SECRETARIAT GENERAL DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
Flag Conference on Information Strategy
15 December 1995
WAGING WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Mr. Robert D. Steele, Chairman & CEO
OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Group
Challenge of Change: Six Revolutions
Changing Threat–Four Warrior Classes/law enforcement as the new legionnaires
Changing Dimensions of Time & Space–War/Peace, Here/There, Long/Short Time
Changing Fiscal Environment–fewer people, fewer dollars
Changing Physical Environment–urban, civilian, international, mixed demographic
Changing Knowledge Environment–private sector as center of gravity
Changing Technology Environment–virtual intelligence and total vulnerability
Open Source Intelligence–Background
Open source roots (OSS, CIA);
Copeland anecdote
USMC Intelligence Center, lessons learned about OSINT
SOUTHCOM and DOE, lessons learned about OSINT and drugs
CIA/CSIS lessons learned about OSINT and consumers
Joe Nye's Jig-Saw Puzzle:OSINT in perspective
OSINT is the foundation for reinventing classified disciplines
The Open Source Environment
Information Continuum (Nine Sectors) Schools, Universities, Libraries, Businesses, Private Investigators/Information Brokers, Media, Government, Defense,
Intelligence Information Commons versus the Iron/Bamboo/Plastic Curtains
Distributed (90%) versus Central (10%) Intelligence
Hard Copy (90%) versus Electronic (10%)Information
Internet is less than 1% of knowledge CIA Study on Journals
Center of Gravity is in the private sector
Overview of Some National Open Source Intelligence Practices
Australia–Pacific Rim Tier 4 burden-sharing option
Canada–80% from open sources, unclassified production
France–economic intelligence Germany–still a sweat-shop, creeping forward
Israel–precision-strike,U.S. information brokers, FOIA masters
Italy–you can just imagine…
Japan–6,000 newsprint pages a day collected, private sector lead
Netherlands–reorganization of collection, analysis; Internet centralized discovery, decentralized exploitation; possible lead for European OSINT Council
Quebec–harbinger of future provincial/state endeavors
Singapore–National Computer Board, wiring the island
Sweden–triad Committee, S&T attaches, Internet, “smart Nation”
United Kingdom–C4I (I=Info), DIS, Foreign Office, Board of Trade
Some Generalizations About OSINT Practices in Other Governments
No one has a national information strategy
No one has a significant lead on U.S. Government-industry relationships are all terribly ineffective
Private sector collection, translation, & analysis capabilities not used
Bureaucracy and control of money are the show-stoppers
Amount of money spent on OSINT by government is marginal
Virtually nothing is spent on technical applications: focus on content
Consumers do their own OSINT,
Producers do not filter/evaluate
Creating the Virtual Intelligence Community
Data, Information, Intelligence: Emphasis on OSINT Achieves Savings, Satisfies Broader Range of Requirements Enables Clandestine and Technical Focus on Hard Targets
Secrecy Paradigm is Counterproductive–Quick Open Access is Key
Information = Content + Context + Time
Obtain Information Before It is Classified Secret
Security through Speed and Obscurity
Distributed Collection and Filtering “JUST IN TIME” is Critical– Human Filtering, Leveraging External Overhead Essential
Analyst as Manager of Network of Overt Sources
Analyst as Manager of Private Sector Outsourcing
Analyst as “Recruiter/Handler” of Consumers
Vulnerabilities in Both Government and Industry Data Integrity, Availability, Security Cost of Uninformed Decisions
Information Warfare: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities
Defining IW–American Focus on Offensive
Interruption of Services Defining IW–American Focus on Defensive
MILITARY Measures Ignoring IW–American Oversights
80% of the data the commander needs is: — unclassified — in a foreign language — in hardcopy (not yet digitized)
60-80% of the civil and coalition partners can't handle electronic data
Defining IW Properly: Virtual Intelligence for the Commander
Electronic Home Defense (Continuity of CIVIL Operations) Offensive
IW for Deterrence and War Winning
Information Peacekeeping for Deterrence and War Winning
Eight Points War by other means–very unconventional
Acquiring information is more important than destroying information
Center of gravity is the civil sector (rear area) rather than the front line
Must inventory vulnerabilities across the Nation
Must “draft” civil sector communications & computing
Must redefine concepts of national security and military mission
Must mobilize the population for total war/total peace
Applied intellect wins–national information strategy critical
Impact on Mobility, Weapons, Command
Mobility systems extremely vulnerable to HERF attack by one person
Weapons systems lack data as well as functionality for one on one attack Command cannot be exercised using the existing architecture
What is to be Done?
