0	A

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: none.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

No native population.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
80	75	100	Wet/Hot

Tropical hot, humid climate with heavy rainfall and frequent storms.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

The **Spratlys** consist of numerous unpopulated islands in the **South China Sea**. Some islands contain jungle vegetation but most are flat and small, with coral reefs.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- The **Spratlys** are unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

Poor, with line of sight distances less than 1,000 meters due to vegetation on the larger islands.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- No charts available.

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
None	0	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Map coverage is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Not accessible by air.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
0	None	0/0	None

Ports

- No ports are available in the **Spratlys**.

Key Installations

There are no key installations.

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU could reach the **Spratlys** in less than two days.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in the **Spratly's** would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	0	A

Note: In the **Spratly Islands**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
OOB (Ground, Air, Naval)
NBC


SRI LANKA

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


SUMMARY

Recent conflict in **Sri Lanka** has occurred as a result of grievances and aspirations of the Tamil community. Militant Tamils have sought to create a separate state in **Sri Lanka's** Northern and Eastern Provinces where Tamils predominate. The **U.S.** enjoys a cordial relationship with **Sri Lanka**. While **U.S.** equity in this country is low, the **U.S.** provides developmental aid and serves as **Sri Lanka's** largest export market. Almost 700 **U.S.** citizens reside there. Tamil separatists use terrorist tactics, including assassinations of officials in pursuit of their objectives. They have also demonstrated a growing capability to mount quasi-military operations against targets such as police stations and government facilities. **Sri Lanka** has a modest ground OOB and a small air force and navy. These forces' primary mission is internal security but have been somewhat ineffective in dealing with the Tamil insurgents.

Sri Lanka is located in the **Indian Ocean** off the southeast coast of **India**. A plain, only slightly above sea level, makes up the northern half of the island while the center and south consist of hills and mountains. There is a uniformly tropical climate, with hot, humid conditions and heavy rainfall. **Sri Lanka's** culture is different from that of the **U.S.** About 50 percent of the people live in the southwest quarter of the island where agriculture is most favorable. Cross-country movement is severely restricted over most of **Sri Lanka** due to the broken terrain, forests, plantations, rice fields, and streams. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available. The ports and airfields can effectively handle strategic lift. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach **Sri Lanka**. Due to 700 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be quite difficult.


SRI LANKA - THREAT SUMMARY



Sri Lanka - 1

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SRI LANKA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Sri Lanka

- Overall U.S. equity is low.

The U.S. enjoys warm cordial relations with Sri Lanka. In addition to being one of the country's major aid donors, the U.S. is also its largest export market, mostly for garments, tea, and rubber. Sri Lanka recently emerged as the world's 11th largest foreign supplier of garments to the U.S. Almost 700 U.S. citizens live in this country.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	164	280	36	480	695	1 2	3	Low

Terrorism

- Tamil separatists use terrorist tactics as a widespread, often indiscriminate means to accomplish their goals.

The Tamil separatist insurgents of **Sri Lanka** use terrorism as a widespread, often indiscriminate tactic. Lacking the rigid military organization of the other groups, the Tamils use terror in an uncalculated, crude, and often ineffective manner. Bombings, assassinations, and assaults against civilian targets are common, and the general population is increasingly at risk. The Tamils have conducted operations against foreigners infrequently, as in the May 1986 jetliner bombing in **Colombo**, which killed several **Europeans**.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	None	Howitzers	14	3	77	B

Ground OOB consists mainly of 14,000 volunteers. Training of soldiers is accomplished at the Army Training Center in-country. Officers are trained at **British, Indian, and Pakistani** academies. There are some specialist schools available together with on-the-job training. Tanks: none; Artillery: **Yugoslavia** M-48, other howitzers.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	None	Early AAA	3	3	26	B

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	5	3	48	B

Ships: 3 Surveillance Command Ships (unarmed former Ro-Ro ships used for command and control of patrol craft); SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 2 Offshore Patrol Vessels; 18 Fast Attack Craft-Gun (6-Ex-**Chinese**); 21 Small Coastal Patrol Craft; 9 Small Inshore Patrol Craft.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Sinhalese (English, Tamil)

Primary religion - Buddhist

There is a significant cultural difference between **Sri Lanka** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
80	76	50-200	Wet/Hot

Sri Lanka has a generally uniform tropical climate with hot, humid conditions. Average annual rainfall ranges from about 50 inches in the northeast to 200 inches in the southwest. This distribution is influenced by two separate monsoon seasons and the island's topographical features.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

Sri Lanka is a pear shaped island in the **Indian Ocean** off the southeast coast of **India**. A plain, only slightly above sea level, makes up the entire northern half of the island and continues around the coast of the southern half. The south and central regions are hilly and mountainous.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Sri Lanka** is generally unsuited to cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement is severely limited over most of **Sri Lanka** due to year-round and/or seasonal obstacles. These obstacles include forests, coconut plantations, rice fields, and streams. Foot movement is feasible throughout most of **Sri Lanka** but may become difficult in areas of dense undergrowth and interrupted by precipitous slopes and deep streams.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances normally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The coastal areas and northern half of **Sri Lanka** are flat while the south and central sections are hilly and mountainous. Line of sight distances are restricted to less than 1,000 meters over most of the country however, due mainly to the forests, coconut plantations, dense tropical ground cover, and heavy rainfall.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
63233	1,830	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
85 mm D-44	9,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage for **Sri Lanka** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
2	1 C-5 1 C-141B	1/1	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Colombo/Katunmayake International Colombo/Ratmalana	C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130	- Low runway WBC.

Sri Lanka - 5

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Ports

- Two major ports with excellent capabilities to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Colombo	Large	36-40/36-40	31-35	Yes
Trincomalee	Medium	Over 76/Over 76	41-45	Yes

Key Installations

Sri Lanka has several development programs ongoing to improve its industrial facilities. Communications and ground transportation services are adequate.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Colombo	- Good telecomm - 17 Radio stations - 1 TV station - 1 Satellite station	66,176 km	1,868 km	2	2	- Crude oil - Refined products	None (oil refining)	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach Sri Lanka. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (about 700), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
76	695	2 (Colombo)	F

Note: In Sri Lanka, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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
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


SUMMARY

Drug trafficking, a communist insurgency, minority unrest, and fighting in neighboring **Cambodia** are all continuing problems. **Thailand** is strategically important because it controls the land route from **Asia** to **Malaysia** and **Singapore**. U.S. equity in **Thailand** is high. The U.S. has over \$1 billion in direct investment in **Thailand** and in recent years has provided over \$50 million in economic and military assistance. About 10,000 U.S. citizens live there. **Thailand** has reduced opium cultivation to about 28 metric tons annually, but remains a refiner of heroin and a transit site for drugs departing the **Golden Triangle**. **Thailand** also has an active trade in precursor chemicals and is a money laundering center. The armed forces stress defense from external attack as their primary mission and internal security as a secondary role. The armed forces have a combined strength of about 239,000 personnel. **Laos** recently accused **Thailand** of using chemical weapons during a border incident.

Thailand has a different culture from that of the U.S. The climate is hot and humid with heavy rainfall particularly in the south. The topography consists of a central plain, an eastern plateau, a mountain range in the west, and the southern densely forested isthmus joining the country with **Malaysia**. Cross-country movement of vehicles is virtually impossible due to steep slopes, thick vegetation in the plains, numerous rivers, and coastal swamps. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. NGF ships can approach the coast to support operations ashore but **Thal** coastal defense weapons would provide significant opposition. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the **Thal** borders with **Laos** and **Cambodia** and around **Bangkok**. Airfields are satisfactory to receive C-5 aircraft but the major port at **Bangkok** is inadequate to handle sealift. Key installations may include facilities for chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach **Thailand**. Due to about 10,000 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be extremely difficult.

THAILAND - THREAT SUMMARY




Thailand - 1

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THAILAND - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Drugs, insurgency, minority unrest, and fighting in neighboring **Cambodia** are continuing problems.

The Government appears to have turned the corner in its efforts to suppress a persistent communist insurgency. This is because of success in the field and in meeting the social and political needs of its people, friendlier links with **China**, and paradoxically, the communist takeover of **Cambodia**, which presented a particularly unpleasant example of a "worker's paradise" in action. Cooperation with **Malaysia** in conducting antiguerrilla operations along their mutual frontier has been of critical importance as well. Efforts against the private armies of various drug lords remain frustratingly inconclusive, however, and there also appears to be **Libyan**-sponsored unrest among the country's tiny Moslem minority.

U.S. Equities in Thailand

- Overall U.S. equity is high.
- Thailand controls the only land route from Asia to Malaysia and Singapore.

The U.S. has a long history of good relations with Thailand. In recent years the two countries have worked together to counter the illicit narcotics trade centered in the Golden Triangle. Thailand has received U.S. military equipment, essential supplies, training, and assistance in the construction of key installations. A U.S. military advisory group in Thailand oversees the delivery of equipment to the Thai armed forces. For military assistance, the U.S. provided over \$50 million in grants during 1987.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
1,282	1,544	2,387	57	5,270	9,550	5 5	10	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X	X	X	X	X

- Producer and processor of opium.
 - 1988 produced 23 - 33 metric tons
 - 1987 produced 20 - 45 metric tons
 - 1986 produced 20 - 25 metric tons
 - 1985 produced 35 metric tons
- Producer of marijuana.
- Active trade in precursor chemicals.

Thailand has reduced opium cultivation to about 28 metric tons, but remains as a significant refiner of heroin and conduit for opium/heroin from other sources in the Golden Triangle. High-quality Thai marijuana is exported to the U.S. and other markets and there is also an active trade in precursor chemicals. Thailand is also an important money flow country.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	M-48	Howitzers	166	4	210	E

Ground OOB consists of 166,000 conscripts. Recruits are trained in the units. Officers are mostly trained at a military academy near **Bangkok** while a few are sent to the **U.S.** and **U.K.** for instruction. Tanks: M-48A5, Type 69; Artillery: M-71, M-101, M-102, M-114, M-198, M-618A2.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Day Jet Atk	EW Radar	48	4	132	D

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E/F; Close Air: A-37B, AC-47, AU-23A, OV-10C, T-33A; Air Defense: Blowpipe and Spada SAMs and AA guns. A program is underway to automate and modernize the Royal Thai Air Defense System (RTADS). Initial efforts are designed to link radars along the border with **Cambodia** and upgrade the existing communications system.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	25	4	139	D

Ships: 6 Frigates and 2 Corvettes with SSMs, SAMs, guns, torpedoes, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSMs: Harpoon, Exocet, Gabriel I; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, and radars; 3 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 21 Large Patrol Craft; 35 Coastal Patrol Craft; 40 River Patrol Craft; 1 Hydrofoil.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

Laos has accused **Thailand** of using chemical weapons.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Thai
Primary religion - Buddhist

There is a significant cultural difference between **Thailand** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
75-86	62	40-150	Wet/Hot

Thailand's tropical climate is dominated by monsoons, with high temperatures and humidity. Rainfall varies but generally is heaviest in the south and lightest in the northeast.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

In **Thailand**, topography is broken into four general regions: a densely populated central plain watered by the **Chao Phraya River** system; an eastern plateau bordered on the east by the **Mekong River**; a mountain range spanning the country in the west and separating the plain and plateau in east-central **Thailand**; and the southern isthmus joining the land mass with **Malaysia**.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Thailand** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles is virtually impossible due to steep slopes in the mountains and hills, dense forests in many plain areas, and coastal swamps. Movement of foot troops is feasible throughout most of **Thailand**, however movement would be slowed in areas of dense undergrowth in forests, over flooded ground, and on steep slopes.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The topography of **Thailand** is characterized by thickly forested mountains in the north, an agricultural central region, dissected plateaus in the northeast, and a narrow strip of land covered mainly by rain forest in the south. Due to the rough terrain and heavy vegetation, line of sight distances would be under 1,000 meters in most of this country.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
93224/93243	4.575	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-198	24,000	U.S. NGF and Threat Equal

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists along the **Thai** border with **Laos** and **Cambodia** and for the area surrounding **Bangkok**. There is only spotted coverage elsewhere.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
14	7 C-5 5 C-141B 1 C-130 1 None	4/10	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Bangkok International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Chiang Mai International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Hat Yai International	C-141B, C-130	-
Korat	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles.
Nakhon Phanom West	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Nam Phong Air Base	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Phitsanulok	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Phrae	None	-
Surat Thani	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Tak	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Takhli	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Less than 6,000 feet of runway. Daylight/VFR only.
U-Tapao International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Ubon	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Udon (Udom)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway narrow for C-5s. Low runway WBC.

Ports

- One major port with poor capabilities to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Bangkok	Large	26-30/26-30	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

There may be facilities in the country for the production and storage of chemical weapons. Industrial facilities are numerous and developing. Communication facilities are adequate in the major cities. Roads vary in quality from modern divided highways to ungraded roads that may be impassable in the rainy season.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Bangkok	- Adequate telecomm - 300 Radio stations - 11 TV stations - 1 Satellite ground station - Domestic satellite system being developed	44,534 km	3,940 km	1	14	- Natural gas - Refined products	None	C

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach Thailand. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (about 10,000), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be extremely difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
453	9,550	15 (Bangkok)	F

Note: In Thailand, the following factors are of little significance:

Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

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


SUMMARY

The **U.S.** has no diplomatic relations with **Vietnam** and **U.S.** equity in that country is nonexistent. Recent moves have been made toward normalization since the withdrawal of **Vietnamese** forces from **Cambodia** and the recent willingness of **Vietnam** to help recover the remains of **U.S.** servicemen reported missing during the war. **Vietnam** has supported terrorist actions by insurgents operating against the Government in **El Salvador**. Most foreign-made weapons used by these insurgents, are **U.S.** arms that were lost during the **Vietnam** War and later sold by **Vietnam**. Due to involvement with both terrorism and gray arms sales, **Vietnam** warrants special attention. **Vietnam** has the third largest ground OOB in the **Asia/Pacific** region with over one million personnel. It also has a moderate size air force and navy. There have been published reports that **Vietnam** recently used chemical and biological weapons while operating in **Laos** and **Cambodia**.

Vietnam has a culture significantly different from that of the **U.S.** It is a long, narrow country with a 1,400 mile coastline. There is a heavily populated valley in the north, coastal plains in the center, and the wide, often marshy, river delta in the south. The remaining land consists of semi-arid plateaus and barren mountains, with stretches of tropical rain forest. The climate in the north is monsoonal, with a hot, humid wet season in summer and a warm, humid dry season in the winter. Southern **Vietnam** has a year-round tropical climate with varied heavy rainfall. The combination of mountains, jungle, and marshes preclude cross-country movement of vehicles in about three-fourths of **Vietnam**. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would normally be limited to less than 1,000 meters. NGF platforms can approach the coast to support operations ashore but these platforms could expect to be out-gunned by **Vietnamese** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to coastal areas and the northern border with **China**. Several airfields and one port can receive strategic lift. The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach **Vietnam**.


VIETNAM - THREAT SUMMARY



Vietnam - 1

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U.S. Equities in Vietnam

- Overall U.S. equity is low.

The U.S. does not have diplomatic relations with Vietnam although there has been some movement toward normalization. The economy and infrastructure of the country are in poor condition.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	-	-	-	0 0	0	Low

Terrorism

Vietnam, together with Cuba, Nicaragua, and the U.S.S.R, sponsors the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) operating against the Government of El Salvador. The FMLN, while primarily an insurgent group, frequently resorts to terrorist tactics, especially when its more conventional military resources are weak.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Most of the foreign-made weapons used by the FMLN insurgents in El Salvador are U.S. arms that were lost during the Vietnam War and later provided by Vietnam.

Consolidated Threat

Vietnam warrants special consideration because of its involvement in the two threat categories of terrorism and gray arms trade.

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General Ground OOB

Vietnam has the third largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-54	Bloc	1,100	21	1,231	F

Ground OOB consists of 1,100,000 personnel which are mainly conscripts. Initial recruit training is accomplished in village militias and upon call-up is completed in training units. Officers are selected to attend one or two military schools near Hanoi. Tanks: M-47, M-48, T-34, T-54, T-55, Type 59; Artillery: D-20, D-30, M-46, M-101, M-102, M-114, M-1938, M-1944, M-1946, T-12.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	15	21	166	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-19, MiG-21, MiG-23; Close Air: MiG-17F, Su-20/22; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, and SA-9 SAMs and AA guns. There are about 100 radar sites throughout Vietnam to provide air defense surveillance and control of aircraft.

General Naval OOB

Vietnam has the fifth largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	6	21	157	E

Ships: 7 Frigates (5 Ex-Soviet, 2 Ex-U.S.) and 2 Corvettes (Ex-U.S.) with SSMS, guns, torpedoes, mines, countermeasures, and radars; SSMS: SS-N-2C; Patrol Craft: 8 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-Soviet) with SSMS, guns, and radars; 21 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Ex-Soviet); 9 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol (Ex-Soviet); 18 Large Patrol Craft (Ex-Soviet); 2 Coastal Patrol Craft (Ex-Soviet).

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Strong evidence that chemical and biological weapons have been used.

There has been published evidence that Vietnamese forces have been using toxic chemical weapons in Laos and Cambodia. It was reported that Vietnamese forces poisoned water supplies in Cambodia and conducted a chemical attack that killed 43 persons and injured hundreds in 1986.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Vietnamese (French, Chinese)
Primary religion - Eastern

There is a significant cultural difference between **Vietnam** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
69-90	72-79	68-160	Wet/Hot

The north has a monsoon climate comprised of a hot, humid wet season from mid-May to mid-September; a relatively warm, humid dry season from mid-August to mid-March; and two short transitional seasons.

The south has a year-round tropical climate with relatively cool conditions in the central lowlands and mountains from about October to March. Rainfall is heavy in the delta and highlands in summer and central lowlands in winter.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

Vietnam is a long, narrow country with a 1,400 mile coast. There is a densely populated valley in the north, narrow coastal plains in the center, and the wide, often marshy, **Mekong River** delta in the south. The remainder of the land consists of semi-arid plateaus and barren mountains, with some stretches of tropical rain forests.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Vietnam** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The combination of mountains, jungle, marshes, and coastal swamps preclude cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles over approximately 75 percent of **Vietnam**. The remaining 25 percent of the country, composed of coastal plains, and deltas, offers limited movement but may become unsuitable during the rainy season.

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Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances normally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The combination of mountains, tropical rain forests broken by large areas of monsoon forests, and covered marshes, would restrict line of sight distances to under 1,000 meters in about two-thirds of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
93442/93446	3,000	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
130 mm M-46	27,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for coastal areas and along the northern border with China.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
10	2 C-5 7 C-141B 1 None	0/10	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Bein Hoa Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s. Daylight/VFR only.
Cam Ranh Bay	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Da Nang Air Base	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Ho Chi Minh (Tan Son Nhut)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Nha Trang	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Phan Rang Air Base	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Unknown status.
Phu Cat	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Pleiku Air Base	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Qui Nhon	None	-
Tuy Hoa Air Base	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- One major port with good capabilities to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Vinh Cam Rahn	Small	Over 76/56-60	41-45	Yes

Key Installations

Facilities may be present for the production and storage of chemical and biological weapons. There are a limited number of key industrial, communications, and land transportation facilities; however, most of these are underdeveloped.

U. S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Marginal telecomm - 17 Radio stations - 2 TV stations - 2 Satellite ground stations	85,000 km	2,943 km	1	10	- Refined products	None	BC

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach Vietnam. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	52 (Hanoi)	B

Note: In Vietnam, the drug threat is of little significance.

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**MARINE CORPS
EXPEDITIONARY INTELLIGENCE STUDY 1-89**

**OVERVIEW OF PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING
FACTORS FOR EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS
IN THE THIRD WORLD
VOLUME III**



FINAL REPORT

MARCH 1990

**Mr. Robert D. Steele
Marine Corps Intelligence Center
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134**

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) To develop a series of unclassified intelligence studies as training tools for warfighting. This presentation will familiarize Marines with the warfighting threats they would encounter when deployed. This presentation focuses on planning and programming factors in relation to countries or geographic locations which represent the expeditionary environment. This presentation is also available in 35mm slides with supporting text. Use of this presentation must be coordinated with the MCCDC Intelligence Center. This study is not comprehensive nor is it an authoritative expression of Marine Corps views.				
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MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
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From: Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development
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To: Distribution List
Subj: EXPEDITIONARY INTELLIGENCE STUDY 1-89, "OVERVIEW OF
PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FACTORS FOR EXPEDITIONARY
OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD"

1. Expeditionary Intelligence Study 1-89, "Overview of Planning and Programming Factors for Expeditionary Operations in the Third World", has been staffed and is approved as noted in paragraph 3 below. The objective of the study is to provide an unclassified (For Official Use Only) overview of general conditions in a number of countries of Marine Corps interest. Both the factors and the countries are dynamic and will change over time.
2. The objectives of the study were accomplished. The general information presented by the study is accurate to the extent permitted by unclassified sources. However, there are some areas, notably with respect to the methodology for calculating comparative aviation threat factors, where categorizations could change significantly if different criteria and sources of information are used. As a result, and to preclude inappropriate reliance on this study for operational planning purposes, the Study Advisory Committee (SAC) has recommended the following strong cautionary notice:

WARNING NOTICE:

THIS STUDY WAS DEVELOPED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES
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This material is therefore published for information, and does not necessarily reflect official conclusions of the Marine Corps.

4. A copy of this letter will be affixed inside the front cover of each volume of each copy of the subject study prior to its distribution. Local reproduction is authorized provided a copy of this letter is included in each reproduced volume.

E. T. COOK, Jr.

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9Nov90

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: ORIGIN AND INTENT OF THE "WARRIOR'S WORLD HANDBOOK"

- Created in 1988 by Col Walter Breede III, founding Director of the USMC Intelligence Center; funded by Marine Corps Studies Program, work accomplished by retired Marines employed by BDM.
- Focuses on countries of highest interest to Fleet Marine Force (at that time), and on warfighting factors and thresholds identified by the MAA specialists at the Warfighting Center. Provides a unique unclassified (FOUO) look at status of each warfighting factor in each country - new countries and factors can be added easily.
- Does not duplicate information contained in CIA, DIA, State, or Army country profiles. Is a deliberate attempt to create a warfighter's "ref a" at a sufficiently high level of generalization.
- Volumes I and II (organized by planning & programming factor) completed and approved for dissemination by LtGen Cook in Oct 90. Printing scheduled in Nov 90.
- Recipients of advance copies suggested that organization by country, with regional summaries, would be more useful. Intent is to make this a living document, with regular updates and the addition of countries and factors suggested by action officers at HQMC, MCCDC, MCRDAC, and FMF.
- Dissemination in electronic spreadsheet form would permit individual action officers to sort, group, and otherwise exploit information to meet their individual needs. Planners will be able to pull out information by mission area, group countries by theater or MEF or anticipated MAGTF Master Plan operation type, and look for differences meriting consideration in force structure and acquisition programming.
- Eventually, in coordination with the USMC Intelligence Center, we could develop a more detailed (and classified) electronic spreadsheet providing degree of difficulty evaluations for more specific capabilities and conditions of interest to mission area planners. This particular product should stay at high level of generalization, but it could benefit from inclusion of additional factors overlooked in first go-around. **Purpose of this prototype is to stimulate action officer opinions on how to improve content and format.**

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INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this study has been to take a group of countries identified by the Fleet Marine Force as being of interest, and to identify capabilities of threats, groups of countries, and trends or themes regarding threats, terrain, and/or logistics which would be useful to the Marine Corps mission area planner. In developing this unclassified study, the USMC Intelligence Center also strived to create both a slide presentation and reference manuals generally helpful as an orientation to the "expeditionary environment" for every Marine Corps professional. The study does not represent official Marine Corps policy or views; it does not establish a "fixed" list of countries or mission area planning factors, and it does not reflect classified information. The study is a "snapshot" based on a list of countries developed by the USMC Intelligence Center and the FMF in 1989.

Both the list of countries and the way in which "thresholds" between levels of difficulty for each factor are defined can be expected to change over time. The study may also conflict with other more accurate studies based on classified information. Our intent here has been to inform, to provide a useful reference that does not need to be locked up, and to establish an introductory baseline from which more detailed and accurate internal and external studies may proceed.

B. METHODOLOGY

The methodology included a comprehensive literature search which focused on identifying, obtaining, and reviewing relevant materials on Third World countries and developing a suitable report format. Study materials were prepared using the specific guidance contained in the Special Assistant, Intelligence Center, MCCDC Memorandum 3811 over IN 06 dated August 14, 1990. Close coordination was maintained with the Study Sponsor throughout to include review of factors, format, content, and graphics.

C. REPORT STRUCTURE

Expeditionary Intelligence Study 1-89 is in three volumes, all under separate covers. Volume I provides the primary presentation material including 35-mm slides and text. The text contains slide numbers for proper sequencing of slides. Paper copies of the slides in color are also provided for reference without the use of a slide projector. Volume II contains detailed supporting material used to develop each topic in the presentation. Volume III, created at the request of recipients of Volumes I and II, consists of six separate sections, including a section titled "Executive Country Profiles" and five regional descriptions (Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe/Mediterranean, Middle East/Southwest Asia, and Western Hemisphere). Volume III takes the materials from Volumes I and II and breaks it down by region and country. The criteria for determining the relative threat and the degree of difficulty associated with the terrain and logistics factors is explained in Volumes I and II and is not repeated in Volume III. Terms of reference are included in the Executive Country Profiles.

D. OTHER REFERENCES

Further information organized on countries and at different levels of classification can be found in the following:

- (1) American University Series (Unclassified).
- (2) U.S. Army Country Profiles (Classified).
- (3) Defense Intelligence Agency Projections (Classified).
- (4) Central Intelligence Agency Projections (Classified and Unclassified).

EUROPE/MEDITERRANEAN SUMMARY

The expeditionary environment countries in the **Europe** and **Mediterranean** region are those that are shaded in gray on the accompanying map. In this region, the factors of drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer all present a concern to U.S. interests. Both **Greece** and **Turkey** have acted as transit points for heroin moving to **European** and **U.S.** markets, while **Cyprus** has been a major trafficking center for the **Middle East** drug trade. Marine Corps forces sea-based in this region can expect to be on call to aid law enforcement agencies and preemptive raids in support of counternarcotics operations could become more common in the 1990s. Lethal terrorist acts in **Europe** and the **Mediterranean** usually are carried out by a small nucleus. Most groups, like the **Italian Red Brigades**, and the **Greek 17 November** are highly structured. They attack their respective Governments as well as U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization interests. Terrorists do not have rules of engagement, and they generally cannot be detected until after they have struck. Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) must be ready to deal with unexpected terrorist incidents on short notice. In this respect, the possibility of a new method of operation evolving between Joint Special Operations Forces (SOFs) and MAGTFs is worth consideration. In concept, this involves the use of SOFs to "find and secure" hostages in place, with Marine forces being used to execute a hostile NEO on call. During recent years, high technology exports to Third World countries have been an increasing concern to the U.S. **Italy**, **Greece**, and **Turkey** have all been reportedly involved in the transfer of critical technology that can allow countries such as **Iraq**, **Iran** and **Libya** to develop advanced weapon systems more quickly and at lower cost than if they had to rely on their own resources. Gray arms trafficking and technology theft are very possible reasons for employing Marine forces in the future. The expeditionary environment countries of **Europe** and the **Mediterranean** present some very substantial conventional force structures. MAGTFs can expect to meet trained and experienced infantry, advanced armor, modern artillery, aviation with nighttime or all-weather capability, integrated air defense systems, and smart or stand-off munitions. Of the six countries considered, **Turkey** had the largest army and navy, while **Italy** had the most significant air force. In the threat category of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons, the expeditionary environment countries in this region were relatively benign. However, NBC weapons are rapidly proliferating worldwide, and there is always the possibility that they may fall into the hands of terrorist groups operating in the region.

Overall in **Europe** and the **Mediterranean**, **Greece** and **Turkey** emerged as most representative of general conditions in the geographic region. In the area of culture (language and religion), most of the countries assessed were found to be not greatly different from the U.S. Only **Turkey** and **Yugoslavia** had more difficult languages and distant religions. For operations in **Norway**, MAGTFs should be prepared for wet and cold conditions which are the most difficult. Other countries had generally mixed variations of temperature and rainfall. **Greece**, **Norway**, **Turkey**, and **Yugoslavia** all had mountainous terrain while **Denmark** and **Italy** were classified as urban. None of the countries proved to be well suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles; only **Italy** and **Turkey** were partly suited. All of the countries except **Denmark** have poor intervisibility which restricts the exploitation of line of sight weapons designed for engagements at 2,000 to 3,000 meters. Conversely, all the expeditionary environment countries had generally favorable hydrographic conditions where NGF platforms can approach the coast to support operations ashore. However, when evaluating NGF capabilities versus the coastal threat, it was found that all the countries except **Denmark** had coastal defense weapons that can out-range the standard 5-inch gun on most U.S. Navy platforms. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy is an area of concern for Marine Corps forces. **Denmark**, **Norway**, and **Yugoslavia** have complete coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps, but some of these maps may be outdated. **Italy** has only partial 1:50,000 map coverage, while **Greece** and **Turkey** had none at all. MAGTFs operating in these latter countries would have to rely heavily on Multispectral Imagery for ground combat operations. In the area of strategic mobility, all countries except **Yugoslavia** have more than one airfield able to accommodate C-5 aircraft. **Yugoslavia**, however, has several airfields capable of handling C-141B aircraft. **Italy**, **Norway**, and **Yugoslavia** all have excellent port facilities, followed by **Denmark**, **Greece**, and **Turkey** which were somewhat less capable. From the standpoint of key installations, and associated military targeting, **Greece** and **Norway** have offshore oil facilities, while all the countries have important pipelines and industrial capabilities. When assessing sea-based response times, it was determined that **Greece**, **Italy**, **Turkey**, and **Yugoslavia** could be reached in less than two days by the **Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group** and its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). It was assessed that it would take this force between four to six days to reach **Denmark**, and in excess of six days to arrive at **Norway**. Despite the emphasis in recent years on the importance of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), the study determined that these operations are extremely difficult to execute by a MEU in all of the regions's expeditionary environment countries unless there is a major draw-down of U.S. citizens before the crisis develops, or provisions are made for the employment of strategic airlift. The existing range and lift capabilities of the CH-46 helicopter accompanying the MEU are insufficient to support NEO requirements of this particular expeditionary environment. Of the five regions considered by this study, **Europe** and the **Mediterranean** emerged as one of the highest threat environments. Overall, it presents a high-level OOB capability together with the terrain and logistics factors which would make close combat a challenging proposition.

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DENMARK

MEF G-2:
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CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095

Theater J-2:
Telephone:


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STU-III AV 430-8003

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


SUMMARY

Located strategically at the mouth of the **Baltic Sea**, **Denmark** consists of the **Jutland Peninsula** projecting north from **Germany**, and about 406 islands, of which 100 are inhabited. The straits between these islands connect the **Baltic** and **North Seas**. **Greenland** and **Faroe Islands** belong to **Denmark**. There are close relations between the **U.S.** and **Denmark** and overall **U.S.** equity is moderate. About 225 **U.S.** firms do business in **Denmark** and over 4,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. **U.S.** bases in **Greenland** are of significant value to Western defense. The factors of drugs, terrorism, gray arms/technology transfer, and NBC are of little significance in **Denmark**. The **Danes** have a ground OOB of about 10,200 regulars and 6,800 conscripts. The air OOB includes 7,000 personnel while the naval OOB has about 5,000. Military equipment is obtained from the **U.S.** and other **European** countries. Training is accomplished at the unit level, but in recent years there has been more concentration on specialized schools. Regular officers attend a tri-service military college in **Copenhagen**.

The **Danes** are a homogenous Gothic-Germanic people that have inhabited **Denmark** since prehistoric times. **Danish** is the principal language and about 97 percent of the people are affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church. There is a moderate cultural difference between **Denmark** and the **U.S.** The climate is temperate with mild winters, cool summers, and strong prevailing westerly winds. **Denmark** has mainly flat or rolling terrain, most of which is in use for agricultural, industrial, or residential purposes. About one-fifth of the population lives in **Copenhagen**. Cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles is possible, but generally unfavorable throughout most of **Denmark**. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally restricted to between 1,000 to 2,000 meters. There are old 1:50,000 scale maps available for **Denmark** but coverage is likely to be outdated. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to accommodate strategic lift. Key installations include offshore oil facilities in the **North Sea**. The **Atlantic ARG** would require between four to six days to reach **Denmark**. Due to over 4,000 potential evacuees in **Denmark**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.


DENMARK - THREAT SUMMARY



Denmark - 1

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U.S. Equities in Denmark

- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

U.S. relations with **Denmark**, a long-standing **European** ally, are friendly and close. The **U.S.**, along with the **U.K.**, **Germany**, **Italy**, and **Japan**, is a principal export market for **Danish** agricultural products. About 225 **U.S.** firms do business in **Denmark**, primarily in **Copenhagen**. **U.S.** bases in **Greenland** continue to be of significant value to Western defense. Over 4,000 **U.S.** citizens live in **Denmark**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
1,114	893	1,882	-	3,889	4,100	4 4	8	Medium

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers/SP	17	18	105	C

Ground OOB consists of 10,200 regulars and 6,800 conscripts. Training has traditionally been accomplished at the unit level, but in recent years there has been more concentration on specialized schools. Conscript officers and NCOs train at the specialized schools while regular officers attend a tri-service college at **Copenhagen**. Tanks: Centurion, Leopard; Artillery: M-59, M-101, M-109, M-114, M-115.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	Std-off PGM	EW Radar	7	18	135	D

Fighter Aircraft: F-16A/B, F-104G; Close Air: Saab F-35; Air Defense: HAWK, Redeye, and Stinger SAMs and AA guns (Redeye is being phased out). **Denmark** is one of the 14 **European** countries which comprise the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) system. **Denmark's** air defense system is fully integrated into NADGE and recent improvements have included the acquisition of 3-dimensional air surveillance radars and automation of C2 facilities.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	5	18	133	D

Ships: 10 Frigates with SSMs, SAMs (Sea Sparrow), guns, torpedoes, depth charges, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSMs: Harpoon; Patrol Craft: 7 General Purpose Patrol Craft with guns and radars; 10 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, torpedoes, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 6 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo; 8 Seaward Defense Craft; 14 Large Patrol Craft; 29 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Danish
Primary religion - Protestant

A small **German**-speaking minority lives in southern **Jutland**; a mixed **Inuit-Danish** population inhabits **Greenland**; and the **Faroe Islands** have a Nordic population with its own language. About 97 percent of the people are affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church. There is a moderate cultural difference between **Denmark** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
32-63	74	24	Mixed

The climate of **Denmark** is temperate with mild winters and cool summers. The terrain, location, and prevailing westerly winds make the weather changeable.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

Located strategically at the mouth of the **Baltic Sea**, **Denmark** consists of the **Jutland Peninsula** and about 406 islands, of which about 100 are inhabited. The straits between these islands connect the **Baltic** and **North Seas**. **Denmark** has mainly flat or rolling terrain, most of which is in productive use. **Greenland**, the largest island in the world, belongs to **Denmark**. About one-fifth of the **Danish** population lives in **Copenhagen**. Almost 400,000 tourists visit **Denmark** each year.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Denmark** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles is possible yet generally unfavorable throughout most of **Denmark**. Tracked movement is restricted to the undulating coastal sand plains and cultivated plains of the mainland. Conditions of poor movement exist throughout much of the southern mainland due to closely spaced streams, heath plains, and widely distributed peat bogs.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Line of sight distances in **Denmark** are normally restricted to between 1,000 to 2,000 meters.

The terrain of **Denmark** is flat or gently rolling, and is almost all in some kind of productive use (agricultural, industrial, or residential). The highest elevation is 568 feet. Line of sight distances in this country are expected to range between 1,000 to 2,000 meters and would be restricted mainly by cultivated fields, residential areas, and industrial zones.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
37201/37205	7,245	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-109	18,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage by old 1:50,000 scale map.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
9	7 C-5 2 C-141B	5/4	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Aalborg	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Billund	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Esbjerg	C-141B, C-130	-
Karup	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles.
Kastrup	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Skrydstrup	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Tirstrup	C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Vaerlose	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s. Airfield has obstacles.
Vandel	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s.

Ports

- **Denmark** has several major ports with good capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Kobenhavn	Large	31-35/36-40	31-35	Yes
Kallundborg	Small	41-45/41-45	36-40	Yes
Aabenraa	Small	26-30/36-40	26-30	Yes
Emsted	Small	41-45/Over 76	41-45	-
Fredericia	Small	41-45/36-40	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

There are offshore oil facilities in the **North Sea**. Many industrial facilities are in and around **Copenhagen**. Communications, roads, and rail facilities are quite well developed.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Copenhagen (About 225 U.S. firms have interests in Copenhagen)	- Excellent telecomm - 56 Radio stations - 35 TV stations - 2 Satellite ground stations plus domestic satellite systems	66,482 km	2,770 km	5	9	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Offshore oil in North Sea	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Atlantic ARG with its embarked MEU which normally operates in the Mediterranean Sea could reach Denmark in between four to six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (4,100) in Denmark, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
100	4,100	2 (Copenhagen)	F

Note: In Denmark, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

Denmark - 7

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
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STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
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STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
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STU-III AV 243-3125Embassy Defense Attache:
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EXT 204/212/213/285SUMMARY

Greece is located in southeastern Europe on the southern tip of the Balkan Peninsula. It consists of a mainland and 1,400 islands. Disputes are ongoing between Greece and Turkey over oil rights in the Aegean Sea and the status of Cyprus. U.S. equity is high. The U.S. has defense installations in Greece which are used for strategic airlift, training, naval support, reconnaissance, storage of materials, and communications. Over 50,000 U.S. citizens reside there. Greece is a key transit point for drugs going to Europe and the U.S. The anti-American-Greek terrorist group 17 November has attacked U.S. interests in the country as well as Greek Government facilities. Greece transships illicit arms and high technology systems moving from Europe to embargoed countries. Because of its involvement in drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/trafficking, Greece rates special attention by military planners. The armed forces consists of about 215,000 personnel, of which 171,000 serve in the army, 20,000 in the navy, and 24,000 in the air force. Greek military concepts, doctrine, and training follow closely that of the U.S.


The Greek language dates back 3,000 years and Greek Orthodoxy is the established religion. Muslims, concentrated in western Thrace, are the only recognized minority. Greek culture is considered to be moderately different from that of the U.S. Greece has a temperate climate with mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers. About 80 percent of the terrain is mountainous or hilly. Due to the rugged conditions, Greece is basically unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions do not limit NGF platforms from approaching the coast, but would be out-gunned by coastal defense weapons. A shortfall for operations in Greece is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields and ports are excellent. Key installations include offshore oil facilities in the Aegean Sea. The Atlantic ARG operating in the Mediterranean could be expected to reach Greece in less than two days. Due to over 50,000 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

GREECE - THREAT SUMMARY



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GREECE - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

The latest dispute in the longstanding confrontation between **Turkey** and **Greece** surfaced in 1987 over the right to exploit oil found under the continental shelf that extends beneath the **Aegean Sea**. **Turkey** decided to send its oil research vessel into waters claimed by **Greece**. When both countries threatened war, it took the personal intervention of the NATO secretary-general to defuse the situation. The two countries have also been in bitter dispute over **Cyprus** since the **Turkish** invasion in 1974. **Greece** refuses to negotiate until the 20,000 **Turkish** troops still on the island are withdrawn. Should the next disagreement between **Turkey** and **Greece** lead to war, there could be serious effects on **Europe**, as well as the **U.S.**

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U.S. Equities in Greece

- Overall U.S. equity is high.

The **U.S.** and **Greece** have longstanding historical, political, and cultural ties based on a common heritage and shared values. Since 1946 the **U.S.** has provided **Greece** with more than \$6.7 billion in economic and security assistance. The **U.S.** has several defense installations in **Greece** which serve important missions. Some 3,700 **U.S.** military personnel are stationed at these installations. Over 50,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country. As trading partners, the **U.S.** receives 3.8 percent of **Greek** exports and supplies it with the same amount of imports.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
215	402	529	304	1,450	50,385	3 6	9	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

Greece is an important transit point due to its location at the commercial crossroads between **Europe** and the **Middle East**. Its long coastline and sparsely populated islands and extensive merchant marine facilities contribute to its role in the international drug trade. Heroin transits **Greece** enroute to **Europe** and the **U.S.**

Terrorism

- The Revolutionary Organization 17 November, attacks **U.S.** interests and **Greek** Government installations.

Domestic groups were responsible for three attacks against **U.S.** personnel in 1988. In January, the Revolutionary Organization 17 November--the most lethal and anti-American of the **Greek** terrorist groups and the only major West **European** group against which there have been no successes--attempted to kill a **U.S.** Drug Enforcement Administration official in **Athens**. On June 28, the group carried out a second attack, killing the **U.S.** defense attache, Navy Captain William Nordeen, with a powerful car bomb as he was leaving his home for work. Since it first surfaced in 1975, 17 November has killed three **U.S.** officials and ten **Greeks**. No member of the group has ever been arrested in connection with any of its attacks. In August, 17 November demonstrated its sophistication and daring in a daylight raid of an **Athens** police station that netted it automatic weapons.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Greece is known to be a transit point for illegal arms and high technology systems moving from **Europe** to embargoed Third World countries.

Consolidated Threat

Greece deserves special attention by military planners because of its involvement in all three of the threat categories: narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	M-48	Howitzers/SP	171	10	221	E

Ground OOB consists of about 58,000 regulars and 112,500 conscripts. Less than a quarter of the military's strength is in long-service regulars, almost all of them officers, NCOs, and specialists. Because of the static birth rate, the **Greek** government has begun compulsory military service for women. The army is trained for combat in both nuclear and non-nuclear conditions. **Greek** military concepts, doctrine, and combat training are almost completely **U.S.** in origin. Tanks: AMX-30, Leopard, M-47, M-48A2, M-48A3, M-48A5; Artillery: M-52A1, M-56 pack howitzer, M-101, M-102, M-107, M-109A2, M-109A3, M-110, M-114, M-115, M-198.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	Std-off PGM	EW Radar	24	10	144	E

Fighter Aircraft: F-4E, F-5A/B, F-16A/B, F-104G, Mlrage F1CG; Close Air: A-7H; Air Defense: HAWK, Nike Hercules, Redeye, and Stinger SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Antiair	20	10	140	E

Ships: 14 Destroyers and 6 Frigates with SSMs, SAMs (Sea Sparrow, Portable Redeye), guns, torpedoes, countermeasures, fire control, and radar; SSMs: Harpoon, Exocet, Aerospatiale SS-12; Patrol Craft: 14 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, torpedoes, fire control, and radars; 5 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo; 2 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol; 7 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Greek
Primary religion - Greek Orthodox

About 53 percent of the people live in urban areas; more that 30 percent of the population is in the vicinity of **Athens**. The culture of **Greece** is moderately different from that of the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
53-73	49-68	15-48	Mixed

Greece has mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers; the temperatures are rarely extreme.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

Greece consists of a large mainland, with the Peloponnisos connected to the mainland by the Isthmus of Corinth, and more than 1,400 islands including Crete, Rhodes, and Corfu. About 80 percent of the country is mountainous or hilly. Only 28 percent of the land is arable.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Greece is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement.

Conditions for cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles are unsuitable throughout most of Greece due to extensive areas of steep hills and rugged mountains. Interior basins and northeastern coastal regions offer limited movement which may be further impeded in places by canals, ditches, marshes, and rough ground.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances normally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

About 80 percent of Greece is mountainous or broken terrain with a moderate amount of vegetation. While interior basins and northeastern coastal regions offer some open terrain, the majority of this country would present line of sight distances of less than 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
54340/54343	3,220	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
175 mm M-107	32,700	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage of Greece is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
26	3 C-5 16 C-141B 7 C-130	11/15	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Agrinion New	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Alexandroupolis	C-141B, C-130	-
Almiros	C-130	Low runway WBC.
Andravida	C-141B, C-130	-
Araxos	C-141B, C-130	-
Athinai	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Elefsis	C-130	Low runway WBC.
Ioannina	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.
Kalamata	C-141B, C-130	-
Kavala/Amigdhaleon	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Kavala/Khrisoupolis	C-141B, C-130	-
Kerkira	C-141B, C-130	-
Komotini	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Kos	C-141B, C-130	-
Kozani	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Larisa	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Lemnos	C-141B, C-130	-
Mitilini	C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Preveza	C-141B, C-130	-
Rodos/Maritsa	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Samos	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Santorini	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.
Sedes	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Skyros	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Tanagra	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s. Taxiway narrow for C-5s/C-141Bs. Airfield has obstacles. Suitable for C-5 only as emergency alternate airfield.
Thessaloniki	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

Ports

- **Greece** has several major ports with good capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Piraeus	Large	Over 76/36-40	31-35	Yes
Volos	Small	31-35/31-35	36-40	Yes
Thessaloniki	Medium	31-35/31-35	31-35	Yes
Limn Sirou	Small	46-50/Over 76	26-30	Yes
Iraklion	Medium	36-40/51-55	31-35	Yes

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Key Installations

Oil is being extracted at **Prinos** and the **South Kavala** fields east of the island of **Thasos** in the **Aegean Sea**. Oil has also been found in the **Gulf of Thessaloniki**. The **U.S.** has 4 major and 12 secondary defense installations in **Greece**. The primary facilities are the Hellenikon Air Base in **Athens**, the Nea Makri Communications Station at **Marathon**, and the Souda Air Base and Iraklion Communications Station on the island of **Crete**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Athens (U.S. has 4 major and 12 secondary military installations in Greece)	- Adequate, modern telecomm - 66 Radio stations - 361 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	38,938 km	2,476 km	5	26	- Crude oil - Refined products	Offshore oil in Aegean Sea	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked **MEU** which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** could reach **Greece** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 50,000), **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Greece** would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
250	50,385	2 (Athens)	F

Note: In **Greece**, the **NBC** factor is of little significance.


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STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3B//
STU-III AV 243-3125Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO ROME IT//DATT//
011-396-46742, EXT 502/339/524
(AUTOVON 621-9612)SUMMARY

Italy's position on the main routes between Europe, Africa, and the Near and Far East gives it great political, economic, and strategic importance. The U.S. and Italy have cordial relations and overall U.S. equity in the country is high. The two countries conduct substantial bilateral trade and numerous U.S. firms have investments in Italy. Over 92,000 U.S. citizens reside there. The Italian Red Brigades is one of the most lethal of the European terrorist groups. During the Iran-Iraq War, Italian firms were suspected of providing illegal weapons and explosives to Iran. Due to its association with terrorism and the gray/arms trade, Italy warrants the attention of military planners. Italy has a ground OOB consisting of about 50,000 regular troops and 215,000 conscripts. The air and naval OOBs are also of substantial size. Much of the military training is modeled after that of the U.S. Italy has shown a willingness to work closely with the U.S. and others on issues such as Middle East peacekeeping and combatting terrorism.

With the Italian language and Catholic religion, Italy's culture is not greatly different from that of the U.S. The climate is generally mild and Mediterranean, but there are wide variations between the north and south. Italy occupies a boot-shaped peninsula, extending southeast from the Alps into the Mediterranean Sea, with the islands of Sicily and Sardinia offshore. The terrain is primarily rugged and mountainous. About 75 percent of Italy is unsuitable for cross-country vehicular movement. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally less than 1,000 meters. While hydrographic conditions do not prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast, these platforms would be out-gunned by Italian coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to the northeast, the southeast and the island of Sicily. Ports and airfields are quite satisfactory. Key installations include nuclear powered reactors and numerous industrial, communications, and transportation facilities. The Atlantic ARG which operates in the Mediterranean could reach Italy in less than two days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to over 92,000 potential evacuees.


ITALY - THREAT SUMMARY



Italy - 1

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ITALY - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Italy

- Overall U.S. equity is high.

The U.S. maintains warm and friendly relations with Italy. The two countries are NATO allies and work closely on other issues such as Middle East peacekeeping and combatting terrorism. Numerous U.S. firms have investments in Italy and U.S.-Italian bilateral trade is substantial. Over 92,000 U.S. citizens reside in Italy.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
8,449	5,530	11,698	-	25,677	92,269	6 6	12	High

Terrorism

- Red Brigades terrorist group is highly structured and attacks the U.S. and NATO.

The Red Brigades or Brigade Rosse has been one of the most lethal of the major European terrorist groups. It has conducted an extensive number of attacks involving murder, "kneecapping," and kidnapping as its favored terrorist tactics. Preferred targets are members of the Italian establishment, NATO, and U.S. interests. Attacks have been characterized by precise planning and execution.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

During the Iran-Iraq War, Italian firms reportedly provided Iran with weapons and large quantities of explosives.

