Gem of continuing value–“must read” for busy managers,
April 8, 2000
Herbert E. Meyer
Herb, one of the distinguished speakers at OSS '92, has been Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and is in my mind one of the top five pioneers of business intelligence in the United States. He started in late 1970's, and his little paperback book is both a gospel and a guide of continuing value. This book was distributed at OSS '92, and continues to be worthy of reading by senior executives who don't do a lot of reading.
The book is nothing short of sensational, for two reasons: itis the first and still the only really comprehensive look at globalsignals intelligence operations as dominated by the National Security Agency; and second, because all of his research was done using only open sources, including unclassified employee newsletters at Alice Springs, and he did a great job of making the most out of legally and ethically available information. James is still around, working on another book about SIGINT, and I believe that only he will be able to top this one.
This is still the only really great book on overhead reconnaissance, and I have been surprised and disappointed to see it overlooked by the mainstream intelligence academics. Contains useful early history on why we got into technical collection (our human spies kept getting killed on arrival as we took the easy route of recruiting from émigré organizations already penetrated by the KGB and GRU). Ends with a passing reference to commercial imagery, a topic that merits its own book.
Dewey was a Division Chief when I was a junior case officer, and I continue to admire him. His pocket handkerchiefs were amazing-you could parachute from a plane with one in an emergency. Dewey's bottom line is clear: he concludes that “the Clandestine Services (sic) is finished as a really effective intelligence service.” He has other worthwhile insights, ranging from the inadequacy of the information reaching CIA analysts from open sources (e.g. Nepal), to the “wog factor” dominating CIA analytical assessments (e.g. Pakistan will never attack India), to the sterile and politically-safe approaches to intelligence by the leadership of NSA and the some of the military intelligence services. My bottom line on Dewey is also clear: he was typical of the case officer talent pool, he tried very hard, and the system still failed. He was a good person in a very bad system.
I almost broke two fountain pens on this book, and that is close to my highest compliment. Depending on one's mood, it will move any person with a deep knowledge of intelligence to tears or laughter. This is a really superior detailed look at the men that set the tone for clandestine operations in the 20th century: “Patriotic, decent, well-meaning, and brave, they were also uniquely unsuited to the grubby, necessarily devious world of intelligence.” From card file mentalities to Chiefs of Station not speaking the language, to off-the-cuff decision making and a refusal to include CIA analysts in strategic deliberations, this is an accurate and important study that has not gotten the attention it merits from the media or the oversight staffs.
Nigel has given us a lovely history, and also drawn out a number of themes that have meaning for the future. For instance, the superiority of amateurs from the ham radio ranks over the so-called professional military communications personnel, in the tricky business of breaking patterns and codes; the many “human in the loop” breaks of otherwise unbreakable technical codes, from the Italians with hemorrhoids (not in the code book, spelling it each day broke the code) to the careless Russians. He also touches on security cases in both the U.S. and England. In his conclusion, one sentence jumped out at me: “The old spirit of RSS, with its emphasis on voluntary effort, has been replaced by a bureaucracy of civil servants who preferred to stifle, rather than encourage, initiative.” As the current Director of NSA has discovered, NSA today is in mental grid lock, and its culture is oppressive in the extreme.
The only real “catalog” of American traitors during Cold War,
April 8, 2000
Norman Polmar
Roughly 100 American traitors, most of them within the U.S. defense establishment, are itemized in this book, the only such over-all review I have encountered. As I have said on several occasions that I believe we have at least 500-750 additional cases of espionage to discover, at least half of them controlled by our “allies”, this book is for me a helpful reminder of the true pervasiveness of betrayal in a Nation where opportunism and financial gain often outweigh loyalty and principle.