Journal: CIA Denies Disability to Poisoned Officer

Corruption, Government
CIA Double-Crosses Its Own

Washington Post  June 16, 2010  Pg. B3

Federal Diary

Former CIA Agent Suing Agency Over Lead Poisoning

By Joe Davidson

When Franklin A. Richards, a CIA agent, readily accepted assignment to Iraq, he knew he might have to take a bullet — some lead — for his
country.

And he says he took plenty, but not because he was shot.

Richards, a firearms expert, was sent to Iraq in August 2003 to provide weapons training. He wasn't hit by a bullet during the three weeks he was there, but according to a lawsuit he has filed, he was seriously wounded by lead poisoning.

Now he can no longer work as an agent, or at much of anything else, he says. The former agent is suing the CIA because of a long list of
ailments that he alleges grew from being ordered to labor in a toxic workplace that even the Army had placed off-limits.

READ FULL STORY

OFFICER IN HIS OWN WORDS

Phi Beta Iota:  Obama has betrayed both the public and the government civil servants and uniformed personnel.  He is nothing more than a continuation of “business as usual” under Bush-Cheney, and Leon Panetta is obviously nothing more than a placeholder who liked being played for a fool.  This case officer (evidently The Washington Post no longer employs editors or fact checkers–in the foreign intelligence world agents commit treason, case officers handle them) deserves better.  He should make this a class action lawsuit for $100 million, and seek $10 million for himself and his lawyer.  CIA is covering up so many high crimes and misdemeanors, it is hard to get a grip on all of them, but the worse high crime has been CIA mismanagement of the clandestine, analytic, administrative, and so-called scientific and technical services.  From the Afghan Eight to the Iraq  Thousand, CIA is so morally bankrupt that plowing salt into the ground at Langley would be an upgrade.

See Also:

Journal: CIA’s Poor Tradecraft AND Poor Management

Journal: CIA as Poster Child For Dull US Intelligence

Journal: OUT OF CONTROL–The Demise of Responsible Government “Intelligence” I

Journal: Suicide Bomber–CIA Cluster a Gift from God

Journal: CIA Opens Climate Center–the Reductionism and Irrelevance Continues within a “Dumb Nation”

Journal: US Government Still Inept at 183 Languages, 33 of them Core (including 12 distinct dialects of Arabic)

Journal: CIA Blows–Blackwater, $5M Bar Bill, and Reprise of Rendition Atrocities

Event Report: 20 Nov 09 NYC Counterinsurgency–America’s Strategic Burden Featuring Nagl, Kilcullen, Sheehan, Bergen, Coll Among Others

Memoranda

COIN20 Trip Report
COIN20 Trip Report

21 November 2009

Memorandum of Transmittal by Robert David STEELE Vivas

Subject:  Counterinsurgency Conference Overview

Mr. Jason Liszkiewicz, Executive Director of the Earth Intelligence Network (EIN) and resident in NYC, attended the 20 November 2009 conference on counterinsurgency (speakers identified on page two), and provided me with the notes on pages 3-9.  Below is my own exploitation of these notes.

IGNORANT US POLICYMAKERS.  We have policymakers with crippling illusions about how the world is—worst ever—people in policy positions do not understand the problems they are making policy on—Congress is unsophisticated about Afghanistan; Washington-area decision-makers vastly misunderstand the enemy—Taliban is a super-bug  adapting super-fast.  This is NOT about Al Qaeda having a home base.  Congress lacks next of kin engaged.

CORRUPT AFGHAN OFFICIALS. Afghan government officials own 32% of the Palm Islands in Dubai—election was “industrial-strength fraud”—tsunami of cash (US, Saudi, others) drives corruption.  NOTE:  No Afghans on any of the panels.

US LACKS AREA KNOWLEDGE & STRATEGY. We really do not “get” the Afghanistan-Pakistan-India  context, detail, etcetera.  US “strategy” of “ten cities” is a mirror of the Soviet strategy before defeat.  Doctrine is not a substitute for Strategy.  Water (Indus River) is central to Pakistan-India relationship (Kashmir is about water).  Question NOT being asked: how do we do this without a US ground presence?  “Cheap coat of paint” approach to challenges.  “Tactics without strategy is noise before defeat.”  Saudi money, Pakistan-Taliban axis will outlast US money and US ground presence.

COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL LACKING. Counterinsurgency manual is not realistic and warps policy debate—the reality of poppy crops is not in the manual, not in the “strategy/doctrine”

UN, AID, NGO OOB NOT WORKNG. UN not working, its role not thought out, shortfalls in specialized everything.  Local corruption and family-political angling for contracts lead to some IED’s intended to block or redirect contract funds.  AID  giving contracts to Americans, not Afghans.  US has no ability to create ministries from scratch.  Civilian capabilities non-existent or not understood by military when they do show up.  No inter-agency planning in part because the civilians have no idea why they are there or what they should do.

LOST IN TRANSLATION. Continue to lack Pashto translators.   More Pashto speakers within NYPD than in all US forces across Afghanistan

EXIT OPPORTUNITIES. Afghan Army most respected institution in country, best fighters but worst policemen.  US ground presence makes things worse.  Solutions have to be Afghan.  Afghan population wants sovereignty and independence.  US troops simply surviving, not campaigning.

On page 10 I provide the “Lessons Learned” from my 1992 study of USMC operations.