Consolidated Threat

Italy rates special attention by military planners due to its involvement in both terrorism and gray arms trade.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	M-60	Howitzers/SP	265	21	336	E

Ground OOB consists of about 50,000 regulars and 215,000 conscripts. Recruits attend a two-month basic course, with aspects modeled after U.S. Army Ranger training, followed by four months of company-level training, and, if necessary, further specialist training at respective schools. Regular officers attend a military academy for two years before going to a branch school for another two years. Tanks: Leopard, M-47, M-60A1; Artillery: FH-70, M-44, M-56 pack howitzer, M-59, M-107, M-109B, M-109L, M-110A2, M-114, M-115.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	Std-off PGM	EW Radar	71	21	202	F

Fighter Aircraft: AMX, F-104G/S; Close Air: G-91, Tornado; Air Defense: HAWK, Mistral, Nike Hercules (to be replaced by Patriot), Selenia Spada, and Stinger SAMs.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
F/W Carrier	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	50	21	161	F

Ships: 2 Light Aircraft Carriers (1 can accommodate VSTOL and helicopters and 1 can handle helicopters only), 2 Cruisers, 6 Destroyers, 16 Frigates, and 19 Corvettes with SSMs, SAMs, guns, torpedoes, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSM: Otomat; Patrol Craft: 1 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 7 Hydrofoils-Missile; 2 Commando Support Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Italian
Primary religion - Catholic

Italy has the fifth highest population density in Europe. Minority groups include the Germans of Bolzano Province, the Slovenes around Trieste, and Albanian, Greek, Ladino, and French communities. The Italian culture is moderately different from that of the U.S.

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
52-66	64	20-80	Mixed

The climate of **Italy** is generally mild and **Mediterranean**, but there are wide variations. **Sicily** and the south are comparable to southern **California**, though warmer. The **Alps** and northern **Dolomites** have a climate similar to **Colorado**, but more humid.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

Italy occupies a long boot-shaped peninsula, extending southeast from the **Alps** into the **Mediterranean Sea**, with the islands of **Sicily** and **Sardinia** offshore. The alluvial **Po Valley** drains most of the north. The rest of the country is rugged and mountainous, except for intermittent coastal plains like the **Campagna** south of **Rome**. The **Appenine Mountains** run down through the center of the peninsula.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Italy** are suitable for cross-country vehicular movement.

Approximately three-fourths of **Italy** is unsuitable for cross-country vehicular movement due to an extensive mountain range and a dense network of ditches and canals throughout the plain regions. Tracked movement is feasible throughout much of the latitudinal **Po Plain** in the north and in a belt of foothills along most of the east coast. Movement is also favorable in the southern portion of the peninsula.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances normally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Except for the **Po Valley** region in the north, the southern "heel of the boot", and small coastal areas, **Italy** is rugged and mountainous. Line of sight distances would be generally less than 1,000 meters in about 70 percent of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
53161	1,373	Good

Italy - 5

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199

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
LANCE SSM	130,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for northeast Italy, the southeast (heel of the boot) and the island of Sicily.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
42	25 C-5 11 C-141B 6 C-130	25/17	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Alghero	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Amendola	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Aviano Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Bergamo/Orio Al Serio	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Cagliari/Elmas	C-141B, C-130	-
Cameri Air Base	C-130	-
Capodinchino	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Casale	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s.
Catania/Fontanarossa	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s.
Clampino	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Crotone	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Decimomannu	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s.
Falconara	C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-141Bs.
Forlì	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Genova/Sestri	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Ghedi	C-141B, C-130	-
Giora Del Colle Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s.
Grazzanise	C-130	-
Grosseto	C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Istrana	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s and C-141Bs.
Lamezia Terme	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Lampedusa	C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-141B. Runway less than 6,000 feet.
Lecce	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s/C-141Bs. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Linate	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Malpensa	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Montichiari	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Runway only for C-5s. Narrow runway for C-5s. Daylight/VFR only.
Olbia/Costa Smeralda	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Palermo	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Piacenza/San Damiano	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Pisa/San Giusto	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Reggio Calabria	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Rimini	C-141B, C-130	-
Rivolto	C-141B, C-130	-
Roma/Fiumicino	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Ronchi Del Leffonary	C-141B, C-130	-
Sigonella	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s.
Torino	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Trapani-Birgi	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only. Low runway WBC.
Treviso	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Emergency only for C-5s. Airfield has obstacles.
Venezia/Tessera	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Vicenza	C-130	Daylight only.
Villfranca	C-141B, C-130	-

Italy - 7

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Ports

- Several major ports are available and able to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Savona	Medium	31-35/36-40	26-30	Yes
Genova	Large	56-60/31-35	31-35	Yes
Livorno	Medium	41-45/26-30	41-45	Yes
Civitavecchia	Medium	26-30/Over 76	26-30	Yes
Gaeta	Small	Over 76/26-30	26-30	-
Napoli	Large	Over 76/51-55	41-45	Yes
Messina	Medium	Over 76/36-40	Over 76	Yes
Palermo	Large	Over 76/Over 76	41-45	Yes
Brindisi	Medium	31-35/31-35	31-35	Yes
Bari	Medium	36-40/31-35	31-35	Yes
Ancona	Medium	31-35/31-35	31-35	Yes
Lido	Large	31-35/41-45	31-35	Yes
Trieste	Large	56-60/Over 76	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

Italy has two nuclear powered reactors in operation and three under construction.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Rome (Po Valley in the north, and south "heel of the boot" are major industrial centers)	- Excellent telecomm - 2,177 Radio stations - 1,500 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	294,410 km	20,011 km	3	42	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Atlantic ARG with its embarked MEU which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** could reach Italy in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.


NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 92,000) in Italy, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
350	92,269	18 (Rome)	F

Note: In Italy, the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
NBC

NORWAYMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3B//
STU-III AV 243-3125Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO OSLO NO//DATT//
7-011-47-244-8550, EXT 2281SUMMARY

Norway occupies a strategic position in northwestern **Europe**, close to **Soviet** bases on the **Kola Peninsula** and adjacent to the sea lanes of communication between **Europe** and the **U.S.** The **U.S.** and **Norway** enjoy friendly relations and overall **U.S.** equity in this country is high. The two countries are active trading partners and a number of **American** firms participate in **Norway's** petroleum sector. About 13,500 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country. The factors of drugs, terrorism, gray arms/technology transfer, and NBC are of little significance there. The **Norwegian** army is a highly motivated, infantry heavy mobilization force composed of about 19,000 troops. The air force and navy are technically sophisticated organizations manned by a core of professionals. **Norway** is a staunch supporter of **NATO** but does not allow the stocking of nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime or the stationing of foreign forces on its soil unless threatened with attack. However, in recent years military exercises including **U.S.** forces have been conducted in **Norway** and the Marine Corps maintains prepositioned equipment there.


The **Norwegian** language and Protestant religion predominate in the country and the **Norwegian** culture can be characterized as being moderately different from that of the **U.S.** The climate of **Norway** is cold and wet and is the most difficult of all the expeditionary environment countries. The winter weather tends to be less severe along the coast than it is inland. **Norway's** high plateaus and rugged mountains are broken by frequent valleys and numerous lakes. About 25 percent of the land is forested. Most of the terrain is unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters. While hydrographic conditions generally permit **NGF** ships to approach the coast, they are apt to be out-gunned by **Norwegian** coastal defense weapons. The country has complete coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps, but some of these maps may be outdated. Airfields and ports in **Norway** are highly satisfactory. Key installations include offshore oil facilities. The **Atlantic ARG** which normally operates in the **Mediterranean** would require in excess of six days to reach **Norway**. **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Norway** would be very difficult due to the over 13,000 potential evacuees.

NORWAY - THREAT SUMMARY



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NORWAY - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Norway

- Overall U.S. equity is high.

The U.S. and Norway enjoy a long tradition of friendly association. Norway is an active member of NATO and readily supports the United Nations and its specialized agencies. As bilateral trade partners, the U.S. receives 5.1 percent of Norway's exports and furnishes 7.2 percent of its imports. About 13,500 U.S. citizens reside in Norway.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
4,142	842	1,514	-	6,498	13,500	5 6	11	High

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	M-48	Howitzers/SP	19	14	73	B

Ground OOB has a strength of 19,000 of which 13,000 are conscripts. Recruit training lasts from three to eight months depending on the branch of service and specialty. Recruits are then sent to their units. There are also officer candidate and NCO training schools. **Norwegian** training emphasizes winter warfare. Regular officers attend a military academy at **Oslo**. Tanks: Leopard, M-48A5; Artillery: M-101, M-109G, M-114.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	Std-off PGM	3d Gen SAMs	9	14	143	E

Fighter Aircraft: F-5A/B, F-16A/B; Close Air: F-5A/B, F-16A/B; Air Defense: HAWK NOAH, Nike Hercules, and RBS-170 (with Giraffe radar) SAMs and AA guns. The **Norwegian** air control facilities are integrated into NADGE. **Norway** maintains 3-dimensional air surveillance radars on mountain tops to enhance air defense coverage. Other advanced radar systems are being added to the HAWK configuration and the RBS-70 SAM system.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Flex Trajectory	ASUW/Anti-air	9	14	123	D

Ships: 5 Frigates and 2 Corvettes with SSMS, SAMs (Sea Sparrow), guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine mortars, mines, countermeasures, and radars; SSMS: Penguin Mk 2, Penguin Mk 3; Patrol Craft: 28 Fast Attack Craft-Missile and SSMS, guns, torpedoes, fire control, and radars; 8 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo; 2 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Norwegian (Bokmal, Nynorsk Dialects)
Primary religion - Protestant

Ethnically, **Norwegians** are predominately Germanic, although in the far north there are communities of Lapps who came to **Norway** more than 10,000 years ago, probably from central **Asia**. The Evangelical Lutheran Church is the main religious affiliation. There is a moderate cultural difference between **Norway** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
23-63	73	12-130	Wet/Cold

With wet and cold conditions, **Norway** presents the most difficult climate of all expeditionary environment countries. The influence of the North Atlantic current, warmed by the Gulf Stream, results in relatively milder winters along the coasts; however, winter temperatures in the interior are extremely low. Spring and summer are moderately warm.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

Norway's high plateaus and rugged mountains are broken by verdant valleys, and there are many lakes. About 25 percent of the land is forested, and only 3 percent is arable. **Norway** has the lowest mean population density in Europe. About 65 percent of the people live in the south and along the coast.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Norway** is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement.

Approximately 90 percent of **Norway** consists of rugged terrain, dense forests, or deep snow, which preclude the cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles year round. Cross-country movement is feasible over the remaining 10 percent of the country but only during late spring, summer, and autumn periods.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances normally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The terrain of **Norway** consists of high plateaus and mountains broken by valleys and numerous lakes. About 25 percent of the land is covered with forest. Due to the heavily dissected terrain, frequent winter snowfall, and occasional coastal fog, line of sight distances in about 90 percent of the country would be limited to less than 1,000 meters.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
43125	400	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
Penguin SSM	27,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage with old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
32	13 C-5 8 C-141B 7 C-130 4 None	11/21	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Alesund/Vlgra	C-141B, C-130	-
Alta	C-141B, C-130	Runway is less than 6,000 feet.
Andoya	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles.
Aro	C-141B, C-130	Runway is less than 6,000 feet.
Banak	C-130	-
Bardufoss	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s.
Bergen/Flesland	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Bobo	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s.
Evenes	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Folldal/Grimsmoen	None	-
Fyresdal	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Haugesund/Karmoy	C-141B, C-130	Runway is less than 6,000 feet.
Kaulokeino	None	-
Kirkenes/Hoybuktnoen	C-130	-
Kjeller	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Kristiansand/Kjevik	C-141B, C-130	-
Kristiansund/Kvernberget	C-141B, C-130	Runway is less than 6,000 feet.
Lista	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Notodden	C-130	-
Orland	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s.
Oslo/Fornebu	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Oslo/Gardermoen	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s.
Roros	C-141B, C-130	Runway is less than 6,000 feet.
Rygge	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Skien/Geiteryggen	C-130	Low runway WBC.
Stafsberg	None	-
Stavanger/Sola	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s.
Svartnes	None	-
Torp	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Tromso/Langnes	C-141B, C-130	-
Trondheim/Vaernes	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s. Airfield has obstacles. Daylight only.
Voss/Bomoen	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.

Ports

- Norway has several major ports with excellent capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Kirkenes	Small	Over 76/36-40	51-55	Yes
Hammerfest	Small	56-60/26-30	26-30	Yes
Tromso	Small	26-30/36-40	26-30	Yes
Narvik	Small	Over 76/56-60	46-50	Yes
Bodo	Small	71-75/41-45	36-40	Yes
Mo	Small	Over 76/Over 76	36-40	Yes
Trondheim	Medium	Over 76/71-75	36-40	Yes
Mongstad	Medium	-/Over 76	Over 76	-
Bergen	Medium	Over 76/26-30	31-35	Yes
Agotnes	Small	Over 76/Over 76	56-60	Yes
Stavanger	Medium	Over 76/26-30	51-55	Yes
Oslo	Large	46-50/46-50	31-35	Yes

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Key Installations

Norway has offshore oil facilities. There are numerous industrial facilities in the vicinity of **Oslo**. Communications and transportation facilities are well developed.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Oslo (Norway is a major oil and gas producer)	- Excellent telecomm - 1,020 Radio stations - 1,938 TV stations - Well-developed satellite ground stations	79,540 km	4,242 km	12	32	- Refined products	Offshore oil	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** would require in excess of six days to reach **Norway**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (over 13,000) in **Norway**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
100	13,500	4 (Oslo)	F

Note: In **Norway**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

Norway - 7

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AB E/M 5

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TURKEY

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095

Theater J-2:
Telephone:

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3B//
STU-III AV 243-3125

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

USDAO ANKARA TU//DATT//
126-54-70, EXT 300/305/309




SUMMARY

With a common border with the **Soviet Union**, **Iran**, and **Iraq**, and control of the straits leading from the **Black Sea** to the **Mediterranean**, **Turkey** occupies a position of strategic importance. Since 1947, the U.S. has loaned or granted **Turkey**, about \$4 billion in economic aid and more than \$9 billion in military assistance. Besides the 10,000 military personnel stationed at installations in **Turkey**, almost 5,000 U.S. citizens live there. **Turkey** provides an important route for **Asian** drug traffickers to move heroin and hashish to U.S. and European markets. Terrorist groups such as the **Kurdish Worker's Party** and **Armenian separatists** operate in **Turkey** and attack political and economic targets. Because of its involvement with drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, **Turkey** deserves special attention by military planners. With total personnel of more than 626,000, **Turkey's** armed forces are the second largest in NATO. Two NATO headquarters, Land South East and Sixth Tactical Air Force are located in **Izmir**. Major U.S. military organizations in **Turkey** are the Joint U.S. Military Mission for Aid to **Turkey** and the U.S. Logistical Group.

With the **Turkish** language and Islamic religion, **Turkey's** culture is significantly different from that of the U.S. The interior of the country has wide plateaus with high mountains surrounding them on all sides except the west. There are rolling plains in the west and fertile coastal plains in the southwest. About half of the **Turkish** people live in urban areas. Only parts of **Turkey**, in the inland areas, are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the rough terrain and ground cover. Hydrographic conditions permit NGF platforms to approach the coast within range of targets ashore, but would be out-gunned by coastal defense weapons. A shortfall for operations in **Turkey** is the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to accommodate strategic lift. The **Atlantic ARG** which normally operates in the **Mediterranean** would require less than two days to reach **Turkey**. NEO conducted by a MEU in **Turkey** would be very difficult due to the almost 5,000 potential evacuees and the 212 nautical miles distance from the coast to **Ankara**, the probable evacuation site.

TURKEY - THREAT SUMMARY




Turkey - 1

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TURKEY - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Turkey

- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

Despite a setback in the 1970s over **Turkish** intervention in Cyprus, **U.S.** relations with **Turkey** have been good. Since 1947, the **U.S.** has loaned or granted **Turkey** more than \$4 billion in economic aid and more than \$9 billion in military assistance. The two countries are major trading partners. Besides the approximately 10,000 **U.S.** military personnel stationed at installations in **Turkey**, almost 5,000 **U.S.** citizens live there.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
241	1,483	897	450	3,071	4,972	4 4	8	Medium

Drug Threat

- Important route between **Asian** drug producers and **U.S./European** consumers.

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
	X			X

Traffickers take advantage of this land bridge between **Asian** producers and **European/U.S.** consumers to smuggle heroin and hashish. Some heroin is also refined in **Turkey**. There are reports of increased heroin/morphine smuggling across the **Iranian** frontier into **Turkey**.

Terrorism

- Intermittent terrorist attacks are conducted by the Kurdish Workers's Party (PKK) and other radical groups.

In 1988, the PKK was responsible for numerous attacks against **Turkish** Government officials, police, and soldiers. The group also continued to attack civilian and economic targets, particularly in the villages in southeastern **Turkey**. Large-scale arrests of radical leftists by **Turkish** security authorities in 1981 have hindered the activities of domestic groups such as Dev Sol and Dev Yol, but they may be attempting to rebuild. During 1988, the groups engaged in numerous low-level bombings to protest the trials of accused terrorists. **Turkish** ethnic separatist groups such as the **Armenians** also employ terrorist tactics. They almost always target representatives of the **Turkish** Government and the Government's interests outside **Turkey**.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

- **Turkey** offered to sell **Pakistan** F-16 jet fighters belonging to General Dynamics Corporation.

In 1987, when the **U.S.** was about to cut off military aid to **Pakistan** unless democracy was restored, **Turkey** offered to sell the **Pakistani** Government F-16 jet fighters built under a license agreement with General Dynamic Corporation.

Consolidated Threat

Due to its involvement in the drug trade, terrorism, gray arms/technology transfer, **Turkey** deserves special consideration by military planners.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	M-48	Howitzers/SP	523	19	582	F

Ground OOB has a strength of 523,000 personnel of which 26,000 are conscripts. Army recruits receive about eight weeks of basic training and are then assigned to a unit. Some may receive further training at a branch school. Career NCOs are recruited upon graduation from secondary school and enter the Army on long-term enlistment. Regular officers are trained at a military academy at **Ankara** for three years. A general staff college in **Istanbul** trains senior officers for important, upper-echelon positions. Tanks: Leopard, M-47, M-48A1, M-48A2, M-48A5, M-48T1; Artillery: M-44A1, M-52A, M-101A1, M-102, M-108, M-109A1, M-110A2, M-114, M-115.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	Std-off PGM	EW Radar	53	19	183	F

Fighter Aircraft: F-4E, F-5A/B, F-16C/D, F-104G/S; Close Air: F-4E, F-100; Air Defense: Rapier, Redeye, and Stinger SAMs and AA guns. **Turkey's** air defense system is somewhat outdated but improvements are planned. Radar systems are being replaced or upgraded and some 3-dimensional radars added.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	50	19	179	F

Ships: 12 Destroyers and 8 Frigates with SSMs, SAMs (Sea Sparrow Mk 29), guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine mortars, depth charges, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSMs: Harpoon, Penguin; Patrol Craft: 16 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, torpedoes, mines, and radars; 1 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 4 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo; 23 Large Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Turkish (Kurdish)
Primary religion - Islam

Non-Islamic minorities in **Turkey** include mainly **Greeks, Armenians, and Jews**. The Kurds constitute an ethnic and linguistic, but not religious, minority. The culture of **Turkey** differs significantly from that of the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
39-68	44	12-98	Mixed

The climate of **Turkey** is moderate in the coastal areas with lower temperatures inland. Central **Turkey** generally has hot, dry summers and cold winters.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

The central part of **Turkey** has wide plateaus. High mountains ring the interior on all sides but the west, with more than 20 peaks over 10,000 feet. Rolling plains are in the west with mild, fertile coastal plains in the southwest. About half of **Turkey's** population live in urban areas.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Parts of **Turkey** are suitable for cross-country vehicular movement.

Cross-country movement for tracked and wheeled vehicles is drastically limited throughout 60 percent of the country due to mountains and precipitous slopes that dominate the area. Tracked movement throughout the remaining 40 percent of **Turkey** is restricted to low-lying area basins located mainly in the interior. Even these areas may become impassable between the months of November and April due to severe flooding and deep snow.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances normally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Central **Turkey** consists of plateaus surrounded by high mountains in all direction except the west. Rolling plains are found in the west and along the southern coast. Line of sight distances in over half of the country would be less than 1,000 meters due to the mountains and rough terrain conditions. In the west and southern regions visibilities beyond 1,000 meters are feasible.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
54387	6,000	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
HONEST JOHN SSM	37,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage of **Turkey** is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
31	8 C-5 9 C-141B 13 C-130 1 Emergency Only.	8/23	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Adnan Menderes	C-141B, C-130	-
Afyon	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only. Low runway WBC.
Akhisar Air Base	C-130	Daylight only.
Antalya	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Ataturk	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Balikesir	C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight only.
Bandirma	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Batman	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Cardok	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Cigli	C-130	-
Corlu	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Dalaman	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Diyarbakir	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight only.
Elazig	C-130	Low runway WBC.
Erhac	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only. Low runway WBC.
Erzumum	C-130	Daylight only. Low runway WBC.
Esenboga	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Emergency only for C-5s.
Eskisehir Air Base	C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles.
Incirlik	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Kesan	C-130	Emergency only for C-130s.
Konya	C-130	Low runway WBC.
Molatya	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Murted	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight only.
Sakirpasa	C-141B, C-130	-
Sinop	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Sivas	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Sivrihisar	C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight only.
Topal	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Van	C-141B, C-130	-
Yalova	C-130	Daylight only.
Yenisehir	C-130	Daylight only.

Ports

- Turkey has three major ports with good capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pler Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Izmir	Medium	31-35/Over 76	31-35	Yes
Mersin	Small	41-45/31-35	31-35	-
Iskenderum	Small	Over 76/41-45	31-35	Yes

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Key Installations

There are two NATO headquarters, a major air base at **Incirlik** (near **Adana**), several communications and electronics facilities, and a number of smaller **U.S.** Installations in **Turkey**. Roads are fairly good around the urban centers but marginal elsewhere.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Ankara (Two NATO headquarters are located at Izmir. About 10,000 U.S. military personnel and dependants are at installations in Turkey)	- Fair telecomm - 137 Radio stations - 492 TV stations - 2 Satellite ground stations	49,615 km	8,193 km	3	31	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Atlantic ARG with its embarked MEU which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** could reach **Turkey** in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the almost 5,000 potential evacuees, and the 212 nautical miles distance from the coast to the city of **Ankara**, the probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult. -

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
300	4,972	212 (Ankara)	F

Note: In **Turkey**, the factor of NBC is of little significance.

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YUGOSLAVIA

MEF G-2:	CG II MEF//G-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 484-8095
Theater J-2:	USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 430-8003
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3B//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-3125
Embassy Defense Attache:	USDAO BELGRADE YO//DATT//
Telephone:	0038-11-645-655, EXT 130




SUMMARY

Yugoslavia geographically controls the land routes from Central and Western **Europe** to the **Aegean Sea** and **Turkish** straits. **U.S.** relations with **Yugoslavia** remain cordial. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Yugoslavia** is moderate. The **U.S.** ranks sixth among **Yugoslavia's** trading partners with a 4.7 percent share of total trade. Almost 4,000 **U.S.** citizens live there. **Yugoslavia** has a ground OOB consisting of 140,000 troops, of whom 95,000 are conscripts. The air OOB is composed of 37,000 personnel, MiG-29 aircraft, and an inventory of modern surface-to-air missiles. The naval OOB numbers 13,000 personnel. **Yugoslav** citizens have some military liability and receive various amounts of training. Recruits must serve for a period of 15 months.

Yugoslavia's population has the greatest ethnic and religious diversity in all of Eastern **Europe**. Besides the principal South Slavic groups, there are an additional 17 minorities. The special interests and concerns of these various factors have caused some problems for the **Yugoslav** Government. There is a significant difference in culture between **Yugoslavia** and the **U.S.** Much of the interior of the country is composed of lowland hills and plains. The remaining terrain is mainly mountainous. The **Dinaric Alps** runs parallel to the **Adriatic** coast. The climate along the coast is milder than in the interior. Due to the broken terrain, **Yugoslavia** is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions allow NGF ships to approach the coast, but their 5-inch guns would be out-ranged by coastal defense weapons. There is complete coverage of the country by old 1:50,000 scale maps. Port facilities are satisfactory for strategic sealift but airfields cannot accommodate C-5 aircraft. The **Atlantic ARG** which normally operates in the **Mediterranean** would require less than two days to reach **Yugoslavia**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Yugoslavia** would be very difficult due to over 4,000 potential evacuees and the 161 nautical miles distance from the coast to **Belgrade**, the probable evacuation site.


YUGOSLAVIA - THREAT SUMMARY



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YUGOSLAVIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Yugoslavia

- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

Despite differing views on a number of foreign policy issues, U.S. relations with Yugoslavia remain cordial. The U.S. ranks in sixth place among Yugoslavia's trading partners with a 4.7 percent share of total trade. Total volume of trade between the two countries in recent years has been over \$1 billion. Yugoslavia enjoys most-favored-nation tariff treatment under U.S. tariff schedules. The U.S. also encourages American firms to consider investments in Yugoslavia. About 4,000 U.S. citizens reside there.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
1	461	871	-	1,333	3,922	3 4	7	Medium

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	M-72	Bloc	140	18	258	E

Ground OOB consists of 140,000 troops of which 95,000 are conscripts. All **Yugoslav** citizens have some military liability and receive various amounts of training. Recruits are drawn from all parts of the country and serve a term of 15 months. Most training is accomplished at the unit level. Tanks: M-47, T-54, T-55, T-72; Artillery: 2S1, D-20, D-30, M-7, M-18, M-46, M-56, M-59, M-101, M-114, M-1931, M-1937, SSC-3/SSC-4 SSM.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	37	18	185	F

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, MiG-29; Close Air: Jastreb, Orao; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, and SA-11 SAMS and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	13	18	161	F

Ships: 4 Frigates and 3 Corvettes with SSMs, SAMs (SA-N-4), guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine mortars, mines, countermeasures, and radars; SSMs: SS-N-2C, SS-N-2B, SS-N-2A; Patrol Craft: 16 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (10 Ex-Soviet) with SSMs, guns, fire control, and radars; 15 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Ex-Soviet); 11 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol; 11 Large Patrol Craft; 11 River Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Serbo-Croatian (Slovenian, Macedonian, Hungarian, Albanian)

Primary religion - Eastern Orthodox

Yugoslavia's population has the greatest ethnic and religious diversity in Eastern Europe. Besides the principal South Slavic groups, there are an additional 17 minorities. About 7 million people are of the Eastern Orthodox faith, 5 million are Roman Catholic, and 2 million are Muslims. There is a significant difference between the culture of **Yugoslavia** and that of the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
28-73	59	25	Mixed

Along the **Adriatic** coast the climate is hot in summer and mild and rainy in winter. In the interior, the climate is moderate with seasonal variations, comparable to that of the U.S. east coast between **Virginia** and **Rhode Island**.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

Lowland hills and plains cover about one-third of the area from **Zagreb** in the northwest to **Nis** in the east. A few minor mountain ranges interrupt these lowlands. The rest of the country is mountainous except in the northeast. The **Dinaric Alps** run parallel to the **Adriatic** coast. The **Danube River**, the most important water route from Central and Western **Europe** to the **Black Sea**, flows through northeastern **Yugoslavia**.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Yugoslavia** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Approximately three-fourths of **Yugoslavia** is considered impassable to tracked and wheeled vehicles due to the extensive mountain areas, steep hills, and rough karst areas. The remaining one-fourth is dispersed throughout the northern plains, valleys, and dissected hills in the east. Cross-country movement in these areas is feasible through most of the year.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances normally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Most of **Yugoslavia** is mountainous, with scattered lowland hills and plains. Line of sight distances of less than 1,000 meters can be expected in about 70 percent of the country. Direct visibilities greater than 1,000 meters are feasible in the roughly oval lowland areas that extend from **Zagreb** in the northwest to **Nis** in the east.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
54201	800	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
SSC-3/SSC-4 SSM	85,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage of Yugoslavia by old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-141B aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
5	4 C-141B 1 C-130	5/0	>5/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Belgrade	C-141B, C-130	-
Ohrid	C-130	-
Pristina	C-141B, C-130	-
Skopje	C-141B, C-130	-
Titograd International	C-141B, C-130	-

Ports

- Yugoslavia has several major ports with excellent capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Rijeka	Large	56-60/Over 76	31-35	Yes
Sibenik	Medium	71-75/46-50	31-35	-
Split	Medium	26-30/31-35	26-30	-
Gruz	Medium	Over 76/56-60	21-25	-

Yugoslavia - 5

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Key Installations

Yugoslavia has one nuclear power reactor in operation.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Belgrade (U.S. Embassy) Zagreb (U.S. Consulate) (U.S. Information Centers are at Ljubljana, Skopje, Sarajevo, and Titograd)	- Fair telecomm - 286 Radio stations - 50 TV stations - 2 Satellite ground stations	116,602 km	9,279 km	4	5	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** could reach **Yugoslavia** in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the almost 4,000 potential evacuees, and the 161 nautical miles distance from the coast to the city of **Belgrade**, the probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
150	3,922	161 (Belgrade)	F

Note: In **Yugoslavia**, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

EXECUTIVE COUNTRY PROFILES

This section consolidates the summary descriptions of expeditionary environment countries found elsewhere in this document. The 69 country summaries are listed separately and alphabetically for the regions of Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe/Mediterranean, Middle East/Southwest Asia, and the Western Hemisphere.

AFRICA

ALGERIA

Algeria is the second largest nation in Africa and has a coastline stretching 620 miles. Its foreign policy is one of independence and nonalignment and is frequently a leading proponent of the Third World viewpoint in international affairs. In recent years U.S. relations with Algeria have significantly improved. The U.S. and Algeria are trading partners and the U.S. imports some Algerian petroleum products. Over 300 U.S. citizens live in the country. In the region, Algeria has the largest air OOB and second largest ground and naval OOBs. Most of the military equipment is furnished by the Soviet Union and, Soviet advisors assist with operational training. The armed forces are oriented primarily toward its borders with Morocco and Libya. Over the past several years, defense related expenditures have amounted to between six and almost 10 percent of its total budget.

The Algerian culture is different from that of the U.S. The topography consists of three zones parallel to the Mediterranean Sea and separated by mountain ranges. There is a fertile plain along the coast backed by the Tellian Atlas Mountains. In the central region there is a high plateau followed to the south by the Saharan Atlas Mountains. In the south there is mainly desert. Generally, the summers are hot and dry with rain in the winter. Dust and sandstorms frequently occur between February and May. About two-thirds of Algeria is suitable for cross-country movement of vehicles. Average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) usually exceeds 2,000 meters except when limited by weather conditions. NGF ships can approach the coast to provide support for operations ashore, but would be severely out-gunned by coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to coastal areas around Algiers, Mostaganem, and Tlemcen. Airfields are numerous but cannot accommodate C-5 aircraft. There are excellent port facilities to receive strategic sealift. Key installations include a number of oil fields. The Atlantic ARG with its embarked MEU could reach Algeria in less than two days. With over 300 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would not be difficult.

ANGOLA

Angola has, in recent years, been characterized by intensification of the civil war, its involvement in regional conflicts, and turmoil within the government. Although the regime in power maintains close links with Cuba and the Soviet Union, it has begun to seek better relations with the U.S. and the moderate African states. However, conflict continues on a sporadic basis primarily with insurgent forces. The U.S. has supported the insurgents against the communist Government in Luanda but believes that Angola must solve its problems without external interference. Although Angola is the third largest trading partner of the U.S. in sub-Saharan Africa, overall U.S. equity is low. Main U.S. interests involve Angolan petroleum. Angola provides a support base for an insurgent group, the African National Congress, which operates in South Africa and uses terrorist tactics against civilians and government officials. Within the region, Angola maintains the third largest air force, and the fourth largest army and navy. Most military equipment is obtained from the Soviet Union. Technical military training and assistance has been provided by Cuban, Soviet, and German advisors.

Located on the southwest coast of Africa, Angola is about twice the size of Texas. It consists of a narrow coastal plain which joins plateau and highland regions. There is a large desert in the south and significant jungle surrounding the enclave of Cabinda on the northwest coast. Other than on the coastal plains, Angola is poorly suited for cross-country movement of vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters in about two-thirds of the country. While NGF ships are able to approach the coast to provide support for operations ashore they would be out-ranged by Angolan coastal defense weapons. Coverage of the country by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available. Although port facilities are quite satisfactory there are no airfields that can receive C-5 aircraft. Key installations include oil fields. The Atlantic ARG operating in the Mediterranean would require in excess of six days to reach Angola.

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DJIBOUTI

The Republic of **Djibouti** is located in northeast **Africa** on the **Gulf of Aden**. The **Djiboutian** Government generally adopts positions consistent with **U.S.** and Western interests. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Djibouti** is low. The **U.S.** provides the country about \$3 million in economic assistance annually and **Djibouti** has permitted the **U.S.** Navy access to its seaport and airport. The **Djiboutian** army is very small with about 2,870 volunteers and its air force and navy are practically negligible. A **French** garrison is based at **Djibouti** and provides the country's primary defense as well as training for the small military force.

With the Arabic language and Islamic religion, the culture of **Djibouti** is much different from that of the **U.S.** The climate is hot and humid with little rainfall. The country's topography is divided into three regions: the coastal plain; mountains further inland; and a plateau behind the mountains. Most of the terrain is bare, dry, and desolate, marked by sharp cliffs, deep ravines, burning desert sands, and thorny shrubs. About two-thirds of the country is suitable for cross-country movement of vehicles. In over one-half of **Djibouti** the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would normally be greater than 2,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions would not constrain **NGF** support and the 5 inch gun employed by most **U.S.** Navy platforms would have the range advantage over **Djiboutian** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to the northern-most corner of **Djibouti**. There is one airfield available which can receive **C-141B** aircraft and one major port with moderate capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift. **Djibouti** has no industrial facilities and few key installations outside the port and airfield. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** could reach **Djibouti** in between two to four days. With few potential evacuees and the probable evacuation site (**Djibouti** city) on the coast, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in this country would not be difficult.

ETHIOPIA

Located on the **Horn of Africa**, **Ethiopia** is bordered in the northeast by the **Red Sea**. About ten insurgent movements are active within the country ranging from separatists to royalists. The **Eritrean** guerrillas in the north have been the most active. In recent years drought has caused wide spread starvation and death. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Ethiopia** is low. While in the past the **U.S.** has provided **Ethiopia** with significant amounts of humanitarian aid, relations between the two countries has been poor due to differences over **Ethiopian** foreign policies and human rights. **Ethiopia** has one of the largest armed forces on the **African** Continent. Since the war with **Somalia** in 1977 and 1978, the army has grown to about 250,000 troops. The **U.S.** was **Ethiopia's** major arms supplier until 1977 when the country began receiving massive arms shipments from the **Soviet Union**, and incurred a debt estimated at over \$3.5 billion. The **Ethiopian** military has been engaged recently on two fronts: in the north against the **Eritrean** and **Tigrean** insurgent groups and in the east and southeast against ethnic **Somali** guerrillas.

There are more than 40 different ethnic groups within **Ethiopia** and the culture is vastly different than that of the **U.S.** **Ethiopia's** terrain consists of a high central plateau mixed with mountains. Elevations are highest just before the **Great Rift Valley** which splits the plateau diagonally. The plateau has a number of rivers crossing it and slopes to the lowlands of the **Sudan** in the west and the **Somali** plains in the southeast. The climate is temperate in the highlands and hot in the lowlands. Over half of **Ethiopia** is suited for the cross-country movement of vehicles and average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) exceeds 2,000 meters in large portions of the country. Hydrographic conditions permit **NGF** ships to approach the coast and support operations ashore but would be out-gunned by **Ethiopian** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to **Addis Ababa**, and the port cities of **Missawa** and **Aseb**. Adequate airfields and ports are available but there are few other key installations. The **Pacific ARG** would require in excess of six days to reach **Ethiopia**. Due to the over 700 evacuees, and the 356 nautical miles distance to **Addis Ababa**, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be very difficult.

KENYA

Kenya is bounded by **Somalia**, **Ethiopia**, the **Sudan**, **Uganda**, **Tanzania**, and the **Indian Ocean**. The **U.S.** and **Kenya** maintain cordial relations, and overall **U.S.** equity is moderate. More than 140 **U.S.** firms are represented in **Kenya** and **U.S.** business interests amount to about \$350 million. Over 9,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country. **Kenya** has become a transit point for southwest **Asian** heroin enroute to west **Africa**, **Europe**, and the **U.S.** Use of heroin in **Kenya** is growing and small amounts of marijuana are grown and consumed locally. The military services are small, with a total strength of about 16,000 members. The army is the dominant service with about 13,000 personnel, followed by the air force, and navy. Although the **Kenyan** military has strong ties to the **United Kingdom**, **Kenya** also looks to the **U.S.**, **Canada**, **Israel**, **France**, **Germany**, **India**, and **Pakistan** for military equipment and technical training.

Kenya's population is quite varied. Traditional herders, Arab Muslims, and cosmopolitan residents of **Nairobi** all contribute to the culture, which is different from that of the **U.S.** **Kenya** has a striking topographical diversity. In the west there is the **Great Rift Valley**, significant mountains such as **Mount Kenya** (17,040 feet), and high, sweeping plateaus. The northern three-fifths is arid, consisting mainly of semidesert. About 85 percent of the population and almost all of the economic activity is found in the southern two-fifths of the country. The climate on the coast and immediate interior is tropical, but becomes more temperate at the higher elevations. Much of **Kenya** is generally suited for cross-country movement of vehicles and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. NGF platforms are limited by the hydrography in their ability to approach the coast and deliver support. A shortfall for ground operations is the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage. A major port and four airfields are available and key installations are situated in and around the principal cities. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require four to six days to reach **Kenya**. Due to the over 9,000 potential evacuees, and the 235 nautical miles distance to **Nairobi**, NEO conducted by a MEU would be difficult.

LIBERIA

The commitment of **U.S.** Marines to the crisis torn west **African** country of **Liberia** continues on with poor prospects for peace or stability in the foreseeable future. On August 5, 1990, after a long period afloat off the capital city of **Monrovia**, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) established a security force ashore at the **American Embassy** compound and nearby communications facilities and assisted in the evacuation of 1705 **Americans** and foreign nationals. The 22nd MEU was later relieved by the 26th MEU. President Samuel Doe's death on September 10 and the failure of the five-nation west **African** peacekeeping force to ameliorate the situation has caused chaos and disorder to continue. The civil war shows no promise of quick resolution, with reports of starvation in **Monrovia** and rebel leaders Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor both claiming to be president. **U.S.** equity in **Liberia** is moderate. For many years, the **U.S.** has been **Liberia's** primary trading partner and has provided the country with significant amounts of economic and military assistance. Until recently, up to 4,000 **U.S.** citizens resided in **Liberia**. The country has a small ground OOB, with about 5,300 troops and air and naval OOBs that are practically negligible. Most military equipment and training has been obtained from the **U.S.** The army services are all engaged in fighting the rebel groups in and around **Monrovia**.

The population of **Liberia** includes at least 16 distinct ethnic groups and descendents of emancipated slaves from the **U.S.** Ethnic unrest is a major cause of the present disorder. The culture of **Liberia** is quite different from that of the **U.S.** **Liberia** lies within the tropical rain forest and the climate is hot and humid year-round. The terrain consists of a coastal plain, rising to a rolling plateau and low mountains near the inland borders. The country is generally unsuited for tracked movement due to the dense vegetation and broken terrain. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters mainly because of the ground cover and frequent heavy rainfall. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the coastal area extending from **Monrovia** to **Buchanan**. Airfields and ports are available to receive strategic lift and other key installations include **U.S.** telecommunications facilities. The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Liberia**.

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MADAGASCAR

Madagascar, the world's fourth largest island, is located 250 miles off the southeast coast of **Africa**. U.S. equity in this country is low. Relations between the two suffered during the 1970's but have improved since then. The U.S. is **Madagascar's** second largest market and fifth major supplier. The country has potentially large oil deposits and U.S. oil companies have undertaken extensive exploratory drilling efforts. The Popular Armed Forces of **Madagascar** number about 22,000 personnel. A portion of the ground OOB has been designated the Intervention Force with the mission to deploy rapidly to areas of internal and external threat. Currently **Madagascar** relies heavily on the **Soviet Union** for military equipment and training. **North Korea**, **France**, and the **U.S.** also have military assistance programs with **Madagascar**. Reports indicate there have been **Cuban** trainers in the country.

Madagascar's population is predominantly of mixed **Asian** and **African** origin. The **Malegasy** language of **Malayo-Polynesian** origin is understood throughout the island. **French** is also spoken. Most people practice a form of animism combined with ancestor worship as their religion. The culture of **Madagascar** differs significantly from that of the **U.S.** The climate of the coastal region is hot and humid throughout the year while it is more temperate in the central highlands. The island's interior consists of a high plateau averaging about 6,000 feet above sea level. The highlands descend gradually to the coast in the west but the transition is more abrupt in the east. The coastal plains are suitable for cross-country vehicular movement while this kind of mobility is precluded in the central highlands. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the rough terrain and significant ground cover. While the hydrography permits NGF ships to approach the coast and provide limited support for operations ashore, their 5-inch guns would be out-ranged by **Malagasy** coastal defense weapons. A serious shortfall for ground combat operations in **Madagascar** is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields are available to accommodate C-141B aircraft, but the one major port has poor capability to receive strategic sealift. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require four to six days to reach **Madagascar**.

NAMIBIA

Namibia, formerly known as **South West Africa**, was administered by **South Africa** for a number of years. When other **African** nations charged **South Africa** with exploiting **Namibia**, fighting broke out primarily between **South African** forces and the Marxist **South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)** supported by **Angola** and **Cuba**. In 1988, a U.S. mediated plan was agreed upon by **South Africa**, **Angola**, and **Cuba** which called for withdrawal of **Cuban** troops from **Angola** and black majority rule in **Namibia**. After free elections in 1989, **Namibia** became an independent nation in early 1990. Its president is the SWAPO guerrilla leader Sam Nujoma who apparently has dropped his Marxist rhetoric in favor of democratic ideals. The **U.S.** presently maintains no permanent diplomatic or consular representation in **Namibia** but **U.S.** Embassy officials in **South Africa** monitor developments in the country. **Namibia's** economy depends heavily on mining and ranching, with these resources concentrated in the hands of foreigners and the white minority. **Namibia** has no armed services, although now that it is independent it may soon establish some military capability.

With indigenous **Africans** of diverse ethnic origins and a minority white population, primarily **South African**, **British**, and **German**, the culture of **Namibia** is quite different from that of the **U.S.** The climate is mainly hot and dry. Periods of excessive winter drought alternate with short periods of heavy summer rainfall. Most of the country consists of a high plateau averaging about 3,600 feet above sea level. There is significant desert in both the coastal and inland regions. **Namibia** is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement due to the broken terrain of the high plateau. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters in over 50 percent of the country. A problem for the conduct of ground operations in **Namibia** is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. One airfield is available at **Windhoek** to receive C-5 aircraft but the one major port at **Walvis Bay** has poor capability to accommodate strategic sealift. The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Namibia**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in would be difficult due to the 142 nautical miles distance from the coast to **Windhoek**.

SOMALIA

Somalia is strategically located on the **Horn of Africa**, along the southern approaches to the **Red Sea** and the **Suez Canal**. **U.S.-Somalia** relations are currently excellent and **U.S.** equity is low. The **U.S.** Agency for International Development conducts a program of assistance within the country. The **U.S.** also provides relief to the numerous refugees in **Somalia** who are fleeing **Ethiopian** oppression in the **Ogaden** territory. Through a mutual agreement, **U.S.** forces are allowed access to **Somali** ports and airfields. **Somalia** has a modest size army of 61,300 troops and a small air force and navy. Most **Somali** military equipment was obtained from the **Soviet Union** between 1972 and 1977, half of which was lost during the 1977 **Ogaden War**, and much of the remainder is rapidly deteriorating. The **Somali** Government has turned to Western countries for new and modern weapon systems. Western aid has centered on small deliveries of defensive arms, training, and improved maintenance. The **P.R.C.**, **Egypt**, **Italy**, **Saudi Arabia**, and the **U.S.** have provided most of **Somalia's** recent military assistance. The **Somali** military has been faced with challenges from two separate insurgent groups which attack government facilities and benefit from foreign support.

Somalia's culture is quite different from that of the **U.S.** **Somalia** has a year-round hot climate, monsoon winds, and irregular rainfall with recurring droughts. **Somalia's** coast extends 1700 miles along the **Gulf of Aden** in the north and the **Indian Ocean** in the east. Northern **Somalia** is hilly, while the central, and southern areas are flat. **Somalia** is well suited for cross-country vehicular movement, and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally exceeds 2,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions allow **NGF** platforms to approach the coast within range of targets ashore, but these platforms would be out-gunned by coastal defense weapons. A shortfall for combat operations in this country is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. More than one airfield is available to receive **C-5** aircraft, but there are no ports capable of accommodating strategic sealift. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require between four to six days to reach **Somalia**. **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would pose some difficulties due to the over 150 potential evacuees.

SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa's policy is to deny political rights and equal economic opportunity to the black majority which is a major cause of instability in the country. If **South Africa's** policies remain unchanged, racial confrontation and conflict can be expected. **U.S.-South African** relations have suffered due to **South Africa's** position on racial issues. To demonstrate its opposition to apartheid, the **U.S.**, in conjunction with the **United Nations**, has embargoed arms sales to **South Africa**. The **U.S.** supplies 15 percent of **South Africa's** imports and buys about 8 percent of its exports. Over 9,000 **U.S.** citizens live in **South Africa**. **South Africa** has its own clandestine program for weapons sales to Third World countries and allegedly has received illicit nuclear technology from **Israel**. **South Africa** has one of the largest armed forces in the region. The armed forces are capable of conducting counterinsurgency and conventional operations within **South Africa** and neighboring states. The country is thought to possess chemical weapons and reportedly used these weapons in **Angola**. **South Africa** may be trying hard to develop nuclear weapons.

South Africa lies at the southern tip of the **African** Continent and has a 2,700 mile coastline. The independent **Kingdom of Lesotho** is situated within the east-central part of **South Africa**. The terrain consists of a narrow coastal zone and an extensive interior plateau and mountainous region. The climate is generally moderate with sunny days and cool nights. Due to broken terrain, the country is mainly unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be normally limited to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to **Capetown**, **Port Elizabeth**, **Durban**, and **Maseru** in the enclave of **Lesotho**. Airfields and ports are adequate to accommodate strategic lift. Key installations may include facilities for nuclear and chemical weapons. The **Atlantic** and **Pacific ARGs** would both require in excess of six days to reach **South Africa**. Due to over 9,000 potential evacuees, and the distance to **Pretoria**, the probable evacuation site, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be extremely difficult.

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SUDAN

Sudan is situated to influence both the **Arab** and **African** communities. There has been protracted civil war between Government forces and insurgents backed by **Ethiopia** and **Libya**. The **U.S.** has overall low equity in **Sudan**, and bilateral relations are good. The **U.S.** and **Saudi Arabia** provide a large amount of **Sudan's** economic assistance. Investment by **U.S.** companies is about \$187 million. The present drought threatens to cause severe famine and death. **Sudan** has a 54,000-member army supported by a small air force and navy. The military is hampered by old, poorly maintained equipment left over from **Soviet** assistance. A **U.S.** assistance mission is working to upgrade equipment and logistics. **Sudan** also receives military assistance from **Arab** and **European** countries and **China**. **Sudan** has a mutual defense treaty with **Egypt**.

Sudan's population is composed of two cultures, **Arab** and **black African**, and effective association between them poses a primary internal problem. Both cultures are different from that of the **U.S.** **Sudan's** climate varies from hot and dry in the desert regions of the north to tropical in the south. From south to north, **Sudan** has three primary zones: tropical forest and savanna; vast swampland, open semitropical savanna, and scrublands; and sandy, arid hills lying between the **Red Sea** and the **Libyan** and **Sahara Deserts**. In the north and central desert areas, cross-country vehicular movement is feasible while the remainder of the country is unsuited. Average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters in over half the country due to tropical jungle and covered swampland in the south and the broken terrain in the northeast. **NGF** platforms can approach the coast within range of targets ashore, but would be out-gunned by **Sudanese** coastal defense weapons. A shortfall for combat operations is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. There are several airfields and one major port with marginal capabilities to accommodate strategic air and sealift. The **Pacific ARG** would require in excess of six days to reach **Sudan**. Due to the over 700 potential evacuees, and the 330 nautical miles distance to **Khartoum**, the probable evacuation site, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be quite difficult.

