Phi Beta Iota: Insane is continuing to do what is not working. Stupid is continuing to do what is not working combined with throwing more money at it. The US Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense may finally be closing in on a paradigm shift that restores OUTPUTS (decision-support for the first, peace for the second) as the reason for existence, rather than INPUTS (budget share). As with Viet-Nam, it would be a lot cheaper, faster, and better to simply give the money we are spending to the individual Afghanis. The IC desperately needs a Multinational Engagement lifeboat built predominantly on open sources and methods, focused on needs assessment and satisfaction at the household level. Time for a paradigm shift. Click on the book cover to see what one man armed with pennies accomplished.
1. “Reforms” were never really implemented–this is business as usual
2. No one will be held accountable–President has no one who knows HOW to do reforms
3. This article is as close as we will get to soul searching.
Intel Swap Is Key Vs. Afghan IEDs (But Refusing to Share)
Former commander urges better sharing
1. Shades of Viet-Nam not sharing images of targets with pilots
2. What part of IEDs will outlast drones do we not get?
3. Legitimacy comes from meeting needs, not finding IEDs all day
Complete article below the fold.
January 7, 2010
By Jim Michaels, USA Today
WASHINGTON — A reluctance by the U.S. military to share its latest technology and intelligence with allies in Afghanistan is hampering efforts to defeat deadly roadside bombs there, said the outgoing commander charged with defeating improvised explosive devices.
We’re very timid and slow at changing our disclosure and information sharing,” said Thomas Metz, who retired last week as an Army lieutenant general after leading the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. “The commanders in the field are coming back to Washington with a very clear message that we’ve got to figure out this information sharing” because it will help disrupt cells that make IEDs, he said.
The Pentagon has spent billions of dollars on efforts to defend against IEDs and attack the networks that build and finance them. The bombs kill more coalition forces than any other weapon used by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The reluctance to share information is based on sensitivities about revealing sources or giving enemies insight into secret technologies, Metz said. Information on roadside bombs is often gleaned from secret drones and sensors. Some U.S. aircraft have equipment and cameras sensitive enough to detect ground that has been dug up for IEDs, for example.
“The bureaucrat back in Washington is concerned that somebody’s going to find out how they got the information,” Metz said. The solution is simple, he said: “You can separate how the information was obtained from what the information is.”
The problem is particularly acute in Afghanistan, where the United States is fighting alongside 42 allies. There are about 71,000 U.S. servicemembers in Afghanistan, and 42,000 troops fromNATO and individual countries.
“We continue to have a tremendous problem with the jammers because each nation builds its jammers a different way,” Metz said. “No one wants to open up their box and show how the electronics works.”
Jammers are used to interfere with the signals that insurgents use to trigger bombs electronically.
“If you’ve got some information about the network, you don’t have to share how you got that information. But it would surely be nice if your allies and your coalition partners got that part of the information that they needed to be successful,” Metz said.
Insurgents in Afghanistan in recent years have been turning increasingly to roadside bombs and suicide attacks to target coalition forces. The number of IED attacks that killed or wounded coalition forces increased to 60 in December from 32 in December 2008. The total number of IEDs, including those that were found before they detonated, increased to 8,690 last year from 3,783 in 2008.