The truth at any cost lowers all other costs — curated by former US spy Robert David Steele.
Robert Garigue was focusing only on the “technical” side of the matter. The above divide is compounded (made exponentially worse) by the divide between cyber-services and human end-users. To the best of our knowledge, no one has done a full-up functional requirements survey since 1986, and we still do not have the eighteen CATALYST functionalities …
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Briefing as Presented Seminal Technical Preface (2008) Gunnar Peterson on Robert Garigue’s Last Briefing Core Slides as Expandable JPEG with Comments: Robert Garigue: When Everything Else is Distributed…. Robert Garigue: Information Security MANDATE Robert Garigue: Structuring Risks (Role of Security) Robert Garigue: Evolution of Cyber-Space Robert Garigue: Three Information Security Domains–the Physical (Old), the Process …
Core Point: The US national security world is still operating under a two conflicting paradigms: stovepipes within which authorized users have access to everything in the stovepipe (more or less); and isolated stovepipes in which external authorized users have to spend 25% of their time gaining access to 80+ databases (or worse, don’t bother), and …
Core Point: Information Security must enable both risk and advance–for example, M4IS2 (multinational, multiagency, multidisciplinary, multidomain information-sharing and sense-making). Today cyber-security is an OBSTACLE to progress because it is, in one word, retarded–in two-words, risk-averse rather than risk-bounding. See Also: Robert Garigue, “Technical Preface” to Book Three Robert Garigue, CISO Briefing
See Also: Robert Garigue, “Technical Preface” to Book Three Robert Garigue, CISO Briefing
Credited by Robert Garigue to Gabe Davids of EDS. Core Point: Done properly, security enables MORE risk-taking, allows one to do MORE with LESS. In other words, cyber-security policies that are risk-averse instead of risk-enabling are, in a word, retarded and retard the enterprise. Case in point: Wikileaks leading to no more flash drives–what SHOULD …
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Core Point: It is not possible to have centralized cyber-anything if both the human end-users and all of the (multi-media and multi-lingual) data is distributed. This is especially true of security, which is historically several steps behind mission area processes to begin with, and any form of top-down “regulation” that tends to appear after the …
Continue reading “Robert Garigue: When Everything Else is Distributed….”