TUNISIA

Tunisia is the smallest of the **North African** countries and has a 1,000 mile coastline on the **Mediterranean Sea**. **U.S.-Tunisian** relations in recent years have generally been good. The only temporary setback occurred in 1985 when **Tunisia** mistakenly perceived that the **U.S.** supported an **Israeli** raid on the **PLO** headquarters outside of **Tunis**. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Tunisia** is low. As the country's fourth ranking trade partner, the **U.S.** buys 6.6 percent of **Tunisia's** exports and provides 5.8 percent of its imports. About 675 **U.S.** citizens live there. **Tunisia** has relatively small armed forces with a combined strength of about 38,000 personnel and has looked mainly to the **U.S.** and **France** for military assistance. With the military aid it received, **Tunisia** has acquired a squadron of **F-5** aircraft, **M-60** tanks, assorted surface-to-air missiles, and extensive military training (primarily in the **U.S.**) for its personnel.

While most **Tunisians** are Muslim, there is a small Jewish population and roughly 50,000 **Europeans** in residence. The majority of the people live along the coast or in the major cities. **Tunis**, the capital, industrial center, principal port, and largest city, has just under 20 percent of the population. The culture of **Tunisia** is much different from that of the **U.S.** Northern and central **Tunisia** have mild, rainy winters and hot, dry summers while in the south it is hot and dry year-round. The country's topography consists of a well-watered and fertile northern area, a central coastal plain, and primarily desert in the south. Several mountain ranges extend into **Tunisia** from neighboring **Algeria**. Conditions are generally suited for cross-country vehicular movement and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. Coverage of the country by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to the northern area down to about the **Gulf of Gabes**. Airfields are available to accommodate **C-141B** aircraft and there are three major ports with moderate capabilities to receive strategic sealift. Key installations include at least eleven oil fields. The **Atlantic ARG** operating in the **Mediterranean** could reach **Tunisia** in less than two days. Due to the presence of about 675 potential evacuees, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Tunisia** would present a number of difficulties.

UGANDA

Uganda lies astride the equator in the center of Africa, bounded by Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Zaire, and Sudan. Since the removal of Idi Amin in 1978, U.S. relations with Uganda have remained cordial. In recent years, Uganda has improved its human rights record, and the U.S. has provided modest humanitarian aid. Despite Uganda's many natural resources and great potential for development, chronic political and economic instability have combined to produce a continuing economic decline that has left the country among the world's poorest. Uganda has a small army of about 20,000 troops and an air force that is practically negligible. It is an inland country with no navy. Discipline and training in the armed forces are poor and deserters provide recruits for insurgent groups. At various times Cuba, North Korea, Libya, and the Soviet Union have all provided military aid to Uganda.

Uganda's population is predominately rural, and its density is highest in the southern regions. With English widely spoken and a predominate Christian faith, the culture of Uganda is not greatly different from that of the U.S. Uganda has a moderate climate which is pleasant most of the year. A large part of Uganda is plateau ranging from about 3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level, and thick jungles frequently prevail. Approximately 18 percent of the country is covered by water, swamp, and mountains. Much of northern Uganda is well suited for tracked movement. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters in all but parts of the northern region. A shortfall to combat operations in Uganda is the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage. There are three airfields available which can receive C-141B aircraft. The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach Kenya and then need to move overland more than 500 miles to enter Uganda. Total deployment is estimated at more than six days. Likewise, with about 400 potential evacuees, and a distance of about 521 nautical miles from the coast off Kenya to Kampala, the probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

ZAIRE

Zaire is located in the heart of the African continent and pursues a policy of nonalignment. It is a underdeveloped country with more than 200 different ethnic groups. The U.S. has maintained close relations with the President Joseph Mobutu despite his reputation for extreme repression and widespread corruption. Zaire is presently facing an increasing insurgency problem. Cuban-trained secessionists have been active since the late 1970s and have proven to be a serious threat. Mobutu plans to increase his armed forces to 100,000 personnel to counter this threat. The armed forces consist of an army of 22,000 troops and a small air force and navy. Conditions and morale are poor, and soldiers receive little training at a few schools within the country but a small amount of foreign training has been obtained from the U.S., U.K., France, Belgium, Italy, and Morocco.

French is the primary language but 700 local languages and dialects are spoken. Based on language and religion, the culture of Zaire is considered to be moderately different from that of the U.S. The climate is hot and humid with much rainfall in the north and west. Conditions in the south central and eastern areas are cooler with less rainfall. Central Zaire is a basin-shaped plateau sloping to the west and covered by tropical rain forest. This area is surrounded by mountainous terraces in the west; plateaus merging into savannas in the south and southwest; and dense grasslands extending beyond the Zaire River in the north. High mountains are found in the extreme eastern region. Zaire is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions would restrict NGF platforms from approaching the coast to engage targets ashore. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is available only for the area around Kinshasa. Two airfields are available to receive C-5 aircraft, but the one major port has poor capability to accommodate strategic sealift. Key installations include oil fields. The Atlantic ARG with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach Zaire. Due to the over 3,000 potential evacuees, and the 217 nautical miles distance from the coast to Kinshasa, the most probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

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ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in south-central **Africa**, bordered by **Zambia**, **Mozambique**, **South Africa**, and **Botswana**. **Zimbabwe** became independent in 1980. Animosity between political factions and sabotage committed by former guerrilla fighters have posed the major threats to stability and security of **Zimbabwe**. Relations with **South Africa** are poor, yet **Zimbabwe** must depend on **South Africa** for communication links with the outside world. **Zimbabwe** is important to the West as it is the only major producer of high-quality chromium outside the **Soviet Union**. Although 2,450 U.S. citizens reside there, overall U.S. equity in **Zimbabwe** is low. The armed forces number 46,000 army troops and a small air force which recently purchased new jet fighters from **China** and transport helicopters from **Italy**. The U.S., U.K., **Pakistan**, **North Korea**, and **China** have all provided military training to **Zimbabwe**.

The population of **Zimbabwe** consists of about 8.8 million blacks, 100,000 whites, 20,000 persons of mixed race, and 10,000 **Asians**. Some blacks are Christian, although many practice traditional beliefs. The culture is considered to be moderately different from that of the U.S. Although the country lies within the tropics, its climate is subtropical and temperatures vary with altitude. A plateau of modest elevation covers the central region. It is crossed from southwest to northeast by a higher plateau called the "highveld". From the central plateau the land slopes north and south. There are mountains along the eastern border with **Mozambique**. Due to broken terrain and heavy ground cover, **Zimbabwe** is unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement and average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the cities of **Harare** and **Gutu**. One airfield can receive C-5 aircraft. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require about six days to reach the coast of **Mozambique**. From there, the MEU would need to move at least 200 nautical miles by tactical lift to enter **Zimbabwe**. Total deployment is estimated at between six and eight days. With over 2,000 potential evacuees, and a distance of 243 nautical miles from the **Mozambique** coast to **Harare**, the probable evacuation site, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

ASIA/PACIFIC

AFGHANISTAN

Soviet forces occupied **Afghanistan** and battled **Afghan** rebels for nine years. A UN-mediated agreement was signed in 1988 providing for the withdrawal of **Soviet** troops, creation of a neutral **Afghan** state, and repatriation of millions of **Afghan** refugees. **Afghan** rebels rejected the agreement and vowed to continue the resistance while a **Soviet** backed government remained in control. The **U.S.** has never recognized the communist regime in **Kabul** and since the **Soviet** withdrawal has continued to assist the **Afghan** resistance and the displaced refugees. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Afghanistan** is low. This country is the largest producer of opium in **Southwest Asia** with an output of 700 to 800 metric tons in 1988 and remains a principal source for this drug in **European** and **U.S.** markets. The **Afghan** Government has sponsored violent terrorist attacks against **Afghan** refugees and other civilians in **Pakistan**. Because of its involvement in both opium production and terrorism, **Afghanistan** should be considered as a serious source of concern. The country has a moderate size army with about 50,000 troops, a small air force, and no navy. Most of its military equipment is provided by the **Soviet Union**. Training and morale in the armed forces is marginal.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country divided from southeast to northeast by towering mountain ranges. Small valleys intersperse the mountains and large desert areas. Due to the rugged and broken terrain, cross-country movement of tracked and heavy wheeled vehicles is not feasible in about two-thirds of the country. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters because of the geographic conditions. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the northern **Afghan** border area with the **Soviet Union**. While there are no airfields that can handle C-5 aircraft, two airfields are available that can accommodate C-141B aircraft. The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **Afghanistan**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Afghanistan** would be very difficult due to the 582 nautical miles distance to **Kabul**, the most likely evacuation point.

BANGLADESH

With a long history of turmoil, disorder, and frequent coups in the Government, **Bangladesh** was declared an Islamic Republic in 1988. Chronic destitution among the densely crowded population has been worsened by the decline of jute, a primary crop, as a major world commodity. **Bangladesh** remains one of the world's poorest countries. While recent **U.S.-Bangladesh** relations are cordial, overall **U.S.** equity in this country is low. The **U.S.** maintains a bilateral trade association with **Bangladesh** and provides the country about \$140 million a year in aid. Over 700 **U.S.** citizens reside there. The ground OOB consists of about 82,000 volunteers modeled and organized along **British** regimental lines. The majority of military equipment is acquired from the **Soviets** and **Chinese**. **Bangladesh** maintains a small air force with two fighter squadrons and one bomber squadron. The navy is limited to three frigates and several coastal patrol craft.

With a culture much different from the **U.S.**, a wet/hot climate, and largely jungle terrain, military operations in **Bangladesh** would be quite difficult. The region is generally unsuited for tracked vehicle movement due to the continually wet alluvial plains, cut by streams and swamps. The thick ground cover and frequent heavy rainfall would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions would prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast to provide support for operations ashore. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available for **Bangladesh**. Airfields are available to receive C-5 or C-141B aircraft, but there are no ports able to accommodate strategic sealift. There are few key installations in this country. The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach **Bangladesh**. Due to the over 700 potential evacuees and the 135 nautical miles distance to the most likely evacuation site (**Dhaka**), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

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BURMA

Insurgency in **Burma** is pursued by ethnic groups motivated by demands for secession or autonomy. Most insurgents depend largely on the narcotics trade for financial existence. The Mong Tai Revolutionary Army, an insurgent group that operates in the **Burmese-Thai** border region, extorts protection from heroin factories in order to finance its war against the **Rangoon** Government and rival Insurgents, the **Burmese** Communist Party. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Burma** is low. Specific **U.S.** interests in this country include bilateral cooperation to suppress the illicit drug trade, assistance to **Burmese** economic development, commercial access, and cultural exchanges. About 150 **U.S.** citizens live there. **Burma** is the world's largest opium producing country with an output of 1,065 to 1,500 metric tons in 1988. Production reportedly increased in 1989 due to favorable climatic conditions and a decrease in government eradication efforts. **Burma** has an army of 170,000 volunteers plus a relatively small air force and navy. In addition to counterinsurgency, the mission of the armed forces include internal security, territorial defense, assistance to the national administration, and civic action. **Burma** purchases small amounts of military equipment and training from various countries including the **U.S.** and **Western Europe**. In the area of NBC, **Burma** is reportedly producing mustard gas for chemical weapons.

Burma has a significant cultural difference from the **U.S.**, a wet/hot tropical climate with heavy coastal rainfall, and geography that includes mountains in the north, east, and west and a dense jungle interior. About two-thirds of the country is not suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 500 meters due to the broken terrain, thick vegetation, and frequent rainfall. Hydrographic conditions off the coast would prevent NGF platforms from moving in close enough to provide support for operations ashore. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available for **Burma**. The three primary airfields and one major port would be constrained to handle strategic lift. Communications and ground transportation facilities are adequate at best. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between four and six days to reach **Burma**.

INDIA

India is located adjacent to important **Indian Ocean** trade routes. The **U.S.** is **India's** largest trading partner and an important source of foreign economic assistance. Almost 5,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **India**. Opium is produced for legal purposes but there is concern that it is being diverted to illegal trafficking. **India** is involved in money laundering and acts as a transit point for **Pakistani** and **Burmese** heroin and precursor chemicals enroute to refineries. Sikh terrorism has been on the rise with attacks against government and civilian targets. **India** has begun to develop weapons systems and is expected to become an arms exporter in the future. Due to involvement in drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, **India** deserves attention by military planners. **India** has the second largest ground, air, and naval OOBs in the region. Military equipment is obtained from the **U.S.S.R.**, **U.K.**, **France**, and **Italy**. **India** may have chemical weapons with means of delivery and may be developing nuclear weapons.

India has a climate that varies from tropical in the south to temperate in the north. The topography ranges from a mountainous northern border, to northern plains, desert in the northwest, rolling hills in the northeast, and a southern peninsula with moderate elevation. **India** has a culture much different from the **U.S.** It is generally well suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions permit NGF ships to provide some support for operations ashore, but would be out-gunned by coastal defense weapons. A major shortfall for military operations in this country is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields and ports are quite sufficient to handle strategic lift. Key installations for military planning include oil fields. It is estimated that the **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require two to four days to reach **India**. Due to about 5,000 potential evacuees, and the 458 nautical miles distance to the probable evacuation site (**New Delhi**), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **India** would be very difficult.

INDONESIA

Indonesia is an archipelago of more than 13,500 islands extending 3,000 miles along the equator from mainland **Southeast Asia** to **Australia**. The archipelago forms a natural barrier between the **Indian** and **Pacific Oceans**, making the straits between the islands strategically and commercially important. Little known conflict continues on the **Indonesian** island of **Timor** between insurgents and Government forces. Reports indicate that in 14 years of fighting, one-third of the population of **East Timor Province** has died due to civil war and famine. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Indonesia** is high. Total trade amounts to about \$4.5 billion annually with the **U.S.** importing some of **Indonesia's** oil. Over 12,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. **Indonesia** is a transit point for heroin, opium, hashish, and precursor chemicals, and there have been reports of increased drug trafficking in the resort area of **Ball**. Besides an army of 216,000 regulars, **Indonesia** maintains the fourth largest naval capability in the region. The air force is also well equipped with a recently upgraded air defense network. There have been allegations that **Indonesian** forces used chemical weapons against the insurgents in **East Timor**.

The larger **Indonesian** islands consist largely of coastal plains, mountainous interiors, and heavy jungle vegetation. The country has an equatorial climate with more temperate heat and humidity in the upland areas. The **Indonesian** culture is much different from that of the **U.S.** The islands are generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the thick jungle and mountainous conditions. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters because of the broken terrain, jungle, and frequent heavy rainfall. Coverage of **Indonesia** by 1:50,000 scale maps is absent except for the area around **Jakarta**. Airfields and ports are numerous and capable of receiving strategic lift. Key installations in the country include oil fields. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require between two to four days to reach **Indonesia**. Due to the over 12,000 potential evacuees, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Indonesia** would be very difficult.

JAPAN

Due to its economic power and international role, **Japan** has become one of the most important countries in the world community. The close relationship with **Japan** is the cornerstone of **U.S.** policy in **Asia**. **Japan** is the **U.S.**'s largest trading partner after **Canada**. Concerns are growing about the **U.S.** trade deficit with **Japan** caused by **Japanese** market restrictions. **U.S.** equity in **Japan** remains high and almost 42,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. Terrorism has continued at a generally low level in **Japan** with periodic attacks by radical leftist groups. In 1987, the **Soviets** obtained technology from a **Japanese** firm which was used to produce quieter submarine propellers. Due to its involvement in terrorism and illicit technology transfer, **Japan** deserves attention by military planners. **Japan** has an army of 156,000 volunteers, and the third largest air force and navy in the region. **Japan** is suspected of having chemical weapons.

Four-fifths of **Japan** is mountainous and is one of the most densely populated nations in the world. **Japan's** climate ranges from subtropical on **Okinawa** to cool on the island of **Hokkaido**. **Japanese** culture is quite different from that of the **U.S.** About three-fourths of **Japan** is unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the mountains, hills, and forests. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. **NGF** platforms can approach the coast within range to support operations ashore, but would be outgunned by **Japanese** coastal defense weapons. There is complete coverage of **Japan** by older 1:50,000 scale maps, but some may be outdated. There are airfields and ports capable of receiving strategic airlift and sealift. Key installations include communications, transportation, and industrial facilities as well as possible storage sites for chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARF** with its embarked **MEU** would require between four and six days to reach southern **Japan** and more than six days to arrive at northern **Japan**. **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** would be very difficult due to over 40,000 potential evacuees.

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MALAYSIA

In **Malaysia**, the possibility of a revived communist insurgency along the border with **Thailand** is viewed with great seriousness. The U.S. supports **Malaysia** through cooperation in the areas of narcotics enforcement and military assistance programs. Overall U.S. equity in **Malaysia** is moderate. In bilateral trade, the U.S. receives about 14 percent of **Malaysia's** exports and provides 26 percent of its imports. Over 2,000 U.S. citizens reside there. **Malaysia** is an important heroin processing center and transit site, exporting drugs primarily to **Europe** and **Australia**. The country has moderate size armed forces which have been mainly directed at containing the communist insurgency. Recently, a major program has been initiated to expand and modernize the military to meet both internal and external threats. The army in particular is being reorganized and its equipment upgraded. **Malaysia** is a member of the Five-Power Defense Arrangement with the U.K., **Australia**, **New Zealand**, and **Singapore**. Under the arrangement, small **Australian** air units are stationed in **Malaysia**.

Malaysia has a culture significantly different from that of the U.S. The climate is mainly hot and humid with large amounts of rainfall. The country is basically broken into two regions, the **Malay Peninsula** which borders with **Thailand**, and **East Malaysia** which occupies the northern part of the island of **Borneo**. On the peninsula, a range of forested mountains runs north and south and is flanked on the east and west by coastal plains. **East Malaysia** is composed of a broad, swampy coastal plain, drained by wide rivers which merge into hills and mountains of the interiors. Most of **Malaysia** is covered with dense jungle. Due to these conditions, at least two-thirds of **Malaysia** is unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be less than 500 meters due to the adverse terrain and frequent heavy rainfall. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available for **Malaysia**. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to handle strategic lift entering the country. Key installations include oil fields on both the **Malay Peninsula** and **East Malaysia**. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between two and four days to reach **Malaysia**. Due to the over 2,000 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Malaysia** would be very difficult.

NORTH KOREA

Since 1950, **North Korea** has maintained a large, well-equipped armed force. Overall U.S. equity in **North Korea** is low. The U.S. maintains no diplomatic representation and conducts no trade with this country. Terrorist attacks by **North Korea** are evidenced by the 1987 bombing of a **South Korean** airliner and the 1983 assassination of **South Korean** officials in **Burma**. **North Korea** has provided training and support to international terrorist groups. It is suspected that **North Korea** supplies large quantities of major weapons to **Iran** as well as other Third World countries. **North Korea** illegally acquired U.S.-made Hughes helicopters in order to improve its military posture. The **North Koreans** have one of the largest armed forces in the **Asia/Pacific** region. They reportedly possess stocks of chemical weapons and the means of delivery. **North Korea** rates particular attention by military planners due to its involvement in terrorism, gray arms/technology, chemical weapons development, and its large ground, air, and naval OOBs.

North Korea's culture is different from that of the U.S. Mountains and hills cover nearly all of the country, with narrow valleys and small plains in between. The climate is temperate with July and August the warmest months. In the winter, snowfall is generally light, but the ground is covered for long periods. Conditions are poor for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters because of the broken terrain, forested areas, and cultivated plains. Hydrographic conditions at some locations along the coast would prevent NGF platforms from providing support for operations ashore. **North Korean** coastal defense weapons would be able to out-gun the standard U.S. NGF weapon (5"/54 cal). Mapping is available for the country by older 1:50,000 scale maps, but they may be outdated. More than one airfield and port are considered capable of receiving strategic lift. Key installations may include facilities for the production and storage of chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require in excess of six days to reach **North Korea**.

PAKISTAN

Recent conflict in **Pakistan** has included the **India - Pakistan** War, tribal and political insurgencies, and confrontations with the Government of **Afghanistan**. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Pakistan** is moderate. The two countries are major trading partners and the **U.S.** provides long-term military and economic aid. Over 2,800 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country. **Pakistan** is the third largest producer of opium in **Southwest Asia**. In 1988, there were 127 terrorist incidents in **Pakistan**, most of which were attributed to the **Afghan** Government. **Pakistan** has the sixth largest ground OOB in the **Asia/Pacific** region. Its air and naval OOBs are also of substantial size. **Pakistan** has military equipment from the **U.S.**, **Soviet Union**, **China**, the **U.K.** and **France**. Indications are that **Pakistan** possesses chemical weapons with delivery means and is developing nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's culture is different from that of the **U.S.** There are mountainous conditions along the western border with **Afghanistan**. The climate ranges from hot near the coast to temperate in the interior uplands. Conditions are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles only in the eastern plains, and valleys of the northern mountains. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) varies between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. NGF ships can approach the coast and provide some support for operations ashore, but would be out-gunned by **Pakistani** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to central **Pakistan**, including **Islamabad**, and the borders with **Afghanistan** and **India**. Airfields are adequate but ports have limited capabilities. Key installations are suspected to include facilities for production and storage of chemical and perhaps nuclear weapons. The **Pacific ARG** could reach **Pakistan** in less than two days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to the over 2,800 potential evacuees and the 616 nautical miles distance to the likely evacuation site (**Islamabad**).

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Papua New Guinea is located in the southwest **Pacific** about 100 miles northeast of **Australia**. It consists of the eastern half of the island of **New Guinea**, the **Bismark Archipelago**, and several other islands. The **U.S.** and **Papua New Guinea** maintain friendly relations and overall **U.S.** equity in the country is moderate. The two nations are trading partners and the **U.S.** has about \$420 million in direct investments there. Over 3,500 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Papua New Guinea**. The country has a small ground OOB composed of 2,900 volunteer personnel. Both the air and naval OOBs are negligible. Most of the military support is provided by **Australia**.

The culture of **Papua New Guinea** is quite similar to that of the **U.S.**, with English being the primary language and Protestant the main religion. The most predominate characteristic of this country is its wet/hot climate and mountainous, jungle covered terrain. The average annual rainfall in many areas is over 200 inches. The main island (eastern **New Guinea**) contains about 85 percent of the land area. In recent years there has been considerable urban drift toward **Port Moresby** and other major centers. Due to the severe terrain and climatic conditions, cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be restricted to the narrow coastal lowlands. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be limited to less than 500 meters due to the rough terrain, thick ground cover, and frequent heavy rainfall. Hydrographic conditions would somewhat limit the ability of NGF ships to approach the coast and provide support for operations ashore. Another significant shortfall for military operations is that map coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available. An airfield and a major port are able to receive strategic lift. There are few key installations in this country due mainly to the harsh geographic and climatic conditions which inhibit development, particularly in the interior. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach **Papua New Guinea**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in this country would be very difficult due to the over 3,500 potential evacuees.

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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

There is potential for renewed conflict between **Taiwan** and the **People's Republic of China (PRC)**. U.S. equity in the **PRC** is high. The two countries conduct bilateral trade and the **U.S.** is the **PRC's** third largest trading partner. With increased normalization, direct **U.S.** investment in the **PRC** has increased significantly. Over 2,500 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country. The **PRC** is a transit point for precursor chemicals and heroin moving to and from the **Golden Triangle**. The **PRC** provides illicit weapons to a number of Third World countries. The **PRC** rates special attention because of its involvement in both drug trafficking and gray arms trade. The **PRC** continues to maintain the largest army, navy, and air force in the **Asia/Pacific** region. Efforts are underway to make the military leaner, and better equipped in the 1990s. The **PRC** may have a chemical weapons production capability and may be expanding its stocks of nuclear weapons.

There is a cultural difference between the **PRC** and the **U.S.** The **PRC** is almost entirely in the temperate zone and has a mixed climate. Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is precluded in most of the country except for the northern desert plains. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally limited to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions prevent NGF ships from coming within range to provide support for operations ashore. When they are able to approach the shore, they would be out-gunned by **Chinese** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to scattered areas throughout the **PRC**. Key installations include facilities for the production and storage of nuclear and chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between two to four days to reach the **Chinese** coast. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to over 2,500 potential evacuees and the 124 nautical miles distance to **Beijing**, the most likely evacuation site.

PHILIPPINES

Nationalist ambitions, ethnic animosities, oligarchic oppression, and religious persecution all influence the continuing instability in the **Philippines**. A communist insurgent group, the New People's Army (NPA) has spread terror and destruction across the country. The economy continues to deteriorate and the Aquino Government is threatened by a series of coup attempts. Overall **U.S.** equity is high. Negotiations are underway to renew the leases on **U.S.** bases which are due to expire in 1991. The **U.S.** is the country's largest trading partner and over 120,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. The **Philippines** exports marijuana as well as quantities of this drug obtained from **Thailand**. It is a transit point for **Golden Triangle** heroin and **South American** cocaine enroute to various lucrative markets. The **Philippines** deserves special attention because of its involvement in drug trafficking and terrorism. The **Philippine** armed forces are of moderate size.

There is a small cultural difference between the **Philippines** and the **U.S.** The climate is tropical with warm, humid conditions and heavy rainfall. About 95 percent of the population is concentrated on the eleven largest islands where the terrain is mostly mountainous. Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is restricted primarily to the central **Luzon** plain. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the mountainous terrain. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps exists for most of the country except for parts of western **Luzon**. Airfields and ports are adequate to receive strategic lift. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could be expected to reach the **Philippines** in less than two days. Due to the very large number of potential evacuees (over 120,000), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be extremely difficult.

SOUTH KOREA

South Korea occupies a strategic location on the **Korean** peninsula among the **Chinese**, **Japanese**, and **Soviet** spheres of influence. **U.S.** equity in **South Korea** is high. This country has become the seventh largest trading partner of the **U.S.** About 39,000 military personnel are stationed in **South Korea** and over 10,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. **South Korea** has the fifth largest ground OOB in the region composed of about 520,000 troops. It also has a relatively large air force and navy, equipped with modern weapon systems. An air defense network is deployed along its northern border with **North Korea** and the coastal waters to the southwest. **South Korea** is thought to possess stocks of chemical weapons.

South Korea has a culture significantly different from that of the **U.S.** It has a temperate climate with hot, rainy summers and cold, dry, and windy winters. The terrain consists of partially forested mountain ranges separated by deep, narrow valleys. There are cultivated plains along the coasts, mainly in the west and south. Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is possible in the valleys and plains during certain parts of the year. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the dissected terrain, forests, and cultivated areas. Intervisibility would be particularly restricted in the rugged east coastal and central interior. NGF platforms can approach the coast and provide a limited degree of support for operations ashore but would be confronted by a significant **South Korean** coastal defense threat. Coverage of the country is available by old 1:50,000 scale maps, but are likely to be outdated. There are several airfields and ports to accommodate strategic lift. Key installations may include production and storage facilities for chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach **South Korea**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be difficult due to over 10,000 potential evacuees.

SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS

For purposes of this examination, the **South Pacific Islands** include **Fiji** and the **Solomon Islands**. The **U.S.** maintains cordial relations with these island nations and **U.S.** equity is low. About 500 **U.S.** citizens reside on the islands. **Suva**, the capital city of **Fiji**, is the local headquarters for the **U.S.** Agency for International Development (AID) which administers assistance to the entire region. **Fiji** has a small ground OOB consisting of about 5,000 volunteers. Units have served with the **United Nations** forces in **Lebanon** and the multinational force in the **Sinal**. **Fiji's** contributions to peacekeeping in the **Middle East** and **Africa** are unique for a nation of its size. No military forces are maintained by the **Solomon Islands**; a police force of about 500 provides internal security. Prior to independence, the **Solomons** were administered by the **U.K.** as a protectorate and the **U.K.** continues to be responsible for the defense of these islands from outside attack.

The cultures of the **U.S.** and the **South Pacific Islands** are quite similar. The larger islands of both **Fiji** and the **Solomons** are mountainous with dense, tropical jungle. The climate is hot and humid with heavy annual rainfall. Collectively, these islands present terrain conditions not conducive to cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 500 meters due to the mountains, thick ground cover, and frequent heavy rainfall. A serious shortfall for military operations in these islands is the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage. While airfields and ports are adequate to receive strategic lift, there are few other key installations of military significance. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU would require between four to six days to reach the islands. Due to the over 500 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Fiji** and the **Solomons** would pose some difficulties.

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SPRATLY ISLANDS

The **Spratly Islands**, located in the **South China Sea**, are the center of a multinational dispute. These islands are significant because they occupy locations in important sea lanes and are believed to contain valuable oil and gas resources. **China**, **Vietnam**, **Malaysia**, the **Philippines**, and **Taiwan** all claimed sovereignty to some of the islands in this complex. In 1987, **Chinese** and **Vietnamese** warships operating in the area opened fire on each other with considerable damage and casualties. These countries continue to maintain warships in the vicinity of the **Spratlys**. **Malaysia** claims possession of the southern **Spratlys**, and has been conducting naval operations in the islands for at least nine years. The **Philippines** claim the northern **Spratlys** which it calls the **Kalayaan Islands**. **Taiwan** occupies **Itu-aba** island, the largest of the **Spratlys**, maintaining a weather station and a contingent of marines there. The islands are of little interest to the **U.S.** other than for their strategic location in the **South China Sea**. They have no indigenous population and no armed forces.

The **Spratlys** consist of numerous small islands. Some of the larger ones contain jungle growth and scrub vegetation. Most, however are small flat and desolate, with coral outcrops. They are unsuitable for cross-country vehicular movement and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be less than 1,000 meters. Coverage of the **Spratlys** by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available. There are no airfields, ports or key installations. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** could reach the **Spratlys** in less than two days.

SRI LANKA

Recent conflict in **Sri Lanka** has occurred as a result of grievances and aspirations of the Tamil community. Militant Tamils have sought to create a separate state in **Sri Lanka's** Northern and Eastern Provinces where Tamils predominate. The **U.S.** enjoys a cordial relationship with **Sri Lanka**. While **U.S.** equity in this country is low, the **U.S.** provides developmental aid and serves as **Sri Lanka's** largest export market. Almost 700 **U.S.** citizens reside there. Tamil separatists use terrorist tactics, including assassinations of officials in pursuit of their objectives. They have also demonstrated a growing capability to mount quasi-military operations against targets such as police stations and government facilities. **Sri Lanka** has a modest ground **OOB** and a small air force and navy. These forces' primary mission is internal security but have been somewhat ineffective in dealing with the Tamil insurgents.

Sri Lanka is located in the **Indian Ocean** off the southeast coast of **India**. A plain, only slightly above sea level, makes up the northern half of the island while the center and south consist of hills and mountains. There is a uniformly tropical climate, with hot, humid conditions and heavy rainfall. **Sri Lanka's** culture is different from that of the **U.S.** About 50 percent of the people live in the southwest quarter of the island where agriculture is most favorable. Cross-country movement is severely restricted over most of **Sri Lanka** due to the broken terrain, forests, plantations, rice fields, and streams. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available. The ports and airfields can effectively handle strategic lift. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require between two to four days to reach **Sri Lanka**. Due to 700 potential evacuees, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be quite difficult.

THAILAND

Drug trafficking, a communist insurgency, minority unrest, and fighting in neighboring **Cambodia** are all continuing problems. **Thailand** is strategically important because it controls the land route from **Asia** to **Malaysia** and **Singapore**. **U.S.** equity in **Thailand** is high. The **U.S.** has over \$1 billion in direct investment in **Thailand** and in recent years has provided over \$50 million in economic and military assistance. About 10,000 **U.S.** citizens live there. **Thailand** has reduced opium cultivation to about 28 metric tons annually, but remains a refiner of heroin and a transit site for drugs departing the **Golden Triangle**. **Thailand** also has an active trade in precursor chemicals and is a money laundering center. The armed forces stress defense from external attack as their primary mission and internal security as a secondary role. The armed forces have a combined strength of about 239,000 personnel. **Laos** recently accused **Thailand** of using chemical weapons during a border incident.

Thailand has a different culture from that of the **U.S.** The climate is hot and humid with heavy rainfall particularly in the south. The topography consists of a central plain, an eastern plateau, a mountain range in the west, and the southern densely forested isthmus joining the country with **Malaysia**. Cross-country movement of vehicles is virtually impossible due to steep slopes, thick vegetation in the plains, numerous rivers, and coastal swamps. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (Intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. **NGF** ships can approach the coast to support operations ashore but **Thai** coastal defense weapons would provide significant opposition. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the **Thai** borders with **Laos** and **Cambodia** and around **Bangkok**. Airfields are satisfactory to receive **C-5** aircraft but the major port at **Bangkok** is inadequate to handle sealift. Key installations may include facilities for chemical weapons. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require between two to four days to reach **Thailand**. Due to about 10,000 potential evacuees, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be extremely difficult.

VIETNAM

The **U.S.** has no diplomatic relations with **Vietnam** and **U.S.** equity in that country is nonexistent. Recent moves have been made toward normalization since the withdrawal of **Vietnamese** forces from **Cambodia** and the recent willingness of **Vietnam** to help recover the remains of **U.S.** servicemen reported missing during the war. **Vietnam** has supported terrorist actions by insurgents operating against the Government in **El Salvador**. Most foreign-made weapons used by these insurgents, are **U.S.** arms that were lost during the **Vietnam War** and later sold by **Vietnam**. Due to involvement with both terrorism and gray arms sales, **Vietnam** warrants special attention. **Vietnam** has the third largest ground **OOB** in the **Asia/Pacific** region with over one million personnel. It also has a moderate size air force and navy. There have been published reports that **Vietnam** recently used chemical and biological weapons while operating in **Laos** and **Cambodia**.

Vietnam has a culture significantly different from that of the **U.S.** It is a long, narrow country with a 1,400 mile coastline. There is a heavily populated valley in the north, coastal plains in the center, and the wide, often marshy river delta in the south. The remaining land consists of semi-arid plateaus and barren mountains, with stretches of tropical rain forest. The climate in the north is monsoonal, with a hot, humid wet season in summer and a warm, humid dry season in the winter. Southern **Vietnam** has a year-round tropical climate with varied heavy rainfall. The combination of mountains, jungle, and marshes preclude cross-country movement of vehicles in about three-fourths of **Vietnam**. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (Intervisibility) would normally be limited to less than 1,000 meters. **NGF** platforms can approach the coast to support operations ashore but these platforms could expect to be out-gunned by **Vietnamese** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to coastal areas and the northern border with **China**. Several airfields and one port can receive strategic lift. The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** would require between two to four days to reach **Vietnam**.

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EUROPE/MEDITERRANEAN

DENMARK

Located strategically at the mouth of the **Baltic Sea**, **Denmark** consists of the **Jutland Peninsula** projecting north from **Germany**, and about 406 islands, of which 100 are inhabited. The straits between these islands connect the **Baltic** and **North Seas**. **Greenland** and **Faroe Islands** belong to **Denmark**. There are close relations between the **U.S.** and **Denmark** and overall **U.S.** equity is moderate. About 225 **U.S.** firms do business in **Denmark** and over 4,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. **U.S.** bases in **Greenland** are of significant value to Western defense. The factors of drugs, terrorism, gray arms/technology transfer, and NBC are of little significance in **Denmark**. The **Danes** have a ground OOB of about 10,200 regulars and 6,800 conscripts. The air OOB includes 7,000 personnel while the naval OOB has about 5,000. Military equipment is obtained from the **U.S.** and other **European** countries. Training is accomplished at the unit level, but in recent years there has been more concentration on specialized schools. Regular officers attend a tri-service military college in **Copenhagen**.

The **Danes** are a homogenous Gothic-Germanic people that have inhabited **Denmark** since prehistoric times. **Danish** is the principal language and about 97 percent of the people are affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church. There is a moderate cultural difference between **Denmark** and the **U.S.** The climate is temperate with mild winters, cool summers, and strong prevailing westerly winds. **Denmark** has mainly flat or rolling terrain, most of which is in use for agricultural, industrial, or residential purposes. About one-fifth of the population lives in **Copenhagen**. Cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles is possible, but generally unfavorable throughout most of **Denmark**. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally restricted to between 1,000 to 2,000 meters. There are old 1:50,000 scale maps available for **Denmark** but coverage is likely to be outdated. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to accommodate strategic lift. Key installations include offshore oil facilities in the **North Sea**. The **Atlantic ARG** would require between four to six days to reach **Denmark**. Due to over 4,000 potential evacuees in **Denmark**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

GREECE

Greece is located in southeastern **Europe** on the southern tip of the **Balkan Peninsula**. It consists of a mainland and 1,400 islands. Disputes are ongoing between **Greece** and **Turkey** over oil rights in the **Aegean Sea** and the status of **Cyprus**. **U.S.** equity is high. The **U.S.** has defense installations in **Greece** which are used for strategic airlift, training, naval support, reconnaissance, storage of materials, and communications. Over 50,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. **Greece** is a key transit point for drugs going to **Europe** and the **U.S.** The anti-American-Greek terrorist group 17 November has attacked **U.S.** interests in the country as well as **Greek** Government facilities. **Greece** transships illicit arms and high technology systems moving from **Europe** to embargoed countries. Because of its involvement in drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/trafficking, **Greece** rates special attention by military planners. The armed forces consists of about 215,000 personnel, of which 171,000 serve in the army, 20,000 in the navy, and 24,000 in the air force. **Greek** military concepts, doctrine, and training follow closely that of the **U.S.**

The **Greek** language dates back 3,000 years and **Greek** Orthodoxy is the established religion. Muslims, concentrated in western **Thrace**, are the only recognized minority. **Greek** culture is considered to be moderately different from that of the **U.S.** **Greece** has a temperate climate with mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers. About 80 percent of the terrain is mountainous or hilly. Due to the rugged conditions, **Greece** is basically unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions do not limit NGF platforms from approaching the coast, but would be out-gunned by coastal defense weapons. A shortfall for operations in **Greece** is the absence of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields and ports are excellent. Key installations include offshore oil facilities in the **Aegean Sea**. The **Atlantic ARG** operating in the **Mediterranean** could be expected to reach **Greece** in less than two days. Due to over 50,000 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

ITALY

Italy's position on the main routes between **Europe**, **Africa**, and the Near and Far East gives it great political, economic, and strategic importance. The **U.S.** and **Italy** have cordial relations and overall **U.S.** equity in the country is high. The two countries conduct substantial bilateral trade and numerous **U.S.** firms have investments in **Italy**. Over 92,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. The **Italian Red Brigades** is one of the most lethal of the **European** terrorist groups. During the **Iran-Iraq War**, **Italian** firms were suspected of providing illegal weapons and explosives to **Iran**. Due to its association with terrorism and the gray/arms trade, **Italy** warrants the attention of military planners. **Italy** has a ground OOB consisting of about 50,000 regular troops and 215,000 conscripts. The air and naval OOBs are also of substantial size. Much of the military training is modeled after that of the **U.S.** **Italy** has shown a willingness to work closely with the **U.S.** and others on issues such as Middle East peacekeeping and combatting terrorism.

With the **Italian** language and Catholic religion, **Italy's** culture is not greatly different from that of the **U.S.** The climate is generally mild and **Mediterranean**, but there are wide variations between the north and south. **Italy** occupies a boot-shaped peninsula, extending southeast from the **Alps** into the **Mediterranean Sea**, with the islands of **Sicily** and **Sardinia** offshore. The terrain is primarily rugged and mountainous. About 75 percent of **Italy** is unsuitable for cross-country vehicular movement. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally less than 1,000 meters. While hydrographic conditions do not prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast, these platforms would be out-gunned by **Italian** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to the northeast, the southeast and the island of **Sicily**. Ports and airfields are quite satisfactory. Key installations include nuclear powered reactors and numerous industrial, communications, and transportation facilities. The **Atlantic ARG** which operates in the **Mediterranean** could reach **Italy** in less than two days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to over 92,000 potential evacuees.

NORWAY

Norway occupies a strategic position in northwestern **Europe**, close to **Soviet** bases on the **Kola Peninsula** and adjacent to the sea lanes of communication between **Europe** and the **U.S.** The **U.S.** and **Norway** enjoy friendly relations and overall **U.S.** equity in this country is high. The two countries are active trading partners and a number of **American** firms participate in **Norway's** petroleum sector. About 13,500 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country. The factors of drugs, terrorism, gray arms/technology transfer, and NBC are of little significance there. The **Norwegian** army is a highly motivated, infantry heavy mobilization force composed of about 19,000 troops. The air force and navy are technically sophisticated organizations manned by a core of professionals. **Norway** is a staunch supporter of NATO but does not allow the stocking of nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime or the stationing of foreign forces on its soil unless threatened with attack. However, in recent years military exercises including **U.S.** forces have been conducted in **Norway** and the Marine Corps maintains prepositioned equipment there.

The **Norwegian** language and Protestant religion predominate in the country and the **Norwegian** culture can be characterized as being moderately different from that of the **U.S.** The climate of **Norway** is cold and wet and is the most difficult of all the expeditionary environment countries. The winter weather tends to be less severe along the coast than it is inland. **Norway's** high plateaus and rugged mountains are broken by frequent valleys and numerous lakes. About 25 percent of the land is forested. Most of the terrain is unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters. While hydrographic conditions generally permit NGF ships to approach the coast, they are apt to be out-gunned by **Norwegian** coastal defense weapons. The country has complete coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps, but some of these maps may be outdated. Airfields and ports in **Norway** are highly satisfactory. Key installations include offshore oil facilities. The **Atlantic ARG** which normally operates in the **Mediterranean** would require in excess of six days to reach **Norway**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Norway** would be very difficult due to the over 13,000 potential evacuees.

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TURKEY

With a common border with the **Soviet Union**, **Iran**, and **Iraq**, and control of the straits leading from the **Black Sea** to the **Mediterranean**, **Turkey** occupies a position of strategic importance. Since 1947, the **U.S.** has loaned or granted **Turkey**, about \$4 billion in economic aid and more than \$9 billion in military assistance. Besides the 10,000 military personnel stationed at installations in **Turkey**, almost 5,000 **U.S.** citizens live there. **Turkey** provides an important route for **Asian** drug traffickers to move heroin and hashish to **U.S.** and **European** markets. Terrorist groups such as the **Kurdish Worker's Party** and **Armenian** separatists operate in **Turkey** and attack political and economic targets. Because of its involvement with drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, **Turkey** deserves special attention by military planners. With total personnel of more than 626,000, **Turkey's** armed forces are the second largest in **NATO**. Two **NATO** headquarters, **Land South East** and **Sixth Tactical Air Force** are located in **Izmir**. Major **U.S.** military organizations in **Turkey** are the **Joint U.S. Military Mission for Aid to Turkey** and the **U.S. Logistical Group**.

With the **Turkish** language and **Islamic** religion, **Turkey's** culture is significantly different from that of the **U.S.** The interior of the country has wide plateaus with high mountains surrounding them on all sides except the west. There are rolling plains in the west and fertile coastal plains in the southwest. About half of the **Turkish** people live in urban areas. Only parts of **Turkey**, in the inland areas, are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the rough terrain and ground cover. Hydrographic conditions permit **NGF** platforms to approach the coast within range of targets ashore, but would be out-gunned by coastal defense weapons. A shortfall for operations in **Turkey** is the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to accommodate strategic lift. The **Atlantic ARG** which normally operates in the **Mediterranean** would require less than two days to reach **Turkey**. **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** in **Turkey** would be very difficult due to the almost 5,000 potential evacuees and the 212 nautical miles distance from the coast to **Ankara**, the probable evacuation site.

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia geographically controls the land routes from **Central** and **Western Europe** to the **Aegean Sea** and **Turkish** straits. **U.S.** relations with **Yugoslavia** remain cordial. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Yugoslavia** is moderate. The **U.S.** ranks sixth among **Yugoslavia's** trading partners with a 4.7 percent share of total trade. Almost 4,000 **U.S.** citizens live there. **Yugoslavia** has a ground **OOB** consisting of 140,000 troops, of whom 95,000 are conscripts. The air **OOB** is composed of 37,000 personnel, **MiG-29** aircraft, and an inventory of modern surface-to-air missiles. The naval **OOB** numbers 13,000 personnel. **Yugoslav** citizens have some military liability and receive various amounts of training. Recruits must serve for a period of 15 months.

Yugoslavia's population has the greatest ethnic and religious diversity in all of **Eastern Europe**. Besides the principal **South Slavic** groups, there are an additional 17 minorities. The special interests and concerns of these various factors have caused some problems for the **Yugoslav** Government. There is a significant difference in culture between **Yugoslavia** and the **U.S.** Much of the interior of the country is composed of lowland hills and plains. The remaining terrain is mainly mountainous. The **Dinaric Alps** runs parallel to the **Adriatic** coast. The climate along the coast is milder than in the interior. Due to the broken terrain, **Yugoslavia** is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is normally limited to less than 1,000 meters. Hydrographic conditions allow **NGF** ships to approach the coast, but their 5-inch guns would be out-ranged by coastal defense weapons. There is complete coverage of the country by old 1:50,000 scale maps. Port facilities are satisfactory for strategic sealift but airfields cannot accommodate **C-5** aircraft. The **Atlantic ARG** which normally operates in the **Mediterranean** would require less than two days to reach **Yugoslavia**. **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Yugoslavia** would be very difficult due to over 4,000 potential evacuees and the 161 nautical miles distance from the coast to **Belgrade**, the probable evacuation site.

MIDDLE EAST/SOUTHWEST ASIA

BAHRAIN

Bahrain has strategic significance through its oil fields and important location in the **Persian Gulf**. It also provides a convenient port-of-call for ships of the U.S. Navy's **Middle East Force**. **Bahrain** by itself, constitutes a negligible threat to the U.S. It is only through its oil resources in conjunction with other **Middle East** oil producers that this country can have an impact on the Western world.

With a considerable cultural diversity with the U.S. and a dry/hot climate, this country would present obstacles for military operations. Only small portions of **Bahrain** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. While NGF ships can approach the coast to provide fair support for operations ashore, **Bahrain**, through its coastal defense weapons, could pose a substantial threat. Mapping of **Bahrain** is barely adequate through the use of old 1:50,000 scale maps. With many modern communications networks and key installations, detailed planning would be necessary for military operations in this country. Likewise, with over 300 potential evacuees in **Bahrain**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would require a strong effort.

EGYPT

Egypt is a strong U.S. ally in the **Middle East**. U.S.-**Egyptian** strategic cooperation, including joint military endeavors, have improved the capacity of both countries to respond to regional security threats. U.S. military support has helped **Egypt** update its defense inventory with modern equipment. **Egypt** is a large consumer of narcotics and a transit point for drugs intended for U.S. and **European** markets. **Egypt** has the largest air and naval capabilities in the region and the fourth largest ground OOB with about 320,000 troops. **Egypt** is alleged to possess chemical weapons and may have delivery systems for chemical warheads.

With a culture much different from the U.S., a dry/hot climate, and topography which is mainly desert, military operations in **Egypt** would present some difficulties. Large portions of the western and eastern desert plains are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. Although NGF ships can approach the **Mediterranean** and **Red Sea** coasts to provide fair support for operations ashore, the **Egyptian** coastal defense weapons could present a serious threat. Mapping of **Egypt** is limited, with 1:50,000 scale map coverage available only along the **Mediterranean** coast and south along the **Nile River** (including **Cairo**) to the town of **Al Minya**. **Egypt** is suspected of having facilities for storage and possible production of chemical weapons. Oil fields are mainly located on the **Sinai Peninsula** and offshore in the **Gulf of Suez**. The planning and execution of NEO by a MEU under normal conditions in **Egypt** would be highly difficult due to the presence of over 11,000 potential evacuees.

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IRAN

With a fundamentalist Moslem government and strong anti-U.S. sentiments, Iran is a major source of instability in the **Middle East**. Relations between the U.S. and Iran continue to be at a low point due to Iran's support for terrorism, including association with the hostage-takings in **Lebanon**. Iran is a significant producer of opium and a transit point for narcotics moving from **Pakistan** and **Afghanistan** to Western markets. Iran uses terrorism as a basic tactic against the U.S. and other Western influence, and also as a means to intimidate Arab nations in the **Persian Gulf**. This country is a major buyer of black market weapons and technology from **Europe** and other Third World countries. Iran has the second strongest ground OOB in the region (after **Iraq**) with about 305,000 experienced troops and a variety of weapons from many sources. It also has the third largest naval capability and fourth largest air OOB in the region. Iran reportedly used chemical weapons against **Iraq** and may have production facilities for biological weapons. It is suspected that Iran would like to develop nuclear weapons.

There is a distinct cultural difference between Iran and the U.S. which could significantly impact on military operations. Rugged terrain, generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles, and hot, humid summer conditions along the coasts would also pose problems for military planners. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the extensive mountain ranges and irregular terrain. Hydrographic conditions will allow NGF ships to within range of some coastal targets, but Iranian coastal defense weapons could out-gun these ships. Iran has limited mapping although 1:50,000 scale maps are available for coastal areas along the **Persian Gulf** and **Gulf of Oman**, the capital **Tehran**, the area around **Lake Urmia** in the northwest, and scattered locations elsewhere. Facilities for the production and/or storage of chemical and biological weapons are suspected at unknown locations in Iran. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in this country would pose some problems due to the distance from the coast to the probable evacuation site (**Tehran** at 348 nm).

