Very strange combination–and multiple searches with the exact same words.
Below the line: 1) On UN, 2) On UN national, 3) on national, 4) on M4IS2
1) The United Nations does not have an intelligence strategy or intelligence department, something recommended in Robert Steele’s latest book, INTELLIGENCE FOR EARTH: Clarity, Diversity, Integrity, & Sustainability (EIN, 2010). Right now there are multiple non-collaborative centers–the Department of Safety & Security (DSS) is trying to hire intelligence analysts, but their chain of command is so corrupt, and the Chief Administration Officers at the various missions so weak, that this is perverting entire mission budgets, moving money toward security and away from substance because of falsely inflated risk assessments (or in the case of Iraq, merely lazy and ignorant ones). The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) comes closest to getting it right, and the creation of the Department of Field Support (DFS) opens the door to the creation of a Department of Multinational Decision Support (DMDS) that is independent of DSS, DPA, and all the other inherently corrupt elements of the UN that will misrepresent information to further their own biases–the UN needs three kinds of intelligence support: to the strategic mission and mandate development; to independent agencies; and to multinational field operations.
2. The UN does not have national intelligence strategies either, but it does have a new concept, “Deliver As One,” which came out of the High Level Panel on Coherence. There have been three truly extraordinary, productive, and globally vital panels out of the UN in the last 20 years: the Brahimi panel on the future of peacekeeping operations (including intelligence support); the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change that produced the world-changing report, A More Secure World–Our Shared Responsibility–Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and the most recent panel, on Coherence, of which the UN has none. It was this panel that inspired the emphasis in the book on Intelligence for Earth, on using information to harmonize budgets, programs, and deliverables, not only across the UN, but across all eight tribes of intelligence.
3. Most governments have national intelligence strategies, but they are both elementary and mis-directed, focusing in most cases–the Nordics, Netherlands, and Singapore being the usual exceptions–on secret intelligence narrowly focused and generally without accountability. A true national intelligence strategy–and this was briefed to the National Computer Board (NCB) in Singapore in 1994–harnesses the distributed intelligence of the whole nation, generally approached via the eight tribes of intelligence. Below are some links along these lines, including the 1994 and 1995 briefings that were completely without result in the USA.
4. Finally, neither the UN nor NATO nor any regional (continental) organization appears to have any concept of how to do Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing and Sense-Making (M4IS2). This will be developed over time in South America and perhaps Africa, perhaps ASEAN, and there will also be a parallel development of Liberation Technology and People’s Information Centres. There is a great deal to be done, and enormous promise in the possibilities that emerge when information is shared and collective intelligence (collective sense-making) is made possible. across all threats and all policy areas. This is vital–sharing on one threat or one domain is COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE–it leads to doing more of the wrong thing because it is isolated from holistic strategic analytics that are deeply multicultural in nature, and totally grounded in a comprehensive appreciation of the “true cost” of each and every possible course of action.