4 Star – Page 49 – Public Intelligence Blog

Delightful Overview of the Collection and How It Came To Be,

February 12, 2005

Rod Barker

I bought this book in paperback at the same time that I bought four horses from a store and then–using the book as a guide–ordered two more from the web site.

It tells a great story and is a pleasure to have.

My only complaint is that the book focuses on telling a story with larger photos of a very small number of the horses, and then gives each of the **many** other horses in the collection nothing more than a thumbnail, literally (twelve 1.5 inch bu 1.5 inch tiny tiny tiny photos).

I would strongly encourage the sponsors to do a new edition that gives a quarter page to each horse, and also specifies the material that the horse is made of–I find the ceramic glaze horses generally disappointing.

2005/01/302009/12/04

Review: Why Secret Intelligence Fails

4 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

Superb for the general audience, not for professionals,

January 30, 2005

Michael A Turner

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links.

On balance I like this book for the general audience–the author has a reasonable amount of experience, he has a very fine structure for discussing the subject, and it is a good alternative to my current favorite, Lowenthal's Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy(3rd Edition) This is, and I wish to be crystal clear here, a very fine option for undergraduate students. I strongly recommend this book for purchase by those with a limited knowledge of the world of intelligence, and for use as an undergraduate text.

It fails to satisfy at the professional level for two reasons: a lack of adequate attention to professional-level publications, and a lack of discussion of nuances vital to future success.

Despite its being published in 2005 and presumably rounded out in 2004, the author has failed to consult–this is quite an extraordinary lapse–*any* of the intelligence reform books of note, from Allen “None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam to Berkowitz' Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age to Johnson Bombs, Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs: Intelligence and America's Quest for Security to Odom “Fixing Intelligence” to Treverton Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (RAND Studies in Policy Analysis) to Zeegart Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC…and many others. As I carefully reviewed each chapter, I could only lament the fact that each chapter would have been twice as excellent had the author taken the trouble to integrate key observations from the recent literature.

I was also struck by the author's excessive reliance on just two journals, “Studies in Intelligence” (the CIA in-house publication) and “International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,” for most of his references that were not largely dated books. Seymour Hersh of “The New Yorker,” Jim Fallows of “The Atlantic Monthly,” even Vernon Loeb, the only really focused Washington Post journalist covering intelligence, these are not cited.

Consequently, the professional with over ten years experience, and the academic scholar with over ten years alternative reading, need not spend time with this book. It is lacking in nuance–for example, the brief section on imagery intelligence does not discuss the findings of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Report of December 1999, and the section on open source intelligence–while dramatically superior to most publications–is seriously in error when it labels open sources “expensive” without reference to the $50 billion a year we are spending now on secret sources that fail to satisfy. The author, speaking from a limited perspective as an analyst who has never managed a major budget, does not seem to realize that open sources cost less than 1% of the total national intelligence budget while producing 40% or more of all useful information.

A future edition of the book would benefit from a chapter on different types of threats and what that implies in terms of collection and analysis challenges, and from a focus on sub-state threats, not just other governments. This is, I say again, a superb choice for undergraduate students and the public.

See my own books, especially THE SMART NATION ACT: Public Intelligence in the Public Interest, for where we need to be going while reducing the secret budget from $60 billion a year to $12 billion a year.

2005/01/302009/12/04

Review: Denial and Deception–An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11

4 Star, Intelligence (Government/Secret)

Excellent Useful Single-Person Account Focused on CIA,

January 30, 2005

Melissa Boyle Mahle

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links.

This is a very personal story by a female case officer who served overseas, did some very hard time over the course of at least fifteen years with the Directorate of Operations, and has produced a very rare book, one that provides some useful documentation of the ups and downs of clandestine operations under five Directors of Central Intelligence (this would be even more impressive if the five had not all been appointed in the space of six years).

This is, without question, one of the best books available on the intimate subject of the clandestine culture, and it offers some lovely gems and personality assessments that intelligence professionals will appreciate more than the general public. I have taken one star off for lack of detail and context, but strongly recommend the book to anyone who has served in the clandestine service and wishes to be reminded of the dark years, and to anyone who has not served in the clandestine service, and wishes to have a small glimmering of the down side of it all.

