Strategy-Holistic Coherence – Page 46 – Public Intelligence Blog

Hard to believe, but the U.S. Intelligence Community still does not do holistic analysis, in part because most of what the U.S. Government actually needs in the way of decision-support is not secret and has nothing to do with really expensive improbable threats.

ANY factor can be put in the center–the point is that ALL factors must be analyzed at ALL times.

As with all graphics this remains the intellectual property of Robert Steele.

2006/08/132010/12/25

Graphic: OSINT Marketplace

Advanced Cyber/IO, Balance, Capabilities-Force Structure, Leadership-Integrity, Multinational Plus, Strategy-Holistic Coherence

The OSINT Marketplace will not fully develop until we constrain the corruption within the military-intelligence-industrial complex that substitutes “butts in seats” with clearances and precioius little else to offer, for tangible substance that can be easily shared across all boundaries. Butts in seats are a waste of time-energy. We must also stop paying more than once for anything, which requires a coherent requirements system, harmonzied contracting–we cannot even get one agency to have one OSINT contracting officer uber alles–and an OSINT “cloud” repositiory.

2004/08/132010/12/25

Graphic: Threat Level Changes Depending on the Level of Analysis

Advanced Cyber/IO, Analysis, Strategy-Holistic Coherence, Threats

Hard to believe, but we are not making this up. The U.S. Intelligence Community still does not routinely depict threats in relation to the level of analysis, only in absolute terms and generally in worst-case technical threat terms assuming idealized scenarios favoring the enemy. And when that is not good enough, field grade officers are assigned to manipulate the data bases and fabricate threat capabilities.

2004/08/132010/12/25

Graphic: Global Intelligence Processing Failure

Advanced Cyber/IO, Analysis, Balance, Capabilities-Force Structure, Processing, Strategy-Holistic Coherence

This slide, less the bulls-eye that still does not exist, was created by the Collection Requirements & Evaluation Staff (CRES) of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in the mid to late 1990's. It is still more or less on target, which should give the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) something to think about–MASINT is a bust, HUMINT is inept, and OSINT is underfunded. Time for leadership.

2004/08/132010/12/25