Military Archives on Public Intelligence (1992-2006)

Military
Archives 1992-2006
Archives 1992-2006

2005

US

MilitarySteeleUS Army Conference: E3i: Making the Revolution

2005

US

MilitaryUSAArmy Modernization Briefing

2004

US

MilitarySimmonsForeword to the Draft SOF OSINT Handbook

2004

NL

MilitaryWiebesSIGINT in Bosnia

2003

US

MilitaryHardeeOSINT in Support of Special Operations

2003

US

MilitaryHarrisonOSINT Requirements, Collection, & Production Management

2003

US

MilitarySteeleSOUTHCOM: Strategic Threat Assessment

2003

US

MilitarySteeleAFCEA Texas: C4I Revolution and National Security

2003?

US

MilitarySteeleTo SecDef: Force Structure Trade-Offs and the Real World

2002

US

MilitaryHardeeGrowing an Open Source Intelligence Program

2001

US

MilitarySteeleAUSA: Intelligence Support to a Transforming Army

2001

US

MilitarySteeleAWC: Welcome to the Real World: Force Structure Trade-Offs

2000

CA

MilitaryCoxOSINT at SHAPE…Some Musings

2000

FR

MilitaryDebatThe Challenge of Informing European Defence Decisions

2000

US

MilitaryHughesOpen Sources and Intelligent Solutions

2000

Austria

MilitaryMuellerAustrian Military Intelligence Thoughts on OSINT

2000

UK

MilitaryReganThe UK Ministry of Defence OSINT Program

2000

US

MilitaryReynoldsU.S. Transportation Command OSINT

2000

US

MilitarySteeleBriefing to NATO/PfP: One World Ready or Not

1999

US

MilitaryClarkEAGLE VISION: USAF Initiative for Tactical Receipt of Imagery

1999

US

MilitaryConnorsPACOM Additional Slides on VIC

1999

US

MilitaryConnorsU.S. Pacific Command’s Virtual Information Center (VIC)

1999

US

MilitaryDearthIntelligence in the 21st Century

1999

US

MilitaryLeeSummary of Military Map Availabililty for Iran

1999

US

MilitaryMyers & MadisonVirtual Information Center Concept Refinement

1999

US

MilitaryPrinslow & BondInformation Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies

1999

US

MilitarySteeleOverview of OSINT Issues & OSINT Utility to DoD

1999

US

MilitarySteeleSetting the Stage for Information Sharing in the 21st Century: 3 Issues

1999

US

MilitarySteeleWhat Do We Need to Know and Where Do We Get It? (Slides)

1999

US

MilitarySteeleExpeditionary Environment in the 21st Century

1999

US

MilitaryWirtzBridging the Culture Gap: OSINT and the Tet Offensive

1998

US

MilitaryBeavers & ShanahanOperationalizing IO in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Book Chapter)

1998

SE

MilitaryBjoreOpen Sources and Methods for the Military

1998

SE

MilitaryBjoreOSINT Lessons Learned

1998

UK

MilitaryRathmellAssessing the IW Threat from Sub-State Groups

1998

US

MilitarySteeleINFORMATION PEACEKEEPING: Purest Form of War (Outline)

1998

US

MilitarySteeleSkeptical Assessment of USN-USMC Based on Real-World OSINT

1998

US

MilitarySteeleTAKEDOWN: The Asymmetric Threat to the Nation

1998

UK

MilitaryTyrrellOSINT: The Challenge for NATO

1997

US

MilitaryAlgerIATAC: Building a Knowledge Base of Emerging IAT

1997

US

MilitaryClarkEAGLE VISION: Tactical Downlink Station for Imagery

1997

US

MilitaryClintonManaging Complex Contingency Operations

1997

US

MilitaryMolholmDTIC: Building a Virtual Knowledge Warehouse

1997

US

MilitaryNecobaThe Marines and OSINT

1997

US

MilitaryPedtkeNational Air Intelligence Center Science & Technology OSINT

1997

US

MilitarySteeleCINC Brief: The One that Got CINCSOC (Now CSA) to Buy In

1997

US

MilitarySteeleCreating a Bare Bones OSINT  Capability (Slides)