Although the book does a good job of weaving a somewhat superficial (that is to say, the highlights, not the irrelevant) history of counter-terrorism with a history of bureaucratic mis-steps by a series of DCIs, and the book does a superb job of shredding both CIA lawyers and CIA security officers and CIA's complete lack of counterintelligence, this is primarily a book about the failure of the Directorate of Operations as a tribe, not about the failure of the US Government in the global war on terrorism.

In retrospect, 1983-1985 are the years when the USG and the IC should have gone to “General Quarters,” and 1992 was the year when Congress should have risen to its role and passed the Boren-McCurdy National Security Act of 1992. No one comes out of this book looking better than Senator Dave Boren (today the President of the University of Oklahoma) and Congressman Dave McCurdy, both from Oklahoma, both in charge of the respective committees on intelligence, and both bright men with good hearts who were unable to prevail against their less enlightened colleagues.

The author does an excellent job of capturing some of the really low moments in CIA's clandestine history (such as in the 1990's when case officers were advised to take out legal liability insurance, both to protect themselves from CIA witch-hunts and to protect themselves from witch hunts mounted by others against which CIA would not be helpful to them).

The author, who got into trouble over some Palestinian relations that led to her being fired, has *not* written a bitter or a revenge book. This is an excellent and useful book, and for those who wish to study the CIA's clandestine service and its ups and downs in the 1980-2005 timeframe, this is destined to be a core reference. It captures nuances and insights that are not available to outsiders in any other source.

I do, however, want to highlight the author's brief discussion of CIA Security and the shortcomings of CIA security, the excessive reliance by CIA Security on the polygraph (which both Ames and the Cuban agents that blew two of my classmates passed), and the “room from hell” that is created by CIA Security and CIA management for those who are “suspect,” more often than not without cause. I was stunned to learn that in the post-Ames environment 400 case officers (400–that is, by some accounts, at least 10% and perhaps as much as 30% of the entire case officer corps!) failed the polygraph as roughly administered by CIA Security, and were referred to the FBI for full field investigations. I cannot articulate the depth of my disdain for any CIA manager that would allow that to happen.

There is a great deal wrong at CIA, and I give the author top marks on her discussion of CIA's over-all attitude of denial and deception across two decades; and her helpful discussion of the culture of deceit and self-service that has prevented the clandestine service from adjusting to reality and being more effective in protecting America. However, as the author is careful to point out, CIA's failure take place in the context of the failures of the FBI, of the White House, and of other governments.

This is not a book I recommend for applicants to the clandestine service, mostly because I do not want to see them dissuaded from applying. The clandestine service is the last great adventure left in the U.S. government, outside of special operations, and no matter how screwed up it might yet be, there is no greater honor and no greater life-affirming engagement, than to be a case officer in the service of your country. Miles Copeland, Without Cloak or Dagger : The truth about the new espionage– remains my single best suggested work for applicants to the clandestine service.

And also the bad:
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA
None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam
Who the Hell Are We Fighting?: The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars

One last comment: over the next ten years I want to reduce the secret intelligence budget by 80%, down to $12 billion, and redirect the savings into national education and global connectivity for the five billion poor. You can learn more by seeking out information on collective intelligence, peace intelligence, commercial intelligence, gift intelligence, cultural intelligence, and Earth Intelligence. My first book, On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World remains the standard work on why this needs to be done.

2005/01/292009/12/04

Review DVD: Bush’s Brain (2004)

4 Star, Executive (Partisan Failure, Reform), Politics, Reviews (DVD Only)

Explains McCain's Loss,

January 29, 2005

Lee Atwater

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add link to the others books on what Rove did to us.

This is quite a chilling movie, and it makes even more sense to me now that I have finished reading Lee Harris' “Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History.” Never mind John Kerry, a world-class loser with a wife to match–what this movie explains is how and why John McCain lost the South Carolina primary to Karl Rove's dirty tricks.

What really chilled me is not that Rove plays dirty against Democrats, but that he plays dirty against Republicans.