IRAQ

Iraq is strong militarily and has designs on becoming the dominant power in the oil-rich **Persian Gulf** area. It has used brutal, repressive measures against its own Kurdish minority. Overall U.S. equity in Iraq is low. Iraq has sponsored terrorist acts against **European** and **African** countries and presently provides safe haven for the notorious terrorist Abu Nidal. It is a major buyer of gray arms and illicit technology from all available sources. Iraq has the largest ground OOB in the **Middle East** with over 475,000 experienced regular troops and advanced Soviet-provided tanks and SSMs. It also has among the strongest air and naval capabilities in the region, backed by Soviet equipment and on-site advisors. Iraq is known to maintain quantities of chemical and biological weapons and is reported to have used these weapons against Iran and the Kurds. It is also suspected that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons production capability.

With a hot, dry climate and strong anti-Western sentiment, military operations in Iraq would present a serious challenge. While the steep and desert region bordering **Saudi Arabia** and **Syria** is generally well suited for tracked movement, the northeast highlands bordering **Turkey** are not. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is restricted to 2,000 meters or less mainly in the mountainous northeast and marshy southeast. The basic land-locked geography of Iraq, plus the poor hydrography at **Al Faw** and the considerable coastal defense threat in that area would all serve to limit the effectiveness of NGF support. The restricted map coverage would also adversely affect military operations in this country. Presently, 1:50,000 scale maps are available only for northeastern Iraq and the area east of **Basra** to the **Persian Gulf**. Accessibility to Iraq would be limited by the availability of only one airfield (**Baghdad**) which can handle C-141B aircraft (not C-5s) and one major port at **Basra** with marginal capabilities. The chemical/biological weapons complexes, oil fields, refineries, and communications networks in Iraq should receive priority consideration by military planners. NEO conducted by a MEU in this country under normal circumstances would present difficulty due to the distance (302 nm) from the gulf to the probable evacuation site (**Baghdad**) and the large number of potential evacuees (500).

KUWAIT

Kuwait has strategic significance through its oil resources, important location on the **Arabian Peninsula**, and its relationships with other **Arab** countries in the region. In recent years, strong ties have formed between the **U.S.** and **Kuwait** in the areas of trade and **Kuwaiti** defense. Within the **Middle East**, **Kuwait** has a relatively small armed force and is dependent on the **U.S.** and other friendly nations for protection against attack.

With a culture much different from the **U.S.** and intensely hot, dry summers, military operations in **Kuwait** would pose some problems. The terrain consists mainly of desert plains and trafficability of tracked vehicles is possible in about one-half of the country. Hydrographic conditions will allow NGF ships to approach the coast within range of most targets ashore but **Kuwaiti** coastal defense weapons could out-gun these ships. The most serious setback to military operations in **Kuwait** could be the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. The numerous oil fields and refineries, as well as many vital communications networks, should require careful consideration by military planners. Also, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would be very difficult due to the large number (2,500) of potential evacuees in **Kuwait**.

LEBANON

Lebanon is located on the eastern shore of the **Mediterranean Sea**, bounded by **Syria** and **Israel**, and forms a strategic bridge between the **West** and the **Middle East**. In recent years it has become a battleground for the diverse and hostile forces in the region. Combat ranges from sniping and unorganized street fighting to sophisticated electronic warfare and the use of surface-to-surface missiles. **Syria** has positioned sizable forces in **Lebanon** and engaged various Lebanese factions. **Lebanon** is a major narcotics producing and trafficking country, supplying heroin to **Europe** and the **U.S.**, as well as hashish to the **Middle East** and **Western** countries. The **Iranian** backed Hizballah group operates primarily in **Lebanon** and employs terrorism as a tactic to support its political and religious goals. **Lebanon** has a small armed force which is presently rather ineffective due to the political instability and civil war.

The considerable cultural difference between the **U.S.** and **Lebanon** as well as the presence of various potentially hostile forces could pose a variety of problems for **U.S.** military operations in the country. Only portions of **Lebanon**, mainly on the interior plain, are suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. While NGF ships can approach the coast to provide good support for combat operations along the coast, **Lebanon**, through its organic coastal defense weapons could present effective opposition. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is available for most of **Lebanon** except for areas along the southern borders with **Israel** and **Syria**. The continuing civil war has inflicted massive damage on **Lebanon's** key installations and significant investment would be necessary for their reconstruction. With over 1900 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Lebanon** would require precise planning and execution.

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LIBYA

Since 1969, when Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi came to power through a coup, U.S. - **Libyan** relations have been increasingly strained because of **Libya's** foreign policies supporting international terrorism and subversion against moderate **Arab** and **African** Governments. Due to its involvement in numerous incidents of terrorism, the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions against **Libya**, ordered all **Americans** to leave the country, and frozen **Libyan** assets in the U.S. In recent years, Qaddafi has shown no sign of giving up terrorism, and **Libyan** agents continue to track and kill opponents of the regime. Besides exporting terrorism, **Libya** is a major buyer of illegal weapons and technology from all available sources. **Libya** has the fifth largest ground, air, and naval OOBs in the region. Numerous regular force personnel receive training outside the country, mainly in the **Soviet Union**. **Libya** is believed to maintain stores of chemical weapons, and is suspected to have an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

Cultural differences and the hot/dry desert conditions of **Libya** could present obstacles to U.S. military operations in this country. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally restricted to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters due to terrain contours and dusty windstorms. Although NGF ships can approach the coast to provide fair support for operations ashore, **Libyan** coastal defense weapons could pose a serious threat. Mapping of **Libya** is limited, with 1:50,000 scale map coverage available along the **Mediterranean** coast, but not inland. Marginal and constrained airfields and ports provide limited accessibility to this country. **Libya** has numerous key installations including oil fields and refineries.

NORTH YEMEN

The U.S. has helped to expand the security assistance program in **North Yemen** as well as providing this country with significant economic support. **North Yemen** has modest armed forces which would have difficulty in dealing with an attack from outside its borders. Almost all military training beyond the basic level is done outside the country mainly in **Egypt** and **Saudi Arabia**. Some foreign advisors are present in **North Yemen** to perform technical tasks and operate advanced equipment.

With a much different culture from the U.S., a hot/dry climate, and mostly mountainous terrain, military operations in **North Yemen** would present some difficulties. While some parts of the coastal plains would allow trafficability, the country in general is unsuited for off-road movement of tracked vehicles. Due to the dissected terrain, the average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Because of shallow water off much of the **Red Sea** coast, NGF platforms would have a poor capability to approach the coast and provide support for operations ashore. A most serious setback to military operations in **North Yemen** could be the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. While **North Yemen** is accessible by air with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft it has no major ports to accommodate strategic sealift. Oil fields are located in the eastern part of the country near the town of **Marib**. Communications facilities are underdeveloped but gradually improving. In a crisis situation, it is estimated that the Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach **North Yemen** in two to four days. Under normal conditions, NEO conducted by a MEU would be quite difficult due to over 2000 potential evacuees.

OMAN

While the Dhafari insurgents in southern **Oman** were all but wiped out in 1975, remnants of the group remain in the field and there is a possibility that this conflict may resume. There are also a number of border disputes ongoing between **Oman** and the **United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)**. Oil is the major source of income for **Oman**, and this country has strong political ties to the **U.S.** In northern **Oman**, the tip of the **Ruus-al-Jebal** peninsula controls access to the **Strait of Hormuz** and the **Persian Gulf**. Under a **U.S.-Omani** agreement, the **U.S.** is provided access to **Omani** military facilities. These facilities are being upgraded for mutual use. **Oman** has a small armed force, which would have difficulty in defeating an attack from outside its borders.

A much different culture as well as a hot, dry climate and diverse terrain conditions would cause some difficulties for **U.S.** military operations in **Oman**. About two-thirds of **Oman** is unsuitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the extensive volcanic mountain network and dissected geography. Due to adverse terrain and climatic conditions, the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. While NGF ships can approach the coast to provide adequate support for operations ashore, the standard naval gun (5 inch, 54 caliber) would be out-gunned by **Omani** coastal defense weapons. Only northern **Oman**, including **Muscat**, has coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps. A major drawback to operations in **Oman** is that this country has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift. Key military installations in **Oman** are being improved by the **U.S. Army Corps of Engineers**. With over 800 potential evacuees in **Oman**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would require a significant effort.

QATAR

Qatar has importance through its oil production and refining capabilities and its strategic location along the western coast of the **Persian Gulf** adjacent to **Saudi Arabia** and the **United Arab Emirates**. It has a modest defense establishment which would have difficulty in dealing with an attack from outside its borders.

A much different culture from the **U.S.** and a dry, hot climate with temperatures reaching 120 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer would make military operations in **Qatar** quite difficult. While cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is better than many other **Middle East** countries, only about 40 percent of the country is trafficable. Mapping by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to central **Qatar** including the area around the capital of **Doha** on the east coast and the city of **Dukhan** on the west coast. Accessibility to **Qatar** by air is generally poor with only one airfield available at the city of **Doha**. This airfield can accommodate C-141B aircraft but not C-5s. The two ports in **Qatar** are also somewhat constrained by small harbors and limited channel/anchorage depths, and would have some difficulty in handling cargo ships with deep drafts. Numerous key installations, including oil fields and communications networks, would need to be considered during military operations. With over 500 potential evacuees, NEO under normal circumstances conducted by a MEU equipped with the aging CH-46 helicopter would require a significant effort.

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SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia is of major importance due to its oil reserves, strategic location on the **Arabian Peninsula** bordering **Kuwait**, **Iraq**, and **Jordan**, and because over 20,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. **Saudi Arabia** is the largest trading partner of the **U.S.** in the **Middle East** and continued availability of oil from the country is important to the **U.S.** economy. In recent years, the **U.S.** has provided significant military support to **Saudi Arabia** to help strengthen its defenses from outside attack. As compared with other countries within the region, **Saudi Arabia** has moderate size armed forces equipped with many modern **U.S.**-supplied weapon systems. Military training is patterned after the **U.S.** armed forces.

With a culture quite different from the **U.S.**, a dry/hot summer climate, and topography which is mainly desert, ground combat operations in **Saudi Arabia** would present some difficulties. The northern part of the country is generally suited for cross-country movement of vehicles while the western highlands are basically unsuited due to the rugged terrain. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is mainly limited to less than 1,000 meters. Although NGF ships can approach the **Red Sea** and **Persian Gulf** coasts to provide fair support, the **Saudi Arabian** coastal defense weapons could present a serious threat. There is limited mapping throughout the country with sporadic 1:50,000 scale map coverage along the **Persian Gulf**, the capital of **Riyadh**, and the area around **Jeddah** on the **Red Sea**. **Saudi Arabia** has many key installations, including oil fields, pipelines, refineries, and modern communication and transportation facilities which should be considered when planning military operations. Likewise, the planning and execution of NEO by a MEU under normal conditions would be exceedingly complex due to the presence of many **U.S.** citizens who might require evacuation.

SOUTH YEMEN

The **U.S.** has no formal diplomatic relationship with **South Yemen** because of the antagonism with which this Arab country views the **U.S.** The Government is modeled after the communist regimes of the **Soviet Union** and **Eastern Europe**. **Aden**, the principal city and capital, has served as a major training base for terrorists. **South Yemen** has actively provided weapons, explosives, and safe haven to terrorist groups. It has also reportedly been a transit point for gray arms shipments to other **Middle East** countries. **South Yemen** has moderate size armed forces with much of its equipment being furnished by communist countries. It intends to increase the size of its army to about 40,000 personnel. The **U.S.S.R.**, **East Germany**, **Cuba**, and **North Korea** have sent training missions to **South Yemen**.

Cultural differences, a hot, dry climate, and diverse terrain conditions would pose difficulties to **U.S.** military operations in **South Yemen**. With a mountainous interior and dissected terrain, cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be generally limited to small flat areas along the coastal plain. The geographic conditions also cause the average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) to be limited to less than 1,000 meters. Although NGF ships can approach the coast along the **Gulf of Aden** to provide adequate support for operations ashore, significant opposition could be expected from **South Yemen** coastal defense weapons. Mapping of this country is very limited with 1:50,000 scale maps available only for the city of **Aden**. Airlift accessibility is also limited to one airfield at **Aden** which cannot handle C-5 aircraft. Two moderate size ports are available at **Aden** and **Al Mukalla** to accommodate strategic sealift. In a crisis situation, it is estimated that the **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **South Yemen** in two to four days.

SYRIA

Acute political and social instability and expansionist intentions toward **Lebanon**, **Jordan**, and **Israel** characterize the position of **Syria** in the **Middle East**. Overall U.S. equity in **Syria** is low due mainly to **Syria's** adamant rejection of attempts to mediate peace in the area, its support for international terrorism, and close military ties with the **Soviet Union**. **Syria** is a transit point for illegal narcotics, as well as a heroin refining center. Its military forces allegedly profit from drug production and trafficking in **Lebanon's Bekaa Valley**. **Syria** is known to sponsor terrorism in the **Middle East** and **Western Europe**. **Syria** is also involved in acquiring illicit weapons and technology for a major arms buildup against **Israel**. **Syria** should receive special attention by military planners because of its association with all three threat categories of narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer. It has one of the largest armed forces in the **Middle East** and depends heavily on **Soviet** military equipment and technical assistance. **Syria** is reported to have a significant chemical weapons production capability to include the arming of **Soviet-supplied SS-21 SSMs** with chemical warheads.

A large cultural difference exists between **Syria** and the **U.S.** The rugged mountains and broken terrain in the west would present obstacles for military operations in **Syria**. Only portions of **Syria**, mainly on the eastern plain, are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters in large parts of the country due to the rough terrain and ground cover. While **NGF** ships can approach the coast to provide good support for operations ashore, **Syrian** coastal defense weapons would have them seriously out-gunned. Mapping by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to western **Syria** including the coastal area bordering the **Mediterranean**. **Syria** has one airfield that can accommodate **C-5** aircraft and two moderate size ports with depths exceeding 40 feet. Key installations include oil fields, refineries, and pipelines, as well as suspected factories for the production of chemical weapons. Due to over 1,000 potential evacuees in **Syria**, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would present numerous difficulties.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

For some years, the **U.S.** has enjoyed a friendly, informal and mutually advantageous relationship with the **United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)**. This country has been an important source of petroleum for the **U.S.**, **Western Europe**, and **Japan**. The **U.A.E.** is also a significant importer of goods from the **U.S.** It has moderate sized armed forces compared to other countries in the region and is equipped with fairly modern systems. The **U.S.**, **France**, and the **U.K.** are the main suppliers of military equipment to the **U.A.E.** Expatriates from **Oman**, **Pakistan**, and **Jordan**, are heavily represented in the **U.A.E.** armed forces along with every other **Arab** country and **India**. The **U.A.E.** however, seeks to place its own citizens in leadership positions.

With an extreme cultural difference, a hot/dry climate, and primarily desert terrain, there would be some difficulties to overcome during **U.S.** military operations in this country. A major shortfall would be the limited mapping available. Only the northeastern part of the **U.A.E.** from the **Strait of Hormuz** to **Dubai**, and the area around **Abu Dhabi** have coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps. The country has several major airfields and ports to enable access by strategic airlift and sealift. There are a number of modern key installations in place throughout the country and many more new infrastructure projects are planned. **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (5,000).

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

COLOMBIA

Colombia is the world's third largest producer of coca and the center of South American cocaine trafficking. It is involved in drug production and processing, and the distribution of precursor chemicals. Narco-terrorism is also a serious threat. Terrorist organizations operating in Colombia include the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and at least three others. Colombia has medium sized ground, air, and naval Order of Battle (OOB) capabilities as compared to other expeditionary environment countries.

A wet/hot climate, mountainous terrain, and high elevation make Colombia one of the most difficult countries in South America in which to conduct operations. This country is generally unsuited for cross-country movement by tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. There is only partial coverage of this country by 1:50,000 scale maps. This coverage exists for locations such as Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Punta Chirambira and the northern coastal area. The 1:50,000 scale maps are not available for the large riverine networks along Colombia's borders with Venezuela to the northeast and Peru to the south. From the standpoint of key installations, Colombia has numerous industrial sites plus oil fields and pipelines for crude oil, refined products, and natural gas. The typical response time for a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) on the U.S. east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and move to Colombia is in excess of six days. In terms of the potential number of evacuees (over 18,000) and the distance they must be transported (217 nautical miles from off the coast to Bogota), the conduct of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) by a MEU would be very difficult. Colombia is accessible by air with three C-5 capable airfields (two are daylight only) and has three moderate size ports with Santa Marta having the best capabilities.

COSTA RICA

Costa Rica is a major trading partner with the U.S. and shares an interest in promoting democracy in Central America. This country is increasingly important as a transit point for narcotics, with estimates that 6 to 12 metric tons of cocaine are being transported through its territory yearly. Libyan terrorists are suspected of attacking U.S. citizens in Costa Rica. The armed forces of Costa Rica are practically negligible and this country would be hard pressed to defend itself from outside invasion.

With a hot, humid climate, dissected terrain, and thick ground cover, U.S. military operations in Costa Rica would prove difficult. A rugged, central massif runs the length of the country separating coastal plains. Trafficability by tracked vehicles would be severely limited and cross-country movement would be feasible only for foot troops. Due to the rough topography and jungle conditions, the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the area around San Jose, the northern border with Nicaragua, the eastern coast on the Caribbean, and the southern border with Panama. One airfield is available at San Jose to accommodate C-5 aircraft. Costa Rica has three small ports, all having limited accessibility to strategic sealift. The estimated response time for a MEU on the U.S. east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to Costa Rica is in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Costa Rica would be quite difficult due to the sizeable number (20,000) of potential evacuees.

CUBA

The primary U.S. equity in Cuba is the naval base at **Guantanamo Bay**. U.S. relations with Cuba have suffered in recent years due to its support for violent political change and its plans for expanding revolution in the Caribbean basin. Cuba is located along some of the primary drug routes from **South America** to the U.S. and has acted as a transit point for narcotics and provided support to traffickers. For nearly 30 years Cuban President Fidel Castro has been instrumental in sponsoring terrorism within **Latin America** and elsewhere. Cuba maintains close ties with the M-19 insurgent group in **Colombia** and has helped them acquire arms, training, and supplies. Because of its involvement in drug trafficking, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, Cuba deserves special attention by military planners. This country also has the most experienced and powerful armed forces in **Latin America**. Most of its military equipment is obtained from the **Soviet Union**. Cuba reportedly has stocks of chemical weapons and allegedly used these weapons during the recent conflict in **Angola**.

With a semitropical climate and predominately flat or gently rolling terrain, Cuba would not pose as many problems to U.S. military operations as many other **Latin American** countries. The country is generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. While U.S. NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide adequate support for operations ashore, they are likely to be out-gunned by Cuban coastal defense weapons. The 1:50,000 scale maps which are available for Cuba may be somewhat outdated. The primary Cuban airfield outside of the U.S. facility at **Guantanamo Bay** is located at **Havana**. There are three major ports other than **Guantanamo Bay** but they have limited capability to handle strategic sealift. The estimated time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to deploy to Cuba is between two and six days.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Dominican Republic is geographically the largest and most populous democratic country in the Caribbean. It associates closely with the U.S. and other states of the inter-American system. U.S. firms account for nearly all foreign private investment in the Dominican Republic and bilateral trade is important to both countries. Because of numerous small airfields and ports, the Dominican Republic has become a favored staging area and refueling stop for narcotics traffickers from **South America** smuggling cocaine into the U.S. Although the armed forces are relatively modest, they are well trained and equipped to fight internal guerrilla movements.

A maritime tropical climate and mountainous terrain with dense ground cover would pose some problems for U.S. military operations in this country. A mountain range with some high elevations crosses the middle of the country. The rough terrain makes conditions generally unsuitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. Likewise, the broken terrain, dense forests, and frequent heavy rainfall causes the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to be less than 1,000 meters. The 1:50,000 scale maps which are available for the Dominican Republic may be somewhat outdated. While several C-5 capable airfields are available in this country, the four major ports have restricted capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift. The estimated time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to the Dominican Republic is in excess of six days. With an approximate number of evacuees that could reach 69,000, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in this country would require an extraordinary effort.

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EL SALVADOR

In **El Salvador**, recent conflict has caused Government instability and extreme hardship for the population. Right-wing death squads financed by wealthy exiles commit assassinations and acts of terrorism. Left-wing guerrillas, supported by **Cuba** and the **Nicaraguan Sandinistas**, conduct raids and disruption; while U.S.-backed Government forces battle both sides. Land reform continues to be the central issue of dispute. U.S.-**Salvadoran** relations have been cordial and close. The U.S. provides assistance to the **Salvadoran** Government in its efforts to build democratic institutions and promote stability. **El Salvador** is reported to be a transit point for cocaine enroute to the U.S. from **South America**. The terrorist group FMLN operates in this country, primarily in **San Salvador**, and is sponsored and supported by **Cuba**, the **Nicaraguan Sandinistas**, the **Soviet Union**, and **Vietnam**. In the **Western Hemisphere**, **El Salvador** constitutes a serious problem due to its internal turmoil and its involvement in terrorism and narcotics. The country has moderate sized armed forces which, through support from the U.S., has improved its capabilities against the insurgents.

With a hot, humid climate and mountainous terrain with dense ground cover, U.S. military operations in **El Salvador** would present some difficulties. Due to steep hills and mountains, cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be impractical in most of the country. The dissected land and thick vegetation would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. There are parts of the northern border with **Honduras** which lack coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps. A major shortfall in **El Salvador** is that it has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift. The estimated response time for a MEU on the U.S. east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and move to **El Salvador** is in excess of six days.

GRENADA

The island of **Grenada** is strategically located adjacent to sea lanes off the coast of **South America**. This country can be an influence in the region without the risks and costs of continental involvement. In October 1983 a joint U.S.-**Caribbean** force landed in **Grenada** after a breakdown in civil order to evacuate U.S. citizens and help restore the peace. A U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) mission assists the **Grenadian** Government in its reconstruction and development efforts. The security in **Grenada** is maintained by the Royal **Grenada** Police Force which includes an 80-man paramilitary unit and a 30-man Coast Guard. The U.S. Army and Coast Guard provide periodic training for these forces.

Grenada is a volcanic island with a central mountainous rain forest and tropical climate. While cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is generally feasible on the cultivated coastal plains, it would not be possible in the heavily forested ridges of the interior. The broken terrain, thick ground cover, and frequent heavy rainfall would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available for **Grenada**. The **Point Salines** International Airport can handle C-5 aircraft and the port at **St. George** can readily accommodate strategic sealift. Major infrastructure improvement involve the upgrading of road, electricity, and communications systems. The estimated time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to **Grenada** is in excess of six days. Due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,020), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Grenada** would be difficult.

GUATEMALA

In **Guatemala**, there are continuing domestic, economic, and social problems as well as human rights violations. The **Guatemalan** Government conducts ongoing counterinsurgency operations against communist guerrillas. Relations between the **U.S.** and **Guatemala** have been good and the **U.S.** has helped this country address many of its problems. The **U.S.** exports oil from **Guatemala** and strives to maintain a mutually beneficial trade relationship. **Guatemala** produces a relatively small amount of opium and marijuana and acts as a transit point for cocaine moving to the **U.S.** and precursor chemicals being shipped to **South America**. The URNG is a terrorist group sponsored by **Cuba** which operates in **Guatemala** to promote disorder and instability. Within the region, close attention should be paid to **Guatemala** by military planners due to its involvement in both drug trafficking and terrorism. This country has a moderate sized army, but a small air force and navy. Some military personnel receive training in the **U.S.** and other countries in the region.

Most of the country is mountainous with a fairly narrow coastal plain on the **Pacific** side and fertile river valleys bordering the **Caribbean**. The climate is temperate in the highlands and semitropical on the coasts. Due to the mountainous terrain, **Guatemala** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The geography, together with frequent heavy rainfall, normally limits the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is available for most of **Guatemala** except for the northern extension called the Department of Peten. While more than one airfield is available to handle C-5 aircraft, only one port, with limited capability, can accommodate strategic sealift. Key installations include oil fields in the **Rubelsanto** area. The estimated time for an east coast MEU to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to **Guatemala** is in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Guatemala** would be very difficult due to the 6,500 potential evacuees.

HAITI

Haiti is one of the most underdeveloped and repressed states in the **Western Hemisphere**. Government instability and human rights violations have prevailed through numerous regimes. The **U.S.** has sought to foster constructive and cooperative relations with **Haiti** which occupies an important location on the western third of the island of **Hispaniola** in the **Caribbean Sea**. While **U.S.** equity in **Haiti** is not high, about 6,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in the country and a bilateral trade relationship is maintained. **Haiti** is being used increasingly as a transshipment center for cocaine moving to the **U.S.** from **South America**. It has a small, poorly trained and equipped armed force. Military officers are frequently involved in corruption and attempts to overthrow the government.

Haiti consists of rough, mountainous terrain and has a generally semiarid climate. Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would not be possible in most of the country due to the broken terrain, swamps, and marshes. The geography and significant ground cover also limits the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage of this country by older 1:50,000 scale maps is likely to be outdated. **Port-au-Prince** International Airport is able to accommodate C-5 aircraft but the single major port, also at **Port-au-Prince**, has restricted capability to receive strategic sealift. The estimated response time for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and move to **Haiti** is in excess of six days. Due to the potential requirement to evacuate about 6,000 persons from **Haiti**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

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HONDURAS

Honduras feels threatened by the conflict in **El Salvador** and by potential further aggression and hostility of the **Nicaraguan** Sandinistas. It is the least developed country in **Central America** and faces serious economic and social problems. The **U.S.** and **Honduras** maintain close, cordial relations and work together to promote stability in the region. With moderate overall equity in **Honduras**, the **U.S.** supplies about 35 percent of the country's imports and buys more than half its exports. About 3,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Honduras**. In recent years, **Honduras** has been a transit point for **Colombian** cocaine moving to the **U.S.** Several terrorist groups sponsored by **Cuba** and the **Nicaraguan** Sandinistas operate in **Honduras** to promote disorder and instability. **Honduras** has a small armed force which in the past has been poorly trained but recently seems to be improving. In response to the threat of insurgency, **Honduras** has concentrated on building a mobile deterrent force with a strong counterterrorism capability.

With a hot, humid climate, mountainous terrain, and heavy vegetation, **Honduras** would pose some difficulties for **U.S.** military operations. These conditions would preclude cross-country movement of tracked vehicles in most of the country. The steep hills and mountains, dense forests, and frequent abundant rainfall would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. While the hydrography would permit NGF platforms to approach the coast and provide adequate support for operations ashore, **Honduras** coastal defense weapons would present a significant threat. A serious shortfall for military operations would be the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage for eastern **Honduras** and the border area with **El Salvador**. Three airfields are available to handle C-5 aircraft but there is only one major port with limited capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift. By modern standards, communications and ground transportation facilities in **Honduras** are generally poor. The response time for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coast to embark on amphibious ships and proceed to **Honduras** is estimated to be in excess of six days. Due to the large number of potential evacuees (3,000), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Honduras** would be very difficult.

JAMAICA

Jamaica has a strategic location in the **Caribbean Sea** astride the main sea lanes for the **Panama Canal**. The **U.S.** maintains close, cooperative relations with this country and overall **U.S.** equities there are substantial. Over 120 **U.S.** firms have operations in **Jamaica** and almost 5,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. The island serves as a transit point for drug traffickers moving cocaine from **South America** to the **U.S.** **Jamaica** also produced about 405 metric tons of marijuana in 1988. The country has a very small army of 2,000 regular troops which is inadequate to contain any significant internal conflict or resist foreign invasion. The size of the air force and navy is negligible.

The climate of **Jamaica** is hot and humid most of the year and the terrain is mountainous. The island is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the steep slopes and unfordable streams in the interior highlands. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters because of the rough terrain, dense ground cover, and frequent heavy rainfall. The mapping of **Jamaica** by older 1:50,000 scale maps may be somewhat outdated. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to provide good accessibility by strategic lift. Although most main roads are paved, they are often narrow and winding through the mountains. The time required for an east coast MEU to embark on amphibious ships and move to **Jamaica** is estimated to be in excess of six days. Due to the large number of **U.S.** citizens in **Jamaica** (4,803), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

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MEXICO

Mexico has strategic importance due to its location on the southern border with the U.S. **Mexico** and the U.S. maintain close and cordial relations. Overall U.S. equity in **Mexico** is high with over 322,000 U.S. citizens residing there. Despite a program by the Government to stop drug trafficking, **Mexico** is a leading producer of heroin and marijuana. It also acts as a major transit point for cocaine entering the U.S. Terrorist groups such as the **Salvadoran FMLN** and the **Guatemalan URNG** are permitted to maintain offices in **Mexico City** where they can arrange and coordinate the acquisition of illicit weapons. Through its involvement in narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms transfers, **Mexico** constitutes a very serious concern to U.S. interests. With an army of 105,000 regular troops, **Mexico** has the third largest ground OOB in **Latin America**. The **Mexican** air force and navy are significantly smaller than the army. Training and morale in the armed forces are below average and most regulars are rural mestizos or Indians who have failed to find work elsewhere.

The climate of **Mexico** is mixed and ranges from tropical to desert. The geographic conditions vary considerably from low desert plains and jungle-like coastal regions to high plateaus and rugged mountains. **Mexico City**, with a population of about 20 million, is estimated to have the largest urban concentration in the world. About two-thirds of **Mexico** is generally suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally varies between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. A major shortfall for military operations in this country is the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields and ports in **Mexico** are satisfactory to accommodate most strategic lift requirements. Key installations include oil fields and nuclear power plants under construction. Depending on the destination in **Mexico** (north, central, or south) the time required for a MEU on the U.S. east or west coast to embark on ships and arrive could range from between two days to more than six. Because of the numerous U.S. citizens in **Mexico**, NEO by a joint U.S. force, including a MEU, would be a major endeavor.

NICARAGUA

Despite the election of Violeta Chamorro and the trend toward democracy in **Nicaragua**, the Sandinistas still remain a strong force in the Government. After ten years of civil war between the former Sandinista Government and the U.S. backed Contra rebels tensions remain high, particularly in rural areas. The Sandinistas continue to control the powerful Defense and Interior ministries within the new Government and military ties to **Cuba** and the U.S.S.R. reportedly remain strong. U.S. efforts are focused on assisting the new Government and promoting democratic ideals. The economy is in poor condition with an \$11 billion foreign debt. **Nicaragua** is a suspected transit point for cocaine moving from **South America** to the U.S., and Government officials have allegedly been engaged in drug trafficking. **Nicaragua** has provided training and safe haven to terrorist and guerrilla groups such as the FMLN operating in **El Salvador**. **Nicaragua** should be considered a serious concern due to its involvement in narcotics trafficking and terrorism. The **Nicaraguan** ground OOB is the largest in **Latin America**, but the Chamorro Government plans to reduce this force by one-third. All the services possess significant amounts of **Soviet** equipment.

Due to the dense forests, mountains, and swampy eastern coastal plain, cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be precluded in about three-fourths of **Nicaragua**. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be limited to less than 1,000 meters due to broken terrain, thick vegetation, and frequent heavy rainfall which obscures visibility. While hydrographic conditions permit NGF platforms to approach the coast and provide support for operations ashore, opposition could be expected from **Nicaraguan** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is absent in much of eastern **Nicaragua**. An airfield is available to handle C-5 aircraft but port facilities are constrained. The time necessary for a MEU from the U.S. east or west coasts to arrive in **Nicaragua** is estimated to be in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,800).

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PANAMA

Due to instability and disorder in **Panama** caused by **Panamanian** strongman General Manuel Noriega, **U.S.** forces were dispatched in late 1989 to take action against Noriega and protect **American** interests. **U.S.** forces quickly gained control and captured Noriega who presently awaits legal action in the **U.S.** **Panama** is important for its strategic location on the isthmus which connects **North** and **South America** and for having the **Panama Canal** which runs between the **Pacific** and **Atlantic Oceans**. The **U.S.** has high overall equity in **Panama** and seeks to promote its economic, political, and social development. Over 11,000 **U.S.** citizens live in **Panama**. In recent years, **Panama** has been a principal money-laundering center for the **South American** cocaine trade and transit site for cocaine and precursor chemical shipments. **Panama**, and particularly General Noriega, has been implicated in the furnishing of illegal arms to terrorist groups in **El Salvador** and **Colombia**. Due to its involvement in drug trafficking; terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, **Panama** constitutes a serious threat to **U.S.** interests. **Panama** has a small army of 6,000 volunteers and its air force and navy are practically negligible.

Panama's topography is mostly mountainous and hilly with dense tropical forests in the eastern regions. The climate is tropical with heavy rainfall, particularly on the **Atlantic** side. Because of the terrain conditions, cross-country movement by vehicle would be infeasible. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the broken terrain, heavy ground cover and frequent heavy rainfall. There is 1:50,000 scale map coverage for most of **Panama** except for portions along the **Atlantic** side. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to handle strategic lift. The time required for a MEU to arrive from the **U.S.** east or west coasts would be in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to over 11,000 potential evacuees.

PERU

In **Peru**, the main sources of conflict are the insurgent groups, drug production and trafficking, foreign debt, and extensive poverty. Although the **Peruvian** Government has indicated support for democracy, reduced drug trafficking, and control of terrorism, progress in these areas remains slow. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Peru** is high. The **U.S.** is **Peru's** largest trading partner with recent exchange totaling about \$1.6 billion. Over 7,000 **U.S.** citizens live in **Peru**. It is the world's largest producer of coca with up to 124,000 metric tons in 1988, and provides the main supply of coca paste for **Colombian** cocaine refineries. The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is the primary insurgent group in **Peru**. This organization is believed to be allied with drug traffickers and uses terrorist tactics to spread disorder and accomplish its goals. **Peru** constitutes a serious concern because of its involvement in narco-terrorism. **Peru** has moderate size armed forces and has embarked on an arms modernization program. It has acquired tanks, artillery, surface to air missile systems, and helicopters from the **Soviet Union**. These acquisitions have made **Peru** a formidable force in **South America**, causing **Chile** and **Ecuador** some concern.

Peru is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the rugged **Andes Mountains** and thick jungle forests in the eastern lowlands. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally limited to less than 1,000 meters due to terrain and weather conditions. While NGF platforms can provide adequate support for operations ashore, they would be out-gunned by **Peruvian** coastal defense weapons. Coverage of **Peru** by 1:50,000 scale maps is generally lacking except for spotted areas along the coast. Airfields and ports are available to accommodate entry by strategic lift. Key installations include oil fields on the northern coast and the northern **Salva** area. It is expected that it would take in excess of six days for a MEU on the **U.S.** east or west coasts to reach **Peru**. Due to over 7,000 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU would be very difficult.

SURINAM

Surinam occupies an important position on the South American mainland near Brazil and adjacent to oil tanker routes from South America. The U.S. maintains cordial relations with Surinam and is Surinam's largest trading partner. Due to human rights violations in 1982, when the Government executed several prominent opposition leaders without trial, the U.S. suspended economic and military assistance. The Government subsequently came under democratic leadership in 1988. Surinam has a very small army of 2,700 troops, no air force, and a negligible sized navy. Training is provided to the army by up to 200 Libyan military advisors. Brazil also provides some military assistance and training.

With significant cultural differences, a tropical climate with heavy rainfall, and dense jungle, U.S. military operations in Surinam would be quite difficult. The country is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement due to coastal swamps, thick forests, and wet conditions. The terrain and weather of Surinam would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. The hydrography adjacent to Surinam would prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast within range to provide support for operations ashore. A significant shortfall is the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage. Surinam lacks a major port to accommodate strategic sealift. However, one airfield is available which can handle C-5 aircraft. There are not many key installations in Surinam. Roads and bridges are few and austere and large parts of the country are accessible only by helicopter or foot. The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to Surinam would be in excess of six days.

VENEZUELA

Venezuela occupies a strategic position on major sea and air routes between North and South America. The U.S. and Venezuela share common objectives of strengthening democratic institutions and overall U.S. equity in this country is high. Venezuela is a major trading partner with the U.S. and exports significant amounts of oil. The U.S. has about \$2.1 billion in direct investment in Venezuela and over 20,000 U.S. citizens live there. Venezuela is a transit point for precursor chemicals and cocaine moving to and from South America. It is also a producer of as much as 2,000 metric tons of marijuana. The terrorist group Bondera Roja operates in Eastern Venezuela to attack Government installations and spread disorder. This group also coordinates with Colombian insurgents to pursue terrorist goals throughout the region. Because of its involvement in both drugs and terrorism, Venezuela deserves special attention by military planners. Venezuela has moderate size armed forces which has developed into one of the most modern and professional among Latin American countries.

The topography of Venezuela ranges from the Andes Mountains in the northwest, to plains extending south and east, to high plateaus, and rolling hills in the far south and east. The climate varies from tropical along the coast and inland river valleys, to temperate at the higher elevations. About 80 percent of the population lives in cities and towns along the coast and in the Andes. Over half of the country, mainly in the coastal and plain regions, is suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) generally ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 meters. While hydrographic conditions would permit NGF platforms to approach the coast and provide adequate support for operations ashore, they would be out-gunned by Venezuelan coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to portions of the Caribbean coastal area. Airfields and ports are quite satisfactory to handle strategic lift. Key installations include oil fields as well as numerous modern and expanding communications, transportation, and industrial facilities. The time required for a MEU to move to Venezuela from the U.S. east coast is estimated to be in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Venezuela would be very difficult due to over 20,000 potential evacuees.

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MIDDLE EAST SUMMARY

The expeditionary environment countries in the **Middle East** are those that are shaded in gray on the accompanying map. Some of these countries such as **Iraq** and **Saudi Arabia** are presently poised for conflict that could erupt at any time. U.S. forces, through the deployment of Operation Desert Shield, are getting a first hand orientation of **Saudi Arabia** and military planners are assessing the options for combat operations against **Iraq**. In this region, the emerging threat has presented "worst case" scenarios for which Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) must prepare. Besides the likely prospect of conventional warfare, there is the distinct possibility that **Iraq** may be contemplating the employment of chemical and biological weapons against the U.S. and its allies in the Gulf area. The nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) threat must be factored into service capabilities planning and programming. In addition to **Iraq**, countries such as **Iran** and **Libya** have used chemical weapons and in the future can be expected to use them again. In the **Middle East**, there are increasing numbers of countries that are acquiring stocks of bio-chemical weapons, and other countries working to develop nuclear capabilities. Perhaps most threatening, as NBC technology and weapons proliferate, the opportunities for non-governmental groups to steal working weapons and active bio-chemical agents increases dramatically. The next decade may well see a large metropolitan area held hostage to the threat of covertly emplaced and remotely detonated NBC weapons. All MAGTFs should be prepared to execute raids to seize and neutralize NBC weapons under development or in transit. The expeditionary environment of the **Middle East** is volatile and U.S. investments and U.S. citizens no longer enjoy the relative immunity from local violence which characterized earlier decades. The increasing lethality of both governments and non-conventional groups in this region places at risk strategic choke points and assets that in the past could only have been attacked by a major power. Terrorism is an unpredictable global threat and the **Middle East** contains the greatest number of terrorist training camps and other targetable facilities. To counter this threat, preemptive raids could become more common in the 1990s. MAGTFs can expect to engage trained and experienced infantry, modern armor, and relatively sophisticated artillery. There is likely to be aviation with some night or all-weather capability as well as smart or stand-off munitions. The **Middle East** countries with the most significant ground, air, and naval OOBs were found to be **Egypt**, **Iran**, **Iraq**, and **Syria**. Overall in the **Middle East**, **Libya** and **Syria** emerged as most representative of general conditions in the geographic region.

Most **Middle Eastern** countries, with the Arabic language and Islamic religion, have a culture significantly different from that of the U.S.. MAGTFs are not strong in **Arabic** language skills and would have difficulty communicating with the people in the region. For operations in the **Middle East**, MAGTFs should be prepared for dry/hot conditions as about 80 percent of the countries were in this climatic category. Over half the countries had predominately desert terrain while **Iran**, **North Yemen**, and **Oman** were mountainous. Of the 14 countries in the region that were assessed, two were found generally suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles, six were partially suited, and six were unsuited. Over 50 percent of the countries have poor intervisibility which restricts the exploitation of line of sight weapons designed for engagements at 2,000 to 3,000 meters. In the **Middle East**, five countries have hydrographic conditions which do not constrain NGF support. Half of the countries have fair hydrographic conditions where NGF platforms can approach the coast, but are restricted from providing optimum support for operations ashore. Only two countries (**Iraq** and **North Yemen**) have poor hydrographic conditions which would severely limit NGF support. However, when considering the firepower advantage, it was found that 10 of 14 countries in the region had coastal defense weapons that could out-range the standard 5 inch guns on most U.S. Navy platforms. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) is a critical problem area for Marine Corps forces in the **Middle East**. Only one country of those assessed (**Bahrain**) had full coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps. There were eleven countries such as **Iran**, **Iraq**, **Libya**, and **Saudi Arabia** which had only partial 1:50,000 map coverage while two countries (**Kuwait** and **North Yemen**) had none at all. MAGTFs operating in these latter countries would have to rely heavily on Multispectral Imagery (MSI). In the area of strategic mobility, ten countries had one or more airfield able to receive C-5 aircraft. **Iraq**, **North Yemen**, and **Qatar** were the most limited in airfields. **Lebanon**, **Saudi Arabia**, and the **United Arab Emirates** had the most capable ports, while **Iraq** and **Libya** were highly constrained and **North Yemen** and **Oman** had no ports that could accommodate strategic sealift. In addressing key installations, it was found that five countries (**Egypt**, **Iran**, **Iraq**, **Libya**, and **Syria**) probably have facilities for chemical or biological weapons and that at least ten countries have oil fields with associated pipeline and industrial complexes. When assessing sea-based MEU response times, it was estimated that most of the countries could be reached in less than two days. Only **North** and **South Yemen** were thought to require between two to four days. The study found that Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) would be extremely difficult to execute in over 70 percent of the countries due primarily to the large number of potential evacuees (mainly U.S. citizens). In **Iran** and **Iraq**, NEO conducted by a sea-based MEU would be hampered by the over 300 nautical mile distances to the capital cities (probable evacuation sites). Of the five regions considered by this study, the **Middle East** emerged as one of the highest threat environments. It combined a very high-level order of battle threat with a very serious NBC threat, and the most difficult of cultural environments, the combination of a hard language--Arabic in all its variations--and the most distant of religions, Islam.

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MIDDLE EAST/SOUTHWEST ASIA

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TAB</u>
BAHRAIN	1
EGYPT	2
IRAN	3
IRAQ	4
KUWAIT	5
LEBANON	6
LIBYA	7
NORTH YEMEN	8
OMAN	9
QATAR	10
SAUDI ARABIA	11
SOUTH YEMEN	12
SYRIA	13
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	14


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TAB ME

BAHRAINMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597**SUMMARY**

Bahrain has strategic significance through its oil fields and important location in the **Persian Gulf**. It also provides a convenient port-of-call for ships of the U.S. Navy's **Middle East Force**. **Bahrain** by itself, constitutes a negligible threat to the **U.S.** It is only through its oil resources in conjunction with other **Middle East** oil producers that this country can have an impact on the Western world.


With a considerable cultural diversity with the **U.S.** and a dry/hot climate, this country would present obstacles for military operations. Only small portions of **Bahrain** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. While NGF ships can approach the coast to provide fair support for operations ashore, **Bahrain**, through its coastal defense weapons, could pose a substantial threat. Mapping of **Bahrain** is barely adequate through the use of old 1:50,000 scale maps. With many modern communications networks and key installations, detailed planning would be necessary for military operations in this country. Likewise, with over 300 potential evacuees in **Bahrain**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would require a strong effort.

BAHRAIN - THREAT SUMMARY

Bahrain - 1

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BAHRAIN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Bahrain

In addition to being an important source of oil, **Bahrain** lies near **Saudi Arabia** midway between the **Strait of Hormuz** and the **Shatt al-Arab Waterway**. A government in **Bahrain** unfriendly to the Saudis would seriously threaten **Saudi Arabia** and the **United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)**. In addition, **Bahrain** provides an important port-of-call for ships of the U.S. Navy's **Middle East Force**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
31	-	-	-	31	325	1 2	3	Low

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Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Bahrain** constitutes a negligible threat to the **U.S.** in the areas of drug trafficking, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	M-60	Howitzers	2	4	86	B

Ground OOB includes 2,300 troops, all of whom are volunteers. The army is composed of one brigade for internal security and coastal patrol. Some foreign officers are on contract for training and assistance. Additional armor and artillery units are planned. The tank is the M-60A3, while artillery includes 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	None	Hand-Held SAMs	Negligible	4	44	B

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E/F; Close Air: None; Air Defense: Stinger and RBS SAMs. **Bahrain** will be included in the air defense coverage provided by the Saudi Peace Shield system.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	1	4	65	C

Ships: None; SSMs: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with Exocet SSMs, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 4 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 3 Small Gun Boats; 17 Speed Boats.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Persian, English)

Primary religion - Islam

There is a relatively large cultural difference between **Bahrain** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
57-99	70	4	Dry/Hot

Hot and humid from April through October; temperate from November through March.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Bahrain is composed of a group of islands in the **Persian Gulf** midway between the top of the **Qatar Peninsula** and mainland **Saudi Arabia**.

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Small portions of **Bahrain** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The topographical characteristics and features of **Bahrain**, **Kuwait**, **Qatar**, and the **U.A.E.** are quite similar. The four states are collectively divided into two distinct topographical regions, the Desert Plains and Eastern Highlands. The Desert Plains are generally poorly suited for tracked and wheeled vehicles due to extensive sand dunes, sebkhas (crusted surface over soft ground), and steep-sided wadis. One-third of this region, mainly in **Kuwait** and **Qatar**, offers more suitable conditions. Throughout the Eastern Highlands, tracked and vehicular movement is restricted to the floors of narrow, steep-sided wadis due to rugged terrain, nearly vertical valley sides, and seasonal flooding.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor

The terrain of this small country consists of low rolling hills with numerous rocky cliffs and wadis. From the shoreline the land surface rises gradually toward the center where it drops into a basin surrounded by steep cliffs. Line of sight distances are expected to be under 1,000 meters over most of this country.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for amphibious operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62420	11,270	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Substantial coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-198	24,000	U.S. NGF and Threat Equal

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage with older 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-5	1/0	1/C-5

Airfield	Type Aircraft	Comments
Bahrain International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	No restrictions

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Ports

- One port with a small harbor and depths over 40 feet.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Sitrah	Small	41-45/41-45		Yes

Key Installations

Numerous oil fields, pipelines, and communications facilities will necessitate in-depth planning for military operations. Oil fields are located throughout central **Bahrain**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Manama	- Excellent international/adequate domestic telecomm - 3 Radio stations - 2 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	225 km	None	1	1	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU could reach **Bahrain** in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the number of potential evacuees in **Bahrain**, NEO conducted by a MEU would require a strong effort.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
35	290	7 (Manama)	D

Note: In **Bahrain**, the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

EGYPTMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO CAIRO EG//DATT//
011-202-355-7371SUMMARY

Egypt is a strong **U.S.** ally in the **Middle East**. **U.S.-Egyptian** strategic cooperation, including joint military endeavors, have improved the capacity of both countries to respond to regional security threats. **U.S.** military support has helped **Egypt** update its defense inventory with modern equipment. **Egypt** is a large consumer of narcotics and a transit point for drugs intended for **U.S.** and **European** markets. **Egypt** has the largest air and naval capabilities in the region and the fourth largest ground OOB with about 320,000 troops. **Egypt** is alleged to possess chemical weapons and may have delivery systems for chemical warheads.

With a culture much different from the **U.S.**, a dry/hot climate, and topography which is mainly desert, military operations in **Egypt** would present some difficulties. Large portions of the western and eastern desert plains are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. Although NGF ships can approach the **Mediterranean** and **Red Sea** coasts to provide fair support for operations ashore, the **Egyptian** coastal defense weapons could present a serious threat. Mapping of **Egypt** is limited, with 1:50,000 scale map coverage available only along the **Mediterranean** coast and south along the **Nile River** (including **Cairo**) to the town of **Al Minya**. **Egypt** is suspected of having facilities for storage and possible production of chemical weapons. Oil fields are mainly located on the **Sinai Peninsula** and offshore in the **Gulf of Suez**. The planning and execution of NEO by a MEU under normal conditions in **Egypt** would be highly difficult due to the presence of over 11,000 potential evacuees.


EGYPT - THREAT SUMMARY



Egypt - 1

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EGYPT - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Egypt

- Egypt is a strong U.S. ally in the Middle East region.

Egypt is the most populous Arab country and a strong ally of the U.S. The Camp David accords of 1978 and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979 have opened the way for wider regional cooperation. The U.S. provides a large amount of economic and military aid to Egypt. U.S. equities in Egypt are the second highest in the region behind only Saudi Arabia.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
1,441	-	-	1,608	3,049	11,210	4 6	10	High

Drug Threat

- Important consumer of opium, heroin, and hashish.
- Transit point for drugs intended for **U.S.** and **European** markets.

