Category: Briefings & Lectures

1997	US	Presentation	Steele	DIA/JMITC: The Future of Intelligence
1995	US	Presentation	Steele	CENDI & COSPO As Catalysts for National Security & Competitiveness
1994	US	Presentation	Steele	Advantages of OSINT for National and Corporate Security
1993	US	Presentation	Steele	OSS ’93: Reinventing National Intelligence—Advantages of OSINT

SECRETARIAT GENERAL DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

Flag Conference on Information Strategy

15 December 1995

WAGING WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Mr. Robert D. Steele, Chairman & CEO

OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Group

Challenge of Change: Six Revolutions

Changing Threat–Four Warrior Classes/law enforcement as the new legionnaires

Changing Dimensions of Time & Space–War/Peace, Here/There, Long/Short Time

Changing Fiscal Environment–fewer people, fewer dollars

Changing Physical Environment–urban, civilian, international, mixed demographic

Changing Knowledge Environment–private sector as center of gravity

Changing Technology Environment–virtual intelligence and total vulnerability

Open Source Intelligence–Background

Open source roots (OSS, CIA);

Copeland anecdote

USMC Intelligence Center, lessons learned about OSINT

SOUTHCOM and DOE, lessons learned about OSINT and drugs

CIA/CSIS lessons learned about OSINT and consumers

Joe Nye's Jig-Saw Puzzle:OSINT in perspective

OSINT is the foundation for reinventing classified disciplines

The Open Source Environment

Information Continuum (Nine Sectors) Schools, Universities, Libraries, Businesses, Private Investigators/Information Brokers, Media, Government, Defense,

Intelligence Information Commons versus the Iron/Bamboo/Plastic Curtains

Distributed (90%) versus Central (10%) Intelligence

Hard Copy (90%) versus Electronic (10%)Information

Internet is less than 1% of knowledge CIA Study on Journals

Center of Gravity is in the private sector

Overview of Some National Open Source Intelligence Practices

Australia–Pacific Rim Tier 4 burden-sharing option

Canada–80% from open sources, unclassified production

France–economic intelligence Germany–still a sweat-shop, creeping forward

Israel–precision-strike,U.S. information brokers, FOIA masters

Italy–you can just imagine…

Japan–6,000 newsprint pages a day collected, private sector lead

Netherlands–reorganization of collection, analysis; Internet centralized discovery, decentralized exploitation; possible lead for European OSINT Council

Quebec–harbinger of future provincial/state endeavors

Singapore–National Computer Board, wiring the island

Sweden–triad Committee, S&T attaches, Internet, “smart Nation”

United Kingdom–C4I (I=Info), DIS, Foreign Office, Board of Trade

Some Generalizations About OSINT Practices in Other Governments

No one has a national information strategy

No one has a significant lead on U.S. Government-industry relationships are all terribly ineffective

Private sector collection, translation, & analysis capabilities not used

Bureaucracy and control of money are the show-stoppers

Amount of money spent on OSINT by government is marginal

Virtually nothing is spent on technical applications: focus on content

Consumers do their own OSINT,

Producers do not filter/evaluate

Creating the Virtual Intelligence Community

Data, Information, Intelligence: Emphasis on OSINT Achieves Savings, Satisfies Broader Range of Requirements Enables Clandestine and Technical Focus on Hard Targets

Secrecy Paradigm is Counterproductive–Quick Open Access is Key

Information = Content + Context + Time

Obtain Information Before It is Classified Secret

Security through Speed and Obscurity

Distributed Collection and Filtering “JUST IN TIME” is Critical– Human Filtering, Leveraging External Overhead Essential

Analyst as Manager of Network of Overt Sources

Analyst as Manager of Private Sector Outsourcing

Analyst as “Recruiter/Handler” of Consumers

Vulnerabilities in Both Government and Industry Data Integrity, Availability, Security Cost of Uninformed Decisions

Information Warfare: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

Defining IW–American Focus on Offensive

Interruption of Services Defining IW–American Focus on Defensive

MILITARY Measures Ignoring IW–American Oversights

80% of the data the commander needs is: — unclassified — in a foreign language — in hardcopy (not yet digitized)

60-80% of the civil and coalition partners can't handle electronic data

Defining IW Properly: Virtual Intelligence for the Commander

Electronic Home Defense (Continuity of CIVIL Operations) Offensive

IW for Deterrence and War Winning

Information Peacekeeping for Deterrence and War Winning

Eight Points War by other means–very unconventional

Acquiring information is more important than destroying information

Center of gravity is the civil sector (rear area) rather than the front line

Must inventory vulnerabilities across the Nation

Must “draft” civil sector communications & computing

Must redefine concepts of national security and military mission

Must mobilize the population for total war/total peace

Applied intellect wins–national information strategy critical

Impact on Mobility, Weapons, Command

Mobility systems extremely vulnerable to HERF attack by one person

Weapons systems lack data as well as functionality for one on one attack Command cannot be exercised using the existing architecture

What is to be Done?

