The truth at any cost lowers all other costs — curated by former US spy Robert David Steele.
PDF USMC Winning Submission to JNIDS*
*3 years after the fact, too late to fix, USMC was told that it had won, but the Admiral in charge of JNIDS said “We are a Navy shop, we will do a Navy problem.” This is emblematic of the pervasive corruption across DoD at every level across every mission area.
Analyst 2000 was a special working group that included Dr. Mike Leavitt and Andy Shepard, who wrote 1992 Shepard (US) Intelligence Analysis in the Year 2002 and is today (2010 ADDNI/[ ]. We don't have this today because from the White House to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to today's Director of National Intelligence (DNI) there has been zero strategic r5equirements manager or budget management.
The Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC), today a Command, broke new ground, but failed to achieve traction despite strong support from the mid-career professionals. For example, the Marine COrps submission won the Joint National Intelligence Development Staff (JNIDS) competition one year with its proposal for a generic all-source analytic workstation, but they were over-ruled by a Navy Admiral who ordered them to do an anti-submarine problem instead. It is that lack of integrity that has incapacitated the intelligence and defense communities–both the Admiral who abused his position, and the JNIDS staff who allowed him to do so, lacked the kind of integrity that the Constitution calls for among its civilian and uniformed servants to the public interest.
In DIA OSINT is treated as an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), distributing money to the standard suspects without any form of strategic guidance, operational harmonization, or tactical effect. DIA does not “do” OSINT because neither the DIA leadership nor the so-called leadership of the intelligence directorate at DIA, where the Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office (DIOSPO) is left in deserved obscurity (five “managers” in three years is worse than a joke, it is reprehensible) have the foggiest notion of OSINT as an integrated discipline in its own right. The newly-selected incumbent is under protest (to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) since DoD and DIA have demonstrated they lack integrity in hiring on process or merit to this specific position), and Congressional investigations at the Appropriations Committee level are being inspired. In USDI OSINT is treated as a data-mining technical function, and document exploitation (which requires distributed human translation in 183 languages) is explicitly excluded at the same time that DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is handicapped by individuals who have no idea what the fifteen slices of HUMINT–much less what comprises effective clandestine, covert, defensive, and offensive counterintelligence–and have absolutely no inclination to manage them as a coherent whole. Defense intelligence has followed “central” intelligence over the cliff.
PDF (156 Pages):
1986 MPA Steele on Artificial Intelligence & Complex Public Organizations
It cost CIA $3000 to teach us the word “heuristics” also known as “rules of thumb. Attempts to leverage expert & decision support systems heuristics, encoding specificity, and cognitive mapping decision making in foreign policy ultimately failed for two reasons:
1. No over-arching authority able to force the Directorate of Operations (DO) to enter the 21st Century; and
2. Bureaucratic mind-sets all too comfortable with cut and paste slave labor instead of gold collar workers.
As best we can tell, national security productivity is no better today than it was in the 1988-1992 timeframe.
