Deja vu — over and over again.
In Kim’s Death, an Extensive Intelligence Failure
By MARK LANDLER and CHOE SANG-HUN
New York Times, December 19, 2011
EXTRACT:
For South Korean, Chinese and American intelligence services to have failed to pick up any clues to this momentous development — panicked phone calls between government officials, say, or soldiers massing around Mr. Kim’s train — attests to the secretive nature of North Korea, a country not only at odds with most of the world but also sealed off from it in a way that defies spies or satellites.
Phi Beta Iota: There is a huge disconnect between how the US secret intelligence community spends money, and what it produces. 4% “at best” of what a major commander needs to know, and nothing for everyone else. Until the secret world has leadership focused on requirements definition, collection management, holistic analytics, multinational information-sharing and sense-making, and direct constant support to decision-makers at all levels across all issue areas, it will continue to administer (not mange, not lead) the world's most expensive Potemkin Village.
See Also:
Graphic: Tony Zinni on 4% “At Best”
Graphic: Intelligence Maturity Scale
Journal: Reflections on Integrity UPDATED + Integrity RECAP
2010: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Trilogy Updated
2008 COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE: Creating a Prosperous World at Peace
2006 INFORMATION OPERATIONS: All Information, All Languages, All the Time
2002 THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE: Personal, Public, & Political
2000 ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World