The movie begins with an early look at Karl Rove's start with Lee Atwater teaching young Republicans, including “dirty tricks” that the movie takes pains to point out are questionable but not illegal.

Included in the middle year's are stories with on the record interviews and replays of old media stories that make it quite clear that Rove is not above planting a “bug” in his own office (one with a six hour battery life, only 15 minutes of which have expired by the time it is “found”), nor of co-opting a single rogue FBI special agent to “coincidentally” have opponents under supeona just when it matters most.

Over the course of the movie, one learns that Rove is a master of playing the politcal “game” (only his version actually kills people) at three levels:

1) Disciplined overt politics–staying on message
2) Underlying messages that are legal but misdirecting
3) Underlying dirty tricks that are out and out unethical

This is where I was able to see the connection between Rove's playbook from Texas, and how John McCain was done in after a roaring victory in New Hampshire, when the South Carolina primary suddenly produced carefully orchestrated whisper campaigns about McCain's mental abilities, his black “love child” (actually an adopted orphan), and his family member's drug addition (an open issue being dealt with but made to sound terrible). In all this John Weaver, McCain's political director, shines as a voice of reason and honor when discussing the details.

Over-all the movie suggests that Rove has brought politics to a new low in ethics, and a new high in efficiency. Rove is a killing machine. He turned 9-11, and the war on Iraq, into political devices, and suggests that Rove, who has never served in uniform or in combat (nor have Cheney, Rice, or Wolfowitz), is essentially sacrificing American lives to keep his candidate in power.

The movie comes to closure with more than one commentator from Texas, where they all know Karl Rove *real well,* saying, “There's no rule he won't break.”

Well, as a moderate Republican, I find this troubling. What was done to John McCain in the South Carolina Republican presidential primary, and to Max Cleland of South Carolina in his Senate race, strike me as so reprehensible as to call into question the future of the Republican Party.

I recommend this movie to every American, but especially to Republicans, in whose name some things are being done that should shame us all.

2005/01/272009/12/04

Review: Inside the Asylum–Why the UN and Old Europe are Worse Than You Think

4 Star, United Nations & NGOs

Sensible Insights Against the United Nations,

January 27, 2005

Jed L. Babbin

Edit 20 Dec 07 to add links.

This is a short but very worthwhile book that while it might be flawed in some small ways, renders and invaluable service but putting all of the arguments against the United Nations into one easy to understand and well-organized book.

The author is dramatically and compellingly sensible when he addresses the insanity of letting a bunch of left of center poor nations, each led by fat-cat corrupt bureaucrats living high on the hog and stealing their own countries blind, “out vote” the bill-payer–the USA–and saddle the USA with all kinds of costly and often ludicrous program demands.

He is also compelling in condemning United Nations tolerance of terrorism and of corruption. While the US continues to support 44 dictators–something that is addressed by Ambassador Mark Palmer is his superb book on “The Real Axis of Evil” and therefore something we have to stop before we can credibly criticize the United Nations, the author makes a strong case for dumping the UN and moving toward a new form of organization that is comprised of only the democratic nations that are not corrupt and that can pay their bills.

The author arouses fury, at least in me, when he points out that Russia and China have manipulated the system and avoided their responsibilities by paying, in 2003, $18.6 million for Russia and $23.7 million for China, this at a time when the US is paying 22% of the entire United Nations system budget. ENOUGH!!

There are over 15 places throughout the book where I have “AGREE!” in the margins, and I give the author very high marks for itemizing everything that is wrong with the United Nations and that needs to be fixed in a new organization. At one point, I could even see the great value of throwing the UN out of the US, of the Rockefeller family repossessing the land they gave to the UN for its HQS. Enough. Let them move to Geneva while we create a completely new building and a completely new democratic-capitalist organization that can serve as the political and economic counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

This brings up another point–the author very wisely points out all that is wrong with the European countries that abuse their NATO membership to get a free ride on regional security, when they are unwilling to invest even minimalist amounts in their own armed forces and in forces that could be use to the coalition. The author makes important points against both Germany and France that need to be understood by all Americans.