Declassify the threat

Change rules of engagement (ROE)

Shift resources to research & development

Create National Information Foundation

Create civil sector continuity of operations plan — Due diligence law — National education program — C4 security standards — Electronic counterintelligence program — Military internships in civilian sector (thousands)

Explore alternative means of meeting law enforcement, paramilitary, and special operations requirements

Create Cyberspace Corps (lead to Signals Intelligence)

Develop Information Peacekeeping Concepts and Doctrine

Develop National Information Strategy

Some Implications of the Six Revolutions for the Military

Traditional (Classified) Intelligence is not adequate

Communications & computing security is not adequate

Mobility platforms are too big, too obvious, too expensive

Weapons systems lack terrain data and target sensing support

Rear area security non-existent–command & control at risk

Rules of engagement out of date–cannot wait for “rounds out”

Mission areas need to be redefined in terms of functionality

Role of private sector must be carefully studied: As source of intelligence (e.g. SPOT Image Corporation) As vulnerability to be defended through law and other measures Integration with civilian and law enforcement agencies must be addressed

National Information Strategy–The Legislation

Connectivity–Global, Corporate, and Individual–NII/GII a good start

Content–National Information Foundation/distributed CoE

Coordination of Research & Development–Common Toolkits

Communications & Computing Security–Standards, Testing, Education

Epilogue: U.S. Military Technology Initiative Evaluations

What Did We Learn? Doctrine, not Technology, is the Enabler

C4I and Combat Systems Must Merge

CIA and DIA Still Do Not “Get It”

Connectivity is Overrunning Content Must Plan for Multi-Belligerent/Civil Coalition Operations

Pre-Hostilities Rules of Engagement Required

What Did We NOT Learn?

Electronic Civil Defense is Show-Stopper SEW

Assuming that Information Needs Will Be Met Data Acquisition is Ignored–Labor/Skill Intensive

Threat is UNCONVENTIONAL Center of Gravity for R&D is in the Civil Sector Civilian Agencies–Domestic and Foreign–Critical Players Still Ignored Power (and Initiative) Now in Hands of the “Mongrels”

Mind Stretch

1895 Lord Kelvin, British physicist: “heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible”

1923 Nobel Laureate Robert Millikan “There is no likelihood that man can ever tap the power of the atom”

1932 University of Chicago astronomer Dr. F. R. Moulton “There is no hope for the fanciful idea of reaching the moon because of the insurmountable barriers to escaping earth's gravity”

1991 Martin Van Crevald, Israeli Professor “The shift from conventional war to low-intensity conflict will cause many of today's weapons systems, including specifically those that are most powerful and advanced, to be assigned to the scrap-heap. Very likely it also will put an end to large-scale military-technological research as we understand it today.”

Thinking Outside the Box

Information Systems

Invest in civil sector C3I security–95% of the comms go this way

Face the reality of civil-military connectivity shortfalls

Deal with encyclopedic intelligence shortfalls, especially mapping

Mobility Systems

Undersea Troops and Logistics Long-Range Aerial Resupply/Air Head Utility

Very fast shallow-water/riverine craft

On the fly mine-clearing, bottom mapping critical

Focus on distributed ARGs (“pile on”) rather than centralized CBGs

Instream off-load required in 50% of the contingencies

What Happens If You Can't Get Out of Town?

Weapons Systems

Target is down to single human being

Non-lethal is not just against humans

COST is an issue!

Information as a weapon, FAO as a weapons system

Radical Reinterpretation of Mission Areas

Strike (down to individual target, anywhere, anytime)

Forcible entry (into what? banks, companies, gangs?)

Maritime Battlespace Superiority (low slow singleton, loiter)

ISR/Information Warfare (sensor to shooter, information peacekeeping)

Assessment (mind over matter–sensors in charge of shooters)

Deterrence: what are the pre-emptive investment priorities?

Bottom Line One bullet can influence one mind, perhaps more, BUT precision cannot be achieved without intelligence

War in the 21st Century will be “mano a mano”–we are not ready.

FULL TEXT WITH GRAPHICS: 1995 WAGING WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY