Ada Bozeman, in Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft: Selected Essays, has written:
(There is a need) to recognize that just as the essence of knowledge is not as split up into academic disciplines as it is in our academic universe, so can intelligence not be set apart from statecraft and society, or subdivided into elements…such as analysis and estimates, counterintelligence, clandestine collection, covert action, and so forth. Rather … intelligence is a scheme of things entire. (Bozeman 1998: 177).
The principal failing of all intelligence endeavors to date, both in government (including law enforcement and the military), and in the private sector (across academia, civil society, commerce, the media, and non-government/non-profit), has been the lack of coherent comprehensive analytic models that by their very nature, foster an appreciation for the whole. In one word, they lack integrity — they lack the integrity of being whole; they lack the integrity of providing for relationships among all factors; and they lack the integrity of providing for true cost cradle to grave economic cost-benefit analytics.
The analytic model is what determines the maturity of the intelligence process, but it is irrelevant if the rest of “the thing entire” is a mess. If counterintelligence is not sufficient to eradicate traitors and special interests corrupting the decision-cycle entire; if collection is not coherent and responsive; if processing is marginal at best; and if constituencies are either ignored or ignorant — one cannot have intelligence. Intelligence without integrity is not intelligence. Integrity in this context is not about individual honor, rather it is about the coherence — the state of being whole and unfragmented — the integral consciousness of the whole, with intelligence and its constituencies being “one mind, one soul.”
There are four Whole of Government constituencies for decision-support that are not being addressed coherently because the Office of Management and Budget does not appear to “do” Whole of Government” management: strategy, policy, acquisition, operations. The individual Departments cannot be expected to make up for this deficiency at the presidential level–but they should be held accountable for coherent threat support to acquisition in the context of respect those of the ten threats to humanity that are within their mandate. Our current practice of doing intelligence support to each stovepipe in isolation from the whole is counter-productive, and we generally only do the “threat” in generic terms and do not tailored analytic support to strategy development and testing; to 360 degree policy both current and future; or to acquisitions beyond token support to individual weapons systems that are never themselves called into question for being unnecessary, unaffordable, and often untransportable..
In relation to threat support to acquisition, the primary justification for the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIA) created in 1988, the service intelligence centers appear to be more focused on justifying whatever programs the service chiefs demand, rather than on assuring integrated air, sea, ground, C4I systems affordability, sustainability, and interoperability — not just within services, but across services and in collaboration with all possible coalition partners.
In the absence of intelligence with integrity, ideological foolishness and budget share greed will rule. In the case of the US Government (USG), the time has come for OMB to have a Deputy Director for Management that actually manages, and to demand ethical evidence-based decision-support for a coherent national strategy, coherent supporting departmental strategies, and coherent implementation plans including Whole of Government acquisition and Whole of Government communications planning, programming, and budgeting. The only element capable of doing this now is the Department of Defense, which could — if it chose to do so — create a model for all others and at the same time become the hub for M4IS2.
Below are some link responsive to search terms used by visitors today.
10 High-Level Threats to Humanity
1990 Expeditionary Environment Analytic Model
2004 ANALYSIS: All-Source Analysis, Making Magic
2010: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Trilogy Updated
2010 Robert Steele: Reflections on Integrity UPDATED + Integrity RECAP
2011 Thinking About Revolution in the USA and Elsewhere (Full Text Online for Google Translate)
2012 PREPRINT: The Craft of Intelligence 3.4
2013 Public Governance in the 21st Century: New Rules, Hybrid Forms, One Constant – The Public
Chuck Spinney: Treason Thy Name is F-35A aka “Acquisition Malpractice”
Graphic: Culture Complex (102 Great Ideas)
Graphic: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) J-2 Central
Graphic: Preconditions of Revolution in the USA Today
Graphic: Ten High-Level Threats to Humanity
Reference: CRS Understanding Defense Acquisition
Search: four quadrants cultural intelligence
Strategic Analytic Model for Creating a Prosperous World at Peace
Tom Christie on Failure of Acquisition Reform
Tony Zinni: Background & Confirmation of the 4% “At Best” Quote on Secret versus Open Sources
Winslow Wheeler: Treason Thy Name is F-35A — We Expect Hagel to “Do A Cheney”