I do not normally agree with all that neo-conservatives say, but in this case, I believe the author has rendered a stellar service, and his book is not only worthwhile, it is politically actionable. Good stuff.

2005/01/062009/12/04

Review: Enforcing the Peace–Learning from the Imperial Past

4 Star, Empire, Sorrows, Hubris, Blowback, History, Peace, Poverty, & Middle Class, Voices Lost (Indigenous, Gender, Poor, Marginalized)

Worthwhile but Stops Short,

January 6, 2005

Kimberly Zisk Marten

This book came highly recommended to me, but I now believe, after reading it, that is was recommended because it contributes to the tarring of America for being an imperial power in the present, while also documenting the almost certain failure of any imperial power in the present that chooses to a) act unilaterally and b) impose its values and form of governance on an uncooperative indigenous population.

On balance, I find the book worthy in so far as it draws parallels between the imperial occupations of the past and those of the present that focus on winning the war but pay no attention to winning the peace. Unfortunately, the book stops precisely where I was hoping it would start: it fails to address the two biggest aspects of winning the peace: a) inter-agency operations that mobilize *all* sources of national power and b) a deliberate concept, doctrine, manning, funding, and capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction, such as the Defense Science Board has recommended and the US Department of Defense is now implementing.

A few notes:

1) The author coins the term “complex peace operations” where the term is not needed–the author means to discuss peace enforcement missions;

2) The author is completely correct and helpful in pointing out that multilateral operations inspire legitimacy, while unilateral operations inspire counterinsurgency;

3) The author focuses on political will with respect to sustained occupation by military forces (we do not have it), but does not engage in what I regard as the more important discussion, which is the need for political will and wit to understand, as General Tony Zinni understands, that the fastest way to reduce violence and restore legitimacy is to introduce water, food, and medicine to the area;

4) The author very helpfully spends time discussing why the German and Japanese reconstruction models are irrelevant to today's failed states;

5) The author praises the military for being able to do humanitarian and other “operations other than war” when the military is well-led and carefully monitored, but misses the larger point that most military professionals and historians will gladly point out: one needs both forces–a big war force put into OOTW operations will lose its skill at big war within two years, while also being incompetent at small war/OOTW for the first two years it is thus engaged;

6) The author suggests, and I believe with good reason based on solid research, that the West is over-reaching when it seeks to impose Western values, Western forms of governance, and even singular governments on ethnic divisions that have stood the test of time–flexibility in accepting multiple forms of self-governance is essential;

7) Finally, and I have seen this myself in Viet-Nam and in El Salvador, and read of it in many other places, the author points out that any time the West intervenes and seeks to select leaders on the basis of its own criteria, it inevitably disregards local realities and ends up creating more friction than it resolves.

The author ends with the suggestion that we focus less on instilling liberal democracies, and more in simply assuring sufficient security such that commerce can be practiced and the arts can flourish.

This is an ably crafted and documented book, but it stops short. It urgently needs a companion volume that collects and integrates lessons from successful interventions. As the book went to press, Haiti was breaking apart for the second time, and I note with interest that the one force that might actually be effective there–the French-speaking French gendarme, is nowhere to be found.

Ten other books as good or better:
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People
The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone
Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror
Security Studies for the 21st Century
The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
Modern Strategy
Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming
The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism: How the Financial System Underminded Social Ideals, Damaged Trust in the Markets, Robbed Investors of Trillions – and What to Do About It
Running on Empty: How the Democratic and Republican Parties Are Bankrupting Our Future and What Americans Can Do About It

2004/12/122009/12/04

Review: The Qur’an Translation

4 Star, Culture, Research, Religion & Politics of Religion

Print too small, looking for easier version to study,

December 12, 2004

Sayed A. A. Razwy

As a purely administrative note, with all due regard for what is surely a very fine translation, the print in this book is too small to support careful study. I bought this book, am glad to have it, but the publisher made a mistake in seeking to put too much small font print on each page. For a subject of this importance, what is needed is an 8.5 x 11 text with annotations and a syntopicon.

Category: 4 Star

Review: The Trail of Painted Ponies, Collectors Edition