Review: A Season of Inquiry–The Senate Intelligence Investigation

4 Star, Congress (Failure, Reform), Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform), Intelligence (Government/Secret)

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5.0 out of 5 stars Devastating, informative, essential reference,

April 8, 2000
Loch K. Johnson

“You see, the way a free government works, there's got to be a housecleaning every now and then.” Harry Truman, as cited on the first page of the book. Well, in the U.S. Government, before you get a real housecleaning, it appears you have to build the vacuum cleaner from scratch every few years, and even then you only get the big dirt on the margins. This book is a very important book with all the more value today as we finally get serious about intelligence reform. Loch's professional and extraordinarily detailed account of the entire Church Committee investigation, its findings, White House attempts to avoid reform, and the rather bland outcomes that finally resulted, should be considered the key to understanding where we are today and why we so desperately need legislation to achieve substantive reform. Had Senator Church been chosen by Jimmy Carter as Vice President (Church was favored by the convention, with Mondale and Stevenson tied behind him), who knows what good might have come of his White House service.

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Review: Slow Burn–The Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam

4 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

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4.0 out of 5 stars Crystal-clear insights into intelligence failure in Viet-Nam,

April 8, 2000
Orrin Deforest
This is one of two books I regard as essential to an understanding of our intelligence failures in Viet-Nam. DeForrest was a former military enlisted man who ended up managing a great deal of the prisoner interrogation for a major Agency facility in-country. His story ties together a number of important themes, from the failure of Ivy League types to understand what they were dealing with to the inadequacies (and sometimes the superiority) of vast numbers of “contract” case officers who would normally not have been hired, to the very real value of systematically debriefing all prisoners and entering the results into a database amenable to search and retrieval, something we don't know how to do today. Across every major military operation since Viet-Nam, it has been my experience that we have no table of organization and equipment, completely inadequate numbers of trained interrogators and translators, and no commitment to the tedious but essential work of extracting knowledge from large numbers of hostile prisoners.
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Review: War Without Windows

4 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

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4.0 out of 5 stars Essential reference on intelligence failure in Viet-Nam,

April 8, 2000
Bruce Jones
Sam Adams may be more famous as the whistle-blower on CIA and U.S. military falsification of the numbers of Viet Cong and regular North Vietnamese army personnel confronting the U.S. in Viet-Nam, but this book is the very best account I have found of the intimate details of how politics, bureaucracy, bad judgment, and some plain downright lying falsified the military intelligence process at all levels of the U.S. military in Viet-Nam.
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Review: The Tunnels of Cu Chi

6 Star Top 10%, Asymmetric, Cyber, Hacking, Odd War, Insurgency & Revolution, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

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5.0 out of 5 stars Required Reading for All Command & Staff Officers,

April 8, 2000
Tom Mangold
This is required reading for every commander and every staff officer, and for every intelligence professional, both at the entry-level and at mid-career. Two things really hit home from this book: 1) the fact that we were completely clueless about the physical, mental, and cultural toughness and dedication of the Vietnamese who opposed our interference in Viet-Nam; 2) the fact that we are completely unable to detect tunnels under our base camps or in the tactical environment (although new technology is coming along). They dug 200 miles of tunnels by hand, including extensive networks under the major Bien Hoa complex.
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Review: The Tet Offensive–Intelligence Failure in War

5 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

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5.0 out of 5 stars Very detailed review of intelligence failure in Viet-Nam,

April 8, 2000
James J. Wirtz
Jim, a very respected member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School, has provided us with a very well documented study of how the U.S. missed the Tet Offensive in Viet-Name. Among his findings: we knew fully two months in advance at the tactical collection level, with several additional collection successes and some modest analysis successes in the weeks preceding the offensive. We were distracted by Khe Sanh, the commanders did not want to hear it, “intelligence to please” was the standard within the Military Assistance Command Viet-Nam intelligence bureaucracy, and when we finally did grasp, one day before the attack, its true strategic nature, we failed to disseminate the warnings to the tactical commanders with sufficient effectiveness.
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Review: From the Shadows–The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War

4 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

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4.0 out of 5 stars Useful benchmark on intelligence-policy relationship,

April 8, 2000
Robert M. Gates
I wore out one fountain pen on this book. Bob Gates has served his country, and five presidents, as earnestly and capably as anyone might, and there is much to learn from this book. The level of detail is quite good. He is very critical of the Directorate of Operations for both misbehavior and a lack of management control in relation to Central America, and as one who was there I have to say, he is absolutely right. We disagree on the point of intelligence (he would say, “secrets for the president”, I would say “knowledge for the Nation”) but I believe we would agree on this: intelligence is important, and intelligence merits deep and sustained interest by the President.
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Review: In from the Cold–The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence

4 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

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4.0 out of 5 stars Essential Citizen-Led Reference on Intelligence Reform,

April 8, 2000
Allan E. Goodman
The Director of Central Intelligence now serving refuses to accept the word “reform” and persists in the traditionalist view that only incremental change is needed within the U.S. Intelligence Community. This book, by a very respected team of private sector authorities with experience in the business of intelligence opens by noting that “informed opinion overwhelmingly holds that many of the important questions about the intelligence agencies have yet to be addressed.” Their book, and mine, and the books coming out this year by Greg Treverton, the team of Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman, and a group of ten authors including Mel Goodman and Bob White, are part of the responsible effort from the private sector to get the incoming President and the incoming Congress to finally accept their own responsibility for engaging these issues and legislating reform that will never come from within the U.S. Intelligence Community if it is left to its own devices and inclinations.
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noble gold