1997

US

MilitarySteeleCreating a Bare Bones OSINT Unit for DIA

1997

US

MilitarySteeleCINCSOC 10 Minute Brief on OSINT

1997

US

MilitaryVeselyStriking A Balance: National, Operational, & Tactical Acquisition

1996

US

MilitarySmithDefense Mapping Agency and the Commercial Sector

1996

US

MilitarySteeleOpen Source Intelligence Handbook, Chapter 5, OSINT and Military

1996

US

MilitarySteeleDIA/JMITC: National Knowledge Strategy & Revolution in Intelligence

1996

US

MilitarySteinMapping, Charting, and Geodetic Needs for Remote Sensing Data

1995

SE

MilitaryBjoreSix Years of Open Source Information (OSI): Lessons Learned

1995

US

MilitaryDandarArmy Intelligence XXI, Open Source Status Report

1995

US

MilitaryDandarOSIF Exploitation for Army Intelligence XXI: Summary

1995

UK

MilitaryGarfieldUpdate on the UK MoD OSINT Programme (Slides)

1995

UK

MilitaryGarfieldUpdate on the UK MoD OSINT Programme (Text)

1995

US

MilitaryRicardeliOSINT in Support of Haiti Invasion (Slides)

1995

US

MilitaryRicardeliOSINT in Support of Haiti Invasion (Text)

1995

US

MilitarySteeleThe Military Perspective on Information Warfare: Apocalypse Now

1995

US

MilitarySteeleAWC: Open Source Intelligence for the Military

1994

US

MilitaryBrooks & McKeeyerSplit-Based Ops in DESERT STORM: Glimpse of the Future Digital Army

1994

US

MilitaryMunroINFORMATION WARFARE: Snake Eaters Meet Net-Heads

1994

US

MilitaryPedtkeNAIC & The Intelligence Community Open Source Architecture

1994

US

MilitarySteeleDIA/JMITC: NS via the Reinvention of National & Defense Intelligence

1992

US

MilitaryCliftMilitary OSINT Requirements, Capabilities, and Contracting Directions

1992

US

MilitaryPedtke et alNAIC S&T Open Source Intelligence Requirements & Capabilities

1992

US

MilitaryPetersenNew Roles for the U.S. Military

1992

US

MilitarySchwartauIntroduction to Information Warfare

1992

US

MilitarySteeleIntelligence Lessons Learned from Recent Expeditionary Operations

1992

US

MilitarySteeleComments Prepared for Future War Roundtable

1992

US

MilitaryStrassmannForcing Innovation, Cutting Costs, and Increasing Defense Productivity

1991

US

MilitarySteeleDefense Intelligence Productivity in the 1990’s

1990

US

MilitaryUSMC & SteeleExpeditionary Environment Research & Analysis Model

1990

US

MilitaryUSMC & SteeleExpeditionary Mission Area Factors Summaries

Review: The Tet Offensive–Intelligence Failure in War

5 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

Amazon Page
Amazon Page

5.0 out of 5 stars Very detailed review of intelligence failure in Viet-Nam,

April 8, 2000
James J. Wirtz
Jim, a very respected member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School, has provided us with a very well documented study of how the U.S. missed the Tet Offensive in Viet-Name. Among his findings: we knew fully two months in advance at the tactical collection level, with several additional collection successes and some modest analysis successes in the weeks preceding the offensive. We were distracted by Khe Sanh, the commanders did not want to hear it, “intelligence to please” was the standard within the Military Assistance Command Viet-Nam intelligence bureaucracy, and when we finally did grasp, one day before the attack, its true strategic nature, we failed to disseminate the warnings to the tactical commanders with sufficient effectiveness.
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