1997 Tyrrell (UK) Proposals for the Development of an Open Source Programme to Support NATO and PfP Activities

Historic Contributions, Military, Non-Governmental, Peace Intelligence
1997 NATO Handbooks
Commodore Patrick Tyrell, RN OBE

Without the leadership of then Capt Patrick Tyrrell, RN OBE, these handbooks would not exist today.  He started the ball rolling, BGen Jim Cox, CA, then NATO and SHAPE Deputy J-2 organized a lecture to all the flag officers in charge of military intelligence, and finally directed SACLANT, then led by General William Kernan, USA, to create these first multinational doctrinal guides.  Under the direct supervision of Admiral Sir William Pewone, RN, this was done over the course of two years. Below is the white paper and lecture that started it all.

NATO Awakes....
NATO Awakes....

1995 Bjore (SE) Six Years of Open Source Information (OSI) Lessons Learned

Historic Contributions, Military
Mats Bjore CEO InfoSphere (SE)
Mats Bjore CEO InfoSphere (SE)

Mats Bjore, along with Arno Reuser, Steve Edwards, Joe Markowitz, is one of a tiny handful of “originals” who have striven to create the discipline of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) that has now morphed into M4IS2 (Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing and Sense-Making).  Collective Intelligence, Cognitive Science, and Civil Affairs as well as Civil Society are all congregating outside of government “control.”

Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned

USMC 1991 National Intelligence Topics FIXED

Ethics, Military, Peace Intelligence

In 1991 the Marine Corps sought to change the National Intelligence Topics (NIT) away from their heavy emphasis on the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, and toward the emerging threats in the Third World, including non-state actors. The effort died in staffing. This is the sole surviving documentation from that effort.

PDF (4 Pages): 2019 USMC NITS Redirection 1991

Continue reading “USMC 1991 National Intelligence Topics FIXED”

Supplemental Observation

Ethics, Military

In DIA OSINT is treated as an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), distributing money to the standard suspects without any form of strategic guidance, operational harmonization, or tactical effect.  DIA does not “do” OSINT because neither the DIA leadership nor the so-called leadership of the intelligence directorate at DIA, where the Defense Intelligence Open Source  Program Office (DIOSPO) is left in deserved obscurity (five “managers” in three years is worse than a joke, it is reprehensible) have the foggiest notion of OSINT as an integrated discipline in its own right.  The newly-selected incumbent is under protest (to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) since DoD and DIA have demonstrated they lack integrity in hiring on process or merit to this specific position), and Congressional investigations at the Appropriations Committee level are being inspired.  In USDI OSINT is treated as a data-mining technical function, and document exploitation (which requires distributed human translation in 183 languages) is explicitly excluded at the same time that DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is handicapped by individuals who have no idea what the fifteen slices of HUMINT–much less what comprises effective clandestine, covert, defensive, and offensive counterintelligence–and have absolutely no inclination to manage them as a coherent whole.  Defense intelligence has followed “central” intelligence over the cliff.

Supports Handbook: Joint Operating Environment 2010