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
			X	X

Egypt is an important consumer of opium, heroin, and hashish, supporting production in **Asia** and the **Middle East**, and is increasingly important as a transit point for drugs intended for **European** and **U.S.** markets. Heroin moves from both **Southwest** and **Southeast Asia** as well as **Lebanon** and **Syria** which are also principal suppliers of hashish. Some money laundering occurs but most profits flow abroad.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Egypt** constitutes a drug threat which is one of the three (drugs, terrorism, and gray arms technology transfer) consolidated threat categories.

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General Ground OOB

- **Egypt** has the fourth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-62	Bloc	320	22	432	F

Ground OOB includes about 320,000 troops of whom 140,000 are regulars and 180,000 are conscripts. **Egypt** has a large, competent, and experienced cadre of NCOs with an average of over 10 years' service and experience in at least one war. NCOs are also technically proficient and in many ways constitute the backbone of the **Egyptian** armed forces. Regular officers are trained in service academies and the tri-service Armed Forces Technical College. There is an extensive system of technical, branch, and staff schools for military officers. **Egyptian** officers have also had opportunities over the years to attend both **U.S.** and **Soviet** schools which have given them a broad perspective of modern warfare. Tanks: M60A3, PT-76, T-54, T-55; Artillery: D-30, M-31, M-37, M-46, M-109A2, M-1937, M-1938, Samlet SSM.

General Air OOB

- **Egypt** has the largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	105	22	277	F

Fighter Aircraft: F-4E, F-16A/B, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21, Mirage 5SDE, Mirage 2000; Close Air: Il-28, Su-7, Su-20, Tu-16; Air Defense: Amoun/Sparrow, Crotale, HAWK, SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 SAMs and AA guns. **Egypt** is developing an integrated air defense system to include ground radars such as the AN/TPS-59 (3-dimensional) and AN-TPS-63. To further enhance air defense coverage, **Egypt** is acquiring the E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platform. In addition to 25,000 air force personnel, there is a separate air defense force of 80,000.

General Naval OOB

- **Egypt** has the largest naval OOB in the region

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	20	22	172	F

Ships: 1 destroyer and 5 frigates with SSMs, SAMs, guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine mortars, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; SSMs: Harpoon, SS-N-2A, Otomat, CSS-N-1 Styx; Patrol Craft: 37 Fast Attack Craft-Missile, Gun, and Torpedo (Ex-Soviet and Ex-Chinese) with SSMs, SAMs (SA-N-5 Grail), guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars.

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Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Possession of chemical weapons date to 1952.
- Suspected of having chemical weapon delivery systems.

Egypt is suspected to be the first **Middle Eastern** possessor of chemical weapons. This country reportedly recommissioned chemical stocks abandoned by **British** forces when they departed **Egypt** in 1952. Delivery systems for chemical weapons are suspected.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (English)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Egypt** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
45-97	68-77	1-8	Dry/Hot

The hot summer extends from April to October and a relatively cool winter lasts from November to March. Hot, driving windstorms called "khamsin" occur in the spring. The sparse rainfall falls mainly along the coast.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

The **Western Desert** accounts for about two-thirds of the country's land area. The **Eastern Desert** and **Sinai Peninsula** comprise the remainder of the country.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Egypt** is generally well suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The vast majority of **Egypt**--the western and eastern desert plains--allows for tracked movement over extensive areas of hard, stony desert. Movement would be precluded, however, in portions of this region by dunes, numerous depressions, and in many places, by high escarpments. The rest of **Egypt**--the **Nile** delta and the highlands bordering the **Red Sea**--consists of terrain unsuited for tracked movement.

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Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum, with line of sight distances exceeding 2,000 meters.

The western desert accounts for two-thirds of the country's land area and is mainly a massive, flat sandy plateau. It is expected that line of sight distances in this region, and to a lesser degree in the eastern desert, would range above 2,000 meters. In the spring however, this visibility could be occasionally reduced due to hot, driving wind storms called khamsin.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
56105 (Port Said)	10,980	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons have significant capability.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
Samlet SSM	145,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available along the **Mediterranean Coast** and south along the **Nile River** (including **Cairo**) to the town of **Al Minya**.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with 6 airfields that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
19	6 C-5 10 C-141B 3 C-130	4/15	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Alexandria	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Aswan	C-141B, C-130	
Beni Suef	C-5, C-141B, C-130	The C-5 operations are limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only.
Cairo East International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Cairo West International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Dekhaylan	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
El Arish	C-141B, C-130	The C-141B is limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only.
El Gora	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Inshas	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Jeyanklis New	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Luxor	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Mersa Matruk	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
New Valley	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Port Said	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Ras El Nakab	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s. Daylight/VFR only.
Ras Gharib	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Ras Nasrani	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Wadi Adu Rish	C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.
Wadi Al Jandali	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.

Ports

- Eight major ports with **Sidi Kerir** providing the greatest accessibility.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Bur Said	Large	36-40/36-40	31-35	Yes
Al Iskandariyah	Large	36-40/36-40	36-40	Yes
Sidi Kerir	Small	Over 76/over-76	66-70	-
Jazirat Safajah	Small	31-35/over 76	26-30	-
As Suways	Medium	26-30/31-35	26-30	Yes
Adabiyah	Small	-/31-35	26-30	-
Zanimah	Small	Over 76/over-76	31-35	-
At Tur	Small	36-40/56-60	26-30	-

Key Installations

Egypt is suspected of having facilities for storage and possible production of chemical weapons. There are about 36 oil fields located on the **Sinai Peninsula** and offshore in the **Gulf of Suez**. Oil exploration continues, particularly in the western desert. Although communications networks are numerous, telephone service is erratic and delays are frequent. Rail service is available from **Cairo** to **Aswan** in the south and **Alexandria** in the north. The **Nile River** system plus other navigable canals are important for inland transport.

Egypt - 7

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7-2 ME 3

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U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Cairo	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Inadequate telecomm- 30 Radio stations- 47 TV stations- 2 Satellite stations	47,025 km	4,857 km	8	19	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Crude oil- Refined products- Natural gas	Yes	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Atlantic ARG with its embarked MEU, which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea**, could reach **Egypt** in less than two days. It is estimated that the Pacific ARG would require in excess of 6 days to reach the **Egyptian coast on the Red Sea**. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the very large number (over 11,000) of potential evacuees in **Egypt**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be highly difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
436	11,210	91 (Cairo)	F

Note: In **Egypt**, the following factors are of little significance:


Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

IRANMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG I MEF/G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA/J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC/DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC/DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597SUMMARY

With a fundamentalist Moslem government and strong anti-U.S. sentiments, **Iran** is a major source of instability in the **Middle East**. Relations between the **U.S.** and **Iran** continue to be at a low point due to **Iran's** support for terrorism, including association with the hostage-takings in **Lebanon**. **Iran** is a significant producer of opium and a transit point for narcotics moving from **Pakistan** and **Afghanistan** to Western markets. **Iran** uses terrorism as a basic tactic against the **U.S.** and other Western influence, and also as a means to intimidate **Arab** nations in the **Persian Gulf**. This country is a major buyer of black market weapons and technology from **Europe** and other Third World countries. **Iran** has the second strongest ground OOB in the region (after **Iraq**) with about 305,000 experienced troops and a variety of weapons from many sources. It also has the third largest naval capability and fourth largest air OOB in the region. **Iran** reportedly used chemical weapons against **Iraq** and may have production facilities for biological weapons. It is suspected that **Iran** would like to develop nuclear weapons.


There is a distinct cultural difference between **Iran** and the **U.S.** which could significantly impact on military operations. Rugged terrain, generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles, and hot, humid, summer conditions along the coasts would also pose problems for military planners. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the extensive mountain ranges and irregular terrain. Hydrographic conditions will allow NGF ships to within range of some coastal targets, but **Iranian** coastal defense weapons could out-gun these ships. **Iran** has limited mapping although 1:50,000 scale maps are available for coastal areas along the **Persian Gulf** and **Gulf of Oman**, the capital **Tehran**, the area around **Lake Urmia** in the northwest, and scattered locations elsewhere. Facilities for the production and/or storage of chemical and biological weapons are suspected at unknown locations in **Iran**. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in this country would pose some problems due to the distance from the coast to the probable evacuation site (**Tehran** at 348 nm).

IRAN - THREAT SUMMARY



Iran - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Unpredictable fundamentalist Moslem government.
- Long war with **Iraq** recently suspended.
- Islamic terrorists pose a threat to the **West**.

The fundamentalist Moslem government of **Iran** is confronted by resistance from a broad range of groups, including Kurds, rightists, monarchists, and leftists, some of whom are receiving aid from **Iran's** external enemy, **Iraq**. However, without unity among the insurgents, it is doubtful that they can seriously threaten the regime. **Iranian** terrorists continue to pose a threat to all they oppose. A worrisome possibility is that these terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon by theft or black-market purchase for use against their targets in the West.

U.S. Equities in Iran

Relations between the **U.S.** and **Iran** suffer due to **Iran's** financial, logistical, and material support for acts of terrorism, including association with the hostage-takings in **Lebanon**. In spite of this, the **U.S.** tries to maintain third-party contacts within **Iran** in an attempt to moderate actions of its unstable Government and maintain the flow of oil through the **Persian Gulf**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
32	54	1,752	-	1,838	100	3 1	4	Low

Drug Threat

- Produced 200-400 metric tons of opium in 1988.
- Transit point for drug flow.
- Does not cooperate in efforts against drugs.

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

Iran has not cooperated with efforts against drug production and trafficking. U.S. officials estimate the annual Iranian opium production at 200 to 400 metric tons. While this amount would not satisfy Iran's domestic addict population, opium and heroin are flowing across Iran from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and exported through Turkey and other routes to Western markets.

Terrorism

- Supports surrogate Hizballah movement in Lebanon.
- Uses terrorism as a basic tactic against the West.
- Uses terrorism to further Islamic fundamentalist revolution.
- Uses terrorism to intimidate Arab states in the Persian Gulf.

The regime in Iran views terrorism as a basic tactic to be used against U.S. and other Western influence and presence in the Middle East as well as a tool to foment Islamic fundamentalist revolution. Iran also uses terrorism to intimidate Arab states in the Persian Gulf.

Iran's principal surrogate, the Hizballah movement in Lebanon, has carried out car bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, and other acts of terrorism against Western interests since 1983. Like Libya, and previously Syria, Iran uses its government apparatus to recruit, train, finance, and deploy terrorists, especially in Lebanon.

Gray Arms/ Technology Transfer

Iran is a major buyer of illegal weapons and technology from Europe and other Third World nations. In the mid-1980s countries such as Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Scotland, and Sweden reportedly sent large quantities of explosives to Iran. In particular, the Swedish firm Novel Industries provided an estimated 400 tons of illegal munitions. In 1987, the British Government approved a 400-million dollar sale of radar equipment to Iran on the basis that it was a defensive system for use along the Soviet-Iranian border and not in the Gulf war.

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Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, Iran constitutes a very serious concern through involvement in all three threat categories (narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer).

General Ground OOB

- Second largest ground capability in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	305	22	467	F

Ground OOB includes 305,000 troops of whom about 55,000 are regulars and 250,000 are conscripts. Recruits receive 13 weeks of basic training at one of six induction centers and are then sent off to their units for more advanced training. The majority of officers and NCOs are regulars. Officers attend a military college and are trained in combat tactics at schools run by different branches of the army. Higher military education is also provided by the Army Staff College and the War Academy. Iranian troops gained much experience during the Iran-Iraq War. Tanks include: M-60A1, M-47, M-48, T-54, T-55, T-59, T-62, and T-72. Artillery includes: HY-2 SSM, M-46, M-107, M-109A1, and M-114.

General Air OOB

- Fourth largest air capability in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	NT/AW	Bloc	35	22	197	F

Fighter Aircraft: F-14, J-6; Close Air: F-4D/E, F-5E/F; Air Defense: CSA-1 (Chinese version of the SA-2), Improved HAWK, Rapier, RBS-70, and SA-7 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- Third largest naval capability in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	15	22	147	E

Ships: 3 Destroyers, 4 Frigates, and 4 Corvettes with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: Sea Killer II, Harpoon (stockpiles may have been depleted during war with Iraq); Patrol Craft: 11 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, and radars; 3 Fast Attack Craft-Gun (Ex-Chinese); 6 Large Patrol Craft; 13 Hovercraft.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Reportedly used chemical weapons against **Iraq** during the **Iran-Iraq** war.
- May have production facilities for biological weapons.
- Suspected to have an interest in nuclear weapons.

Iran reportedly used chemical weapons against **Iraq** during the **Gulf War**. Mortars and artillery were employed to deliver mustard gas and phosgene. This country is alleged to have production facilities for biological warfare agents. **Iran** has two nuclear power reactors under construction. Although possession of nuclear weapons is improbable, **Iran's** commitment to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been publicly questioned. However, this country is in the very early stage of nuclear development and lacks the industrial infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons program.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Persian (Kurdish, Arabic, Turkish, English, French)

Primary religion - Islam

There is a very large cultural difference between **Iran** and the **U.S.** which would impact significantly on military operations in the country.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
51-73	59	10	Dry/Warm

Iran's climate is characterized by wide variations in precipitation and temperature. Seasonal changes are abrupt with a short fall and spring. There is adequate rainfall in the northwest and along the **Caspian Sea** but almost none in the eastern deserts and in the south. Most of **Iran** experiences long, hot, dry summers. Along the **Persian Gulf** very high humidity accompanies the heat.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

About one-fifth the size of the **U.S.**, **Iran** is in the highlands of southwest **Asia**. About 70 percent of the country (mostly mountains and desert areas) is virtually uninhabited. The heaviest populated areas are along the **Caspian** coast, in **Tehran**, and in the provinces of **East** and **West Azerbaijan**.

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Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

The mountain rimland, comprising about one-half of Iran, is dominated by two major mountain chains, the Zagrose and the Elburz.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Iran is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be precluded at all times in about two-thirds of Iran due to rugged hills and mountains, and smaller areas of wet or flooded salt flats, marshes, and swamps. Tracked movement is generally good in only a few regions, such as the coastal plains near Bandar Abbas. Even in these areas, movement may be restricted by sebkhas.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with average line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances in about two-thirds of Iran would be limited to under 1,000 meters due to extensive mountain ranges and irregular terrain. Only in a few areas, such as the coastal plains near Bandar Abbas, could line of sight visibility exceed 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62394 (Bandar Abbas)	9,150	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
HY-2 SSM	40,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists for coastal areas along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, the area around Tehran, the vicinity of Lake Urmia in the northwest, and scattered locations elsewhere.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with eight airfields that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
17	8 C-5 8 C-141B 1 None	9/8	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Abadan	None	
Ahwaz	C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Badr	C-141B, C-130	
Bandar Abbas International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Bushehr	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles.
Dezful	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Esfahan Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Hamadan Military	C-5, C-141B, C-130	The C-5 and C-141B operations are limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only.
Jask	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Kerman	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Khark Island	C-141B, C-130	Runway is less than 6,000 feet. Daylight/VFR only.
Mehrabod International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Shiraz International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Tabriz	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Uromiyeh	C-141B, C-130	
Yazd	C-141B, C-130	
Zahedan International	C-141B, C-130	

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Ports

- There are seven major ports with **Jazireh Ye Khark** being most accessible.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Khorramshahr	Medium	31-35/26-30	26-30	Yes
Abadan	Medium	31-35/31-35	31-35	Yes
Bandar E Mah Shahr	Small	36-40/-	-	Yes
Bandar E Shahpur	Small	26-30/61-65	36-40	Yes
Jazireh Ye Khark	Small	Over 76/71-75	-	-
Bushehr	Small	26-30/-	31-35	Yes
Bandar Abbas	Small	26-30/31-35	46-50	Yes

Key Installations

Facilities for the production and/or storage of chemical and biological weapons are suspected at unknown locations in **Iran**. Two nuclear powered reactors are also under construction. Oil fields are located in west-central **Iran** in the vicinity of **Bandar Khomeini**, **Ahvaz**, **Dezful**, and **Masjed Soleyman**. Other key installations include oil refineries, pipelines, power stations, and communications networks.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Radio relay system centered in Tehran - 90 Radio stations - 250 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations (Note: some may be inoperable)	136,372 km	4,601 km	7	16	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** could reach **Iran** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

Due to the distance from the coast to the probable evacuation site (**Tehran** at 348 nm), **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** in **Iran** would present considerable difficulty.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	100	348 (Tehran)	D

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IRAQ

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:
Telephone:

USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265

DIA DB Desk Code: -
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

USDAO BAGHDAD IZ//DATT//
719-6138




SUMMARY

Iraq is strong militarily and has designs on becoming the dominant power in the oil-rich **Persian Gulf** area. It has used brutal, repressive measures against its own Kurdish minority. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Iraq** is low. **Iraq** has sponsored terrorist acts against **European** and **African** countries and presently provides safe haven for the notorious terrorist Abu Nidal. It is a major buyer of gray arms and illicit technology from all available sources. **Iraq** has the largest ground OOB in the **Middle East** with over 475,000 experienced regular troops and advanced **Soviet**-provided tanks and SSMS. It also has among the strongest air and naval capabilities in the region, backed by **Soviet** equipment and on-site advisors. **Iraq** is known to maintain quantities of chemical and biological weapons and is reported to have used these weapons against **Iran** and the Kurds. It is also suspected that **Iraq** is pursuing a nuclear weapons production capability.

With a hot, dry climate and strong anti-Western sentiment, military operations in **Iraq** would present a serious challenge. While the steep and desert region bordering **Saudi Arabia** and **Syria** is generally well suited for tracked movement, the northeast highlands bordering **Turkey** are not. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is restricted to 2,000 meters or less mainly in the mountainous northeast and marshy southeast. The basic land-locked geography of **Iraq**, plus the poor hydrography at **Al Faw** and the considerable coastal defense threat in that area would all serve to limit the effectiveness of NGF support. The restricted map coverage would also adversely affect military operations in this country. Presently, 1:50,000 scale maps are available only for northeastern **Iraq** and the area east of **Basra** to the **Persian Gulf**. Accessibility to **Iraq** would be limited by the availability of only one airfield (**Baghdad**) which can handle C-141B aircraft (not C-5s) and one major port at **Basra** with marginal capabilities. The chemical/biological weapons complexes, oil fields, refineries, and communications networks in **Iraq** should receive priority consideration by military planners. NEO conducted by a MEU in this country under normal circumstances would present difficulty due to the distance (302 nm) from the gulf to the probable evacuation site (**Baghdad**) and the large number of potential evacuees (500).


IRAQ - THREAT SUMMARY



Iraq - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Wants to be the dominant power in the oil-rich **Persian Gulf** area.
- Has used brutal, repressive measures against its own Kurdish minority.

In 1980, due to religious tensions with revolutionary **Iran** and dispute over the **Shatt Al-Arab waterway**, **Iraq** attacked **Iran**. The long and costly war continued until 1988 when a ceasefire was declared. However, the tensions remain. **Iraq** has battled its Kurdish minority for years with brutality and chemical weapons, but Kurdish rebels continue their resistance to Government demands. **Iraq** is strong militarily and wants to be the dominant power in the **Persian Gulf** region. The alienation of **Iraq** from **Syria**, which supports **Iran**, is a potential source of confrontation in the **Iraqi** rear.

U.S. Equities in Iraq

Iraq is strong militarily as well as being an important player in the **Arab** world. **U.S.** trade with **Iraq** peaked in 1981 and has since been on the decline. **U.S.** exports to this country have been primarily agricultural.

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Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	683	526	21	1,230	500	3 1	4	Low

Terrorism

- Past sponsor of the Abu Nidal Organization.
- Sponsored three terrorist assassinations in 1988.

Iraq sponsored three assassinations of exiled dissidents in the **United Kingdom**, **Sudan**, and **Norway** in 1988. It is suspected that the **Iraqi-backed Mujahedin-e-Khalq** was responsible for an attempted bombing at a **Tehran** bus terminal. **Iraq** also continued to provide safe haven to some **Palestinian** groups, such as the **Iraqi-created Arab Liberation Front** and the **Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)**, responsible for the **Achille Lauro** hijacking in 1985. **Baghdad** views its safe haven to **Palestinian** groups as legitimate assistance to the struggle for a **Palestinian** homeland. The notorious terrorist **Abu Nidal** presently enjoys the hospitality of **Iraq**.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Iraq is a major buyer of gray arms and technology from the **Soviet Union** and other **Western European** countries. The availability of critical technology can allow **Iraq** to develop sophisticated weapons more quickly and at lower cost than might occur if it had to rely exclusively on the output of its own research. **Iraq** is known to have a clandestine program for acquiring weapons, particularly **SSMs** and **air defense systems**. It is also alleged to be actively seeking nuclear technology transfer from any available source.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Iraq** presents the most serious threat in the combined areas of terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer.

Iraq - 3

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General Ground OOB

- Largest ground capability in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	475	24	639	F

Ground OOB includes 475,000 regular troops, all of whom are conscripts. A large part of the enlisted strength, including NCOs, is composed of career personnel. Recruits receive basic training and then advanced instruction with their assigned units. Regular personnel attend service schools for the combat arms as well as technical and support services. **Soviet** advisors assist in training and employment of advanced **Soviet** weapons. Most officers are graduates of the Military College at **Baghdad**. **Iraqi** forces gained combat experience during the **Iran-Iraq War**. Tanks include: Chieftain, PT-76, T-54, T-55, T-62, and T-72. Artillery includes: 2S1, 2S3, D-30, D-74, M-46, M-56, M-1938, SCUD SSM, and Al Abbas SSM.

General Air OOB

- Third largest air capability in the region after **Egypt** and **Syria**.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	38	24	212	F

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-19, MiG-21, MiG-25, MiG-29; Close Air: MiG-23BM, Mirage F-1EQ5 (Exocet-equipped), Mirage F-1EQ-200, Su-7, Su-20; Air Defense: Roland, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, and SA-9 SAMs, AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- Second largest naval capability in the region after **Egypt**.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	4	24	158	E

Ships: 5 Frigates and 6 Missile Corvettes with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: Otomat, SS-N-2 Styx; Patrol Craft: 2 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-**Soviet**) with SSMs, guns, and radars; 6 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Ex-**Soviet**); 5 Large Patrol Craft (Ex-**Soviet**); 16 Coastal Patrol Craft (Ex-**Soviet**).

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Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Suspected to maintain quantities of chemical and biological weapons.
- Reported to have used chemical weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish citizens.
- May have used biological weapons against Kurdish civilians.
- Alleged to have an interest in producing nuclear weapons.

Iraq is considered to be a significant possessor of chemical weapons and has reportedly used blister, blood, and nerve gas against Iran during the Gulf War. Reports indicate Iraq has established an indigenous production capability for certain chemical warfare agents. Iraq has allegedly employed aerial bombs and very probably rockets with chemical agents. In 1987, there were reports of Iraqi air attacks with chemical weapons on a succession of Kurdish villages in Iraq as well as Iranian Kurdistan, with many hundreds of civilian casualties. It is suspected that Iraq has a biological weapons production complex southeast of Baghdad. Biological agents were allegedly used against the Kurds in the vicinity of As Sulaymaniyeh. Although it is unlikely that Iraq has nuclear weapons, its support of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty has been publicly questioned. However, this country is in the early stage of nuclear development and lacks the industrial base to support nuclear weapons production.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic
Primary religion - Islam

There is a relatively large cultural difference between Iraq and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
59-87	29	6	Dry/Hot

Average temperatures range from higher than 120 degrees Fahrenheit in July and August to below freezing in January. The most rainfall occurs from December through April and averages between four and seven inches annually.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X	X		

About 75 percent of Iraq's population live in the flat alluvial plain stretching southeast toward Baghdad and Basra to the Persian Gulf. Much of the land is desert or wasteland with some mountains in the northeast.

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Iraq - 5

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General Cross-Country Mobility

- Iraq is moderately suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

While the steep and desert region bordering **Saudi Arabia** and **Syria** is generally well suited for tracked movement, the northeastern highlands bordering **Iraq** and **Turkey** are not. The **Tigris-Euphrates** delta region of **Iraq** is generally unsuited for tracked vehicles due to irrigated plains, marshes, and other wet areas.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Restricted to 2,000 meters or less.

The desert and wasteland region bordering **Saudi Arabia** would accommodate line of sight distances of between 1,000 and 2,000 meters and perhaps more in some locations. The mountains in the northeast and covered marshes in the southeast, however, would limit line of sight distances to well under 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Poor NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62434 (Al Faw)	20,130	Poor

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
SCUD SSM	80,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists for northeastern **Iraq** and the area east of **Basra** to the **Persian Gulf**.

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Airfields

- Poor accessibility by air with only one airfield which is not C-5 capable.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-141B	0/1	1/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Saddam International (Baghdad)	C-141B, C-130	Cannot accommodate C-5 aircraft

Ports

- One major port with marginal capabilities.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Basra	Medium	26-30/31-35	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

There are several chemical or biological weapons research or production complexes located in central and northern Iraq that should constitute priority targets for military planners. Oil fields are found in **Kirkuk**, **Basra**, and **Mosul**. Oil refineries are in operation in northeast Iraq and near the **Persian Gulf**. Communications networks are adequate but prolonged outages are common. Paved highways connect major cities although some are in poor condition.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Baghdad	- Good telecomm - 10 Radio stations - 81 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	25,379 km	2,710 km	1	1	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes (3 major)	BC

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach Iraq in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

Due to the distance to the probable evacuation site (**Baghdad** at 302 nm), NEO conducted by a MEU would present considerable difficulty.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
37	500	302 (Baghdad)	E

Note: In Iraq, the drug threat is of little significance.

Iraq - 7

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7/08 MC

KUWAIT

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:
Telephone:


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Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:


DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597

SUMMARY


Kuwait has strategic significance through its oil resources, important location on the **Arabian Peninsula**, and its relationships with other **Arab** countries in the region. In recent years, strong ties have formed between the U.S. and **Kuwait** in the areas of trade and **Kuwaiti** defense. Within the **Middle East**, **Kuwait** has a relatively small armed force and is dependent on the U.S. and other friendly nations for protection against attack.

With a culture much different from the U.S. and intensely hot, dry summers, military operations in **Kuwait** would pose some problems. The terrain consists mainly of desert plains and trafficability of tracked vehicles is possible in about one-half of the country. Hydrographic conditions will allow NGF ships to approach the coast within range of most targets ashore but **Kuwaiti** coastal defense weapons could out-gun these ships. The most serious setback to military operations in **Kuwait** could be the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. The numerous oil fields and refineries, as well as many vital communications networks, should require careful consideration by military planners. Also, NEO, conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would be very difficult due to the large number (2,500) of potential evacuees in **Kuwait**.

KUWAIT - THREAT SUMMARY



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U.S. Equities In Kuwait

In recent years, cooperation between the **U.S.** and **Kuwait** has increased due to efforts to ensure freedom of navigation through the **Persian Gulf** for **Kuwaiti** oil in **U.S.** flag ships. The **U.S.** is currently **Kuwait's** second largest supplier (after **Japan**) and provides substantial military support. **Kuwait** comprises the fifth largest market in the **Middle East** for **U.S.** goods and services.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
7	505	587	-	1,099	2,500	3 4	7	Medium

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Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Kuwait** constitutes a negligible threat to the **U.S.** in the areas of drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/ technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	LAV	Howitzers/SP	16	5	61	A

Ground OOB includes 16,000 troops, all of whom are conscripts. Officers are recruited mainly from the ruling clan to ensure loyalty. The army remains heavily dependent on foreign training assistance although there are plans to create new military colleges and technical schools. Tanks include the Centurion, Chieftain, and Vickers Mk 1 while the main artillery piece is the M-109 155-mm SP howitzer.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	Bloc	2	5	117	D

Fighter Aircraft: Mirage F-1BK, Mirage F-1CK; Close Air: A-4KU, TA-4KU; Air Defense: Improved HAWK, SA-6, SA-7, and SA-8 SAMs. Enhancements have recently been made through the acquisition of 3-dimensional radars. Also, a product improvement program has been initiated to use the AN/TSQ-73 command and control system with HAWK SAMs.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Antiair	1	5	56	C

Ships: None; SSMS: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 8 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMS, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 5 Large Patrol Craft; 39 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Persian and English)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a significant cultural difference between **Kuwait** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
69-85 -	55	5	Dry/Hot

Intensely hot and dry summers; short, cool winters. Rainfall averages five inches or less annually.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Kuwait is situated in the northeast corner of the **Arabian Peninsula**, bounded on the north and west by **Iraq**, on the south by **Saudi Arabia**, and on the east by the **Persian Gulf**.

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Kuwait** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The topographical characteristics of **Kuwait** consist primarily of desert plains with extensive sand dunes, sebkhas (crusted surface over soft ground), and steep-sided wadis. About one-half of this region offers suitable terrain for cross-country trafficability of wheeled and tracked vehicles.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum

Kuwait consists almost entirely of flat rolling desert and mud flats. Line of sight distances would mainly exceed 2,000 meters except during occasional heavy cloudbursts and sand storms.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF ships are able to approach the coast and provide good support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62433	5,490	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Serious coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
Frog SSM	70,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Major shortfalls due to no coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	1 C-5 2 C-141B 1 C-130	1/3	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Ahmadi Ahmed al Jaber Air Base Ali al Salem Air Base Kuwait International	C-130 C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC. Daylight/VFR only. Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- Two ports with small harbors and depths over 40 feet.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Mina al Ahmadi Al Kuwayt	Small Small	Over 76/Over 76 26-30/41-45	46-50 31-35	Yes Yes

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Key Installations

Kuwait is an oil rich country with numerous onshore and offshore oil fields. Oil refineries are located in central **Kuwait** and along the southeastern coast near the **Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone**. Communications networks are excellent with direct-dial links available to most countries. All-weather highways run north to **Iraq** and south to **Saudi Arabia**. Most principal roads are at least four lanes.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Kuwait	- Excellent international/ adequate domestic telecomm - 4 Radio stations - 3 TV stations - 5 Satellite stations	2,600 km	None	2	4	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **Kuwait** in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to about 2,500 potential evacuees in **Kuwait**, NEO conducted by a MEU would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
84	2,500	3 (Kuwait)	F


Note: In **Kuwait** the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

LEBANONMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO BEIRUT LE//DATT//
417774/415802/415803/414712
EXT 314/315**SUMMARY**


Lebanon is located on the eastern shore of the **Mediterranean Sea**, bounded by **Syria** and **Israel**, and forms a strategic bridge between the **West** and the **Middle East**. In recent years it has become a battleground for the diverse and hostile forces in the region. Combat ranges from sniping and unorganized street fighting to sophisticated electronic warfare and the use of surface-to-surface missiles. **Syria** has positioned sizable forces in **Lebanon** and engaged various Lebanese factions. **Lebanon** is a major narcotics producing and trafficking country, supplying heroin to **Europe** and the **U.S.**, as well as hashish to the **Middle East** and **Western** countries. The **Iranian** backed Hizballah group operates primarily in **Lebanon** and employs terrorism as a tactic to support its political and religious goals. **Lebanon** has a small armed force which is presently rather ineffective due to the political instability and civil war.

The considerable cultural difference between the **U.S.** and **Lebanon** as well as the presence of various, potentially hostile forces could pose a variety of problems for **U.S.** military operations in the country. Only portions of **Lebanon**, mainly on the interior plain, are suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. While **NGF** ships can approach the coast to provide good support for combat operations along the coast, **Lebanon**, through its organic coastal defense weapons could present effective opposition. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is available for most of **Lebanon** except for areas along the southern borders with **Israel** and **Syria**. The continuing civil war has inflicted massive damage on **Lebanon's** key installations and significant investment would be necessary for their reconstruction. With over 1900 potential evacuees, **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions in **Lebanon** would require precise planning and execution.

LEBANON - THREAT SUMMARY

Lebanon - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Displaced **Palestinians**, **Syrian** encroachment, and political instability cause serious conflict.
- Continuous war and violence have all but destroyed this country.

The current conflict in **Lebanon** is technologically and politically complex. Combat ranges from sniping and unorganized street fighting to sophisticated electronic warfare and the use of surface-to-surface missiles. The weapons and tactics reflects the spectrum of battle from neighborhood versus neighborhood to superpower versus superpower. Two problems lie at the heart of the conflict. These are the disposition of **Arab** and **Palestinian** Christians and the need for a new homeland for **Palestinians** since the creation of **Israel**. There have been numerous peacekeeping forces in **Lebanon** but none have been very effective. Recently, **Syria** has positioned sizable forces in **Lebanon** and engaged Christian **Lebanese** forces. **Syria** would like to expand its borders to include **Lebanon**.

U.S. Equities in Lebanon

- **Lebanon** forms a strategic bridge between the **West** and the **Middle East**.

Lebanon is strategically located on the eastern shore of the **Mediterranean Sea**, bounded by **Syria** and **Israel**. It has traditionally been a bridge between the **West** and the **Middle East** but in recent years has become a battleground for the diverse and hostile forces in the region.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2	97	34	-	133	1,900	1 3	4	Low

Drug Threat

- Leading producer of hashish
- **Syria** conducts trafficking in the **Bekaa Valley**.

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

Lebanon continues to be a major narcotics producing and trafficking country, supplying heroin to **Europe** and the **U.S.**, as well as hashish to the **Middle East** and **Western** countries. The assessment of **Lebanon** takes into account the limited control of the central Government. **Syria** controls an estimated 65 percent of the country, including the strategic **Bekaa Valley** where crops are cultivated and processed and trafficking originates.

Terrorism

- Hizballah and other **Middle East** factions promote terrorism.

The Hizballah group operates primarily in **Lebanon** and employs terrorism as a tactic to support its political and religious goals. The group seized at least eight foreigners in 1988, including U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Higgins who was assigned to **United Nations** peacekeeping duties in **Lebanon**. Other groups conducting terrorist attacks in **Lebanon** have included **Palestinian** factions, **Lebanese** Christian militias, and **Lebanese** Shia and Sunni fundamentalists.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Lebanon** constitutes a serious threat by its involvement in drugs and terrorism which are two of the three consolidated threat categories (drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer).

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	M-48	Howitzers	15	8	103	C

Ground OOB includes about 15,000 troops, most of whom are volunteers. The army is presently rather ineffective due to political instability and civil war. Syrian, Palestinian, and Israeli forces occupy parts of the country. A military academy for officers and technical school for NCOs was previously in existence, but due to the current situation it is not known if they are open. Tanks: AMX-13, M-41, M-48; Artillery: D-30, M-46, M-50, M-101A1, M-102, M-114, M-198, M-1938

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Props	Early AAA	1	8	49	B

Fighter Aircraft: F-70 Hunter; Close Air: AS-11/12 ASM, SA-342 Gazelle; Air Defense: AA guns

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Sm Gun Boats	Negligible	8	38	A

Ships: None; SSM: None; Patrol Craft: 4 Small Gun Boats, 2 Speed Boats

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (French, and English)

Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between Lebanon and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
63-75	64	35	Mixed

The climate is typically **Mediterranean** and resembles that of southern **California**. Temperatures rarely exceed 85 degrees Fahrenheit during the summer, but humidity is high.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

The urban population of **Lebanon** is mainly concentrated in **Beirut**. The country's principal topographic features are a narrow coastal plain behind which are the high **Lebanon Mountains**, the fertile **Bekaa Valley** and the **Anti-Lebanon Mountains** extending to the **Syrian** border.

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Lebanon** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Trafficability is restricted in the mountainous areas, with movement limited to roads. The interior plain, however, is well suited for tracked movement.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distance limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The mountain ranges which cover much of **Lebanon** would restrict line of sight distances to well under 1,000 meters. Only on the narrow coastal plain and the interior plain behind the mountains would line of sight visibility exceed 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Good NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
56043 (Beirut)	1,000	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons have significant capability.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
130 mm M-46	27,000	Threat Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New -	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available for most of **Lebanon** except for the areas along the southern borders with **Israel** and **Syria**.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-5	1/0	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Beirut International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	

Ports

Lebanon has one major port at **Beirut** with excellent capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Beirut	Medium	61-65/Over 76	46-50	Yes

Key Installations

The civil war has inflicted massive damage on **Lebanon's** economic infrastructure. **Beirut** and southern **Lebanon** have been particularly hard hit. Industry, housing, roads, telecommunications, and water-supply systems will require major reconstruction to attain pre-civil war condition. One estimate indicates it will take a 10-year investment at a rate of \$1.2 billion annually to reconstruct the country.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Awkar	- Telecomm disrupted - 8 Radio stations - 15 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations (Note: some are inoperable)	7,370 km	378 km	1	1	- Crude oil	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic** ARG with its embarked MEU, which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea**, could reach **Lebanon** in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees in **Lebanon** (1900), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	1,900	0 (Beirut)	F

Note: In **Lebanon** the following factors are of little significance:


Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

LIBYAMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597SUMMARY

Since 1969, when Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi came to power through a coup, U.S. - Libyan relations have been increasingly strained because of Libya's foreign policies supporting international terrorism and subversion against moderate Arab and African Governments. Due to its involvement in numerous incidents of terrorism, the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions against Libya, ordered all Americans to leave the country, and frozen Libyan assets in the U.S. In recent years, Qaddafi has shown no sign of giving up terrorism, and Libyan agents continue to track and kill opponents of the regime. Besides exporting terrorism, Libya is a major buyer of illegal weapons and technology from all available sources. Libya has the fifth largest ground, air, and naval OOBs in the region. Numerous regular force personnel receive training outside the country, mainly in the Soviet Union. Libya is believed to maintain stores of chemical weapons, and is suspected to have an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

Cultural differences and the hot/dry desert conditions of Libya could present obstacles to U.S. military operations in this country. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally restricted to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters due to terrain contours and dusty windstorms. Although NGF ships can approach the coast to provide fair support for operations ashore, Libyan coastal defense weapons could pose a serious threat. Mapping of Libya is limited, with 1:50,000 scale map coverage available along the Mediterranean coast, but not inland. Marginal and constrained airfields and ports provide limited accessibility to this country. Libya has numerous key installations including oil fields and refineries.


LIBYA - THREAT SUMMARY



Libya - 1

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LIBYA- TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Libya

Overall **U.S.** equity in **Libya** is low. Due to its involvement in numerous incidents of international terrorism, the **U.S.** has imposed economic sanctions against **Libya**, ordered all **Americans** to leave, and frozen all **Libyan** assets in the **U.S.**

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
252	-	-	-	252	-	1	1	Low

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Terrorism

- Notorious for state sponsored terrorism.
- Recently hosted the most extreme **Palestinian** terrorist group, the Abu Nidal Organization.

The **Middle East's** most notorious practitioner of terrorism, Qaddafi historically has employed terrorism to lash out against regime opponents and to further his own foreign policy objectives within the **Arab** political arena and within worldwide revolutionary movements. **Libyan** People's Bureaus abroad, Revolutionary Committees, the Anti-Imperialism Center in **Tripoli**, numerous front organizations, and intelligence and security services all have been called upon at times to support **Libyan** terrorism. Following the April 1986 **U.S.** air strikes, however, detectable **Libyan** involvement in terrorist activity dropped significantly through 1987. Nevertheless, Qaddafi shows no sign of forsaking terrorism, and **Libyan** agents continue to track and kill opponents of the regime. Qaddafi has turned increasingly to surrogates for attacks, seeking greater plausible denial and safety from retaliation. **Libya** recently hosted the most extreme **Palestinian** terrorist group--the Abu Nidal Organization--and there are other signs that **Libyan** involvement in terrorism may be again on the rise.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Libya is a major buyer of illegal weapons and technology from all available sources.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Libya** presents terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer threats which are two of the three consolidated threat categories (drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer).

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General Ground OOB

- **Libya** has the fifth largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	60	4	204	E

Ground OOB includes about 60,000 troops (regulars and conscripts). Numerous regular force personnel receive training outside **Libya**, mainly in the **Soviet Union**. The **Soviets** also have a large training cadre inside **Libya** to instruct **Libyan** personnel and help operate equipment. As yet, **Libyans** are unable to perform many of the technical functions themselves. **Libyan** forces obtained combat experience during their invasion of **Chad**. Tanks: T-54, T-55, T-62, and T-72; Artillery: 2S1, 2S3, ASTROS MRS, D-30, D-74, M-46, M-101, and M-109.

General Air OOB

- **Libya** has the fifth largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	9	4	163	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, Mirage 5DE, Mirage F1AD/ED; Close Air: J1 Jastreb, Mi-24, Mirage 5D, Su-20, Tu-22; Air Defense: Crotale, SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, and SA-13 SAMs and AA guns. Air defense is modeled after **Soviet** equipment and doctrine. An integrated air defense system known as SENEZH is operational.

General Naval OOB

- **Libya** has the fifth largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	7	4	141	E

Ships: 4 Frigates, 7 Missile Corvettes, and 1 Corvette with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: SS-N-2C, Otomat; Patrol Craft: 28 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (12-Ex-**Soviet**, 4 **Yugoslav**) with SSMs, guns, fire control, and radars.

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Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Reportedly used chemical weapons against **Chad**.
- Alleged to have obtained chemical weapons from **Iran**.
- Suspected to have an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

There were reports during 1987 that **Libya** used air-delivered toxic gas, as well as napalm against **Chadian** forces. Other reports indicate **Libya** agreed to provide **Iran** with **Soviet** - made sea-mines in return for **Iranian**-manufactured chemical weapons. **Libyan** support for the nuclear non proliferation treaty has been publicly questioned but it is unlikely that this country has a nuclear weapons production capability.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Berber)

Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Libya** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
60-85	57	10-15	Dry/Hot

Rainfall is greatest on the coast and less in the interior, with occasional complete rain failures. The coastal temperature is influenced by the **Mediterranean**, but the interior experiences the hot, wideranging extremes of the desert. A special feature of the **Libyan** climate is the "ghibi", a hot dry, dust-laden, southern wind lasting for 1 to 4 days. The ghibi usually occurs in the spring and fall and can cause temperatures to rise within hours to over 110 degrees Fahrenheit.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

Libya - 5

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General Cross-Country Mobility

- Libya is generally well suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be possible all year throughout the greater part of Libya. This movement would be restricted in some areas, however, by the severely dissected plains, steep hills, mountains, marshes, and sebkhas.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Restricted, with line of sight distances ranging between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

About 93 percent of Libya consists of desert or semidesert. In between occasional hills and mountains are largely barren plains and vast sand seas. Hot, dry, dusty windstorms occasionally occur in the spring and fall that would reduce visibility. Line of sight distances would be expected to range between 1,000 and 2,000 meters over more than 50 percent of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
56190	9.660	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant opposition could be expected from coastal defense weapons.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
ASTROS MRS	60,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available along the Mediterranean coast but not inland.

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Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-141B aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
4	4 C-141B	1/3	2-4/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Aozou	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Benina	C-141B, C-130	
Okba Ibn Nafa	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Tripoli International	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

Libya has three major ports with poor capability to receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Tobruk	Small	56-60/31-35	26-30	Yes
Banghazi	Small	36-40/31-35	26-30	Yes
Tripoli	Medium	31-35/31-35	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

Libya is suspected to have facilities for the production and or storage of chemical weapons. Oil fields are located at **Sarir**, **Tripolitania**, **Fezzan**, and the **Sirtica** basin southeast of the **Gulf of Sidra**; the **Ghadamis** basin (400 kilometers southwest of **Tripoli**); and offshore fields (30 kilometers northwest of **Tripoli** at **Bouri**).

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Modern telecomm - 21 Radio stations - 13 TV stations - 16 Satellite stations	19,300 km	None	3	4	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic ARG** with its embarked **MEU** which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea** could reach **Libya** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

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NEO

With few **U.S.** citizens in **Libya** and the location of the most likely evacuation site (**Tripoli**) on the coast, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	5 (Tripoli)	A


Note: In **Libya** the drug threat is of little significance.

NORTH YEMEN
(YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC)MEF G-2:
Telephone:CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO SANAA YE//DATT//
967-2-271-950 to 958, EXT 218/9**SUMMARY**

The **U.S.** has helped to expand the security assistance program in **North Yemen** as well as providing this country with significant economic support. **North Yemen** has modest armed forces which would have difficulty in dealing with an attack from outside its borders. Almost all military training beyond the basic level is done outside the country mainly in **Egypt** and **Saudi Arabia**. Some foreign advisors are present in **North Yemen** to perform technical tasks and operate advanced equipment.


With a much different culture from the **U.S.**, a hot/dry climate, and mostly mountainous terrain, military operations in **North Yemen** would present some difficulties. While some parts of the coastal plains would allow trafficability, the country in general is unsuited for off-road movement of tracked vehicles. Due to the dissected terrain, the average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Because of shallow water off much of the **Red Sea** coast, NGF platforms would have a poor capability to approach the coast and provide support for operations ashore. A most serious setback to military operations in **North Yemen** could be the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. While **North Yemen** is accessible by air with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft it has no major ports to accommodate strategic sealift. Oil fields are located in the eastern part of the country near the town of **Marib**. Communications facilities are underdeveloped but gradually improving. In a crisis situation, it is estimated that the Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach **North Yemen** in two to four days. Under normal conditions, NEO conducted by a MEU would be quite difficult due to over 2000 potential evacuees.

NORTH YEMEN - THREAT SUMMARY



North Yemen - 1

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U.S. Equities in North Yemen

Since 1979 the U.S. has cooperated with **Saudi Arabia** to greatly expand the security assistance program in **North Yemen**. An **American** company, Hunt Oil of **Dallas, Texas** discovered oil in **North Yemen** in 1984. In addition to the Agency for International Development (AID) program, the U.S. has about 50 Peace Corps volunteers in **North Yemen** engaged in agricultural development, irrigation, nursing, and teaching.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	533	47	580	2,340	2 3	5	Medium

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-62	Howitzers	35	6	101	C

Ground OOB includes about 35,000 troops, most of whom are conscripts. Almost all training beyond the basic level is done outside the country, mainly in **Egypt** and **Saudi Arabia**. Foreign advisors are also present inside **North Yemen** to perform technical tasks and operate advanced equipment. Tanks: M-60, T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62; Artillery: BM-21 MRS, M-101, M-115, M-1931, M-1937, M-1942.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	1	6	137	D

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E, MiG-17, MiG-21; Close Air: Il-28, Su-22; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-6, SA-7 SAMs, and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Bloc	1	6	67	C

Ships: None; SSM: None; Patrol Craft: 5 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol (Ex-Soviet), 3 Small Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic

Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **North Yemen** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
80-91	60	3	Dry/Hot

Temperate in the interior with some rainfall; hot and humid on the coastal plain. Recently, severe drought conditions have prevailed.

North Yemen - 3

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

North Yemen is mostly mountainous with a 40-mile wide coastal plain.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- The country is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement would be restricted by steep slopes and by dissected areas, salt flats, and dunes on the coastal plains. While there are some parts of the coastal plains which would allow tracked movement, the interior desert plains would not due to the extensive sand dunes, escarpments, lava fields, sebkhas, and steep-sided wadis.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distance limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Except for the coastal plains which border the Red Sea, North Yemen consists of mountains, dissected terrain, and a series of highland plateaus. Line of sight distances over most of the country, with the possible exception of the coastal plains, would be restricted to less than 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Poor capability to approach the coast and provide NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62292	20,000	Poor

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons cannot out-gun U.S. NGF.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
BM-21 MRS	20,500	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Major shortfalls due to no coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
2	1 C-5 1 C-141B	0/2	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Sanaa Taizz	C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-141B	Daylight only. Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- No accessible ports.

Key Installations

Oil fields are located 70 kilometers northeast of the town of **Marib**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Sanaa	- Poor but improving telecomm - 3 Radio stations - 17 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	4,000 km	None	0	1	- Crude oil	Yes	None

North Yemen - 5

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TAB ME 9

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

- The **Pacific** ARG with its embarked MEU could reach **North Yemen** in less than four days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.


NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
73	2,340	88 (Sanaa)	F

Note: In **North Yemen** the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

OMANMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO MUSCAT OM//DATT//
737050SUMMARY

While the Dhafari insurgents in southern Oman were all but wiped out in 1975, remnants of the group remain in the field and there is a possibility that this conflict may resume. There are also a number of border disputes ongoing between Oman and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). Oil is the major source of income for Oman, and this country has strong political ties to the U.S. In northern Oman, the tip of the Ruus-al-Jebal peninsula controls access to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Under a U.S.-Omani agreement, the U.S. is provided access to Omani military facilities. These facilities are being upgraded for mutual use. Oman has a small armed force, which would have difficulty in defeating an attack from outside its borders.

A much different culture as well as a hot, dry climate and diverse terrain conditions would cause some difficulties for U.S. military operations in Oman. About two-thirds of Oman is unsuitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the extensive volcanic mountain network and dissected geography. Due to adverse terrain and climatic conditions, the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. While NGF ships can approach the coast to provide adequate support for operations ashore, the standard naval gun (5 inch, 54 caliber) would be out-gunned by Omani coastal defense weapons. Only northern Oman, including Muscat, has coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps. A major drawback to operations in Oman is that this country has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift. Key military installations in Oman are being improved by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. With over 800 potential evacuees in Oman, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would require a significant effort.


OMAN - THREAT SUMMARY



Oman - 1

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OMAN - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Dhafari insurgents operate in southern Oman.
- Border disputes ongoing with the U.A.E.

Although the Dhafari insurgents in southern Oman received losses in 1975 by Omani, British, and Iranian forces while South Yemeni attentions were focused on Ethiopia, they remain in the field in reduced numbers and there is a serious possibility of a revival of this once broadly based insurrection. Also, there are numerous border disputes ongoing between Oman and the U.A.E.

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U.S. Equities in Oman

Under a U.S. - Omani agreement, the U.S. is provided access to Omani military facilities.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
19	156	-	-	175	830	1 2	3	Low

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	M-60	Howitzers	17	3	100	C

Ground OOB includes about 17,000 regular troops. The army was mostly run by British officers at the time of independence but is now going through transition to Omani officers. Basic recruit training is accomplished at a center near Muscat. Basic officer training also begins there with additional instruction obtained in U.K., Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. Tanks: Chieftain, M-60; Artillery: M-46, M-109A2.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	3	3	96	C

Fighter Aircraft: F-70 Hunter, Jaguar; Close Air: BAe Strikemaster, Hawk, Air Defense: Blowpipe and Rapier SAMs and AA guns. The Omani air defense system was recently upgraded with 28 Rapier fire units equipped with Blindfire radars. Also acquired were two long-range, 3-dimensional radars to extend air surveillance coverage. Additionally, improvements were made to existing air control facilities.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	3	3	66	C

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 4 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 4 Fast Attack Craft-Gun; 4 Inshore Patrol Craft.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between Oman and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
78-89	71	4	Dry/Hot

Hot and humid along the coast; hot and dry in the interior; summer monsoon in the far south.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

The terrain of Oman includes mountains, plains, and arid plateau. A negligible amount of land is forested; much is desert, waste or urban.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Oman is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Approximately two-thirds of Oman is unsuitable for the cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles due to the extensive volcanic mountain network. On the coastal plains, cross-country movement would be restricted by steep slopes, dissected areas, salt flats, and dunes. While there are some parts of the coastal plains which would allow tracked movement, the interior desert plains would not due to the extensive sand dunes, escarpments, lava fields, sebkhas, and steep-sided wadis.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances in about two-thirds of Oman would be less than 1,000 meters due to the large volcanic mountain complex. Along the coast, visibility would be restricted by steep slopes, irregular areas, salt flats, and dunes. In the south, the region of Dhofar experiences a strong monsoon season from May to September with frequent, heavy mists that would reduce visibility.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF ships can approach the coast to provide good support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62355	3220	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons have significant capability.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
130 mm M-46	27,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available only for northern **Oman**, including **Muscat**.

Airfields

- **Oman** is accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
4	2 C-5 2 C-141B	1/3	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Masirah Salalah Seeb International (Muscat) Thumrait	C-141B, C-130 C-141B- C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow. Daylight/VFR only. Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.

Oman - 5

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7,12 Mi. 10

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Ports

- Oman has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift.

Key Installations

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has worked on upgrading Omani military airfields.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Muscat	- Fair Telecomm - 6 Radio stations - 11 TV stations - 10 Satellite stations	16,900 km	None	0	4	- Crude oil - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach Oman in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.


NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would require a significant effort.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
71	830	2 (Muscat)	F


Note: In Oman the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

QATARMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103Theater J-2:
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Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597**SUMMARY**


Qatar has importance through its oil production and refining capabilities and its strategic location along the western coast of the **Persian Gulf** adjacent to **Saudi Arabia** and the **United Arab Emirates**. It has a modest defense establishment which would have difficulty in dealing with an attack from outside its borders.

A much different culture from the **U.S.** and a dry, hot climate with temperatures reaching 120 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer would make military operations in **Qatar** quite difficult. While cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is better than many other **Middle East** countries, only about 40 percent of the country is trafficable. Mapping by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to central **Qatar** including the area around the capital of **Doha** on the east coast and the city of **Dukhan** on the west coast. Accessibility to **Qatar** by air is generally poor with only one airfield available at the city of **Doha**. This airfield can accommodate C-141B aircraft but not C-5s. The two ports in **Qatar** are also somewhat constrained by small harbors and limited channel/anchorage depths, and would have some difficulty in handling cargo ships with deep drafts. Numerous key installations, including oil fields and communications networks, would need to be considered during military operations. With over 500 potential evacuees, NEO under normal circumstances conducted by a MEU equipped with the aging CH-46 helicopter would require a significant effort.

QATAR - THREAT SUMMARY

Qatar - 1

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U.S. Equities in Qatar

Although the U.S. is a major equipment supplier for Qatar's oil and gas industries, to date there has been little American investment in Qatar. Over the past two years, two U.S. oil firms, Sohio and Amoco, concluded oil and gas exploration agreements for on- and offshore operations. These agreements are for 25-year terms and may lead to increased U.S. investment.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2	-	-	-	2	500	1 2	3	Low

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Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Qatar** constitutes a negligible threat in the areas of drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers/SP	6	2	78	B

Ground OOB includes 6,000 troops all of whom are volunteers. Military forces are small and inexperienced and would have difficulty coping with an outside attack, possibly from **Iraq**. There are numbers of expatriate personnel assisting the army from **Britain** and other **Arab** countries. The tank is the AMX-30. Artillery consists of 88-mm towed, and the Mk F-3 155-mm SP.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	1	2	93	C

Fighter Aircraft: Hunter FGA-78, Mirage F1C; Close Air: Alpha Jet, Hunter FGA-78; Air Defense: Blowpipe, Rapier, Roland, Stinger, and Tigercat SAMs with Blindfire radars.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Antiair	1	2	63	C

Ships: none; SSMS: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 3 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMS, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 6 Large Patrol Craft; 17 Coastal Patrol Craft; 25 Small Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic

Primary religion - Islam

There is a significant cultural difference between **Qatar** and the **U.S.**

Qatar - 3

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
59-108	70	3	Dry/Hot

The hottest time of the year is between June and the end of September when temperatures reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit. The winter is mild with little rain. Rain averages three inches or less annually.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Qatar is on a peninsula jutting northward into the sea halfway along the west coast of the **Persian Gulf**.

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Qatar's** desert plains are suited for cross-country movement by tracked vehicles.

The topographical characteristics and features of **Qatar** are divided into two distinct regions, the Desert Plains and the Highlands. The Desert Plains consist mainly of sand dunes, sebkas (crusted surface over soft ground), and steep-sided wadis. Roughly one-third of the region offers suitable terrain for cross-country movement of tracked or wheeled vehicles. The Highlands in the northwest consist of some modest hills and sparse vegetation and would be less accommodating to cross-country vehicular movement.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum.

The terrain of **Qatar** is generally flat and low-lying except for a few modest hills to the northwest. The north has some sparse vegetation while the south is arid with stretches of salt flats. It is expected that over 50 percent of this country would accommodate line of sight distances exceeding 2,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62409	9,155	Fair

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm SPH	18,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Restricted map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for central **Qatar** including the capital of **Doha** on the east coast and the city of **Dukhan** on the west coast.

Airfields

- Poor accessibility by air with only one airfield which is not C-5 capable.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-141B	1/0	1/C-130

Airfield	Type Aircraft	Comments
Doha International	C-141B, C-130	Cannot accommodate C-5 aircraft

Ports

- Two relatively small ports, with **Musayid** being the most accessible.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Musayid Ad Dawhah	Small Small	36-40/41-45 26-30/26-30	6-10 26-30	Yes -

Qatar - 5

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Key Installations

Qatar has numerous oil fields and industrial centers, as well as excellent communications facilities. Most industrial projects are based in **Umm Said** and include an oil refinery with a 50,000 barrel/day capacity, a fertilizer plant for urea and ammonia, a steel plant, and a petrochemical plant.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Doha	- Good urban telecomm - 3 Radio stations - 2 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	805 km	None	2	1	- Crude oil - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **Qatar** in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.


NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees in **Qatar**, NEO conducted by a MEU would require a significant effort.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
8	500	5 (Doha)	E

Note: In **Qatar**, the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

SAUDI ARABIAMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO RIYADH SA//DATT//
966-1-488-3800, Ext 275-282SUMMARY

Saudi Arabia is of major importance due to its oil reserves, strategic location on the **Arabian Peninsula** bordering **Kuwait**, **Iraq**, and **Jordan**, and because over 20,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. **Saudi Arabia** is the largest trading partner of the **U.S.** in the **Middle East** and continued availability of oil from the country is important to the **U.S.** economy. In recent years, the **U.S.** has provided significant military support to **Saudi Arabia** to help strengthen its defenses from outside attack. As compared with other countries within the region, **Saudi Arabia** has moderate size armed forces equipped with many modern **U.S.**-supplied weapon systems. Military training is patterned after the **U.S.** armed forces.


With a culture quite different from the **U.S.**, a dry/hot summer climate, and topography which is mainly desert, ground combat operations in **Saudi Arabia** would present some difficulties. The northern part of the country is generally suited for cross-country movement of vehicles while the western highlands are basically unsuited due to the rugged terrain. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is mainly limited to less than 1,000 meters. Although **NGF** ships can approach the **Red Sea** and **Persian Gulf** coasts to provide fair support, the **Saudi Arabian** coastal defense weapons could present a serious threat. There is limited mapping throughout the country with sporadic 1:50,000 scale map coverage along the **Persian Gulf**, the capital of **Riyadh**, and the area around **Jeddah** on the **Red Sea**. **Saudi Arabia** has many key installations, including oil fields, pipelines, refineries, and modern communication and transportation facilities which should be considered when planning military operations. Likewise, the planning and execution of **NEO** by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be exceedingly complex due to the presence of many **U.S.** citizens who might require evacuation.

SAUDI ARABIA - THREAT SUMMARY



Saudi Arabia - 1

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U.S. Equities in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is the **U.S.**'s largest trading partner in the **Middle East**. There are over 20,000 **U.S.** citizens in this country, and total **U.S.** equity exceeds 10 billion dollars. However, **U.S.** interests in **Saudi Arabia** go far beyond trade. **Saudi Arabia's** unique role in the Arab and Islamic worlds and its strategic location on the **Arabian Peninsula** make its friendship critical to the **U.S.** for **Middle Eastern** stability. The continued availability of oil from **Saudi Arabia** remains very important to the economy of the **U.S.** as well as those of **European** countries and **Japan**. In recent years the **U.S.** has sold a significant amount of military equipment to **Saudi Arabia** including F-15 aircraft, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, and air defense weapons in order to strengthen its defenses from outside attack.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2,385	3,373	4,887	-	10,645	21,600	6 6	12	High

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **Saudi Arabia** constitutes a negligible threat to the **U.S.** in the areas of drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	M-60	Howitzers/SP	38	11	129	D

Ground OOB includes 38,000 regular troops, all of whom are volunteers. Conscription is used to augment this force. Training is patterned after the **U.S.** armed forces. There are recruit training and numerous branch technical schools. The **U.S.** Training Mission in **Saudi Arabia** provides direct training assistance to the **Saudi** army and supervises contractor personnel providing training, construction, and logistical support. Conditions of service in the regular forces are good and pay is the highest of any military force in the **Middle East**. The tank inventory consists of the AMX-30, M-60A1, and M-60A3. Artillery includes the ASTROS MRS, M-101, M-102, M-109, and M-198.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
3d Gen Radar	NT/AW	3d Gen SAMs	15	11	156	E

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E, F-15C/D, F-53, Tornado ADV; Close Air: Tornado IDS; Air Defense: Crotale, HAWK, Redeye, Shaline, and Stinger SAMs and AA guns. The **U.S.** has provided 3-dimensional air surveillance radars and AWACS aircraft. A joint air defense system called Peace Shield has been established using the AWACS and ground-based radars to provide integrated coverage for **Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, U.A.E., Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.**

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Counter-measures	ASUW/Anti-air	8	11	129	D

Ships: 4 Frigates and 4 Missile Corvettes with ASUW/Air/ASW capabilities; SSMs: Otomat, Harpoon; Patrol Craft: 9 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 3 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo; 1 Large Patrol Craft; 8 Coastal Patrol Craft.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic
Primary religion - Islam

There is a relatively large cultural difference between **Saudi Arabia** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-92	55	3	Dry/Hot

Rainfall is erratic, averaging 2 to 4 inches annually, except in **Asir** (mountainous region along the southern **Red Sea** coast), which averages 12 to 30 inches in the summer. During summer, the heat is intense over much of the country, frequently exceeding 120 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade, with high humidity along the coasts. In winter, temperatures sometimes drop below freezing in the central and northern areas, but snow and ice are uncommon.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Saudi Arabia occupies about four-fifths of the **Arabian Peninsula** which is roughly the size of the **U.S.** east of the **Mississippi**. Boundaries are not fully defined in the south and southeast. From the mountain ranges near the **Red Sea**, the land slopes gently eastward toward the **Persian Gulf**. The topography is mainly desert. **Saudi Arabia** has no permanent rivers or bodies of water.

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

The higher elevations are in the mountain ranges near the **Red Sea**.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Saudi Arabia** are generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Conditions for cross-country movement are fair to good in about a third of the country, where vehicles can move freely across firm sandy and gravelly surfaces. Elsewhere, extensive sand dunes, high escarpments, lava fields, sebkhas, and steep-sided wadis would limit movement. The western highlands are also unsuited for tracked movement due to the rugged terrain.

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Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with average line of sight distance limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Well over half of **Saudi Arabia** would have line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters due to high escarpments, lava fields, steep-sided wadis, and sand dunes. The mountains in the west near the **Red Sea** would be particularly restrictive. The eastern part of the country is noted for having heavy fogs.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62242 (Jeddah)	9,155	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal defense threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
ASTROS MRS	60,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists for the **Saudi Arabian** coast north of **Dhahran** along the **Persian Gulf**, for the area around the capital **Riyadh**, and for the area around **Jeddah** on the **Red Sea**.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than nine unconstrained airfields that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
18	10 C-5 8 C-141B (1 Emergency use)	14/4	>1/C-5

Saudi Arabia - 5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Abha	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Daylight/VFR only.
Dhahran International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Gizan	C-141B, C-130	
Jeddah	C-141B, C-130	
Jubail	C-141B, C-130	
Abdul Aziz International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Abdul Aziz Naval Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
King Khalid Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
King Khalid International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
King Khalid Military City	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Madinah	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Emergency use only.
Riyadh International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Sharourah	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Sulayel	C-141B, C-130	
Tabuk Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Taif	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Wejeh	C-141B, C-130	
Yenbo	C-141B, C-130	

Ports

- Six major ports with Jubail being the most accessible.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Jiddah	Small	Over 76/Over 76	31-35	Yes
Ad Damimam	Small	46-50/46-50	36-40	Yes
Jubail	Medium	Over 76/Over 76	71-75	Yes
Ras At Tannurah	Medium	56-60/26-30	46-50	Yes
Juaymoh Oil Terminal	Small	66-70/Over 76	-	-
Ras Al Khafji	Small	51-55/41-45	16-20	-

Key Installations

Oil fields are located onshore and offshore in the **Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone**. Production is shared equally between these countries. Other oil fields in **Saudi Arabia** are at **Al Ghawar**, **As Saffaniyah**, and **Khurays**. Most oil exports move by tanker from the **Eastern Province** oil terminals of **Ras Tanura** and **Ju 'Ayman**. The remaining oil exports are mainly transported by a pipeline running east-west across the country to the **Red Sea** port of **Yanbu**. Communications networks are excellent with expanding telephone and telegraph service. Transportation facilities are quite modern with many domestic and international airline flights scheduled daily.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Riyadh	- Good telecomm - 37 Radio stations - 97 TV stations - 8 Satellite stations	74,000 km	886 km	6	18	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach Saudi Arabia in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the very large number (21,600) of potential evacuees in Saudi Arabia, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be a formidable endeavor.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
132	21,600	196 (Riyadh)	F

Note: In Saudi Arabia the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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SOUTH YEMEN (PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN)

MEF G-2:	CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 365-9103
Theater J-2:	USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 968-6265
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-4315
Embassy Defense Attache:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-0597




SUMMARY

The U.S. has no formal diplomatic relationship with **South Yemen** because of the antagonism with which this **Arab** country views the U.S. The Government is modeled after the communist regimes of the **Soviet Union** and **Eastern Europe**. **Aden**, the principal city and capital, has served as a major training base for terrorists. **South Yemen** has actively provided weapons, explosives, and safe haven to terrorist groups. It has also reportedly been a transit point for gray arms shipments to other **Middle East** countries. **South Yemen** has moderate size armed forces with much of its equipment being furnished by communist countries. It intends to increase the size of its army to about 40,000 personnel. The U.S.S.R., East Germany, Cuba, and North Korea have sent training missions to **South Yemen**.

Cultural differences, a hot, dry climate, and diverse terrain conditions would pose difficulties to U.S. military operations in **South Yemen**. With a mountainous interior and dissected terrain, cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be generally limited to small flat areas along the coastal plain. The geographic conditions also cause the average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) to be limited to less than 1,000 meters. Although NGF ships can approach the coast along the **Gulf of Aden** to provide adequate support for operations ashore, significant opposition could be expected from **South Yemen** coastal defense weapons. Mapping of this country is very limited with 1:50,000 scale maps available only for the city of **Aden**. Airlift accessibility is also limited to one airfield at **Aden** which cannot handle C-5 aircraft. Two moderate size ports are available at **Aden** and **Al Mukalla** to accommodate strategic sealift. In a crisis situation, it is estimated that the **Pacific ARG** with its embarked MEU could reach **South Yemen** in two to four days.


SOUTH YEMEN - THREAT SUMMARY



South Yemen - 1

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U.S. Equities in South Yemen

The **South Yemen** Government has viewed the **U.S.** with antagonism due to the close **U.S.** relationship with **Saudi Arabia** and what **South Yemen** regards as a pro- **Israel** - **U.S.** policy. The **U.S.** has no formal diplomatic relationships with **South Yemen**. The **United Kingdom**, acts as the protecting power for the **U.S.** in this country. **U.S.** equities in **South Yemen** are rated as low.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	-	-	-	0 0	0	Low

Terrorism

- **South Yemen** serves as a major terrorist training base.

South Yemen has actively provided weapons, explosives, training, safe passage, and safe haven to terrorist groups. This country continues to play host to a number of **Palestinian** factions, including the Abu Nidal Organization, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of **Palestine**, the Popular Struggle Front, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of **Palestine**.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

South Yemen has been reported to be a transshipment point for gray arms to **Middle East** countries. This country has been involved in the training and equipping of **Middle Eastern** terrorists.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Middle East**, **South Yemen** presents a serious threat through involvement in terrorism and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-62	Bloc	24	8	122	C

Ground OOB includes about 24,000 troops, most of whom are conscripts. The intention is to increase the size of the army to 40,000. The **U.S.S.R.**, **East Germany**, **Cuba**, and **North Korea** have sent training missions to **South Yemen**. Tanks: T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62; Artillery: BM-25 MRS, D-20, D-30, M-38, M-46.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	3	8	141	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-17, MiG-21; Close Air: Il-28, Mi-24, Su-22; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	Bloc	Bloc	1	8	119	D

Ships: none; SSM: SS-N-2B Styx; Patrol Craft: 5 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-Soviet) with SSMs, guns, and radars; 2 Fast Attack Craft-Torpedo (Ex-Soviet); 2 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol (Ex-Soviet).

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (English)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **South Yemen** and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
80-91	60	3	Dry/Hot

The entire country is extremely hot and humid with minimal rainfall.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

A sandy coast rises to mountains which give way to desert sands.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **South Yemen** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The southwestern highlands are poorly suited for cross-country tracked movement due to mountain slopes, dunes, boulder fields, and lava plains. Movement is limited to small flat areas along the coastal plain, and to wadi bottoms.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances generally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The coastal areas of **South Yemen** are sandy and flat while the interior is mainly mountainous and irregular with occasional dunes, boulder deposits, and lava fields. Due to the broken and dissected terrain over more than half the country, line of sight distances would be generally under 1,000 meters.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Good capability to approach the coast along the **Gulf of Aden** and provide NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62097/62098	7,320	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant opposition could be expected from coastal defense weapons.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
BM-25 MRS	55,900	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available only for the capital city of **Aden**.

Airfields

- Poor accessibility by air with only one airfield which is not C-5 capable.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-141B	1/0	1/C-130

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Aden International	C-141B, C-130	

South Yemen - 5

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Ports

South Yemen has two moderate size ports which can handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Aden	Medium	36-40/36-40	16-20	Yes
Al Mukalla	Small	over 76/56-60	6-10	Yes

Key Installations

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None	- Small telecomm system - 1 Radio station - 5 TV stations - 3 Satellite stations	5,600 km	None	2	2	- Refined products	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The Pacific ARG with its embarked MEU could reach South Yemen in less than four days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- With few U.S. citizens in South Yemen and the location of the most likely evacuation site (Aden) on the coast, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	0	4 (Aden)	A


Note: In South Yemen the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
NBC

SYRIAMEF G-2:
Telephone:CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095Theater J-2:
Telephone:USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//J-2//
STU-III AV 430-8003DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO DAMASCUS SY//DATT//
332814/332315/330416 Ext 234 and 250**SUMMARY**


Acute political and social instability and expansionist intentions toward **Lebanon**, **Jordan**, and **Israel** characterize the position of **Syria** in the **Middle East**. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Syria** is low due mainly to **Syria's** adamant rejection of attempts to mediate peace in the area, its support for international terrorism, and close military ties with the **Soviet Union**. **Syria** is a transit point for illegal narcotics, as well as a heroin refining center. Its military forces allegedly profit from drug production and trafficking in **Lebanon's Bekaa Valley**. **Syria** is known to sponsor terrorism in the **Middle East** and **Western Europe**. **Syria** is also involved in acquiring illicit weapons and technology for a major arms buildup against **Israel**. **Syria** should receive special attention by military planners because of its association with all three threat categories of narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer. It has one of the largest armed forces in the **Middle East** and depends heavily on **Soviet** military equipment and technical assistance. **Syria** is reported to have a significant chemical weapons production capability to include the arming of **Soviet**-supplied SS-21 SSMs with chemical warheads.

A large cultural difference exists between **Syria** and the **U.S.** The rugged mountains and broken terrain in the west would present obstacles for military operations in **Syria**. Only portions of **Syria**, mainly on the eastern plain, are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters in large parts of the country due to the rough terrain and ground cover. While NGF ships can approach the coast to provide good support for operations ashore, **Syrian** coastal defense weapons would have them seriously out-gunned. Mapping by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to western **Syria** including the coastal area bordering the **Mediterranean**. **Syria** has one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft and two moderate size ports with depths exceeding 40 feet. Key installations include oil fields, refineries, and pipelines, as well as suspected factories for the production of chemical weapons. Due to over 1,000 potential evacuees in **Syria**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would present numerous difficulties.

SYRIA - THREAT SUMMARY

Syria - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Has expansionist intentions toward **Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel**.
- Has acute political and social instability.

President Hafez al-Assad must keep his country militarized to maintain control of the people. Almost all of the **Syrian** political factions have visions of a greater **Syria**, an idealized state that encompasses **Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel**. In particular, **Syria** strives to maintain an active presence in **Lebanon**. Visions of greater **Syria**, a threatened dictatorship, and militant Arabs lead **Syria** into an ongoing struggle with **Israel**. **Syria** also supports insurgent PLO elements in an attempt to further its ambitions.

U.S. Equities in Syria

Syria is a strong military force in the **Middle East** and plays an important role in the Arab world. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Syria** is low.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2	93	66		161	1,043	1 3	4	Low

Drug Threat

- Transit point for illicit narcotics.
- Heroin refining center.
- Profits from drug trafficking in the **Bekaa Valley**.

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
	X			X

Syria is a transit point for illicit narcotics, as well as a heroin refining center. Its military exerts significant influence over **Lebanon's Bekaa Valley**, allegedly profiting from widespread drug production and trafficking in that area.

Terrorism

- Sponsors terrorism in the **Middle East** and **Western Europe**.

Syria, under President Assad, previously was an active, if not a more calculated, sponsor of terrorism. **Syrian** operations normally were confined to the **Middle East**, although **Western Europe** occasionally has been the venue for its activities. Three acts of **Syrian** terrorism occurred in **Europe** in 1986: an attempted bombing of the El Al airline in **London**; the bombing of the **German-Arab** friendship society in **Berlin**; and the bombing of the El Al ticket counter in **Madrid**. These attacks drew intense international criticism and sanctions, forcing **Syria** to distance itself from its previously close association with terrorism, although more circumspect support for terrorist acts in the **Middle East** likely will continue.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Syria is involved in acquiring illicit weapons and technology for a major arms buildup against **Israel** and to pursue its interests in **Lebanon**. The **Syrian** cities of **Damascus** and **Aleppo** are centers of commerce and, as such, act as transit points for gray arms shipments to the **East**, particularly **Iran** and **Iraq**.

Consolidated Threat

Syria deserves special consideration by military planners because it is involved in all three of the threat categories: narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

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General Ground OOB

- Syria has the third largest ground OOB in the **Middle East** following **Iraq** and **Iran**.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	300	10	450	F

Ground OOB includes about 300,000 troops of whom 120,000 are regulars, 130,000 are conscripts, and 50,000 are reserves. The general standard of individual training in the **Syrian** army is considered good. It is largely independent of **Soviet** training assistance except for specific highly advanced training subjects. **Syrian** forces have gained combat experience during operations in **Lebanon** and against **Israel**. Tanks: T-54, T-55, T-62, T-72, T-72M. Artillery: 2S1, 2S3, D-30, M-1931, M-1937, M-1938, M-1943, SS-21 SSM.

General Air OOB

- Syria has the second largest air OOB in the region behind **Egypt**.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	NT/AW	Bloc	95	10	255	F

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-29; Close Air: Gazelle, Mi-24, Su-7, Su-22, Su-25; Air Defense: SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, SA-11, SA-13, and SA-14 SAMs and AA guns. In addition to 45,000 air force personnel, there are 50,000 personnel in a separate air defense command.

General Naval OOB

- Syria has the fourth largest naval OOB in the region behind **Egypt**, **Iraq**, and **Iran**.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	3	10	143	E

Ships: 2 Frigates (Ex-**Soviet**) with guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine mortars, depth charges, mines, and radars; SSMs: SS-N-2A; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Ex-**Soviet**) with SSMs, SAMs (Crotale), guns, countermeasures, fire control and radars; 6 Large Patrol Craft; 3 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- Reported to have a significant chemical weapons production capability.
- Delivery systems for chemical weapons may include the **Soviet**-supplied SS-21 missiles.

Syria is reported to have weapons production capability at two factories including capacity for arming **Soviet**-supplied SS-21 missiles with chemical warheads. No nuclear weapons are suspected.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Armenian, Kurdish, French, English)

Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between **Syria** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
51-76	36	9	Dry/Warm

The weather in **Syria** can be compared to **Phoenix, Arizona**; summer days are dry and hot with average maximum temperatures above 80 degrees Fahrenheit. From December to March it is quite cold but seldom reaches freezing. Precipitation may reach 30 inches annually along the coast, decreasing to less than 10 inches in the eastern desert area. The rainy season is generally from November to April.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

The topography consists of a coastal zone with a narrow double mountain belt enclosing a depression in the west, deserts, and a much larger eastern plateau.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Syria** are generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The large eastern plateau can generally accommodate cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The northwestern coastal highlands and the area bordering **Lebanon** however, are basically unsuited due to steep slopes and rough terrain.

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Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, limited to less than 1,000 meters in large parts of the country.

About 75 percent of **Syria** consists of mountainous and rough terrain which would limit line of sight distances to less than 1,000 meters. Only the narrow coastal plain along the **Mediterranean Sea**, the **Euphrates River** valley, and portions of the eastern plateau would accommodate unrestricted visibility beyond 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Good NGF support for coastal operations.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
56041 (Baniyas)	2,100	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons have significant capability.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
SS-21 SSM	120,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available for western **Syria** including the coastal area.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
2	1 C-5 1 C-141B	1/1	1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Damascus International Tiyas	C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- Two moderate size ports with small harbors and depths exceeding 40 feet.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Al Ladhiqiyah Atarus	Small Small	-/46-50 61-65/66-70	31-35 -	Yes -

Key Installations

It has been reported that there are facilities in **Syria** which are producing chemical weapons. Oil fields are found at **Qarah Shuk** in the northeast near the **Iraqi** border, **Suwaydlyah**, **Remaylan**, **Jubaysah**, **Dayr az Zawr**, **Sharifah**, **Qayrik**, **Wahab**, **Said**, **As Safih**, and **Thaylm**. There have been recent improvements in roads, railroads, ports, electricity, and communications networks.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Damascus	- Fair telecomm currently being improved - 10 Radio stations - 40 TV stations - 1 Satellite station and 1 under construction	27,000 km	1,997 km	2	2	- Crude oil - Refined products	Yes	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Atlantic** ARG with its embarked MEU, which normally operates in the **Mediterranean Sea**, could reach **Syria** in less than two days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,043) in **Syria**, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would present numerous difficulties.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
42	1,043	45 (Damascus)	F

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:
Telephone:


USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FLA//J-2//
STU-III AV 968-6265

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-8C//
STU-III AV 243-4315

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-6//
STU-III AV 243-0597




SUMMARY

For some years, the **U.S.** has enjoyed a friendly, informal and mutually advantageous relationship with the **United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)**. This country has been an important source of petroleum for the **U.S.**, **Western Europe**, and **Japan**. The **U.A.E.** is also a significant importer of goods from the **U.S.** It has moderate sized armed forces compared to other countries in the region and is equipped with fairly modern systems. The **U.S.**, **France**, and the **U.K.** are the main suppliers of military equipment to the **U.A.E.** Expatriates from **Oman**, **Pakistan**, and **Jordan**, are heavily represented in the **U.A.E.** armed forces along with every other **Arab** country and **India**. The **U.A.E.** however, seeks to place its own citizens in leadership positions.

With an extreme cultural difference, a hot/dry climate, and primarily desert terrain, there would be some difficulties to overcome during **U.S.** military operations in this country. A major shortfall would be the limited mapping available. Only the northeastern part of the **U.A.E.** from the **Strait of Hormuz** to **Dubai**, and the area around **Abu Dhabi** have coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps. The country has several major airfields and ports to enable access by strategic airlift and sealift. There are a number of modern key installations in place throughout the country and many more new infrastructure projects are planned. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (5,000).

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES - THREAT SUMMARY




United Arab Emirates - 1

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in the UAE

Oil revenues have given the U.A.E. one of the highest gross national products in the world. The U.S. share of the U.A.E.'s oil exports is about 5.6 percent. The U.A.E. is also a significant importer of goods from the U.S. Overall U.S. equity in the U.A.E. is high.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
762	1,029	862	-	2,653	5,000	4 5	9	High

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers/SP	40	1	111	C

Ground OOB includes 40,000 troops, most of whom are volunteers. A large portion of the army is composed of foreign mercenaries from other **Arab** states, **Pakistan**, and the **U.K.** Tanks: AMX-30; Artillery: M-56 pack howitzer, Mk F-3 155mm SP, ROF 105mm.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	2	1	93	C

Fighter Aircraft: Hawk, Mirage 5AD, Mirage 2,000; Close Air: Alpha Jet, Hunter, Mirage 5AD; Air Defense: Crotale, Rapier, and RBS-70 SAMs and AA guns. This country is seeking and may already have acquired radar and telecommunications equipment for a ground-based air defense system. Negotiations for this equipment have been conducted with the **U.S.**, **U.K.**, and **U.S.S.R.**

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	HE	ASUW/Antiair	2	1	63	C

Ships: None; SSM: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 8 Fast Attack Craft-Missile with SSMs, SAMs (Crotale), guns, countermeasures, fire control, and radars; 6 Large Patrol Craft; 3 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Arabic (Persian, English)
Primary religion - Islam

There is a large cultural difference between the **U.A.E.** and the **U.S.**

United Arab Emirates - 3

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
57-100	70	3	Dry/Hot

The **U.A.E.** is largely a hot, dry desert where temperatures in the shade reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit. In the eastern mountains, the climate is cooler with enough rainfall to permit some cultivation.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
	X		

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

The terrain is mostly desert with a few agricultural areas.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Large portions of the **U.A.E.** are suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

It is estimated that over one-half of the **U.A.E.** is suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. This includes the flat, barren coast, the inland plain, and some of the large, virtually uninhabited wasteland which borders on **Saudi Arabia**. In the eastern highlands, tracked and vehicular movement is more restricted and channeled due to the dissected terrain conditions.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Optimum, with line of sight distances exceeding 2,000 meters.

Coastal areas of the **U.A.E.** are mainly barren and flat. Inland, the coastal plain gradually gives way to rolling sand dunes which eventually merge into the expansive wasteland called the Empty Quarter. Line of sight distances are considered to exceed 2,000 meters in more than 50 percent of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Fair NGF support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
62400/62449	16,100	Fair

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- U.S. NGF has an advantage in firepower over U.A.E. coastal defense weapons.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155mm SPG	18,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

Only the northeastern part of the U.A.E. to Dubai, and the area around Abu Dhabi have coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps.

Airfields

The U.A.E. is highly accessible by air with more than one airfield capable of accommodating C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
6	2 C-5 4 C-141B	4/2	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Abu Dhabi International	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Al Dhafra Air Base	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Bateen	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Dubai International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Ras al Khaimah International	C-141B, C-130	
Sharjah International	C-141, C-130	

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Ports

- The **U.A.E.** has several major ports which can handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Khor Al Fakkan	Small	36-40/-	36-40	Yes
Mina Saqr	Small	36-40/-	36-40	Yes
Port Rashid	Small	31-35/31-35	46-50	Yes
Mina Jebel Ali	Medium	Over 76/Over 76	36-40	-
Das	Small	71-75/36-40	16-20	-
Abu Dhabi	Small	31-35/31-35	46-50	Yes

Key Installations

The emirate of **Abu Dhabi** contains major oil producing facilities including the major **Ruwais** refinery complex and the **Upper Zakum** off-shore oil structure. The **U.A.E.** is planning the construction of a pipeline from the main oil fields in **Abu Dhabi** through **Fujairah** to the **Indian Ocean** to eliminate the need for its oil to pass through the **Strait of Hormuz**. While many modern facilities are in place currently, infrastructure projects such as roads, schools, and hospitals are still planned throughout the **U.A.E.**

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Abu Dhabi	- Adequate telecomm - 11 Radio stations - 12 TV stations - 4 Satellite stations	2,000 km	None	6	6	- Crude oil - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The **Pacific ARG** with its embarked **MEU** could reach the **U.A.E.** in less than two days. The **AAF/ACB** can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of potential evacuees (5,000), **NEO** conducted by a **MEU** under normal conditions would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
66	5,000	10 (Abu Dhabi)	F

Note: In **U.A.E.** the following factors are of little significance:


Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

WESTERN HEMISPHERE SUMMARY

The expeditionary environment countries in the **Western Hemisphere** are those that are shaded in gray on the accompanying map. Many of these countries are faced with existing ongoing conflicts and a high likelihood of continued instability in the 1990s. The deliberate sinking of a major vessel in the **Panama Canal** is a possible threat which would be difficult to defend against. As such threats begin to concern policy - makers, the prospects for the employment of **U.S.** forces in the region for preemptive attacks will increase. The war on drugs is developing into a real war and, **Latin America** in particular, offers a "target rich environment" where Marine Corps forces can expect to be on call to aid law enforcement agencies. The most common form of assistance will be wide - area surveillance and interdiction. This challenge will tax to the utmost Marine Corps reconnaissance, intelligence, and communications assets. Terrorism is an unpredictable global threat and **Latin America** has been the location for the greatest number of terrorist events. Terrorists do not have rules of engagement, and they generally cannot be detected until after they have struck. MAGTFs must plan for perimeter security and be able to conduct short notice preemptive raids to divert terrorists or assist in hostage rescue. Gray arms trafficking and technology theft are also possible reasons for employing Marine forces in the 1990s. **Panama**, for example, is a major transshipment site for computer technology enroute from the **U.S.** to **Eastern Europe** and as such could be a likely location for crisis response. Most countries in the **Western Hemisphere** had small-to-medium Orders of Battle (OOBs) capabilities. The countries with the most significant ground OOB resources were **Cuba, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Mexico**. Those with the largest air OOB were **Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru**. **Cuba** again had the region's largest naval OOB. Although these forces are somewhat modest compared to those of other regions, MAGTFs must be prepared to meet some strong opposition in these countries. Overall in the **Western Hemisphere**, **Peru, Mexico, and Cuba** emerged as representative of general conditions in the geographic region. Such countries would be good candidates for new and refined Marine Corps scenarios. In the area of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) weapons **Latin America** is relatively benign. Only **Cuba** is alleged to have used chemical weapons while operating in Angola. However, these weapons are rapidly proliferating and MAGTFs must be ready to deal with them while operating in any **Third World** country.

In the area of culture (language and religion) most **Western Hemisphere** countries were not found to be greatly different from the **U.S.** MAGTFs with strong **Spanish** language skills can generally communicate without difficulty with the people in the region. For operations in **Latin America** and the **Caribbean**, MAGTFs should be prepared for wet and hot conditions. In this region, over half the countries had significant mountain ranges while **Cuba, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela** were found to have highly urban populations. **Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Surinam** were predominately jungle. Of the 16 countries in the region that were addressed, 12 were found to be generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. Over 80 percent of the countries have poor intervisibility which precluded exploitation of line of sight weapons designed for engagements at 2,000 to 3,000 meters. In the **Western Hemisphere**, most of the countries have hydrographic conditions which did not prove to be a constraint to delivering Naval Gunfire (NGF) support. Only **Surinam** had unsatisfactory conditions. However, when considering a firepower advantage against the standard 5 inch gun on most **U.S.** Navy platforms, **Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela** have greater coastal defense firepower, while **Honduras and Nicaragua** have an equal capability. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) remains a critical problem area for Marine Corps forces. Only four countries in the region (**Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica**) had full coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps. Most countries such as **Colombia, El Salvador, and Panama** had partial coverage by 1:50,000 maps, while three countries (**Grenada, Mexico, and Surinam**) had none at all. In these latter countries MAGTFs must rely solely on Multispectral Imagery (MSI) to support ground combat operations. In the area of strategic mobility, half the countries in the region had more than one airfield able to accommodate C-5 aircraft. The other half had at least one airfield to receive C-5s. However, nine countries in the region (56 percent) had marginal ports, or none at all to accommodate strategic sealift. From the standpoint of key installations, and associated military targeting, **Cuba** was most relevant due to the possible presence of chemical weapons storage facilities. When looking at sea-based MEU response times, most countries in the region require in excess of six days to be reached. Only **Cuba** and parts of **Mexico** can be arrived at in less time. Despite emphasis in recent years on the importance of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), the study found that these operations would be extremely difficult to execute in 80 percent of the region's countries due primarily to the large number of potential evacuees (mainly **U.S.** citizens). Overall, the **Western Hemisphere** emerged among the most challenging and likely environments for the employment of expeditionary forces in the 1990s. This region is expected to present more opportunities and threats related to drugs and terrorism. It contains an equal mix of two tough types of terrain: mountains and large urban areas. Close combat, defined as engaging the enemy at less than 1,000 meters distant, will be the norm. Strategic air offers some relief against the lack of ready sea-launched forces.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TAB</u>
COLOMBIA	1
COSTA RICA	2
CUBA	3
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	4
EL SALVADOR	5
GRENADA	6
GUATEMALA	7
HAITI	8
HONDURAS	9
JAMAICA	10
MEXICO	11
NICARAGUA	12
PANAMA	13
PERU	14
SURINAME	15
VENEZULA	16

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COLOMBIA

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CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:
Telephone:

USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
STU-III AV 282-3209

DIA DB Desk Code:
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DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
STU-III AV 243-3096

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


SUMMARY

Colombia is the world's third largest producer of coca and the center of **South American** cocaine trafficking. It is involved in drug production and processing, and the distribution of precursor chemicals. Narco-terrorism is also a serious threat. Terrorist organizations operating in **Colombia** include the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and at least three others. **Colombia** has medium sized ground, air, and naval Order of Battle (OOB) capabilities as compared to other expeditionary environment countries.

A wet/hot climate, mountainous terrain, and high elevation make **Colombia** one of the most difficult countries in **South America** in which to conduct operations. This country is generally unsuited for cross-country movement by tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line-of-sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. There is only partial coverage of this country by 1:50,000 scale maps. This coverage exists for locations such as **Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Punta Chirambira** and the northern coastal area. The 1:50,000 scale maps are not available for the large riverine networks along **Colombia's** borders with **Venezuela** to the northeast and **Peru** to the south. From the standpoint of key installations, **Colombia** has numerous industrial sites plus oil fields and pipelines for crude oil, refined products, and natural gas. The typical response time for a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and move to **Colombia** is in excess of six days. In terms of the potential number of evacuees (over 18,000) and the distance they must be transported (217 nautical miles from off the coast to **Bogota**), the conduct of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) by a MEU would be very difficult. **Colombia** is accessible by air with three C-5 capable airfields (two are daylight only) and has three moderate size ports with **Santa Marta** having the best capabilities.

COLOMBIA - THREAT SUMMARY




Colombia - 1

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COLOMBIA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

Killings by guerrillas, death squads, and drug traffickers are common occurrences in **Colombia**. It has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between the different groups. Reports indicate that drug traffickers have laundered over \$5 billion during the past 10 years by using it to purchase real estate, including rural land. Guerrilla groups which operate in rural areas are subsidized by private armies which the drug barons set up to police them. The drug economy is thus a key element in **Colombian** agriculture as well as finances. The country has become accustomed to killings as the **Medellin** and **Call** drug cartels continue to feud among themselves and terrorize government officials.

U.S. Equities in Colombia

Generally, the record of **U.S.-Colombian** relations has been one of constructive cooperation. In recent years the two governments have closely cooperated in narcotics control efforts. Currently several prominent drug traffickers are being extradited from **Colombia** for trial in the **U.S.** **Colombia** is the third ranking trading partner with the **U.S.** in **Latin America**, after **Mexico** and **Venezuela**. There are about 18,000 **U.S.** citizens in **Colombia** and the total **U.S.** equity (direct investment and trade) amounts to over 5 billion dollars.

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Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2,037	1,411	1,737	12	5,197	18,000	5 6	11	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X	X	X		

- Third largest producer of coca.
1988 produced 19,000 - 24,200 metric tons
1987 produced 18,000 - 23,000 metric tons
1986 produced 12,000 - 13,600 metric tons
1985 produced 12,400 metric tons
- Center of **South American** cocaine trafficking.
- Largest producer of marijuana.
1988 produced 5,927 - 9,625 metric tons
1987 produced 3,435 - 7,760 metric tons
1986 produced 2,530 - 3,630 metric tons
1985 produced 2,000 - 4,000 metric tons

Colombia has destroyed more than 90 percent of cannabis growing in traditional northern areas, but traffickers have planted extensively in the **San Lucas Mountains** and south in **Cauca**. Marijuana tonnage increased in 1988 despite an aggressive eradication campaign. Coca cultivation increased above the 1987 level although eradication of 230 hectares was conducted manually. Despite police efforts to harass the **Medellin** cartel and other trafficking groups, large amounts of cocaine continued to flow to the **U.S.**; almost 20 metric tons were seized by **U.S.** Customs. Overall enforcement remains hampered by a judicial system that has been intimidated by violence. Drug profits flow into and out of **Colombia**, but money laundering per se is not a major activity.

Terrorism

Increased efforts against international narcotics trafficking are generating growing, violent reactions from the narcotics traffickers, who often employ the tactics of terror. A marriage of convenience between some traffickers and insurgents occasionally has produced common objectives in **Colombia** where assassination-for-hire arrangements have occurred between narcotics dealers and leftist terrorists.

M-19 is a leftist guerrilla group in **Colombia** with ties to **Cuba**, **Nicaragua**, and **Libya** which carried out nine attacks on international targets in 1988. In late March 1988 the group fired a rocket at the **U.S.** Embassy in **Bogota** to protest **U.S.** troop maneuvers in **Central America**.

Another terrorist group is **FARC**. It is reputed to be the largest, best-trained and equipped, and most effective insurgent organization in **South America**. Since May 1984, **FARC** has carried out terrorist actions such as extortion, kidnappings, and killings, as well as armed attacks against military units.

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The National Liberation Army (ELN) is a terrorist group of about 1,000 operating in **Colombia** and supported by **Cuba**. It has most recently concentrated its efforts on attacking petroleum pipelines and facilities, damaging **Colombia's** economic infrastructure and investment climate.

Colombia's democratic institutions are also threatened from terrorist attacks by narcotraffickers. Narcotics-connected violence has recently been intense and designed to intimidate government officials to allow unrestricted pursuit of the narcotics trade.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Colombia** constitutes the most serious threat in the combined areas of narcotics and terrorism.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	69	6	145	D

Ground OOB includes 69,000 troops of whom 25,800 are conscripts. The army has recently reorganized and is among the better counterinsurgency forces in the region. The tank is the M-3A1, and the primary artillery piece is the M-101.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	EW Radar	4	6	80	C

Fighter Aircraft: Kfir C-2; Close Air: AT-33A (light attack), Cessna A-37B, Mirage 5COA, T-37C; Air Defense: Cactus/Crotale SP SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	HE	ASUW/Antiair	9	6	95	D

Ships: 4 Frigates with SSMs and SAMs; SSMs: Exocet; Patrol Craft: 2 Fast Attack Craft with guns, fire control, and radars; 3 River Gun Boats; 2 Coastal Patrol Craft; 6 River Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Colombia** and the **U.S.**Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
58-82	56	81	Wet/Hot

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

The wet/hot and humid climate of **Colombia**, combined with significant elevation associated with mountainous terrain, makes operations difficult.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Colombia** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

In about two-thirds of **Colombia**, conditions for cross-country movement are unsuited at all times for tracked vehicles due to steep slopes, dense forest, soft ground, and streams and gullies with wide banks. In the remaining third of the country, much of the tracked movement is limited during the wet season, mid-April through November.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor.

Conditions in about two-thirds of **Colombia** limit line of sight distances to less than 1,000 meters. This is due to the large amount of broken and covered terrain including steep slopes, dense forests, and deep gullies.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- Good NGF support for amphibious operations.

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DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
21033/22040	1,610	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-101	11,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 map coverage exists for locations such as **Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Punta Chirambira** and the northern coastal area.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
10	3 C-5 4 C-141B 2 C-130 1 None	3/7	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Alfonso Bonilla Aragon (Cali)	C-141B, C-130	Daylight only. Daylight only. Narrow taxiway. The C-5s are limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway Weight Bearing Capacity (WBC), however a weight waiver is possible.
Ernest Cortesoz (Barranquilla)	C-141B, C-130	
Eldorado International (Bogota)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Polonegro (Bucaramanga)	C-141B, C-130	
Rafael Nunez (Cartagena, Crespo)	C-141B, C-130	
German Olano Air Base (Palanquero)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	
Jose Maria Cordova (Rionegro)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Low runway WBC.
Los Garzones (Monteria)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Olaya Herrera (Medellin)	None	Daylight/VFR only.
Sesquicentenario (San Andres)	C-130	

Ports

Three moderate size ports, with **Santa Marta** being most accessible.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Cartagena	Small	36-40/46-50	36-40	Yes
Barranquilla	Medium	26-30/56-60	31-35	Yes
Santa Marta	Small	Over 76/Over 76	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

Oil fields, industrial centers, and communications networks will make military operations more complex. Oil fields are found in the vicinity of **Santander, Norte de Santander, Putumayo**, and the **Guajira Peninsula**. There are exploratory wells in the eastern part of the country.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Bogota (Colombia's major industrial centers are Barranquilla, Cali, Medellin, and Bogota)	- Radio relay system - Satellite station - 439 Radio stations - 33 TV stations	75,450 km	3,563 km	3	10	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas - Natural gas liquids	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Colombia** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

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NEO

- NEO conducted in **Colombia** by a MEU would be very difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
444	18,000	217 (Bogota)	F

Note: In **Colombia** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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COSTA RICA

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:
Telephone:


USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
STU-III AV 282-3209

DIA DB Desk Code:
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DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache:
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DIRECT 506-20-2375; EMB: 506-20-3939
EXT: 2351/2361




SUMMARY

Costa Rica is a major trading partner with the **U.S.** and shares an interest in promoting democracy in **Central America**. This country is increasingly important as a transit point for narcotics, with estimates that 6 to 12 metric tons of cocaine are being transported through its territory yearly. **Libyan** terrorists are suspected of attacking **U.S.** citizens in **Costa Rica**. The armed forces of **Costa Rica** are practically negligible and this country would be hard pressed to defend itself from outside invasion.

With a hot, humid climate, dissected terrain, and thick ground cover, **U.S.** military operations in **Costa Rica** would prove difficult. A rugged, central massif runs the length of the country separating coastal plains. Trafficability by tracked vehicles would be severely limited and cross-country movement would be feasible only for foot troops. Due to the rough topography and jungle conditions, the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is restricted to the area around **San Jose**, the northern border with **Nicaragua**, the eastern coast on the **Caribbean**, and the southern border with **Panama**. One airfield is available at **San Jose** to accommodate C-5 aircraft. **Costa Rica** has three small ports, all having limited accessibility to strategic sealift. The estimated response time for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Costa Rica** is in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Costa Rica** would be quite difficult due to the sizeable number (20,000) of potential evacuees.

COSTA RICA - THREAT SUMMARY




Costa Rica - 1

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COSTA RICA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Costa Rica

- Shares with the U.S. an interest in promoting democracy in **Central America**.

This country shares with the U.S. an interest in, and has played an important role in, promoting democracy in **Central America**, including **Nicaragua**. **Costa Rica** is a major trading partner with the U.S.; 53 percent of its exports go to the U.S.; and 40 percent of its imports come from the U.S. The U.S. has also responded to **Costa Rica's** economic plight through developmental assistance and humanitarian aid. Overall U.S. equity in **Costa Rica** is high.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
120	415	492	159	1,186	20,000	3 6	9	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

- Cocaine transit country.

Costa Rica is increasingly important as a cocaine transit country, with estimates that 6 to 12 metric tons of cocaine are being transported through its territory by air and sea. Authorities remain vigilant to the possibility of labs being established; but no new labs were found in the last two years. Cannabis cultivation appears to be less extensive than previously estimated and the export trade is a minor enterprise.

Terrorism

- Terrorist attacks against **U.S.** citizens.

In April 1988, a bomb exploded near the **U.S.** binational cultural center in **San Jose, Costa Rica** in which several persons were injured. A group with ties to **Libya** was the prime suspect.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Costa Rica** is involved with both narcotics and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
PM	None	None	0	3	33	A

Costa Rica has no army. There is a 9,500 person paramilitary security force which is considered to be well trained and experienced. Tanks: none; Artillery: none.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Costa Rica has no airforce, therefore it has no aircraft or air defense weapons.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	Negligible	3	43	B

Ships: none; SSMs: none; Patrol Craft: 1 Fast Patrol Craft (118 displacement tons); 4 Coastal Patrol Craft; 11 Inshore Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Costa Rica** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
60-77	68	76	Wet/Hot

The climate is tropical in the lowlands and semitropical on the interior plateau.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

A rugged, central massif runs the length of the country separating coastal plains. There is dense ground cover throughout.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Costa Rica** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement would be feasible only for foot troops in most of **Costa Rica** due to rough or steep terrain, dense forests, and marshes and swamps. In limited areas of the country, tracked movement is feasible, but very difficult.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

In most of **Costa Rica**, the terrain is suitable only for light infantry and line of sight distances beyond 500 meters are infrequent. This is due to the rough or steep topography, dense forests, and marshes and swamps.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
21544/21546	1,830	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Negligible coastal defense threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
	0	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage exists for the area around the capital of **San Jose**, the northern border with **Nicaragua**, the eastern coast on the **Caribbean Sea**, and the southern border with **Panama**.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield at **San Jose** which can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
7	1 C-5 4 C-130 2 None	1/6	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Cabo Velas	None	-
Chacarita (Puntarenas)	None	-
Juan Santamaria International (San Jose)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Las Canas	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Limon International	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Santa Cruz	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Tomas Guardia International (Llano Grande)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

Three small ports are available with limited accessibility to strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Puerto Limon	Small	26-30/31-35	31-35	Yes
Puerto Golfito	Small	31-35/31-35	26-30	-
Puntarenas	Small	-/26-30	26-30	Yes

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Key Installations

While primarily an agricultural country **Costa Rica** is gradually improving its infrastructure. Key industrial facilities are located around **San Jose**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
San Jose	- Satellite station - Good telecomm system - Microwave connection - 71 Radio stations - 18 TV stations	15,400 km	800 km	3	7	- Refined products	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Costa Rica** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to the large number (20,000) of potential evacuees.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
54	20,000	35 (San Jose)	F

Note: In **Costa Rica** the following factors are of little significance:

- Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
- Ground OOB
- Air OOB
- NBC

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CUBA

MEF G-2:	CG II MEF//G-2//
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Theater J-2:	USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 564-6626
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-5//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-0619




SUMMARY

The primary **U.S.** equity in **Cuba** is the naval base at **Guantanamo Bay**. **U.S.** relations with **Cuba** have suffered in recent years due to its support for violent political change and its plans for expanding revolution in the **Caribbean** basin. **Cuba** is located along some of the primary drug routes from **South America** to the **U.S.** and has acted as a transit point for narcotics and provided support to traffickers. For nearly 30 years **Cuban** President Fidel Castro has been instrumental in sponsoring terrorism within **Latin America** and elsewhere. **Cuba** maintains close ties with the **M-19** insurgent group in **Colombia** and has helped them acquire arms, training, and supplies. Because of its involvement in drug trafficking, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, **Cuba** deserves special attention by military planners. This country also has the most experienced and powerful armed forces in **Latin America**. Most of its military equipment is obtained from the **Soviet Union**. **Cuba** reportedly has stocks of chemical weapons and allegedly used these weapons during the recent conflict in **Angola**.

With a semitropical climate and predominately flat or gently rolling terrain, **Cuba** would not pose as many problems to **U.S.** military operations as many other **Latin American** countries. The country is generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles and the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. While **U.S.** NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide adequate support for operations ashore, they are likely to be out-gunned by **Cuban** coastal defense weapons. The 1:50,000 scale maps which are available for **Cuba** may be somewhat outdated. The primary **Cuban** airfield outside of the **U.S.** facility at **Guantanamo Bay** is located at **Havana**. There are three major ports other than **Guantanamo Bay** but they have limited capability to handle strategic sealift. The estimated time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to deploy to **Cuba** is between two and six days.

CUBA - THREAT SUMMARY




Cuba - 1

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CUBA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Cuba

- Naval base at **Guantanamo Bay**.
- Other **U.S.** equities in **Cuba** are low.

The **U.S.** Naval Base at **Guantanamo Bay**, is leased to the **U.S.** and only mutual agreement or **U.S.** abandonment of the area can terminate the lease. Since the **U.S.** broke diplomatic relations with **Cuba** in 1961, **U.S.-Cuban** relations have been characterized by varying degrees of hostility.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	-	-	-	-	24	0 1	1	Low

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Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

- Drug transit point and support to traffickers.

Cuba is located on some of the primary drug routes into the **U.S.** and airlift and sealift are reportedly eluding **U.S.** agents by entering **Cuban** territorial waters or airspace. In the past, **U.S.** officials have accused **Cuban** officials of involvement, and indictments were returned against four ranking officials in 1982. **Cuban** authorities have publicly expressed an interest in antidrug cooperation with the **U.S.** but have not elaborated on what kind of cooperation they envision.

Terrorism

- **Cuba** sponsors terrorism in **Latin America** and elsewhere.

For nearly 30 years now, **Cuban** President Fidel Castro has trained and supported guerrillas from many parts of the world, including **Palestinians**, who have relied in part on terrorist operations against noncombatants to advance their political aims. **Cuba** has maintained a large and complex apparatus for subversion that has substantially assisted guerrilla movements throughout **Latin America**, and many of **Latin America's** radical leftist organizations look to Castro for guidance and advice.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Cuba has maintained close ties with the M-19 insurgent group in **Colombia** and has helped them acquire arms, training, and supplies. Arms obtained from external sources were reportedly provided to M-19 guerrillas while they were being trained in **Cuba**. The **U.S.S.R.** has been a primary provider of arms to **Latin American** insurgent groups and has frequently used **Cuba** as a transit point for moving these arms.

Consolidated Threat

Cuba deserves special attention by military planners because of its involvement in all three of the threat categories: drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

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General Ground OOB

- **Cuba** has the largest ground OOB in the region.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	T-72	Bloc	145	15	300	E

Ground OOB includes about 145,000 troops which includes 15,000 ready reservists and 60,000 conscripts. There has been a recent increase in **Cuban** overall military strength. This country has the most experienced and powerful military in **Latin America**. Tanks: PT-76, T-54, T-55, T-62, T-72; Artillery: FROG SSM, Guns/howitzers including 76 mm, 85 mm, 122 mm, 130 mm, 152 mm.

General Air OOB

- **Cuba** has the largest air OOB in the region.

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Bloc	Early Smart	Bloc	19	15	164	E

Fighter Aircraft: MiG-19, MiG-21, MiG-23; Close Air: Mi-24, MiG-17, MiG-23BN; Air Defense: SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, SA-13, and SA-14 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

- **Cuba** has the largest naval OOB in the region.

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	Bloc	Bloc	14	15	159	E

Ships: 2 Frigates (**Soviet** Koni Class) with SAMs, guns, and antisubmarine mortars; SSM: SS-N-2 Styx; Patrol Craft: 5 Fast Attack Craft-Missile (**Ex-Soviet**); 3 Fast Attack Craft-Patrol (**Ex-Soviet**); 9 Fast Attack Craft-Hydrofoil (**Ex-Soviet**), 2 Large Patrol Craft (**Ex-Soviet**).

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threat

- The **Soviets** have reportedly supplied chemical weapons to **Cuba** since 1970.
- **Cuba** is alleged to have used chemical weapons in **Angola**.

Reports have indicated that **Soviet**-supplied chemical weapons similar to "yellow-rain" have existed in **Cuba** since 1970. **Cuba** is alleged to have used chemical weapons in **Angola**. Two nuclear power reactors are under construction. No nuclear weapons are suspected.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**Culture (Language and Religion)**

Primary language - Spanish
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Cuba** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
70-84	63	48	Mixed

Cuba is in the tradewind belt, making its climate generally semitropical.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

Cuba is the largest island in the **West Indies**. About three-fifths of the country is flat or gently rolling with many wide, fertile valleys or plains. The remaining two-fifths is mountainous or hilly. About 70 percent of the population is urban.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Cuba** is generally suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement of vehicles would be feasible in most of **Cuba**. In some areas--on the low plains bordering some coastal zones, in dense forests, and in steep and rougher terrain--movement would be precluded most of the year.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Line of sight visibility is generally restricted to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

While more than half of the country is flat, there is forest and savanna over roughly two-thirds of the land area. It is estimated that line of sight distances of between 1,000 and 2,000 meters can be found in many coastal and inland locations.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

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DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
27083/27084	1,830	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal defense weapons.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
FROG SSM	70,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage with old 1:50,000 scale map.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
3	1 C-5 1 C-141B 1 C-130	1/2	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
McCalla Field (Guantanamo Bay) Guantanamo Bay Naval Air Station	C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only.
Jose Marti International (Havana)	C-141B, C-130	

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Ports

- Three moderate size ports with limited capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
La Habana	Medium	36-40/31-35	36-40	Yes
Caibarien	Small	26-30/31-35	6-10	-
Cienfuegos	Medium	26-30/26-30	26-30	-

Key Installations

There are suspected storage facilities for chemical weapons in **Cuba**, probably in the vicinity of **Havana**. Two nuclear power reactors are being built.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
None (U.S. Interests Section is in the Swiss Embassy in Havana)	- Satellite ground station - 148 Radio stations - 52 TV stations	21,000 km	14,921 km	3	3	None	None	C

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Cuba** is between two and six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO


- Based on the small number of potential evacuees (24) and the short distance to the probable evacuation site (Havana), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would not be difficult. (This does not address NEO at the **Guantanamo Bay** Naval Base.)

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
0	24	0 (Havana)	D

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC


MEF G-2:	CG II MEF//G-2//
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DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache:	USDAO SANTO DOMINGO DR//DATT//
Telephone:	EMB SWITCH: (809) 541-2171, EXT 220/ 221; DIRECT: (809) 687-5222

SUMMARY

The **Dominican Republic** is geographically the largest and most populous democratic country in the **Caribbean**. It associates closely with the **U.S.** and other states of the inter-American system. **U.S.** firms account for nearly all foreign private investment in the **Dominican Republic** and bilateral trade is important to both countries. Because of numerous small airfields and ports, the **Dominican Republic** has become a favored staging area and refueling stop for narcotics traffickers from **South America** smuggling cocaine into the **U.S.** Although the armed forces are relatively modest, they are well trained and equipped to fight internal guerrilla movements.

A maritime tropical climate and mountainous terrain with dense ground cover would pose some problems for **U.S.** military operations in this country. A mountain range with some high elevations crosses the middle of the country. The rough terrain makes conditions generally unsuitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. Likewise, the broken terrain, dense forests, and frequent heavy rainfall causes the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to be less than 1,000 meters. The 1:50,000 scale maps which are available for the **Dominican Republic** may be somewhat outdated. While several C-5 capable airfields are available in this country, the four major ports have restricted capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift. The estimated time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to the **Dominican Republic** is in excess of six days. With an approximate number of evacuees that could reach 69,000, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in this country would require an extraordinary effort.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - THREAT SUMMARY



Dominican Republic - 1

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U.S. Equities in the Dominican Republic

- The **Dominican Republic** is a country friendly to the **U.S.**, strategically located in the **Caribbean**.

This country is geographically the largest and most populous democracy in the **Caribbean**. It shares the island of **Hispaniola** with **Haiti**. The **Dominican Republic** maintains cordial relations with the **U.S.** It is located near **Cuba**, as well as astride major shipping lanes between the **Gulf of Mexico** and **Europe**. Bilateral trade is important to both countries, and **U.S.** firms account for nearly all foreign private investment in the **Dominican Republic**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
86	1,142	1,217	62	2,507	69,000	4 6	10	High

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Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

- Staging area and refueling site for cocaine traffickers.

The **Dominican Republic** has become an ideal staging area and refueling stop for traffickers smuggling cocaine into the **U.S.** Some marijuana is also transshipped by traffickers, who are attracted by the island's 63 airstrips.

Consolidated Threat

In the region of **Latin America**, the **Dominican Republic** is involved only in the drug threat.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	13	1	84	B

Ground OOB includes about 13,000 volunteers. The army is well trained and equipped to fight internal guerrilla movements. Tanks: AMX-13, M-41A1; Artillery: M-101.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	Props	Early AAA	5	1	36	B

Fighter Aircraft: P51D, T-34B; Close Air: T-28D; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Frigate	None	Lg Gun Boats	15	1	56	C

Ships: 1 Frigate and 5 Corvettes with guns and radars; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 7 Large Patrol Craft; 8 Coastal Patrol Craft.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish (French and English)

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between the **Dominican Republic** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
77-86	64	56	Mixed

The **Dominican Republic** has a maritime tropical climate. Ocean currents and year-round trade winds moderate the heat of the tropics.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

A mountain range with the highest peaks in the **Caribbean** crosses the middle of the country. The **Cibao**, a large fertile valley to the north is a major agricultural area.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- The **Dominican Republic** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Conditions for tracked movement are perennially unsuited in about 80 percent of the country due to steep hills and mountains, severely dissected plains, dense forests, and swamps and marshes. In the remainder of the country--chiefly the nearly flat rolling plains in the southeast, and in the valleys of the **Rio Camu** and **Rio Yaque de Norte**--conditions are fair, but may preclude movement during the wet season.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances generally less than 1,000 meters.

A large part of the **Dominican Republic** consists of mountains, rough plains, dense ground cover, and swamps with thick growth. These terrain conditions plus the heavy rainfall would limit line of sight distances to under 1,000 meters in practically all of the country except for the nearly flat rolling plains in the southeast.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
25848	732	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-101	11,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage with old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
10	3 C-5 4 C-130 3 None	1/9	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Arroyo Barril (Samana City)	None	-
Barahma	None	-
Cabo Rojo	None	-
Cibao International (Santiago)	C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Constanza Air Base	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
De Las Americas International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
La Romana	C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Puerto Plata International (La Union)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Narrow taxiway for C-5s.
Punta Cana	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
San Isidro Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.

Ports

- Four ports with restricted capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Santa Domingo	Small	31-35/36-40	31-35	Yes
Rio Haina	Small	36-40/-	36-40	Yes
Barahona	Small	31-35/41-45	31-35	Yes
Cabo Rojo	Small	31-35/41-45	31-35	-

Key Installations

Communications, transportation, and industrial facilities are relatively numerous and gradually improving.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Santo Domingo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good telecomm systems - 123 Radio stations - 18 TV stations - Satellite stations 	12,000 km	1,655 km	4	10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Crude oil - Refined products 	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to the **Dominican Republic** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the very large number of potential evacuees in the **Dominican Republic** (69,000), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be complex and require additional support.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
30	69,000	0 (Santo Domingo)	F

Note: In the **Dominican Republic** the following factors are of little significance:

Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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EL SALVADOR

MEF G-2: Telephone:	CG I MEF//G-2// STU-III AV 365-9103
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DIA DB Desk Code: Telephone:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C// STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache: Telephone:	USDAO SAN SALVADOR ES//DATT// 503-26-7100, EXT 2400/2401; DIRECT 503-26-3062




SUMMARY

In **El Salvador**, recent conflict has caused Government instability and extreme hardship for the population. Right-wing death squads financed by wealthy exiles commit assassinations and acts of terrorism. Left-wing guerrillas, supported by **Cuba** and the **Nicaraguan** Sandinistas, conduct raids and disruption; while **U.S.**-backed Government forces battle both sides. Land reform continues to be the central issue of dispute. **U.S.-Salvadoran** relations have been cordial and close. The **U.S.** provides assistance to the **Salvadoran** Government in its efforts to build democratic institutions and promote stability. **El Salvador** is reported to be a transit point for cocaine enroute to the **U.S.** from **South America**. The terrorist group FMLN operates in this country, primarily in **San Salvador**, and is sponsored and supported by **Cuba**, the **Nicaraguan** Sandinistas, the **Soviet Union**, and **Vietnam**. In the **Western Hemisphere**, **El Salvador** constitutes a serious problem due to its internal turmoil and its involvement in terrorism and narcotics. The country has moderate sized armed forces which, through support from the **U.S.**, has improved its capabilities against the insurgents.

With a hot, humid climate and mountainous terrain with dense ground cover, **U.S.** military operations in **El Salvador** would present some difficulties. Due to steep hills and mountains, cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be impractical in most of the country. The dissected land and thick vegetation would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. There are parts of the northern border with **Honduras** which lack coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps. A major shortfall in **El Salvador** is that it has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift. The estimated response time for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and move to **El Salvador** is in excess of six days.


EL SALVADOR - THREAT SUMMARY



El Salvador - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Right-wing death squads are financed by wealthy exiles.
- Left-wing guerrillas supported by **Cuba** and **Nicaragua** conduct raids.
- **U.S.** backed Government forces battle both factions.

Land reform has been a central issue. The Government developed a strong land-reform policy, but its implementation has been sporadic and right-wing critics have tried to stop the program. Moderates in **El Salvador**, those who have not fled or been slain, press for a centrist "government of national reconciliation" that would try to incorporate all but the most extreme political elements. This is almost as impossible as trying to stop the right-wing death squads and the left-wing guerrilla raids and terror bombings. The Government is trying to convince the peasants that reform is progressing, to stop left- and right-wing violence, and to ensure continued **U.S.** support. The Government also claims that putting an end to outside support for left- and right-wing violence is beyond its means. Right-wing death squads are financed by wealthy exiles living in **Miami** and elsewhere. The left is supplied by **Nicaragua** and **Cuba**.

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The right wing wants to roll back land reform. Assassination and terror are its tactical methods. The right wing says that labor organizers and clergy who talk about the health needs of peasants are just troublemakers. It argues that the old patriarchal system provided stability.

Left-wing rebels plan to remain in the field. They will continue hitting isolated army posts, seizing and holding villages until the army responds, then engaging Government main-force units when such units are vulnerable. Urban hit-and-run raids and economic disruption also play a part in their strategy. The rebels dynamite electric generators, bridges, and railroads, damaging the economy. Shooting up buses and trucks further weakens the transportation-and-distribution networks. And the right-wing rebels have no monopoly on terror. Assassination of key opponents remains a classic revolutionary tool; the ideal is to shift the blame to someone else.

U.S. Equities in El Salvador

- Non-communist Government which is trying to promote democracy in the region.

U.S.-Salvadoran relations have traditionally been cordial and close. The **U.S.** provides assistance to the **Salvadoran** Government in its effort to build democratic institutions and promote stability in the **Central American** region.

The **U.S.** receives 46 percent of **El Salvador's** exports and provides 32 percent of its imports.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
13	352	354	414	1,133	51	3 1	4	Low

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

El Salvador has been reported to be a transit point for cocaine enroute to the **U.S.** from **South America**.

Terrorism

- FMLN operates in this country sponsored by **Cuba**, **Nicaragua**, **U.S.S.R.**, and **Vietnam**.

The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) is a Marxist-Leninist group supported by **Cuba**, **Nicaragua**, the **U.S.S.R.** and **Vietnam** which operates against the Government of **El Salvador**. In 1988, the FMLN stated its intention to increase terrorism in the capital of **San Salvador** and have since carried through with this intention. The guerrillas have warned that **U.S.** personnel would be targeted and there have been a number of terrorist incidents against **U.S.** facilities.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **El Salvador** constitutes a serious threat in the combined areas of narcotics and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Rog/Exp	LAV	Howitzers	39	8	127	C

Ground OOB includes about 39,000 troops which includes some conscripts. The U.S. provides training and support which has improved capabilities against insurgents. Tanks: AMX-13, M-3; Artillery: M-101, M-102, M-114.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	EW Radar	2	8	80	C

Fighter Aircraft: Super Mystere; Close Air: Cessna A-37, Magister; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	2	8	50	C

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 3 Large Gun Boats (100 displacement tons); 8 Small Gun Boats; 20 Small Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between El Salvador and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
64-90	56	70	Wet/Hot

The climate of El Salvador is semitropical with distinct wet and dry seasons.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Mountains separate the country into three regions: the southern coastal belt; central valleys and plateaus; and northern mountains.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **El Salvador** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be impractical in most of **El Salvador**. Steep hills and mountains, very rough lava flows, and mangrove swamps would preclude vehicular movement at all times in about 70 percent of the country.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances generally less than 1,000 meters.

Steep hills and mountains, frequent lava flows, and covered mangrove swamps preclude line of sight distances beyond 1,000 meters over most of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
21520/21524	1,000	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-114	14,600	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available for most of **El Salvador** except for parts of its northern border with **Honduras**.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield at **San Salvador (Cuscatlan)** which can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
12	1 C-5 1 C-141B 4 C-130 6 None	1/11	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Cangrejera	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Casas Nuevas (La Carrera)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
El Obrajuelo	None	-
El Papalon	None	-
San Salvador International (Cuscatlan)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
El Triunfo	None	-
Golfito	None	-
Hacienda La Mesitas	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Hacienda Madre Sal	None	-
Ilopango (San Salvador)	C-141B, C-130	Airfield has obstacles. Daylight only.
Laguna de Maquigue	None	-
Tamarindo	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

El Salvador has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift.

Key Installations

With numerous economic and financial problems, communications, transportation, and industrial facilities in **El Salvador** remain austere.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
San Salvador	- Radio relay system - Microwave connection - 79 Radio stations - 5 TV stations	10,000 km	602 km	0	12	None	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **El Salvador** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Based on the few number of potential evacuees (131) and the short distance (177 nautical miles) to the likely evacuation site (**San Salvador**), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal circumstances would not be difficult.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
80	51	17 (San Salvador)	C


Note: In **El Salvador** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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GRENADA

MEF G-2:	CG II MEF//G-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 484-8095
Theater J-2:	USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 564-6626
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAH-5//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-0619




SUMMARY

The island of **Grenada** is strategically located adjacent to sea lanes off the coast of **South America**. This country can be an influence in the region without the risks and costs of continental involvement. In October 1983 a joint **U.S.-Caribbean** force landed in **Grenada** after a breakdown in civil order to evacuate **U.S.** citizens and help restore the peace. A **U.S.** Agency for International Development (AID) mission assists the **Grenadian** Government in its reconstruction and development efforts. The security in **Grenada** is maintained by the Royal **Grenada** Police Force which includes an 80-man paramilitary unit and a 30-man Coast Guard. The **U.S.** Army and Coast Guard provide periodic training for these forces.

Grenada is a volcanic island with a central mountainous rain forest and tropical climate. While cross-country movement of tracked vehicles is generally feasible on the cultivated coastal plains, it would not be possible in the heavily forested ridges of the interior. The broken terrain, thick ground cover, and frequent heavy rainfall would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is not available for **Grenada**. The **Point Salines** International Airport can handle C-5 aircraft and the port at **St. George** can readily accommodate strategic sealift. Major infrastructure improvement involve the upgrading of road, electricity, and communications systems. The estimated time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to **Grenada** is in excess of six days. Due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,020), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Grenada** would be difficult.

GRENADA - THREAT SUMMARY




Grenada - 1

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GRENADA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Grenada

- Strategic location in the **Caribbean**.

This island is strategically located near a vital region. The power that controls it can be commercially, politically, and militarily active without the greater costs and risks of continental involvement.

A **U.S.** AID mission assists the **Grenadian** Government in its reconstruction and development efforts. In the area of trade, 27 percent of **Grenada's** exports go to the **U.S.** while 20 percent of its imports are provided by the **U.S.**

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
1	14	9	5	29	1,000	1 3	4	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/NoTR	None	None	0	0	0	A

Grenada has no army but does have a security force, consisting of 80 personnel, receives **U.S.** training and equipment. In addition, the country has a 550-man police force. Tanks: none; Artillery: none.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Sm Gun Boats	Negligible	0	30	A

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 3 Small Gun Boats, 3 Speed Boats.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - English

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a very small cultural difference between **Grenada** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
70-84	High	60-150	Wet/Hot

Tropical hot, humid climate.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

Grenada is a volcanic island with a central mountainous rain forest.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Portions of **Grenada** are suitable for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Tracked movement is generally feasible on the cultivated coastal plains. The heavily forested ridges in the interior would limit tracked movement.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

A verdant rain forest covers the center of the island while a mountain ridge forms a spine down the length of the island. Rainfall is frequent, particularly in the mountains. It is estimated that line of sight distances up to 1,000 meters would be feasible only on the cultivated coastal plains. The heavily forested and rugged terrain in the interior would severely limit the employment of armor and antiarmor weapons.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
25400/25481	2,415	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
-	0	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage is not available for **Grenada**.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
2	1 C-5 1 C-130	0/2	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Pearls Point Salines International (Salines)	C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- One port with adequate capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
St. George	Small	41-45/41-45	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

Well financed public works projects have improved development and produced a number of modern communications and transportation facilities.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
St. George	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Automatic telecomm External comm links 1 Radio station 1 TV station 	1,000 km	None	1	2	None	None	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Grenada** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by MEU under normal conditions in **Grenada** would be difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,020).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
20	1,000	0 (St. George)	F

Note: In **Grenada** the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
Ground, Air, and Naval OOB
NBC

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GUATEMALA

MEF G-2:	CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 365-9103
Theater J-2:	USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 282-3209
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache:	USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT//DATT//
Telephone:	311541, EXT 221/222; DIRECT 011-502-2-317804




SUMMARY

In **Guatemala**, there are continuing domestic, economic, and social problems as well as human rights violations. The **Guatemalan** Government conducts ongoing counterinsurgency operations against communist guerrillas. Relations between the **U.S.** and **Guatemala** have been good and the **U.S.** has helped this country address many of its problems. The **U.S.** exports oil from **Guatemala** and strives to maintain a mutually beneficial trade relationship. **Guatemala** produces a relatively small amount of opium and marijuana and acts as a transit point for cocaine moving to the **U.S.** and precursor chemicals being shipped to **South America**. The URNG is a terrorist group sponsored by **Cuba** which operates in **Guatemala** to promote disorder and instability. Within the region, close attention should be paid to **Guatemala** by military planners due to its involvement in both drug trafficking and terrorism. This country has a moderate sized army, but a small air force and navy. Some military personnel receive training in the **U.S.** and other countries in the region.

Most of the country is mountainous with a fairly narrow coastal plain on the **Pacific** side and fertile river valleys bordering the **Caribbean**. The climate is temperate in the highlands and semitropical on the coasts. Due to the mountainous terrain, **Guatemala** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The geography, together with frequent heavy rainfall, normally limits the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is available for most of **Guatemala** except for the northern extension called the Department of Peten. While more than one airfield is available to handle C-5 aircraft, only one port, with limited capability, can accommodate strategic sealift. Key installations include oil fields in the **Rubelsanto** area. The estimated time for an east coast MEU to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to **Guatemala** is in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Guatemala** would be very difficult due to the 6,500 potential evacuees.


GUATEMALA - THREAT SUMMARY



Guatemala - 1

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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Ongoing counterinsurgency operations against communist guerrillas.
- Unresolved domestic, economic, and social problems.

Since the early 1960s, the Government of **Guatemala** has been engaged in counterinsurgency operations against Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. The insurgency lost considerable ground in the late seventies, but has begun to revive, due partially to a rising level of unrest in **Central America**, but primarily to unresolved domestic, economic, and social problems.

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U.S. Equities in Guatemala

- Support for regional peace efforts.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is moderate.

Relations between the **U.S.** and **Guatemala** traditionally have been good. **Guatemala's** major diplomatic interests are related to regional security issues, and it has been an active participant in the Contadora process.

In the area of trade, the **U.S.** receives about 35 percent of **Guatemala's** exports which includes crude petroleum, coffee, sugar, and bananas. The **U.S.** provides about 37 percent of **Guatemala's** imports consisting mainly of agricultural chemicals, machinery, trucks, buses, aircraft, food products, and textiles.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
123	407	350	156	1,036	6,500	3 5	8	Medium

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X		X		X

- Producer of opium and marijuana.
- Transit point for cocaine and precursor chemicals.

Guatemala increased in importance to the **U.S.** drug situation as larger amounts of opium and marijuana were produced during the past year. **U.S.** officials estimate that as much as 150 kilograms of heroin are smuggled into the **U.S.**, probably under control of **Mexican** traffickers. **Guatemala** is also important to the cocaine trade, serving as a transit point for narcotics headed for **Florida**, **Louisiana**, and **Texas** and for precursor chemicals destined for **South America**.

Terrorism

The **Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)** is a terrorist organization sponsored by **Cuba** which operates in rural **Guatemala**. The URNG is anti-**U.S.** and has conducted assassinations of civilians and economic sabotage as well as attacks against the **Guatemalan Army**.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Guatemala** is involved in the two threat areas of narcotics and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	40	1	111	C

Ground OOB includes about 40,000 regular troops. About 75 percent of army personnel are long-service volunteers. Officers are sent to army schools in the U.S. and other countries. Military pay is inadequate and personnel are allowed to obtain other means of income. Tanks: AMX-13, M-3, M-41A3; Artillery: 75 mm, 105 mm.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	Early AAA	1	1	52	B

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	1	1	42	B

Ships: none; SSMs: none; Patrol Craft: 1 Large Gun Boat; 7 Small Gun Boats.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish (Maya)

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Guatemala** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
58-78	65	52	Mixed

The climate is temperate in the highlands and semitropical on the coasts.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

The terrain is mostly mountainous. The **Pacific** plain is a fairly narrow belt between the mountains and ocean while the **Caribbean** lowlands have fertile river valleys.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Guatemala** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement of vehicles would be precluded in about 90 percent of the country, as well as in the rest of the country during seasonal rains. Some tracked movement would be feasible in scrub-covered and cultivated areas along the **Pacific** coast.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Guatemala is mainly mountainous with much ground cover. Rainfall which would obscure visibility is heaviest from May to October with up to 200 inches accumulated in a year. Along the **Caribbean** coast, however, rainfall is frequent throughout the year. Line of sight distances are expected to be less than 1,000 meters over about 90 percent of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
21510	3,220	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-101	11,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is available for large parts of the country except for the sparsely populated Department of Peten in the north.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
3	2 C-5 1 C-130	1/2	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
La Aurora (Guatemala City) Puerto Barrios Santa Elena	C-5, C-141B, C-130 C-130 C-5, C-141B, C-130	- Daylight/VFR only. Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

One small port is available with limited capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Santo Tomas	Small	26-30/26-30	26-30	Yes

Key Installations

Primary oil fields in **Guatemala** are located at **Rubelsanto**. Recent development of its hydroelectric resources has made **Guatemala** self-sufficient in electrical energy.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Guatemala City	- Satellite station - Fairly good telecomm - 104 Radio stations - 24 TV stations - Microwave connection	26,429 km	870 km	1	3	- Crude oil	Yes	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Guatemala** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Guatemala** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (6,500).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
48	6,500	43 (Guatemala City)	F

Note: In **Guatemala** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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HAITI

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG II MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 484-8095

Theater J-2:
Telephone:

USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J-2//
STU-III AV 564-6626

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

USDAO PORT AU PRINCE HA//DATT//
DIRECT 011-509-1-29397
EMB SWITCH 011-509-1-20200/20368,
EXT 236/237




SUMMARY


Haiti is one of the most underdeveloped and repressed states in the **Western Hemisphere**. Government instability and human rights violations have prevailed through numerous regimes. The U.S. has sought to foster constructive and cooperative relations with Haiti which occupies an important location on the western third of the island of Hispaniola in the **Caribbean Sea**. While U.S. equity in Haiti is not high, about 6,000 U.S. citizens reside in the country and a bilateral trade relationship is maintained. Haiti is being used increasingly as a transshipment center for cocaine moving to the U.S. from **South America**. It has a small, poorly trained and equipped armed force. Military officers are frequently involved in corruption and attempts to overthrow the government.

Haiti consists of rough, mountainous terrain and has a generally semiarid climate. Cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would not be possible in most of the country due to the broken terrain, swamps, and marshes. The geography and significant ground cover also limits the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. Coverage of this country by older 1:50,000 scale maps is likely to be outdated. **Port-au-Prince** International Airport is able to accommodate C-5 aircraft but the single major port, also at **Port-au-Prince**, has restricted capability to receive strategic sealift. The estimated response time for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and move to Haiti is in excess of six days. Due to the potential requirement to evacuate about 6,000 persons from Haiti, NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

HAITI - THREAT SUMMARY



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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Poorest and most repressed state in the Americas.
- Government instability and human rights violations prevail.

Haiti remains one of the poorest countries in the world, suffering shortages of most resources as well as the skilled labor needed for instituting reform. Haiti's recent history was marked by the strong and autocratic rule of the late President Francois Duvalier, and to a lesser extent his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier. Since the younger Duvalier relinquished power in 1986, there has been even greater Government instability and a series of coups or attempted coups. The Government's human rights record has recently come under increasing criticism. Also, the Tontons Macoutes, a former presidential security force, remains a source of potential violence. Cuban activities against Haiti are noteworthy, particularly since the Cuban ouster from Grenada.

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U.S. Equities in Haiti

- Haiti is a non-communist country strategically located in the Caribbean.
- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

U.S. policy seeks to foster constructive and cooperative relations with Haiti, which occupies a strategic location on the western third of the island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean Sea. Although poor and underdeveloped, Haiti is presently transitioning to democracy and has no strong ties with communist countries.

The U.S. purchases about 75 percent of Haiti's exports. Some 60 percent of Haitian imports come from the U.S., including machinery, food products, petroleum, and cotton textiles. The U.S. Agency for International Development provides assistance to Haiti.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
24	204	145	92	465	6,000	1 5	6	Medium

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

- The weak, unstable Government of Haiti is unable to control drug trafficking and transshipment.

Haiti improved its drug interdiction efforts in 1988, despite two coups and four Governments. Seizures increased substantially in 1988, thanks in part to a new Center for Information and Coordination at Port au Prince airport, but the volume of trafficking remains beyond the capability of the narcotics police. U.S. enforcement agencies are concerned that the uncertain situation in Haiti and lack of strong control by the central Government has led to the increasing use of Haitian waters and Haitian-registered vehicles for the transshipment of cocaine. Although corruption remains a problem, the Government did remove from service a number of military officers suspected of involvement.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	7	0	77	B

Ground OOB consists of about 7,000 volunteers. The army has many roles including internal security, fire-fighting, and immigration. Training in the armed forces is marginal. Tanks: M-5A1; Artillery: 75 mm, 105 mm.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	Props	Early AAA	Negligible	0	30	B

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: Cessna 0-2A (COIN); Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	Negligible	0	40	B

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 1 Large Gun Boat (860 displacement tons); 11 Small Coastal Patrol Craft; 2 Small Harbor Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - French (Creole)
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between Haiti and the U.S.

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-88	49	53	Mixed

Although in the tropics, Haiti is generally semiarid due to the mountains between Haiti and the Dominican Republic that cut off the moist trade winds.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

About two thirds of the country is rough, mountainous terrain.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Haiti is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be infeasible in most of Haiti due to steep hills and mountains, roughly dissected plains, and swamps and marshes. Conditions are fair for tracked movement along the coast plains.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Most of Haiti consists of rough, mountainous terrain which would severely limit line of sight distances for the employment of extended range direct-fire weapons. Along the coastal plains occasional line of sight distances may be possible up to 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
26100/26190	5,635	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
105 mm M-101	11,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage with old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
	X				

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
3	1 C-5 2 None	0/3	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Bowen Field	None	-
Cap Haitien	None	-
Port-au-Prince International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Narrow runway for C-5.

Ports

One small port is available with limited capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Port au Prince	Small	26-30/31-35	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

Most of Haiti's communications and transportation facilities are barely adequate. Although outside agencies such as the U.S. AID provides assistance, infrastructure development progresses very slowly.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Port-au-Prince	- Barely adequate telecomm - 30 Radio stations - 4 TV stations - Satellite station	4,000 km	40 km	1	3	None	None	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to Haiti is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Haiti would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (6,000).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
35	6,000	0 (Port-au-Prince)	F

Note: In Haiti the following factors are of little significance:

Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

YAPU NEW JACQUES 804

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
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Telephone:DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
STU-III AV 243-3096Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO//DATT//
504-31-2906SUMMARY

Honduras feels threatened by the conflict in **El Salvador** and by potential further aggression and hostility of the **Nicaraguan Sandinistas**. It is the least developed country in **Central America** and faces serious economic and social problems. The **U.S.** and **Honduras** maintain close, cordial relations and work together to promote stability in the region. With moderate overall equity in **Honduras**, the **U.S.** supplies about 35 percent of the country's imports and buys more than half its exports. About 3,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Honduras**. In recent years, **Honduras** has been a transit point for **Colombian** cocaine moving to the **U.S.** Several terrorist groups sponsored by **Cuba** and the **Nicaraguan Sandinistas** operate in **Honduras** to promote disorder and instability. **Honduras** has a small armed force which in the past has been poorly trained but recently seems to be improving. In response to the threat of insurgency, **Honduras** has concentrated on building a mobile deterrent force with a strong counterterrorism capability.

With a hot, humid climate, mountainous terrain, and heavy vegetation, **Honduras** would pose some difficulties for **U.S.** military operations. These conditions would preclude cross-country movement of tracked vehicles in most of the country. The steep hills and mountains, dense forests, and frequent abundant rainfall would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. While the hydrography would permit NGF platforms to approach the coast and provide adequate support for operations ashore, **Honduras** coastal defense weapons would present a significant threat. A serious shortfall for military operations would be the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage for eastern **Honduras** and the border area with **El Salvador**. Three airfields are available to handle C-5 aircraft but there is only one major port with limited capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift. By modern standards, communications and ground transportation facilities in **Honduras** are generally poor. The response time for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coast to embark on amphibious ships and proceed to **Honduras** is estimated to be in excess of six days. Due to the large number of potential evacuees (3,000), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Honduras** would be very difficult.


HONDURAS - THREAT SUMMARY



Honduras - 1

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HONDURAS - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Low-level insurgency with potential for growth.
- Severe economic problems and social unrest.

This country feels threatened by the leftist insurgency in **El Salvador** and by aggression and hostility of the **Nicaraguan** Sandinistas. The present low-level conflict has great potential for growth in this country with a new, unstable democratic Government, and serious economic and social problems.

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U.S. Equities in Honduras

- Supports U.S. policy towards **Nicaragua**.
- Overall U.S. equity is moderate.

This country speaks forcefully on the need for democracy and internal dialogue within **Nicaragua** and has been a strong supporter of U.S. policy toward **Nicaragua**.

The U.S. has traditionally been **Honduras's** most important trading partner supplying 30 to 40 percent of the country's imports and buying more than half of its exports. Also, significant amounts of economic aid are provided to this country by the U.S. About 3,000 U.S. citizens reside in **Honduras**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
79	543	479	205	1,306	3,000	3 4	7	Medium

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
				X

Honduras is a transshipment point for **Colombian** cocaine moving to the U.S.

Terrorism

- Several terrorist groups supported by **Cuba** and the **Nicaraguan** Sandinistas operate in **Honduras**.

The number of leftist guerrilla groups, most of which were supported by **Cuba** and **Nicaragua** and assisted by guerrilla insurgents in **El Salvador**, were active in **Honduras** in 1988. There was a perceptible increase in terrorist attacks over the previous year.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Honduras** is involved in the two threat areas of narcotics and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	LAV	Howitzers	15	1	56	A

Ground OOB consists of 15,400 troops of which 11,000 are conscripts. Training in the past has been poor but now seems to be improving. Tanks: Scimitar, Scorpion; Artillery: M-101, M-102, M-198.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	Early AAA	2	1	53	B

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E; Close Air: Cessna A-37B; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	1	1	42	B

Ships: none; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 3 Large Fast Patrol Craft; 9 Small Coastal Patrol Craft; 8 Small River Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Honduras** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-88	High	96	Wet/Hot

The climate is generally subtropical but varies considerably with elevation.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Honduras is bisected by mountain ranges that run north to south in the western part of the country and tropical lowlands lie along both coasts.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Honduras** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be feasible in most of **Honduras**. In more than 75 percent of the country, movement would be precluded by steep hills and mountains, dense forests, and perennially wet ground.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances of less than 1,000 meters would be encountered in over 75 percent of **Honduras** due to steep hills and mountains, dense forests, and frequent rainfall.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide adequate support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
28143/28163	14,500	Fair

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Coastal defense weapons have significant capability.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
155 mm M-198	24,000	U.S. NGF and Threat Equal

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MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is absent for eastern **Honduras** and the southeast border with **El Salvador**.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
18	3 C-5 7 C-130 8 None	0/18	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Aguacate	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Amapala	None	-
Catacamas	None	-
Choluteca	None	-
Coyota	None	-
El Paraiso	None	-
Goloson International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Jamastran	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
La Jagua	None	-
La Mesa International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.
Mocoron/Durzun	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Nacome	None	-
Puerto Lempira	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Roatan Island	None	-
San Lorenzo	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Soto Cano Air Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Daylight only.
Tela	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Toncontin International	C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

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Ports

One small port is available with limited capability to handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Puerto Cortes	Small	41-45/26-30	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

By modern standards, communication and transportation facilities in this country are poor. Limited rail service is confined to the **Caribbean** coast.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Tegucigalpa	- Inadequate telecomm - Microwave connection - 181 Radio stations - 22 TV stations - 2 Satellite ground stations	8,950 km	545 km	1	18	None	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Honduras** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Honduras** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (3,000).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
76	3,000	52 (Tegucigalpa)	F

Note: In **Honduras** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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JAMAICA

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STU-III AV 484-8095

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
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
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SUMMARY

Jamaica has a strategic location in the **Caribbean Sea** astride the main sea lanes for the **Panama Canal**. The **U.S.** maintains close, cooperative relations with this country and overall **U.S.** equities there are substantial. Over 120 **U.S.** firms have operations in **Jamaica** and almost 5,000 **U.S.** citizens reside there. The island serves as a transit point for drug traffickers moving cocaine from **South America** to the **U.S.** **Jamaica** also produced about 405 metric tons of marijuana in 1988. The country has a very small army of 2,000 regular troops which is inadequate to contain any significant internal conflict or resist foreign invasion. The size of the air force and navy is negligible.


The climate of **Jamaica** is hot and humid most of the year and the terrain is mountainous. The island is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the steep slopes and unfordable streams in the interior highlands. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is limited to less than 1,000 meters because of the rough terrain, dense ground cover, and frequent heavy rainfall. The mapping of **Jamaica** by older 1:50,000 scale maps may be somewhat outdated. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to provide good accessibility by strategic lift. Although most main roads are paved, they are often narrow and winding through the mountains. The time required for an east coast MEU to embark on amphibious ships and move to **Jamaica** is estimated to be in excess of six days. Due to the large number of **U.S.** citizens in **Jamaica** (4,803), NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult.

JAMAICA - THREAT SUMMARY



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JAMAICA- TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Jamaica

- Overall **U.S.** equity is moderate.

Jamaica has a strategic location between the **Caymen Trench** and **Jamaica Channel**, the main sea lanes for the **Panama Canal**. The **U.S.** maintains a close, cooperative relationship with the Government of **Jamaica**. A bilateral trade situation exists where the **U.S.** provides 44 percent of **Jamaica's** imports and buys 33 percent of its exports. The **U.S.** has been strongly supportive of the **Jamaican** Government's efforts to revitalize the economy. There are 4,803 **U.S.** citizens living in **Jamaica**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
129	601	422	88	1,240	4,803	3 4	7	Medium

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Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

Jamaica produced about 405 metric tons of marijuana in 1988. The island is also a transit point for cocaine; traffickers are now paying for services in kind, increasing the amount of cocaine available for **Jamaican** consumption. Money laundering does not appear to be a major problem, with most drug proceeds being laundered elsewhere.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	None	Mortars	2	2	54	A

Ground OOB consists of 2,200 regular troops. The army is inadequate to contain any significant internal conflict or resist foreign invasion. Training is obtained from **Britain** and **Canada**. Tanks: none; Artillery: 81 mm mortars.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	None	None	Negligible	2	12	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	Negligible	2	42	B

Ships: none; SSMs: none; Patrol Craft: 1 Large Patrol Craft; 4 Small Patrol Craft.

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Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - English

Primary religion - Protestant

There is no cultural difference between **Jamaica** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
71-88	66	78	Wet/Hot

The climate is humid and tropical most of the year, but temperatures from November to March are cooler, particularly along the north shore where the range is 70 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Jamaica is the third largest island in the **Caribbean**. Mountains cover about 80 percent of its surface.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Jamaica** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The coastal lowlands, ranging from five to twenty miles in width along most of the coast, are generally suitable for tracked movement due to a relatively flat surface and extensive road and trail network. Approximately 75 percent of the country --the interior highlands--is unsuited for tracked movement due to steep forested slopes and unfordable streams.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight generally limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Mountains cover about 80 percent of **Jamaica** which severely restrict the distance of line of sight visibility. Only in the coastal lowlands would line of sight distances up to 1,000 meters be feasible.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
26121	4,025	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
81 mm Mortar	4,595	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Complete coverage by old 1:50,000 scale maps.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
2	2 C-5	2/0	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Norman Manley International (Kingston)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Sangster International (Montego Bay)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

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Ports

Jamaica has two moderate size ports which can receive strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Port Royal Kingston	Small Medium	36-40/41-45 36-40/41-45	26-30 41-45	- Yes

Key Installations

Communications, transportation, and industrial facilities in **Jamaica** are relatively modern and improving. Almost all main roads are paved, but due to the mountainous conditions, they are often narrow and winding, with uneven surfaces.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Kingston	- Fully automatic telecomm - 2 Satellite ground stations - 25 Radio stations - 8 TV stations	18,200 km	370 km	2	2	- Refined products	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Jamaica** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Jamaica** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (4,873).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
70	4,803	0 (Kingston)	F

Note: In **Jamaica** the following factors are of little significance:

Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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


SUMMARY

Mexico has strategic importance due to its location on the southern border with the U.S. **Mexico** and the U.S. maintain close and cordial relations. Overall U.S. equity in **Mexico** is high with over 322,000 U.S. citizens residing there. Despite a program by the Government to stop drug trafficking, **Mexico** is a leading producer of heroin and marijuana. It also acts as a major transit point for cocaine entering the U.S. Terrorist groups such as the **Salvadoran FMLN** and the **Guatemalan URNG** are permitted to maintain offices in **Mexico City** where they can arrange and coordinate the acquisition of illicit weapons. Through its involvement in narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms transfers, **Mexico** constitutes a very serious concern to U.S. interests. With an army of 105,000 regular troops, **Mexico** has the third largest ground OOB in **Latin America**. The **Mexican** air force and navy are significantly smaller than the army. Training and morale in the armed forces are below average and most regulars are rural mestizos or Indians who have failed to find work elsewhere.


