FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
Introduction Open Source Roots–Copeland Anecdote Informing the Consumer or Collecting Secrets? 90% of Consumer’s Input Unclassified & Unanalyzed (Congress, White House, Bureaucracy, Foreign Governments, Lobbyists, Think Tanks, Media, Friends–<10% Intelligence) 40-80% of Producer’s Input from Open Sources–Allen Dulles New Threats/Environments Lend Themselves to OSINT Coverage Jig-Saw Puzzle Analogy–OSINT and Other Means Opportunity for Savings in Every Government Department PATHFINDER at the Dawn of the 21st Century
It was a privilege to be asked by the National Research Council to comment on the U.S. Army’s multi-billion dollar future communications architecture. I noticed immediately that the entire program assumed self-generated bits and bytes and made no provision, ZERO PROVISION, for acquiring and making sense of external information from anyone outside the DoD “grid.”
As a Marine familiar with how our arriving Marines could not communicate with the US Embassy they were coming to save, and as a CEO newly familiar with the plethora of open sources relevant to the real world of operations other than war (OOTW) and what is now called Irregular Warfare (IRWF), I considered my contribution valuable.
They did not. As with all other early warnings from myself and many others in the 1980’s and 1990’s, “the Borg” just kept on marching along, oblivous to the real world and the known future requirements.
In 1993 the Prime Minister of France was furious with his intelligence community. His direct aide for intelligence was Col Louis Dilais, a former chief of the Americas branch in French military intelligence. He put Open Source Intelligence on the agenda for a special conference in the French Senate, with the other major speakers being Admiral Lacoste and General Heinrich.
Below is an English version of the presentation but as adapted for OSS 1993.
Electromagnetic pollution–in the form of both increased levels of uncontrolled and misunderstood levels of emission, and in the form of broader and more intense bandwidth exploitation–constitutes the technical terror of the 21st century.
There is another terror facing us in that era as well, and it is the terror of human isolation, of human irrelevance, of human disorientation, of human surrender to the madness of rationality run amok.
In essence, we face the prospects of technical and biological burn-out in the cultural equivalent of the Ice Age. Has man lost the ability to create civilization? It is in this context that we must consider the role of INTERVAL and the high priests of INTERVAL….hence the title of my rant, “God, Man, and Information: Comments to INTERVAL In-House”.
As presented to the National Federation of Abstracting and Indexing Services in Washington, D.C.
The Intelligence Community Was Built To Do Soviet Secrets
The reality is that the intelligence community, in its designs and methods, its collection and production management decisions, and its resource allocations, has been so totally structured for a single mission, the collection of intelligence about a closed society, the only closed society that represented a strategic nuclear threat of consequence, that its capabilities do not lend themselves to re-orientation to other targets, much less to rapid and constant re-orientation among differing targets sets over time.
It is as if we had built a Cadillac and a single superhighway connecting two points–Moscow and Washington—and all of a sudden find that we need three jeeps, ten motorcycles, and a hundred bicycles in order to handle our information requirements. The Cadillac does not lend itself to off-road movement, nor does it lend itself to multiple “minor” missions.
Let me pursue this from another angle, that of cybernetics. Effective decision-making and action comes from having good feed-back loops—not only lots of feed-back loops, out to various sensors or informants or sources of information in different areas of interest, but also efficient feed-back loops, in which the time between change of circumstance, report of change, and notice of change is kept to a minimum.
By imposing its rules of secrecy, the intelligence community is pre-ordaining a longer feed-back loop, a slower response time, and—in this era more often than not—the possibility that it does not even have access to the right source which is only available outside the classified arena.