Declassify the threat
Change rules of engagement (ROE)
Shift resources to research & development
Create National Information Foundation
Create civil sector continuity of operations plan — Due diligence law — National education program — C4 security standards — Electronic counterintelligence program — Military internships in civilian sector (thousands)
Explore alternative means of meeting law enforcement, paramilitary, and special operations requirements
Create Cyberspace Corps (lead to Signals Intelligence)
Develop Information Peacekeeping Concepts and Doctrine
Develop National Information Strategy
Some Implications of the Six Revolutions for the Military
Traditional (Classified) Intelligence is not adequate
Communications & computing security is not adequate
Mobility platforms are too big, too obvious, too expensive
Weapons systems lack terrain data and target sensing support
Rear area security non-existent–command & control at risk
Rules of engagement out of date–cannot wait for “rounds out”
Mission areas need to be redefined in terms of functionality
Role of private sector must be carefully studied: As source of intelligence (e.g. SPOT Image Corporation) As vulnerability to be defended through law and other measures Integration with civilian and law enforcement agencies must be addressed
National Information Strategy–The Legislation
Connectivity–Global, Corporate, and Individual–NII/GII a good start
Content–National Information Foundation/distributed CoE
Coordination of Research & Development–Common Toolkits
Communications & Computing Security–Standards, Testing, Education
Epilogue: U.S. Military Technology Initiative Evaluations
What Did We Learn? Doctrine, not Technology, is the Enabler
C4I and Combat Systems Must Merge
CIA and DIA Still Do Not “Get It”
Connectivity is Overrunning Content Must Plan for Multi-Belligerent/Civil Coalition Operations
Pre-Hostilities Rules of Engagement Required
What Did We NOT Learn?
Electronic Civil Defense is Show-Stopper SEW
Assuming that Information Needs Will Be Met Data Acquisition is Ignored–Labor/Skill Intensive
Threat is UNCONVENTIONAL Center of Gravity for R&D is in the Civil Sector Civilian Agencies–Domestic and Foreign–Critical Players Still Ignored Power (and Initiative) Now in Hands of the “Mongrels”
Mind Stretch
1895 Lord Kelvin, British physicist: “heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible”
1923 Nobel Laureate Robert Millikan “There is no likelihood that man can ever tap the power of the atom”
1932 University of Chicago astronomer Dr. F. R. Moulton “There is no hope for the fanciful idea of reaching the moon because of the insurmountable barriers to escaping earth's gravity”
1991 Martin Van Crevald, Israeli Professor “The shift from conventional war to low-intensity conflict will cause many of today's weapons systems, including specifically those that are most powerful and advanced, to be assigned to the scrap-heap. Very likely it also will put an end to large-scale military-technological research as we understand it today.”
Thinking Outside the Box
Information Systems
Invest in civil sector C3I security–95% of the comms go this way
Face the reality of civil-military connectivity shortfalls
Deal with encyclopedic intelligence shortfalls, especially mapping
Mobility Systems
Undersea Troops and Logistics Long-Range Aerial Resupply/Air Head Utility
Very fast shallow-water/riverine craft
On the fly mine-clearing, bottom mapping critical
Focus on distributed ARGs (“pile on”) rather than centralized CBGs
Instream off-load required in 50% of the contingencies
What Happens If You Can't Get Out of Town?
Weapons Systems
Target is down to single human being
Non-lethal is not just against humans
COST is an issue!
Information as a weapon, FAO as a weapons system
Radical Reinterpretation of Mission Areas
Strike (down to individual target, anywhere, anytime)
Forcible entry (into what? banks, companies, gangs?)
Maritime Battlespace Superiority (low slow singleton, loiter)
ISR/Information Warfare (sensor to shooter, information peacekeeping)
Assessment (mind over matter–sensors in charge of shooters)
Deterrence: what are the pre-emptive investment priorities?
Bottom Line One bullet can influence one mind, perhaps more, BUT precision cannot be achieved without intelligence
War in the 21st Century will be “mano a mano”–we are not ready.
FULL TEXT WITH GRAPHICS: 1995 WAGING WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