The climate of **Mexico** is mixed and ranges from tropical to desert. The geographic conditions vary considerably from low desert plains and jungle-like coastal regions to high plateaus and rugged mountains. **Mexico City**, with a population of about 20 million, is estimated to have the largest urban concentration in the world. About two-thirds of **Mexico** is generally suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) normally varies between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. A major shortfall for military operations in this country is the lack of 1:50,000 scale maps. Airfields and ports in **Mexico** are satisfactory to accommodate most strategic lift requirements. Key installations include oil fields and nuclear power plants under construction. Depending on the destination in **Mexico** (north, central, or south) the time required for a MEU on the U.S. east or west coast to embark on ships and arrive could range from between two days to more than six. Because of the numerous U.S. citizens in **Mexico**, NEO by a joint U.S. force, including a MEU, would be a major endeavor.

MEXICO- THREAT SUMMARY



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U.S. Equities in Mexico

- **Mexico** has a strategic location on the southern border with the **U.S.**
- Overall **U.S.** equity in **Mexico** is high.

For many years, **Mexico** and the **U.S.** have maintained close and friendly relations. The **U.S.** is **Mexico's** number one trading partner, and **Mexico** is the fourth most important trading partner of the **U.S.** The discovery of extensive oil fields in the coastal regions along the **Gulf of Mexico** enabled **Mexico** to become self-sufficient in crude oil and to export significant amounts of petroleum. Over 322,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Mexico**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
4,997	8,532	11,826	540	25,895	322,250	6 6	12	High

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Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

- Large source of heroin.
- Second largest source of marijuana.
- Major transit point for cocaine.

Mexico remains the largest single source for heroin, the second largest source for marijuana, and leading transit point for cocaine. Newly elected President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has made antinarcotics programs a national priority for his new Government. However, U.S. officials are concerned about the inhibiting effects of corruption throughout the programs. U.S. enforcement agencies continue to monitor instances of drug-related corruption within **Mexico**.

Terrorism

- **Mexico** provides safe haven for terrorist groups.

Despite **Mexico's** official policy of nonintervention in the affairs of other nations, the **Salvadoran FMLN** and **Guatemalan URNG** are permitted to maintain offices or headquarters in **Mexico City**.

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

Mexico has been a transit point for arms shipments from private organizations in the U.S. to the **Nicaraguan Contras**. Insurgent groups such as **El Salvador's FMLN** are permitted to maintain offices in **Mexico City** where they can arrange and coordinate the acquisition of weapons.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Mexico** constitutes a very serious threat due to its involvement in narcotics, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

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General Ground OOB

- **Mexico** has the third largest ground OOB in **Latin America**.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	LAV	Howitzers	105	3	178	D

Ground OOB consists of a 105,000 person regular voluntary force. Most regulars are rural mestizos or Indians who have failed to find work elsewhere. Recruits are trained in their units or at several specialized schools. Training for officers occurs largely at the military academy at **Chapultepec, Mexico City**, or special arms or staff training schools. Tanks: M-3; Artillery: 120 mm coastal defense guns, M-8 75 mm SP, M-101, M-116.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Day Jet Atk	Early AAA	6	3	69	C

Fighter Aircraft: F-5E/F; Close Air: AT-6G, AT-28D, AT-33A, PC-7; Air Defense: AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	None	Lg Gun Boats	27	3	90	D

Ships: 3 Destroyers with antisubmarine ASROC missiles, antisurface and antiaircraft guns, and ASW torpedoes; 6 Frigates with guns; 37 Patrol Ships with guns; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 36 Large Patrol Craft; 6 Coastal Patrol Craft; 11 River Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Mexico** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
49-89	39-80	6-66	Mixed

The climate of **Mexico** varies from tropical to desert.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
			X		

The topography of **Mexico** ranges from low desert plains and jungle-like coastal strips to high plateaus and rugged mountains. With a population of 20 million, **Mexico City** is estimated to have the largest urban concentration in the world.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Mexico** is generally suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be possible during most of the year in about two-thirds of **Mexico**. In the remaining third of the country, tracked movement would be precluded by steep slopes in most places, as well as by limited areas of dense forests, swamps, and marshes.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Line of sight distances will normally fall between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

With terrain that varies from low, flat desert regions and jungle-like coastal plains to high plateaus and rugged mountains, it is estimated that line of sight distances between 1,000 and 2,000 meters would be found in over 50 percent of the country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
28320/28321	1,610	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
120 mm Coastal Defense Gun	15,000	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
25	5 C-5 19 C-141B 1 C-130	22/3	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Cancun International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Cuidad Obregon	C-141, C-130	-
Cozumel International	C-141, C-130	-
Don Miguel Hidalgo International (Guadalajara)	C-141, C-130	-
Durango	C-141, C-130	-
General Heriberto Jara International	C-141, C-130	-
General Ignacio P. Garcia International (Hermosillo)	C-141, C-130	-
General Jose Maria Yanez International (Guaymas)	C-141, C-130	-
General Juan N. Alvarez International (Acapulco)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
General Manuel Marq de Leon (La Paz)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
General Mariano Escobedo International	C-141B, C-130	-
General Rafael Buelna International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
General Rodolfo Sanchez International	C-141B, C-130	-
La Manga International	C-141B, C-130	-
Lic Benito Juarez International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Lic Gustavo Diaz Ordaz	C-141B, C-130	-
Loreto	C-141B, C-130	-
Merida	C-141B, C-130	-
Minatitlan	C-130	-
Playa de Oro International (Guadalajara)	C-141B, C-130	-
Quetzalcoatl International	C-141B, C-130	-
Santa Lucia	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Torreón	C-141B, C-130	-
Zacatecas	C-141B, C-130	The C-141B is limited to runway operations only. Daylight only.
Zapopan	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- **Mexico** has several ports that can readily accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Tampico	Medium	36-40/36-40	26-30	Yes
Veracruz	Medium	31-35/41-45	26-30	Yes
Pajaritus	Small	36-40/41-45	26-30	-
Coatzacoalcas	Small	36-40/-	31-35	No
Acapulco	Small	Over 76/ Over 76	36-40	Yes
Manzanillo	Small	-/36-40	36-40	Yes
Mazatlan	Small	31-35/over 76	31-35	Yes
Santa Rosalia	Small	26-30/46-50	26-30	Yes

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Key Installations

In **Central Mexico**, oil fields are located in the **Tampico-Misantla** basin, and the **Chilcontepec** basin in the state of **Veracruz**. In **South Mexico**, oil fields are found in the **Macuspana** basin, the offshore **Tabasco-Campeche** basin, the **Tabasco-Chiapas** area, the continental shelf of the **Bahia de Campeche**, and the offshore **Reforma** fields that include the **Isthmus of Salina** basin. In **North Mexico**, oil fields are found in the **Sabinas** basin and the **Burgos** basin. **Mexico** has two nuclear powered reactors under construction. Its land transportation network is one of the most extensive in **Latin America**. It has a well developed telecommunications system, with its own satellites and hundreds of television and radio stations.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Mexico City	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Highly developed telecomm - Microwave connection - 679 Radio stations - 246 TV stations - 120 Satellite terminals - 2 Satellite ground stations 	210,000 km	20,680 km	8	25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas 	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

Depending on the destination in **Mexico** (north, central or south), the time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to this country could range between two to more than six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- Due to the large number of **U.S.** citizens in **Mexico** (322,250) it is unlikely that a MEU would be the only force conducting NEO in this country. NEO of this magnitude conducted by a joint force with MEU participation would require detailed planning and execution.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
750	322,250	148 (Mexico City)	F

Note: In **Mexico**, the NBC factor is of little significance.

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NICARAGUA

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:
Telephone:


USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
STU-III AV 282-3209

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

USDAO MANAGUA NU//DATT//
011-505-2-666010/666013




SUMMARY

Despite the election of Violeta Chamorro and the trend toward democracy in **Nicaragua**, the Sandinistas still remain a strong force in the Government. After ten years of civil war between the former Sandinista Government and the **U.S.** backed Contra rebels tensions remain high, particularly in rural areas. The Sandinistas continue to control the powerful Defense and Interior ministries within the new Government and military ties to **Cuba** and the **U.S.S.R.** reportedly remain strong. **U.S.** efforts are focused on assisting the new Government and promoting democratic ideals. The economy is in poor condition with an \$11 billion foreign debt. **Nicaragua** is a suspected transit point for cocaine moving from **South America** to the **U.S.**, and Government officials have allegedly been engaged in drug trafficking. **Nicaragua** has provided training and safe haven to terrorist and guerrilla groups such as the FMLN operating in **El Salvador**. **Nicaragua** should be considered a serious concern due to its involvement in narcotics trafficking and terrorism. The **Nicaraguan** ground OOB is the largest in **Latin America**, but the Chamorro Government plans to reduce this force by one-third. All the services possess significant amounts of **Soviet** equipment.


Due to the dense forests, mountains, and swampy eastern coastal plain, cross-country movement of tracked vehicles would be precluded in about three-fourths of **Nicaragua**. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be limited to less than 1,000 meters due to broken terrain, thick vegetation, and frequent heavy rainfall which obscures visibility. While hydrographic conditions permit NGF platforms to approach the coast and provide support for operations ashore, opposition could be expected from **Nicaraguan** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is absent in much of eastern **Nicaragua**. An airfield is available to handle C-5 aircraft but port facilities are constrained. The time necessary for a MEU from the **U.S.** east or west coasts to arrive in **Nicaragua** is estimated to be in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,800).

NICARAGUA THREAT SUMMARY



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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Recent conflict between **U.S.** backed rebels and the former Communist Sandinista Government.
- Sandinistas strongly supported by the **Soviet Union** and **Cuba**.

The insurgents were a mixture of former Somozan troops and disillusioned Sandinista rebels who ran the gamut from ultra-rightists to ultra-leftists, plus a sizable dissatisfied Indian population which would probably be in arms against whoever was in power. These groups did not coalesce into a unified front. But they had a serious effect on the stability of **Nicaragua** while operating both internally and from secure bases in **Honduras** and **Costa Rica**, with **American** blessings even though Congress became increasingly reluctant to continue funding covert activities there. The insurgency was regarded with great concern by the former **Nicaraguan** revolutionary Government, supported by the **Soviets** and **Cubans**, which made conciliatory gestures toward the rebels and, more particularly, **U.S.** opinion. The situation stabilized somewhat in 1990 when the Sandinista Government was voted out of power.

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U.S. Equities in Nicaragua

- Continuing **U.S.** efforts to promote democratic ideals and reduce communist influence.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is low.

While stating a policy of nonalignment, the former Sandinista Government of **Nicaragua** moved this country into the **Soviet** camp. The **U.S.** encouraged severance of **Nicaraguan** ties to **Cuba** and the **Soviet** bloc, and increased diplomatic efforts to solve the problems in this country. Efforts are being made by the **U.S.** to assist the newly elected democratic Government.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
80	-	-	-	80	1,800	1 3	4	Low

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
	X			X

- **Nicaragua** is a suspected cocaine transit point.
- Government officials have reportedly been engaged in trafficking.

Nicaragua continues to be mentioned by informants and traffickers as a cocaine transit point. In 1986, there were accusations that top Government officials engaged in trafficking. **Nicaragua** is now cooperating with **Costa Rica** on drug matters.

Terrorism

- Has sponsored terrorist groups in **Latin America**.

Like **Cuba**, **Nicaragua** has provided training and safe haven to **Latin American** terrorist and guerrilla groups. The Sandinistas supported the FMLN in **El Salvador** despite their commitment to end such assistance. In addition to dealing with individual groups, **Nicaragua** has occasionally acted as a coordinator for **Latin American** insurgents, including hosting meetings between **Central** and **South American** subversives.

Consolidated Threat

Within the region, **Nicaragua** constitutes a threat to **U.S.** interests because of its involvement in narcotics trafficking and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

- Largest ground OOB in **Central America**.

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	T-54	Bloc	80	11	201	E

Ground OOB consists of 80,000 troops of which 20,000 are conscripts and 35,000 reservists. **Nicaragua** has the largest military force in **Central America**. Training for enlisted men is accomplished at the National Guard Training School at **Managua**. Officers attend the **Nicaraguan** National Military Academy or the **Chilean** Military School. The Sandinistas continue to control the **Nicaraguan** Army and supply the **Salvadoran** FMLN and other Latin insurgencies with training, facilities, political guidance, and weapons. Tanks: PT-76, T-54, T-55; Artillery: D-20, D-30. (Note: the recently elected Chamorro Government is reportedly reducing the size of the army by one-third.)

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Day/VFR Jets	Day Jet Atk	Bloc	2	11	103	D

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: AT-28, AT-33A (light attack), Mi-24; Air Defense: SA-7, SA-9, and SA-14 SAMs and AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Bloc	1	11	72	C

Ships: none; SSMS: none; Patrol Craft: 4 Inshore Minehunters with guns and radars (Ex-Soviet); 4 Minesweeping Boats with guns (Ex-Soviet); 16 Small Gun Boats (8 Ex-Soviet, 2 Ex-North Korean, 2 Ex-U.S., 2 Ex-Israeli, 2 Ex-French).

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish (English and Indian Dialects)
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Nicaragua** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
68-86	62-84	45-100	Wet/Hot

Nicaragua's climate is tropical. Rainfall is heavy year-round and is greater on the **Caribbean** coast than on the **Pacific**. Some sections of the country have as much as 300 inches of rain annually.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
		X			

The largest of the **Central American** republics, **Nicaragua** borders **Costa Rica** to the south and **Honduras** to the north. **El Salvador** is across the narrow **Gulf of Fonseca**. **Lake Managua** and **Lake Nicaragua**, the region's largest bodies of water, are in the west; north of them, the coastal plain gradually rises toward rugged mountains. Beyond the mountains lies a sparsely inhabited area of forested plains and hills. The swampy eastern coastal plain extends 64-80 kilometers (40-50 mi.) inland.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Nicaragua** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be precluded in about 75 percent of **Nicaragua**, mainly in steep hills and mountains, dense forests, and swamps. In the remaining parts of the country, movement would be difficult for part of the year.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Line of sight distances of less than 1,000 meters should be expected in about 75 percent of **Nicaragua**. This is due to the steep hills and mountains, dense ground cover, and heavy rainfall which would obscure visibility.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
28120	2,415	Good

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
152 mm GH	24,000	U.S. NGF and Threat Equal

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

Eastern **Nicaragua** is lacking in 1:50,000 scale map coverage except for areas such as **Puerto Cabezas** and **Bluefields** on the east coast.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can accommodate C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
8	1 C-5 1 C-141B 3 C-130 3 None	1/7	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Augusto Cesar Sandino (Managua)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Corteza	None	-
El Terrero	None	-
La Paz	C-130	Daylight VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Los Dos Montes	None	-
Montelimar (Masachapa)	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Oscar Garcia	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
Punta Huete	C-141B, C-130	The C-141B operations are limited to runway only. Daylight/VFR only.

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Ports

- One small port is available with limited capability to handle strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Corinto (Pacific coast)	Small	26-30/26-30	26-30	-

Key Installations

Due to **Nicaragua's** economic difficulties the country's communications and transportation facilities are in poor condition and are likely to remain so for the immediate future. The country is traversed from north to south by the Inter-American Highway and from west to east by rivers, by a road to **Puerto Cabazas**, and by a road and river to **Bluefields**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Managua	- Low-capacity telcomm - Microwave connection - 45 Radio stations - 7 TV stations - Satellite ground station	25,000 km	373 km	1	8	- Crude oil	None	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Nicaragua** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Nicaragua** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (1,800).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
40	1,800	26 (Managua)	F

Note: In **Nicaragua**, the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

PANAMA

MEF G-2: CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 282-3209

DIA DB Desk Code: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone: STU-III AV 243-3096


Embassy Defense Attache: USDAO PANAMA CITY PN//DAT//
Telephone: (507) 27-1777 EXT 2310/2311;
DIRECT: (507) 27-2717; KY-3: 4741; KY-7:
04450-507-27-2717

SUMMARY

Due to instability and disorder in **Panama** caused by **Panamanian** strongman General Manuel Noriega, U.S. forces were dispatched in late 1989 to take action against Noriega and protect **American** interests. U.S. forces quickly gained control and captured Noriega who presently awaits legal action in the U.S. **Panama** is important for its strategic location on the isthmus which connects **North** and **South America** and for having the **Panama Canal** which runs between the **Pacific** and **Atlantic Oceans**. The U.S. has high overall equity in **Panama** and seeks to promote its economic, political, and social development. Over 11,000 U.S. citizens live in **Panama**. In recent years, **Panama** has been a principal money-laundering center for the **South American** cocaine trade and transit site for cocaine and precursor chemical shipments. **Panama**, and particularly General Noriega, has been implicated in the furnishing of illegal arms to terrorist groups in **El Salvador** and **Colombia**. Due to its involvement in drug trafficking; terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer, **Panama** constitutes a serious threat to U.S. interests. **Panama** has a small army of 6,000 volunteers and its air force and navy are practically negligible.

Panama's topography is mostly mountainous and hilly with dense tropical forests in the eastern regions. The climate is tropical with heavy rainfall, particularly on the **Atlantic** side. Because of the terrain conditions, cross-country movement by vehicle would be infeasible. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) would be limited to less than 1,000 meters due to the broken terrain, heavy ground cover and frequent heavy rainfall. There is 1:50,000 scale map coverage for most of **Panama** except for portions along the **Atlantic** side. Airfields and ports are satisfactory to handle strategic lift. The time required for a MEU to arrive from the U.S. east or west coasts would be in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions would be very difficult due to over 11,000 potential evacuees.


PANAMA - THREAT SUMMARY



Panama - 1

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PANAMA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Corrupt, unstable military dictatorship (Noriega) became a threat to **U.S.** interests.
- Operation Just Cause conducted by the **U.S.** to protect **American** interests.

On December 15, 1989, the **Panamanian** strongman General Manuel Noriega declared that his country was at war with the **U.S.** The next day **Panamanian** Defense Force (PDF) troops shot and killed an unarmed Marine Corps officer and detained a **U.S.** naval officer and his wife. On December 20, 1989, **U.S.** forces were dispatched to **Panama** on Operation Just Cause to take action against Noriega and protect **American** interests. These forces quickly seized control of the PDF headquarters and secured the **Panama Canal** and **American** installations. **U.S.** strategy in the assault was to seize Noriega because, besides being indicted in the **U.S.** on drug trafficking charges, he was becoming so belligerent that the danger to **American** lives in **Panama** was unacceptable. Although Noriega was able to avoid capture for a few days by seeking refuge in the **Vatican** Embassy in **Panama**, he was finally forced to turn himself in to **U.S.** authorities.

U.S. Equities in Panama

- Strategic location and the **Panama Canal**.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is high.

This country has a strategic location on the eastern end of the isthmus forming the land bridge connecting **North** and **South America**. It controls the **Panama Canal** that links the **North Atlantic Ocean** via the **Caribbean Sea** with the **North Pacific Ocean**. The **U.S.** supports the **Panamanian** Government in promoting economic, political, and social development. As a trading partner with **Panama**, the **U.S.** is a major buyer of **Panamanian** exports and supplies much of its imports. Over 11,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Panama**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
4,780	712	402	10	5,904	11,300	5 6	11	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
		X	X	X

- Principal money laundering center.
- Transit site for cocaine and precursor chemicals.

Panama was denounced in 1988, following the indictments of General Noriega by two **U.S.** grand juries on charges of narcotics trafficking. Since then, **Panama** has continued to be a principal money-laundering center for the **South American** cocaine trade and a transit site for cocaine and precursor chemical shipments. With the dispatch of **U.S.** troops to **Panama** on December 20, 1989 for Operation Just Cause, it is highly probable that General Noriega will be brought to justice for his crimes, and drug trafficking in this country will be on the decline.

Terrorism

- Major transit point for terrorists.
- Banking facility for M-19 and other terrorist groups.
- Major source of weapons and explosives acquired illegally.

Panama's geographical position and role as a trade and banking center make it a crossroads for the travel and transactions of various terrorist and insurgent groups. Some of this activity is facilitated by the **Cuban** and **Nicaraguan** Embassies and the **Libyan** People's Bureau in **Panama City**. This activity is transient in nature, not normally involving direct participation by the **Panamanian** Government. Congressional testimony and published accounts, however, implicate some **Panamanian** officials, including General Noriega, in the shipment of arms to such groups as **El Salvador's** FMLN and **Colombia's** M-19. The existence of a prior relationship between Noriega and M-19 was, in part, confirmed in July 1988 when M-19 asked Noriega to intercede with the **Colombian** Government regarding the kidnapping of the Conservative Party's president, Alvaro Gomez Hurtado, whom M-19 held hostage.

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Gray Arms/Technology Transfer

- Provided arms and explosives to **Colombian** terrorists.

Congressional testimony and published accounts implicate **Panamanian** officials in the shipment of arms to such insurgent groups as **El Salvador's FMLN** and **Colombia's M-19**.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Panama** constitutes a serious threat to **U.S.** interests due to its involvement in narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.

General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/Exp	None	Mortars	6	1	67	B

Ground OOB consists of 6,000 troops. The army is voluntary but conscription is authorized if needed. There is also a paramilitary force (police and national guard) of 12,300. Recruits attend a three-month course in military and police matters. Officers attend foreign military academies or the **U.S. Army School of the Americas** at **Fort Benning, Georgia**. Tanks: none; Artillery: 60 mm and 81 mm mortars.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Props	None	None	Negligible	1	11	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	1	1	42	B

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 2 Large Patrol Craft; 6 Coastal Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish

Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Panama** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-87	87	70-130	Wet/Hot

The climate is tropical with rainfall heavy but seasonal. The **Atlantic** side has much higher precipitation and a less clearly defined dry season than the **Pacific** side.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
			X

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

Panama's topography is mostly mountainous and hilly; two mountain ranges form the backbone of the isthmus. The eastern regions are almost entirely covered by dense tropical forests.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Panama** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country movement would be infeasible for all vehicles in the majority of **Panama**. Any movement for tracked vehicles would be restricted to the grass, scrub, and cultivated areas in the lowlands in the south and southwest, and some plains along the canal zone.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

Panama's terrain is mostly mountainous and hilly. The eastern regions are covered almost entirely by dense tropical forests. Rainfall is heavy and would frequently obscure visibility. Due to these conditions it is expected that line of sight visibility would be limited to under 500 meters except in the lowlands in the south and southwest, and some plains along the canal zone.

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Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
21603/21605	5,490	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
81 mm Mortar	4,595	U.S. NGF Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is not available on the **Caribbean** side along the **Gulfo de los Mosquitos** and the **San Blas** district.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/Constrained)	Rating
8	2 C-5 4 C-130 2 None	2/6	>1/C-5

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Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Albrook Air Force Base (Balboa) Calzada Larga	None C-130	- Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC. Runway operations only.
Enrique Adolfo Jimenez	C-130	Daylight only.
Enrique Malek International	C-130	Daylight only.
General Omar Torrijos International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Howard Air Force Base	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
La Joya	C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC. Runway operations only.
Marcos A. Gelabert International	None	-

Ports

- Two ports with capability to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Laguna de Chiriqui	Small	71-75/71-75	-	Yes
Balboa	Medium	41-45/31-35	36-40	Yes

Key Installations

The primary key installation is the **Panama Canal**. There is also a trans-**Panama** pipeline designed to transport **Alaskan** North Slope oil, hydro-electric power facilities, and numerous communications systems. The Inter-**American** highway continues from **Costa Rica** to **Panama City** where it ends. **Panama City** and **Colon** are connected by both rail and road.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Panama City	- Well-developed telecomm - Microwave connection - 2 Satellite ground stations - 91 Radio stations - 14 TV stations	8,530 km	238 km	2	8	- Crude oil	None	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to Panama is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Panama would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (11,300).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
40	11,300	0 (Panama City)	F

Note: In Panama, NBC is of little significance.

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PERU

MEF G-2:
Telephone:

CG I MEF//G-2//
STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2:
Telephone:

USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
STU-III AV 282-3209

DIA DB Desk Code:
Telephone:

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache:
Telephone:

USDAO LIMA PE//DATT//
DIRECT: 51-14-31-6595
EMB: 51-14-33-8000




SUMMARY

In **Peru**, the main sources of conflict are the insurgent groups, drug production and trafficking, foreign debt, and extensive poverty. Although the **Peruvian** Government has indicated support for democracy, reduced drug trafficking, and control of terrorism, progress in these areas remains slow. Overall **U.S.** equity in **Peru** is high. The **U.S.** is **Peru's** largest trading partner with recent exchange totaling about \$1.6 billion. Over 7,000 **U.S.** citizens live in **Peru**. It is the world's largest producer of coca with up to 124,000 metric tons in 1988, and provides the main supply of coca paste for **Colombian** cocaine refineries. The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is the primary insurgent group in **Peru**. This organization is believed to be allied with drug traffickers and uses terrorist tactics to spread disorder and accomplish its goals. **Peru** constitutes a serious concern because of its involvement in narco-terrorism. **Peru** has moderate size armed forces and has embarked on an arms modernization program. It has acquired tanks, artillery, surface to air missile systems, and helicopters from the **Soviet Union**. These acquisitions have made **Peru** a formidable force in **South America**, causing **Chile** and **Ecuador** some concern.


Peru is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles due to the rugged **Andes Mountains** and thick jungle forests in the eastern lowlands. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) is generally limited to less than 1,000 meters due to terrain and weather conditions. While NGF platforms can provide adequate support for operations ashore, they would be out-gunned by **Peruvian** coastal defense weapons. Coverage of **Peru** by 1:50,000 scale maps is generally lacking except for spotted areas along the coast. Airfields and ports are available to accommodate entry by strategic lift. Key installations include oil fields on the northern coast and the northern **Salva** area. It is expected that it would take in excess of six days for a MEU on the **U.S.** east or west coasts to reach **Peru**. Due to over 7,000 potential evacuees, NEO conducted by a MEU would be very difficult.

PERU - THREAT SUMMARY



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Existing Ongoing Conflicts

- Maoist Shining Path terrorists battle Government.
- Extensive drug production and terrorism.

The primary sources of conflict in this country are the insurgent groups, cocaine, foreign debt, and extensive poverty. The primary insurgent group is Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), with Maoist ideology, whose brutal activities have included kidnapping, assassinations, and attacks on Government buildings and police posts. The atrocities committed by this group have been compared with those carried out by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Peru's problems with coca growers in the Upper Huallaga Valley continue to pose major difficulties for Peruvian authorities. Although much of the overall operations are thought to be run by Colombia's cocaine lords, profits from the drug trade have filled Lima banks and corrupted many officials. There is also the possibility that drug traffickers have allied themselves with Shining Path terrorists.

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U.S. Equities in Peru

- The **Peruvian** Government has indicated support for democracy, reduced drug trafficking, and control of terrorism.

- Overall **U.S.** equity in **Peru** is high.

The **U.S.** and **Peru** share the goals of supporting democracy, curbing the narcotics trade, and controlling terrorism. Cooperation in these areas as well as substantial **U.S.** development assistance to **Peru** have allowed the two nations to retain a working relationship. The **U.S.** is **Peru's** largest trading partner. **Peru** receives about 29 percent of its imports from the **U.S.**, while the **U.S.** in turn receives about 35 percent of **Peru's** exports. Total trade in recent years between the **U.S.** and **Peru** has equaled about \$1.6 billion. Current book value of **U.S.** investment in the country is about \$3 billion. The largest single **U.S.** investors are Occidental Petroleum and Southern Peru Copper Corporation.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
3,000	696	875	62	4,633	7,265	4 5	9	High

Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X	X			

- World's largest producer of coca.
1988 produced 97,000 - 124,000 metric tons
1987 produced 98,000 - 121,000 metric tons
1986 produced 95,000 - 120,000 metric tons
1985 produced 95,200 metric tons
- Major supplier of coca paste for **Colombian** cocaine refiners.

Peru remains the largest cultivator of coca, at more than 115,630 hectares, but is primarily a supplier of coca paste for **Colombian** cocaine refiners. Enforcement in the **Upper Huallaga Valley**, the major growing zone, remains quite hazardous.

Terrorism

- Shining Path fanatical guerrilla movement.

The Sendero Liminoso or Shining Path is a highly active and violent terrorist/insurgent group that claims a neo-Marxist orientation. Particularly gruesome assassinations are the hallmark of the Shining Path. Victims are often ritually mutilated and the corpses left on public display. The principal targets of Shining Path assassination teams are civilian technicians of government-sponsored civic action projects and local political leaders.

Consolidated Threat

Within the **Western Hemisphere**, **Peru** constitutes a major concern because of its involvement in drugs and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	T-54	Howitzers	80	4	124	C

Ground OOB consists of 80,000 troops of which 55,000 are conscripts. **Peru** has a formidable armored force composed primarily of **Soviet** tanks. Officers receive extensive training at an army academy and a joint service war college. Tanks: AMX-13, T-54, T-55; Artillery: D-30, M-46, M-56, M-101, M-114.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	Bloc	15	4	129	D

Fighter Aircraft: Mirage 5, Mirage 2000; Close Air: Camberra, Cessna A-37B, Su-22 Fitter, MB 339; Air Defense: SA-7 SAMs and **Soviet**, **U.S.**, and **Swedish** AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	HE	ASUW/Anti-air	25	4	109	D

Ships: 2 Cruisers with SSMs and SAMs; 6 Destroyers; 4 Frigates; SSM: Exocet, Otomat; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missiles with Exocet SSMs, guns, fire control, and radars; 4 River Gun Boats; 4 River Patrol Craft; 3 Lake Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish (Quechua)
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Peru** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
40-75	29-75	1-32	Dry/Warm

The climate of **Peru** ranges from arid and mild along the coast, temperate to frigid in the **Andes Mountains**, and tropically warm and humid in the eastern lowlands.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
				X	

The topography of **Peru** consists of western coastal plains, the central rugged **Andes Mountains**, and eastern lowlands with tropical jungle forests. The population is mainly centered in urban areas.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Peru** is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Conditions are unsuited for cross-country tracked movement at all times in about 90 percent of **Peru** due to steep slopes, deep gorges, heavy forest, and generally rough terrain.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distances limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The eastern jungle (the selva) accounts for more than half of **Peru's** land area. The **Andes Mountains** (the sierra) occupy an additional 27 percent. A low-hanging fog is prevalent particularly in the vicinity of **Lima** during the months of May to November. These conditions would limit line of sight distances to well under 1,000 meters during most of the year.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
22170/22172	2,415	Good

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
130 mm M-46	27,000	Threat Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is absent for most of **Peru** except for spotted areas along the coast. Coverage is not available for **Lima**.

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
14	1 C-5 11 C-141B 2 None	5/9	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Capitan J. A. Quinones Gonzales	C-141B, C-130	-
Capitan Carlos Martinez	C-141B, C-130	-
Capitan Concha	C-141B, C-130	-
Capitan Montes	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Collique	None	-
Coronel Fap Carlos Civian	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Coronel Franciso Secada	C-141B, C-130	-
Ilo	None	-
Jorge Chavez International (Lima Callao)	C-141B, C-130	Narrow taxiway for C-5. Suitable for C-5 only as emergency alternate airfield.
Las Palmas (Lima)	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Pisco	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
Rodriguez Ballon-Chachani	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Ten Fap J. A. Mont Morales	C-141B, C-130	Runway less than 6,000 feet.
Valazco Asteti	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only. Low runway WBC.
		Daylight/VFR only.

Ports

- Two ports with capabilities to accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Matarani Callao	Small Medium	41-45/over 76 36-40/26-30	46-50 36-40	- Yes

Key Installations

Oil fields are located at **Talara** (north coast) and the northern **Salva** area. Recent oil discoveries have been made in the eastern jungle and on the northern part of the continental shelf. Communications and land transportation facilities are fairly adequate. A railroad connects **Lima** with the central highlands of the **Peruvian Andes**. A more extensive railroad in the south links **Mollendo** on the coast with the inland cities of **Arequipa**, **Cusco**, and **Puno**.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Lima	- Fairly adequate telecomm - 417 Radio stations - 140 TV stations 2 Satellite stations	56,645 km	1,876 km	2	14	- Crude oil - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east and west coasts to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Peru** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Peru** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (7,265).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
742	7,265	0 (Lima)	F

Note: In **Peru** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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SURINAM

MEF G-2:	CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 365-9103
Theater J-2:	USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 282-3209
DIA DB Desk Code:	DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone:	STU-III AV 243-3096
Embassy Defense Attache:	USDAO PARAMARIBO NS//DATT//
Telephone:	011-597-71229/72900




SUMMARY

Surinam occupies an important position on the **South American** mainland near **Brazil** and adjacent to oil tanker routes from **South America**. The **U.S.** maintains cordial relations with **Surinam** and is **Surinam's** largest trading partner. Due to human rights violations in 1982, when the Government executed several prominent opposition leaders without trial, the **U.S.** suspended economic and military assistance. The Government subsequently came under democratic leadership in 1988. **Surinam** has a very small army of 2,700 troops, no air force, and a negligible sized navy. Training is provided to the army by up to 200 **Libyan** military advisors. **Brazil** also provides some military assistance and training.

With significant cultural differences, a tropical climate with heavy rainfall, and dense jungle, **U.S.** military operations in **Surinam** would be quite difficult. The country is generally unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement due to coastal swamps, thick forests, and wet conditions. The terrain and weather of **Surinam** would limit the average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) to less than 1,000 meters. The hydrography adjacent to **Surinam** would prevent NGF platforms from approaching the coast within range to provide support for operations ashore. A significant shortfall is the absence of 1:50,000 scale map coverage. **Surinam** lacks a major port to accommodate strategic sealift. However, one airfield is available which can handle C-5 aircraft. There are not many key installations in **Surinam**. Roads and bridges are few and austere and large parts of the country are accessible only by helicopter or foot. The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and deploy to **Surinam** would be in excess of six days.

SURINAM - THREAT SUMMARY




Surinam - 1

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SURINAM - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Surinam

- Important location on the **South American** mainland.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is low.

Surinam's location on the **South American** mainland near **Brazil** makes it strategically important. **Soviet** or **Cuban** penetration of the country would constitute a threat to **Brazil** as well as the oil tanker routes from **South America**. The **U.S.** is **Surinam's** largest trading partner, normally providing 30 percent of the country's imports and taking 40 percent or more of its exports. As a result of human rights concerns, **U.S.** economic and military assistance to **Surinam** was suspended in 1982. The Government came under democratic leadership in 1988.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
-	135	146	-	281	260	1 1	2	Low

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Reg/TR	None	Mortars	3	0	53	A

Ground OOB consists of 2,700 troops who are all volunteers. Training is conducted by up to 200 **Libyan** military advisors. Officers receive military instruction in the **Netherlands**. Tanks: none; Artillery: 81 mm mortars.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
None	None	None	0	0	0	A

Fighter Aircraft: none; Close Air: none; Air Defense: none

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Small Surface	None	Lg Gun Boats	Negligible	0	40	A

Ships: none; SSM: none; Patrol Craft: 3 Large Patrol Craft; 4 Coastal Patrol Craft; 3 River Patrol Craft.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Dutch (English, Spanang Tongo)

Primary religion - Hindu

There is a significant cultural difference between **Surinam** and the **U.S.**

Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
73-87	74	91	Wet/Hot

Surinam's climate is tropical with heavy rainfall. Temperatures are high throughout the year with little seasonal change. The hottest month is **September**. Sudden wind twisters occasionally occur and have caused extensive damage in the jungle forests.

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General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
		X	

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
X					

The terrain varies from coastal swamps to dense forests with intermittent scattered savannas in the central region. The southern zone is hilly with thick jungle terrain.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- Surinam is generally unsuited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

The country is generally unsuited for cross-country tracked movement due to dense tropical forests, wet grounds, and extensive network of deep rivers, numerous swamps and marshes, and steep slopes in the hills and mountains.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Poor, with line of sight distance limited to less than 1,000 meters.

The central and southern zones of **Surinam** consist of broken terrain and forests with scattered savannas. In the south, low mountains with heavy vegetation cover most of the land. Line of sight distances would be limited to under 1,000 meters throughout most of this country.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are not able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
24370/24375	25,760	Unsatisfactory

Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Limited coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
81 mm Mortars	4,595	U.S. NGF Advantage

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MC&G Shortfalls

- 1:50,000 scale map coverage is not available.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
			X		

Airfields

- Accessible by air, with one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
1	1 C-5	1/0	1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Zanderij (Zandery)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

Ports

Surinam has no major ports that can accommodate strategic sealift.

Key Installations

Communication, transportation, and industrial facilities in Surinam are few and austere. There are few roads and bridges, and large parts of the country are accessible only by helicopter or on foot with fording equipment.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Paramaribo	- Good telecomm - 13 Radio stations - 6 TV stations - 2 Satellite stations	8,300 km	166 km	0	1	None	None	None

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Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the U.S. east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to Surinam is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

- NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in Surinam could be accomplished without great difficulty.

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
19	260	22 (Paramaribo)	D

Note: In Surinam, the following factors are of little significance:

Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
OOB (ground, air, naval)
NBC

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VENEZUELA

MEF G-2: CG I MEF//G-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 365-9103

Theater J-2: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J-2//
Telephone: STU-III AV 282-3209

DIA DB Desk Code: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3C//
Telephone: STU-III AV 243-3096

Embassy Defense Attache: USDAO CARACAS VE//DATT//
Telephone: 011-58-285-3111/222 DIRECT: 284-8031




SUMMARY

Venezuela occupies a strategic position on major sea and air routes between **North** and **South America**. The **U.S.** and **Venezuela** share common objectives of strengthening democratic institutions and overall **U.S.** equity in this country is high. **Venezuela** is a major trading partner with the **U.S.** and exports significant amounts of oil. The **U.S.** has about \$2.1 billion in direct investment in **Venezuela** and over 20,000 **U.S.** citizens live there. **Venezuela** is a transit point for precursor chemicals and cocaine moving to and from **South America**. It is also a producer of as much as 2,000 metric tons of marijuana. The terrorist group **Bondera Roja** operates in Eastern **Venezuela** to attack Government installations and spread disorder. This group also coordinates with **Colombian** insurgents to pursue terrorist goals throughout the region. Because of its involvement in both drugs and terrorism, **Venezuela** deserves special attention by military planners. **Venezuela** has moderate size armed forces which has developed into one of the most modern and professional among **Latin American** countries.

The topography of **Venezuela** ranges from the **Andes Mountains** in the northwest, to plains extending south and east, to high plateaus, and rolling hills in the far south and east. The climate varies from tropical along the coast and inland river valleys, to temperate at the higher elevations. About 80 percent of the population lives in cities and towns along the coast and in the **Andes**. Over half of the country, mainly in the coastal and plain regions, is suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles. The average standoff distance for engagement by line of sight weapons (intervisibility) generally ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 meters. While hydrographic conditions would permit NGF platforms to approach the coast and provide adequate support for operations ashore, they would be out-gunned by **Venezuelan** coastal defense weapons. Coverage by 1:50,000 scale maps is limited to portions of the **Caribbean** coastal area. Airfields and ports are quite satisfactory to handle strategic lift. Key installations include oil fields as well as numerous modern and expanding communications, transportation, and industrial facilities. The time required for a MEU to move to **Venezuela** from the **U.S.** east coast is estimated to be in excess of six days. NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Venezuela** would be very difficult due to over 20,000 potential evacuees.

VENEZUELA - THREAT SUMMARY




Venezuela - 1

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VENEZUELA - TERRAIN AND LOGISTICS SUMMARY



U.S. Equities in Venezuela

- Important location on major sea and air routes between **North** and **South America**.
- Overall **U.S.** equity is high.

Venezuela is one of the **U.S.'s** most important **Latin American** trading partners and a major supplier of oil and petroleum products to the **U.S.** With \$2.1 billion in direct investment, **Venezuela** ranks fifth after **Brazil**, **Mexico**, **Panama**, and **Argentina** in the amount of **U.S.** investment in the region. Over 20,000 **U.S.** citizens reside in **Venezuela**.

Direct Inv (Mil of \$)	Exports (Mil of \$)	Imports (Mil of \$)	U.S. Aid (Mil of \$)	Total Equity (Mil of \$)	U.S. Citizens	\$ Rating Rating	Total Numerical Rating	Overall U.S. Equity
2,124	650	7,000	-	9,774	20,600	5 6	11	High

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Drug Threat

Drug Production	Drug Processing	Precursor Chemicals	Money Laundering	Transit Point
X				X

- Transit point for precursor chemicals and cocaine.
- Suspected large quantities of marijuana are produced and sent to **Colombia**.

Venezuela is an important point for the transit of precursor chemicals and cocaine. Marijuana is cultivated along the border with **Colombia**, apparently by **Colombian** traffickers; as much as 3,000 metric tons of cannabis may be grown in **Venezuela** and exported via **Colombia**.

Terrorism

The Bandera Roja (Red Flag - GBR) operates in eastern **Venezuela** and along the **Venezuela-Colombia** border. It engages in kidnappings and hijackings as well as raids on small towns. The Red Flag sometimes coordinates with the **Colombia** group M-19 and the National Liberation Army.

Consolidated Threat

In the **Western Hemisphere**, **Venezuela** constitutes a serious concern due to its involvement in narcotics trafficking and terrorism.

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General Ground OOB

Infantry	Tank OOB	Artillery	Army Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Draft/TR	LAV	Howitzers/SP	34	4	78	B

Ground OOB consists of 34,000 troops. Conscripts from the rural and urban poor areas form the majority of the army strength. Officers and NCOs are all regulars. Training for enlisted men is accomplished in the infantry battalions. Officers attend various **Venezuelan** military schools, the **U.S.** Army School of the **Americas**, and the Inter-American Defense College in **Washington, D. C.** Tanks: AMX-13, AMX-30, M-18; Artillery: 160 mm MRS, M-56, M-101, M-109, M-114.

General Air OOB

Air OOB	Close Air	AAW (IAD)	Air Force Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
Early Radar	Early Smart	EW Radar	5	4	99	C

Fighter Aircraft: CF-5A, F-5E/F, F-16A, F-86K, Mirage IIIEV; Close Air: Canberra B82/88, Mirage 5, OV-10E, T-2D; Air Defense: Roland and RBS-70 SAMs; 18 Signal Flycatcher radars form the Guardian air defense system. It is reported that **Venezuela** has acquired other long-range air defense radars such as the AN/TPS-43. There are **Italian** and **Swedish** AA guns.

General Naval OOB

Naval OOB	S/S Missiles	Patrol Craft	Navy Size (Thousands)	Quality	Total Capability Value	Rating
ASUW/Air/ASW	HE	ASUW/Antiair	11	4	95	D

Ships: 8 Frigates with SSMs, SAMs, guns, and torpedoes; SSM: Otomat; Patrol Craft: 6 Fast Attack Craft-Missile and Gun with Otomat SSMs, guns, fire control, and radars.

Culture (Language and Religion)

Primary language - Spanish
Primary religion - Catholic

There is a relatively small cultural difference between **Venezuela** and the **U.S.**

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Weather

Average Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)	Average Relative Humidity (Percent)	Average Annual Rainfall (Inches)	Rating
60-92	62	23-71	Mixed

The climate varies from tropical to temperate depending on the elevation.

General Geographic Conditions

URBAN	DESERT	JUNGLE	MOUNTAINOUS
X			

Operational Elevation

<2,000 FT	<4,000 FT	<6,000 FT	>6,000 FT	>9,000 FT	>12,000 FT
	X				

The topography of **Venezuela** is varied. The **Andes Mountains** and adjacent hill country are in the northwest. There is a coastal zone north of the mountains bordering **Lake Maracaibo** and the **Caribbean Sea**. The plains or "llanos" extend from the mountains south and east to the **Orinico River**. The **Guyana Highlands**, a vast area of high plateaus and rolling plains, extend south and east of the **Orinico River**. Eighty percent of the population lives in cities and towns.

General Cross-Country Mobility

- **Venezuela** is generally suited for cross-country movement of tracked vehicles.

Cross-country tracked movement would be possible in about half of **Venezuela**. In the remaining portions of the country, tracked movement would be difficult due to the rough terrain and greatly restricted in direction in many places by deep, unfordable streams.

Intervisibility (Line of Sight)

- Restricted, with line of sight distances generally ranging between 1,000 and 2,000 meters.

Line of sight distances of from 1,000 to 2,000 meters are considered feasible in about half of **Venezuela** primarily in the coastal zone bordering **Lake Maracaibo** and the plains in the south and east. In the regions of the **Andes Mountains** and **Guyana Highlands**, line of sight visibility would be limited to under 1,000 meters.

Hydrography (Five Fathom Line)

- NGF platforms are able to approach the coast to provide satisfactory support for operations ashore.

DMA Chart #	5 Fathom Line from Shore (Meters)	NFG Rating
24452	500	Good

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IN-235

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Hydrography (Coastal Threat)

- Significant coastal threat.

Maximum Capability Coastal Defense Weapon	Maximum Range of Weapon (Meters)	Rating (Compared with 5"/54-cal)
160 mm MRS	30,000	Threat Advantage

MC&G Shortfalls

- Limited map coverage.

1:50 New	1:50 Old	Some 1:50	MSI Avail	1:250 New	None
		X			

1:50,000 scale map coverage is limited to portions of the coastal area bordering the **Caribbean Sea**.

Airfields

- Highly accessible by air, with more than one airfield that can handle C-5 aircraft.

Number of Airfields	Type Aircraft (C-5, C-141B, C-130) Accommodated	Airfield Utility (Unconstrained/ Constrained)	Rating
8	3 C-5 3 C-141B 1 C-130 1 None	3/5	>1/C-5

Airfields	Type Aircraft	Comments
Barquisimeto	C-130	-
Del Caribe International	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-
El Libertador	C-141B, C-130	VFR only.
General Francisco de Miranda	None	-
Josefa Camejo	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
La Chinita	C-5, C-141B, C-130	Taxiway narrow for C-5s.
La Fria	C-141B, C-130	Daylight/VFR only.
Simon Bolivar International (Caracas)	C-5, C-141B, C-130	-

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Ports

- Several moderate size ports which can accommodate strategic sealift.

Major Ports	Harbor Size	Channel/Anchorage Depths (Feet)	Cargo Pier Depth (Feet)	Cranes
Maracaibo	Small	36-40/31-35	21-25	Yes
La Salina	Small	41-45/36-40	-	-
Punto de Palmas	Small	41-45/-	-	-
Puerto Miranda	Small	36-40/31-35	41-45	-
La Estacada	Small	41-45/-	-	-
Amuay	Small	46-50/36-40	41-45	Yes
El Palito	Small	36-40/-	-	-
Puerto Cabello	Small	41-45/36-40	26-30	Yes
La Guaira	Medium	36-40/46-50	36-40	Yes
Puerto de Hierro	Small	-/over 76	41-45	Yes

Key Installations

Oil fields are found in the **Maracaibo** basin (along and under the northeast part of **Lake Maracaibo** and the **Maracaibo** and **Mara** districts, northwest of the lake), the **Orinoco** basin (numerous widely scattered fields south of **Puerto La Cruz**), and the **Barinas** basin.

U.S. Embassy	Communications	Highways	Railroads	Major Ports	Primary Airfields	Pipeline	Oil Field	NBC
Caracas	- Modern and expanding telecomm - 204 Radio stations - 59 TV stations - 4 Satellite stations	77,785 km	439 km	10	8	- Crude oil - Refined products - Natural gas	Yes	None

Strategic and Tactical Lift

The time required for a MEU on the **U.S.** east coast to embark on amphibious ships and sail to **Venezuela** is in excess of six days. The AAF/ACB can arrive within 24 hours but these elements do not possess a forcible entry capability.

NEO

NEO conducted by a MEU under normal conditions in **Venezuela** would be very difficult due to the large number of potential evacuees (20,600).

Embassy Staff	Evacuees	Inland Objective (nm)	Rating
608	20,600	10 (Caracas)	F

Note: In **Venezuela** the following factors are of little significance:

Gray Arms/Technology Transfer
NBC

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Year	Amount	Source	Destination	Comments
1950	100.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1951	150.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1952	200.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1953	250.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1954	300.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1955	350.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1956	400.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1957	450.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1958	500.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1959	550.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1960	600.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund

The following table shows the amount of money received from the State of Illinois for the University of Chicago from 1950 to 1960. The amount received each year is shown in the second column, the source of the money is shown in the third column, and the destination of the money is shown in the fourth column. The comments column contains any additional information about the money received.

Year	Amount	Source	Destination	Comments
1950	100.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1951	150.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1952	200.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1953	250.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1954	300.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1955	350.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1956	400.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1957	450.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1958	500.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1959	550.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1960	600.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund

The following table shows the amount of money received from the State of Illinois for the University of Chicago from 1950 to 1960. The amount received each year is shown in the second column, the source of the money is shown in the third column, and the destination of the money is shown in the fourth column. The comments column contains any additional information about the money received.

Year	Amount	Source	Destination	Comments
1950	100.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1951	150.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1952	200.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1953	250.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1954	300.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1955	350.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1956	400.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1957	450.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1958	500.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1959	550.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund
1960	600.00	State of Illinois	University of Chicago	General Fund

100