Benchmark book on a relatively young discipline of CI/BI,
April 8, 2000
John E. Prescott
This is the most professional collection of articles on competitive intelligence I know of, with a good mix of both technical intelligence and foreign intelligence information. The Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP)has grown from 2,000 members in 1992 to 6,000 in 1999, and it's journal as well as its conferences, set the industry standard. A relatively low standard, but the standard never-the-less.
I have mixed feeling about these guys, and their book, but the bottom line is that it makes a contribution and must be read. They address, in a manner understandable by the complete layman, the intersection of competitive intelligence, corporate security, and WarRoom operations. They have a number of very useful and thoughtful figures. The book is unquestionably at the head of the class with respect to WarRoom operations and exploiting information technology and basic planning and execution and visualization concepts. Where I have a real problem with this book is in its advocacy of elicitation and other deceptive techniques, no doubt a hang-over from Steven's days as a CIA case officer. There is absolutely no place in U.S. competitive intelligence for such methods, and any discussion in that direction must be forcefully opposed if we are to succeed in creating a legal, ethical, overt network of intelligence professionals able to reinforce each other in providing open source intelligence to businesses as well as non-governmental organizations.
Well before I got into the open source business Ruth was managing global business intelligence activities, and she wrote the book I would have written if I had had to choose one starting point. This is an essential reference for every manager, both in government and in business as well as in the non-profit arena, and I continue to regard Ruth as the dean of the practical business intelligence educators. Together with Jan Herring, Dick Klavans, Herb Meyer, and Leonard Fuld, she completes the de facto U.S. board of directors for real-world business intelligence.
The book is nothing short of sensational, for two reasons: itis the first and still the only really comprehensive look at globalsignals intelligence operations as dominated by the National Security Agency; and second, because all of his research was done using only open sources, including unclassified employee newsletters at Alice Springs, and he did a great job of making the most out of legally and ethically available information. James is still around, working on another book about SIGINT, and I believe that only he will be able to top this one.
Dewey was a Division Chief when I was a junior case officer, and I continue to admire him. His pocket handkerchiefs were amazing-you could parachute from a plane with one in an emergency. Dewey's bottom line is clear: he concludes that “the Clandestine Services (sic) is finished as a really effective intelligence service.” He has other worthwhile insights, ranging from the inadequacy of the information reaching CIA analysts from open sources (e.g. Nepal), to the “wog factor” dominating CIA analytical assessments (e.g. Pakistan will never attack India), to the sterile and politically-safe approaches to intelligence by the leadership of NSA and the some of the military intelligence services. My bottom line on Dewey is also clear: he was typical of the case officer talent pool, he tried very hard, and the system still failed. He was a good person in a very bad system.
I almost broke two fountain pens on this book, and that is close to my highest compliment. Depending on one's mood, it will move any person with a deep knowledge of intelligence to tears or laughter. This is a really superior detailed look at the men that set the tone for clandestine operations in the 20th century: “Patriotic, decent, well-meaning, and brave, they were also uniquely unsuited to the grubby, necessarily devious world of intelligence.” From card file mentalities to Chiefs of Station not speaking the language, to off-the-cuff decision making and a refusal to include CIA analysts in strategic deliberations, this is an accurate and important study that has not gotten the attention it merits from the media or the oversight staffs.
