Iraq lessons learned: intelligence
The Prime Minister got just enough cover from the Office of National Assessments to meet political needs. Beyond politics, though—as a basis for war—the Oz intelligence supporting war was thin stuff.
This is the way Swieringa summarised the Iraq findings of the Joint Intelligence Committee:
- The scale of threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was less than it had been a decade earlier.
- Under sanctions that prevailed at the time, Iraq’s military capability remained limited and the country’s infrastructure was still in decline.
- The nuclear program was unlikely to be far advanced. Iraq was unlikely to have obtained fissile material.
- Iraq had no ballistic missiles that could reach the US. Most if not all of the few Scuds that were hidden away were likely to be in poor condition.
- There was no known chemical weapons production.
- There was no specific evidence of resumed biological weapons production.
- There was no known biological weapons testing or evaluation since 1991.
- There was no known Iraq offensive research since 1991.
- Iraq did not have nuclear weapons.
- There was no evidence that chemical weapon warheads for Al Samoud or other ballistic missiles had been developed.
- No intelligence had accurately pointed to the location of weapons of mass destruction.
ROBERT STEELE: There is absolutely no excuse for an intelligence professional who knows better allowing their country to go to war on the basis of lies. This is treason, pure and simple.
See Also:
Review: Weapons of Mass Deception–The Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq
Review: 935 Lies – The Future of Truth and the Decline of America’s Moral Integrity
Review: A Pretext for War–9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies
Review (Guest): Pay Any Price – Greed, Power, and Endless War
