Here is document, and below, the conclusion.
The phenomenon of the swing of Salafism/Wahhabism into terrorism is not monolithic, but is divided on the grounds of realities, historical context and local customs. Similarly, we must take into account the relatively low importance of boundaries between States that most often deal with various ethnic and religious ensembles.
The impact on the war in Afghanistan on the emergence of Salafist jihadism is a well-known phenomenon and it’s a safe bet that the current conflict in Northern Mali will have consequences on the entire Sahel. Not to mention, in the case of Mali, the weight of the “tradition” of Ghazi, the warrior who participate in an operation against “infidels” and thereby contribute to jihad and traffic of all kinds that marked Saharan nomads and semi-nomads.
In the same way, terrorists operations conducted against national interests by organisations strongly anchored in their countries of origin are to be distinguished from networks operating in vast areas straddling several countries (the Sahara and Afghanistan-Pakistan region, for example). In the case illustrated by the very recent French operation in Mali, such groups have targeted foreign interests, military or civilian.
Not to mention the handling and direct use of Salafist terrorist organisations by intelligence services on behalf of state interests (Indo-Pakistani conflict, Qatar and Saudi funding, manipulation by the Algerian secret services, etc.).
It should be noted here that this type of manipulation is growing rapidly. The civil war in Syria is a perfect illustration.
Based on these findings and the extent of the involvement in terrorism of Salafist/Wahhabi movements we must conclude the risk of the perpetuation of the threat which above all menaces the local populations but also the political and economic interests of all nations present in those areas.
This is all the more true given that we are witnessing the internationalisation of jihad since the war in Afghanistan. We should therefore expect that the growing number of in doctrinated jihadi fighters will be an additional risk factor for the emergence of new conflicts and terrorist actions.
Phi Beta Iota: The USA has always been willfully stupid about “friendly enemies” and its politicans always too willing to take direction from financial interests that do not focus on the holistic outcomes. Intelligence with integrity is lacking in Washington, D.C., and counterintelligence does not exist. The Saudis and Qatar are thinking strategically — the USA cannot define the term. While NATO is notably less American each day — and this is a very good thing — it continues to be limited by its military mind-set to military approaches. The Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Initiative — and the Regional Cooperation Course — are examples of doing the wrong thing righter. What NATO should be doing is merging with the EU, the BRICs, and the regional associations to create Open Source Everything (OSE) technical solutiosn for local to global information sharing, and M4IS2 (Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing ans Sense-Making networks. The eight major demographics are playing population, religious, economic, and cultural chess — NATO is so limited in its options as to be destined for failure if not extinction in its present configuration.
1997 Strategic Intelligence in the USA: Myth or Reality? (en francais aussi)