The truth at any cost lowers all other costs — curated by former US spy Robert David Steele.
This is the first and only time we have seen truth & trust properly identified as fundamental to security. The only other related works are those of Dr. Col Max Manwaring, whose edited work, The Search for Security–A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century makes the point that legitimacy is the core value enabling …
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Original Online as of 24 December 2010 Copy Held by Phi Beta Iota (PDF)
IMPORTANT: The Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is not the Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO) nor the Mission Commander or the Mission Logistics Officer or any of the other mission support specialties. The point is that security and knowledge must co-exist and in collaboration with one another, the CISO and CKO need to ensure that the …
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See Also: Robert Garigue, “Technical Preface” to Book Three Robert Garigue, CISO Briefing
Robert Garigue was focusing only on the “technical” side of the matter. The above divide is compounded (made exponentially worse) by the divide between cyber-services and human end-users. To the best of our knowledge, no one has done a full-up functional requirements survey since 1986, and we still do not have the eighteen CATALYST functionalities …
Continue reading “Robert Garigue: Security Services versus IT Processes”
Briefing as Presented Seminal Technical Preface (2008) Gunnar Peterson on Robert Garigue’s Last Briefing Core Slides as Expandable JPEG with Comments: Robert Garigue: When Everything Else is Distributed…. Robert Garigue: Information Security MANDATE Robert Garigue: Structuring Risks (Role of Security) Robert Garigue: Evolution of Cyber-Space Robert Garigue: Three Information Security Domains–the Physical (Old), the Process …
Core Point: The US national security world is still operating under a two conflicting paradigms: stovepipes within which authorized users have access to everything in the stovepipe (more or less); and isolated stovepipes in which external authorized users have to spend 25% of their time gaining access to 80+ databases (or worse, don’t bother), and …
