Graphic: OSINT Marketplace

Advanced Cyber/IO, Balance, Capabilities-Force Structure, Leadership-Integrity, Multinational Plus, Strategy-Holistic Coherence
OSINT Marketplace
OSINT Marketplace

The OSINT Marketplace will not fully develop until we constrain the corruption within the military-intelligence-industrial complex that substitutes “butts in seats” with clearances and precioius little else to offer, for tangible substance that can be easily shared across all boundaries.  Butts in seats are a waste of time-energy.  We must also stop paying more than once for anything, which requires a coherent requirements system, harmonzied contracting–we cannot even get one agency to have one OSINT contracting officer uber alles–and an OSINT “cloud” repositiory.

Graphic: OSINT Multinational Information Operations

Advanced Cyber/IO, Multinational Plus
OSINT MIOC IO2
OSINT MIOC IO2

This slide, originally created for THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE was morphed to address needs in a briefing to the Coalition Coordination Center (CCC) in Tampa within the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM).  This remains the core time-energy slide for harnessing the distributed intelligence of the Whole Earth leveraging multinational multifunctional information-sharing and sense-making agreements.

Graphic: Six Circles–Earth Intelligence Network Operational Concept

Advanced Cyber/IO, ICT-IT
Six Circles for M4IS2

Fairly straight-forward.  All it requires is integrity, intelligence, and imagination.

See also:

Definitions: M4IS2 (Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing & Sense-Making

Reference: World Brain Institute & Global Game

Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]

Search: Multinational Engagement (Intelligence)

Search: InfoOps (Information Operations (IO))

Search: OSINT (Open Source Intelligence)

1988-2009 OSINT-M4IS2 TECHINT Chronology

Graphic: Expeditionary Environment Analytic Model

Advanced Cyber/IO, Analysis
Analytic Framework
Analytic Framework

This is the highest level depiction of the Expeditionary Environment analytic model created by the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC) on the basis of Robert Steele's first graduate thesis on the remediation of revolution across multiple dimensions.  With deep help from the Warfighting Center, this model ultimately defined 144 mission area factors, and in warfighter terms, three to five degrees of difficulty for each of those factors.  To the best of our knowledge, no such model exists within the U.S. Intelligence Community, nor is this model still in use at MCIA.

Graphic: Linear versus Diamond Paradigm

Advanced Cyber/IO, Analysis, Balance, Collection, Innovation, Leadership-Integrity, Multinational Plus
Linear versus Diamond Paradigm
Linear versus Diamond Paradigm

First presented in Canada in 1994, this was the first depiction of how out-of-date the existing government intelligence communities are.  They are hierarchical Weberian stove-pipes out of touch with reality and anyone who is actually steeped in reality.

The old intelligence paradigm is on the left–a very controlled hierarchical stovepipe process that is best characterized as twelve-month planning cycles followed by three-month writing cycles and eighteen-month editing cycles.  Most of what we produce is too late, not right, and not useful.

The new intelligence paradigm makes the acme of skill “knowing who knows” (with a tip of the hat to Stevan Dedijer) and the ability to put a consumer with a question in touch with a source (or multiple sources) who can create new tailored knowledge in the instant.

Graphic: Threat Level Changes Depending on the Level of Analysis

Advanced Cyber/IO, Analysis, Strategy-Holistic Coherence, Threats
Threat Level Changes
Threat Level Changes

Hard to believe, but we are not making this up.  The U.S. Intelligence Community still does not routinely depict threats in relation to the level of analysis, only in absolute terms and generally in worst-case technical threat terms assuming idealized scenarios favoring the enemy.  And when that is not good enough, field grade officers are assigned to manipulate the data bases and fabricate threat capabilities.

Graphic: Global Intelligence Processing Failure

Advanced Cyber/IO, Analysis, Balance, Capabilities-Force Structure, Processing, Strategy-Holistic Coherence
Processing Failure
Processing Failure

This slide, less the bulls-eye that still does not exist, was created by the Collection Requirements & Evaluation Staff (CRES) of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in the mid to late 1990's.  It is still more or less on target, which should give the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) something to think about–MASINT is a bust, HUMINT is inept, and OSINT is underfunded.  Time for leadership.