Analyst 2000 was a special working group that included Dr. Mike Leavitt and Andy Shepard, who wrote 1992 Shepard (US) Intelligence Analysis in the Year 2002 and is today (2010 ADDNI/[ ]. We don't have this today because from the White House to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to today's Director of National Intelligence (DNI) there has been zero strategic r5equirements manager or budget management.
The Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC), today a Command, broke new ground, but failed to achieve traction despite strong support from the mid-career professionals. For example, the Marine COrps submission won the Joint National Intelligence Development Staff (JNIDS) competition one year with its proposal for a generic all-source analytic workstation, but they were over-ruled by a Navy Admiral who ordered them to do an anti-submarine problem instead. It is that lack of integrity that has incapacitated the intelligence and defense communities–both the Admiral who abused his position, and the JNIDS staff who allowed him to do so, lacked the kind of integrity that the Constitution calls for among its civilian and uniformed servants to the public interest.
It cost CIA $3000 to teach us the word “heuristics” also known as “rules of thumb. Attempts to leverage expert & decision support systems heuristics, encoding specificity, and cognitive mapping decision making in foreign policy ultimately failed for two reasons:
1. No over-arching authority able to force the Directorate of Operations (DO) to enter the 21st Century; and
2. Bureaucratic mind-sets all too comfortable with cut and paste slave labor instead of gold collar workers.
As best we can tell, national security productivity is no better today than it was in the 1988-1992 timeframe.